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Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan

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Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan THE ARTS This PDF document was made available CHILD POLICY from www.rand.org as a public service of CIVIL JUSTICE EDUCATION the RAND Corporation. ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT Jump down to document6 HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit NATIONAL SECURITY research organization providing POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY objective analysis and effective SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY solutions that address the challenges SUBSTANCE ABUSE facing the public and private sectors TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY around the world. 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RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND mono- graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. RAND COUNTERINSURGENCY STUDYtVOLUME 4 Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan Seth G. Jones Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense Approved for public release; distribution unlimited NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE The research described in this report was prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The research was conducted in the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the OSD, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community under Contract W74V8H-06-C-0002. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Jones, Seth G., 1972– Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan / Seth G. Jones. p. cm. — (Rand counterinsurgency study ; v.4) Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978-0-8330-4133-3 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Afghanistan—Politics and government—2001– 2. Counterinsurgency— Afghanistan. 3. Afghan War, 2001–—Commando operations. 4. Counterinsurgency. I. Title. DS371.4.J66 2008 958.104'7—dc22 2008016686 Cover photo by Army Staff Sgt. Michael L. Casteel The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. R® is a registered trademark. Cover design by Stephen Bloodsworth © Copyright 2008 RAND Corporation All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from RAND. Published 2008 by the RAND Corporation 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: [email protected] Preface This book examines counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan fol- lowing the overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001. It is based on repeated trips to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India in 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008. It focuses on the early stages of the insurgency—from 2002 until 2008—and examines why and how the insurgency began. It also draws lessons from the broader literature on counterinsurgency warfare and provides recommendations to help the United States develop capabilities and improve performance in future counterinsur- gency operations. The focus of this research is on the U.S. military. However, since the actions of other U.S. government agencies, coun- tries, international organizations such as the United Nations (UN), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are obviously important, they are discussed where appropriate. The results should be of interest to a broad audience of policymakers and academics concerned with coun- terinsurgency and the related issues of state-building, nation-building, and stability operations. This research was sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combat- ant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community. For more information on RAND’s International Security and Defense Policy Center, contact the Director, James Dobbins. He can be reached by iii iv Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan email at [email protected]; by phone at 703-413-1100, exten- sion 5134; or by mail at the RAND Corporation, 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050. More information about RAND is available at www.rand.org. Contents Preface ............................................................................. iii Figures .............................................................................vii Table ................................................................................ ix Summary .......................................................................... xi Acknowledgments ...............................................................xv Abbreviations ................................................................... xvii CHAPTER ONE Introduction ....................................................................... 1 CHAPTER TWO Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare....................................... 7 CHAPTER THREE The Age of Insurgency ..........................................................25 CHAPTER FOUR Insurgents and Their Support Network .....................................37 CHAPTER FIVE Afghan Government and Security Forces ...................................67 CHAPTER SIX U.S. and Coalition Forces ..................................................... 87 CHAPTER SEVEN Recommendations ............................................................. 111 v vi Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan APPENDIX Insurgencies Since 1945 ...................................................... 135 References ....................................................................... 139 About the Author .............................................................. 157 Figures 2.1. A Counterinsurgency Framework .................................12 2.2. A Framework for Afghanistan ......................................14 2.3. Competency of Security Forces and Success of Counterinsurgencies .................................................16 2.4. Government Popularity and Success ............................. 20 2.5. External Support for Insurgents and Success .....................21 2.6. Sanctuary of Insurgents and Success ............................. 23 4.1. The Afghan Insurgent Front ........................................39 4.2. Pakistan Tribal Areas ................................................45 4.3. Insurgent Targets, 2002–2006 .....................................53 5.1. Opium Poppy Cultivation, 1986–2007 ...........................81 5.2. Afghanistan’s Rule of Law, 1996–2006 .......................... 84 6.1. Peak Military Presence per Capita .................................91 7.1. Variation in Indigenous Capacity ................................ 115 7.2. Example of Grid Methodology ................................... 125 vii Table 7.1. Example of Counterinsurgency Capabilities ................... 113 ix Summary Following the initial success of U.S. and Afghan forces in overthrow- ing the Taliban regime in 2001, an increasingly violent insurgency began to develop. A mixed group of insurgents comprised of the Tali- ban, Hezb-i-Islami, the Haqqani network, foreign fighters, local tribes, and criminal organizations began a sustained effort to overthrow the Afghan government. U.S. and coalition efforts in Afghanistan offer a useful opportunity to assess what works—and what does not—in counterinsurgency warfare. This study examines the beginning of the insurgency in Afghanistan and asks three major questions. First, what was the nature of the insurgency? Second, what factors have contrib- uted to the rise of insurgencies more broadly and to the insurgency in Afghanistan in particular? Third, what capabilities should the U.S. military consider developing to improve its ability to wage effective counterinsurgency operations? The core argument of this study is that the United States should focus its resources on developing capabilities that help improve the capacity of the indigenous government and its security forces to wage counterinsurgency
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