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Primary Contributing Factors to the Disintegration of the Taliban and the Rise of the Islamic State in Afghanistan

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Primary Contributing Factors to the Disintegration of the Taliban and the Rise of the Islamic State in Afghanistan ACCELERATING RADICALISM: PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE TALIBAN AND THE RISE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE IN AFGHANISTAN Item Type text; Electronic Thesis Authors McGee, Anthony Publisher The University of Arizona. Rights Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author. Download date 26/09/2021 01:09:27 Item License http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/630292 McGee 1 ACCELERATING RADICALISM: PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE TALIBAN AND THE RISE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE IN AFGHANISTAN By ANTHONY MCGEE ___________________ A Thesis Submitted to The Honors College In Partial Fulfillment of the Bachelor’s Degree With Honors in Middle Eastern and North African Studies THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA MAY 2016 Approved by: __________________________ Leila Hudson School of Middle Eastern and North African Studies McGee 2 Abstract The intended goal of this research project is to elaborate on the methods and conditions which contributed to the dramatic entrance of IS Khurasan into the fray of the Afghan insurgency. Though the insurgent group has witnessed short lived success, they have openly challenged the Taliban in direct action in a bold attempt to supplant the dominant insurgent element. It is necessary to evaluate the current literature on the Afghan conflict with a focus on the years following the Taliban’s formation in 1994 to the recent power struggle between the rival organizations. This provides an understanding of the strategic decision making processes apparent in the advances of IS Khurasan in the provinces of Nangarhar, Helmand, and Farah. A bulk of the material related specifically to IS Khurasan is derived from journalistic sources due to the extremely current nature of this insurgency within an insurgency. The sensitive nature of information related to key battles and current military operations, limits the research of the IS phenomenon in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, a more complete evaluation of these events will not be available for a number of years. McGee 3 Glossary of Acronyms ANA: Afghan National Army ​ ANP: Afghan National Police ​ ANSF: Afghan National Security Forces ​ COIN: Counterinsurgency ​ FATA: Federally Administrated Tribal Areas ​ IED: Improvised Explosive Device ​ ISAF: International Security and Assistance Force ​ ISI: Inter­Service Intelligence, the Pakistani military’s clandestine service ​ ISIS: The Islamic State in Iraq and Sham, a global radical Islamist organization under the ​ leadership of Abu Bakr al­Baghdadi which seeks to establish a global Caliphate with sovereignty over the greater Islamic Community. The organization is also referred to as IS: Islamic State, ISIL: the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and Daesh: from the Arabic acronym, al­Dawlah ​ al­Islamiyya fi al­Iraq wa al­Sham. GIROA: The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the current internationally ​ recognized government authority in Afghanistan. NGO: non­governmental organization ​ NWFP: North­West Frontier Province ​ OEF: Operation Enduring Freedom, the U.S. Government’s blanket official title for for military ​ operations in the Global War on Terror. TTP: Tehreek­i­Taliban Pakistan ​ McGee 4 Introduction At the tail end of 2014, Afghanistan witnessed a change in the dynamics of its insurgency with the end of American combat operations in Afghanistan. The most prominent of these developments is the rise of Islamic State (IS) splinter groups in Nangarhar, Helmand and Farah provinces. Operating under the organizational name, Wilayat Khurasan or IS Khurasan, the largest of these splinter groups was able to establish a foothold in Nangarhar province and sustain combat operations against Afghan security forces and their Taliban rivals. In Helmand and Farah, they were never able to obtain the base of support needed to be anything more than a nuisance to local Taliban groups. IS Khurasan has all but crumbled in the wake of joint military operations in Nangarhar province; however, their existence represents a symptom of a much larger affliction plaguing the Taliban organizationally. The advent of rival insurgent groups with a narrative counter to the Taliban brand of religio­ethnic nationalism is indicative of an unprecedented organizational schism in the movement’s history. Wilayat Khurasan represents a denial of Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mansoor’s authority as Amir al­Mu’mineen, an Arabic honorific which translates to Commander ​ ​ of the Faithful. Consequently, IS affiliates in Afghanistan have pledged the biy’ah (oath of ​ ​ allegiance) to Abu Bakr al­Baghdadi, leader of the militant organization Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS, IS or ISIL). Wilayat Khurasan and similar self styled IS affiliates have not been officially endorsed or recognized by the parent organization. Initial successes for the IS splinter groups include the seizure of strategically important districts within Nangarhar. In order to explain the nascent success of IS loyalists in Afghanistan, it is important to understand the importance of seized territories to the illicit infrastructure of the McGee 5 insurgent economy. The organizational genesis of rival insurgent groups is focused in three provinces which are key to the Afghan narcotics trade in addition to a variety of other clandestine revenue generation efforts. Access to the narcotics and smuggling pipeline allows the splinter groups financial support for their combat operations. The most successful group in Nangarhar has the easiest access to safe haven in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the North West Frontier Provinces. Ultimately, the formation of IS splinter groups in Afghanistan is the first significant schism in the Taliban dominated insurgency. The spread of IS Khurasan can be attributed to opportunistic exploitation of illicit financial networks to fund direct action against the Taliban. The death of the Taliban spiritual figurehead and the two year cover up have weakened the legitimacy of the movement’s leadership. Finally, the recent withdrawal of coalition forces after thirteen years of sustained action against the Afghan insurgency created a security vacuum which was subsequently filled by the ambitious leadership of IS Khurasan. The foundation of rival insurgent organizations represents a growing frustration with a weakened Taliban. In the cases of the Nangarhar and Helmand offshoots, the split can be traced to internal strife related to the Taliban’s suspiciously absent supreme leader. The recent announcement of Mullah Muhammad Omar’s death in 2015 by the movement’s current leader, Mullah Akhtar Mansoor, further exacerbated these internal rifts. At the time of the announcement, Mullah Mansoor had been leading the organization in secret for two years following the death of Mullah Omar. Additionally, pre existing rivalries and internal power struggles have provided avenues of opportunity for independently minded insurgent leaders to break away and exploit the lucrative illicit economy. McGee 6 External erosion by nearly fifteen years of counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan is the final factor contributing to the weakened Taliban in the areas of concern. In provinces which have witnessed heavy military footprints, in relation to the insurgent strength in Farah and as a result of the insurgent strength in Helmand, hardcore Taliban fighters were removed at a rate exceeding the replacement capacity. The improved security situations following American clearing operations were short lived and created a security vacuum with the cessation of ground combat operations. Background During a ceremony in Kabul on 28 December 2014, President Obama announced an end to American combat operations in Afghanistan. The ceremony marked a formal end to thirteen years of sustained conflict, which began with the September 11th attacks. As a result, United States Forces were scaled down from 68,000 service members to approximately 13,500. They were with advisory and training roles in addition to counter­terrorism operations (Jackson 1). This is in accordance with the end of the troop ‘surge’ in 2012 (Nordland 1). The withdrawal of the bulk of coalition troops after five years of intensive counterinsurgency campaigns created a weakened security posture, which was exploited by an emboldened Taliban and the entrance of IS (Islamic State) affiliates to Afghanistan. ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Sham), ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant), IS (Islamic State), or Daesh (al­Dawla al­Islamiya fi al­Iraq wa al­Sham) created international ​ ​ alarm with the incredible speed and efficiency of their military operations against American trained Iraqi security forces, their rapid occupation of territories in Syria and Iraq, and their McGee 7 treatment of religious minority groups in controlled territories. Afghanistan’s IS affiliates pledged fealty to the organization’s founding leader, Abu Bakr al­Baghdadi, under the name IS Khurasan. Currently, there is no evidence of an official endorsement from the parent organization and very little to suggest the promotion of Central Asian IS offshoots from external sources. Rather, the shift in loyalty was a break with the Taliban dominated insurgency and refusal of Mullah Muhammad Omar’s leadership
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