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Fm 6-27 Mctp 11-10C the Commander's Handbook on the Law of Land Warfare

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Fm 6-27 Mctp 11-10C the Commander's Handbook on the Law of Land Warfare FM 6-27 MCTP 11-10C THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE AUGUST 2019 DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. This publication supersedes FM 27-10/MCTP 11-10C, dated 18 July 1956. HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS Foreword The lessons of protracted conflict confirm that adherence to the law of armed conflict (LOAC) by the land forces, both in intern ational and non-international armed conflict, must serve as the standard that we train to and apply across the entire range of military operations. Adhering to LOAC enhances the legitimacy of our operations and supports the moral framework of our armed forces. We have learned th at we deviate from these norms to our detriment and risk undercutting both domesti c and international support for our operations. LOAC has been and remains a vital guide for all military operations conducted by the U.S. Governm ent. This fi eld manual provides a general description of the law of land warfare for Soldiers and Marines, delineated as statements of doctrine and practice, to gui de the land forces in conducting di sci plined military operations in accordance with the rule of law. The Department of Defense Law of War Manual (June 20 15, updated December 2016) is the authoritative statement on the law of war for the Department of Defense. In the event of a conflict or discrepancy regarding the legal standards addressed in this publication and th e DOD Law of War Manual, the latter takes precedence. This fi eld manual has been over 20 years in the making and owes mu ch to the judge advocates, Soldiers, Marines, and civilian employees who have endeavored to update The Law of Land Warfare since its publication, as Field Manual (FM) FM 27-10/Marine Corps Tactical Publication (MCTP) 11-lOB.l (changed in 201 7 to MCTP 11- 1O C), in 1956, and the change promulgated in 1976. CHARLES N. PEDE LIEUTENANT GENERAL, U.S. ARMY THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL W. F. MULLEN III MAJOR GENERAL, U.S. MARINE CORPS COMMANDING GENERAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION COMMAND This publication is available at the Army Publishing Directorate site (https://armypubs.army.mil/) and the Central Army Registry site (https://atiam.train.army.mil/catalog/dashboard). *FM 6-27/MCTP 11-10C Field Manual Headquarters No. 6-27 Department of the Army Washington, DC Marine Corps Tactical Publication Headquarters No. 11-10C United States Marine Corps Training and Education Command Quantico, VA, 07 August 2019 The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Land Warfare Contents Page PREFACE..................................................................................................................... v INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ vii Chapter 1 GENERAL BACKGROUND AND BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF ................. ARMED CONFLICT .................................................................................................. 1-1 International Law and Use of Force in International Relations .................................. 1-1 Lex Specialis–The Law of Armed Conflict ................................................................. 1-1 Purposes of the Law of Armed Conflict ..................................................................... 1-2 When the Law of Armed Conflict Applies .................................................................. 1-2 Principles of the Law of Armed Conflict ..................................................................... 1-5 Classes of Persons .................................................................................................. 1-11 Sources of the Law of Armed Conflict ..................................................................... 1-20 Protecting Powers and Humanitarian Organizations .............................................. 1-24 End of Hostilities and LOAC Rules .......................................................................... 1-25 Human Rights Law .................................................................................................. 1-26 Training the Law of Armed Conflict ......................................................................... 1-26 Chapter 2 CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES ................................................................................... 2-1 Practical Guidance for Adhering to LOAC ................................................................. 2-1 Distinction Between Means and Methods of Warfare ............................................... 2-1 Protection of Civilians ................................................................................................ 2-1 Protection of Civilians: A Shared Responsibility........................................................ 2-2 Civilians Taking a Direct Part in Hostilities ................................................................ 2-2 Targeting and Military Objectives .............................................................................. 2-5 Combatants ............................................................................................................. 2-10 Proportionality in Conducting Attacks – Excessive Incidental Harm and Feasible Precautions .............................................................................................................. 2-12 Lawfulness of Certain Methods of Waging Warfare ................................................ 2-15 Good Faith, Perfidy, and Other Unlawful Acts, and Lawful Deception and Ruses of War .......................................................................................................................... 2-24 DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: This publication is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. This publication supersedes FM 27-10/MCTP 11-10C (dated 18 July 1956). i Contents Prohibition Against Compelling Enemy Nationals to Take Part in Military Operations Directed Against Their Own Forces or State .......................................................... 2-28 Treatment of Enemy Property ................................................................................. 2-30 Ensuring Legality of Weapons and Weapon Systems ............................................ 2-32 Chapter 3 PRISONERS OF WAR AND OTHER DETAINEES ................................................. 3-1 Practical Guidance on POWS and Detainee Operations.......................................... 3-1 Basic Protections and Humane Treatment for All Detainees ................................... 3-1 GPW and POW Protections ...................................................................................... 3-3 Persons Entitled to Prisoner of War Status .............................................................. 3-3 Other Persons to be Given Prisoner of War Treatment ............................................ 3-5 Commencement and Duration of Status ................................................................... 3-5 Retained Personnel................................................................................................... 3-5 Persons Not Entitled to Prisoner of War Status ........................................................ 3-6 Basic Protections and Humane Treatment for POWS .............................................. 3-7 Beginning of Captivity ............................................................................................... 3-8 Internment in Prisoner of War Camps ..................................................................... 3-10 Communications, Shipments, and Related Entities ................................................ 3-13 Labor ....................................................................................................................... 3-16 Financial Resources of Prisoners of War................................................................ 3-17 Camp Administration and Discipline ....................................................................... 3-17 Penal and Disciplinary Sanctions ............................................................................ 3-18 Transfer of Prisoners of War ................................................................................... 3-22 Death of Prisoners of War ....................................................................................... 3-23 Termination of Captivity .......................................................................................... 3-23 Chapter 4 THE WOUNDED AND SICK .................................................................................... 4-1 Basic Principles ......................................................................................................... 4-1 Protection and Care of the Wounded and Sick ......................................................... 4-3 Medical Units, Facilities, Personnel, and Ground Transports ................................... 4-4 The Distinctive Emblems .......................................................................................... 4-7 Medical Care Provided by Impartial Humanitarian Organizations ............................ 4-9 Chapter 5 CIVILIANS ................................................................................................................ 5-1 Practical Guidance on the Protection of Civilians ..................................................... 5-1 General Provisions .................................................................................................... 5-2 Provisions Common to the Territories of the
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