ACCELERATING RADICALISM: PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE TALIBAN AND THE RISE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE IN AFGHANISTAN

Item Type text; Electronic Thesis

Authors McGee, Anthony

Publisher The University of Arizona.

Rights Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.

Download date 26/09/2021 01:09:27

Item License http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/

Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/630292

McGee 1

ACCELERATING RADICALISM:

PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE TALIBAN

AND THE RISE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE IN AFGHANISTAN

By

ANTHONY MCGEE

______

A Thesis Submitted to The Honors College

In Partial Fulfillment of the Bachelor’s Degree With Honors in

Middle Eastern and North African Studies

THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

MAY 2016

Approved by:

______

Leila Hudson

School of Middle Eastern and North African Studies

McGee 2

Abstract

The intended goal of this research project is to elaborate on the methods and conditions which contributed to the dramatic entrance of IS Khurasan into the fray of the Afghan insurgency.

Though the insurgent group has witnessed short lived success, they have openly challenged the

Taliban in direct action in a bold attempt to supplant the dominant insurgent element. It is necessary to evaluate the current literature on the Afghan conflict with a focus on the years following the Taliban’s formation in 1994 to the recent power struggle between the rival organizations. This provides an understanding of the strategic decision making processes apparent in the advances of IS Khurasan in the provinces of Nangarhar, Helmand, and Farah. A bulk of the material related specifically to IS Khurasan is derived from journalistic sources due to the extremely current nature of this insurgency within an insurgency. The sensitive nature of information related to key battles and current military operations, limits the research of the IS phenomenon in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, a more complete evaluation of these events will not be available for a number of years.

McGee 3

Glossary of Acronyms

ANA: Afghan National Army ​ ANP: Afghan National Police ​ ANSF: Afghan National Security Forces ​ COIN: Counterinsurgency ​ FATA: Federally Administrated Tribal Areas ​ IED: Improvised Explosive Device ​ ISAF: International Security and Assistance Force ​ ISI: Inter­Service Intelligence, the Pakistani military’s clandestine service ​ ISIS: The Islamic State in Iraq and Sham, a global radical Islamist organization under the ​ leadership of Abu Bakr al­Baghdadi which seeks to establish a global Caliphate with sovereignty over the greater Islamic Community. The organization is also referred to as IS: Islamic State,

ISIL: the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and Daesh: from the Arabic acronym, al­Dawlah ​ al­Islamiyya fi al­Iraq wa al­Sham.

GIROA: The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the current internationally ​ recognized government authority in Afghanistan.

NGO: non­governmental organization ​ NWFP: North­West Frontier Province ​ OEF: Operation Enduring Freedom, the U.S. Government’s blanket official title for for military ​ operations in the Global War on Terror.

TTP: Tehreek­i­Taliban Pakistan ​

McGee 4

Introduction

At the tail end of 2014, Afghanistan witnessed a change in the dynamics of its insurgency with the end of American combat operations in Afghanistan. The most prominent of these developments is the rise of Islamic State (IS) splinter groups in Nangarhar, Helmand and Farah provinces. Operating under the organizational name, Wilayat Khurasan or IS Khurasan, the largest of these splinter groups was able to establish a foothold in Nangarhar province and sustain combat operations against Afghan security forces and their Taliban rivals. In Helmand and Farah, they were never able to obtain the base of support needed to be anything more than a nuisance to local Taliban groups. IS Khurasan has all but crumbled in the wake of joint military operations in Nangarhar province; however, their existence represents a symptom of a much larger affliction plaguing the Taliban organizationally.

The advent of rival insurgent groups with a narrative counter to the Taliban brand of religio­ethnic nationalism is indicative of an unprecedented organizational schism in the movement’s history. Wilayat Khurasan represents a denial of Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar

Mansoor’s authority as Amir al­Mu’mineen, an Arabic honorific which translates to Commander ​ ​ of the Faithful. Consequently, IS affiliates in Afghanistan have pledged the biy’ah (oath of ​ ​ allegiance) to Abu Bakr al­Baghdadi, leader of the militant organization Islamic State in Iraq and

Syria (ISIS, IS or ISIL). Wilayat Khurasan and similar self styled IS affiliates have not been officially endorsed or recognized by the parent organization.

Initial successes for the IS splinter groups include the seizure of strategically important districts within Nangarhar. In order to explain the nascent success of IS loyalists in Afghanistan, it is important to understand the importance of seized territories to the illicit infrastructure of the

McGee 5 insurgent economy. The organizational genesis of rival insurgent groups is focused in three provinces which are key to the Afghan narcotics trade in addition to a variety of other clandestine revenue generation efforts. Access to the narcotics and smuggling pipeline allows the splinter groups financial support for their combat operations. The most successful group in

Nangarhar has the easiest access to safe haven in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the North West Frontier Provinces.

Ultimately, the formation of IS splinter groups in Afghanistan is the first significant schism in the Taliban dominated insurgency. The spread of IS Khurasan can be attributed to opportunistic exploitation of illicit financial networks to fund direct action against the Taliban.

The death of the Taliban spiritual figurehead and the two year cover up have weakened the legitimacy of the movement’s leadership. Finally, the recent withdrawal of coalition forces after thirteen years of sustained action against the Afghan insurgency created a security vacuum which was subsequently filled by the ambitious leadership of IS Khurasan.

The foundation of rival insurgent organizations represents a growing frustration with a weakened Taliban. In the cases of the Nangarhar and Helmand offshoots, the split can be traced to internal strife related to the Taliban’s suspiciously absent supreme leader. The recent announcement of Mullah Muhammad Omar’s death in 2015 by the movement’s current leader,

Mullah Akhtar Mansoor, further exacerbated these internal rifts. At the time of the announcement, Mullah Mansoor had been leading the organization in secret for two years following the death of Mullah Omar. Additionally, pre existing rivalries and internal power struggles have provided avenues of opportunity for independently minded insurgent leaders to break away and exploit the lucrative illicit economy.

McGee 6

External erosion by nearly fifteen years of counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan is the final factor contributing to the weakened Taliban in the areas of concern. In provinces which have witnessed heavy military footprints, in relation to the insurgent strength in Farah and as a result of the insurgent strength in Helmand, hardcore Taliban fighters were removed at a rate exceeding the replacement capacity. The improved security situations following American clearing operations were short lived and created a security vacuum with the cessation of ground combat operations.

Background

During a ceremony in Kabul on 28 December 2014, President Obama announced an end to American combat operations in Afghanistan. The ceremony marked a formal end to thirteen years of sustained conflict, which began with the September 11th attacks. As a result, United

States Forces were scaled down from 68,000 service members to approximately 13,500. They were with advisory and training roles in addition to counter­terrorism operations (Jackson 1).

This is in accordance with the end of the troop ‘surge’ in 2012 (Nordland 1). The withdrawal of the bulk of coalition troops after five years of intensive counterinsurgency campaigns created a weakened security posture, which was exploited by an emboldened Taliban and the entrance of

IS (Islamic State) affiliates to Afghanistan.

ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Sham), ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant), IS

(Islamic State), or Daesh (al­Dawla al­Islamiya fi al­Iraq wa al­Sham) created international ​ ​ alarm with the incredible speed and efficiency of their military operations against American trained Iraqi security forces, their rapid occupation of territories in Syria and Iraq, and their

McGee 7 treatment of religious minority groups in controlled territories. Afghanistan’s IS affiliates pledged fealty to the organization’s founding leader, Abu Bakr al­Baghdadi, under the name IS

Khurasan. Currently, there is no evidence of an official endorsement from the parent organization and very little to suggest the promotion of Central Asian IS offshoots from external sources. Rather, the shift in loyalty was a break with the Taliban dominated insurgency and refusal of Mullah Muhammad Omar’s leadership over the global Islamic community, a role suggested by his title Amir al­Mumineen, the Commander of the Faithful. ​ ​ In the beginning of 2015, Afghanistan witnessed a small number of attacks claimed by the fledgeling IS affiliates. The most successful attack was perpetrated by the Nangarhar affiliate, which resulted in thirty­five dead outside a bank in Jalalabad on 18 April 2015 (Kumar

1). At the opening of 2015, insurgent groups in both Helmand and Farah provinces lifted the black banner and announced alignment with ISIS. It was not until July of the same year, IS

Khurasan increased their efforts in Nangarhar, Helmand, and Farah provinces, which can be credited to a revelation about the Taliban’s spiritual leader.

On 31 July 2015, Taliban spokesman, Zabiullah Mujahid, confirmed Afghan Government reports that Mullah Omar died (Popalzai et al 2). Taliban leadership had managed to keep Mullah

Omar’s death a secret for two years until Afghan intelligence sources released the information through media channels. Former Quetta Shura leader, Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansour, had been leading the organization in secret and became the official leader of the organization after the announcement of Mullah Omar’s death (Popalzai et al 1). While Mullah Mansour was solidifying his support, IS Khurasan began targeting the Taliban with the bulk of activity focused in Nangarhar. A video released by the emergent group showed the execution of ten Taliban

McGee 8 members by means of an explosive device thus sparking an intense turf war in the province

(Bolton 1).

By February of 2016, the United States was willing to recognize and act on the threat of

IS Khurasan by coordinating strikes with Afghan security forces. To date, they have been vigorously pursued by the Coalition forces and by the Taliban, inflicting heavy tolls on the fledgling organization.

McGee 9

Section I

Contextualizing the Taliban

The Taliban can be described as a predominantly Pashtun ideological/nationalist movement with the late Mullah Omar as its spiritual and organizational leader. The ideological nature of the organization has roots in the Deobandi tradition with a greater emphasis on the

Hanafi school of jurisprudence. According to Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi, the Hanafi school “...is by and large considered to be the most liberal amongst the four Sunni schools of thought” (Zaidi

147). He attributes the Taliban’s rigid interpretation of Islam as a tribalized version of the religion he refers to as Meta Assabiatic, which he characterizes as a “...feeling of social solidarity with other Islamist groups which has more to do with a perception of violation of honour related to historical reference points rather than Islam itself” (Zaidi 137). The Meta Assabiatic concept is important to defining the Taliban’s current organizational mindset.

The term “Meta Assabiatic” is derived from ‘asabiya, a concept forwarded by 14th ​ ​ century historian Ibn Khaldun. He used the concept to describe the strong sense of tribal solidarity which allowed conquering dynasties a strong base of support for their authority

(Rosenthal xli). Meta Assabiyya differs as the sense of social solidarity is based on notions of

“socio­religious honor” and “ethno­nationalism” (Zaidi 136).

Their ambitions are limited in scope; it is mainly establishing an Independent Islamic government in Afghanistan, an ambition which was nearly realized before the United States invasion of 2001. The ideological goals as a governing entity can be summarized by Abdul

Salam Zaeef’s statement, “The shari’a would be our guiding law and would be implemented by ​ ​

McGee 10 us. We would prosecute vice and foster virtue, and would stop those who were bleeding the land” (Zaeef 65). Prior to the September 11th attacks, the United States was willing to allow the organization to continue as the government of Afghanistan, despite strained relations over the harboring of Osama bin Laden; however, it should be noted that the United States had made no moves to recognize them as the legitimate rulers of the war torn country and therefore accepted the potential unifying factor of the organization.

Following dispersion by Coalition Forces, they are no longer a singular organization with a central leadership apparatus but rather a confederacy composed of the foundational group and a number of affiliates or “neo­Taliban” organizations (Yadav 141). In the words of Thomas Ruttig,

“... it is a ‘network of networks’ but still rather homogenous, with an undisputed Mullah Omar, as its leader, and the so­called Quetta Shura as its military command centre…” (Ruttig 3). The majority of these groups are loyal to the Quetta Shura but have varying levels of autonomy to execute political and military action. The Quetta Shura still maintains a relevant degree of political legitimacy by assigning governors, providing rule of law, local conflict resolution, and security services. Taliban control has been considered by locals as “...more effective than anything the Afghan government or international community have been able to muster”

(Dressler, Forsberg 7).

The Quetta Shura has experienced a state of decline resulting from internal strife following the death of Mullah Omar. The Taliban confirmed Afghan government reports of

Mullah Omar’s death in July of 2015, two years after he had died in a Pakistani hospital

(Popalzai, Smith­Spark, McLaughlin 1, 2). The genesis of IS affiliates in Afghanistan coincides with rumors of his death and before confirmation was a key component of IS Khorasan

McGee 11 propaganda campaigns (Byrne, Krzyzaniak, Khan 5). Mullah Omar did however have a considerable amount of prestige having outlasted the Soviet occupation, the Afghan Civil War, and the most of the current Afghan conflict. Additionally, he had built his legitimacy through religious credibility and a cult of personality, which is reflected in the literature originating from

Taliban and other favorable sources.

Death of Mullah Omar and the Resulting Power Struggle

To understand the reasoning behind Mullah Akhtar Mansour’s choice to withhold the confirmation of the Taliban supreme leader’s death, it is first important to emphasise Mullah

Omar’s significance as both a temporal and spiritual authority. In an article titled “The Myth of the Moderate Taliban” Vikash Yadav states:

Mullah Omar is best understood as a Weberian charismatic figure. He has claimed divine

grace from the earliest days of the movement. He is said to me inspired in the mid­1990s

to lead the Taliban by a dream in which the Prophet Muhammad told him he would bring

peace to Afghanistan. Mullah Omar’s ability to articulate this vision and to present

himself and his organization as credible purveyors of the vision helped him woo support

across Pashtun areas of Afghanistan. Mullah Omar assumed the title of Amir al­mu’minin ​ ­commander of the faithful­ after donning a relic purported to be the cloak of the Prophet

Muhammad in Kandahar in 1994. (140)

Yadav’s statement that Mullah Omar is a Weberian charismatic figure is reasonable based off of sociologist Max Weber’s views of the conditions that create charismatic leaders. An article by

Christopher Adair­Toteff titled “Max Weber’s Charismatic Prophets” clarifies this idea,

McGee 12

“Extraordinary times, however, call for extraordinary people. People who seem to have charismatic authority appear primarily during periods of great unsettledness and upheaval. Times of crisis require special leaders ­ charismatic leaders. In Weber’s considered view, charisma is a radical, and even revolutionary, power” (7). This is especially noteworthy considering the conditions in which Mullah Omar rose to power; Afghanistan was a country embroiled in civil war, and the transitional government under President Burhanuddin Rabbani had little authority outside of Kabul and therefore rule of law was nonexistent.

Mullah Omar capitalized on the vacuum of political authority in a failed state. With the assistance of Pakistani ISI, his movement of madrassah students steamrolled across Afghanistan seizing Kabul in 1996. At the Taliban’s height of power Mullah Omar had established a highly centralized and effective government providing security and rule of law to roughly ninety percent of Afghanistan (Laub 2). At the very least, this was the longest period of relative stability the country had experienced since before the Soviet­Afghan War.

In the Taliban narratives, he is described with a remarkably reverent tone including comparisons to Umar ibn al­Khattab, the second of the Rashidun Caliphs. The biography of an

Arab jihadi ideologue who spent the late 1990s with the Taliban captures the sense of admiration for the former leader (Strick 4). In The Giant Man, Husayn Ibn Mahmud expresses in blatantly ​ ​ biased terms regarding Mullah Omar that “... Amir Al­Mu’minin, who has carried the pickaxe ​ ​ [SIC] of Hanifiyyah in order to break with it the idols of Al­Jahiliyyah As­Salibiyyah, with his ​ ​ giant brothers from the followers of the divine Millah, the Quranic Verses and the Prophetic ​ ​ ​ ​ Sunan” (39). Two things are immediately clear in this statement: the author accepts the religious ​ authority of Mullah Omar “Amir Al­Mu’minin” and the American effort in Afghanistan ​ ​

McGee 13 represents an ignorant crusade “Al­Jahiliyyah As­Salibiyyah.” The author continues with similar ​ ​ statements throughout the work but provides something telling of jihadist sentiments for Mullah

Omar prior to the spread of ISIS, “... may Allah have mercy on this giant man who returned to the Ummah some of its prestige and honor” (44). Mullah Omar had managed to evade capture ​ ​ and killing by one of the most technologically advanced military forces in the world. Locally and internationally, this amplified his prestige in the militant Islamist community.

An interesting facet of the document is the manner in which Husayn Ibn Mahmud validates the honorific Amir Al­Mu’minin. The title implies leadership of the Ummah or the ​ ​ ​ ​ greater Islamic community, however, it is hardly exclusive and the title is claimed by current legitimate rulers such as Mohammed VI of Morocco and Abdullah II of Jordan. Following the author’s historical discourse and its relationship to the second caliph of Islam, he adds, “The

‘Umar of yesterday fought the Persians and the Romans (the two great human powers), and the

‘Umar of today fought the Soviets and the Americans. So he who called him “Amir ​ Al­Muminin,” did not make a mistake” (7). During the spring of 2015, the Taliban also released ​ a biography on their celebrated leader.

The biography was published on the Taliban website Shahamat on 06 April 2015 and was widely covered by media outlets as well as interpreted as an attempt to dissuade members from aligning with ISIS (Watson 1). A number of Taliban militants had defected to IS affiliates beginning as early as September 2014 (Dawn Bureau Report 1). The account provides laudatory descriptions of the organization’s supreme leader, his accomplishments and credentials, and lesser known facts like his preference for “the ‘RPG­7’” (8). Additionally, the document continues a reassurance “Mullah Mohammad Umar ‘Mujahid’ is still the leader in the present

McGee 14 hierarchy of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” (22). He had in fact been quite deceased and the biography was a desperate ploy by the current leader Mullah Akhtar Mansour to avoid the inevitable power struggle.

Mullah Mansour lacked the religious pedigree and genuine respect of his predecessor.

Consequently, it is understandable that he withheld news of Omar’s death to steer clear of further discord within the Taliban and its affiliates. The release of information sparked a competition for leadership within the umbrella organization and exacerbated preexisting divisions. Mansour’s authority was rejected by Omar’s oldest son, Mullah Yacoob, and senior Taliban leader, Mullah

Qayum Zakir (Khan, Crilly 1). To further reduce tensions and increase Mullah Mansour’s legitimacy, he was conferred with the title Amir Al­Muminin (Khan, Crilly 3). The measure was ​ ​ simply damage control. At the outset of the leadership crisis Mullah Mansour was in a shaky position and set on a campaign to limit defection and build prestige. However, the schism had already manifested itself in the breakaway of two distinct IS affiliates the most significant of which was operational in Nangarhar Province.

McGee 15

Resistance in Nangarhar: Hafiz Saeed Khan and Wilayat Khorasan

Fig. 1. Map of Afghanistan with Nangarhar Highlighted. 2011. Wikipedia. Web. 29 Apr. 2016. ​ ​ ​ ​

As early as September 2014, reports circulated regarding the spread of ISIS propaganda in Pakistan (Dawn Bureau Report 1). By 14 October, a senior Tehreek­i­Taliban Pakistan (TTP) commander, Hafiz Saeed Khan, also known as Mulla Saeed Orakzai, pledged allegiance to the

Islamic State and its leader Abu Bakr al­Baghdadi along with five other “top commanders”

(Sherazi 1). This is the earliest instance of senior Taliban officials renouncing the legitimacy of

Mullah Omar in favor of a rival Amir al­Mu’minin. Based on the limited information available ​ ​ on Hafiz Saeed Khan it can be determined his alignment with ISIS was an independent move to seek greater personal power in the absence of definite Taliban leadership.

The most comprehensive source to date providing information on IS Khorasan’s shadowy leader is the article “Hafiz Saeed Khan: The Former Taliban Warlord Taking ISIS to India and

Pakistan” by Islamuddin Sajid. The article provides that Khan was born in 1972 in the Orakzai

McGee 16

Agency, which was useful in disambiguating him from Hafiz Muhammad Saeed the

Lashkar­e­Taiba founder responsible for the the 2008 Mumbai attacks (Walsh 1). He is a figure who has been mistakenly reported to be the same individual (Gitau 1). Sajid’s article cites internal strife in the TTP as one of the primary reasons for abandoning the organization. The author reports a split in the organization over a leadership dispute between Hakimullah Mahsud and Wali Ur Rahman (Sajid 2). He then adds, “The TTP split down the middle again in 2013, when Hakimullah was himself killed in a US drone strike. ‘Saeed was one of the three main contenders for the top slot of the TTP chief, and I think he was disheartened when Fazlullah [the current TTP chief] was nominated’” (Sajid 2). Other factors contributed to the initial success of

IS Khorasan in Nangarhar Province, feeding its brief period of organizational success throughout

2015.

Estimates on the numbers of IS Khorasan fighters in Nangarhar range between

1000­3000 fighters. Disillusion of militants with the Taliban in the absence of charismatic leadership and organizational infighting is also a major factor. As previously stated in section one, Nangarhar has value as both a channel for illicit smuggling and as a significant center for opium agriculture and narcotics refinery, a factor which would generate revenue for IS Khorasan and draw the existing criminal element into its fold. Nangarhar is also a significant base of operations for Hezb­e­Islami Gulbuddin militants who announced support for ISIS in July 2015

(Adeel 1). Sources have not confirmed if Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is behind the group’s embracement of ISIS, but he has been known to publicly criticize the Taliban since his ejection from Afghanistan (Mashal 5). Hekmatyar and his organization later denied support (Roggio 1).

However, it would not be the first time he had initiated a conflict for control of opium resources

McGee 17 as he once “... launched a two­year internal war against Mullah Akhundzada for control of

Helmand’s rich poppy fields” (Peters 40).

Essentially, the manner in which IS has established a foothold in Afghanistan has less to do with the direct involvement of the parent organization and more to do with opportunistic and independently acting insurgent leaders. Initial reports of propaganda distributed in Pakistan did not link the material to foreign sources or identify any evidence of incentivization of membership. It is reasonable to speculate that ISIS would foster satellite groups throughout areas with heavy to moderate al­Qaeda influence and to establish inroads to exploit Central Asia’s lucrative illicit trade infrastructure.

Resistance to Taliban Legitimacy in Helmand and Farah: Mullah Mansoor Dadullah’s

Islamic State

Fig. 2. Map of Afghanistan with Helmand Highlighted. 2011. Wikipedia. Web. 29 Apr. 2016. ​ ​ ​ ​

McGee 18

On 08 September 2015, the Afghan online news outlet Khaama released that Mullah

Mansoor Dadullah joined the ranks of ISIS and was being reinforced with approximately 230

ISIS loyalists from Farah Province (Khaama 1). The announcement was made shortly after

Mullah Akhtar Mansoor had allegedly deployed 600 fighters to hunt him down in Zabul province

(Khaama 1). The deployment was a response to Mansoor Dadullah’s open rejection of the new

Taliban chief. Dadullah held semi­autonomous control of the two largest opium producing provinces in Afghanistan Farah and Helmand after his brother was killed in a skirmish with the

United States. forces (Achakzai 1). It is additionally likely that Mansoor Dadullah was branded an ISIS associate by the Taliban as an excuse to engage the commander who was ejected from the organization for unknown reasons in 2007.

Mullah Mansoor Dadullah, originally Mullah Bakht Muhammad, had a history of animosity against the higher echelons of Taliban leadership for events surrounding the death of his brother. The incident was initiated with airstrike in 2006 which killed Akhtar Osmani, Mullah

Dadullah’s organizational rival “... after Dadullah allegedly tipped off NATO as to his comrade’s location” (Reedy et al. 614). In March of 2007, the Afghan Government agreed to release of five

Taliban prisoners, including Mullah Dadullah Mansoor, in trade for abducted “Italian Journalist

Daniele Mastrogiacomo” (Wilner 307). The prisoner swap was met with a great deal of negative attention by American and Italian officials but “unbeknownst to almost everyone, Mansoor had been placed under covert surveillance the moment he had stepped out of prison and was leading

Coalition and Afghan forces directly to his brother’s hideout” (Wilner 308). Some analysts have suggested that the raid was in retribution for killing of Akhtar Osmani, “... senior Taliban

McGee 19 leaders may have betrayed Dadullah, who was killed by U.S. forces a few months later” (Reedy et al. 615).

The elder Dadullah’s death had a drastic effect on the morale of the Taliban and the

Helmand leadership causing a series of organizational repercussions which were articulated through policy changes (Wilner 322). The Taliban made several drastic changes to the Layeha, ​ ​ the movement’s pamphlet outlining rules and regulations for its fighters. Several of the changed rules are arguably the result of Dadullah’s conduct in Helmand. The article, “Analyzing the

Taliban Code of Conduct: Reinventing the Layeha” by Thomas H. Johnson, provides the most ​ ​ significant are a deletion of an earlier attack on non­governmental organizations:

The 2006 Layeha included a protracted attack against NGO’s operating in Afghanistan ​ ​ and justifying the targeting and killing of unarmed NGO field personnel. The 2009

manifesto does not include any mention of NGO’s nor does it promote the targeting and

killing of their personnel. This discrepancy is likely attributed to the death of Mullah

Dadullah Lang in May of 2007, a brutal Taliban “southern zone” commander known for

his barbarity and deadly conduct on the battlefield, including his personal orders to kill a

South American NGO worker captured by the Taliban in central Afghanistan in 2003.

(12)

Johnson adds that the provisions in the Layeha “Regarding Spies” stem from an organizational ​ ​ phobia inspired by the events surrounding Dadulla’s death (22). It is also plausible that the stipulation banning the formation of new movements can be attributed to the fact that Dadullah’s was fairly autonomous of the Quetta Shura leadership (22). Thomas Ruttig noted that his group

McGee 20

“... cut across tribes and reached regions beyond the classic Kandahari realm and was financially self­sufficient” (Ruttig 2).

Mullah Bakht Muhammad changed his name to Mansoor Dadullah to honor his brother and was appointed to fill the empty leadership position in May 2007 (Achakzai 2). By December

2007, the new commander was fired for disobeying orders (BBC 1). It seemed the Taliban had avoided further turmoil with Mansoor Dadullah as he was apprehended by Pakistani authorities two months later (Noor 1). However, by May 2012, a group known as the Mullah Dadullah Front claimed responsibility for the assassination of Mullah Arsala Rahmani a “potential intermediary in any future negotiations between the government and the Taliban” (Nordland 2). Reports about the group began circulating following news of Mullah Dadullah Mansoor’s release from custody

(Ruttig 2).

Mawlawi Arsala Rahmani’s assassination over proposed negotiations between GIROA and the Taliban demonstrate a clear break with the founding organization based on ideological principles. Much like Hafiz Saeed Khan, Dadullah Mansoor capitalized on Mullah Omar’s death to secure greater autonomy in Helmand and the surrounding areas. Refusal to validate Omar’s successor served as a legitimizing argument for operating outside of the Quetta Shura’s control.

Alignment with ISIS provided these two groups a reasonable counter narrative to Mullah Akhtar

Mansoor’s position as Amir al­Muminin and offered a unique organizational identity with a ​ ​ definable Taliban enemy.

McGee 21

Fig. 3. Map of Afghanistan with Farah Highlighted. 2011. Wikipedia. Web. 29 Apr. ​ ​ ​ ​ 2016.

The secession of Taliban leadership following Mullah Akhtar Mansoor’s appointment was not limited to Mansoor Dadullah and Hafiz Saeed Khan. Mullah Muhammed Rasool split with the parent organization after attempts to persuade the new Amir to step down (BBC 1). The short lived IS affiliate in Farah province potentially constitutes an independent grab at a substantial opium producing district by a small group of marginalized militants (Donati et al 2).

The unifying theme of militant succession in each instance is characterized by exploitation of the leadership crisis in an area with a steady avenue of funding.

McGee 22

Section II

Capitalizing on the Pre­existing Narcotics Infrastructure of Nangarhar, Helmand and

Farah

It is important to comment on the background of the opium driven Taliban economy.

This aids to better understand the importance of specific territories to ISIS splinter groups operating in the region. Though these groups have experienced limited success in Helmand and

Farah provinces, the unofficial ISIS affiliate, Wilayat Khurasan, has proven capable of ​ ​ ​ ​ establishing a foothold in Nangarhar province. Seizing control of the pre­existing narcotics infrastructure of these provinces would further endear these organizations to the primary ISIS leadership. Furthermore, these provinces give the splinter groups the capability to self­sustain in their conflict with established insurgency groups and government forces.

The opium trade has been one of the most reliable engines of insurgent economies during the period of conflict from the Russian invasion in 1979 to the current counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan under Operation Enduring Freedom. Afghan dominance in the illicit opium trade experienced a jolt with the reduction of competing sources in Asia. Anthony Hyman notes in his work, Afghanistan Under Soviet Domination 1964­83, that opium “... has become ​ ​ more important since the mid­1970s decline of the Golden Triangle countries’ opium crops. With

South­East Asian sources of opium from Burma, Thailand and Laos in decline, Afghan and

Pakistani producers stepped in to supply markets in the Middle East, Europe and the USA”

(35­36). In 1984 when the book was published, Afghanistan’s opium production was recognized

McGee 23 as a problem internationally. The author cites an estimated value of $25 million annually in addition to referencing widely circulated rumors that King Zahir Shah was attached to the trade by familial ties (36).

The Soviet invasion intensified the the production of raw opiates as a means of funding the numerous Mujahideen factions during the conflict. The narcotics infrastructure saw a surge during the reign of King Zahir Shah but the Soviet Afghan War increased production exponentially. Journalist Gretchen Peters elaborates on this fact in addition to detailing the complexities of the insurgent/opium nexus in her book, Seeds of Terror: How Drugs, Thugs and ​ Crime are Reshaping the Afghan War. She states, “Opium production more than doubled in ​ Afghanistan between 1984 and 1984, from 140 metric tons to 400, according to U.S.

Government estimates at the time, doubling again in 1986” (37). The profits from the opium trade supplemented income from foreign donors and state assistance for the Afghan Mujahideen factions. Building on the pre­existing narcotics and smuggling infrastructure, the Afghan insurgency against the Soviets was able to capitalize on a sustainable revenue source. This aided substantially to continue combat operations against the militarily powerful Soviet Union.

Afghanistan’s narcotics enterprise was a cause of concern for the United States, but it hardly matched priority with the threat of Soviet domination in Central Asia. The United States was eager to bleed the Soviet Union by means of a proxy war just as the Soviets had done during the Vietnam War. Funding to specific anti­Soviet resistance groups was funneled through the

Pakistani Directorate for Inter­Services Intelligence (ISI). Peters provides, “The lack of U.S. oversight into drug smuggling by the mujahideen had set up the preconditions for the complete integration of narcotics­and reliance on drug money­into the politics of the region” (55). The

McGee 24 fortified opium trade continued with tacit ISI support and acted as an insurance policy in the withdrawal of American monetary support following Soviet defeat. The civil war which erupted in the vacuum of Soviet presence and legitimate leadership would rely heavily on illicit funding to achieve a decision.

When the Taliban rose to power in 1994, they easily incorporated the pre­existing opium infrastructure into their fledgeling government. The Taliban’s need to further exploit the drug trade was a matter of necessity to maintain revenues in spite of heavy sanctions. The United

Nations sanctions were imposed in response to a series of attacks perpetrated by the Islamic

Emirate of Afghanistan’s infamous guest, Osama bin Laden. In regards to the importance of the drug trade to the Taliban, Peters adds,

...Mullah Omar’s movement ­ almost from its inception ­ was highly dependent on and

intertwined with the opium network spanning the Pakistan­Afghanistan border. Drug

traffickers and tribes growing poppy were critical to the Taliban’s swift and astonishing

rise to power. Later on, the opium trade provided vital tax revenue, which kept the pariah

state afloat despite global economic sanctions (74).

The Taliban required any revenue source available to fund their efforts as they steamrolled through Afghanistan, seizing territory and establishing order in much of the country; furthermore, they needed a reliable and time tested revenue source to drive infrastructure work after they solidified their position of power.

Despite heavy international pressure and a strict interpretation of Islamic law, the organization continued to cultivate, refine, and export opiates. Contrary to the Taliban’s reports that they were in the efforts of banning poppy cultivation, production increased from “...2,804

McGee 25 tons in 1997… soaring to a whopping 4,581 metric tons in 1999” (87). There were substantial downsizing efforts for opium production undertaken in September of 1999 and again in July of

2000. The 1999 downsizing reduced opium cultivation to approximately 28%, most of which was attributed to drought. The landmark ban in July of 2000 substantially reduced opium cultivation. It limited the combined agricultural areas to 8,000 hectares, down from 82,000 hectares the previous year (99). Peters interprets this to be a manipulation of the farm gate value of narcotics which had dropped to a value $29 per kilo and skyrocketed in value to $726 by 11

September 2001 (106).

Prior to the institution of the ban, the Taliban created large stockpiles of the drug with the intentions of surviving the self imposed drought. Mullah Omar himself was believed to be in possession of 3,800 metric tons of opium according to DEA informants (114). Peters notes the stockpile functioned “...in effect as their federal reserve” (114). Following the United States invasion of the country, Afghan farmers proceeded to revitalize opium agriculture. Within a year the agricultural capacity was amped back up to 74,000 hectares of poppy (112).

Figures from the 2014 Afghanistan Opium Survey published by the United Nations

Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) provide more current information on the production capacities of the three provinces. In the regional breakdown provided in the document it is noted that Nangarhar, Farah, and Helmand are the leading producers of opium poppy in their respective regions. The primary producer in the Eastern Region, Nangarhar, accounts for 18,227 hectares dedicated to poppy cultivation (17). Farah Province leads the Western Region in opium production with 27,513 hectares of poppy (23). Helmand Province dominates the Southern

McGee 26

Region and is the largest opium producing province in Afghanistan accounting for 46% of total opium cultivation, 103,240 hectares (21).

The agricultural sector of narcotics production was not the only area which had been developed preceding and under Taliban rule. The drug bazaars in Ghani Khel, Nangarhar were additionally trading in the precursor chemicals necessary for the refinement of opium into morphine base, heroin, and crystal heroin (Peters 90). Nangarhar was the site of a particularly substantial drug bust during the Drug Enforcement Administration’s multinational Operation Tar

Pit in October of 2010 (DEA 1). The bust resulted in the seizure of nearly one metric ton of heroin from four separate laboratories in Achin District along with a variety of precursor chemicals (DEA 1, 2). In 2011, The Marine Corps Times reported the destruction of four heroin laboratories in Helmand Province and the seizure of 8.8 metric tons of narcotics to include precursor chemicals (Lamothe 2). Many reports of laboratory seizures are from the troop surge period from 2009 ­ 2012. The seizures were hardly substantial given the figures from a 2007 report from the UNODC titled Monitoring of Drug Flow in Afghanistan. The report included the ​ ​ estimates of twenty­four laboratories in Achin District of Nangarhar, twenty­seven labs in

Helmand, and five labs in Farah (18­19).

The Taliban profits indirectly from the opium trade through a series of levies at multiple stages of the narcotics enterprise. At the lowest level, a ten percent land tax or ushr is collected ​ ​ from the farmers. Transportation of the product from the farm is likewise charged a twenty percent zakat (Peters 88). There are additional taxes on export, refinement, and on the import of ​ ​ precursor chemicals (Peters 89­90). Gretchen Peters also includes that the UNODC valued the

“precursor chemical industry… at $3 billion in 2009” (Peters 16). She continues with, “...U.S.

McGee 27 military intelligence found insurgents in certain border districts to be collecting as much tax revenue off precursor chemical imports as they earned from the opium itself” (Peters 16). The drug industry is the most profitable aspect of illicit trade for the Taliban which would easily benefit a rival organization such as ISIS in Afghanistan. Funding is also generated from the transport of narcotics and a variety of goods through smuggling conduits in Farah, Nangarhar, and Helmand.

Smuggling: Nangarhar, Helmand, and Farah as International Conduits for Illicit Trade

The strategic locations of Nangarhar, Helmand, and Farah Provinces are an important factor for the establishment of ISIS cells in Afghanistan. Each of the provinces lie on an international border and benefits from a political situation which permits illicit cross­border trade. Smuggling is a successful enterprise in the region due to the poorly policed international boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan in conjunction with some areas of the border between Iran and Afghanistan. This is in relation to the area of interest in the Western, Southern, and Eastern Regions of Afghanistan. There are also substantial problems with illicit cross­border activities with other nations bordering the country such as Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and

Uzbekistan. Pakistan, however, offers a traditional safe haven for insurgents, particularly in the

Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the North­Western Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan; furthermore, it is the primary hub of smuggling activity for the Afghan Eastern and

Southern Provinces.

Smuggling has a very long and enduring history in Afghanistan largely due to the economic realities of tribal lifestyle and the border drafted by the British in 1893. In his book,

McGee 28

Afghanistan, Historian Stephen Tanner remarks, “In 1893 Sir Mortimer Durand began work ​ delineating Afghanistan’s eastern border, cutting a nonchalant swathe through Pashtun territory, sometimes drawing the line through the middle of villages, grazing grounds or in such a way that farmers lived on one side of the border with their fields on the other” (218). The border as a result, tends to be ignored by the Pashtun ethnic group.

The Pashtun peoples also the largest minority ethnic group in Pakistan which has influenced Pakistan’s lack of intervention in smuggling activity. Pakistan can not afford another

Kashmir type situation with a breakaway Pashtunistan. With this understanding, Pakistan’s limited policing efforts serve an existential motive, maintenance of the status quo.

It is also important to note many Pashtuns do not regard smuggling across the

Afghan­Pakistani border as anything other than standard trade. Akbar S. Ahmed points this out in his study of the Mohmand tribal group by stating, “The crossing of the international border is not seen as smuggling by the Mohmands” (Ahmed 54). He continues, “They argue, with a certain logic, that neither were they consulted regarding its lines nor do they see the point in dividing clans into two halves, and wide tribal networks are mobilized and trade organized through them by passing formal and legal frontiers and customs posts” (Ahmed 54). The

Mohmands as residents of the FATA and NWFP areas provide some of the insight into the manner in which the local populace justifies smuggling as an activity. The cross­border trafficking in the Eastern and Southern Provinces in Afghanistan is likewise justified in the same manner.

Insurgent groups such as the Taliban and ISIS have used their traditional tribal smuggling networks as a means of sustaining their organizations. Reliance on these networks became more

McGee 29 necessary after United States intervention in Afghanistan following the September 11th attacks of 2001. Additionally, GIROA has begun to rely on the same networks to supplement income which is largely from International funding. George Gavrilis notes this in his work, The ​ Dynamics of Interstate Boundaries, with the statement, “...the post­Taliban state survives ​ through two principal strategies: co­option and protection of smuggling networks” (168). The author points out the fact that the Afghanistans inclusion of warlords into the fold of politics has allowed the warlords a certain freedom to operate in exchange for nominal support of the central government (168­169).

What is fascinating about Gavrilis’ assessment is the manner in which he justifies the

Afghan government’s tacit support of the smuggling enterprise:

Afghan state­building policies of co­optation and smuggling consequently rely on an

open, unpoliced border. Border policing would curtail drug smuggling operations that

directly and indirectly accrue revenues to the Afghan state. Moreover, border policing via

a professionalized border guard would violate the co­optation policies that govern

Kabul’s relations with outlying elites. Cross­border transit is often controlled by local

militia leaders who exact customs tolls. Effective border policing would, paradoxically,

make central state authorities less rather than more secure. (169)

This is probably somewhat true considering that the Afghan security apparatus has largely been the responsibility of the United States military. Unfortunately, the pennies pulled into the central government by allowing such activities do fund the very insurgent groups who challenge the legitimacy of GIROA.

McGee 30

The Iranian experience with cross­border smuggling has been less than ideal. The trafficking of opiates from the Western Provinces of Afghanistan represents a huge problem for the Islamic Republic of Iran in terms of the strings of addictions along the path to European markets. Iran banned poppy cultivation shortly after the Islamic Revolution in 1979 and has subsequently made great investments into combatting the flow of opium. Gavrilis adds, “Iranian officials have reported thousands of military, police and civilian casualties resulting from attempts to fight the drug trade. The Iranian government intends to build a series of fences and walls along segments of the border” (170). There is added incentive for Iran to better police its international boundary with Afghanistan as the Shi’a government is incompatible with the harsh brand of Sunni Islam espoused by ISIS and the Taliban.

Fig. 4. Interprovincial movement of opium in eastern Afghanistan. Afghanistan. Islamic ​ ​ Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Counter Narcotics. Research and Law Enforcement Directorates. Afghanistan Interprovincial Opiate Trafficking Dynamics. ​ ​ Kabul: n.p., 2013. Print.

McGee 31

Figure 4 Shows opium trafficking routes into Nangarhar for refinement within the province and in facilities in FATA and NWFP. The primary road (shown in red) cutting through the heart of the province is the Kabul­Jalalabad Highway. The highway is a major trade route linking Highway 1 to the Torkham Border Crossing and Khyber Pass. The map also indicates the

IS stronghold of Achin district as a primary smuggling route for opiates funneled through

Pakistan. Specifically relating to the provinces of early ISIS activity, Nangarhar is the largest producer of opiates in the Eastern Region. The province is a refinement and transportation hub for narcotics which produces a substantial opium crop internally. The flow of refined narcotics travels in two primary directions, to the capital via the Kabul­Jalalabad road and to the Mohmand and Khyber Agencies of FATA (AMCN 23).

Fig. 5. Interprovincial movement of opium in southern Afghanistan. Afghanistan. Islamic ​ ​ Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Counter Narcotics. Research and Law Enforcement Directorates. Afghanistan Interprovincial Opiate Trafficking Dynamics. ​ ​

McGee 32

Kabul: n.p., 2013. Print.

Figure 5 shows the flow of opiates in the southern provinces. Highway 1 (shown in red) runs in close proximity to IS controlled Sangin District which lies on the border of Helmand and

Kandahar. Helmand serves as a major hub for opiates from other provinces in addition to the large amounts produced internally. A bulk of the opiates are refined into heroin and morphine base prior to transport into Nimroz, Herat, or directly into Pakistan’s Baluchistan Province

(AMCN 18). The southern border of Helmand is dotted with a number of processing facilities capable of refining raw opium into morphine, heroin, or crystal heroin (AMCN 18).

Fig. 6. Interprovincial movement of opium in western Afghanistan. Afghanistan. Islamic ​ ​ Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Counter Narcotics. Research and Law Enforcement Directorates. Afghanistan Interprovincial Opiate Trafficking Dynamics. ​ ​ Kabul: n.p., 2013. Print.

Figure 6 shows western province trafficking routes, primarily along Highway 1 and through Khak­e­Safed District. Farah province offers little to the cross­border trade beyond

McGee 33 narcotics. The province does contain mineral deposits and resources such as tin, copper, and uranium. However, the capabilities of insurgent actors to properly exploit said resources are indeed limited, requiring exploitation of pre­existing mining operations. Farah still remains a valuable corridor for the trafficking of narcotics through the province’s western border with Iran and via the bordering provinces of Herat, Nimroz, and Helmand.

Despite the Iranian government’s willingness to invest in greater border security, the narcotics smuggling corridor through the Anar Dara desert in Farah province remains open to smuggling activities. A report compiled for the Afghan Ministry of Counter Narcotics titled

“Afghanistan Interprovincial Opiate Trafficking Dynamics” dated 2013 includes detailed information on the smuggling routes of narcotics and precursor chemicals. The report states,

“Opium from the eastern part of Farah is trafficked to border districts (Anar Dara, Qala­i­Kah,

Shib Koh and Lash Wa Juwayn) in the western part of the province via main and minor roads.

From the four border districts, opium is trafficked to the Islamic Republic of Iran via one official and many unofficial crossing points” (25­26). Khak­e­Safed district funnels a bulk of its narcotics through the neighboring province of Herat and is additionally a shipping hub for narcotics originating in Helmand Province (25, 29, 31).

ISIS activity in these provinces is focused in key districts, Achin in Nangarhar, Sangin in

Helmand, and Khak­e­Safed in Farah. Each of these districts are located in close proximity to a major artery for shipping, Highway 1, which is also known as the Ring Road. This not only provides access to narcotics en route to processing facilities but to the precursor chemicals which are primarily transported along these routes.

McGee 34

Donations and Foreign Support

Donations offer another substantial avenue of financial support for the Taliban and can be pulled from international and domestic sources in the form of the obligatory Islamic tax zakat. ​ ​ Donors provide to the Taliban’s cause for ideological reasons, as a pious cover for business expenses in illicit trade or with the case of local donations in the Federally Administered Tribal

Areas of Pakistan are extorted from the local population. The shift in the world’s attention from the Sunni Islamist/nationalist movement in Afghanistan to the Syrian Civil War has also contributed to a shift in ideologically motivated funding. Ergo, a shift in insurgent allegiances would attach to the most prominent or popular Islamist narrative.

Some analysts believe this to be the primary means of revenue generation for the Taliban movement. A quote from Central Asia Online regarding donations echoes several other media assumptions about the phenomenon, “...Taliban leaders and their associates received $106 m in

2008 in foreign donations from the Middle East and the Gulf. Foreign donations surpassed the amount of money gained by the movement from taxes on drug trafficking, estimated at $70 m”

(Tawil 3). The idea that foreign donations constituted the lion’s share of the Taliban’s funding was even forwarded in official channels, “...Richard C. Holbrooke, the Obama administration’s special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, said the Taliban was reaping the bulk of its revenue from donors abroad, especially from the Persian Gulf” (Whitlock 1). The statements are

McGee 35 somewhat misleading as they do not account for the other revenues gained from the narcotics enterprise in Afghanistan.

As discussed earlier, the Taliban movement exploits the entire narcotics infrastructure and does not limit itself only to the levy of an Islamic tax on trafficking of opiates. The agriculture, storage, transport, refinement and protection of the product, in addition to the import of precursor chemicals necessary for the refinement of morphine base and crystal heroin are likewise subject to taxes. Regardless, donations provide revenues in excess of $100 million. A figure which exceeds the budget of the Taliban at their height of power as the Islamic Emirate of

Afghanistan.

Coalition intervention in Afghanistan beginning in 2001 and the following years of

American political pressure on the governments providing state sponsorship to the Taliban, removed a critical source of revenue. Pakistan officially ceased state sponsored support for the organization in 2003 as a result of heavy pressure from the Bush Administration (Gul 192).

However, this only increased the Taliban’s efforts in soliciting private donations locally and internationally. In The Most Dangerous Place, Imtiaz Gul cites a Kashmiri resistance leader, ​ ​ ​ ​ “'God is gracious, Pakistan shut the financial window on us in Saudi Arabia and a couple of other places,'” further noting that the Kashmiri militants were able to find other sources of private funding (192). The author additionally comments on the ideological nature of foreign donations, “Dozens of Millionaire Arabs from the Gulf Countries, including scores of Saudi

Arabian Nationals, make yearly donations in cash and kind to people and groups they think deserving” (192).

McGee 36

Gulf countries, specifically Qatar and Kuwait, have funneled millions of dollars into the

Taliban’s coffers. Qatari policy regarding the enforcement and tracking of charity operations or lack thereof has an existential dynamic according to Lori Plotkin Boghardt. In “The Terrorist

Funding Disconnect with Qatar and Kuwait,” a policy analysis compiled for the Washington

Institute she states, “Doha’s security strategy has been to support a wide range of international actors in order to help shelter Qatar from an equally broad range of potential threats. This strategy has included providing generous support to Islamists, particularly the Muslim

Brotherhood but also other organizations such as the Taliban” (2). Gulf countries have introduced partial measures to combat private funding as a result of international criticism.

Newly introduced legislation such as Qatar’s 2010 Anti­terrorism financing law, Kuwait’s similar 2013 initiative, and the creation of the Financial Intelligence Unit, have been poorly implemented (1, 2). At the time the article was published in May of 2014, the FIU was not operationalized (2).

The shortcomings in Gulf countries in the realm of policing clandestine funding of non­state actors are not completely to blame for the phenomenon. Their efforts have led to valuable intelligence and, potentially, they have aided in the capture of two Haqqani Network leaders in Bahrain (Stancati, Amiri 2). Non­state actors and their supporters have proven quite capable of circumventing new laws, regulations, and enforcement agencies. Camille Tawil remarks on this in her article “Taliban funding traced to Gulf counties.” She provides:

...security agencies in the Gulf have been able to track money transfers whose ultimate

destination is believed to be the Taliban Movement. These transfers are estimated at $100

million annually by the US media. The agencies tracking the money flow also noted a

McGee 37

change in the way these donations are transferred in order to hide the real identity of the

donors. (1)

Law enforcement officials face difficulties in tracking online transactions undertaken on the dark web also known as the dark or deepnet, in addition to funds exchanged through the hawala ​ system. The author adds, “... a high percentage of transfers are carried out by foreigners working in the Gulf and not directly through Gulf nationals” (2). A statement which suggests that at the very least remittances are being tracked. Additionally, it suggests that Pakistani and Afghan nationals are facilitating the transfers to cover the tracks of wealthy investors involved in the region’s illicit trade.

Gretchen Peters is critical of the notion that foreign donations account for the bulk of the

Taliban’s war chest. She addresses this by stating, “... a lot of the cash that the Taliban receives could more accurately be described as “security investments” not donations” (17). She continues,

“In our surveys and interviews, my colleagues and I heard the this over and over: Traders and businessmen send money to protect their interest” (17). Peters’ focus on the drug trade provides a unique perspective on the ulterior motives of foreign donors. Such investments would not be limited solely to the drug trade but also to any goods tied to Afghanistan’s smuggling enterprises.

Hawala

To elaborate on the methods of transactions, donors use the hawala remittance system as ​ ​ the primary avenue for funding insurgent organizations. In a paper written for the United States

Department of the Treasury “The Hawala Alternative Remittance System and its Role in Money

Laundering” Patrick M. Jost and Harjit Singh Sandhu define it as:

McGee 38

...an alternative or parallel remittance system. It exists and operates outside of, or parallel

to traditional banking or financial channels. It was developed in India, before the

introduction of Western banking practices, and is currently a major remittance system

used around the world. It is but one of several such systems; another well known example

is the chop, chit or flying money system indigenous to China, and also, used around the

world. These systems are often referred to as underground banking; this term is not

always correct, as they often operate in the open with complete legitimacy, and these

services are often heavily and effectively advertised. (5)

The system relies on a network of trusted connections who can execute monetary transactions through existing business operations and without an actual overseas transfer of funds (5). For example, two connected business (one local and one overseas) would perform transactions where goods would be shipped at a discounted rate to cover the cost of the hawala remittance payment ​ ​ (8). The money transfer is essentially transformed into a debt repayment between the two vendors for goods and services rendered and would therefore not require an actual exchange of money.

The system is a preferred method of remittance payment as it does not require the heavy fees associated with traditional banking systems. Operating through a network of businesses with lighter regulations and lower overhead reduces the cost to the individual and creates a reasonable profit for the hawaladar even at low interest. The document provides, “A U.S. hawaladar ​ ​ ​ involved in the laundering of drug proceeds as well as legitimate remittances told one of the authors of this paper that he could still make a profit on an exchange rate margin as small as 2%, making him much more competitive than a bank” (10). The prevalence of hawala exchanges in ​ ​

McGee 39 the Emirate states and particularly Dubai is directly related to the high numbers of South Asian workers and business interests in the region (11). Even though a bulk of the transactions are innocuous in nature, the system is frequently exploited by terrorist networks and insurgent groups for the transfer of illicit funds.

The destination of funds to hawala markets in Afghanistan and the use of this channel as ​ ​ a revenue source for the Taliban are of particular importance as it demonstrates tactical value to

ISIS splinter groups. Imtiaz Gul notes that funds gathered at the destination are coerced from the local population or intended for militants operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan (193). He additionally cites the 2002 testimony of deputy secretary of the U.S. Treasury, Kenneth W. Dam,

“‘When we shut down the Al­Barakaat hawala network, we seized $1.9 million in assets,” Dam testified. He continued, “Our analysts believe that Al­Barakaat’s worldwide network channeled as much as $15 to $20 million to Al Qaeda a year’” (194). The al­Barakaat network was a revenue engine for the pre­9/11 Taliban by way of their al­Qaeda guests. Similarly, current hawala systems drive operations for the Taliban in addition to offshoot organizations.

McGee 40

Section III

The costs of low intensity protracted warfare: Fighting on a Budget

The costs of counterinsurgency (COIN) are astronomical in comparison to the costs of waging a successful insurgency. In the historical scope of warfare, this is by no means a novel concept. Given the prominence of low intensity conflicts on the international stage since the close of World War II, it is important to address this dynamic to better explain how insurgent groups capitalize on limited resources. In his comprehensive text, Counterinsurgency Warfare ​ Theory and Practice, David Galula states, “...disorder­the normal state of nature­is cheap to ​ create and very costly to prevent” (6). Galula built his experience on the subject as a Captain and later a Lieutenant Colonel in the French Army during the war with Algeria. His observations and practices have since become a primary source of the American counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The comparison he made in regards to the Malayan Emergency and Algerian pacification operations was, “The British calculated the cost of every rebel in Malaya at more than $200,000.

In Algeria, the FLN budget at its peak amounted to $30 or $40 million a year, less than the

McGee 41

French forces had to spend in two weeks” (7). Despite the huge investment of state actors into both conflicts, only the British were successful in the Malayan Emergency. British success was more of a factor of terrain favoring the counterinsurgent than of superior resources. Malaysia shares a narrow border with Thailand whose government was not receptive to the ideologies of the Malayan Communist Party. Furthermore, the insurgent force was separated from support from other sympathetic communist regimes by the South China Sea, which was easily policed by the British Navy. This does, however, highlight the exceptional cost of counterinsurgency warfare to the state actor.

The American experience in Afghanistan during the ongoing Operation Enduring

Freedom show the same disparity in the cost of COIN operations versus the cost of the primarily

Taliban driven insurgency. The estimated cost for military operations in Afghanistan for fiscal year 2001 was $23 billion (Belasco 15). American funding for the effort peaked towards $107 billion at the end of the troop surge period during FY 2011 (Belasco 15). Even at the initial stages, it becomes apparent the price for conducting military action for the state actor far outweighs that of the insurgent force.

Figures for the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’s early budget are included in Abdul

Salam Zaeef’s autobiography, My Life With The Taliban. Zaeef states, “The Taliban’s budget for ​ ​ ​ ​ the entire country each year amounted to roughly $80 million (US). Military expenditures took the lion’s share of the budget” (97). These figures are from a point in time when the Taliban held semi­legitimate government authority. The Taliban from their onset has been an insurgent ​ ​ organization exercising lessons learned from the Soviet Afghan War against Coalition Forces during Operation Enduring Freedom. Though, during the Taliban’s rise to power in Afghanistan,

McGee 42 the organization proved capable of staging sustained conventional military action. Such operations were executed against various provincial warlords, the government of Burhanuddin

Rabbani and the forces of the Northern Alliance. Figures vary greatly on the current budget for the organization as the Taliban’s economic construct is both highly decentralized and diversified.

However, the narcotics trade has remained central to the economic capacity of insurgent actors in

Afghanistan. By 2009, the illicit drug trade was estimated to provide between $70 and $400 million per year to the Taliban (Schmitt 1).

The generation of revenue for the Taliban and now ISIS splinter groups in Afghanistan relies heavily on illicit trade. There are three primary avenues of funding, the most well known is agriculture and processing of opium into morphine base and various grades of refined heroin, which include crystal heroin. The second, smuggling of a variety of goods to market via the porous borders of Afghanistan into Iran and Pakistan. The third is donations to the organization, which typically originate from wealthy donors in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Narcotics trade factors heavily into the other funding channels.

The corps of ISIS leadership and militant operations in Syria and Iraq have been able to exploit oil revenues from captured oil fields. This revenue is estimated at upwards of $1 million

U.S. per day. Oil fields have subsequently been targeted by U.S. airstrikes in an effort to degrade the financial capacity of ISIS to fund their combat operations (Sengupta 6). As the Taliban has created a diversified economy which spans throughout Central Asia, it is quite possible the central leadership of ISIS wants to exploit the pre­existing illicit economy of the region. The

ISIS splinter groups have been making attempts to gain territory in key provinces vital to smuggling and the booming narcotics trade in Afghanistan.

McGee 43

Providing revenue for an ongoing conflict of ISIS splinter groups against the Taliban is the most likely scenario. Given that there has been no formal endorsement from ISIS leader Abu

Bakr al­Baghdadi, the splinter groups in Afghanistan have thus far operated autonomously. The territories seized in Nangarhar, Helmand, and Farah Provinces are also reflective of previous divergences with the Taliban leadership. This insurgency within an insurgency would still require a great deal of monetary resources to sustain conflict against the Taliban and the

Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA), as well as the now limited

American and NATO presence in the country. This makes the strategic importance of the three provinces noteworthy as logistical and funding channels for ISIS groups in their infancies.

The opium infrastructure of the three provinces experiencing ISIS activity is the keystone for revenue generation. The following sections will discuss this topic in addition to elaborating on the smuggling channels into Pakistan from Nangarhar and Helmand and into Iran from Farah.

Donations will also be discussed as the main ISIS organization has been a recipient of the lion’s share of private donations which at one time benefitted the Taliban and al­Qaeda. Any demonstrations of quantifiable military success of the ISIS splinter groups could win them endorsement from ISIS leadership. As a viable fifth column for the organization, they would also gain access to this funding channel and further legitimization.

Counterinsurgency and the Creation of a Weakened Taliban Presence in the Areas of

Concern

A major contributing factor to the initial success of IS affiliates is the weakened security situation following the end of the United States led combat mission in Afghanistan. Large scale

McGee 44 combat operations kept insurgent actors focused on an easily definable enemy for a period of thirteen years. Moreover, the amount of skilled Taliban fighters was reduced by prolonged conflict against a militarily and technologically superior opponent. Counterinsurgency (COIN) tactics had been employed throughout the conflict in varying degrees. COIN operations were given a much greater emphasis following the 2009 appointment of General Stanley McChrystal as commander of ISAF. The long term effectiveness of the COIN strategy in Afghanistan is debateable. It is more likely the troop surge in conjunction with COIN tactics and targeted killings made direct action costly for the Taliban. This is not to suggest there was a scaling down of insurgent activity; insurgent tactics shifted in favor of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) over direct fire ambushes.

As a counter to the increased threat posed by the larger American military footprint in the region, insurgent actors countered with an expanded use of IEDs. In the USA Today article,

“Afghan insurgents match surge with more IEDs,” Tom Vanden Brook remarks, “In nine years ​ of war, 617 American troops have been killed by IEDs and the majority of those deaths came in the past two years. The 268 troops killed by IEDs in 2010 account for more than 40% of all deaths caused by bombs during the war” (1). The surge years were more pertinent to military operations in Helmand province in terms of shifting the combat dynamic overwhelmingly in the favor of Coalition Forces. The United Kingdom increased their presence in the province, raising the number of British troops from its 2006 height of 3,000 to 9,500 by October 2009 (Marcus 4).

The American component of the troop surge included, “Some 10,000 Marines from the 2nd

Marine Expeditionary Brigade” (Dressler 10). In Farah and Nangarhar Provinces, the situation was more permissive from military successes prior to the surge period.

McGee 45

Ultimately, Coalition Forces activity in the three provinces upset the power balance of the insurgency although not permanently. Afghan insurgents maintained a few considerable advantages over professional military forces such as a highly decentralized organizational structure, safe haven outside of the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) areas of operation, the ability to easily hide in the local population, and time. Targeted killings removed some of the more talented leadership in the Taliban organization from the equation. Even so, the power struggles which resulted from decapitation operations created more extreme insurgent groups that acted outside the control of the Quetta Shura’s authority. This fact is substantiated by changes to the Layeha in 2009, which was intended to consolidate command (Johnson 5). ​ ​ As mentioned previously, there was already friction inside the greater Taliban movement with independently minded leaders seeking greater autonomy of action. Coalition activity was not solely responsible for this fracturing of the organization but has a substantial role in accelerating it. Many of the former resistance groups of the Soviet­Afghan War era only begrudgingly accepted Taliban sovereignty as a means of self­preservation. Mullah Omar’s death of natural causes in Pakistan created a leadership crisis for the Taliban, which is still in the process of resolution.

Nangarhar Inc. Pre­surge Counterinsurgency

The counterinsurgency approach applied in Nangarhar culminated in Nangarhar Inc. “an integrated, long­term development and commercial plan for Nangarhar” (Kemp 1). COIN operations within the province can be characterized by a greater emphasis on economic development, security, and governance. The joint efforts of Afghan and Coalition Forces

McGee 46 experienced brief success between 2004­2008 (Kemp 34). Additionally, counternarcotics operations were an integral part of the COIN strategy in Nangarhar and even briefly eradicated opium agriculture at the provincial level (Kemp 38). The primary problem with the overall strategy is that the solutions offered by Nangarhar Inc. could only work in the short term.

Nangarhar Inc.’s accomplishments were quite significant but represent a singularity in the current conflict and was unfortunately doomed to failure. Without steady foreign financial, military support, and most importantly local government support, it is doubtful that any of their initiatives would have lasted beyond the American withdrawal. In his article “Counterinsurgency in Nangarhar Province, Eastern Afghanistan, 2004­2008” Robert Kemp provides several examples of the development projects undertaken by Nangarhar Inc. The projects, such as the

Darunta Dam, farm to market roads, and cold storage facilities were intended to make up for the narcotics market (37­41). Refurbishing the Soviet built Darunta Hydroelectric Power Plant was the most ambitious of these projects and was conditional that the provincial governor provide ten percent of $11 million effort (Wadsam 1). By 2013, Governor Sherzai had failed to contribute to the project for a period of six months and repairs were halted (Wadsam 1). Similarly, counternarcotics measures in Nangarhar failed spectacularly.

Kemp remarks on a reduction in poppy growth from 2004­2005 and attributes it to four factors. He states:

First, farmers believed a large­scale eradication plan was imminent, and were reluctant to

plant as a result. Second, there was an informal understanding that large­scale

development projects were planned that would provide alternative livelihoods. Third, the

McGee 47

Afghan government at the local and national level campaigned against poppy cultivation.

Fourth, local mullahs preached that drug production was against Islam. (38)

With the exception of the second factor, each of these had been attempted before in Nangarhar without long term success. The Taliban banned opium agriculture in Nangarhar no less than two times only to have the industry revive itself with increased vigor. In reality, the international community paid in excess of opium revenues for the development period. By 2014, Nangarhar was once again in the top five of opium producing provinces (UNODC 6).

Security gains made in the province practically vaporized with the withdrawal of

Coalition Forces. Nangarhar province had a relatively small insurgent presence with Taliban groups engaging in small­scale attacks. By the end of 2014, Nangarhar was primed for IS

Khorasan.

The Effects of Military Operations in Helmand

During 2009, Helmand Province became the focus of the renewed counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan. Of the 21,000 additional troops committed to the country by President

Obama, 10,000 were deployed to pacify Helmand Province (Dressler 10). The Taliban in

Helmand Province had already been facing internal conflict stemming from local hero Mullah

Dadullah’s rivalries with other Taliban commanders. Prior to the troop surge, the Taliban had adjusted the Layeha to further centralize the insurgency including a rotation of commanders. The ​ ​ Quetta Shura also instituted measures to limit the amount of foreign fighters participating in their struggle against Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and Coalition Forces.

McGee 48

Engaging in their own hearts and minds campaign to maintain political relevance in the province, the Taliban leadership emphasised recruitment from the local population and began reducing the presence of foreign fighters in Helmand Province. In their article, “The Taliban at war,” Theo Farrell and Antonio Giustozzi noted, “The problem was these foreign fighters were not suited to guerrilla warfare. They were not able to blend easily into the local population, and they fought without care for local concerns” (857). Given the time frame of the Leyeha’s release ​ ​ in July 2009 and the commencement of the United States Marine led Operation Khanjar in the same month, it reasonable to assume that this had a negative effect on the Taliban’s readiness.

Foreign fighters who remained in support of the Taliban were limited to training roles and the manufacture of IEDs (857). Based on interviews with two unnamed Taliban commanders, Farrell and Giustozzi provided, “... there had been very large numbers of foreign Taliban in Marjah, these were all driven out by the ISAF offensive in 2010” (857). Interviewed sources conflict slightly regarding whether these foreign fighters were permanent or not; although, they concur on the fact that they represent a well­trained and technically proficient part of the overall organization in Marjah.

The Layeha provision requiring the rotation of Taliban commanders had an equally ​ ​ negative effect on the organization’s strength. Farrell and Giustozzi stated, “This should have professionalized what had been until charismatic leaders of small groups with personal followers

(andiwal). It was also intended to reduce corruption by local Taliban commanders” (860). The ​ ​ change in policy was meant to counter another Dadullah style personality cult; nonetheless, it was instituted at the wrong time. The rotation system failed as Taliban leaders were increasingly

“...targeted by American drone attacks while they were moving from one district to another

McGee 49 district” (860). Organizationally, the Taliban in Helmand Province was in a less than ideal state of affairs at the onset of the troop surge.

The Taliban’s greater emphasis on asymmetrical tactics to combat Coalition Forces proved to be too late an addition to shift the outcome in favor of the insurgency. Farrell and

Giustozzi explained, “Across Helmand, our survey suggests an overall Taliban attrition rate for

2011­2012 of 20 per cent (242 KIA out of 1,213 fighters). These fatality figures have not been verified and so must be treated cautiously. However, they do suggest a remarkable scale of loss

(870). Giustozzi is not so apprehensive about the scale of loss. He cites Taliban sources in a previous work, “The casualty rate is high, with Taliban sources acknowledging 500 killed in

2010 in Helmand alone, which has driven opportunists and mercenaries away from the movement” (Giustozzi 24). Regardless, this demonstrates massive losses for the Taliban led insurgency during peak surge years.

ISAF’s aggressive campaign to remove Taliban strongholds and counter their stranglehold on the narcotics enterprise resulted in a leadership and, consequently, a security vacuum. This was exploited by a resurgent Taliban and Helmand’s IS affiliates when Coalition

Forces ended combat operations in the province in October 2014 (Mallet, Jeong 1). By January

2015, reports began circulating about the establishment of IS affiliates in Sangin District under the leadership of Mullah Abdul Rauf (CBS: ISIS active in south Afghanistan 1). In this instance, attrition by Coalition Forces, poor policy by Taliban leadership, and the weakened security state following Coalition withdrawal, accelerated the initial success of IS affiliates.

Farah Province: Early Attrition of Taliban Shapes Local Insurgency

McGee 50

With a few exceptions, Farah Province experienced relatively insignificant Taliban activity throughout the period of conflict beginning in 2001. Large scale bombing of targets within the province forced a bulk of the fighters to neighboring provinces although the insurgency reestablished a presence in following years (Rathod 20). Farah Province’s terrain in general is not favorable to direct attacks on Coalition military personnel. The large desert valleys and small villages along primary routes do not offer the best cover and concealment against armored vehicles and certainly not against American and Italian airpower. Another major geographical shortcoming is that the province shares an international border with Iran and therefore lacks the support and benefit of safe haven enjoyed by insurgents operating in the eastern and southern provinces. Although the Iranian government is fundamentally opposed to

Sunni extremism on its borders, there has been evidence of Iranian supply of weapons in a very limited capacity (Clark 1). However, geographical separation from Pakistan severely limits the logistical capacity of the organization to wage combat as all arms and supplies needed to pass through Coalition controlled territory.

The Taliban have made attempts to revive militant activity in Farah Province but were largely unsuccessful. In November of 2008, they attempted open combat with American Forces in Bala Baluk District, which failed miserably. An account from the 1st Marine Division’s webpage remarks, “In the city of Shewan, approximately 250 insurgents ambushed 30 Marines and paid a heavy price for it” (Mercure 1). The article provides, “... the Marines had reduced an enemy stronghold, killed more than 50 insurgents and wounded several more” (Mercure 1). A later attempt on 4 May 2009 ended in an airstrike that produced massive civilian casualties and as many seventy­eight Taliban deaths (Motlagh 21). This was the last documented major Taliban

McGee 51 engagement in the province until 2013 as Coalition Forces were in the process of transferring control of the area to GIROA authority (Dulac 1). The Taliban demonstrated their newfound freedom of movement on 3 April 2013 when, “... nine Taliban fighters dressed as Afghan ​ soldiers stormed a government compound in the western part of the country on Wednesday morning, killing at least 44 people and wounding more than 100 in a hostage standoff” (Ahmed

1).

In January of 2015, Pajhwok News reported the establishment of an ISIS training camp in

Khak­e­Safed district (Pajhwok: IS Fighters Run Training Centre 1). Afghan National Security

Forces were limited in the ability to counter the rising threat because “... in March 2013 Karzai banned ANSF completely from calling for ISAF air strikes” (Farrell, Giustozzi 871). This meant any military action launched against a rising ISIS threat would have to be met on the ground and without Coalition support.

McGee 52

Conclusion

The United States and its Coalition partners are not solely responsible for the disintegration of the Taliban and the rise of IS in Afghanistan. However, Coalition efforts to combat the Taliban and shape the tactical environment in their favor have accelerated the formation of increasingly radical insurgent groups. With the end of the American combat mission in December of 2014, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan was left to face a rising insurgent threat without the benefit of United States Airpower or indirect fire assets.

Counterinsurgency tactics were applied too late in the conflict to offer any lasting benefits to the economic and security situation. Certain practices were embraced early on but with little oversight, such as in Nangarhar. In short, money was thrown at problems with the hopes that it would cement a long­term solution. The heavy pacification operations that took place in Helmand Province improved the security situation briefly. This could never accomplish anything but a temporary weakening of insurgent actors in the short period of time between

2009­2014. Farah Province, likewise, required a longer timetable for ISAF security operations.

McGee 53

After insurgents realized the futility of engaging United States Forces in open combat, they simply played the waiting game.

Inability to effectively replace the illicit economy with an alternate source of legitimate trade and income allowed for revived and new insurgent groups to self­sustain. In contrast, the

Afghan government survives primarily on foreign assistance. Without an extended timeline or the increased attention of the international community, Afghanistan will fail. Even with the most ideal conditions, a successful COIN campaign requires a substantial commitment of time and funding. It is important that we finish what we started in Afghanistan in 2001.

Epilogue

The alarming activities of IS affiliates in Afghanistan throughout 2015 has since generated a military response from the United States government in support of ANSF ground operations. In December of 2015 US forces were granted authority to carry out airstrikes on IS loyalists (Sisk 2). Within the same month, IS forces were cleared from Achin District, Nangarhar

Province through joint operations (Totakhil, Donati 1).

IS forces have taken a steady beating during the early part of 2016 from ANSF, US airstrikes in addition to heavy attacks from the Taliban. In Helmand and Farah Provinces,

Taliban fighters have greatly eroded IS affiliates. The IS experiment in Afghanistan has proven to be largely unsuccessful in 2016. News reports identify that hundreds of IS loyalists have been killed, however, estimates range their organizational strength at 1,000­3,000 (Sisk 1). At the time of this writing, it is difficult to gauge the extent of damage to IS Khorasan.

McGee 54

Works Cited

Achakzai, Saeed Ali. "Taliban Replaces Slain Top Commander with Brother." Reuters. Thomson ​ ​ Reuters, 15 May 2007. Web. 15 Apr. 2016.

Adair­Toteff, C. "Max Weber's Charismatic Prophets." History of the Human Sciences 27.1 ​ ​ (2014): 3­20. Sage. Web. 14 Apr. 2016. ​ ​ Adeel, Mirwais. "Hekmatyar’s Party to Support ISIS in Fight against Taliban." Khaama Press ​ KP Afghan News Agency RSS. Khaama Press, 15 Apr. 2016. Web. 15 Apr. 2016. ​ Afghanistan. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Counter Narcotics. Research and Law

Enforcement Directorates. Afghanistan Interprovincial Opiate Trafficking Dynamics. ​ ​ Kabul: n.p., 2013. Print.

Afghanistan. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Illicit Crop Monitoring Program.

Monitoring of Drug Flow in Afghanistan. Kabul: United Nations Office on Drugs and ​ Crime, 2007. Print.

Ahmed, Azam. "Taliban Assault on Afghan Compound Leaves Dozens Dead." The New York ​

McGee 55

Times. The New York Times, 03 Apr. 2013. Web. 25 Apr. 2016. ​ Anonymous. "Afghan Taliban Splinter Group Names Mullah Rasool as Leader." BBC News. ​ ​ BBC News Services, 04 Nov. 2015. Web. 19 Apr. 2016.

Anonymous. "BBC NEWS | South Asia | Taleban Sack Military Commander." BBC News. BBC, ​ ​ 29 Dec. 2007. Web. 18 Apr. 2016.

Anonymous. "Biography of Mullah Muhammad Omar Mujahid." Inayatullah Kakar. N.p., 06 ​ ​ Apr. 2015. Web. 15 Apr. 2016.

Anonymous. "IS Fighters Run Training Centre, Find Foothold in Farah." Pajhwok Afghan News. ​ ​ Pajhwok Afghan News, 14 Jan. 2015. Web. 14 Jan. 2015.

Anonymous. "IS Literature Circulated in Parts of KP." The Dawn. N.p., 04 Sept. 2014. Web. 15 ​ ​ Apr. 2016.

Anonymous. "ISIS Active in South Afghanistan, Officials Confirm for First Time." CBSNews. ​ ​ CBS Interactive, 12 Jan. 2015. Web. 25 Apr. 2016.

Anonymous. "Mullah Mansoor Deployed 600 Militants to Fight Mullah Dadullah in Zabul."

Khaama Press KP Afghan News Agency RSS. Khaama Press, 16 Apr. 2016. Web. 15 Apr. ​ 2016.

Anonymous. "Taliban Leader Mullah Mansoor Dadullah Joined ISIS, the Terror Group Claims."

Khaama Press. Khaama Press, 08 Sept. 2015. Web. 13 Apr. 2016. ​ Boghart, Lori Plotkin. "The Terrorist Funding Disconnect with Qatar and Kuwait." ­ The ​ Washington Institute for Near East Policy. The Washington Institute, 2 May 2014. Web. ​ 13 Feb. 2016.

McGee 56

Bolton, Doug. "Isis Executes 10 Men in Afghanistan for 'apostasy' by Blowing Them up." The ​ Independent. Independent Digital News and Media, 10 Aug. 2015. Web. 09 Apr. 2016. ​ Brook, Tom Vanden. "Afghan Insurgents Match Surge with More IEDs." Afghan Insurgents ​ Match Surge with More IEDs ­ USATODAY.com. USA Today, 10 Jan. 2011. Web. 24 ​ Apr.

2016.

Byrne, Hannah, John Krzyzaniak, and Qasim Khan. "The Death of Mullah Omar and the Rise of

ISIS in Afghanistan." Institute for the Study of War (2015): 1­9. Institute for the Study of ​ ​ ​ War. Institute for the Study of War, 17 Aug. 2015. Web. 13 Apr. 2016. ​ Clark, Kate. "Taliban Claim Weapons Supplied by Iran." The Telegraph. Telegraph Media ​ ​ Group, 14 Sept. 2008. Web. 25 Apr. 2016.

Donati, Jessica, and Mirwais Harooni. "Awash in Opium, Afghan 'wild West' Slips from Kabul's

Grasp." Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 17 Feb. 2015. Web. 19 Feb. 2015. ​ ​ Dressler, Jeffrey. "Counterinsurgency in Helmand." Understanding War. Institute for the Study ​ ​ of War, Jan. 2011. Web. 24 Apr. 2016.

Dulac, Chad. "Team Transfers Farah Base to Afghan Control." DoDLive. The Department of ​ ​ Defense, 5 Nov. 2013. Web. 25 Apr. 2016.

Farrell, Theo, and Antonio Giustozzi. "The Taliban at War: Inside the Helmand Insurgency,

2004­2012." International Affairs 89.4 (2013): 845­71. Web. 16 Apr. 2016. ​ ​ Galula, David, and John A. Nagl. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. Westport, ​ ​ CT: Praeger Security International, 2006. Print.

Gavrilis, George. The Dynamics of Interstate Boundaries. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2008. ​ ​

McGee 57

Print.

Ghanizadah. "11 ISIS Loyalists including a Foreigner Killed in Nangarhar Airstrike." Khaama ​ Press KP Afghan News Agency RSS. Khaama Press, 15 Apr. 2016. Web. 15 Apr. 2016. ​ Gitau, Beatrice. "Is Top ISIS Leader Hafiz Saeed Dead? (+video)." The Christian Science ​ Monitor. The Christian Science Monitor, 11 July 2015. Web. 15 Apr. 2016. ​ Giustozzi, Antonio. Taliban Networks in Afghanistan. Ed. Marc Genest and Andrea Dew. ​ ​ Newport, RI: US Naval War College, Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups,

2012. Print. 2011­2012.

Gul, Imtiaz. The Most Dangerous Place: Pakistan's Lawless Frontier. New York, NY: Viking, ​ ​ 2010. Print.

Hyman, Anthony, and Anthony Hyman. Afghanistan under Soviet Domination, 1964­83. New ​ ​ York: St. Martin's, 1984. Print.

Jackson, David. "Obama Hails End of Combat Operations in Afghanistan." USA Today. Gannett, ​ ​ 28 Dec. 2014. Web. 08 Apr. 2016.

Kemp, Robert. "Counterinsurgency in Nangarhar Province, Eastern Aghanistan, 2004­2008."

Military Review 90.6 (2010): 34­42. Print. ​ Khaldūn, Ibn, Franz Rosenthal, and N. J. Dawood. The Muqaddimah, an Introduction to History. ​ Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1969. Print.

Khan, Mohammad Zubair, and Rob Crilly. "Mullah Omar's Son Says He Cannot Support New

Taliban Leader." The Telegraph. Telegraph Media Group, 31 July 2015. Web. 15 Apr. ​ ​ 2016.

McGee 58

Kumar, Nikhil. "ISIS Claims Suicide Bombing in Afghanistan That Killed 35." Time. Time Inc, ​ ​ 18 Apr. 2015. Web. 8 Apr. 2016.

Lamothe, Dan. "Drug Raids in Afghanistan Choke off Funding for Taliban." Battle Rattle. The ​ ​ Marine Corps Times, 03 Nov. 2011. Web. 29 Nov. 2015.

Laub, Zachary. "The Taliban in Afghanistan." Council on Foreign Relations. Council on Foreign ​ ​ Relations, 4 July 2014. Web. 15 Apr. 2016.

Mahmud, Husayn Ibn. The Giant Man: Biography of Mullah Umar: Exposing a Sensational ​ Taliban Leader, Mullah Muhammad Umar. Jakarta: Ar­Rahmah Media, 2007. Print. ​

Mallet, Victor, and May Joeng. "UK Forces and US Marines End Afghanistan Combat

Operations ­ FT.com." Financial Times. The Financial Times, 26 Oct. 2015. Web. 25 ​ ​ Apr.

2016.

Marcus, Jonathan. "Afghanistan Taliban: British Military Deployed to Helmand." BBC News. ​ ​ BBC News Services, 22 Dec. 2015. Web. 24 Apr. 2016.

Mashal, Mujib. "Hekmatyar's Never­ending Afghan War." ­ Al Jazeera English. Al Jazeera, 28 ​ ​ Jan. 2012. Web. 15 Apr. 2016.

Mercure, James M. "Marines." 1st Marine Division. The United States Marine Corps, 16 Nov. ​ ​ 2008. Web. 25 Apr. 2016.

Motlagh, Jason. "The Bombing at Bala Baluk." VQR Online. The University of Virginia, 1 Apr. ​ ​ 2010. Web. 25 Apr. 2016.

Noor, Abdullah. "Senior Taliban Figure Caught in Pakistan ­ USATODAY.com." Senior Taliban ​

McGee 59

Figure Caught in Pakistan ­ USATODAY.com. USA Today, 11 Feb. 2008. Web. 15 Apr. ​ 2016.

Nordland, Rod. "In Afghanistan, New Group Begins Campaign of Terror." The New York Times. ​ ​ The New York Times, 19 May 2012. Web. 18 Apr. 2016.

Nordland, Rod. "Troop ‘Surge’ in Afghanistan Ends With Mixed Results." The New York Times. ​ ​ The New York Times, 21 Sept. 2012. Web. 08 Apr. 2016.

Peters, Gretchen. Seeds of Terror: How Drugs, Thugs, and Crime Are Reshaping the Afghan ​ War. ​ New York: Picador, 2010. Print.

Popalzai, Massoud, Laura Smith­Spark, and Elliot C. McLaughlin. "Taliban Confirm Mullah

Omar's Death, Name New Leader." CNN. Cable News Network, 31 July 2015. Web. 09 ​ ​ Apr. 2016.

Rathod, Saraswati. A Tale of Two Airstrikes: The Effect of Mass­Casualty Airstrikes on Security ​ in Farah and Kunduz Provinces. Thesis. Wellesley College, 2015. Wellesley, MA: ​ Wellesley College, 2015. Print.

Reedy, Justin, John Gastil, and Michael Gabbay. "Terrorism and Small Groups: An Analytical

Framework for Group Disruption." Small Group Research 44.6 (2013): 599­626. Sage. ​ ​ ​ ​ Web. 13 Apr. 2015.

Ruttig, Thomas. "The Mullah Dadullah Front: A Search for Clues." Afghanistan Analysts ​ Network. Afghanistan Analysts Network, 22 May 2012. Web. 18 Apr. 2016. ​

McGee 60

Sajid, Islamuddin. "Hafiz Saeed Khan: The Former Taliban Warlord Taking Isis to India and

Pakistan." International Business Times RSS. IBTimes Co. Ltd., 19 Jan. 2015. Web. 15 ​ ​ Apr. 2016.

Schmitt, Eric. "Many Sources Feed Taliban's War Chest." The Independent. Independent Digital ​ ​ News and Media, 18 Oct. 2009. Web. 27 Nov. 2015.

Sengupta, Kim. "Isis in Afghanistan Is a Disaster Waiting to Happen." The Independent. ​ ​ Independent Digital News and Media, 11 Mar. 2015. Web. 27 Nov. 2015.

Sherazi, Zahir Shah. "Six Top TTP Commanders Announce Allegiance to Islamic State's

Baghdadi." Dawn News. Dawn News, 14 Oct. 2014. Web. 15 Apr. 2016. ​ ​ Sisk, Richard. "US to Shift Troops to Helmand as More Airstrikes Target ISIS." Military.com. ​ ​ Military.com, 11 Feb. 2016. Web. 01 May 2016.

Stancati, Margherita, and Ehsanullah Amiri. "Haqqani Leaders Detained in Persian Gulf, Not

Inside Afghanistan." WSJ. The Wall Street Journal, 19 Oct. 2014. Web. 3 Feb. 2015. ​ ​ Strick, Alex. "Reading the Afghan Taliban: 67 Sources You Should Be Studying." RSS. A ​ ​ Different Place, 26 Dec. 2015. Web. 15 Apr. 2016.

Tanner, Stephen. Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the ​ Taliban. New York: Da Capo, 2002. Print. ​ Tawil, Camille. "Taliban Funding Traced to Gulf Countries." Central Asia Online. Central Asia ​ ​ Online, 02 Dec. 2010. Web. 03 Feb. 2015.

Totakhil, Habib Khan, and Jessica Donati. "Afghan Forces Dislodge Islamic State From Eastern

Stronghold." WSJ. The Wall Street Journal, 21 Feb. 2016. Web. 01 May 2016. ​ ​ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Afghanistan Opium Survey 2014: Cultivation and ​

McGee 61

Production. N.p.: n.p., 2014. Print. ​ United States. Department of the Treasury. The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network. The ​ Hawala Alternative Remittance System and Its Role in Money Laundering. By Patrick M. ​ Jost and Hajrit Singh Sandhu. Vienna: United States Department of the Treasury, 2003.

Print.

United States Drug Enforcement Administration. Multi­National Operation Nets $55.9 Million ​ Heroin Seizure in Afghanistan. United States Drug Enforcement Administration. Unites ​ ​ ​ States Drug Enforcement Administration, 29 Oct. 2010. Web.

United States of America. Congressional Research Service. The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and ​ Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11. By Amy Belasco. N.p.: ​ Congressional Research Service, 2014. Web. 28 Sept. 2015.

Wadsam. "USAID Suspends Work on the Rehabilitation of Darunta Dam." Wadsam Afghan ​ Business News Portal. Wadsam, 04 Mar. 2013. Web. 29 Apr. 2016. ​ Walsh, Declan. "Pakistani Militant, Price on Head, Lives in Open." The New York Times. The ​ ​ New York Times, 06 Feb. 2013. Web. 15 Apr. 2016.

Watson, Ivan. "Mullah Omar Still Leader of Afghan Taliban, Group Says." CNN. Cable News ​ ​ Network, 06 Apr. 2015. Web. 15 Apr. 2016.

Whitlock, Craig. "Afghan Insurgents' Diverse Funding Sources Pose Challenges." Washington ​ Post. The Washington Post, 27 Sept. 2009. Web. 13 Feb. 2015. ​ Wilner, Alex S. "Targeted Killings in Afghanistan: Measuring Coercion and Deterrence in

Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency." Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 33.4 (2010): ​ ​ 307­29. Web. 13 Apr. 2016.

McGee 62

Yadav, Vikash. "The Myth of the Moderate Taliban." Asian Affairs: An American Review 37.3 ​ ​ (2010): 133­45. Web. 13 Apr. 2016.

Zaeef, Abdul Salam, Alex Strick Van Linschoten, and Felix Kuehn. My Life with the Taliban. ​ ​ New York: Columbia UP, 2010. Print.

Zaidi, Syed Manzar Abbas. "Tribalism, Islamism, Leadership and the Assabiyyas." Journal for ​ the Study of Religions and Ideologies 8.25 (2010): 133­54. Web. 14 Apr. 2016. ​