Intimidation and Targeted Violence Against Afghans

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Intimidation and Targeted Violence Against Afghans European Asylum Support Office Bureau Européen d’Appui pour l’Asile BZ-31-12-273-EN-C EASO Country of Origin Information report Afghanistan Insurgent strategies — intimidation and targeted violence against Afghans December 2012 doi:10.2847/63914 SUPPORT IS OUR MISSION European Asylum Support Office EASO Bureau Européen d’Appui pour l’Asile EASO Country of Origin Information report Afghanistan Insurgent strategies — intimidation and targeted violence against Afghans December 2012 SUPPORT IS OUR MISSION Europe Direct is a service to help you find answers to your questions about the European Union Freephone number (*): 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (*) Certain mobile telephone operators do not allow access to 00 800 numbers or these calls may be billed. More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu). Cataloguing data can be found at the end of this publication. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2012 ISBN 978-92-95079-65-6 doi:10.2847/63914 For Public Use Prepared in accordance with the EASO COI Report Methodology © European Asylum Support Office, 2012 Neither EASO nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which may be made of the information contained therein. Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. Printed in Luxembourg Contents Disclaimer ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 7 Terms of reference ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 9 Abbreviations ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11 Glossary ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13 Introduction ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 15 Terminology �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������15 Methodology �����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������15 Defining the terms of reference ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������15 Collecting information �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������15 Analysing information ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������16 Consulting experts �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������16 Executive summary ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 19 1. General ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 22 1.1 Violent intimidation campaign by insurgents ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������22 1.1.1 Night letters ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������23 Analysis — night letters ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������24 1.1.2 Illegal checkpoints ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������25 1.1.3 Collection of taxes ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������25 1.1.4 Abduction ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������25 1.1.5 Targeted killings ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������26 1.1.6 Taliban courts and death sentences �����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������27 1.1.7 Command, intelligence and ‘hit lists’ ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������27 1.1.8 Shutting down mobile networks ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������28 1.1.9 Attacks on district centres, provincial capitals and Kabul �������������������������������������������������������������������28 1.2 Underlying mechanisms: Local rivalries and tribal feuds ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������29 1.3 Again towards ethnicisation? ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������30 1.4 Regional differences �����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������30 1.4.1 Control of areas ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������30 1.4.2 Cities v rural areas �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 31 Summary — Regional differences ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������32 Analysis — Regional differences ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������33 1.5 Victims’ reactions ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������33 Escaping threats: defecting or quitting activity and fleeing the area �������������������������������������������������������������33 Summary — Escaping threats: defecting or quitting activity and fleeing the area ����������������������������������������36 Analysis — Escaping threats: defecting or quitting activity and fleeing the area�������������������������������������������36 2. Profiles ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 38 2.1 People working for or supporting the government ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������38 2.1.1 Government officials and employees ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������38 2.1.1.1 General �����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������38 2.1.1.2 MPs and council members �����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������39 2.1.1.3 Provincial governors ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������40 2.1.1.4 District governors �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������40 2.1.1.5 Judiciary ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������40 2.1.1.6 People involved in the political process ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������41 2.1.1.7 Bank staff �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 41 Government officials and employees — episodes in 2012 ������������������������������������������������������������������42 Summary — government officials and employees ������������������������������������������������������������������������������47 Analysis — intimidation and targeting of government officials and employees.................................47 2.1.2 Afghanistan’s National Security Forces (ANSF) ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������49 ANSF — episodes in 2012 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������50 Summary — ANSF ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������52 Analysis — Intimidation and targeting of ANSF �����������������������������������������������������������������������������������53 2.1.3 Government supporters, collaborators and contractors ��������������������������������������������������������������������54 Government supporters, collaborators and contractors — episodes in 2012 �����������������������������������54 2.1.3.1 Pro‑government militia (PGM) or anti‑Taliban militia members �������������������������������������������55 Pro‑government militia or anti‑Taliban militia members — episodes in 2012 ���������������������56
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