The Clash of Civilizations
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Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: a Political Perspective on Culture and Terrorism
MAHMOOD MAMDANI Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: A Political Perspective on Culture and Terrorism ABSTRACT The link between Islam and terrorism became a central media concern following September 11, resulting in new rounds of "culture talk. This talk has turned religious experience into a political category, differentiating 'good Muslims" from "bad Mus- lims, rather than terrorists from civilians. The implication is undisguised: Whether in Afghanistan, Palestine, or Pakistan, Islam must be quarantined and the devil must be exorcized from it by a civil war between good Muslims and bad Muslims. This article suggests that we lift the quarantine and turn the cultural theory of politics on its head. Beyond the simple but radical suggestion that if there are good Muslims and bad Muslims, there must also be good Westerners and bad Westerners, I question the very tendency to read Islamist poli- tics as an effect of Islamic civilization—whether good or bad—and Western power as an effect of Western civilization. Both those poli- tics and that power are born of an encounter, and neither can be understood outside of the history of that encounter. Cultural explanations of political outcomes tend to avoid history and issues. Thinking of individuals from "traditional" cultures in authentic and original terms, culture talk dehistoricizes the construction of political identities. This article places the terror of September 11 in a his- torical and political context. Rather than a residue of a premodern culture in modern politics, terrorism is best understood as a modern construction. Even when it harnesses one or another aspect of tradition and culture, the result is a modern ensemble at the service of a modern project. -
Appendix: a Short Note on Karl Marx, Max Weber and Arnold Toynbee
Appendix: A Short Note on Karl Marx, Max Weber and Arnold Toynbee 1 Societies as Sequence of Modes of Production (Marx) In terms of historical events, the teaching of Karl Marx became most influential. Understood or misunderstood, it turned into (to use his own words) a material force in many parts of the world. Thus Marxism does not deserve our attention merely as an alternative perception but also as a social phenomenon, an object of our observation. Four basic assumptions distinguish the Marxist school from all others. First, that the main driving force in history is the class struggle between those who exploit and those who are exploited; this in turn presupposes that economic considerations combined with the division of labour are the most important type of motivation for human action. Second, that with the exception of the earliest (prehistorical) stage of development, which can be described as primitive communism, the whole history of mankind can be divided up according to the main positions and fronts in the class struggle, which in their turn alter with the changes in the main type of means of production and type of ownership, thus constituting the sequence of social formations. Third, that the above-mentioned mode of human relationships will be brought to an end and replaced by a more harmonious relationship in the future. Fourth, that this will happen as a result of conscious action by that class which bears the brunt of the most recent type of exploitation, and that it will happen under the ideological leadership of its vanguard, that is, of those who have got the ‘right understanding’ of the laws of history. -
“Clash of Civilizations”?
Volume 5, No. 2-3 104 How Inevitable Is A “Clash of Civilizations”? Chen LI Jesus College, University of Cambridge, UK Email: [email protected] Abstract: The period since September 11 attacks in 2001 has witnessed intense debates over to what extent a ―clash of civilizations‖ is inevitable. This paper argues that the ―clash of civilizations‖ thesis is a mistaken paradigm of understanding the Post-Cold War international order. While cultural and religious identities have increasingly become a source of political mobilization in the Post-Cold War world, the ―clash of civilizations‖ thesis wrongly presumes that the civilization identities can override other major driving forces of political mobilization, which includes nation-state, global capitalism, and global governance based on common liberal values. All of these forces run against and will constrain the possibility of a clash of civilizations. Key Words: Clash of civilizations, Nation-state, Global capitalism, Global governance, China Journal of Cambridge Studies 105 1. INTRODUCTION Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, there have been heated debates on the future of international order. The optimistic views argue that with the triumph of liberal democracy and market economy, the end of the Cold War has marked the end of history and the perpetual universal peace is eventually coming (Kant, 1970; Fukuyama, 1992). However, sharply contrasting these views, Huntington (1993a, b) provocatively argues that world peace is under severe threat of a ―clash of civilizations‖1, which will dominate global politics in the Post-Cold War world. According to his analysis, the Post-Cold War world is divided into seven or eight civilizations2, the fault lines between which will be the battle lines of the future. -
Methodology of the Cognition of History of A
© Journal «Bulletin Social-Economic and Humanitarian Research», № 1(3), 2019, e-ISSN 2658-5561 Date of publication: February 15, 2019 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.2562161 Historical Sciences METHODOLOGY OF THE COGNITION OF HISTORY OF A. TOYNBEE Chekmeneva, Tatyana Gennadievna1 1Candidate of Political Sciences, Associate Professor, Voronezh State Technical University, Street 20 years of October, 84, Voronezh, Russia, E-mail: [email protected] Abstract: The question of the dual orientation of the historical process is currently being sharply debated. On the one hand, in the course of history, there is a desire for unity and integrity of the human community, on the other - we see a tendency for each subject to preserve the social reality of his independence, uniqueness and individuality. This contradiction is not a product of the theoretical reflection of researchers; this phenomenon has objective grounds hidden in the dialectical essence of social phenomena, the nature of which has not been sufficiently studied. This circumstance leads to the fact that researchers disagree about the driving mechanisms and the nature of the historical process. Some highlight the idea of unity, others the idea of identity. This is where various versions of the course of history emerge, among which the most debatable in social philosophy are concepts based on two alternative approaches - linear-formational and cultural-civilizational. Modern science can adequately and accurately describe the specific societies that existed in the historical process, but does not have the tools that would clearly define the system-forming bases of civilizations. Thus, there is a crisis in the modern methodology of socio-historical knowledge. -
International Terrorism and the Clash of Civilizations
CORE Metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk Provided by LSE Research Online Eric Neumayer and Thomas Plümper International terrorism and the clash of civilizations Article (Accepted version) (Refereed) Original citation: Neumayer, Eric and Plümper, Thomas (2009) International terrorism and the clash of civilizations. British journal of political science, 39 (4). pp. 711-734. DOI: 10.1017/S0007123409000751 © 2009 Cambridge University Press This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/20414/ Available in LSE Research Online: October 2010 LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website. This document is the author’s final manuscript accepted version of the journal article, incorporating any revisions agreed during the peer review process. Some differences between this version and the published version may remain. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 0 International Terrorism and the Clash of Civilizations SECOND REVISED VERSION March 2008 Eric -
The Social Construction of the Clash of Civilizations
Constructing a New Imperial Order? The War in Iraq and the Ideology of Clashism Seifudein Adem* Less than a month after terror attacks hit New York and Washington D. C. in September 2001, America launched a war in Afghanistan. The result was abetting and quick: the Taliban regime was dislodged from power in a little more than a month; Al Qaeda, the parent organization of the perpetrators of the attacks, was driven out of its caves and was walloped. A debate was then sparked as to what this portends for the future of world politics. Observers and analysts all agreed on the epochal significance of the chain of events. On its deeper meaning, however, they were deeply divided.1 Some saw the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan as the beginning of the clash of civilizations while others perceived it as heralding the age of the New Imperialism; still for others it marked the beginning of the Third World War. It is useful to note here that many observers seemed sometimes to overlook that these scenarios are necessarily not mutually exclusive.2 The Anglo-American invasion of Iraq in March 2003 appears, propitiously, to shed the much-needed light on these issues. The central argument of this paper is that the Anglo- American invasion of Iraq in the spring of 2003 demonstrates the world has been plunged into a clash of civilizations driven by America’s new imperial impulse—a historical impulse, which has maintained a clear link to the past.3 The paper focuses on political and academic discourse on the contemporary scene to explore how a new universe of discourse paralleling an emergent hegemonic order is being socially constructed. -
The Clash of Civilizations: a Theological Perspective”
Dr. David Naugle Dallas Baptist University The Friday Symposium February 1, 2002 “The Clash of Civilizations: A Theological Perspective” “Civilizations are the ultimate human tribes, and the clash of civilizations is tribal conflict on a global scale.” Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, 207. "Any kingdom divided against itself is laid waste; and any city or house divided against itself shall not stand.” -Matt. 12:25 Should I be asked . whether I would propose the West, such as it is today, as a model to my country (the Soviet Union), I would frankly have to answer negatively. No, I could not recommend your society as an ideal for the transformation of ours.” Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, “A World Split Apart” (Commencement Address at Harvard University, June 8, 1978) “The multitude of nations indicates not only the manifold quality of God’s creative power but also a judgment, for the disorder in the international world, which our narrator [of Genesis 10-11] regards as the sad conclusion, was not willed by God but is punishment for the sinful rebellion against God. Gerhard von Rad, Genesis, 152. Introduction On more than one occasion, President George W. Bush has described the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, as fostering “a monumental battle of good versus evil.” In this battle, there has been no doubt in his mind (or in ours) regarding who is on the side of good and who is on the side of evil. Though some have winced at the President’s use of such absolute moral terms to portray the tragic events of that fateful day, -
CLASH of CIVILIZATIONS’ THEORY: Through the Eyes of ‘The Rest’
Vol. 1(2), pp. 42-104, October 2013 DOI: 10.14662/IJPSD2013.005 International Journal of Political Copy©right2014 Science and Development Author(s) retain the copyright of this article © 2013 Academic Research Journals http://www.academicresearchjournals.org/IJPSD/Index.html Full Length Research A ‘NON WESTERN’ READING OF THE ‘CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS’ THEORY: Through the Eyes of ‘The Rest’ Memoona Sajjad Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan. E-mail: [email protected] Accepted 25 September, 2013 The Clash of Civilizations theory is thoroughly rooted in its context, which makes it a post Cold War paradigm vindicating post Cold War American foreign policy. Huntington‘s thought falls exactly in line with the repertoire of Orientalist discourse in the West. His assumptions are drawn from secondary sources, are reductionist and simplistic. The real agenda underlying the thesis presented by Huntington is perpetuating Western dominance and hegemony on the globe through the creation of a new enemy and the generation of fear and hatred against it in the public mind. The ‗Clash‘ theory fits well with the growing needs of America‘s powerful and expansive military-industrial complex defined by its Capitalist ideology. The rhetoric of the Clash of Civilizations works well to disguise the geopolitical and strategic interests of the West in the Muslim world. ‗The West and the Rest‘ is an artificial construct based on historical fallacies and sharpening cleavages in order to maintain a ‗wartime status‘ in the Western mind. Western policy and rhetoric after September 11 seems to have officially adopted the Clash of Civilizations theory. -
The International Journal of Illich Studies ISSN 1948-4666
The International Journal of Illich Studies ISSN 1948-4666 Comments on Ivan Illich’s Thesis on Arnold Joseph Toynbee Helmut Woll Ivan Illich received his doctorate in 1951 in Salzburg for his thesis on “The Philosophical Foundations of Historiography in Arnold Joseph Toynbee’s Work.” This work has not been considered in the discussion of Illich’s scientific writings due to the fact that is not well-known. It was lost for a long time. It is almost one hundred pages long and the appendix consists of a wealth of comments and footnotes. The British historian, Toynbee (1889-1975), was one of the most important universal historians of the 20th century. He worked as a professor in London, while also serving as director of the foreign archives of the Royal Institute of International Affairs and of the archives of the Foreign Office. In 1951, only six volumes of his ten-volume magnum opus, “A Study of History,” had been published. “A Study of History” is often mentioned alongside Oswald Spengler’s famous book, “The Decline of the West.” (1923) Illich writes neither a biography nor does he judge the historian’s accomplishments. He rather tries to systematically ask for the foundations of Toynbee’s philosophical thoughts as it comes to light in his essential writings and lectures since the beginning of “A Study of History.” The work is divided into three main parts: General Regulations, Historical Logic, and Ontology. It follows Toynbee’s reasoning and argumentation and describes these in a factual and objective manner. While doing so, Illich occasionally expresses his sympathy for the work’s brilliant style, original ideas, erudition, and associative method. -
A Brief History of Islamic Civilization from Its Genesis in the Late Nineteenth Century to Its Institutional Entrenchment*
A Brief History of Islamic Civilization from Its Genesis in the Late Nineteenth Century to Its Institutional Entrenchment* KEVIN VAN BLADEL Yale University ([email protected]) Abstract This article sketches the early history of Islamic civilization from its genesis in the late nineteenth century to its institutionalization in the twentieth. Key moments include its enshrinement in journals and a monumental encyclopedia and the flight of European Semitists to the United States. Its institutionalization in the undergraduate curriculum at the University of Chicago in 1956 created a successful model for the subsequent dissemination of Islamic civilization. Working in a committee on general education (the core curriculum) in the social sciences at the University of Chicago, Marshall Hodgson inaugurated Islamic civilization as a subject of university study that was not just for specialists but available to American college students as fulfilling a basic requirement in a liberal arts education. Many other universities followed this practice. Since then, Islamic civilization has come to be shared by the educated public. Today it is an internationally accepted and well- funded entity that confers contested social power but still lacks analytical power. he purpose of this article is briefly to trace the development of Islamic civilization from its beginning in the nineteenth century, in the intellectual context of its formation, to the middle of the twentieth century, when it became a part of Tinstitutions that ensured its reproduction. After that, Islamic civilization becomes too widespread and too various for me to capture in short compass. Others may wish to pursue that difficult task. Nevertheless, I do reflect in conclusion on the ramifications of Islamic civilization for university curricula. -
Anthony Hyman Memorial Lecture
The Anthony Hyman Memorial Lecture School of Oriental and African Studies University of London The lures and perils of gender activism in Afghanistan 2009 Deniz Kandiyoti I feel both honoured and gratified to be offering the 7th Anthony Hyman Memorial Lecture. This gives me the opportunity to acknowledge my debt of gratitude to Tony for his unwavering support and friendship over the years. When I met Tony in 1991 at a conference at SOAS, I was taking my first, rather tentative steps in the direction of becoming a scholar of Central Asia. In the years that followed, I benefited from his unstinting generosity and encouragement. A great deal has happened since, which I feel certain, Tony would have approved of. The Centre of Contemporary Central Asia and the Caucasus was launched in 2001. Central Asian Survey, the journal Tony gave such long and dedicated service to, is since 2006 also based at SOAS. However, what might have come as more of a surprise to Tony is my involvement in Afghanistan. I started to work on Afghanistan in 2002, at the behest of my late friend and colleague, Parvin Paidar, a courageous and vibrant Iranian feminist, who had taken on the challenging task of heading UNIFEM in Kabul. It is at a party at Parvin’s house in Tashkent, while she was still with Save the Children Fund, that a group of us met Tony at a point when we already knew this was going to be his last trip to Central Asia. We lost Parvin in 2005, aged 56. The talk you are about to hear is part of a conversation I would have liked to have had with her-and of course, with Tony. -
Explaining Support for Sectarian Terrorism in Pakistan: Piety, Maslak and Sharia
Religions 2015, 6, 1137–1167; doi:10.3390/rel6041137 OPEN ACCESS religions ISSN 2077-1444 www.mdpi.com/journal/religions Article Explaining Support for Sectarian Terrorism in Pakistan: Piety, Maslak and Sharia C. Christine Fair Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, 3600 N. St., Washington, DC 2007, USA; E-Mail: [email protected]; Tel.: +1-202-687-7898 Academic Editor: John L. Esposito Received: 20 July 2015 / Accepted: 7 September 2015 / Published: 25 September 2015 Abstract: In the discourse around sectarian violence in Pakistan, two concerns are prominent. The first is the contention that piety, or the intensity of Muslim religious practice, predicts support for sectarian and other forms of Islamist violence. The second is the belief that personal preferences for some forms of sharia also explain such support. As I describe herein, scholars first articulated these concerns in the “clash of civilizations” thesis. Subsequent researchers developed them further in the scholarly and policy analytical literatures that explored these linkages through qualitative and quantitative methodologies. I revisit these claims in the particular context of sectarian violence in Pakistan. To do so, I use several questions included in a recent and large national survey of Pakistanis to create indices of both piety and support for three dimensions of sharia. I use these indices as explanatory variables, along with other explanatory and control variables, in a regression analysis of support for sectarian violence, the dependent variable. I find that the piety index and dimensions of sharia support are significant only when district fixed effects are excluded; however, personal characteristics (i.e., the particular school of Islam respondents espouse, ethnicity, several demographics) most consistently predict support for sectarian violence.