A Surge and Expansion of Violent Conflict

CHAPTER 1 A Surge and Expansion of Violent Conflict

The threats facing the world today are bipolar international order. A window of different from those of decades ago. Violent opportunity opened to focus on intrastate conflict is now occurring in middle-income conflicts. Despite the escalation of some eth- countries as well as in both low-income coun nic conflicts and prompted by the atrocities tries and fragile contexts, opening space for that took place in Rwanda and the former violent extremist groups and spilling over Yugoslavia, a surge in peacekeeping and pre- borders. vention, among other factors, reduced violent This chapter surveys the state of violent conflict to unprecedented levels by the mid- conflict across several indicators, showing 2000s (Human Security Report Project 2005; that, in recent years, more countries are Pinker 2011). That more peaceful lull was affected by violent conflict, more armed broken in 2007, when violent conflict began groups are fighting, and more outside actors to increase in scope and number of fatalities, are intervening. The chapter also examines particularly beginning in 2010. trends beyond the numbers both to under- What makes people fight and what they stand factors contributing to the new conflict fight over are not new, but the fighting is hap- dynamics and to adapt prevention policy on pening in a new context. Violent conflict has national, regional, and international levels. spread to middle-income countries that have, The cost of not preventing violent conflict or had, functioning institutions (such as Iraq, is extremely high. Beyond its incalculable Syria, and Ukraine), upending assumptions human cost, violent conflict reverses hard- that violent conflict is an exclusive problem won development gains, stunts the opportu- of low-income countries. In a world where nities of children and young people, and communications, finance, crime, and ideas robs economies of opportunities for growth. flow across borders, many conflicts have Preventable diseases become more difficult to evolved into complex systems with interna- treat in and around violent conflict, and there tional, regional, national, and communal is a higher risk of famine. Forced displace- links. Such conflicts are resistant to resolu- ment has reached a level not seen since the tion through negotiated settlement, tending immediate aftermath of World War II. Violent to play out in regions where other countries conflict and the humanitarian crises it spawns are already at risk of violent conflict (Walter cost the world billions of dollars a year, out- 2017b). The proliferation of nonstate armed pacing the capacity of states to respond. groups has also resulted in conflicts with less From roughly 1950 to 1990, parts of Africa state involvement, making them impervious and Asia experienced anti- and postcolonial to the settlement mechanisms deployed in violent conflicts and superpower proxy wars the past. More external countries are inter- over influence and control of the state. vening in violent conflicts, which could The end of the Cold War brought a pause in present opportunities for mediation, yet the interstate tensions that characterized the which also complicates conflict dynamics.

A Surge and Expansion of Violent Conflict 11 Violent Conflict in the While much of today’s violence is Twenty-First Century entrenched in low-income countries, neither wealth nor income renders countries Until recently, the world was becoming more immune. Some of the deadliest and seem- peaceful (Pinker 2011). Following the end of ingly most intractable conflicts are occurring 1 the Cold War, the number and intensity of in middle-income countries, reversing hard- most types of violent conflict steadily won human development gains. In addition, declined. That trend stalled in 2007 and has violence in various forms has reached epi- reversed since 2010. The incidence of violent demic proportions in countries not consid- conflict between states is still low (see ered fragile (Geneva Declaration Secretariat box 1.1), but conflict within states—among 2015; OECD 2016). The highest rates of a ballooning number of armed groups, homicide and violent crime in the world are between nonstate armed groups and the found in Latin America and the Caribbean, state, and increasingly involving some form where urban gang violence and drug-related of external intervention—is spreading. More crime are features of everyday life. countries were experiencing some form of A few of these violent conflicts—whether violent conflict in 2016 than at any time in in low- or middle-income countries—produce the previous 30 years (Allansson, Melander, the preponderance of fatalities, and most con- and Themnér 2017; Gleditsch et al. 2002; flicts are broadly concentrated in a few regions Sundberg, Eck, and Kreutz 2012). (Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia).

BOX 1.1 The Decline of Violent Conflict between States

Interstate violent conflict has been at the perceptions of their domestic historically low levels since the end of constituents and less willing to risk the Cold War. The Uppsala Conflict Data their soldiers’ lives or engage in warfare Program (UCDP) reported just two active when it can be avoided. Today, outright interstate violent conflicts in 2016, one military victory has become less feasible. between India and Pakistan and the other Increasing economic interdependence between Ethiopia and Eritrea. In 1987, may also contribute to the declining five interstate wars were recorded, but trend in interstate conflict because it since 1992, no more than two interstate creates mutual vulnerabilities that act wars were recorded in any given year, as disincentives to going to war. In this and several years experienced no calculus, “The opportunity costs of such wars. conflict greatly outweigh any potential The reasons for these low levels economic gains” (Thompson 2014), are varied. The end of the Cold War which is one of the reasons why trade marked a shifting disposition of the linkages between countries help to great powers from conducting proxy promote peace (Hegre, Oneal, and warfare to preventing conflicts around Russett 2010). the world. Enhanced cooperation The decline in interstate conflict does translated into a greater role for the not mean that disagreements between United Nations (UN) Security Council states have disappeared. Real interstate as a mechanism for resolving disputes. tensions also persist, leaving open the In parallel, “International norms, legal possibility for a potentially devastating regulations, and treaties [have created] violent conflict to come. The number of a situation today where invasion and unresolved boundary issues across the conquest are not only outlawed, world is a further cause of persistent but also actively proscribed through interstate tensions. The South China deterrence” (Thompson 2014). Casualty Sea is but one of these. The African avoidance has become a factor, with Union alone is involved in mediating national leaders acutely sensitive to 19 separate contested border claims.

Sources: Haass 2017; Hegre, Oneal, and Russett 2010; Human Security Report Project 2005; Pinker and Mack 2014; Thompson 2014; Allansson, Melander, and Themnér 2017; Gleditsch et al. 2002.

12 Pathways for Peace Violent extremist groups also contribute to forces within the boundaries of a state— the increase in conflicts, feeding off local griev- has risen sharply.2 After peaking at 50 in ances and exploiting transnational financial 1991, the number of these conflicts and crime networks. declined for some years but then shot up Today’s violent conflicts are not con- again. In 2016, 47 internal state-based fined to national borders. Energized by violent conflicts were recorded—the regional and international links among second-highest number in the post– groups, violent conflicts often spill across Cold War era after 2015, when UCDP borders or reflect the transnational aims recorded 51 violent state-based conflicts and organization of such groups (OECD (Allansson, Melander, and Themnér 2017; 2016, ch. 1). At the same time, countries are Gleditsch et al. 2002; see figure 1.1).3 The increasingly intervening in another coun- number of conflicts that reach the thresh- try’s conflict in support of a party or par- old of war, resulting in at least 1,000 bat- ties, giving these conflicts an additional tle deaths a year, has more than tripled regional or international dimension. These since just 2007 (Allansson, Melander, and new dynamics have significant implications Themnér 2017; Gleditsch et al. 2002; for preventing violent conflict and building Sundberg, Eck, and Kreutz 2012).4 The sustainable peace. number of lower-intensity conflicts (both state-based and nonstate), meaning those Number of Violent Conflicts resulting in between 25 and 999 battle within States deaths a year, has risen by more than 60 percent since 2007 (Allansson, Melander, The number of internal state-based and Themnér 2017; Gleditsch et al. 2002; conflicts—involving state and nonstate Sundberg, Eck, and Kreutz 2012).5

FIGURE 1.1 Violent Conflict Worldwide, by Type of Conflict, 1975–2016

30 Number of conﬂicts 20

1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 Type of conﬂict State-based (state vs. non-state) Non-state (non-state vs. non-state) Interstate (state vs. state)

Sources: For interstate and state-based conflicts, data from Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and Peace Research Institute Oslo (Allansson, Melander, and Themnér 2017; Gleditsch et al. 2002); for nonstate conflicts, data from UCDP (Sundberg, Eck, and Kreutz 2012; Allansson, Melander, and Themnér 2017).

A Surge and Expansion of Violent Conflict 13 Number of Fatalities Associated intensity (number of conflict-related fatali- with Violent Conflict ties) or duration alone, but also by its human, social, and economic impact. Violent conflict is resulting in more fatali- Minor conflicts within countries may be ties. The number of reported battle-related less visible to outside observers and may deaths has risen sharply since 2010 to the result in relatively fewer battle-related highest numbers recorded in 20 years (see deaths; their costs also may be harder to 6 figure 1.2). From the post–Cold War low in measure. But they are just as destructive 2005, reported battle-related deaths have and can have devastating consequences increased tenfold (Allansson, Melander, and for people and economies, not least con- Themnér 2017; Sundberg, Eck, and Kreutz tributing to instability and fragility within 2012). A few conflicts are largely responsi- countries and fueling other intrastate or ble for the overall increase and result in regional conflicts. the greatest proportion of battle-related deaths; the three deadliest countries in 2016 Number of Armed Groups and (Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria) incurred Violent Conflict more than 76 percent of all fatalities recorded that year (Sundberg and Melander Violent conflict between nonstate armed 2013; Croicu and Sundberg 2017; also see groups has been rising, as has the number figure 1.3). However, the true cost of a vio- of armed groups. The number of violent lent conflict should be measured not by its conflicts between nonstate armed groups7

FIGURE 1.2 Number of Battle-Related Deaths Worldwide, by Type of Conflict, 1989–2016

120,000

100,000

80,000

60,000

40,000 Reported number of battle-related deaths

20,000

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Type of conﬂict Non-state vs. non-state State vs. non-state

Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Allansson, Melander, and Themnér 2017; Sundberg, Eck, and Kreutz 2012).

14 Pathways for Peace FIGURE 1.3 Number of Conflict-Related Deaths Worldwide, by Country, 2016

Yemen, Rep.

Turkey South Libya Sudan

Nigeria

Afghanistan Mexico Sudan

Somalia

Iraq Syrian Arab Republic

Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) (Sundberg and Melander 2013; Croicu and Sundberg 2017). Note: This figure is based on the UCDP definition of conflict (Sundberg and Melander 2013; Croicu and Sundberg 2017).

has more than doubled since 2010, as shown Box 1.2 outlines the limitations of current in figure 1.1 (Sundberg, Eck, and Kreutz data sets, including the fact that categoriza- 2012; Allansson, Melander, and Themnér tions of “nonstate” and other actors have 2017). In 2016, 60 violent conflicts were not yet become as nuanced as current reali- reported between nonstate armed groups, ties. The composition and alliances of these and 73 were reported in 2015, compared armed groups are fluid and may evolve over with only 28 in 2010 (Sundberg, Eck, time, depending on resources or leadership. and Kreutz 2012; Allansson, Melander, and Some nonstate armed groups have been Themnér 2017). In 1950, there were an able to seize and hold terrain from state average of eight armed groups in a civil war; militaries, despite a lack of sophisticated by 2010 the average had jumped to 14 weaponry. (Walter 2017b). The proliferation of such groups, which The proliferation of nonstate actors— may fight each other and the state in differ- armed groups that are not formally state ent configurations at different times, com- actors—has been rising steadily especially plicates violent conflicts and efforts to end since 2010 (see figure 1.4). These groups them. One example is the conflict in Syria, include rebels, militias, armed trafficking which was responsible for the greatest num- groups, and violent extremist groups, ber of fatalities of any single war or country among others, that may coalesce around in 2016 (UCDP 2017). It has involved the a grievance, an identity, an ideology, or a government of Syria, Syrian opposition claim to economic or political resources. groups, violent extremist groups including

A Surge and Expansion of Violent Conflict 15 FIGURE 1.4 Number of Nonstate Groups Active in Violent Conflict Worldwide, 1989–2016

150

140

130

120

110

involved in conﬂict 100

Distinct count of non-state actors 90

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Sundberg, Eck, and Kreutz 2012; Allansson, Melander, and Themnér 2017).

BOX 1.2 Adapting Conflict Data to Today’s Violent Conflicts

The shift in trends of violent conflict is state, and militias doing the bidding of difficult to quantify with the measures elites yet not seeking formal state power, used or available now. The structure of among others—conflates these groups. many of the quantitative data sets relied These groups exhibit different patterns on to understand conflict dynamics are of conflict as a result of their diverse better suited for understanding the goals, capacities, incentives, and other conflicts of decades ago, when conflicts factors. The Armed Conflict Location predominantly involved fighting between and Event Data (ACLED) project makes the state militaries of two countries or some distinctions among nonstate when conflicts occurring within a state armed groups. (as opposed to between states) Data sets are organized according consisted largely of rebel groups seeking to the perpetrator of violence, and the to overthrow a government. Today’s perpetrator is not always evident. When a conflicts are increasingly complex and perpetrator is not or cannot be identified, multidimensional, and available the violence often goes unrecorded, measurements may not be capturing and the data may depict a region as their true extent and costs. nonviolent when in fact it is very violent. Both the number of nonstate conflicts UCDP data dramatically undercount that do not involve a country’s formal fatalities related to nonstate conflict, as forces and the number of nonstate it is often difficult, if not impossible, to armed groups have been rising. Yet data identify the victims and the perpetrators. sets—for example, the Uppsala Conflict Armed groups may exploit anonymity Data Program (UCDP)—often lump all to carry out violence on behalf of others nonstate groups into a single category. (Kishi 2015a). Such armed groups are increasingly Conflicts are coded as dyadic diverse and have varied goals. Putting all events, pitting two sides against each of them into one overarching category— other, despite the fact that conflicts one that includes rebel groups seeking are becoming increasingly complex to overthrow a state, armed trafficking and multidimensional. The goals, groups, violent extremist groups with capacities, and incentives of actors may goals beyond the overthrow of a single shift as conflicts become reframed or (Box continued next page)

16 Pathways for Peace BOX 1.2 Adapting Conflict Data to Today’s Violent Conflicts (continued)

internationalized. Alliances can form and in previous eras. While many of these disband or shift among various actors data sets have been refined over the within a single conflict. Especially in years to respond to new needs and cases where conflicts are coded as full contexts, they should continue to adapt. campaigns of violence that can last years, Not all data sets code conflicts as it can be difficult to capture these shifts full campaigns of violence. ACLED, for and nuances accurately—resulting in a example, relies on an atomic format, much simpler view of a very complex coding only a single day of conflict at context. a time, which can later be aggregated As conflicts adapt, data sets should into a larger context. However, ACLED adapt and anticipate their complexity. also relies on a dyadic format where The structure of data sets today two sides are coded as being in combat corresponds to the dynamics of conflicts with one another.

foreign fighters, and the so-called Islamic (Raleigh and Dowd 2013). Some groups State,8 with the state fighting these groups may explicitly reject international humani- and these groups fighting each other. Their tarian law as well as the international insti- interplay contributes to the intractability of tutions established to uphold it, placing the Syrian conflict and overall instability in themselves outside the ambit of traditional the region. peacemaking processes (Walter 2017b). Violent conflict between nonstate Many groups thrive in environments of armed groups does not indicate the weak rule of law or profit from illicit strength or weakness of such groups, nor economies; they have little incentive to does it preclude indirect state involvement. end violence. Progovernment militias, for example, fall More external actors are intervening under the umbrella of nonstate actors, as more often. Proxy wars with international- governments recruit militias to carry out ized involvement from the Soviet Union violence on their behalf.9 Communities or or the United States were commonplace powerful actors (for example, gangs and during the Cold War. Today, emerging pow- drug cartels) may also create militias or ers are also intervening in violent conflicts armed groups when state security forces are in pursuit of regional or strategic interests. absent or to protect their trade routes or In 2016, 18 violent conflicts were interna- control territory. These groups can be used tionalized,10 more than reported in any year to carry out violence on behalf of a regime since the end of World War II and second seeking to distance itself from particularly only to 2015, when 20 conflicts were inter- shameful acts; militia violence may even be nationalized (Allansson, Melander, and used to exercise influence in competitive Themnér 2017; Gleditsch et al. 2002; see democratic contexts, aggravating grievances figure 1.5). and exacerbating local and subnational The involvement of outside countries conflicts (Alvarez 2006; Raleigh 2016; can also provide additional avenues to influ- Ron 2002). ence combatants, whether a state or an This proliferation of nonstate armed armed group, in favor of a settlement. groups challenges state-based models of Current studies, which have largely focused conflict prevention, mediation, and peace- on the impact of direct intervention, find keeping. Many of today’s armed actors that it extended the duration of violent con- operate in areas where state presence is flicts and can complicate peace negotiations too limited and fragmented or diffuse (Regan 2002; Walter 2017a). Less focus has for traditional, leader-based approaches to been placed on indirect intervention, such as negotiated political solutions to be effective nonmilitary involvement by outside actors.

A Surge and Expansion of Violent Conflict 17 FIGURE 1.5 Number of Internationalized Violent Conflicts, Global, 1946–2016

22 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 Number of internationalized violent conﬂicts 0 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Program and Peace Research Institution Oslo (Allansson, Melander, and Themnér 2017; Gleditsch et al. 2002).

The rise of private external funding may most conflicts have been recurrences of old play a role in conflict dynamics. In the con- conflicts rather than new conflicts (Gates, text of Syria, for example, private funding Nygård, and Trappeniers 2016). On average, complicates the dynamics of the conflict peace lasts only seven years after a conflict and any potential settlement. ends. In the post–World War II era, 135 Engagement by outsiders, however, does countries experienced the recurrence of not necessarily have a negative impact. conflict, with 60 percent of all conflicts According to Walter (2017a, 3), “Outside recurring (Gates, Nygård, and Trappeniers intervention that occurs after a peace treaty 2016). In many violent conflicts, gray zones has been signed has a strong positive effect appear, where a conflict becomes less on the successful resolution of these [vio- intense, yet is not fully resolved (National lent conflicts]. . . . External intervention also Intelligence Council 2017). tends to have a positive effect on reducing The average duration of violent conflicts the risks of an additional [violent conflict] involving state forces has been trending once the first [violent conflict] has ended” upward since 1971. Violent conflicts involv- (see also Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fortna ing state forces that ended in 2014 lasted, on 2002). In cases where an outside state or average, 26.7 years, and those that ended in international organization has been willing 2015 lasted, on average, 14.5 years.12 By to enforce or verify the terms of a peace comparison, conflicts that ended in 1970 treaty, “negotiations almost always lead to lasted, on average, 9.6 years (Allansson, peace”; when external actors do not do so, Melander, and Themnér 2017; Gleditsch “negotiations almost always result in et al. 2002; see figure 1.6). renewed [conflict]” (Walter 2017a, 1).11 The longer a conflict lasts, the more diffi- Violent conflicts have become more pro- cult it becomes to resolve (Fearon 2004), tracted and more difficult to resolve, with given that the involved parties tend to many violent conflicts relapsing. Even vio- fragment and mutate with time (ICRC lent conflicts that may seem to stop (that is, 2016). Prolonged violent conflict may where few or no battle-related fatalities are become more complex and multidimen- reported in the following year) often involve sional. Also, as a conflict continues, the orig- neither peace agreements nor ceasefires inal drivers are more likely to transform and nor victories, meaning that fighting could require different solutions (Wolff, Ross, and begin again. The Peace Research Institute Wee 2017).13 Protracted conflicts also tend Oslo reports that, since the mid-1990s, to vary over the course of their life cycle,

18 Pathways for Peace FIGURE 1.6 Average Duration of Conflict Worldwide, 1970–2015

10 Average conﬂict duration (years) 5

1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015

Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Program and Peace Research Institute Oslo (Allansson, Melander, and Themnér 2017; Gleditsch et al. 2002).

both spatially (that is, where conflict occurs violent conflicts in Africa in 2016 (33 vio- within countries) and in intensity (for exam- lent conflicts). The largest proportion, or ple, number of battle-related fatalities). The more than 24 percent of these, occurred implications for prevention are significant. in Somalia, followed by the Democratic Once a country or society is on a violent Republic of Congo (more than 12 percent) path, changing the trajectory becomes more and Nigeria (more than 11 percent) (ACLED difficult and gets more difficult with time. 2016; Raleigh et al. 2010). Conflict between nonstate actors is also the primary form of Understanding Trends in violent conflict occurring in the Middle East and in the Americas,14 where it makes up Violent Conflict more than 63 percent (17 violent conflicts) The regional concentration of violent con- and 80 percent (8 violent conflicts) of all flict is shifting. Most violent conflicts today violent conflicts in the region, respectively are occurring in Africa, the Middle East, and (Sundberg, Eck, and Kreutz 2012; Allansson, South Asia (see figure 1.7); the number of Melander, and Themnér 2017). violent conflicts in other parts of Asia and Subnational conflict, or “violent contes- Europe, previously epicenters of conflict, tation aimed at securing greater political has been decreasing (Allansson, Melander, autonomy [often] for an ethnic minority and Themnér 2017; Gleditsch et al. 2002; group” (Colletta and Oppenheim 2017, 1), Sundberg, Eck, and Kreutz 2012). In affects nearly every part of the world, but 2016, more than 24 percent of all violent some regions more than others. It is the conflicts occurred in the Middle East, an most common form of violent conflict in increase from 2010, when the region experi- Asia, yet it has also been on the rise in enced less than 11 percent of the total. These Europe, the Middle East, and in recent years trends are predicted to continue (National in Sub-Saharan Africa. Between 2000 and Intelligence Council 2017). 2015, subnational conflict affected 24 coun- There are variations, however, in the kind tries, resulting in more than 100,000 battle- of violent conflict that is most prevalent in a related deaths in the period. Several region. Conflicts between nonstate actors countries faced multiple clusters of separat- represented more than 63 percent of the ist conflicts (Colletta and Oppenheim 2017).

A Surge and Expansion of Violent Conflict 19 FIGURE 1.7 Conflict Events Worldwide, by Type of Conflict and Region, 1989–2016

Number of conﬂicts 20

0 1989 2016 1989 2016 1989 2016 1989 2016 1989 2016 Africa Asia Middle East Americas Europe Type of conﬂict Non-state vs. non-state Interstate (state vs. state) State vs. non-state Internationalized conﬂict

Sources: For interstate and state-based conflicts (including internationalized conflicts), data from Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and Peace Research Institute Oslo (Allansson, Melander, and Themnér 2017; Gleditsch et al. 2002); for nonstate conflicts, data from UCDP (Sundberg, Eck, and Kreutz 2012; Allansson, Melander, and Themnér 2017).

Each of the many varieties of conflict in Factors Contributing to the the world today has different implications Increase in Violent Conflict for prevention approaches. Some of the deadliest conflicts are over control of the Three broad, interrelated factors have con- central state or over internal power arrange- tributed to the increased number, resulting ments, as in Iraq, South Sudan, and Syria.15 fatalities, and reach of violent conflict: Protracted subregional conflicts might not disrupt the functionality of the central state •• The eruption of violent conflict in the in most of its territory—as in Myanmar, the Middle East and North Africa in the Philippines, and Thailand, among others— wake of the Arab Spring yet these conflicts still have an impact on •• The spread of violent extremism the operation of the state (Parks, Colletta, •• The increase in power contestation in and Oppenheim 2013). Moreover, a large Sub-Saharan Africa. number of intercommunal conflicts over extractive or natural resources or land can Each, separately and in combination with flare up before declining in intensity. Other the other underlying factors, can have differ- events of political violence may occur ent implications for prevention. This is espe- around electoral periods, such as in Jamaica cially evident in the case of violent extremism, and Kenya (Malik 2017). Chapter 5 dis- which has expanded rapidly by exploiting cusses in greater detail these arenas of con- preexisting violent conflicts related to sectar- testation, where societies negotiate access to ian grievances and power struggles that may resources and political power and where the have nothing to do with extremism, yet pro- risk of violence is intensified. vide a space for these movements to grow.

20 Pathways for Peace Violent Conflict in the Wake of the (Devarajan and Ianchovichina 2017). This Arab Spring mechanism became less and less sustainable Increased levels of violent conflict have starting in the 2000s, as persistent fiscal most affected the Middle East and North imbalances undermined the ability of gov- Africa (Gleditsch and Rudolfsen 2016). ernments to keep their part of the social Arab countries are home to only 5 percent bargain. Once mass protests sparked the of the world’s population, but in 2014 they political transition in Tunisia, contagion to accounted for 45 percent of the world’s the rest of the region was quick, enabled by terrorist incidents, 68 percent of its battle- technology and a common language and related deaths,16 47 percent of its internally rooted in economic problems and popular displaced population, and 58 percent of its grievances that were common through- refugees (UNDP 2016a). The United Nations out the Middle East and North Africa Development Programme’s Arab Human (Ianchovichina 2017).17 Development Report 2016 predicts that by Worsening polarization between groups 2020, “Almost three out of four Arabs could recurred across different contexts, whether be living in countries vulnerable to violent between Islamists and their opponents in conflict” (UNDP 2016a). the Arab Republic of Egypt and Tunisia; The violent conflicts emerging after politicization of cross-sectarian divides the Arab Spring—in Libya, Syria, and involving Sunnis and Shi’ites in Iraq18 and the Republic of Yemen, in particular— some of the Gulf states; or tribal and local originated in domestic unrest influenced by forces in Libya and the Republic of Yemen the regional upheavals of 2011. These con- (Lynch 2016, 37). The lack of institutional flicts quickly drew in regional and global confidence and the failure to secure a powers, which may “influence or support— predictable transition toward new stable but rarely fully control—those fighting institutions further exacerbated social and on the ground” (Guéhenno 2016). Coupled political polarization. External interven- with their internal nature, some of these tions stoking sectarian or ethnic hatred conflicts have become proxy wars in which inflamed intergroup polarization. both regional and international players pur- Countries that managed to stay peace- sue their geopolitical rivalries, and in some ful distinguished themselves from those cases nonstate armed groups linked with that were affected by violence in terms transnational criminal networks embrace of the quality of governance institutions, ideologies of violent extremism that cannot the ability to use redistribution to address be accommodated in peace agreements grievances, and the presence or absence of (International Peace Institute 2016). external military interference (Devarajan One of the factors contributing to the and Ianchovichina 2017). The difference in Arab Spring of 2011 and to the destabiliza- how governments responded to demon- tion of long-standing Arab autocracies was strations and memories of past violence the broken social contract between govern- (in the case of Algeria) were also contrib- ments and citizens (Toska 2017). Challenges uting factors (Brownlee, Masoud, and to state legitimacy across the region also Reynolds 2015). played an important role and emanated from shortcomings in economic opportu- The Spread of Violent Extremism nity, social mobility, democracy, rule of One of the most significant recent develop- law, human rights, and gender equality. The ments is the proliferation and transnational social contract between several Arab gov- reach of violent extremist groups. While the ernments and citizens that had persisted twentieth century is full of examples of vio- since independence consisted of the state lent extremist groups, violent extremism providing public sector jobs, free education presently displays some new features. and health care, and subsidized food and Contemporary violent extremist groups, fuel. In return, citizens were expected to often making use of twenty-first-century keep their voices low and to tolerate some technology, embed themselves into com- level of elite capture in the private sector munities while simultaneously forming

A Surge and Expansion of Violent Conflict 21 strategic alliances with transnational net- trafficking networks—in particular, human works (World Bank 2015). This allows them trafficking networks—has also been a to spread across borders, hooking into local source of income. Finally, ransom and hos- grievances and connecting them to a global tage taking have been a source of revenue identity. Many also have proven adept at for some groups. exploiting local violent conflict to expand A few violent extremist groups, espe- and recruiting well beyond conflict-affected cially over the last decade, have tried to countries.19 They tend to thrive in areas establish a de facto state presence in large with political disorder and at heightened areas of territory. For example, groups like risk of violence. Indeed, the growing reach Al Shabaab, Boko Haram, and the Islamic of violent extremist groups in recent years State claim to be recreating a caliphate with “is more a product of instability than its some of the elements of state structure. primary driver” (ICG 2016a). They differ Looking for territorial control, these groups from their predecessors in at least three make much stronger efforts to connect with ways (World Bank 2015). local communities, who at times support First, some of today’s violent extremist them out of fear or economic opportunity groups have greater global appeal than (ICG 2016a).20 This suggests that focusing violent extremist groups of earlier times. solely on the recruitment of violent extrem- Some are adept at connecting very local ist groups is shortsighted.21 Overall, “pre- grievances—frustration with a discrimina- venting crises will do more to contain tory or predatory state, for example—with violent extremists than countering vio- a global identity that posits youth as heroes lent extremism will do to prevent crises” in ostensibly a movement for global justice. (ICG 2016a, v). Such groups harness technology to promote their narrative and recruit globally in ways Violent Conflict in the Midst of that are often far ahead of state efforts to Rapid Transformation in rein them in (World Bank 2015). Sub-Saharan Africa Second, many of today’s violent extrem- Violent conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa has ist groups form strategic alliances with dif- increased against the backdrop of the conti- ferent groups in the areas in which they nent’s fast-paced economic and political operate. This engagement can take different changes (Williams 2017). Poverty, and to forms. There have always been some true some extent inequality, is decreasing, and believers, some who join for material or economic growth has enabled several coun- political gain, and others who condone such tries to graduate to middle-income status groups but do not actively participate. (Beegle et al. 2016). Democratization has However, today’s violent extremist groups expanded at the same time, although with are taking advantage of local divisions some reversals in 2015 (Mogaka 2017). among groups and building opportunistic Against this positive background, rapid alliances to an unprecedented degree changes are also creating tensions. Three (ICG 2016a). dynamics play out in this context: violent Third, some violent extremist groups competition for political power and associ- today have been able to use transnational ated electoral-related violence; the spread of networks to facilitate financing. This violent extremism that in most cases derives includes mobilizing financing from states from conflicting identity; and the persis- and private donors to an unprecedented tence of violent intercommunal conflict in level. For example, oil revenue has contrib- many parts of East and Central Africa that uted a great deal of financing for the Islamic often does not involve states. State (Heibner et al. 2017). Drug trafficking Conflict around weak political settle- has been an important resource for ments in the region and power contestation both insurgent and extremist groups in is clearly exemplified by the dramatic devel- Afghanistan and northern Mali (Comolli opments in South Sudan. Since 2013, the 2017). Extracting rents in exchange for pro- violent conflict that resulted from a leader- viding protection to many other types of ship division within the Sudan People’s

22 Pathways for Peace Liberation Movement, antagonized by deep civilian casualties, coupled with the use of ethnic structural divisions, has taken a disas- conflict-related sexual violence as a weapon trous turn. By March 2016, at least 50,000 of war since the 1990s (Stearn 2011; UN people had reportedly been killed (Reuters 2017). To a lesser degree, the Central African 2016), and millions of people had been forc- Republic presents a similar situation involv- ibly displaced both as refugees and as inter- ing the multiplication of intercommunal nally displaced persons (IDPs).22 Since South conflict and the incapacity of the state to Sudan proclaimed its independence on project a positive presence (Lombard 2016). July 9, 2011, enormous challenges have con- This is the case as well in many subregions strained the effort of building institutions. of African states, such as in Sudan’s Darfur The absence of legitimate political institu- region and parts of South Sudan, among tions beyond liberation politics, which was others (De Waal 2007). masked during the years of the com- The tactics of violence are evolving. The mon struggle against the Sudanese central number of weapons in circulation around government—combined with the lack of a the world has dramatically increased since security apparatus apart from the rebel the beginning of the twenty-first century movements that had led the fight for (Pavesi 2016). The Small Arms Survey independence—was at the origin of the reports that an estimated 875 million small outbreak of the conflict (ICG 2016b). arms are in circulation worldwide. This is Mali and Nigeria are two examples certainly a conservative estimate, given of identity-based conflicts that have turned that accurate assessments are difficult. into violent extremist insurrections, as seen From 2001 to 2011, the value of the trade in other parts of the world. These conflicts in small arms and light weapons nearly grew out of tensions that had little to do doubled globally, from $2.38 billion to with ideology and were built up over time. $4.634 billion (Small Arms Survey 2014). For example, the Boko Haram insurrection From 2012 to 2013 the global small arms in northern Nigeria, which started in the trade rose to US$6 billion—an increase of 1990s, developed slowly, building on a sen- US$1 billion, or 17 percent, in a single year timent of marginalization fueled by large (Dutt 2016). inequalities between regions that left the Remote violence tactics—sophisticated population of the poorest state (Borno) and unsophisticated—are also becoming feeling excluded from the country’s over- increasingly common and deadlier in conflict all relative prosperity (Comolli 2015). zones around the world. This type of vio- Similarly, the spread of violent extremism lence refers to instances in which a spatially in northern Mali in 2012 started as a nation- removed group determines the time, place, alist Tuareg rebellion, a recurrent phenome- and victims of an attack using an explosive non since colonial times, that turned into a device such as a bomb, an improvised explo- violent extremist insurrection involving sive device (IED), or missiles, among others Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, the (ACLED 2016; Raleigh et al. 2010). For non- Movement for Unity and Jihad in West state-armed actors that may control a limited Africa, Harakat Ansar Al-Dine, and others amount of territory compared to govern- (ICG 2015). ment forces, “remote violence is an ideal tac- The high level of violence in the eastern tic to either damage state forces with minimal Democratic Republic of Congo is a clear risk or to coerce the state without controlling illustration of intercommunal conflict con- it. This tactic also fits into a strategy of groups nected to the absence of a positive state resorting to so-called ‘weapons of the weak’ presence. In this region, many forms of con- after losing territory and influence,” or being flict overlap. External influence has played a in an objective disadvantageous position role in sustaining violent conflict in the compared to state forces (Kishi et al. 2016, 30; region. Yet eastern Democratic Republic of see also McCormick and Giordano 2007; Congo has experienced a relentlessly Merari 1993; and Denselow 2010). high number of both battle and other Drone strikes also have become increas- deaths and a particularly high number of ingly prevalent and deadly and are likely to

A Surge and Expansion of Violent Conflict 23 become even more so (Action on Armed political competition (for example, election Violence 2017). Cyberattacks may begin to periods) or when there are external shocks. have kinetic effects in the contexts of violent In some conflicts, the sale of drugs can conflicts, and weaponizable biotechnologies provide a ready stream of revenue for non- too may become a reality. At the same time, state actors in their battles against more many conflicts are waged with few sophisti- powerful and resource-rich state forces.24 cated weapons, and many events featuring Examples include the links between terrorist tactics rely on artisanal bombs, Colombia’s illegal armed groups and differ- trucks, or knives. The genocide in Rwanda ent stages of the illegal drug industry was carried out using machetes. (including taxation, production, and traf- The tactic of terror. Terrorist incidents ficking), and the sale of illegal amphet- have risen sharply over the last 10 years, as amines in the Middle East by groups have the number of resulting fatalities (see involved in conflict (Otis 2014; NPR 2013). figure 1.8).23 Violence that may stem from these Interpersonal and gang violence and vio- exchanges is therefore at least indirectly lent conflict. Interpersonal, gang, and linked to larger ongoing conflicts, can result drug-related violence may reflect or exacer- in the destabilization of the state, and can bate grievances that ultimately lead to vio- contribute to cycles of persistent violence. lent conflict. Conflicts may degenerate into violence more rapidly in societies with high The Unacceptable Costs of levels of interpersonal violence or with a culture of resolving interpersonal issues Violent Conflict violently, especially along the lines of gen- “A full accounting of any war’s burdens der (see boxes 1.3 and 1.8). Political figures cannot be placed in columns on a ledger” or groups can finance or co-opt gangs to (Crawford 2016, 1). It is clear, however, foment targeted violence against oppo- that violent conflict exacts an incalculably nents, particularly in periods of intense high cost in direct and indirect damage to

FIGURE 1.8 Terrorism Prevalence and Reported Fatalities, Global, 1995–2015

16,000 45,000

14,000 40,000

35,000 12,000 30,000 10,000 25,000 8,000 20,000 6,000 Number of events 15,000 Reported fatalities

4,000 10,000

2,000 5,000

0 0 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 Year Measure names Number of events Reported fatalities

Source: Global Terrorism Database (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 2016).

24 Pathways for Peace BOX 1.3 Crime and Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean

While the rate of homicides seems to be media report, “Brazil reached a new peak declining (Pinker and Mack 2014), of violence [in 2014] with more than it remains very high in some regions, 58,000 violent deaths” (Reuters 2015). specifically in Latin America and the Homicides in Brazil can be attributed Caribbean. A 2017 World Bank study calls to the prevalence of the drug trade the problem “staggering and persistent” and the activity of violent gangs in in “the world’s most violent region” certain neighborhoods, exacerbated by (Chioda 2017), which houses 42 of the 50 “corruption and poor training among most violent cities in the world. Homicide police forces and ineffectiveness in the rates in Latin America are driven largely by court system” (Bevins 2015). Violence in increasing rates in Brazil (UNODC 2016). the República Bolivariana de Venezuela The number of deaths from homicide in is also on the rise, with the capital particular countries can rival or exceed the Caracas ranked the most murderous city fatalities in war zones. The Human in the world (Citizens Council for Public Security Report Project notes, “The Security and Criminal Justice 2016; almost 13,000 deaths from organized Tegel 2016; UNODC 2016). In Mexico, crime in Mexico in 2011 were greater than despite efforts in the security sector, the 2011 battle-death tolls in any of the violence driven largely by drug cartels three countries worst-affected by armed remains very high. On the other hand, conflict and violence against civilians homicide rates in Colombia have declined between 2006 and 2011—Afghanistan, significantly in the last decade as a result Iraq, and Sudan” (Human Security Report of targeted violence prevention strategies Project 2013, 52). According to a 2015 (UNODC 2016).

societies, economies, and people (see atrocities committed worldwide—defined box 1.4 on the impacts of the Syrian con- as “the deliberate killing of noncombatant flict). It kills and injures combatants and civilians in the context of a wider political civilians alike and inflicts insidious damage conflict” (Schrodt and Ulfelder 2016)26— to bodies, minds, and communities that can has increased rapidly since 2010, as has the halt human and economic development for number of civilians reportedly killed in such many years. Violent conflict has a major contexts (Eck and Hultman 2007; Allansson, impact on the ability of the world to Melander, and Themnér 2017; see also improve the well-being of populations and Action on Armed Violence 2017). to reduce poverty, disease, and other cata- About twice as many civilians were strophic risks. Its long-term effects on the reportedly killed by one-sided violence countries involved, and on their neighbors, during conflict in 2016 than in 2010. include monetary costs such as reduced These numbers were even higher in 2014, economic growth, minimized trade and driven largely by attacks carried out by investment opportunities, and the added Boko Haram and the Islamic State (Eck cost of reconstruction.25 and Hultman 2007; Allansson, Melander, and Themnér 2017). In some instances, The Direct Human Cost of nonstate actors may have an incentive Violent Conflict to target civilians—for example, “as a cheaper strategy of imposing costs on the Today’s violent conflicts do not necessarily adversary”—especially at times when a play out within the confines of a distinct settlement may be imminent (Hultman battleground. Nor are their impacts con- 2010).27 States are also responsible for fined to the combatants. Civilians over- high rates of civilian deaths, although they whelmingly bear the brunt of today’s violent may often “contract” this violence out to conflicts (see box 1.5). The number of militias (Raleigh 2012).

A Surge and Expansion of Violent Conflict 25 BOX 1.4 The Impact of the Syrian Conflict

The Syrian conflict is one of the defining impacts of conflict—caring for injured or crises of the contemporary era. At least orphaned family members—but also of 400,000 persons have been killed, providing humanitarian assistance and about 5 million have fled the country, participating in processes to resist and and, according to the United Nations transform the conflict. Office for the Coordination of The economic impacts of the conflict Humanitarian Affairs, 6.3 million have are enormous. In real terms, Syria’s gross been internally displaced. Many of the domestic product (GDP) contracted an individuals remaining in the country estimated 63 percent between 2011 cannot access the help they need, as and 2016. In cumulative terms, the more than 50 percent of hospitals have loss in GDP amounted to an estimated been partially or completely destroyed, US$226 billion between 2011 and and the supply of doctors, nurses, and 2016—approximately four times the medical supplies is woefully inadequate country’s 2010 GDP. According to the (UNICEF 2015; UNOCHA 2017; World Bank, even if the conflict ends this World Bank 2017a). year, the cumulative losses in GDP will Children have been intensely affected: reach 7.6 times the preconflict GDP by the United Nations Children’s Fund the twentieth year after the beginning of reports more than 1,500 grave human the conflict. If the conflict continues, this rights violations against children in 2015 loss will stand at 13.2 times the country’s alone, of which more than one-third preconflict GDP (World Bank 2017a). occurred while children were in or on The impacts of the conflict have their way to school (UNICEF 2015). spread to neighboring countries, which The proportion of children under 15 being feel the brunt of the crisis acutely. recruited by armed groups increased Jordan, for example, has registered from 20 percent in 2014 to more than 654,903 Syrian refugees, while Lebanon 50 percent in 2015, and there has been has registered 997,905 (as of December an alarming increase in child marriage: 2017; UNHCR 2017). Neighboring Turkey a 2017 United Nations Population Fund has registered 3,400,195 Syrian refugees survey estimates that the number of child (as of December 2017; UNHCR 2017). brides (under 18 years of age) in Syria The quality of care for basic public has quadrupled since the war began services in health care and education has (UNFPA 2017). Women have taken on a also declined, for both refugee and host large burden not only of dealing with the communities.

BOX 1.5 Conflict Measures Do Not Capture All of the Costs of Violent Conflict

Not all conflict-related deaths occur in health infrastructure within a country, direct battles between combatants on a leaving a population vulnerable to future battlefield. Conflict-related deaths occur health pandemics, as was the case in because of raids, massacres, skirmishes, Liberia. Deaths can also result at or and other types of hostilities, as well as before birth. Ahuka, Chabikuli and through disease and food insecurity, Ogunbanjo (2004) note how “war among others. Conflict can affect food exacerbates social factors contributing to security by decreasing production and maternal stress and adverse pregnancy diminishing access to land (Seddon and outcomes” in their study of the effects of Adhikari 2003). Food insecurity can war on pregnancy outcomes in the result in deaths from starvation and Democratic Republic of Congo between malnourishment. Conflict can damage 1993 and 2001.

(Box continued next page)

26 Pathways for Peace BOX 1.5 Conflict Measures Do Not Capture All of the Costs of Violent Conflict (continued)

Data for low-income countries are being an obvious case in point” (Human often poor or inadequate, and most Security Report Project 2011). conflict models use the country- Using battlefield deaths to quantify year as the standard unit of analysis. conflict can reinforce a gender bias This is problematic: it assumes that in measuring violent conflicts. “From observations in successive country- a gender perspective, quantifying years are independent of each other, armed conflict on the basis of battle- when often they are not. Particularly related deaths is biased towards men’s regarding countries where violent conflict experiences of armed conflict to the is occurring, country-year measure detriment of those of women and girls. assumes “that increases or decreases While more men tend to get killed on in the risk of war can be explained the battlefield, women and children solely in terms of socioeconomic and are often disproportionately targeted other changes within countries. This with other forms of potentially lethal assumption is often unrealistic because violence during conflict” (Bastick, the conflict dynamics of civil war do Grimm, and Kunz 2007). Also, women not stop at national boundaries—the and children tend to die more often interconnections between political after the violent phase of the conflict violence in Afghanistan and Pakistan ends (Ormhaug 2009).

Much of the violence occurs in urban international military forces. It is important areas and often targets civilian spaces, to note that “when children are targeted or including those considered sanctuaries killed, it is often in an attempt to instill ter- under international humanitarian law, such ror in populations or to reaffirm brutality as schools, hospitals, and places of worship and gain (global) notoriety, given that the (ICRC 2017).28 This impact is facilitated targeting of children is meant to send a by the increasing use of “remote violence”29 message to (adult) adversaries and/or the both in civil wars and in acts of terrorism in international community at-large. In addi- countries far from conflict. In addition to the tion to attacks, there are also numerous doubling of the number of civilian deaths in instances in which children are abducted violent conflicts between 2010 and 2016, and forced to fight in violent conflict” (Kishi many more civilian deaths result from the 2015b; see also Economist 2015; SOS indirect effects of conflict, such as unmet Children’s Village 2015). The deliberate tar- medical needs, food insecurity, inade- geting of civilians overall may be creating a quate shelter, or contamination of water perverse corollary. It is becoming more (Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence accepted that civilians in conflict zones are and Development 2011; UNESCWA 2017). an inevitable part of violent conflict casual- Vulnerable populations, such as children, ties. Although a majority of people still say are at particularly high risk (Economist that it is wrong to violate the international 2015; Guha-Sapir and van Panhuis 2004). norms regarding the rules of war, support Nearly one-third of the 11,418 noncomba- for these norms has dropped from 68 to tants killed or wounded in Afghanistan 59 percent since 1999 (ICRC 2016). in 2016 were children (UNAMA 2017).30 This is due to the nature of the indiscrimi- Regional Trends in Civilian Fatalities nate tactics used, such as suicide bombings, and Atrocities IEDs, and urban terrorist attacks by Between 1980 and 2016, Africa had by far the Taliban and other groups, as well as the the highest proportion of civilian fatalities, increased use of air support by Afghan and with nearly 87 percent (676,625 fatalities in

A Surge and Expansion of Violent Conflict 27 the region) of all reported civilian fatali- accounting for around two-thirds of all ties (Eck and Hultman 2007; Allansson, civilian fatalities reported in 2016 (Eck and Melander, and Themnér 2017). Some Hultman 2007; Allansson, Melander, and 500,000 of these fatalities were a direct result Themnér 2017). This increase has been of the Rwandan genocide of 1994, although driven by an increase in the rate of conflict the estimates vary among sources (Eck and involving nonstate armed groups, which Hultman 2007; Allansson, Melander, and spiked in 2012 in conflicts following the Themnér 2017).31 Arab Spring. Map 1.1 shows reported civilian fatalities in Africa between 2002 and 2016 (ACLED Conflict, Famine, and Displacement 2016; Raleigh et al. 2010). Countries experi- Violent conflict scatters populations and encing the most civilian fatalities during disrupts livelihoods. Conflict, famine, and this time period include the Democratic displacement are deeply interrelated (see Republic of Congo (especially the eastern box 1.6). Famine and food crises further region), Nigeria (where Boko Haram was contribute to the involuntary mass move- responsible for almost half of all reported ment of people, especially in cases where civilian fatalities in the country), Sudan violent conflict, mismanagement, and insuf- (especially in the Darfur region), and South ficient responses to previous disasters have Sudan (especially in recent years during its exacerbated the negative impact of a food civil war). While nonstate armed groups crisis (Raleigh 2017). Violent conflict dis- were responsible for the majority (more rupts trade routes and markets for food and than 86 percent) of civilian fatalities in other necessities, causing further direct and Africa during this time period (ACLED indirect costs. IDPs are particularly vulnera- 2016; Raleigh et al. 2010; Kishi, Raleigh, and ble to the effects of famine and dispropor- Linke 2016), state forces were involved as tionately affected by food insecurity, often well, even if indirectly in some cases. Raleigh due to barriers to accessing labor markets and Kishi (2017) estimate that, in Africa, and reliance on humanitarian assistance progovernment militias commit more for survival. violence against civilians, with at least An estimated 65.6 million people are cur- 10 percent more of their activities targeting rently forcibly displaced from their homes, civilians than other militias. driven primarily by violence (UNHCR In recent years, civilians also have been 2017). Between 2005 and 2016, the number at heightened risk in the Middle East, of IDPs increased more than fivefold

MAP 1.1 Reported Civilian Fatalities in Africa, 2002–16

2002–06 2007–11 2012–16

Iraq Iraq Iraq

Ageria Libya Egypt, Ageria Libya Egypt, Ageria Libya Egypt, Arab Rep. Saudi Arab Rep. Saudi Arab Rep. Saudi Arabia Arabia Arabia

Sudan Yemen, Sudan Yemen, Sudan Yemen, Rep. Rep. Rep.

Congo, Congo, Congo, Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep. Reported fatalities 0 1,000 2,000 3,375

South South South Africa Africa Africa

Source: Raleigh et al. 2010.

28 Pathways for Peace BOX 1.6 Famine and Fragility, Conflict, and Violence

The four-decade declining trend of displaced persons and refugees often famine and famine-related deaths has rely on host communities, placing a reversed since 2011. Throughout history, strain on already-scarce resources famines have been associated with and heightening the risk for tension. violent conflicts, particularly in recent The 2008 and 2011 global food crises decades as our knowledge of how to triggered more than 40 food riots across prevent famine and instruments for doing the world: it arguably contributed to the so in peaceful contexts have improved breakdown of the social contract that dramatically. Yet famines and severe food led to the Arab Spring, to the fall of the insecurity have resulted in hundreds of government of Haiti in 2008, and to thousands of deaths in Nigeria, Somalia, the fueling of grievances underpinning South Sudan, and Yemen, with millions the 2009 coup in Madagascar. For more people left food insecure, partly each added percentage point in because of violent conflicts. undernourishment, the likelihood for In fragile situations, shocks such violent conflict increases by 0.24 percent as drought, conflict, and economic per 1,000 population. insecurity can lead to increased food Famine and food insecurity particularly insecurity and famine. Drought destroys affect rural and agriculture-based agricultural output, and violent conflict workers, women, and children, partly disrupts agriculture and trade of food because social safety nets might be crops between areas of surplus and more prevalent. In addition to short-term deficit. The Global Report on Food suffering, famine victims are more likely Crises 2017 reports that in 2016, violent to experience serious health problems conflict and civil insecurity left more than and have significantly worse financial 63 million people acutely food insecure prospects over the long term. and in need of urgent humanitarian Modern famines are largely man- assistance in 13 countries (Food Security made and avoidable. In fragile contexts, Information Network 2017). alleviating poverty, strengthening social Food insecurity can increase the risk safety nets, and preventing violent of conflict, particularly when caused conflict lower the risk of famine and by rising food prices, by displacing food insecurity. Long-term stability populations, by exacerbating grievances, also increases these states’ chances and by increasing competition for scarce of weathering shocks that potentially food and water resources. Internally cause famines.

Sources: World Bank 2017a, 2017b; World Food Programme 2017a, 2017b; von Uexkull et al. 2016; Brinkman and Hendrix, 2011.

(UNDP 2016b; UNHCR 2017; World Bank Extreme poverty is now increasingly 2016a; see figure 1.9). Approximately 40.3 concentrated in vulnerable groups dis- million IDPs were recorded in 2016 (UNHCR placed by violent conflict, and the presence 2017).32 These are likely conservative esti- of these populations can affect develop- mates given the difficulty of collecting accu- ment prospects in the communities hosting rate data (see box 1.7). The number of them (World Bank 2016a). Often host refugees nearly doubled over the same period, countries and countries with internally with the majority (55 percent) of refugees displaced persons may be fragile them- coming from just three countries: Afghanistan, selves, and housing additional vulnerable South Sudan, and Syria (UNHCR 2017). populations can impose an added strain. More than half of the world’s refugees are Indeed, 95 percent of refugees and IDPs children, many of whom have been separated live in low- and middle-income countries from family (UNHCR 2017). (World Bank 2016a).

A Surge and Expansion of Violent Conflict 29 FIGURE 1.9 Number of Refugees and IDPs Worldwide, 1951–2016

40,000 40,000

35,000 35,000

30,000 30,000

25,000 25,000

20,000 20,000 IDPs

15,000 15,000 Number of refugees 10,000 10,000

5,000 5,000

0 0

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 Year

Measure names Refugees IDPs

Source: UNHCR 2017. Note: IDP = internally displaced person.

BOX 1.7 Limitations of the Data on Forced Displacement

Insecurity can constrain direct access to field offices, and nongovernmental displaced populations, making it difficult, organizations compile and collect data if not impossible, to verify reported using mainly registers, surveys, registration numbers. It can be especially difficult to processes, or censuses. Each method compile accurate data, as crisis of data collection has both strengths and situations resulting in large displaced weaknesses. populations are often dynamic and The use of different methodologies changing rapidly, making static and inconsistent sharing of information, snapshots quickly out of date. however, can weaken systematic data Various sources are used to collect data collection. Logistically, it is also difficult on displaced populations. Within protracted to know when displacement ends. For crises, large numbers of assessments example, should internally displaced and surveys often are undertaken for persons (IDPs) who have lived in an both protection and assistance purposes. area for several years and who have Government agencies, United Nations achieved a durable solution still be High Commissioner for Refugees considered IDPs?

Sources: IDMC 2016; UNHCR 2013.

The Gender Impacts of higher in men, especially in young adult Violent Conflict males, but women tend to experience vio- The impacts of violent conflict on civilians lence and its effects in significantly greater are gendered. Women and men experience proportions. Women often face a contin- conflict and violence differently, and there uum of violence before, during, and after are both direct and indirect effects on each conflict. Sexual and gender-based vio- group. Mortality rates on the battlefield are lence tends to be higher in conflict and

30 Pathways for Peace BOX 1.8 Intimate Partner Violence and Violent Conflict

Violent conflict may exacerbate all forms were 50 percent more likely to of violence against women and girls and experience intimate partner violence than rebound particularly on them. In a women in districts without reported comparative study looking at cross- fatalities. When levels of conflict are split sectional variation in self-reported into low, medium, and high levels, Côte intimate partner violence before and after d’Ivoire and Kenya had significantly conflict in three Sub-Saharan African higher levels of intimate partner violence countries (Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, and in high- compared to low-conflict Liberia), Kelly (2017) finds that, despite districts. Using Demographic and Health differences in the nature of violent Survey data for periods before and after conflict in each country, there is a conflict in Kenya, Kelly (2017) also finds significant relationship between intimate that districts with higher levels of partner violence and previous violent intimate partner violence before the conflict in all three countries. In Kenya conflict were 30 percent more likely to be and Liberia, women living in a district associated with fatal violence after the with reported deaths from violent conflict conflict broke out.

postconflict settings, as does recruitment of on cognitive and social development girls into trafficking, sexual slavery, or forced (Betancourt et al. 2012; Blattman 2006, marriage (Kelly 2017; UN SG 2015; 2016; Calvete and Orue 2011; Huesmann UN Women 2015; UNFPA 2017; UNESCWA and Kirwil 2007; Leckman, Panter-Brick, 2015). Girls’ mobility is often highly and Salah 2014; Shonkoff and Garner 2012; restricted, limiting their access to school, Weaver, Borkowski, and Whitman 2008). employment, and other opportunities, and The experience of traumatic events can this can be exacerbated during and after lead to serious mental health and behav- violent conflict (UN Women 2015). Intimate ioral problems that hinder people’s ability partner violence—whose victims are more to function in life. The World Bank has often women—can also be linked to violent found that 30–70 percent of people who conflict more largely (see box 1.8). have lived in conflict zones suffer from symptoms of post-traumatic stress disor- The Lifetime Impacts of der and depression (CDC 2014; Murthy Violent Conflict and Lakshminarayana 2006; World Bank Exposure to conflict can generate impacts 2016b). Children who are orphaned or sep- all along the life cycle. As illustrated in arated from family often experience pres- box 1.9, living in a setting where violence is sure to provide for themselves or become present can have myriad impacts, some of heads of households, which can make them which continue to manifest throughout the vulnerable to exploitation by trafficking life cycle. These impacts can be generated networks or armed groups (World Vision both by the direct exposure to violence or International 2017). The impacts on human by the witnessing of violence. For children capital can extend over generations (Mueller and youth, the long-term effects of expo- and Tobias 2016). sure to violence, combined with the adver- The harmful effects of violent conflict sities of daily life in a high-violence are especially insidious for children’s poten- context, are associated with a range of chal- tial development. According to Save the lenges (Miller and Rasmussen 2010). These Children (2013), “Almost 50 million children include increased risk of perpetrating or and young people living in conflict areas are being a victim of violence later in life (Child out of school, more than half of them pri- Trends 2017; Finkelhor et al. 2009; Margolin mary age, and reports of attacks on educa- and Elana 2004) as well as negative effects tion are rising” (reported in Tran 2013).

A Surge and Expansion of Violent Conflict 31 BOX 1.9 The Impact of Conflict over the Life Cycle

Conflict causes disruption and destruction far beyond Even if conflict across the region came to an end the loss of life. Famine and disease, the closure of today, the effects of conflict on human development public services, and the collapse of labor market would likely be felt for generations to come. opportunities create lasting impacts that affect the The impact of conflict on the nutritional status of overall pathway of a society and the development children is of particular concern. Stunting, through opportunities of its citizens. Figure B1.9.1 shows how which nutritional disadvantages translate into weaker conflict can affect the skill formation process. physical and cognitive health in childhood and The rise in violent conflict in the Middle East, adulthood, is associated with cognitive development, for example, has interrupted critical investments long-term productivity, and overall adult health. in the development of human capital. Children These risks produce a lifetime of lower productivity exposed to conflict will carry the effects of conflict and opportunity. The persistence of economic and throughout their lives, as the destruction of family educational inequalities, which often manifest in assets has devastating long-term consequences on low educational attainment and low employment future possibilities and the destruction of education opportunities for a large fraction of the population, halts critical interventions designed to enhance the may contribute to grievances that pose a risk of opportunities of individuals and improve society. future violence.

FIGURE B1.9.1 Skill Formation Process over the Life Cycle

Inputs Inputs Inputs Inputs (i) Genes (i) Cognitive skills (i) Cognitive skills (i) Cognitive skills (ii) Environment (ii) Non-cognitive skills (ii) Non-cognitive skills (ii) Non-cognitive skills (iii) Health status (iii) Health status (iii) Health status

CONFLICT Health care system Child care School system School system School system School system Family environment Family environment Family environment Family environment Disrupts the skill formation process by affecting familial and social environments, and the health care and Outputs Outputs Outputs Outputs school systems (i) Cognitive development (i) School attainment and (i) Final schooling level (i) Physical and mental health (ii) Non-cognitive development performance (ii) Labor market outcomes (ii) Social behaviors (iii) Physical and mental health (ii) Physical and mental health (iii) Physical and mental health (iii) Social behaviors (iv) Social behaviors Birth

1 2 3 Childhood Adolescence Adulthood Old age Conception

Source: Based on Urzúa 2016.

Source: UNESCWA 2017.

Years of violent conflict in Syria “have of the hardships of violent conflict may reversed more than a decade of progress in never resume their education or acquire children’s education. Today over 2 million of needed workforce training after the conflict Syria’s 4.8 million school-aged children are (World Vision International 2017). These not in school” (SOS Children’s Village 2014). impacts underscore the need for investment Children who have to leave school as a result in human capital development, which can

32 Pathways for Peace help build a country’s future workforce and of the year. When you consider that accord- thereby enhance its competitiveness in the ing to the most recent World Bank estimates global economy. 10.7 [percent] of the world’s population are living on less than US$2 per day, it shows The Health Impacts of an alarming market failure” (IEP 2016; Violent Conflict Schippa 2017). Violent conflicts affect health in direct and Prolonged violent conflict increases eco- indirect ways. In Liberia, 354 of 550 medical nomic costs. Violent conflict can also result facilities were destroyed during the Liberian in opportunity costs that have long-term Civil War, affecting how it coped with the ramifications for countries. The resources Ebola epidemic (Murphy and Ricks 2014). and money spent fighting wars can result in In the Democratic Republic of Congo, vio- lost employment opportunities, creating lent conflict worsened pregnancy outcomes pressures and grievances that pose risks (Ahuka, Chabikuli, and Ogunbanjo 2004). for future violent conflict (Garrett-Peltier Conflict can also exacerbate the spread of 2014). The adverse economic cost of violent infectious diseases. For example, the onset conflict increases with the length of expo- of recent conflict has resulted in a resur- sure to violence; with the duration of con- gence of polio in Syria, a disease that had flicts increasing over time, these economic been nearly eradicated worldwide (Tajaldin costs will have an increasingly adverse effect et al. 2015). The World Health Organization on affected countries and their futures has called the recent cholera outbreak in the (Röther et al. 2016). Beyond the impacts on Republic of Yemen “unprecedented” due to countries at the macro-level, violent con- its quick appearance in the conflict zone flict also has economic impacts at the (Al Jazeera 2017). Tuberculosis is also a micro-level; loss of livelihoods and assets of major health problem, and conflict-affected households are essential in understanding countries have lower capacity to run tuber- the dynamics of conflict traps. culosis control programs (Waldman 2001). Violent conflict is a major cause of the reversals in economic growth that many The Economic Costs of low- and middle-income countries have Violent Conflict experienced in recent decades. Indeed, recessions experienced during periods of The economic costs of violent conflict are violent conflict in fragile countries are a staggering. However, the overall costs of key reason for much lower average growth conflict are unevenly distributed, contribut- rates over time (Mueller and Tobias 2016). ing to global inequality between countries. The consequences are hugely negative for In the absence of violent conflict, global fragile contexts. Afghanistan’s per capita income inequality would be significantly income, for example, has barely changed lower. In fact, violent conflict is an integral since 1970 as the result of multiple violent part of the world economic structure conflicts, while Somalia’s per capita income (De Groot, Bozzoli, and Brück 2012), result- dropped by more than 40 percent in the ing in certain high-income countries’ bene- same period (IEP 2015). Recurrent and fiting from the prevalence of violent protracted violent conflict, therefore, deci- conflict, while certain low- and middle- mates the ability of states to rebuild their income countries bear a disproportionate economies and thus potentially prevent amount of the costs. future violent conflict. The Institute for Economics and Peace The macroeconomic costs of violent states in a 2016 report that the cost of con- conflict are also high. Violent conflict can taining violence is US$13.6 trillion a year undermine confidence in an economy by globally, a figure “equivalent to 13.3 [percent] altering investors’ expectations about politi- of world GDP or US$1,876 PPP [purchas- cal risks, particularly the risk of violence ing power parity] per annum, per person.33 recurrence (Mueller and Tobias 2016). To further break it down, that figure is Investors seek political stability for their US$5 per person, per day, every day investments because it entails lower risk.

A Surge and Expansion of Violent Conflict 33 Following violent conflict, states can have a or increasing access to social services like difficult time attracting new investors who education (Garrett-Peltier 2014). are willing to incur the higher risks of doing Violent conflict usually exacts a very business in a postconflict environment. high toll on infrastructure and production The impacts on the overall economy can systems (Mueller and Tobias 2016). For be substantial. Mavriqi (2016) finds that example, electoral violence surrounding the countries experiencing violent conflict suf- 2007 Kenyan presidential election drove up fer a reduction in annual GDP growth of labor costs by 70 percent (Ksoll, Rocco, and 2–4 percent and up to 8.4 percent if the Morjaria 2009); insecurity stemming from conflict is severe. Violent conflict is also the Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden and associated with an acceleration of inflation; the Indian Ocean increased shipping costs on average, the consumer price index by about 10 percent (Besley, Fetzer, and increases by 1.6 percentage points during Mueller 2012; Mueller and Tobias 2016). years of violent conflict (Röther et al. 2016). Neighboring countries often shoulder Economic growth can be severely affected the burden of spillover effects from violent in countries relying on trade or natural conflict. On average, countries that border a resources, if these resources are destroyed high-intensity conflict zone experience an during conflict; a country relying on tour- annual decline of 1.4 percentage points in ism may lose or have limited growth in that their GDP and an acceleration in inflation potential source of income as a result of of 1.7 percentage points (Röther et al. 2016). violent conflict. In the Middle East, the conflicts in Iraq and Political, social, and economic risks are Syria are associated with a drop in economic rife in postconflict periods. Postconflict growth of 1 percentage point in Jordan in economies often exist in power vacuums 2013. Similar dynamics were at work in that allow organized crime to flourish and Lebanon, where GDP growth slowed from create black market economies, which can 2.8 percent in 2012 and 2.6 percent in 2013 include both drug and human trafficking. from an average of 9.2 percent in 2007–10. Human trafficking explodes during violent Prices for basic needs such as food or hous- conflict, spilling into neighboring states, ing also increased at the beginning of the but the situation persists once the conflict conflicts (Röther et al. 2016). ends. Grievances can fester and grow in this environment. The Costs of Responding Many countries affected by violent con- to Conflict flict also have had enormous difficulties rebuilding institutions. A principal reason In 2017, an estimated 141.1 million people is that trust and capacity must first be built living in 37 countries were in need of interna- up before new institutions can succeed tional humanitarian assistance (UNOCHA in fragile situations (Chen, Ravallion, and 2017). The costs of this assistance are high Sangraula 2008; World Bank 2011). Mueller and rising. They include the cost of increas- and Tobias (2016) find that countries with a ing humanitarian assistance during conflict history of intrastate conflict collect a smaller and postconflict aid to assist reconstruction share of taxes relative to GDP than coun- and recovery and to support resilience as tries that have not experienced violent con- well as prevention and intervention strate- flict, which can make rebuilding after a gies (Dancs 2011; Demekas, McHugh, and conflict that much more difficult. Kosma 2002; Ndikumana 2015).34 The esti- Societies also pay the costs of conflict in mated economic cost of efforts to contain their security structures. Military costs, violence in 2012 was US$9.46 trillion or especially for large armies, can be very 11 percent of world gross product (IEP high (Nordhaus 2002), hurting opportunity 2015). To put this into perspective, spending costs in particular. When resources are on conflict containment is 2.4 times the total diverted toward security costs, states may GDP of Africa; the majority of this spending forgo opportunities to invest in other sec- goes to militaries, with just 0.1 percent spent tors, such as manufacturing, clean energy, on UN peacekeeping (IEP 2015).

34 Pathways for Peace The costs of responding to conflict 34,000 in 2000 to 94,000 in August have climbed significantly in parallel with 2017.37 By 2016, the total cost of the rapid growth and changing nature of maintaining peacekeeping missions in conflict. the field had climbed to almost US$8 billion a year, also reflecting the fact that •• Total funding requirements for missions today “last on average three humanitarian action in 2016 reached times longer than their predecessors”38 US$22.1 billion, an increase of US$2.2 (United Nations 2015, 11). At the same billion over the previous year and time, the number, size, and responsibilities a staggering US$13.3 billion (nearly of smaller civilian political missions have 70 percent) over 2012.35 This upward grown; 21 political missions are now in trend seems bound to continue in the place, with more than 3,000 personnel.39 future, with estimated requirements for •• Costs for humanitarian action not 2017 reaching new highs at US$23.5 directly linked to conflict have risen as billion. Funding secured for humanitarian well. In 2015, for instance, roughly action has gradually adjusted in response 1.5 million refugees sought asylum in to growing demand. The gap between Organisation for Economic Co-operation requested and secured funding, however, and Development countries, nearly has widened steadily over time. In 2016, twice as many as in the previous total funding secured fell short of requests year. Funding for the immediate by US$9 billion or more than 40 percent response to this crisis came in large part of the total.36 from official development assistance. •• A large majority of resources requested Development aid spent on refugees in for humanitarian action are directed to host countries doubled between areas of violent conflict. A report by the 2014 and 2015 and increased sixfold UN Secretary-General calculates that, in since 2010, reaching a total of US$12 2014, US$83 billion out of US$96 billion billion (9.1 percent of total overseas (or 86 percent) of total requests development assistance).40 through UN appeals were for tackling emergencies in conflict environments The evolving geography of conflict is (United Nations 2014). Since then, driving these cost increases as much as the mega-crises such as in Iraq and Syria escalation of violence. Conflict is becom- have further reinforced the link between ing more concentrated in middle-income conflict and humanitarian action. In countries, presenting a unique set of diffi- 2015, approximately 97 percent of total culties from those of lower-income humanitarian action targeted complex countries. emergencies—situations in which a total or considerable breakdown of authority results from internal or external conflict How Violent Conflicts End (UNOCHA 2016). Violent conflicts tend either to end in vic- •• In the last two decades, peacekeeping tory for one side or another or to fade into a operations expanded in mandate, state of chronic but low-intensity armed size, and length. So-called “traditional” hostilities. Permanent settlements through peacekeeping missions involving mediation, particularly for intrastate con- observational tasks performed by military flicts, have been rarer. In the decades after personnel have evolved into what the World War II, the bipolar international United Nations Capstone Doctrine order focused on interstate wars. The end of referred to as complex “multidimensional” the Cold War ushered in a new era of coop- enterprises (United Nations 2008). As of eration among global powers and a renewed mid-2017, 16 peacekeeping operations effort to peacefully resolve violent conflicts were deployed and operational, while the that were previously seen only through the number of police and military personnel prism of the competition between the in missions had nearly tripled from Soviet Union and the United States.

A Surge and Expansion of Violent Conflict 35 Between 1946 and 1991, more than fatalities relative to the presettlement death 23 percent of conflicts were brought to an toll. This was the case in 10 out of 11 cases in end by means of permanent peace settle- which peace agreements collapsed between ments or ceasefire agreements; the propor- 1989 and 2004 (Mack 2012). The average tion increased to almost 29 percent between annual death toll of intrastate conflicts 1991 and 2014 (Kreutz 2010; see figure 1.10). drops by more than 80 percent if they recur The use of mediation declined in the after a peace agreement (Human Security early 2000s, yet remains well above Cold Report Project 2012). Notwithstanding its War levels (Wallensteen and Svensson 2014). positive impacts, the use of mediation to While the long-term effectiveness of the negotiate the peaceful resolution of conflicts mediation of violent intrastate conflict has has not become a stable feature of the inter- been challenged (Beardsley 2008, 2011; national system. A recent analysis suggests Fortna 2003), recent research suggests that that the proliferation of negotiated settle- negotiated settlements are effective at reduc- ments has ended, with the violent conflicts ing violence in at least the first few years in today’s world challenging existing inter- after an agreement is signed (De Rouen and national mechanisms and hence being Chowdhury 2016; see figure 1.11). increasingly difficult to resolve with agree- Indeed, negotiated settlements can have ments (Walter 2017a). a transformative effect on conflict dynamics Indeed, many of the intrastate conflicts even when they fail. For example, violent and civil wars that have erupted since 2007 conflicts that restart after collapse of a nego- share characteristics that make them partic- tiated settlement result in significantly fewer ularly resistant to negotiated settlements.41

FIGURE 1.10 Termination of Violent Conflicts Worldwide before and after the Cold War, 1946–2014

0.40

0.35

0.30

0.25

0.20

0.15

0.10

Proportion of all state-based violent conflicts 0.05

0 Peace Ceaseﬁre Government Rebel Low activity Actor ceases Conﬂict still agreement agreement victory victory to exist ongoing

1946–1991 1991–2014

Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Kreutz 2010). Note: The Cold War period extends from 1945 to 1991; the post–Cold War period extends from 1991 to 2014. Peace agreement = an agreement concerned with resolving or regulating the incompatibility (completely or a central part of it), that is signed or accepted by all or the main parties active in the last year of conflict. Ceasefire agreement = an agreement typically concerned with ending the use of force by the warring sides. It can also offer amnesty for participation in the conflict. It does not include any resolution of the incompatibility. Government victory = the state manages to defeat comprehensively or eliminate the opposition. Rebel victory = the rebel group manages to oust the government. Low activity = conflict activity continues but does not reach the Uppsala Conflict Data Program threshold with regard to fatalities. Actor ceases to exist = conflict activity continues, but at least one of the parties ceases to exist or becomes another conflict actor.

36 Pathways for Peace FIGURE 1.11 The Onset and End of Armed Conflict Worldwide, 1950–2013

0 1950–59 1960–69 1970–79 1980–89 1990–99 2000–09 2010–13 Average number of onsets per year Average number of terminations per year

Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Kreutz 2010).

For example, international consensus on where communication, finance, crime, how they should end is lacking, as demon- and ideas flow seamlessly across borders. strated in the absence of UN Security Responding to violence after it has broken Council action (UN Security Council 2017). out is more expensive than ever, underscor- Moreover, the nature of these wars—with ing the need to move beyond crisis response multiple fighting factions, significant and recovery to a focus on prevention. involvement of outside states, and the deep This chapter has reviewed current trends societal divisions that the conflicts feed and in violent conflict, the nature of the risks, reflect—challenges the existing interna- and the opportunities for prevention. The tional and state-based conflict-resolution study turns next to an exploration of the mechanisms (Walter 2017a). context in which violent conflicts are hap- pening, focusing on some of the key sys- Conclusion temic risks posed by global trends, and the implications for prevention. Violent conflict remains the exception, not the rule, in today’s world. But it remains a significant threat to the stability of coun- Notes tries and regions. Violent conflict has 1. Intensity is defined as the number of become more complex, more international- conflict-related deaths and injuries. ized, and more multidimensional. It affects 2. Most of the numbers referred to in this more middle-income countries, but is also chapter are based on the UCDP and Peace stubbornly entrenched in low-income Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) definitions countries. In both cases, violent conflicts of state-based armed conflict as “a contested are contagious. incompatibility which concerns government The international system created after and/or territory where the use of armed World War II is rooted in the collective force between two parties, of which at least desire to prevent violent conflict through one is the government of a state, results in at norms, values, and peace mechanisms. But least 25 battle-related deaths” and nonstate it is challenged on many fronts in a world violent conflict as a conflict between

A Surge and Expansion of Violent Conflict 37 nonstate (that is, not state-based) armed and the Levant, the Islamic State of Iraq and groups, which may have ties to one or more Syria, and its Arabic language acronym with states. The data on state-based conflicts a negative connotation, Daesh. cover the years 1946–2016 (Allansson, 9. The use of progovernment militias does not Melander, and Themnér 2017; Gleditsch et necessarily signify that a state lacks the al. 2002), while the data on nonstate violent capacity to carry out violence using its own conflicts cover the years 1989–2016 forces. In fact, the use of such militias is (Sundberg, Eck, and Kreutz 2012; Allansson, often a sign of strong state capacity (see Melander, and Themnér 2017). UCDP is the Kishi, Aucoin, and Raleigh 2016; Raleigh source for the majority of trends on the and Kishi 2017). character and intensity of violent conflicts in 10. UCDP/PRIO defines internationalized con- this chapter. Figure 1.1 includes conflicts flict as those where one side is a state and that have resulted in at least 25 battle-related one side is a nonstate and where an outside deaths in a given year. state intervenes on behalf of one of these 3. Pinker and Mack (2014) note, “The end of (Allansson, Melander, and Themnér 2017; the Cold War … saw a steep reduction in the Gleditsch et al. 2002). number of armed conflicts of all kinds, 11. “This appears to be because credible guaran- including civil wars.” While it is true that the tees on the terms of an agreement are almost rate of violent conflicts between state forces impossible to design by the combatants and a nonstate actor had been decreasing themselves” (Walter 2017a, 1). since the end of the Cold War, it has been 12. UCDP does not report any violent conflicts increasing in recent years, as has the rate of involving state forces ending in 2016 conflicts between nonstate actors—although (Allansson, Melander, and Themnér 2017; the latter is not explored in Pinker and Mack Gleditsch et al. 2002). As this study was being (2014), given the low number of battle prepared, it was too early to say which con- deaths reported by these conflicts. flicts that were active in 2016 might or might 4. UCDP reports four conflicts with more than not be active in 2017. Hence, figure 1.6 1,000 fatalities each for 2007 and 13 for 2016 extends only to 2015. Several factors account (Allansson, Melander, and Themnér 2017; for the stark difference in the duration Gleditsch et al. 2002; Sundberg, Eck, and (number of years, on average) of violent Kreutz 2012). conflicts involving state forces that ended in 5. UCDP reports 63 state-based and nonstate 2014 versus those that ended in 2015. In conflicts with between 25 and 999 battle- 2014, 56 percent of violent conflicts had related deaths for 2007 and 101 for 2016 lasted more than 20 years and 44 percent had (Allansson, Melander, and Themnér 2017; lasted less than 10 years. In 2015, in contrast, Gleditsch et al. 2002; Sundberg, Eck, and 31 percent had lasted more than 20 years and Kreutz 2012). 69 percent had lasted less than 10 years. 6. Figures 1.2 and 1.3 use the best estimate for 13. “Conflict urationd is [also] likely to change battle-related deaths in violent conflicts, power balances that need to be reflected in including those that involve state forces and the institutional designs of political settle- those that do not; figure 1.3 also includes ments; [as such] stability can only be fatalities stemming from one-sided violence. achieved if underlying causes are sufficiently 7. Nonstate armed groups include rebel orga- addressed as well. Otherwise, conflict is nizations and violent extremist groups; likely to recur” (Wolff, Ross, and Wee 2017). political militias or “armed gangs” operating 14. Gang violence, which is prevalent in the on behalf of political actors; and communal Americas, is not systematically included here, and ethnic militias, which can act as local as it was addressed previously in the chapter. security providers or can engage in inter- 15. Political-religious divides and territorial communal conflict, often not engaging with claims are also major drivers, both of which the state (for example, the Fulani ethnic may conflate with issues related to political militia in Nigeria). power. 8. The Islamic State is known by several other 16. In 2015, approximately 19 percent of battle- names, including the Islamic State of Iraq field deaths occurred in the Arab world.

38 Pathways for Peace 17. These states also had highly repressive of economic activity problematic . . . [and so human rights policies and practiced capital numbers] ought to be interpreted with this punishment, among other commonalities in mind. . . . [Regardless of the estimate (see Gleditsch and Rudolfsen 2016). used,] the impact of civil war on output is 18. In Iraq, long-standing grievances are disastrous” (Mueller 2013). increasingly manifesting themselves in the 26. Definitions and data set are available creation of cross-sectarian alliances as an at http://eventdata.parusanalytics.com/data expression of widespread and diverse popu- .dir/atrocities.html. lar dissatisfaction with the ruling elites. Iraq 27. Hultman (2010) suggests three mechanisms also has a history of long-standing tensions that may result in this behavior: “First, if an between Arabs and Kurds. intervention makes the warring parties 19. For example, the global recruitment of expect a settlement of the conflict, they Western foreign fighters through technology might target civilians as a last-minute strat- and other means (ICG 2016a). egy to establish territorial control. Second, if 20. While the international recruitment of the intervention alters the balance of power young people by groups such as the Islamic between the warring parties or hinders mili- State has received much attention, the tary clashes, the warring parties might turn strength of such groups in Iraq, for example, to violence against civilians as a cheaper has come from the local co-optation of the strategy of imposing costs on the adversary. old Ba’athist apparatus as well as from col- Third, if an intervention challenges the laboration with tribes that have been fright- warring parties’ ability to extract natural ened by a formal state structure they perceive resources or to engage in criminal economic to be serving as an instrument of retribution activity, it might trigger them to increase for the years of Sunni domination in Iraq. violent looting behavior in order to main- Al Shabaab has also co-opted many people tain control over resources.” who had been excluded by the domination 28. Attacks on schools and hospitals are consid- of clans in Somali politics, especially ered one of the six grave violations under many youths. the August 1999 UN Security Council 21. Chapter 4 presents the findings of studies of Resolution (S/Res/1261) on Children the motivations of individuals who join and Armed Conflict (see also ICRC 2017; violent extremist groups (see box 4.3) Sassoli 2004). 22. See the United Nations High Commissioner 29. See ACLED for definitions and discussion, for Refugees (UNHCR) data portal, http://www.crisis.acleddata.com/category “South Sudan Situation,” http://data.unhcr. /remote-violence/. org/SouthSudan/regional.php; Internal 30. This was also the highest number of civilian Displacement Monitoring Centre database, casualties that the UN has ever recorded “South Sudan,” http://www.internal over the protracted conflict in the country. -displacement.org/countries/south-sudan. 31. Other estimates put the figure in excess of 23. Terrorism is understood here as “the threat- 800,000, suggesting that UCDP underesti- ened or actual use of illegal force and vio- mates the scale of the genocide. No genocide lence by a non-state actor to attain a political, has been comparable in scale to that of economic, religious or social goal through Rwanda’s for more than 20 years. However, fear, coercion or intimidation” (National several massive genocides occurred between Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 1955 and 1994. Responses to Terrorism 2016). This defini- 32. The numbers reported here reflect the num- tion renders it difficult to distinguish bers released in UNHCR’s report, Global events from warfare during violent conflict Trends: Forced Displacement in 2016 (Hoffman 2006). (UNHCR 2017). The trends depicted in 24. Illicit financing of nonstate actors is not figure 1.9 are based on data downloaded limited to the sale of drugs. from UNHCR. The numbers reported in the 25. “An exact estimate for the economic cost of UNHCR report differ because IDP numbers violent conflict is hard to derive. The very come from the Internal Displacement existence of a conflict makes measurement Monitoring Centre and refugee numbers

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