DOCSLIB.ORG

The Death of Mullah Omar and the Rise of Isis in Afghanistan

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Death of Mullah Omar and the Rise of Isis in Afghanistan Hannah Byrne, John Krzyzaniak, Qasim Khan BACKGROUNDER August 17, 2015 The DeaTH OF MULLah OMar and The RISE OF ISIS IN AFghanISTan The Afghan government announced the death of former Taliban leader Mullah Omar on July 29, 2015, and the Taliban confirmed the report the subsequent day. Widespread knowledge of Mullah Omar’s death will exacerbate existing fractures within the Taliban and accelerate a power grab among several prominent individuals who have fundamental disagreements over the objectives of the movement. This inflection could ultimately make permanent major divisions within the group. A unity shura, or council, is now arbitrating the leadership dispute. Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri has issued a video statement pledging allegiance to Akhtar Mohammad Mansour, who had been Mullah Omar's de facto deputy and is the preferred choice of Pakistan. Zawahiri likely pledged in order to reinforce this candidate and to preclude AQ groups from pledging to the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). ISIS will likely exploit these tensions to gain fighters and resources as it expands its presence and operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Some Taliban elements such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan have already pledged to ISIS. Both conditions will likely accelerate violence in Afghanistan, undermine prospects for a negotiated peace settlement, and create a competitive environment among jihadist groups in Afghanistan that will threaten its future security. U.S. policy makers must consider the likelihood of these deteriorating conditions and re-evaluate planned troop withdrawal timelines. Fourteen years after the invasion of Afghanistan, when Taliban reshape the insurgency in Afghanistan by exacerbating already leader Mullah Omar disappeared from the public eye, the Afghan existing fractures within the Taliban movement—a trend that government and the Taliban have both publically admitted that will neutralize prospects for peace talks, increase violence, and Mullah Omar is deceased. The Taliban, knowing that Mullah facilitate the growth of ISIS in Afghanistan and beyond. Omar was the central unifying node to the movement, kept his death a secret in an effort to maintain unity within the movement. WHO WAS MULLAH OmAR? The Afghan Presidential Palace had not made an effort to bring the truth to light because they welcomed a unified movement Mullah Omar was a mujahideen, or “holy warrior,” who fought that seemed to be moving toward reconciliation. However, the Soviets in Afghanistan during the 1980s. He created and led on July 29, 2015, something in their calculus changed. The the Taliban movement in 1994 and rose to national leadership Taliban, despite their best efforts, was increasingly divided over when the Taliban seized control of Kabul in September the objectives of the organization. Dissent was growing within 1996. To his fighters, Mullah Omar was a military, political its ranks, and many began to question the authenticity of their and religious hero—the man who had grown a small group of leadership. When the government felt the evidence of Mullah inspired students into a national emirate—the reason for their Omar’s death would soon be too insurmountable to deny, they enduring fight for justice. To other jihadist groups, he bore publically announced that he had died two years ago, in April the religious title of “Commander of the Faithful,” or Emir 2013, in a hospital in Pakistan. This was a major blow to both al-Mu’minin, which he had claimed in Kandahar on April 4, 1996. This title earned him the fealty of such jihadist groups as the Taliban movement and prospects for peace in Afghanistan. 1 As the Taliban scramble to select a legitimate successor to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM),2 and al-Qaeda leaders Osama bin their befallen leader, disaffected allies and individuals are 3 4 distancing themselves from the movement. The fracturing of Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. Mullah Omar was not seen in the Taliban will continue to accelerate, expediting violence public after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, but his and fighting throughout Afghanistan. The Islamic State of Iraq elevated religious status ensured the continued loyalty of Taliban and al-Sham (ISIS), which has already established a foothold fighters and other jihadist groups for more than a decade as the in Afghanistan, will seek to exploit the resulting divisions Taliban continued to claim itself as the legitimate government of Afghanistan in exile. Reports indicated that Mullah Omar and disenfranchised subgroups so that it can expand in the 5 region. Ultimately, confirmation of Mullah Omar’s death will was hospitalized in Pakistan in 2011, and recent reports confirming his death indicate that he died only two years later WWW.UnderSTANDIngWAR.org BACKGROUNDER | THE DEATH OF MULLAH OMAR AND THE RISE OF ISIS IN AFGHANISTAN | BYRNE, KRZYZANIAK, KHAN | AUGUST 17, 2015 in 2013. The Taliban has been fracturing ever since, primarily Omar’s death, having convened a meeting of senior Taliban over disagreements over the group’s ultimate objectives and commanders several days prior to the Afghan government’s the prospect of negotiating with the Afghan government. The announcement of Mullah Omar’s death in order to officially public confirmation in July 2015 of Mullah Omar’s death reveal that his father was dead, according to three senior will exacerbate existing fractures within the Taliban and likely Taliban members who attended the meeting.15 It is likely Yaqoob divide the movement, thereby accelerating rising violence intended to publically confirm his father’s death in an effort in Afghanistan and allowing ISIS to exploit disenfranchised to take control of the Taliban himself, unify the deteriorating subgroups so that it can expand its power and influence in the movement, and redirect it away from both Pakistani control region. and negotiations with the Afghan government. Controversy surrounding peace talks directly with the Afghan government, EFFECTS ON THE TALIBAN which were held in Murree, Pakistan on July 7, 2015, could have prompted Yaqoob to act at this time in order to capitalize upon The focal point of prior divisions within the Taliban’s leadership dissent within the movement over the talks. While Yaqoob’s council had been a power struggle between Mullah Omar’s two position on peace talks is unclear, several prominent military deputies, Mullah Mohammad Akhtar Mansour and Mullah commanders, including Zakir, reportedly still back him, Abdul Qayyum Zakir, which escalated in 2013. Akhtar Mansour 16 6 according to sources close to the Taliban. It is likely, therefore, was appointed as the Taliban’s “deputy leader” in 2010, and he that Yaqoob sees direct talks with the Afghan government as a has likely served as de facto leader of the Taliban since Mullah red line. Furthermore, although Yaqoob is only twenty-six years Omar’s reported hospitalization in 2011. Akhtar Mansour old and has limited leadership experience, his religious training signaled willingness to participate in peace talks with the and blood relation to Mullah Omar give him some legitimacy. Afghan government in 2012,7 alienating more hardline military commanders both on the ground and within the Taliban’s senior Sirajuddin Haqqani is another potential rival to Akhtar leadership. Akhtar Mansour’s major rival is Qayyum Zakir, a Mansour who may seek to lead the Taliban movement. The former Guantanamo Bay detainee who became the chief military Taliban’s leadership shura that initially appointed Akhtar commander of the Taliban after returning to Afghanistan in Mansour as the leader of the Taliban on July 30 also reportedly 2010. Zakir is committed to continuing the armed struggle appointed both Sirajuddin Haqqani and Maulavi Haibatullah against the Afghan government and is therefore opposed to Akhunzada, Haqqani Network (HQN) members, as deputies the peace talks. In December of 2013, a statement attributed to to Akhtar Mansour, according to Taliban commanders present Mullah Omar demoted Zakir from his position as the Taliban’s at the meeting.17 The next day, the shura granted Sirajuddin chief military commander, making Akhtar Mansour the sole the title “operational commander” of the Taliban, a position deputy.8 In April 2014, Zakir fully retired from the Taliban’s that would allow him to dictate operational issues for the entire leadership council according to sources within the Taliban, movement.18 Sirajuddin is a hardline leader. The Haqqani although Afghan officials speculated that Akhtar Mansour had Network, a group operating closely with Pakistan's Inter-Service actually forced Zakir to step down after Zakir challenged him to Intellligence (ISI), perpetuates spectacular attacks against the prove Mullah Omar was still alive.9 According to Afghanistan- Afghan government and civilians using its own resources and based researcher Casey Garrett Johnson, Zakir still commands command, but branding them under the Taliban imprimatur. “arguably the largest insurgent front inside Afghanistan” and The ISI and the shura may have given Sirajuddin this new capacity has continued to pursue independent operations.10 Zakir in an attempt to appease militant commanders who opposed therefore constitutes one source of friction within the Taliban at Akhtar Mansour’s soft stance on negotiations. Alternatively, they the expense of Akhtar Mansour’s de facto or de jour leadership might have aimed to forestall a different leadership challenge. of the Taliban.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy
    Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy July 18, 2019 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R45818 SUMMARY R45818 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy July 18, 2019 Afghanistan has been a significant U.S. foreign policy concern since 2001, when the United States, in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, led a military Clayton Thomas campaign against Al Qaeda and the Taliban government that harbored and supported it. Analyst in Middle Eastern In the intervening 18 years, the United States has suffered approximately 2,400 military Affairs fatalities in Afghanistan, with the cost of military operations reaching nearly $750 billion. Congress has appropriated approximately $133 billion for reconstruction. In that time, an elected Afghan government has replaced the Taliban, and most measures of human development have improved, although Afghanistan’s future prospects remain mixed in light of the country’s ongoing violent conflict and political contention. Topics covered in this report include: Security dynamics. U.S. and Afghan forces, along with international partners, combat a Taliban insurgency that is, by many measures, in a stronger military position now than at any point since 2001. Many observers assess that a full-scale U.S. withdrawal would lead to the collapse of the Afghan government and perhaps even the reestablishment of Taliban control over most of the country. Taliban insurgents operate alongside, and in periodic competition with, an array of other armed groups, including regional affiliates of Al Qaeda (a longtime Taliban ally) and the Islamic State (a Taliban foe and increasing focus of U.S. policy). U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Taliban Fragmentation FACT, FICTION, and FUTURE by Andrew Watkins
    PEACEWORKS Taliban Fragmentation FACT, FICTION, AND FUTURE By Andrew Watkins NO. 160 | MARCH 2020 Making Peace Possible NO. 160 | MARCH 2020 ABOUT THE REPORT This report examines the phenomenon of insurgent fragmentation within Afghanistan’s Tali- ban and implications for the Afghan peace process. This study, which the author undertook PEACE PROCESSES as an independent researcher supported by the Asia Center at the US Institute of Peace, is based on a survey of the academic literature on insurgency, civil war, and negotiated peace, as well as on interviews the author conducted in Afghanistan in 2019 and 2020. ABOUT THE AUTHOR Andrew Watkins has worked in more than ten provinces of Afghanistan, most recently as a political affairs officer with the United Nations. He has also worked as an indepen- dent researcher, a conflict analyst and adviser to the humanitarian community, and a liaison based with Afghan security forces. Cover photo: A soldier walks among a group of alleged Taliban fighters at a National Directorate of Security facility in Faizabad in September 2019. The status of prisoners will be a critical issue in future negotiations with the Taliban. (Photo by Jim Huylebroek/New York Times) The views expressed in this report are those of the author alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace. An online edition of this and related reports can be found on our website (www.usip.org), together with additional information on the subject. © 2020 by the United States Institute of Peace United States Institute of Peace 2301 Constitution Avenue NW Washington, DC 20037 Phone: 202.457.1700 Fax: 202.429.6063 E-mail: [email protected] Web: www.usip.org Peaceworks No.
    [Show full text]
  • United States, Taliban and Fundamentalism in Afghanistan
    American International Journal of Available online at http://www.iasir.net Research in Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences ISSN (Print): 2328-3734, ISSN (Online): 2328-3696, ISSN (CD-ROM): 2328-3688 AIJRHASS is a refereed, indexed, peer-reviewed, multidisciplinary and open access journal published by International Association of Scientific Innovation and Research (IASIR), USA (An Association Unifying the Sciences, Engineering, and Applied Research) United States, Taliban and Fundamentalism in Afghanistan: The Growing Instability in Afghanistan Naseer Ahmed Kalis Senior Research Fellow, Department of Strategic and Regional Studies, University of Jammu, J&K, India- 180006 Abstract: This paper aims to elucidate the causes of perpetual instability in Afghanistan since September 11, 2001. It argues that the foreign powers are responsible for “rolling back the stability” and making it a “zone of instability”. United States and Soviet Union, ‘the dancing evils of Cold war’, propel the Afghan descent towards extremism. United States produced so called Mujahedeen and freedom fighter and equipment them with weapons for their strategic interest (to roll back Soviet Union). After winning its Strategic Interest, United States estranged from these Freedom Fighters and remained a silent spectator. When these freedom fighters launched their full-fledged extremism and even not spared United States, United States act as a “wounded bear” and fought the longest war of its history without any conclusion and finally withdraw its NATO forces ‘by force not by choice’. This paper conclude that it is now the responsibility of neighbouring states like Pakistan, Russia, China and India to take comprehensive steps to stabilize Afghanistan and to made security alliances to make Afghanistan a zone of peace.
    [Show full text]
  • Making Sense of Daesh in Afghanistan: a Social Movement Perspective
    \ WORKING PAPER 6\ 2017 Making sense of Daesh in Afghanistan: A social movement perspective Katja Mielke \ BICC Nick Miszak \ TLO Joint publication by \ WORKING PAPER 6 \ 2017 MAKING SENSE OF DAESH IN AFGHANISTAN: A SOCIAL MOVEMENT PERSPECTIVE \ K. MIELKE & N. MISZAK SUMMARY So-called Islamic State (IS or Daesh) in Iraq and Syria is widely interpreted as a terrorist phenomenon. The proclamation in late January 2015 of a Wilayat Kho- rasan, which includes Afghanistan and Pakistan, as an IS branch is commonly interpreted as a manifestation of Daesh's global ambition to erect an Islamic caliphate. Its expansion implies hierarchical order, command structures and financial flows as well as a transnational mobility of fighters, arms and recruits between Syria and Iraq, on the one hand, and Afghanistan–Pakistan, on the other. In this Working Paper, we take a (new) social movement perspective to investigate the processes and underlying dynamics of Daesh’s emergence in different parts of the country. By employing social movement concepts, such as opportunity structures, coalition-building, resource mobilization and framing, we disentangle the different types of resource mobilization and long-term conflicts that have merged into the phenomenon of Daesh in Afghanistan. In dialogue with other approaches to terrorism studies as well as peace, civil war and security studies, our analysis focuses on relations and interactions among various actors in the Afghan-Pakistan region and their translocal networks. The insight builds on a ten-month fieldwork-based research project conducted in four regions—east, west, north-east and north Afghanistan—during 2016. We find that Daesh in Afghanistan is a context-specific phenomenon that manifests differently in the various regions across the country and is embedded in a long- term transformation of the religious, cultural and political landscape in the cross-border region of Afghanistan–Pakistan.
    [Show full text]
  • Old Habits, New Consequences Old Habits, New Khalid Homayun Consequences Nadiri Pakistan’S Posture Toward Afghanistan Since 2001
    Old Habits, New Consequences Old Habits, New Khalid Homayun Consequences Nadiri Pakistan’s Posture toward Afghanistan since 2001 Since the terrorist at- tacks of September 11, 2001, Pakistan has pursued a seemingly incongruous course of action in Afghanistan. It has participated in the U.S. and interna- tional intervention in Afghanistan both by allying itself with the military cam- paign against the Afghan Taliban and al-Qaida and by serving as the primary transit route for international military forces and matériel into Afghanistan.1 At the same time, the Pakistani security establishment has permitted much of the Afghan Taliban’s political leadership and many of its military command- ers to visit or reside in Pakistani urban centers. Why has Pakistan adopted this posture of Afghan Taliban accommodation despite its nominal participa- tion in the Afghanistan intervention and its public commitment to peace and stability in Afghanistan?2 This incongruence is all the more puzzling in light of the expansion of insurgent violence directed against Islamabad by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a coalition of militant organizations that are independent of the Afghan Taliban but that nonetheless possess social and po- litical links with Afghan cadres of the Taliban movement. With violence against Pakistan growing increasingly indiscriminate and costly, it remains un- clear why Islamabad has opted to accommodate the Afghan Taliban through- out the post-2001 period. Despite a considerable body of academic and journalistic literature on Pakistan’s relationship with Afghanistan since 2001, the subject of Pakistani accommodation of the Afghan Taliban remains largely unaddressed. Much of the existing literature identiªes Pakistan’s security competition with India as the exclusive or predominant driver of Pakistani policy vis-à-vis the Afghan Khalid Homayun Nadiri is a Ph.D.
    [Show full text]
  • Conflict and Peacebuilding Observatory Nº 35 – November 2015
    Conflict and Peacebuilding Observatory Nº 35 – November 2015 WORSENING AFGHANISTAN: As the conflict rages, the Taliban split and Islamic State acquires new prominence US military sources announced the dismantling of what was probably al-Qaeda’s largest training camp. Located in the district of Shorabak in Kandahar province, the camp covered 77.7 km2. Losses of territory to the Taliban in some districts have been offset by gains in others. In Helmand, an offensive lasting several months pitted Afghan forces against the Taliban for control of the districts of Marjah and Nad-e-Ali, where over 200 Taliban and 85 soldiers were killed, according to the provincial government. In Kunduz, Afghan forces recovered a base in the district of Dasht-e-Archi, but lost a district in the province of Badakhshan. Government forces confirmed that alongside the Taliban, over 1,300 foreign insurgents (Pakistanis, Tajiks, Uyghurs and others) participated in the battle of Kunduz. Furthermore, in Nangarhar, where there is a group loyal to Islamic State, over 30 insurgents were killed in drone strikes. The local provincial government has stated that around 200 university students there are linked to Islamist groups. In fact, Islamic State banners were waved during an anti-government demonstration. In Zabul, Islamic State executed seven members of the Hazara (Shia) ethnic group that it abducted in September. Among them were three women, the first to be victims of beheading. Their families carried their bodies to Kabul, where they were joined by thousands of people (20,000 according to some media outlets) in one of the largest protests ever seen in the capital.
    [Show full text]
  • Phd DISSERTATION
    COMBATING TERRORISM IN PAKISTAN: POST 9/11 - A NEOCLASSICAL REALIST PERSPECTIVE PhD DISSERTATION This Dissertation is submitted to National Defence University, Islamabad in partial fulfillment for the degree of PhD in International Relations By ARSHAD MAHMOOD NDU-IR/PhD-13/S-023 Supervisor PROF. DR. SHAHEEN AKHTAR Department of International Relations Faculty of Contemporary Studies National Defence University, Islamabad Pakistan, 2019 ii Student’s Declaration This is to certify that this dissertation titled “Combating Terrorism in Pakistan: Post 9/11 – A Neoclassical Realist Perspective” submitted by the undersigned is accepted in its present form by Department of International Relations, National Defence University, Islamabad, Pakistan. It is based on my own research work and has not been submitted to any other institution for any other degree. ______ Dec 2019 Arshad Mahmood i Certificate of Completion It is hereby recommended that the dissertation submitted by Arshad Mahmood titled “Combating Terrorism in Pakistan: Post 9/11 – A Neoclassical Realist Perspective” has been accepted in the partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of PhD in the discipline of International Relations. ___________ Supervisor ii Dedication I dedicate my work to those Pakistanis who laid their lives for the greater cause of fighting the menace of terrorism and confronting the obscurantist mindset, considered as an obstacle in the way of progressive and prosperous Pakistan. Table of Contents Ser Subject Page No 1. Introduction 1 Statement of the Problem 8 Objective of the Study 8 Significance of the Study 9 Theoretical Framework 9 Literature Review 13 The Research Design and Methodology 25 Scope and Limitations 26 Organization of the Study 27 2.
    [Show full text]
  • Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent: a New Frontline in the Global Jihadist Movement?” the International Centre for Counter- Ter Rorism – the Hague 8, No
    AL-QAEDA IN THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT: The Nucleus of Jihad in South Asia THE SOUFAN CENTER JANUARY 2019 AL-QAEDA IN THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT: THE NUCLEUS OF JIHAD IN SOUTH ASIA !1 AL-QAEDA IN THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT: THE NUCLEUS OF JIHAD IN SOUTH ASIA AL-QAEDA IN THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT (AQIS): The Nucleus of Jihad in South Asia THE SOUFAN CENTER JANUARY 2019 !2 AL-QAEDA IN THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT: THE NUCLEUS OF JIHAD IN SOUTH ASIA CONTENTS List of Abbreviations 4 List of Figures & Graphs 5 Key Findings 6 Executive Summary 7 AQIS Formation: An Affiliate with Strong Alliances 11 AQIS Leadership 19 AQIS Funding & Finances 24 Wahhabization of South Asia 27 A Region Primed: Changing Dynamics in the Subcontinent 31 Global Threats Posed by AQIS 40 Conclusion 44 Contributors 46 About The Soufan Center (TSC) 48 Endnotes 49 !3 AL-QAEDA IN THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT: THE NUCLEUS OF JIHAD IN SOUTH ASIA LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AAI Ansar ul Islam Bangladesh ABT Ansar ul Bangla Team AFPAK Afghanistan and Pakistan Region AQC Al-Qaeda Central AQI Al-Qaeda in Iraq AQIS Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas HUJI Harkat ul Jihad e Islami HUJI-B Harkat ul Jihad e Islami Bangladesh ISI Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence ISKP Islamic State Khorasan Province JMB Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh KFR Kidnap for Randsom LeJ Lashkar e Jhangvi LeT Lashkar e Toiba TTP Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan !4 AL-QAEDA IN THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT: THE NUCLEUS OF JIHAD IN SOUTH ASIA LIST OF FIGURES & GRAPHS Figure 1: Map of South Asia 9 Figure 2:
    [Show full text]
  • The Taliban's Survival
    Global-Local Interactions: Journal of International Relations http://ejournal.umm.ac.id/index.php/GLI/index ISSN: 2657-0009 Vol. 1, No. 2, July 2020, Pp. 38-46 THE TALIBAN'S SURVIVAL: FROM POST-2001 INSURGENCY TO 2020 PEACE DEAL WITH THE UNITED STATES Taufiq -E- Faruque Department of International Relations, University of Dhaka, Bangladesh Article Info Abstract Article history: The 2020 United States (US)-Taliban peace deal has essentially made the Received August 18, 2020 Taliban movement as one of the most durable and resilient insurgent groups in Revised November 26, 2020 today's world. Following the 'levels of analysis' of international relations as an Accepted December 04, 2020 analytical framework, this paper explores the reasons behind the survival of the Available online December 12, 2020 Taliban insurgency in an integrative framework that organizes the individual and group, state, and international level dynamics of this insurgency in a single Cite: account. The paper argues that the defection of politically and economically Faruque, Taufiq -E-. (2020). The Taliban’s marginalized individual Afghans, the multilayered and horizontal structure of the Survival: From Post-2001 Insurgency to 2020 Taliban insurgency, regional power configuration in South Asia, and the lack of Peace Deal with The United States. Global- a coherent post-invasion strategy of the US and its allies factored into the Local Interaction: Journal of International survival of the Taliban insurgency that resulted in a peace deal between the Relations, 1(2). Taliban and the US. * Corresponding author. Keywords: Taliban, Afghanistan, insurgency, United States, peace deal Taufiq -E- Faruque E-mail address: [email protected] Introduction It was hard to imagine that the Taliban would be able to mount a resilient challenge to a large-scale commitment of forces by the US and its allies.
    [Show full text]
  • Islamist Militancy in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Region and U.S. Policy
    = 81&2.89= .1.9&3(>=.3=9-*=&0.89&38 +,-&3.89&3=47)*7=*,.43=&3)=__=41.(>= _=1&3=74389&)9= 5*(.&1.89=.3=4:9-=8.&3=++&.78= *33*9-=&9?2&3= 5*(.&1.89=.3=.))1*=&89*73=++&.78= 4;*2'*7=,+`=,**2= 43,7*88.43&1= *8*&7(-=*7;.(*= 18/1**= <<<_(78_,4;= -.10-= =*5479=+47=43,7*88 Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress 81&2.89= .1.9&3(>=.3=9-*=&0.89&38+,-&3.89&3=47)*7=*,.43=&3)=__=41.(>= = :22&7>= Increasing militant activity in western Pakistan poses three key national security threats: an increased potential for major attacks against the United States itself; a growing threat to Pakistani stability; and a hindrance of U.S. efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. This report will be updated as events warrant. A U.S.-Pakistan relationship marked by periods of both cooperation and discord was transformed by the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and the ensuing enlistment of Pakistan as a key ally in U.S.-led counterterrorism efforts. Top U.S. officials have praised Pakistan for its ongoing cooperation, although long-held doubts exist about Islamabad’s commitment to some core U.S. interests. Pakistan is identified as a base for terrorist groups and their supporters operating in Kashmir, India, and Afghanistan. Since 2003, Pakistan’s army has conducted unprecedented and largely ineffectual counterterrorism operations in the country’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) bordering Afghanistan, where Al Qaeda operatives and pro-Taliban insurgents are said to enjoy “safe haven.” Militant groups have only grown stronger and more aggressive in 2008.
    [Show full text]
  • Conflict in Afghanistan Is Here-To-Stay: the Taliban’S Second Coming
    University of New Hampshire University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository Economics Scholarship Economics 2-18-2004 Conflict in Afghanistan is here-to-Stay: The Taliban’s Second Coming Marc W. Herold [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.unh.edu/econ_facpub Recommended Citation Herold, Marc W., “Conflict in Afghanistan is here-to-Stay: The Taliban’s Second Coming” (Durham: manuscript, Dept. of Economics, University of New Hampshire, February 18, 2004) reprinted at http://www.grassrootspeace.org/herold_taliban_afghanistan.pdf This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Economics Scholarship by an authorized administrator of University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 1 "Conflict in Afghanistan is Here-to-Stay : The Taliban's Second Coming" by Marc W. Herold Departments of Economics & Women's Studies Whittemore School of Business & Economics University of New Hampshire Durham, N.H. 03824 U.S.A. Phone: 603 862-3375 FAX: 603 862-3383 e-mail: [email protected] February 18, 2004 On May 1, 2003, in Kabul flanked by his obedient client, Hamid Karzai, Secretary Rumsfeld announced to the world that the United States had moved from a period of major combat activity to a period of stability and reconstruction in Afghanistan. The 'news' was gushingly reported by the U.S. mainstream corporate press, e.g., Matt Kelley of the Associated Press and a favorite of the U.S. colonels at the Bagram base.
    [Show full text]
  • Security Council Distr.: General 30 May 2018
    United Nations S/2018/466 Security Council Distr.: General 30 May 2018 Original: English Letter dated 16 May 2018 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council I have the honour to transmit herewith the ninth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established pursuant to resolution 1526 (2004), which was submitted to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011), in accordance with paragraph (a) of the annex to resolution 2255 (2015). I should be grateful if the present letter and the report could be brought to the attention of the Security Council members and issued as a document of the Council. (Signed) Kairat Umarov Chair Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) 18-06956 (E) 050618 *1806956* S/2018/466 Letter dated 30 April 2018 from the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) I have the honour to refer to paragraph (a) of the annex to Security Council resolution 2255 (2015), in which the Council requested the Monitoring Team to submit, in writing, two annual comprehensive, independent reports to the Committee, on implementation by Member States of the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of the resolution, including specific recommendations for improved implementation of the measures and possible new measures. I therefore transmit to you the ninth report of the Monitoring Team, pursuant to the above-mentioned request. The Monitoring Team notes that the original language of the report is English.
    [Show full text]