"A serious query": Operation THUNDERCLAP and the Allied Bombing of Eastern German Cities During the Winter of 1944-1945.

by

Kevin Norris

BA Honors History and International Studies Option, University of Waterloo, 2003

A Thesis, Dissertation or Report Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Masters of Arts

in the Graduate Academic Unit of History

Supervisors): Marc Milner, PhD, History Department

Examining Board: Gary Waite PhD, History Department, Chair Jeff Brown, PhD, History Department Mike Ircha, PhD, Civil Engineering

This thesis is accepted by the Dean of Graduate Studies

THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW BRUNSWICK

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This thesis examines one of the largest and most destructive aerial operations of the Second World War. During February, March and April 1945, the Royal Air Force

(RAF) and the Eighth United States Army Air Force (Eighth USAAF) deployed their massive bomber forces in support of Operation THUNDERCLAP. Allied officials expected that an all out attack on ten cities located in eastern Germany would result in a quick end to the lagging war. The historiography of the strategic bombing offensive against Germany has, for the most part, ignored Operation THUNDERCLAP in its entirety, but its most notorious raids - the bombing of Dresden on February 13, 14 and

15- have entered the public consciousness as the epitome of senseless destruction and have come to generalize Allied bombing during the final winter of the war. Since 1945, authors have debated the controversy of the bombing of Dresden in numerous books, articles and documentaries, while rarely acknowledging the other nine

THUNDERCLAP cities. By examining the details and results of all the

THUNDERCLAP raids and the Allied intent in bombing these cities, this thesis presents a complete account of the most controversial Allied aerial operation of the Second

World War.

li Acknowledgements

It is with great pleasure that I am able to thank the many people who made this thesis possible.

First and foremost I would like to thank Dr. Marc Milner for his continuing support. Whether it was around the department or on the battlefields, his enthusiasm, knowledge, anecdotes and inspiration made my time at UNB a truly memorable and successful experience.

I am truly indebted to the former Military and Strategic Studies Program (now the Gregg Centre for the Study of War and Society) at the University of New Brunswick for supporting my research and ideas and giving me the ability to present at conferences, visit battlefields and Canadian Forces bases in Atlantic Canada, undertake research in

England and walk the battlefields of France, Belgium and the Netherlands.

I am grateful to the secretaries at the Department of History, Elizabeth Adshade and Carole Hines, and Deborah Stapleford at the Gregg Centre for the Study of War and

Society for helping me with any administrative problems and for keeping me updated on the currents events around campus while I was back in Ottawa. Thank you!

A great deal of thanks has to go to Stephen Harris for his advice and input during the early stages of this thesis and to the staff at the Directorate of History and Heritage for all their assistance in hunting down requested material.

To all my friends back home in Ottawa, from my years at the University of

Waterloo and my fellow grad students at the University of New Brunswick thank you for your encouragement, camaraderie and entertainment. To everyone at the Swan at

iii Carp Restaurant in Ottawa, thank you for your endless support and friendship. I must also thank my second family while in Fredericton the Thomas' for all their support and hospitality. Thank you for everything.

To Leanne Lalonde for all her support, love, encouragement and for allowing me to transform her apartment into my own war office full of papers, books and documents.

Your support has meant more to me than you will ever know.

Lastly, I must thank all my family and especially my parents Brian and Marion for their loving support in whatever endeavors I have chosen to pursue over the last 26 years...and their fantastic editing skills. This thesis would not have been possible without your support and therefore I dedicate it to you.

IV List of Maps

Map

1. Map of Europe, 1944 181

2. Allied "Zone Map" of Berlin (including two and half mile radius from THUNDERCLAP proposal) 182

3. Railway lines around THUNDERCLAP targets 183

v Glossary

A/C Aircraft

AD Air Division (USAAF)

AAC Army Air Corps (name of the aviation branch of the United States Army until June 20, 1941)

AAF Army Air Forces (name of the aviation branch of the United States Army after June 20, 1941)

ACAS Assistant Chief of the Air Staff

ACIU Allied Central Interpretation Unit

AFV Armored Fighting Vehicle

Anti-aircraft gun Gun capable of hitting targets at high elevation and capable of fairly rapid fire

A/P Aiming point

Area bombing Bombing theory which argues it is better to saturate a city area with bombs rather than aim for a specific target

Atlantic Wall An extensive system of coastal fortifications built by Hitler along the western coast of Europe (1942- 44) to defend against an anticipated Anglo- American invasion

AWPD-1 Air War Plan Division- Plan Number 1 (1941)

AWPD-1942 Air War Plans Division- Plan 1942

Battle of Berlin Bombing campaign of the Royal Air Force on Berlin and other cities between the night of November 18, 1943 and March 30, 1944

Big Week Bombing campaign of the USAAF on industrial targets associated with the Luftwaffe between February 20, 1944 and February 25. 1944

VI Blind Bombing Non-visual bombing using radar aids

Bomber's Baedeker Guide to understand what rank or priority the Allies assigned to each German city and the specific targets within them

CAS Chief of the Air Staff

Casablanca Major Allied bombing directive signed January 21, 1943.

CBO Combined Bomber Offensive (1943-1945)

C/C Communication centre

COS Chiefs of Staff

CROSSBOW Bombing operation against German V-Weapon sites Director of Bombing Operations DBOps Deputy Chief of the Air Staff DCAS Deputy Director of Bombing Operations DDBOps A 1943 Plan created, by then USAAF Brigadier- Eaker Plan General, Ira C. Eaker which called for around the clock bombing of Nazi Germany by USAAF and RAF aircraft

ETO European Theater of Operations

FO Foreign Office (British)

GAF German Air Force, Luftwaffe

GEE British radio aid to navigation using three ground transmission stations

H2S Airborne ground mapping radar aid used to navigate and for target identification

H2X American version of H2S

vii HE High Explosive

IB Incendiary Bomb

JIC Joint Intelligence Committee

Luft Feld Divisionen Division of Luftwaffe personnel in German Army

MEW Ministry of Economic Warfare

M/Y Marshalling Yards

NEWHAVEN Technique for ground marking targets with flares or target markers

(0) Target of opportunity

OBOE British electronic blind bombing device

OVERLORD Plan for Allied invasion of France in June 1944

(P) Primary target

POINTBLANK Directive establishing the priorities for the Allied Combined Bomber Offensive in June 1943

PRU Photo Reconnaissance Unit

RAFX Royal Air Force

RCAF Royal Canadian Air Force

RR Railroad

(S) Secondary target

SAA Small Arms Ammunition

Schrage Musik German term for the upward-firing canons fitted onto their night fighters

SHAEF Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces

SIO Senior Intelligence officer

T/0 Targets of Opportunity

vin USAAC United States Army Air Corps

USAAF United States Army Air Forces

USSBS United States Strategic Bombing Survey

USSTAF United States Strategic Air Forces

V-l Unmanned German flying bomb, "buzz-bomb"

V-2 Long-range German rocket

VCAS Vice Chief of the Air Staff

WIS Visual bombing

War Weary Project Project to send war-weary, remote guided aircraft loaded with explosives against Germany

IX Table of Contents

Abstract ii

Acknowledgements iii

List of Maps v

Glossary vi

Introduction 1

Chapter

1. Planes, Bombsights and "Pickle Barrels": A review of the USAAF precision bombing doctrine versus operational reality 13

2. Bombing to Win the War: The politics of area bombing and the evolution of Operation THUNDERCLAP 52

3. The "THUNDERCLAP Model": The February 13, 14 and 15, 1945, raids on Dresden 79

4. Operation THUNDERCLAP: The "associated" cities, February 3, 1945 to March 28, 1945 93

5. Operation THUNDERCLAP: The final weeks,

March29, 1945 to April 21, 1945 138

Conclusion 155

Appendices

I. RAF and USSAF Bomber Specifications 160 II. H2X image of the Normandy beachhead at Graye-Sur-Mer on June 6th, 1944 164

III. Comparison of Total Training Hours of Fighter Pilots GAF, RAF and USAAF 165

x IV. Berlin THUNDERCLAP Chart 166

V. Dresden THUNDERCLAP Chart 169

VI. Chemnitz THUNDERCLAP Chart 170

VII. Leipzig THUNDERCLAP Chart 171

VIII. Halle THUNDERCLAP Chart 172

IX. Plauen THUNDERCLAP Chart 173

X. Dessau THUNDERCLAP Chart 174

XI. Potsdam THUNDERCLAP Chart 175

XII. Erfurt THUNDERCLAP Chart 176

XIII. Magdeburg THUNDERCLAP Chart 177

XIV. Total Combined Tonnage Dropped by Bomber Command and the USAAF on the THUNDERCLAP Cities between February and April 1945 178

XV. Comparison Charts of Total Tonnage dropped by Bomber Command and Eighth USAAF on Germany between February-April 1945 and Total Tonnage dropped by Bomber Command and Eighth USAAF on THUNDERCLAP cities between February-April 1945 179

XVI. THUNDERCLAP Attacks on Each City by Day 180

Bibliography 184

Curriculum Vitae

xi Introduction It may seem fantastic to people who haven't flown at high altitudes, but the other night I saw both the Eastern and Western fronts at once. It makes you think. I mean, the war gone on so long and the Nazis used to be so strong and now a man in a heavy night bomber can practically see across their country. When this can be done, I guess Victory really is in sight at last, as well as the two fighting fronts. A Canadian Flight Sergeant upon returning from his long flight to Dresden in February 1945.

In the historiography of World War II aerial warfare, there are publications on everything from individual air battles to detailed histories of planes and their pilots.

More specifically, the histories of the Royal Air Force's (RAF) Bomber Command and the United States Army Air Force's (USAAF) bomber offensive focus on the tougher years of battle leading up to the invasion of Normandy in June of 1944. During these years German air and ground defenses were at their most dangerous and, as a result,

Allied bomber forces encountered high risks, suffered maximum losses, and achieved low accuracy. With the Allies pushing through France in the summer of 1944 and well into Belgium by mid-September, Bomber Command and the USAAF encountered drastically improved flying conditions. German ground defenses and detection radars were minimal while the Luftwaffe sat exhausted and depleted within Germany.

Meanwhile, the combination of low loss rates and peak wartime production of aircraft meant the strength of the Allied strategic air forces grew at an astounding rate. By late

1944, it appeared that German ground forces were breaking and that the Allies were finally weeks away from victory. It is at this point that the maximum impact of the bomber offensive was felt. The number of sorties had almost tripled, while 70% of all tonnage dropped on Germany fell after September 1, 1944. Paradoxically, this period has generated the least detailed coverage in the literature. In most cases the same story is

1 repeated from book to book and lacks a high level of detail.

This thesis will examine one of the largest and most destructive aerial operations during the last winter of the war. Between, February and mid-April 1945, the RAF and

USAAF deployed their massive bomber forces in support of Operation

THUNDERCLAP. During this period Allied officials expected that an all out attack on ten cities located in eastern Germany would result in a quick end to the lagging war. Few people know of Operation THUNDERCLAP in its entirety, but its most notorious raids - the bombing of Dresden on February 13, 14 and 15- have entered the public consciousness as the epitome of senseless destruction. Since 1945, authors have debated the controversy of the bombing of Dresden in numerous books, articles and documentaries, however, in most cases, they have ignored the other nine

THUNDERCLAP cities.1 By examining the individual raids and results of all the

THUNDERCLAP raids and the Allied intent in bombing these cities, this thesis will present a complete account of the most controversial Allied aerial operation of the

Second World War.

In Chapter One, the development of the bomber and bombing policy in the

United Kingdom and the United States of America will be examined in context to the pre-1945 operations of both the RAF and USAAF. An examination into the policies and technology of Bomber Command and the USAAF will highlight the capabilities and shortcomings of both air forces in the winter of 1945 and, ultimately, during

OPERATION THUNDERCLAP. Chapter Two discusses the politics of area bombing

I As will be examined in the following chapters, Operation THUNDERCLAP targeted ten cities. Dresden, Berlin, Chemnitz and Leipzig are the most common cities referenced in the historiography of World War II aerial warfare. Within most books and even official sources the term "associated cites" is used to describe the lesser known THUNDERCALP cities. These associated cities make up the complete THUNDERCLAP target list and include Halle, Plauen, Dessau, Potsdam, Erfurt and Magdeburg. In this thesis all ten THUNDERCLAP cities will be examined.

2 and describes the development of Operation THUNDERCLAP in a more extensive and

detailed approach than the current historiography. Chapter Three recounts the infamous

Dresden raids and establishes their role as the "THUNDERCLAP model." By

comparing the Dresden raids to the other lesser known THUNDERCLAP attacks, this

thesis will also clarify the main intent of Allied bombing in the winter of 1944-1945.

Chapter Four, will describe the individual cities attacked, their raids and the results

produced by the Allied bombers in February and March of 1945. Chapter Five details

the final weeks of Operation THUNDERCLAP. This thesis will conclude by revisiting

the goals and premise of THUNDERCLAP in relation to the results it produced to

determine not only if it was a success but also to make a judgment about its necessity.

Many books are written about strategic bombing during the Second World War; however, post war literature on bombing during the final winter of the war, and more

specifically Operation THUNDERCLAP, varies. Contemporary debate over whether

Operation THUNDERCLAP was a valid military operation or simply a terror attack tends to rely on data from the February 13, 14 and 15, 1945, raids on Dresden.

Consequently, discussion of the Dresden raids dominates the historiography of the

Allied bombing campaign during the final winter of the war and, as result, historians have, for the most part, generalized a large portion of the Allied air forces activities in

Europe during the winter of 1944-1945.

In analyzing any period of the strategic bombing campaign it is essential to start by examining the official histories of the Allied air forces. Official histories offer a straightforward, technical and operational account of what happened and why, while leaving the judgment of the events to more generalized histories. Specifically, the third

3 volumes of each of the British, American and Canadian official histories are relevant to

the final months of the Allied bombing offensive.

Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland's The Strategic Air Offensive Against

Germany 1939-1945: Victory, Volume III(London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office,

1961) covers Bomber Command's activities during the final winter of the war. Volume

III describes in detail, the debate and development of strategies and directives by

military officials but not the specific raids. The reader is left with the understanding that

Bomber Command is persistently targeting Germany yet there is little mention of the

individual raids. The same limitation is found in the official history's treatment of

Operation THUNDERCLAP. The development of THUNDERCLAP is presented but the full target list is missing. The authors focus on the Dresden attacks and, to some degree, the attacks on Chemnitz and Berlin. The official historians even refer to the

Dresden raids as the "climax of the night area offensive"2 based on the results produced in Dresden and not on the Allies' overall intent of bombing eastern German cities in

1945. Throughout its latter chapters, this thesis will demonstrate that the Allied intent in bombing other eastern German cities in the winter of 1944-1945 was similar to that of

Dresden, although similar results were not necessarily produced.

Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate's The Army Air Forces in World War

II, Europe: ARGUMENT to V-E Day, January 1944 to May 1945 (Washington, DC:

Office of Air Force History, 1983) is the third volume of the American official history.

In Section VI, the activities of the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces during the final winter of the war are meticulously covered. Within the American official history,

2 Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland's The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany 1939-1945: Victory, Volume III (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1961), 109.

4 however, there is little discussion about the moral issues of bombing. Operation

THUNDERCLAP is briefly mentioned during its development phase in August 1944 but is not considered when the actual attacks occur in 1945. The American official historians focus on the February 3 attack on Berlin as the USAAF's more controversial attack during the winter of 1944-1945 and then briefly describe the Eighth Air Force's role in the bombing of Dresden several weeks later. Although many of the post-Dresden

American THUNDERCLAP raids are covered in this volume they are never acknowledged as part of the larger THUNDERCLAP operation.

In Bereton Greenhous, Stephen J. Harris, William C. Johnston and William GP

Rawling's, The Crucible of War 1939 - 1945, The Official History of the Royal

Canadian Air Force, Volume III (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994) a chapter

3 The USAAF official history mentions some February, March and April 1945 raids against Berlin, Chemnitz, Dresden, Magdeburg, Leipzig and Halle but once again not in detail. In some books and articles, especially those strictly covering the American aspect of the bombing offensive, the USAAF's most controversial raid of the war is depicted as the February 3, 1945 attack on Berlin. See Richard G. Davis, Carl A. Spaatz and the Air War in Europe (Washington, D.C: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1993); Richard G. Davis, "OPERATION 'THUNDERCLAP': The US Army Air Forces and the Bombing of Berlin." The Journal of Strategic Studies XIV (March 1991), 90-111; Richard G. Davis, "German Railyards and Cities: US Bombing Policy, 1944-1945." Air Power History (Summer 1995), 46-63; Conrad Crane, Cities, Bombs and Civilians: American Airpower Strategy in World War I (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1993), 105-108; and Tami Davis Biddle, "British and American Approaches to Strategic Bombing: Their Origins and Implementation in the World War II Combined Bomber Offensive," Journal of Strategic Studies 18, 1 (1995), 91-144. In Ronald Schaffer, Wings of Judgment: American Bombing in World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985) Operation THUNDERCLAP is described strictly as the Feb 3, 1945, USAAF raid on Berlin and Dresden is an perceived as an entirely different operation. After describing the American aspect of the THUNDERCLAP development and the USAAF February 3 raid on Berlin, Schaeffer adds, "THUNDERCLAP did not push Germany over the brink, nor did it become the best-remembered operation of the European war. That distinction went to the raid on Dresden, capital of Saxony." Schaffer, 97. A similar view can be found in Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (London: Cornell University Press, 1996). Some authors also portray Operation THUNDERCLAP as purely British in origin and executed primarily by Bomber Command using area bombing whilst American participation is described as minute in comparison and was strictly executed using precision bombing. As seen in Conrad Crane, Cities, Bombs and Civilians: American Airpower Strategy in World War I (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1993), 105-108; Charles Messenger, 'Bomber' Harris and the Strategic Bombing Offensive, 1939-1945 (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1984); and John Terraine, The Right of the Line (Ware, Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions Limited, 1997).Overall, this thesis will prove that Operation THUNDERCLAP was a joint Bomber Command-USAAF initiative that focused on not only Dresden and Berlin but also eight other eastern German cities. In many instances, both the USAAF and Bomber Command performed back to back attacks while in some cases either force single handedly attacked a THUNDERCLAP city.

5 appropriately entitled "Armageddon over Germany: September 1944-May 1945" is

dedicated to examining the Allied bombing operations during the final winter of the war.

The Canadian official Royal Canadian Air Force historians have undertaken a more

critical approach to analyzing the Allied bombing offensive while effectively tracing, in

some detail, the lesser known raids on German cities. Incidentally, the Canadian official

historians do not make Dresden the focus of this chapter and in relation to Operation

THUNDERCLAP, The Crucible of War, only briefly covers its development. It is,

however, one source that does provide the entire THUNDERCLAP target list. It even

describes and acknowledges the THUNDERCLAP raids against Chemnitz from

February 14/15 and March 5/6.

Other general histories of Bomber Command and the USAAF, although

important contributions to the overall historiography of Allied strategic bombing during the Second World War, generally ignore operations during the final winter of the war

and chose to focus on Dresden or the moral issues of bombing. Max Hastings', Bomber

Command (London: Michael Joseph Limited, 1979) offers an appropriately named

chapter entitled "Saturation" to described bombing during the last winter of the war.

Unfortunately, he mentions the larger Allied raids in passing and then briefly focuses on the infamous Dresden raid before quickly jumping to the end of the Allied bomber

offensive. John Terraine's highly referenced, The Right of the Line (Ware, Hertfordshire:

Wordsworth Editions Limited, 1997), is another book guilty of ignoring the end of the bombing war in detail. Of his some 687 pages, only seventeen deal with post D-Day operations.

More recently, Robin Neillands', The Bomber War: The Allied Air Offensive against Nazi Germany (New York: The Overlook Press, 2001) incorporates numerous

6 personal accounts from veterans and civilians who experienced or witnessed the bombing offensive to support his general text on the bomber war. In relation to the last winter of the war, Chapter 15 is dedicated to the bombing between September 1944 and the end of January 1945 and then in Chapter 16 he describes the Dresden controversy.

Chapter 15 focuses on the Allied debate over how to effectively deploy the bomber at the end of 1944 and early 1945 rather than the various attacks. In doing so, Neillands leads into the bombing debate in his chapter on Dresden. Operation THUNDERCLAP and its development are briefly mentioned in the two chapters, but once again only

Berlin, Dresden, Chemnitz, Leipzig and "associated cities" are identified as the main targets. Instead of focusing on the entire THUNDERCLAP operation, Neillands chooses to debunk several "myths" about the bombing of Dresden.

David Bashow's recently released No Prouder Place: Canadians and the

Bomber Command Experience 1939-1945 (St. Catherine's, Ontario: Vanwell Publishing

Limited, 2005) traces the bomber war while focusing on the Canadians who contributed within Bomber Command. In general, the strongpoint of No Prouder Place is its numerous personal accounts from veterans. These narratives serve well to support the general history of the bomber offensive. Although No Prouder Place covers the full spectrum of the bombing campaign and is meticulously researched and documented,

Bashow is guilty of quickly skimming over the raids and issues of bombing during the winter of 1944-1945 and repeating the usual arguments involving the Dresden debate.

He does, however, briefly acknowledge several THUNDERCLAP attacks that are rarely discussed in other books such as the bombing of Chemnitz on February 14/15 and

March 5/6 and the rarely mentioned bombing of Leipzig on April 10/11. Once again, these attacks are not described in detail or in context to the winter bombing offensive but

7 are supported by various interesting narratives from Canadians who participated in these raids.

Personal histories written by or about the various players involved in the strategic bombing campaign are also important books to consider when examining

Operation THUNDERCLAP and Allied bombing during the winter of 1944-1945 because they offer insight into what the Allied leaders were thinking. Immediately following the end of the Second World War, Sir Arthur Harris released an official account of his three and a half years in Bomber Command titled Despatch on War

Operations: 23rd February, 1942 to 8th May, 1945.A In 1947, Harris then released his memoirs in a book titled Bomber Offensive (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing Co. Limited,

1990). Both publications are widely available to the public and in a sense are quite similar. The only major difference is that Despatch on War Operations is much more technical than his memoirs. Much of Harris' account in Despatch is dedicated to detailed appendices, tables and charts and the general text is succinctly written and does not go into great descriptions about operations. In Bomber Offensive, Harris spends more time describing the various periods of the bomber offensive in a proper narrative format and defends his actions as Marshal of the RAF and the area bombing policy of Bomber

Command. Consequently there is no direct reference to THUNDERCLAP in either account. In fact, in Despatch the February 1945 Dresden raids are mentioned briefly in a small paragraph as are allusions to the attacks on Dessau and Chemnitz in 1945. In his memoirs, Harris argues that Dresden was a legitimate target and the decision to attack

This account was later released with a forward by Sebastian Cox and Horst Boog. Sebastian Cox ed, Despatch on War Operations 23rd February, 1942 to 8th May, 1945 (London: Frank Class, 1995).

8 the city came from authorities higher in command than him; a controversy that is still

debated today.

Skilled historian Richard G. Davis has written one of the most important works

on USAAF General Carl A. Spaatz. In his book Carl A. Spaatz and the Air War in

Europe (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1993), Davis not only does an

exceptional job of describing Spaatz's role as a commander of the USAAF but he has

also written a comprehensive history of the USAAF's operations in the European

Theater of War (ETO.) In relation to THUNDERCLAP, Davis traces its development

from both the British and American perspective in great detail and he does an excellent job of describing the relationship between USAAF and Bomber Command officials.

Like the USAAF official history Davis focuses on the February 3 raid on Berlin more

than the February raids on Dresden. From Davis' account it appears as if

THUNDERCLAP was solely the February 3 attack on various targets within Berlin and

not the attacks on the various eastern German cities as will be argued by this thesis.5

Within the historiography of Operation THUNDERCLAP, there exists no single

volume on the entire operation, while there are numerous books about the destruction of

Dresden. Of the various books published in English on the bombing of Dresden, David

Irving's The Destruction of Dresden (London: Kimber, 1963) is essential reading.6

5 Davis also explains Operation THUNDERCLAP as strictly the February 3, 1945, USAAF raid on Berlin in his article "OPERATION 'THUNDERCLAP': The US Army Air Forces and the Bombing of Berlin." The Journal of Strategic Studies XIV (March 1991), 90-111. Davis says, "although mission 817 had an unusual gestation its practical results differed little from earlier American raids on Berlin and its timing, as part of an Allied bombing offensive against cities in eastern Germany, made it an integral part of the chain of events leading to the bombing on 14 February 1945 of Dresden, which is often erroneously believed to be part of Thunderclap." Davis. "OPERATION 'THUNDERCLAP': The US Army Air Forces and the Bombing of Berlin," 107. 6 Irving re-released his book in 1995 and 2005. The 2005 version is available to download for free on his webpage. David Irving. Apocalypse 1945: The Destruction of Dresden (London: David Irving and Parforce UK Ltd, 2005). Available ["Online1:http://fpp.co.uk/books/Dresden/index.html. Accessed July 19, 2006. Other older and comprehensive research on Dresden can be found in Alexander McKee, The Devil's

9 Irving's international best selling book is credited with fueling the bombing controversy in the post war period and today it is even viewed as a contentious historical work.

When he first released his book in the 1960s, Irving presented new findings on Allied tactics and startling statistics on the number of alleged casualties. In light of more recent research and publications, a reassessment of Irving's work must be considered while historians should consult The Destruction of Dresden cautiously. Although Irving effectively demonstrates the horrors of the Allied bombing campaign and has employed exhaustive research to support his argument, his final death count should be scrutinized while some of his claims over Allied strafing of civilians should be seriously questioned.7 In relation to THUNDERCLAP, Irving dedicates a chapter titled

"Thunderclap" to describe its development. He also acknowledges all ten cities on the

THUNDERCLAP list but quickly focuses on Dresden as the main attack. He does, however, describe the February raids on Chemnitz and Berlin but ultimately avoids the remaining March and April THUNDERCLAP raids. In the end, any historian studying the Dresden debate should consider The Destruction of Dresden; however, Irving's work must be complemented with more unbiased and perhaps precise works.

More recently a comprehensive and detailed account on Dresden can be found in

Frederick Taylor's, Dresden: Tuesday 13 February 1945 (London: Bloomsbury

Publishing, 2004.) Without a doubt Taylor's book is the companion to Irving's Dresden account. Taylor presents a fresh look into the Dresden debate by skillfully using in-depth

Tinderbox: Dresden 1945 (New York: E.P. Duffon, Inc., 1982); and Alan Cooper, Target Dresden (Bromley: Independent books, 1995). More recent books covering the bombing of Dresden in detail are Paul Addison and Jeremy A. Craig, ed. Firestorm: The Bombing of Dresden, 1945 (London: Pimlico, 2006); and Frederick Taylor, Dresden: Tuesday 13 February 1945 (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2004). 7 Besides the fact his research gathering methods have come into question, Irving has openly denied that the Holocaust ever occurred and as a result is one of history's most controversial authors.

10 research and personal accounts to describe the pre-war history of Dresden, its nature as a

military target and the eventual attacks. In relation to Operation THUNDERCLAP,

Taylor devotes a strong chapter detailing the political aspects of the birth of

THUNDERCLAP. Like most authors, Taylor fails to fully acknowledge the entire

THUNDERCLAP target list while mentioning the usual cities such as Berlin, Dresden

and Chemnitz and, as a result, he never examines any of the other seven

THUNDERCLAP cities or their raids in the latter chapters of his book. Consequently,

Taylor presents an impartial argument that the bombing of Dresden can be justified on

the simple facts that Dresden was an active military target within the German war

economy, that the RAF did not use uncommon methods to attack the city and, the

horrific conditions produced during the bombing were a result of perfect weather, poor

civil defence organization and the inexperience of Dresden's city officials and civilians.

By choosing to focus on Dresden as the main THUNDERCLAP raid and not the

operation in its entirety, Taylor, like most authors, overlooks the overall goal and

accepted trend of targeting refugees during the final months of combat as a means to

bring about an end to the Second World War.

An interesting companion to the THUNDERCLAP historiography is Peter

Hessel's, The Mystery ofFrankenberg's Canadian Airman (Toronto: James Lorimer and

Company Ltd., Publishers, 2005.) This is a unique book that serves a much greater purpose than an operational history but does have some relation to Operation

THUNDERCLAP. In short, The Mystery ofFrankenberg's Canadian Airman describes

Hessel's effort to discover who brutally murdered a downed Canadian airman in March

1945, only a few streets from where he was living. Sixty years later and now a nationalized Canadian, Hessel recounts the personal history of the airman and the

11 mystery of his death with the 1945 winter bombing offensive as his backdrop. In relation to THUNDERCLAP, Hessel recounts the bombing of his home town, Chemnitz, and that of Dresden in 1945. More importantly, unlike any other books in English,

Hessel offers an interesting look into the history of Chemnitz, its wartime life and its nature as a target in 1945 in a somewhat similar process to that which is prominently applied when authors examine Dresden.8

It is obvious that no single thesis or even book could effectively cover, in detail the Allied winter bombing campaign of 1944-1945. This thesis, however, will help to better demonstrate the controversial trend of Allied bombing late in the war by using

Operation THUNDERCLAP as an example. This thesis will trace THUNDERCLAP from its early origins in July 1944 to its conclusion in April 1945. By focusing on the lesser-known attacks and their similarities to the "THUNDERCLAP model," Dresden, the true nature of Operation THUNDERCLAP will be revealed and a missing chapter in the overall Allied bombing offensive will be provided.

Another book that effectively examines the bombing of a lesser known German city, Wurzberg, is Hermann Knell, To Destroy a City: Strategic Bombing and Its Human Consequences in World War II (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2003). Knell sets up the description and destruction of Wurzberg nicely similar to authors who write about Dresden.

12 Chapter 1

Planes, Bombsights and "Pickle Barrels": A review of the USAAF precision bombing doctrine versus operational reality

As far as can at present be foreseen there is absolutely no limit to the scale of its future independent war use. And the day may not be far off when aerial operations with their devastation of enemy lands and destruction of industrial and populous centres on a vast scale may become the principal operations of war, to which the older forms of military and naval operations may become secondary and subordinate.

The Smuts Memorandum, August 17', 1917.

During the Second World War, the two parties that formed the Combined

Bomber Offensive (CBO) against Germany, the RAF and the USAAF, identified themselves as having different bombing techniques. The RAF aircraft were "city busters" and the USAAF aircraft were "precision bombers." The RAF engaged in a nighttime area bombing offensive to destroy its intended target, while the USAAF concentrated on selective targeting singling out the key target as an aiming point that would lead to industrial, and thus military, collapse. Throughout, and even after, the

Second World War, both parties of the Allied bombing offensive against Germany promoted their doctrines as superior to the other. In recent years, several authors have re-examined the descriptions and issues of accuracy produced by those attack styles. In

9 As seen in Tami Davis Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas About Strategic Bombing, 1914-1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002); Tami Davis Biddle, "British and American Approaches to Strategic Bombing: Their Origins and Implementation in the World War II Combined Bomber Offensive," Journal of Strategic Studies 18, 1 (1995), 91-144; Tami Davis Biddle, "Bombing by the Square Yard: Sir Arthur Harris at War, 1942- 1945." The International History Review 21, 3 (September 1999). 626-664; Michael Sherry, The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987); Stewart Halsey Ross, Strategic Bombing by the United States in World War II: The Myths and the Facts (Jefferson, N.C: McFarland and Co, 2003); W. Hays Parks, "'Precision' and 'Area' Bombing: Who Did Which, and When?" Unpublished manuscript, 1994; Richard G. Davis, "Bombing Strategy Shifts, 1944- 1945," Air Power History 36 (Winter 1989), 33-45; Richard G. Davis, "German Railyards and Cities: US Bombing Policy, 1944-1945." Air Power History (Summer 1995) 46-63; Ronald Schaffer, Wings of Judgment: American Bombing in World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); and Ronald

13 their work, some of these authors argue that the USAAF could not achieve "precision bombing" by the end of the Second World War and that such ideas are simply "myths."

Paradoxically, the RAF was capable of quite precise bombing by the last winter of the war as demonstrated by key strikes in support of Normandy ground operations.

In evaluating the debate over precision bombing it is important to examine several questions. First, it is essential to determine how the RAF and the USAAF developed their bombing strategies. Each air force implemented its own distinct techniques for various reasons based on historical ideals and technological developments. This chapter will also examine the various reasons why the USAAF could not achieve true precision bombing during the strategic bombing of Germany and will also analyze the intent of the USAAF in promoting precision attacks in public but in practice pursuing techniques similar to those area attacks of the RAF. Clearly understanding the bombing capabilities of both the RAF and, especially, the USAAF before the winter of 1944-1945 is paramount to the evaluation of the Allied official purpose and intent of Operation THUNDERCLAP.

Development of the Doctrines

Bombing strategies and doctrines were in development on both sides of the

Atlantic before any of the great bombers of the Second World War ignited their engines.

By the end of the First World War, as historian Lee Kennett observes, "The bomber had emerged in the popular mind - with some justification - as the most dangerous weapon

Schaeffer. "American Military Ethics in World War II: The Bombing of German Civilians." The Journal of American History 67, 2 (September 1980), 318-334.

14 the conflict had spawned. This was a weapon from which no one was safe. It could penetrate frontiers at will and reach across entire nations."

The RAF's first Chief of Air Staff (CAS) Sir Hugh Trenchard (1918-1929) heavily influenced the RAF's early bombing doctrine.11 Trenchard strongly expressed his belief in the potential of air power as a weapon. He believed that indiscriminate terror bombing of a city was improper, although he did promote the idea that striking legitimate targets within that city and causing "incidental destruction of civilian life and property" was altogether acceptable. He also argued that targeting civilian workers in war industries was tolerable since they were a main part of an enemy's ability to wage war.12 Although British bombers only appeared a handful of times during World War

One, Trenchard believed they played a key role in defeating Germany. Trenchard expanded his idea about bombing policy in 1923 when he explained: "It is on the bomber that we must rely for defence. It is on the destruction of enemy industries and above all on the lowering of (enemy) morale caused by bombing that the ultimate victory rests. Army policy was to defeat the enemy army; our policy was to defeat the enemy nation."13 During the 1920s and early 1930s the bomber played a key role as a tactical weapon, quelling revolts in British colonies such as Iraq and India. RAF

Lee Kennet, A History of Strategic Bombing (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1982), 37. 1' An excellent and concise examination of the development of the air power theories of Britain, Germany, and the United States of America from WWI into WWII can be found in Lee Kennet, A History of Strategic Bombing (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1982); Robin Neillands, The Bomber War: The Allied Air Offensive Against Nazi Germany (New York: The Overlook Press); Stewart Halsey Ross, Strategic Bombing by the United States in World War II: the Myths and the Facts (Jefferson, N.C: McFarland and Co, 2003); and Tami Davis Biddle, "British and American Approaches to Strategic Bombing: Their Origins and Implementation in the World War II Combined Bomber Offensive," Journal of Strategic Studies 18, 1 (1995), 91-144. 12 Ibid., 75-76. 13 Robin Neillands, The Bomber War: The Allied Air Offensive Against Nazi Germany (New York: The Overlook Press), 14.

15 bombing policy took a definitive turn towards targeting enemy morale during these operations.

In 1936, to better manage its growing resources, British officials divided the

RAF into four commands: Bomber, Fighter, Coastal and Training Command. Bomber

Command entered the Second World War as a daytime precision bombing force equipped with several types of so called "heavy bombers" such as the Handley-Page

Hampden, the Armstrong Whitworth Whitley and the Vickers Wellington. These bombers were slow, had only two engines and limited in their bombing capabilities. The

British quickly realized this.14 Bomber Command adopted a more realistic plan for the time after suffering severe bomber losses during daytime attacks and achieving limited accuracy. This new plan extensively utilized radar devices and generalized target identification which ultimately meant that Bomber Command abandoned precision bombing in favor of nighttime attacks. Beginning in February 1942, Bomber Command openly embarked on one of the more controversial aspects of the Second World War under Sir Arthur Harris; nighttime area attacks. Outfitted with new long-range, four engine, heavy bombers such as the Handley Halifax and the AVRO Lancaster,15 and equipped with radar bombing aids, Bomber Command and Harris' main goal by 1942 was to "carry the war to the enemy."16 Although Bomber Command did not initially support terror bombing as such, its nighttime area bombing policy was questionable since it validated civilian morale and populated industrial centres as military targets. As

A detailed examination into the early bombers of Bomber Command can be found in Chapter 12 Norman Longmate, The Bombers: RAF Offensive Against Germany, 1939-1945 (London: Hutchinson, 1983); and in Chapter 1 of Max Hastings, Bomber Command (London: Simon and Schuster Inc, 1987). 15 For full specifications on these British heavy bombers see Appendix I 16Neillands, 185.

16 a result, there was little room left when differentiating between combatants and non- combatants.

By contrast, the United States developed a different doctrine, which would prove to be much more ambitious. The US precision bombing doctrine originated from three main ideas: the ability of the US to defend its coastline, economic disruption theories, and an American tradition in marksmanship. One major reason the Army Air Corps

(AAC) adopted a precision bombing doctrine was because American officials believed bombers would be needed to defend the US coasts. As a result, the United States needed a weapon that could search out and attack enemy vessels accurately at long distances; therefore putting a premium on navigation and precision.17 Kennett implies that the ideas of World War One air thinkers such as Viscount Tiverton heavily influenced the US bombing doctrine.18 Tiverton is known as one of the first true analysts of air warfare.19

He acknowledged specific geographic areas as specific targets because of their economic significance, and believed that for aerial bombardment to have the most influence it would have to be concentrated.20 In the early 1930s, an instructor at the Air Corps

Training School named Donald Wilson, echoed Tiverton's ideas in a key United States

Army Air Corps (US AAC) study. Wilson explained that if an enemy attacked specific economic industries or facilities of the United States, the whole economic life of the nation could be destroyed. In his words, "The real target is industry itself, not national

Tami Davis Biddle, "British and American Approaches to Strategic Bombing: Their Origins and Implementation in the World War II Combined Bomber Offensive," Journal of Strategic Studies 18, 1 (1995), 111; Tami Davis Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas About Strategic Bombing, 1914-1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 161; and Michael Sherry, The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 52. 18 Kennett, 87. 19 Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare, 38.

17 morale." These ideas about key areas or "nodes" also influenced US bombing policy down the path towards precision. Kennett also links the pursuit of precision bombing to

99 the tradition of military marksmanship in American history. American bombing promoters wanted the new bombers to be known as instruments of marksmanship rather than indiscriminate horror, a tradition that dates back to the frontier period.

With those ideals in mind, President Roosevelt commissioned a group of Army

Air Force officers to formulate a strategic blueprint that would define the goals of the

AAC in the event of global warfare. The group devised a plan known as Air War Plans

Division-1 or AWPD-1 which was not only applicable to a global conflict but also specifically tailored to a potential war with Germany. AWPD-1 had three main tasks.

Specifically and in order of importance, they were:

1. To wage a sustained air offensive against Germany 2. To conduct strategically defensive air operation in the Orient 3. To provide air actions essential to the defence of the continental United States 94

and the Western Hemisphere.

The four goals for an air offensive against Germany included reducing their naval operations, restricting their air operations, undermining "German combat effectiveness by deprivation of essential supplies, production, and communications facilities" and, lastly, supporting a final land invasion of Germany.25 Consequently, the plan identified a list of 154 targets that included power sources, major rail infrastructure, oil and petroleuKennettm, 88 industries. Taken from, an Wesled factoriey Fransk Craveof wanr anrelated Jamed sindustries Lea Crate's. ,Th Thee Armyplan Airals oForces calle din foWorldr War II: Plans and Early Operations, Volume I (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), 52. 22 Kennett, 88; and Conrad C. Crane, Bombs, Cities and Civilians: American Airpower Strategy in World War II (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1993), 20. 23 Conrad C. Crane, "Evolution of US Strategic Bombing of Urban Areas," The Historian, 50, 1 (November 1987), 14-39. 24 Copy of AWPD-1, Spaatz Papers, Subject File 1929-1945. Found in Richard G. Davis, Carl A. Spaatz and the Air War in Europe (Washington: Smithsonian Press, 1992), 60. 25 Ibid.

18 attacks on German morale, but did not emphasize this aspect as an immediate necessity.

More importantly for the American aero industry and military, AWPD-1 called for the manufacture of 63,467 aircraft and recruitment of over two-million men so that the

USAAF could accomplish its goals.26 By the time the Americans entered the war in

December 1941, AWPD-1 was its main program for the bombing offensive against

Germany. Overall, AWPD-1 endorsed bombing Germany with daytime precision bombing methods, which in turn, forced American air officials to develop the technology to support it.

Why the USAAF Believed It Could Achieve Precision Accuracy

With its entrance into the Second World War, the newly named USAAF had finally gained the opportunity to showcase the centerpieces of its bombing doctrine. The

Eighth Air Force (established in the UK on June 18, 1942) and the Fifteenth Air Force

(established December 1, 1943 in Italy) were the two main American bombing forces in

Europe. The B-17 Flying Fortress and the B-24 Liberator were the two main long-range bombers deployed in the European theater.27 They were daylight bombers built with significant defence armor to withstand enemy attacks while operating deep within

Germany. Equipped with the Norden bombsight, a visual bombing aid, American air force officials believed these planes were the perfect tools needed to support USAAF precision bombing tactics.

Davis, Carl A. Spaatz and the Air War in Europe, 60. 27 For detailed examination into the development of the B-17 and B-24 and the development of all other US bombers see Thomas H. Greer, The Development of Air Doctrine in the Army Air Arm 1917-1941. The United States Air Force Special Studies (Washington D.C: Office of the Air Force History, 1985); Robin Neillands, The Bomber War: the Allied Air Offensive against Nazi Germany (New York: The Overlook Press, 2001); and Roger A. Freeman, The Mighty Eighth War Manual (New York: Jane's, 1984).

19 The Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress was the first long-range heavy bomber that the

United States showcased. Even before the United States officially entered the war, the

B-17 was capturing headlines and the attention of the American public. In one day alone, the original B-17 model broke five world aviation records. Other popular media stories involved numerous accounts of the B-17 intercepting foreign ships hundreds of miles off mainland USA in dense fog.29 These were without doubt publicity stunts, as fog and cloud were major problems for precision bombing and navigation. Throughout the war, air force officials portrayed the Flying Fortress in the media as the plane that would get its crew home without serious damage.

The B-17 began production in 1935 but Boeing developed several variants throughout the war in Europe. The models that entered the European Theater of

Operations (ETO) were the mark "E," "F," and "G." It is necessary to compare the earlier Flying Fortress models to the later ones to give some idea of the development of the B-17. The mark "B" was the first combat B-17 to be tested. At a height of 25,000 feet this plane could fly at a maximum speed of 268 mph and cruising speed of 230 mph.

Its maximum combat radius was just over 600 miles with a bomb load of 2,400 lbs.

With respect to defenses, it was lightly armored and loaded with only five .30 caliber machine guns. As the official US air force historians remark, it was "hardly enough to

Kenneth P, Werrel, Blankets of Fire: U.S. Bombers over Japan during World War II (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1996), 5. For technical details of the American bombers see Appendix I. 29 Sherry, 62. 30 When measuring the combat distance of a bomber it is more important to examine its radius rather than its total combat range since the bomber in most cases does have to return to base. For example, a bomber such as the B-17 would have a combat range of 1,500 miles with a 2,400 lb bomb load but its radius would be just over 600 miles. 31 Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Crate's, The Army Air Forces in World War II: Men and Planes, Volume IV (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), 205.

20 justify its popular designation as the Flying Fortress." In the early stages of the war, several preliminary models of the B-17 made their way to Europe to fight under the command of the RAF but British pilots were not convinced of the supposed superiority of these unpredictable machines. On several missions, the B-17s dropped their bombs late over the target because of mechanical issues and when RAF pilots flew the bomber at its peak altitude the engines would cut out, windshields would frost over and the bomb release mechanisms and machines guns would malfunction. Throughout the war

Boeing made enhancements to improve performance and reliability of the Flying

Fortress. According to the official American air force historians, the mark "G" was the most advanced B-17 to see action in Germany. The B-17G could reach speeds upwards of 300 mph, theoretical heights of 35,000 feet, and had an operational radius of roughly

1,200 miles when carrying a bomb load of 4,000 lbs. The typical bomb load of a B-17G was between 2,600 and 8,000 lbs. The USAAF armed the B-17G with eleven to thirteen

.50 caliber machine guns and was protected with better armor than its earlier models.34

Overall, the B-17G was a much improved model over its predecessors; however, it would make its way to Europe at a time when the war was already being won.

In his book Strategic Bombing by the United States in World War 2: The Myths and the Facts, Stewart Halsey Ross arguably offers the best examination into why the

USAAF believed precision bombing was possible and the myths that surrounds the doctrine. Ross covers, in detail, the planes, the bombsights, the bombs and the crews of

32 Ibid. 33 Stewart Halsey Ross, Strategic Bombing by the United States in World War II: The Myths and the Facts (Jefferson, N.C: McFarland and Co, 2003), 86-87. 34 The operational radius of the B-17G varied depending on bomb type, trip distance and fuel load. Longer flights meant more fuel and therefore fewer bombs. Craven and Crate, The Army Air Forces in World War II: Men and Planes, Volume IV, 205-206. 35 Stewart Halsey Ross, Strategic Bombing by the United States in World War II: the Myths and the Facts (Jefferson, N.C: McFarland and Co, 2003).

21 the USAAF. With respect to the B-17, he reiterates what RAF commanders already knew about the aircraft in 1941. Although built to fly at heights of 32,000 feet in theory,

the B-17 suffered from several mechanical failures at high altitudes during operations.

Ross also argues that the bomb load was small in proportion to the size of the aircraft. In

comparison to the Lancaster's typical 8,500 lb bomb load, the B-17 was limited to 3,500

lbs. Even before the United States entered the Second World War, shortcomings in the

B-17s' performance forced air officials to commission a second heavy bomber.

In 1939, American air officials approached the Consolidated Aircraft Company to develop and manufacture a heavy bomber superior to the most advanced B-17 model.

Their goal was a four-engine heavy bomber with a 3,000-mile range, capable of reaching

300 mph and heights of 35,000 feet.37 The resulting Consolidated B-24 Liberator, like the B-17, underwent numerous developments. It reached the mark "N" range towards the end of the war. The mark "D" was the most common version of the B-24. The

Liberator is traditionally viewed as an unattractive aircraft compared to the B-17. The

British referred it to as the "Flying Box" because of its odd appearance. The Davis wing, which was narrow and sat higher up on the aircraft's body, was one distinct feature of the Liberator. This feature provided low drag at cruising speeds while not compromising the B-24's high-speed performance.38 Although its speed remained comparable to the B-

17, the B-24D carried a maximum internal bomb load upwards of 8,800 lbs, and was

Ross also compares other features of the Lancaster and Flying Fortress. For example, "Both the B-17 and RAF's AVRO Lancaster had about the same maximum takeoff weight of about 60,000 lbs, leaving some 25,000 pounds for fuel, bombs, defensive guns and ammunition." Ross, 88. A similar argument is also found in Biddle, "British and American Approaches to Strategic Bombing: Their Origins and Implementation in the World War II Combined Bomber Offensive," 124. 37 Craven and Crate, The Army Air Forces in World War II: Men and Planes, Volume IV, 207. 38 Ross, 89.

22 heavily defended with eleven .50 caliber machine guns. In addition, the Liberator could carry a larger bomb load further than a Flying Fortress with a similar crew often men.

Unfortunately, height issues also plagued the Consolidated B-24 Liberator. The

Davis wing was actually a source of glitches rather than a feature. At a height of just

20,000 feet or above, the aircraft required "hands-on flying" because the engines would cut off.40 During mixed aircraft attacks the B-24 flew 3,000 to 5,000 feet below the B-

17. As a result, the B-24 was fully exposed to anti-aircraft fire and was a relatively easy target for the Luftwaffe.41 The wings were also not as sturdy as those of the B-17. Ross uses personal accounts from aviator advisors and early pilots of the B-24 to demonstrate that the bomber was a difficult aircraft to fly from the start. These advisors and test pilots argued that it was awkwardly designed, poorly constructed, uncomfortable and unsafe.42 Although the B-24 could carry a heavier bomb load at faster speeds, its armament and gun defenses were quite poor. Consolidated modified the bomber so it could adapt to the conditions of war, however, this resulted in the aircraft's overall performance further declining because of excess weight. Air force officials noted that a front gunner modification reduced its speed and limited visibility, while the additional weight increased fuel consumption and affected handling.43

While in theory, the B-17 and B-24 could fly at extreme heights and speeds during the day and avoid enemy defenses, the addition of the Norden bombsight was the final piece of the precision bombing puzzle. A Dutch civilian inventor named C.L.

Norden developed the Mark XV Norden bombsight in the early 1930s. The bombsight

39 Craven and Crate, The Army Air Forces in World War II: Men and Planes, Volume IV, 207. 40 Ross, 90. 41 Ibid., 90-91. 42 Ibid., 91-92. 43 Ibid., 92.

23 was so top secret that the bombardier removed it from the front of the plane between missions and it was locked and guarded at all times. The Norden was also equipped with a powerful self-destruct device that could destroy the nose of a bomber.44 The Mark XV was a mechanical analog computer, weighing roughly 50 lbs, used to determine the exact moment the bombardier needed to release his bombs to accurately hit the intended target. The Norden used a complicated system involving gyroscopes, bubble levels, tachometers, course knobs, rate knobs, arming triggers and an intervalometer. In addition, the bombardier needed to rely on accurate reports of wind direction, velocity, ground speed, aircraft trim, pre-set bombing data, and straight level flying by the pilot.

Nonetheless, USAAF officials strongly believed that the Norden bombsight characterized the US policy of precision bombing. Norden testing in the deserts of

America strengthened their beliefs that it was an instrument of precision that could drop bombs at great heights into "pickle barrels."

Stuart Ross and other historians, however, note that several problems prove that the Mark XV Norden was not perfect. Tests on the Norden bombsight were done under unrealistic conditions. As explained by Ross, "Less than three percent of the practice bombs were released at altitudes over 16,000 feet, the altitudes from which most bombs would be dropped over Europe."46 Furthermore, the Americans evaluated the Norden device in the desert testing grounds during conditions of limited cloudiness, with clearly defined targets in open terrain and at low speeds without any enemy defenses.47 In fact,

Neillands, 74. Ibid., 74. Ross, 132. Ibid., 208.

24 Ross notes that when more realistic tests were done at the end of 1941, results were disappointing.48

Ross also acknowledges that the mechanical configuration of the bombsight caused less than precise results. The bombsight was very sensitive because it had "some

2,000 separate pieces, miniature gears, shafts, bearings, and motors, each manufactured individually to extremely tight tolerances and then meticulously assembled."49 Lack of proper care, microscopic decay and dirt accumulation could seriously degrade accuracy.

Weather also played a major role in determining accuracy as the bombardiers required a clear view of the target. Nonetheless, the Norden bombsight made its way to Europe and became the pedestal of USAAF bomber operations when in reality it was simply a

"useless black box."50

In the end, the notion of American precision bombing is a myth. As W. Hays

Parks contends, the USAAF could put a bomb into a pickle barrel but US officials

"harbored no illusions to the size of that pickle barrel."51 Target definition is important to the understanding of precision bombing and Parks offers interesting and important insight into USAAF and RAF accuracy. In general, he concludes that USAAF declarations that it had the capabilities to do specific target, precision or "pickle barrel" bombing is exaggerated. Parks adds that bombs that fell within a 1000-foot radius were considered within target but in reality they may have not been close to the target at all.

There was also room for leniency when making accuracy claims. There were targets of

48 Ibid., 132. 49 Ibid., 134. 50 Ibid., 4. 51 W. Hays Parks, "'Precision' and 'Area' Bombing: Who Did Which, and When?" Unpublished manuscript, (1994), 5. 52 Ibid., 5. 53 Ibid., 8.

25 opportunity (T/O) such as marshalling yards (M/Y) within city centres or urban areas that were really euphemisms for area bombing. In most cases the lead bomber chose the targets of opportunity when the primary target could not be attacked.54 There were also mission failures and gross errors. Mission failures occurred when "no attacking force was able to place more than five percent of its bombs within 1,000 feet of the aiming point,"55 while gross errors occurred when bombs fell in excess of 3,000 feet from the aiming point. Both mission failures and gross errors were omitted from any accuracy analyses. Parks asserts that omissions for gross errors ranged from 20 to 50 percent in

en the Eighth Air Force. It is also important to note that throughout the war, mission failures and gross errors increased in the USAAF but continued to go unaccounted.58 In the end, Parks' article serves as a useful and critical piece of work to consult when examining the issue of accuracy and in understanding precision bombing during the

Second World War.

Overall, the USAAF developed a doctrine of precision daytime bombing and quickly supported it with technology; however, it is evident that the numerous technological shortcomings of the B-17 and B-24 seriously hampered the possibilities of precision bombing. United States Army Air Force officials had two options when deploying their bomber force during combat operations. They could allow their bombers to fly at lower altitudes in order to bomb precisely but be forced to accept the potential of increased losses by German defences or the bombers could fly at higher altitudes but only at a severe cost to precision bombing. Although it achieved successful tests results

54 Ibid., 9. 55 Ibid. 56 Ibid. "Ibid., 10. 58 Ibid., 24.

26 in limited conditions, the Norden bombsight suffered not only from limited availability and technical flaws during operations over European cities, but also overzealous

USAAF officials. In September 1942, Roosevelt arranged for American air planners to create an updated air war plan. The result was a plan that continued to rely on the

Norden bombsight and targeting specific industries within the German war economy while focusing on the increased production of the B-17 and B-24 bomber. The Air War

Plan Division for 1942 or AWPD-42 proposed that the USAAF would need over 7,000 heavy bombers to be able to perform its mission.59 This is further proof that American air planners truly believed the B-17 and B-24 were self defending aircraft and, when equipped with the Norden bombsight, instruments of precision bombing. As a result, even before the USAAF began its major operations over Europe its precision bombing doctrine was already flawed.

Why the USAAF Could NOT Achieve Precision Bombing Results over Europe

In January of 1943, Allied leaders met at the Casablanca Conference to discuss the future of general operations. The discussions at Casablanca concluded that a land- based invasion of Europe would most likely not be possible until at least the middle of

1944. In preparation, officials also determined that certain conditions needed to be met in order to weaken the German war machine. Allied war planners decided that RAF and

USAAF bombers would play an important role in the preparation of OVERLORD.

Accordingly, air officials developed a new bombing directive as a direct means to achieve the conditions needed for a successful landing. The primary targets and objectives included, in order of priority:

59 The plan also identified 177 targets to be attacked including various aircraft factories, oil industries and other specific war related targets. Ross, 51-52.

27 1. German submarine construction yards - to allow easy navigation throughout the North Atlantic 2. The German Air Force (GAF) industry- to reduce air superiority of Luftwaffe 3. Transportation targets- to limit the mobility of German reinforcements towards the landing area. 4. Oil targets, and 5. Other targets in the enemy war industry- to reduce the military might of the German war machine.

The directive also authorized attacks against Berlin when "conditions are suitable for the attainment of especially valuable results unfavorable to the morale of the enemy or favorable to that of Russia."60 On January 21, the Allies signed the Casablanca Directive as a means to achieve "the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the

German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened."61 The early origins of the Combined Bomber Offensive are often traced to

Casablanca; however, the degree to which any cooperation between the two forces occurred is negligible since both Harris and, and acting commander of the USAAF,

Brigadier-General Ira C. Eaker interpreted the directive in different ways. Harris noted in his biography that, "The scope of my instructions had been enlarged, as a result of the

Casablanca Conference."62 He added

the subject of morale had been dropped, and I was now required to proceed with the general 'disorganization' of German industry, giving priority to certain aspects of it such as U-boat building, aircraft production, oil production, transportation and so forth, which gave me a very wide range of choice and allowed me to attack pretty well any German industrial city of 100,000 inhabitants and above.63

Directive to the Air Officer Commanding-In-Chief Bomber Command. Combined Chiefs of Staff Directive for the Bomber Offensive from the United Kingdom, January 21, 1943. Found in Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany 1939-1945: Annexes and Appendices, Volume IV (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1961), 153-154. 61 Ibid., 153-154. 62 Sir Arthur Harris, Bomber Offensive (Toronto: Stoggart Publishing Co. Ltd., 1990), 144. 63 Ibid.

28 For Eaker, and the Eighth United States Air Force, the Casablanca Directive meant that

American bombers could continue to bomb specific targets using daytime visual bombing as directed by their precision bombing policy.

By 1943, both the USAAF and Bomber Command shared a common problem; devastating losses at the hands of the Luftwaffe and to some extent

German ground defences. The German air and ground defences not only caused a high degree of bomber losses but also hindered precision bombing. United States

Army Air Force officials believed American bombers were self-defending aircraft capable of flying deep into Germany to hit precision targets. Early combat experience quickly proved the opposite. The German fighters of 1943-44 were perhaps not the most versatile aircraft of the war, however, highly experienced crews manned them and when equipped with a powerful range of armaments, it made for a deadly combo. Some Me-110s were equipped with a 37-mm anti-aircraft cannon which could easily disable a B-17 Flying Fortress in one hit. The Luftwaffe later replaced these cannons with rocket shells. Schrage Musik or "jazz music" was another destructive device that haunted USAAF and RAF bombers in 1943.

Mounted on German fighters such as the Bf 110F-4s and later Ju 88C-6cs, Schrage

Musik consisted of two 30-mm cannons or 20-mm cannons, respectively, pointing forward and upward at an angle of 15 degrees from the vertical. The German fighters used radar contact to locate the bomber and then would approach the bomber's blind spot from below, matching its speed. To target the bomber, the fighter aimed by reflecting a sight off the belly of the bomber and then it would fire

29 a quick burst of fire usually fatally damaging its target. Because of the air superiority maintained by the Luftwaffe shortly after Casablanca, and the devastating losses suffered by Bomber Command and the USAAF, the Allies quickly realized that achieving the conditions needed for the land invasion were not as easy as once believed.

German anti-aircraft fire also forced Allied bombers to bomb at higher altitudes, thus, reducing accuracy.65 As noted in the official British air force history,

"The Flying Fortresses were driven by flak to operate at great heights and a bomb aimed in the sun but above the cloud enjoyed no advantages over a bomb aimed in the dark."66 Other German defenses such as smoke screens also reduced visibility forcing the USAAF to use new strategies to increase protection and efficiency. An initial solution was to have the bombers fly in formation or pattern. Parks explains that formation bombing may have increased the number of bombs that fell within

1,000 feet of each aiming point; however, accuracy and precision bombing "yielded to pattern bombing."67 During formation bombing, flight patterns reached dimensions close to 1,500 feet. As a result, when the bombers dropped their loads, the bombs would fall over an area larger than the USAAF standards for precision bombing results. Parks also adds that accuracy during pattern bombing was only one-third as efficient when compared to individual bombing runs.68 Severely diminished accuracy from formation to formation was another result of pattern bombing since the initial bombs dropped would cause extra visual handicaps such

64 John Terraine, The Right of the Line (Chatham, Kent: Mackays of Chatham pic, 1997), 516-517. 65 Parks, 10. 66 Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany 1939-1945: Endeavor, Volume II (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1961), 37. 67 Parks, 7. 68 Ibid., 7. A similar argument can be found in Ross, 135.

30 as smoke from the fires below. As similar second solution was combat-box formation bombing, consisting of eighteen to twenty-one planes in a group.

Common after January 1943, the bombers would remain in tight formation while the top group flew above and slightly to the right of the middle group, and another group flew below it and slightly to the left. Lastly, a middle group flew ahead of

70 them both. These groups would remain in formation and wait for the signal from a lead bomber to drop their bombs. The lead bomber was ultimately in charge of the direction and path of the formation and was also in charge of dropping the bombs on target.71 Davis explains the obvious challenge posed by pattern bombing: "If the pattern hit the target, it obliterated it. If the pattern missed, it was up to the group that followed to strike the target."72 For example, if the bombers were only a second off in dropping their bombs, an overshoot of roughly 250 feet could occur. As a result, pattern bombing of any kind was not precision bombing but it became a regular part of the USAAF bombing offensive in Europe.

Before 1943, American participation in the strategic bombing of Germany was limited in comparison to Bomber Command. Pressured by low bomber availability and increasing bomber losses, Eaker pushed an idea that would see round the clock bombing since, "It was better to cause a high degree of destruction in a few really essential industries than cause a small degree of destruction in many industries."74 In turn, this led to renewed talks over the creation of the Combined

Bomber Offensive and on April 12, 1943, the Allies finalized the Eaker Plan. Eaker

69 Parks, 10. 70 Ross, 135. 71 Parks, 7. 72 Richard G. Davis, "Bombing Strategy Shifts, 1944-1945," Air Power History 36 (Winter 1989), 33. 73 Ross, 135. 74 Neillands, 264. 31 believed that his plan would secure the American bombing offensive by increasing bomber production while once again giving new life to the USAAF precision bombing doctrine. Eaker argued that he would need some 900 B-17 and B-24 bombers in operation by the summer of 1943 and upwards of 2,700 bombers by the spring of 1944 in order to achieve successful results.75

From the Casablanca Directive and the Eaker Plan, the POINTBLANK Directive originated and the Allies officially pursued a combined bomber offensive. In a note to

Harris, Bottomley acknowledged that the combined RAF and USAAF around the clock bombing endeavor drew a great deal of attention from the Luftwaffe which, in turn, required the deployment of an ever increasing number of German fighters. Bottomley noted, "Unless this increase in fighter strength is checked we may find bomber forces unable to fulfill the tasks allocated to them by the Combined Chiefs of Staff."76 On June

10, 1943, the Allied officials issued POINTBLANK as a plan to specifically harness the efforts of both the USAAF and Bomber Command in a combined approach to eliminate the Luftwaffe threat. Although the main objective of the bomber offensive remained as set out on January 21, in due course, the Intermediate Objective, above all other primary objectives, became the "attack of German fighter forces and the industry upon which they depend."77 POINTBLANK directed the Americans to attack precise targets associated specifically with the German aircraft industry such as airfields and factories, while the British would attack towns that were immediately concerned with the German aircraft industry. The CBO was a plan to combine the total power of the American and

75 Ibid., 265. 76 Webster and Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany 1939-1945: Annexes and Appendices, Volume IV. Appendix 8, xxxii. 158. 77 Ibid.

32 British bomber offensives in hopes of pounding the Germans continually; however,

USAAF and RAF air planners still had varying ideas on how to apply their bomber force independently.

The POINTBLANK directive was the first true test of the Combined Bomber

Offensive as, for both Bomber Command and especially the USAAF, the "destruction of enemy fighters in the air and on the ground" was instrumental for ultimate bomber security and mobility deep within Germany. It was no secret that by early 1943 the

Luftwaffe was inflicting severe bombers losses during the day and at night. By the end of 1942, the Luftwaffe had roughly one thousand fighters to defend Germany. Between

January 1943 and June 1943 the Luftwaffe fighter force grew in strength from 1,395 to

l,675.78In comparison, total Allied bomber losses amounted to roughly to 1,395 over

Europe during the same months.79 Throughout this period, characterized by increased losses and danger, the level of cooperation between Bomber Command and the USAAF was questionable.

The Americans pursued POINTBLANK objectives vigorously with the intent of gaining air superiority over Europe. The Luftwaffe, however, still dominated those skies.

Weather, moreover, dramatically hindered bombing missions in general and had a disastrous impact on the precision bombing of the USAAF.80 Clear skies and minimum

Sebastian Cox Ed, The Strategic Air War Against Germany 1939-1945 "Report of the British Bombing Survey Unit (BBSU)," Cass Series: Studies in Air Power (London: Frank Cass, 1998), Table 28, 100. 79 Individually, Bomber Command suffered 1110 nighttime losses and the USAAF suffered 285 losses. These statistics are found in Richard G. Davis, Carl A. Spaatz and the Air War in Europe, (Washington: Smithsonian Press, 1992), Appendix 11 "Aircraft Losses"; and Webster and Frankland, The Strategic Air war Against Germany: Annexes and Appendices, Volume IV, Appendix 40 "Monthly Annual and Grand Totals of Bomber Command Aircraft dispatched, missing and damaged on operations September 1939 to May 1945", 432, respectively. 80 As seen in Richard G. Davis, "German Railyards and Cities: US Bombing Policy, 1944-1945." Air Power History 42, 2 (1995), 46-63; Tami Davis Biddle, "British and American Approaches to Strategic Bombing: Their Origins and Implementation in the World War II Combined Bomber Offensive," 123; and Parks, 11-13.

33 meteorological disturbances were the optimum weather conditions for accurate bombing, but Western Europe has always been notorious for its poor weather. Variations occur not only between seasons but also between day and night. Traditionally, the Allied air forces assigned a value to measure cloud cover. For example, less than 1/10 would be clear skies, 1/10 to 5/10 would indicate scattered clouds, 6/10 to 9/10 would be broken clouds and 10/10 would be considered overcast. These values are important when examining the bombing runs of the USAAF during Operation THUNDERCLAP since they indicate the conditions it faced when attempting to hit "precise" targets within city centres or built up areas. Parks covers the weather issue in great detail. His exhaustive research does an excellent job of analyzing the United States Strategic Bombing Survey

(USSBS) reports. Parks paraphrases the USSBS when he concludes that the weather ultimately decided "the number of days on which operations could be executed, the area(s) that could be attacked, force size, attack timing and bombing method."81 For example, during the entire bomber offensive the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces overall abort rates were 10.4 percent and 12.9 percent respectively, while the RAF overall abort rate was only 1.3 percent.

Appreciating the realities of the European weather and limits - and dangers - of daytime precision bombing, the RAF quickly adopted bombing aids for its nighttime offensive. In 1941, the RAF created its first navigational aid called GEE. The GEE device relied on radar impulses from England, which enabled the navigator to fix his position. Bomber Command expected that GEE would also be helpful as a blind

81 Parks, 12. Also see United States Strategic Bombing Surveys, Volume 3 (New York: Garland Publishing Inc, 1976), "Weather Factors in Combat Bombardment Operations in the European Theater." European Report #62), 1. 82 Parks, 12.

34 bombing device in the sense that it could bring a bomber over the desired target so it could drop its bombs at the right moment without actually seeing the target. In reality,

GEE was problematic since it was simply a navigational tool rather than a bomb sighting device. It was also limited in distance because of the curvature of the earth and thus only had a range of 400-450 miles. By 1942, German radar-jamming devices were easily disrupting GEE. For these reasons the RAF developed two electronic devices in the winter of 1942-43. On December 20, 1942 Bomber Command introduced OBOE. This instrument was similar to the GEE radar, except it was a more accurate blind sighting device. OBOE enabled a plane to fly along a radio beam until it reached a predetermined point. Although more accurate, the earth's curvature still limited the operational distance of OBOE. The OBOE device required one transmitter on the plane and two on the ground in England. This limited reception to 250 miles at 28,000 feet and, as a result,

Berlin was an unreachable target. On January 30, 1943, the RAF began mounting the

H2S radar on the bottom of its aircraft. This blind bombing device produced an image, much like a terrain map, that would help the bombardiers to drop their bombs on targets through clouds. As a result, rapid development in radar bombing technology enabled

Bomber Command to bomb general area targets under most weather conditions at night, while the USAAF continued to rely on clear weather for visual bombing of precise targets.

The first major setback for the American four engine bomber occurred a little after the first anniversary of USAAF operations in Europe. On August 17, 1943, two

83Kennett, 131. 84 Frederick Taylor, Dresden: Tuesday 13 February 1945 (London: Bloomsbury, 2004), 124. 85 Kennett, 135. A large city next to a coastline was the ideal target for the H2S because the bombardier could easily differentiate the city from the water.

35 forces of American bombers took off for key aircraft targets within Germany. The first group of 146 B-17s attacked a Messerschmitt aircraft plant in Regensburg. The second force of 230 B-17s attacked the ball bearing industry in Schweinfurt.86 American air officials believed that if the bombers could destroy these factories, both key industrial nodes, the result would not only be a large blow to Luftwaffe production but quite possibly the collapse of the whole German war industry. In each case, however, the

Luftwaffe achieved severe bomber losses. In Regensburg, eighty-four bombers were missing and in Schweinfurt thirty-six were lost to enemy fighters and another twenty- seven were critically damaged. During the two raids a combined 550 American airmen were either killed or taken prisoner. The fact that neither factory suffered any major production setbacks plus both factories were fully functional within weeks was more damaging to the American precision bombing strategy. In some cases bombing occurred over an area four miles in length and two miles from the factories proving the Norden bombsight was hardly the precision tool it was promoted to be.88

The Americans targeted Schweinfurt again on October 14, to finish off the job they started in August; however, this raid was also plagued with many issues. First weather hampered many of the bombers actually making it over the Channel. Of the 383

B-17s and B-24s that departed from England, only 291 made it to mainland Europe.

Second, after the short range escorts turned home, the Luftwaffe fighters arrived and delivered devastating attacks against the bombers. Of the 291 bombers that made it to

86 Two comprehensive books on the raids at Schweinfurt are Thomas M. Coffey, Decision over Schweinfurt (New York: David McKay Company Inc, 1977) and Martin Middlebrook, The Schweinfurt - Regensburg Mission (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1983). Also found in Biddle, "British and American Approaches to Strategic Bombing: Their Origins and Implementation in the World War II Combined Bomber Offensive," 121. 87 Ronald Schaeffer, Wings of Judgment: American Bombing in World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 66. 88 Neillands, 253-254.

36 Europe, a shocking 198 of them were lost or damaged. The American media reported that this raid essentially cost the country close to six hundred American airmen and twenty million dollars in equipment.90 The October raid, and to a lesser degree the

August raids, undeniably proved that the B-17s and B-24s did not have adequate defensive protection, and were not safe in their so called self-defending formations.

Using direct and flanking style attacks, fierce Luftwaffe resistance tore apart the

American bombers over Europe. Biddle describes the Schweinfurt raid on October 14 as

"America's Waterloo."91 This would be the last time the Eighth Air Force headed towards Germany without full distance escort fighters, while new targeting equipment would be required so the USAAF bombers could effectively hit its objectives and continue to pursue precision bombing. Overall, by the winter of 1943-44 a combination of more distant targets, inclement weather and increased Luftwaffe protection resulted in longer exposure and severe bomber losses to Allied aircraft and, in particular, the

American bombers.

Although the USAAF preferred visual bombing in Europe, poor visibility was a chronic problem. As discussed, the bombardier required a clear visual on the target in order for the Norden bombsight to be an effective precision tool. The device was useless without that visual contact. Since US air officials could not let their bombers sit idle on the airfields while the RAF continued to attack Germany, the USAAF adopted radar- bombing techniques. As the US official history states, "It seemed better to bomb low-

Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas About Strategic Bombing, 1914-1945, 224. 90 Ross, 68. 91 Biddle, "British and American Approaches to Strategic Bombing: Their Origins and Implementation in the World War II Combined Bomber Offensive," 121.

37 priority targets frequently, even with less precision accuracy, than not to bomb at all."

In the fall of 1943, the USAAF developed the H2X radar and fitted the device onto the belly of its bombers for operational use. Much like the H2S, the H2X used a cathode-ray tube to illuminate the terrain under the bombardier. Volume III of the USAAF Official history characterizes the H2X and the problems with it.

Admittedly a campaign of radar bombing would involve some compromise with the doctrine of "precision" bombing... In its early stages at any rate, radar missions would be restricted to targets which would show up clearly on the radar screen-for the most part city areas located on coast lines or on estuaries, since the distinction between water and land was easy to recognize and this facilitated target identification. Moreover, although any large industrial area could be located without too much difficulty, it was not possible to identify specific factories unless they happened to be unusually isolated and unusually 93

extensive.

Authors, such as Richard G. Davis and W. Hays Parks, point to this development as a major step towards accepting area bombing and a decisive break from their precision bombing doctrine.

In his article, "German Railyards and Cities: US Bombing Policy, 1944-1945,"

Richard G. Davis argues that H2X did increase the opportunity for bombing but "at the cost of much reduced overall accuracy." 4 In attacks using H2X, Davis argues that the

USAAF ultimately abandoned its clear weather precision bombing doctrine at all costs in favor of area bombing through overcast skies. He explains, "In conditions of 40 to 50 percent cloud cover fewer than half the bombs fell within a one-mile circle around the aiming point and 96 percent fell within five miles of it. In 100 percent cloud cover only one out of twenty bombs fell within that same one-mile circle and only 60 percent within

Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Crate, The Army Air Forces in World War II: Argument to V-E Day, January 1944 to May 1945. Europe, Volume III (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 11. 94 Davis, "German Railyards and Cities: US Bombing Policy, 1944-1945," 47. He also argues the same point in his other article "Bombing Strategy Shifts, 1944-1945", 33.

38 five miles of it."95 Parks notes that in the last quarter of 1944, 80 percent of the Eighth

Air Force and 70 percent of the Fifteenth Air Force missions employed blind bombing techniques.96 To compensate for reduced accuracy, Davis explains that USAAF officials

increased the number of bombers over the target by increasing the frequency they attacked a target or with larger raids. In turn, increased bomb tonnage on a target

inevitably made for more bombs missing their mark and greater destruction of target areas. As Parks notes, in the last winter of the war even German officials argued that

no

RAF attacks were more accurate and damaging than those of the USAAF.

The USAAF redefinition and prioritization of targets was a major result of its shift to radar bombing and directly linked to the devastating results it suffered during the

Schweinfurt and Regensburg raids. On November 1, 1943 USAAF General Hap H.

Arnold ordered the heavy bomber force to execute area attacks against selective targets when visual bombing was not an option.99 Parks explains that USAAF target priorities changed dramatically in 1944-1945 from specific targets, such as rail bridges or tracks, to marshalling yards within a city centre. Specifically, marshalling yards and industrial centres ranked first and fourth in overall tonnage dropped by the Eighth and Fifteenth

Air Forces between November 1943 and April 1945.100 The original definition of the

H2X was "a radar blind bombing device which will permit coastal targets and land objectives, such as cities, large factories and railroad yards to be bombed under conditions of poor visibility."101 United States Army Air Force officials, however,

95 Davis, "German Railyards and Cities: US Bombing Policy, 1944-1945," 48. "' Parks, 29. 97 Ibid 98' iParks , 50. "Parks, 17. 100 Ibid. 101 Davis, "German Railyards and Cities: US Bombing Policy, 1944-1945," 48.

39 refrained from referring to H2X has a blind bombing device, out of fear of public resentment. Although the H2X device could easily distinguish water from land, and built up areas from open areas, it could not differentiate one city from another, or a specific target within a city. Parks explains that, "Over large urban areas the entire screen was filled with an 'intense blaze of response' that precluded identification of specific targets or aiming points."102 W. Hays Parks, Davis and Biddle also focus on the unreliability of

H2X. They examine the internal problems of the H2X program such as the inadequate training of radar operators and poor maintenance of the devices. Determining the target, especially with respect to cities, was very difficult and as a result, H2X interpretation required highly skilled and experienced radar operators. Ross argues they were not available in 1943 and early 1944 because "few bombardiers and radar operators lived long enough.. .to become proficient." Parks compares RAF radar bombing training to

USAAF training. Royal Air Force trainees received a rigorous six-month training course, taught by experts in navigation and radar bombing while having to achieve superb accuracy rates in training missions. In comparison, the Eighth Air Force training plan was a four-week course conducted by homeland personnel, hence, it was not as comprehensive as the RAF training plan.104 Inadequate maintenance of the highly technical devices was another problem that plagued the Norden's capabilities.

Equipment failure was common since parts were limited and the aircraft that supported the H2X were substandard.105

Parks, 20. A similar argument can be found in Ross, 139. See Appendix II for a picture of an H2X image. 103 Ross, 139. Also argued in Parks, 23. 104 Parks, 23. 105 Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas About Strategic Bombing, 1914-1945, 229.

40 A simple formula of increased tonnage, plus increased bombers, plus radar bombing of marshalling yards and industrial centres, inevitably added to increased damage on the civilian population. In the end, only two percent of the tonnage delivered by blind bombing techniques hit within 1,000 feet of the aiming point.106 Of the 194,928 tons delivered against marshalling yards, the USAAF dropped 124,865 tons or 64 percent using blind bombing techniques and of the 69,865 tons delivered on industrial centres,

American bombers dropped 37,814 or 54 percent using blind bombing techniques.107

From September 1944 to VE-Day, marshalling yards were the number one target for the

USAAF heavy bombers in all but one month. Yet, as Davis explains,

Therein lay the tragic conundrum of the strategic bombing campaign- a well hit marshalling yard meant a well-hit city, with block upon block of residential area gutted, families left homeless, small businesses smashed, and workers and wives and mothers and children and infants blown to bits or, more likely, burnt or crushed by the hundreds, if not thousands.108

Overall, recent research concludes that marshalling yards and industrial centres became a euphemism for area or city bombing.109 As will be found throughout Chapters 4 and 5,

USAAF officials justified their role in THUNDERCLAP as precision bombing by choosing marshalling yards as the main aiming point within the various cities.

After devastating losses during the attacks on Oschersleben, Regensburg and culminating in the Schweinfurt raids in the autumn of 1943, USAAF sorties drastically dropped as it reorganized and contemplated its self-defending bombers. During this period Carl A Spaatz, resumed his role as head of the USAAF in Europe. Under his

106 Parks, 19. 107 Ibid., 17. 108 Davis, "Bombing Strategy Shifts, 1944-45," 33. 109 As seen in Davis, "German Railyards and Cities: US Bombing Policy, 1944-1945," 55; Davis, "Bombing Strategy Shifts, 1944-45," 33; Parks, 17-18; and Tami Davis Biddle, "Bombing by the Square Yard: Sir Arthur Harris at War, 1942-1945." The International History Review 21, 3 (September 1999), 645.

41 leadership American bombers achieved their biggest success, but only at a severe cost to

American bombing principles and practices. In late December of 1943, an old, but newly equipped American fighter appeared alongside the H2X equipped B-17s and B-24s. The

P-51 Mustang, equipped with a Merlin engine, was now able to escort the bombers for longer distances. They could escort the bombers to and from targets deep within

Germany while outclassing the Luftwaffe fighters in every respect of speed, ceiling and rate of climb.110 Although early USAAF missions in 1944 did appear successful, and the

P-51 destroyed many Luftwaffe fighters, these factors did not however, drastically reduce the numbers of enemy fighters inside Germany. By the end of 1943, Germany had roughly 1,426 single and twin-engined fighters available and by the end of January

1944, that figure still rose to roughly 1,800.'n These staggering figures were a result of the Nazis dispersing their aircraft industry across Germany. Luftwaffe losses, however, resulted in a dramatic decline of skilled and experienced pilots defending the Reich; a condition that would become more detrimental in the final year of the war when

Operation THUNDERCLAP was in full swing.

On February 20, 1944, the USAAF launched a series of massive operations against the German aircraft industry. This five day operation, or Big Week, included the first one thousand USAAF bomber raid deep within Germany, accompanied by hundreds of P-51 Mustang escort fighters. During Big Week, USAAF bombers attacked aircraft manufacturing plants all over Germany. By the twenty-fifth, the USAAF had shattered the German aircraft industry and results proved it suffered for some time afterwards. Although American bomber losses were still high at around 220 losses, they

110Neillands,294. 1'' Cox, The Strategic Air War Against Germany 1939-1945 "Report of the British Bombing Survey Unit (BBSU), Table 28, 100.

42 were tolerable in comparison to the some 10,000 tons dropped by 4,300 Eighth and

Fifteenth Air Force sorties. The fact that the P-51 Mustang proved it was, unquestionably, a decisive force during the flight into the heart of Germany, also downplayed the normally considered high losses. Accepting the escort fighter, however, was an admission by American officials that the B-17 and B-24 bomber were not self- defending aircraft. Although the POINTBLANK directive failed in truly unifying the two main Allied bomber forces, it did result in a fundamental change in the methods the

USAAF applied to the strategic bombing of Germany. Bombing operations during Big

Week ultimately turned the advantage towards the Allies. It was truly the USAAF's first great victory in the air war against Germany.

With the prospect of OVERLORD planning looming in the near future, Harris and his bomber force had little opportunity left to win the war for the Allies. From the outset of POINTBLANK, Allied leaders urged Harris to follow up USAAF daytime attacks against specific industries with Bomber Command night attacks. Harris, however, had little patience for precision based targets which he deemed 'panacea' targets. As a result, Harris neglected POINTBLANK in favor of larger scale area raids aimed at destroying German morale. By November 1943, Harris argued that, "We could wreck Berlin from end to end if the USAAF will come in on it. It will cost between us

400-500 aircraft. It will cost Germany the war."113 What resulted was a series of operations more commonly known as The Battle of Berlin.

Specifically, the Eighth deployed 3,800 aircraft and the Fifteenth deployed 500 sorties. 113 Note to Churchill from Harris. November 3, 1943. PRO AIR 14/3507. Found in Charles Messenger. 'Bomber' Harris and the Strategic Bombing Offensive, 1939-1945 (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1984), 142.

43 The Battle of Berlin lasted roughly four and a half months and was actually

waged on Berlin and several cities around the capital. For example, nineteen of the

thirty-five operations related to the Battle of Berlin were on cities other than Berlin.114

As the year wound down, Bomber Command losses grew and grew.115 In fact, January

1944 was the worse month for Bomber Command losses in all of the war. In total,

Bomber Command lost 314 bombers. Intelligence estimated that enemy fighters shot

down 136 of them.116 These losses can be attributed to the sheer distance from England to the targets in and around Berlin, their inability to successfully detect the targets and

especially improved enemy fighter tactics. During this period, Luftwaffe fighters began to attack in groups or packs over the intended Allied targets. In many instances they would even meet the bombers halfway across the North Sea and chase them the whole way to the Berlin area.117 In addition, with very few USAAF attacks after October 1944, the Luftwaffe was able to focus its attention on attacking Bomber Command. In the end, the Battle of Berlin was a failure. Bomber Command suffered 1,047 losses and 1,682 damaged bombers. During these raids, Bomber Command dropped upwards of 30,000 tons of high explosive (HE) and incendiary bombs (IB) which resulted in 6,000 acres being flattened. Although it did produce devastating results around Berlin, it did not destroy the capital or encourage the Germans to rise up and force Hitler to end the war in early 1944.

While the USAAF's successful Big Week wound down, Bomber Command's

Battle of Berlin lost its momentum. In February Bomber Command only executed one

114Terraine, 554. 115162 losses in November 1943, 170 losses in December 1943. Webster and Frankland, The Strategic Air War Against Germany: Annexes and Appendices. Volume IV, 433. 116 Ibid. 117Terraine, 556. 118 Ibid., 557.

44 Battle of Berlin raid followed by one other in March. As a testament to the weak link between Bomber Command and the USAAF during the "Combined" Bomber Offensive, there were no instances where the USAAF bombed in direct support of the Battle of

Berlin plan. As the Allied air forces began to achieve air superiority over Europe, the

Allied ground leaders began to focus on the final plans for the invasion of the continent.

For Harris, this was a disaster since his bomber force would be required to help in this preparation that ultimately focused on the army winning the war for the Allies. He still believed that bombing German cities could bring about a collapse and argued his forces should not be diverted for raids in preparation of OVERLORD. The failure of the Battle of Berlin to bring about a capitulation of Germany also meant that the bomber could not solely win the war for the Allies before June 1944. For Spaatz, OVERLORD meant that his plan of bombing the German oil industry to win the war was also shelved. Instead, both the RAF and USAAF focused on destroying targets to secure the Normandy bridgehead such as rail lines, marshalling yards, bridges and other transportation targets around northern and eastern France. Bomber Command focused most of its effort on bombing targets within France while the USAAF continued to attack targets within

Germany. In preparation for D-Day, Allied bombers achieved some 195,200 sorties and dropped a combined total of 195,400 tons of bombs.119 In France, only four major transportation targets out of eighty remained untouched by Allied bombing while rail traffic within the country dropped by 70 percent in the months before June 1944.120 On

June 5/6, Bomber Command sent 1,056 bombers to drop 5,267 tons of bombs on coastal

119 "The RAF's share of the sorties was 71,800, of which Second TAF accounted for 28,600 and Bomber Command 24,600. This total was substantially below that of the American Eighth and Ninth Air Forces, but Bomber Command's great weight-lifting ability made the bomb tonnage totals very nearly equal: RAF, 94,200; USAAF, 101,200." Terraine, 627. 120 Neillands, 316.

45 defences along the Atlantic Wall while the USAAF sent over 2,300 of its own B-17 and

B-24 heavy bombers to drop 2,944 tons of bombs on similar targets. The Luftwaffe presence was virtually non-existent, perhaps finally signifying the beginning of the end of German air superiority over Europe.

Numerous factors can be linked to the decline of the German Air Force. Errors in

German policy and planning, high losses of skilled crewmen, shortages of fuel, numerical inferiority and the strategic bombing of aircraft related industries all brought about the decline and eventually the disappearance of the Luftwaffe. Without a doubt, during the first years of the war, the Luftwaffe was very well organized. It had modern factories dispersed across the Reich and not limited to traditional larger industrial cities.

As the war progressed, however, and as Germany expanded its battle to new fronts, Nazi officials increasingly neglected the Luftwaffe. Events in the Soviet Union and Africa during the winter of 1942-1943 forced upwards of two hundred thousand trained ground personnel to become members of the Luft Feld Divisionen or GAF Division within the army; therefore slowly depleting ground maintenance personnel. As a result, the

Luftwaffe began to lose experienced crew while maintaining steady aircraft production.

In addition, with the Americans entering the war in 1941, the numerical advantages began to favor the Allies. Restrictions in fuel also played a major factor in the decline of the Luftwaffe. In 1942, the Luftwaffe severely limited training operations as fuel became depleted within the Nazi war machine.121 Although German fighters did achieve high success rate in knocking out Allied bombers throughout 1943 and the first half of

1944, the introduction of the long range escort and post D-Day operations on the ground ultimately brought about the demise of the Luftwaffe. As the Allies marched towards

121 See Appendix III

46 Berlin, they eliminated Germany's early warning radar system and forward bases. By the summer of 1944, US AAF escort fighters were beating the Luftwaffe in the skies, thus eliminating their most experienced pilots. Between January 1941 and June 1944, the Luftwaffe lost a cumulative total of thirty-one thousand airmen. In comparison,

1 99 between June and October 1944 it had lost thirteen thousand airmen. By the end of the war, Luftwaffe pilots numbered fifty-five hundred, only a fraction of the thirty thousand pilots available during its peak. The dramatic decline of the Luftwaffe ensured that by

1945, on most days and nights, Allied bombers enjoyed some form of freedom over the skies of Germany to attack any target, by whatever means air officials deemed fit.

The Intent of the USAAF

The intent of the USAAF is the last factor that must be considered when examining USAAF precision bombing in Europe. Although the weather and German air and ground defences were conditions that gravely affected precision bombing, numerous authors examine the intent in practice of the USAAF as a final source of proof that the

USAAF adopted and supported area-bombing techniques. Critics such as Davis, Parks,

Ross, Biddle and Schaeffer argue that the USAAF's intent was to promote its precision bombing doctrine in public and on record, but, in practice it was a different story. In general, the H2X was not a precision tool and US officials clandestinely understood that fact, although they continued to promote the American official bombing doctrine as precision to the public. In December of 1943, the USAAF announced that its new technology, the H2X radar, was a great success and proof of the United States' commitment to precision bombing in Europe. News ads mimicked its declaration,

122 Max Hastings, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany, 1944-1945 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 301. 123 Neillands, 380.

47 headlines such as "Bomb Accuracy in Clouds Mastered by the Eighth Air Force," appeared in popular US newspapers while USAAF officials refrained from calling the

H2X a "blind bombing" tool. Instead officials referred to it as "overcast bombing technique," "bombing through overcast," and "bombing with navigational devices over clouds extending up to 20,000 feet."125 However careful the USAAF was in deflecting the reality of H2X, its insistence on using incendiaries, pattern bombing and the promotion of the War Weary Project (see below), are all measures that can be used to judge the USAAF intent in Europe.

Incendiaries are highly destructive and devastating weapons, regardless of their size, filled with a mixture of highly flammable substances that can burn at thousands of degrees Fahrenheit.126 The USAAF developed roughly thirty-five types of incendiary bombs during the Second World War ranging in size from tiny shotgun shells to 750 lb cluster bombs containing 138 individual bomblets. Incendiaries fascinated American air officials and they were eager to develop new types throughout the latter stages of the

1 97 war in Europe with plans of using them in the war against Japan. Davis is quite critical of the use of incendiaries, since they were not explosive devices used to penetrate concrete or hardened structures. Instead, they served "but one function — the destruction of soft targets, such as barracks, houses, commercial buildings, and 198 administrative and governmental offices." In many cases, incendiaries made up close

4 Ross, 126. Headline from the front page of the New York Times on December 29* , 1943. 125 Ross, 139-140. Also found in Biddle, "Bombing by the Square Yard: Sir Arthur Harris at War, 1942- 1945", 646. 126 Ross, 107. 127 Description on the planning, development and eventual firebombing of Japanese cities can be found in Ross, 107-109; Werrel, Blankets of Fire; Sherry, The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon; and Schaeffer, Wings of Judgment: American Bombing in World War II. 128 Davis, "German Railyards and Cities: US Bombing Policy, 1944-1945", 49. Also argued in Biddle, "Bombing by the Square Yard: Sir Arthur Harris at War, 1942-1945", 646.

48 to 20 percent of the total bomb load dropped during a raid. Biddle notes that as early as 1943, the USAAF began to "raise the percentage of incendiary bombs used in the bomb 'mix' dropped on enemy targets." The comparison of Eighth Air Force missions against French marshalling yards with those of the ones in the Reich is an important example that demonstrates the intent of USAAF officials to use incendiaries for the destruction of area targets. During missions on the French marshalling yards, the

USAAF included few incendiaries so that collateral damage would be minimal. During raids on the Reich's marshalling yards, however, there was a heavy mix of incendiaries and bombs. From September 1944 to April 1945, the Eighth Air Force averaged 3,000 tons of incendiaries per month on the German marshalling yards while it averaged only

1 T1 nine tons on French marshalling yards from January 1944 through August 1944.

The development of the War Weary Project in the summer of 1944 was perhaps one of the more compelling pieces of evidence that proves the USAAF actively 1 ^9 practiced area attacks. The Americans designed the War Weary Project as a means to take thousands of worn-out bombers, many of them B-17s, fill them with 20,000 tons of explosives and aim them at German cities, much like missiles, in retribution for German

V-l and V-2 attacks. The only exception was that pilots would fly these planes near their intended target, level them out at 2,000 feet, bail out over friendly territory and then rely on automatic devices or a "mother" aircraft to guide the war weary bomber the

129 Biddle, "Bombing by the Square Yard: Sir Arthur Harris at War, 1942-1945", 646; and Davis "German Railyards and Cities: US Bombing Policy, 1944-1945", 49. Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas about Strategic Bombing, 1914-1945, 229. 131 Davis, "German Railyards and Cities: US Bombing Policy, 1944-1945", 56. 132 Jack Olsen, Aphrodite: Desperate Mission (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1970)

49 remainder of the trip. This project was very comparable in intent to that of the V-l and V-2 project of Germany. Both were primarily aimed to terrorize civilians while disrupting the economy wherever possible. United States Army Air Force officials such as Carl Spaatz believed that these war weary bombers would work best against reasonably large towns. Furthermore, the US War Department approved the project based on advice by Air Staff officials that it would be more accurate than radar bombing.134 In his article and book, Schaeffer questions the accuracy of these bombers.

Testing proved that they fell, on average, short of the intended target by a mile and half. Furthermore, these planes were very hard to fly and maneuver because of their weight and condition. Nonetheless, nine war-weary B-17s were ready to fly under the codename Project Aphrodite in August 1944. Consequently, Aphrodite was launched around the same time the Allies had finally gained air superiority over Europe and the freedom to fly unrestricted towards strategic targets deep within German territory. The initial raids called for the planes to be loaded with ten tons of TNT and one with ten tons of napalm. In the end, none of the Aphrodite planes hit their intended target while one

i "in pilot died. Only nineteen war weary planes took off on the one-way trip to Germany from England before the plan was disbanded because of British fears of increased V- weapon attacks. Although none of the Aphrodite aircraft hit their intended target, this controversial plan clearly demonstrates that the USAAF intent was indiscriminate bombing.

133 Ronald Schaeffer. "American Military Ethics in World War II: The Bombing of German Civilians." The Journal of American History 61, 2 (September 1980), 326. 134 Ibid., 327. 135 Schaeffer, Wings of Judgment, 86. Also in Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas About Strategic Bombing, 1914-1945, 240-241. 136 Ross, 113. 137 Ibid., 114.

50 It has been widely assumed that the USAAF pursued precision bombing throughout the war in Europe and did not adopt area-bombing techniques until the war in Japan. As Gerhard L. Weinberg states in his A World at Arms; "With relatively little debate, the American air force embraced in the last stages of the Pacific War the concept of area attacks which it had so long opposed in Europe, where it had for years been advocated by the Royal Air Force."138 This statement is not entirely true. As demonstrated in this chapter, the USAAF truly believed in 1941 that it had the technology to pursue precision bombing but the realities of the war proved otherwise.

Heavy bomber losses caused by the menacing Luftwaffe forced the Americans to abandon the idea of the self-defending bomber and adopt long range escorts. As weather over Europe deteriorated in 1943 and throughout the winter of 1944-1945, the USAAF adopted techniques similar to those of the RAF's area attacks and, as a result, throughout these years the precision bombing policy of the USAAF can be discredited. As Schaeffer exclaims, "There was a policy-on paper. Sometimes it was adhered to, often it was not,

1 TQ or it was so broadly reinterpreted as to become meaningless." When the decision to actually implement Operation THUNDERCLAP in February 1945 arose, USAAF officials overlooked their own policy of precision bombing, resulting in thousands of tons of bombs being dropped inaccurately to destroy eastern German cities.

Gerhard L. Weinberg. A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1994), 870. 139 Schaeffer, "American Military Ethics in World War II: The Bombing of German Civilians", 331.

51 Chapter 2

Bombing to Win the War: The politics of area bombing and the evolution of Operation THUNDERCLAP

We have no Continental Army which can defeat the German military power. The blockade is broken and Hitler has Asia and probably Africa to draw from. Should he be repulsed here or not try invasion, he will recoil eastward, and we have nothing to stop him. But there is one thing that will bring him back and bring him down, and that is an absolutely devastating, exterminating attack by very heavy bombers from this country upon the Nazi homeland. We must be able to overwhelm him by this means, without which I do not see a way through. Winston ChurchillJuly 8, 1940

After the Anglo-American invasion of France in June of 1944, the strategic bomber faced new tasks to help win the war for the Allies. Over France, Belgium and the Netherlands, Bomber Command became a more precise bombing force with the ability to efficiently use radar technology and mark targets more accurately. Specifically, it achieved remarkably accurate strikes against key transportation targets - such as marshalling yards, bridges and rail lines - in order to keep friendly civilian casualties to a minimum. Concurrently, the USAAF enjoyed its newfound freedom in the skies over

Europe as sortie rates increased and losses decreased. Yet debate over whether the bomber should be available to continue to support ground operations or, instead, be unleashed against Germany, ensued. Even before the invasion began, the British Foreign

Office (FO) and the Ministry of Economic Warfare (MEW) circulated a note which proposed that the bomber could be used after OVERLORD to "attempt to produce collapse of the Home Front before the German Armed Forces have been finally defeated in the field."140 The Allies defined an attack on the German Home Front in May 1944 as

"a general attack on the enemy's civilian population or by selective attack of specific

140 "Strategic Bombing Policy after OVERLORD." Foreign Office and Ministry of Economic Warfare. May 27, 1944. PRO AIR 20/8173.

52 objectives" such as transportation, oil or other key economic industries. By the second half of 1944, however, the effects of the Allied strategic bombing campaign were less clear-cut than expected. The bombing did not destroy civilian morale, and German fighter planes and armored vehicle production reached wartime peaks during this period.

In addition, only weeks after the Allied landings in Normandy, the Germans began to launch their V-l weapons at suburbs in London and across Britain and by early

September another V-weapon, the V-2, was terrorizing Britain. On the ground, only months after battling across the beaches of Normandy and pushing towards Berlin, the

Allied ground forces stalled along the German frontier. Meanwhile in the East, the

Russians were also pushing towards the German capital. Resistance, however, proved to be greater than expected and they too, stalled. The war that "would be brought to a swift conclusion"142 was suddenly dragging on longer than expected.

Operation THUNDERCLAP grew out of a desire to push Germany to capitulation. In the summer of 1944, Allied air planners attempted to develop an idea that would use heavy bombers to force the Germans into abandoning their policy of V-l terror attacks against Britain. On June 30, Churchill requested an examination into a public policy of reprisal with the "intention of flattening out in turn the lesser German cities" if the V-Weapon attacks continued.143 These towns were generally "well known for historical or other associations and not particularly connected with the war effort."144

In the days to follow a series of discussions concluded that reprisal attacks would be inefficient, inappropriate and useless, as they would probably not deter Hitler from his

141 Ibid. 142 Second Revision of the Directive to the Strategic Air Forces. DHIST 86/286. 143 "Crossbow." July 2, 1945. PRO AIR 8/1229. 144 Note by the Air Staff, '"CROSSBOW: Question of Retaliation." COS (44) 598 (0). July 5, 1944, 1. PRO AIR 8/1229.

53 policies but rather fuel his desire to attack London. Although the Allies abandoned direct reprisals for V-weapon attacks, the idea of directly targeting civilian centres was not.

At their 222nd meeting, on July 5, the Chiefs of Staffs agreed, "That the time might well come in the not too distant future when an all out attack by every means at our disposal on German civilian morale might be decisive. They recommend that the method by which such an attack would be carried out should be examined and all possible preparations made."146 The Chiefs of Staffs expected that devastating bombing raids against the political, civilian and military morale would persuade the Germans to surrender. This proposal was all too similar to the "Battle of Berlin" idea proposed by

Harris in the winter of 1943. Since "such a plan would, of course, embrace the operations of the Eighth Air Force," who were now under the command of the United

States Strategic Army Air Forces (USSTAF), the RAF's Deputy Chief Air Staff (DCAS)

N.H. Bottomley decided the following day that "it might therefore be wise at this stage to associate the staff of USTAAF (sic) with us in drawing up of the plan."147

Several factors produced the possibility of bringing about a German collapse by intense bombing. Combined Bomber Command and USAAF bomber losses dropped from 681 in April 1944 to 620 in July,148 while sortie rates achieved new highs, rising

In fact, the reports argued that London could be justified as a legitimate military target. Note by the Air Staff, '"CROSSBOW: Question of Retaliation." COS (44) 598 (0). July 5, 1944, 1. PRO AIR 8/1229. 146 Note by the Air Staff. "Attack on German Civilian Morale." July 5, 1944. 147 Top Secret Note from Bottomley to ACAS. July 6, 1944. PRO AIR 20/ 3227. The USAAF became the USSTAF in January 1944 when the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces combined to form a new command led by General Spaatz. 148 Specifically, lower loss rates are mainly attributed to the USAAF and its successes with escort fighters For example, in April, the USAAF lost 467 bombers while in July it only lost 391 bombers. In comparison, Bomber Command's nighttime losses actually increased slightly from 214 in April to 229 in July. However, Bomber Command did increase their sorties significantly between April and July from 9,873 nighttime sorties to 11,500. Too add, it must be noted that in August 1944, Bomber Command's loses dropped dramatically to 186. These statistics are found in Davis, Carl A. Spaatz and the Air War in

54 from 24,337 in April to 35,417 in July. Additionally, bomber production reached new heights for both Bomber Command and especially the USAAF by July 1944. In July

1943, Bomber Command had 1,153 bomber aircraft available. In January 1944 that number rose to 1,226 and in July of 1944 it had 1,601 bombers available. In comparison, the USAAF (Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces combined) had 670 bombers available in

July 1943, while in January 1944 that amount rose to 1,667. By July 1944, the USAAF had a bomber force of 3,645 aircraft available for operational use in Europe.150 Overall, these factors resulted in the ability of the Allied air forces in mid-1944 to saturate targets repeatedly. More importantly, these improving statistics offered the Allies the opportunity to pursue the development of massive raids against the German home front as a means of producing a swift end to the war. On July 8, the Director of Bomber

Operations (DBOps), Sidney Button, sent a memo to all British and USAAF senior air officials outlining some points that should be examined while drawing up a bombing paper on these large scale attacks. Five main questions, with several sub issues, were presented for discussion:

I - What is the ideal form of attack from the Political Warfare and the Ministry of Economic Warfare points of view in the light of the air power available, i.e. a- large towns, small towns or villages; b- objectives upon which Germany's rate of economic recovery after defeat will depend, e.g. chemical plants such as those at

Europe, "Aircraft Losses," Appendix 11; and Webster and Frankland, The Strategic Air war Against Germany: Annexes and Appendices, Volume IV, Appendix 40, "Monthly Annual and Grand Totals of Bomber Command Aircraft dispatched, missing and damaged on operations September 1939 to May 1945", 433, respectively. 149 Specifically, USAAF sorties rose from 14,464 in April to 23, 917 in July and, as mentioned, Bomber Command nighttime sorties rose from 9,873 to 11,500. These statistics are found in Davis, Carl A. Spaatz and the Air War in Europe, "Combat Sorties Flown in the European Theater of Operations," Appendix 13; and Webster and Frankland, The Strategic Air war Against Germany: Annexes and Appendices, Volume IV, Appendix 40, "Monthly Annual and Grand Totals of Bomber Command Aircraft dispatched, missing and damaged on operations September 1939 to May 1945", 433, respectively. 150 Cox, Table 5 "Aircraft Available for Operations", 41.

55 Ludwigshafen and Leverkusen; Sorpe Dam; inland waterways; industrial centres generally; c- objectives directly associated with the German Army such as the War Office, garrison towns of long standing, training establishments etc. II - Assuming that the ideal form of attack is that under (a) above, a- should targets be scattered over Germany or concentrated in particular areas; b- should HE, incendiary, or low flying fighter attacks be employed; c- should attacks be heavy and concentrated in time or so far as possible, continuous. III - Will an attack of the type recommended be practical in the light of; a- permissible diversions from priority tasks; b- tactical situation existing; c- weapons available. IV - What arrangements should be made for the formulation of an Anglo- American plan. V - What preparations can be made prior to the attack to ensure that it can be put into effect with the minimum delay when a decision to do so is taken. 51

Over the next few days, a committee hammered out ideas and recommendations on these points. The Air Staff, in consultation with the Foreign Office, the Ministry of

Economic Warfare and an unofficial representative of the staff of the US Strategic Air

Force in Europe, presented the draft paper on July 17 to clarify some of the preliminary goals and methods of morale bombing. This paper, titled "Attack on German Civilian

Morale", explained that the state of morale in Germany was neither good nor bad, but rather apathetic since the average German was more concerned with the day-to-day activities of earning a living. Furthermore, "the rigid control exercised by the Gestapo over the German civilian population has, even in the face of prolonged and intensive bombardment, effectively prevented expressions of protest or dissatisfaction from the sections of the community who have borne the brunt of our attacks."152 The note also

151 Top Secret Memo to senior Air officials, July 8, 1944. PRO, AIR 20/3227. Letter to USAAF is found in Top Secret note from DDBOps Bufton to Col. Hughes, July 8, 1944. PRO AIR 20/3227. 152 Top Secret note by the Air Staff. "Attack on German Civilian Morale." July 17, 1944, 1. PRO AIR 20/3227.

56 explains that the nature of German morale will not change until "events have made it plain that the authority of the Government is greatly weakened" and that the "German

army has suffered a series of irrecoverable defeats in the field."153 The paper then goes

on to explain that when those conditions become reality, there would be three key areas

of "morale" that could influence a German surrender:

I - The morale of the political and military leaders themselves. It may be possible to attack this by direct means, such as heavy attacks on the traditional centres of Governmental and military control, as well as by well-judged propaganda. II - The morale of the armed forces. This will be affected mainly by conditions in the field and by the extent to which the weapons and essential supplies meet the field army's requirement. III - Civilian morale. Insofar as it leads to outward manifestation, such as uncontrolled rioting or abandonment of war production.154

The paper then examines several methods of attacking morale. The paper states, "Any

form of attack to be effective must be of catastrophic force, and must imply a threat that

it will be continued and intensified if surrender does not follow."155 In the note, the Air

Staff considered widespread strafing by fighters and attacks on small towns of twenty thousand inhabitants as two possible methods of attacks aimed at using the air offensive as a means of directly targeting civilian objectives.156 Senior officials, however, rejected these ideas because they would not produce the "catastrophic" effect needed or they would be at the mercy of the weather; but not because they would be considered immoral.

The possibility of an attack on Berlin and other large towns was another method examined in the July 17 draft paper. It was in this context that the early

153 Ibid. 154 Ibid., 2. 155 Ibid. 156 Ibid., 3.

57 THUNDERCLAP idea was further developed. The Air Staff deemed attacks on Berlin or other large towns feasible because they would not require ideal bombing conditions, plus a massive bomber force could be organized quickly and maintained over a series of consecutive days.157 They also argued that in order to maintain a catastrophic effect and higher concentration of destruction, the bombs must not be aimed at specific objectives on the outskirts of the city but rather the aiming point should be the "heart of the

'government headquarters.'"158 In the end the paper presented several conclusions:

I - Once it is clear that the German Army has been defeated, our object must be so to influence the minds of the German High Command that they prefer organized surrender to continued resistance. II - It may, however, be of value in the last crisis to launch some attack directed against the morale of the High Command, the army and the civilian population rather than against objectives immediately related to the battles. III - The best form of attack from all points of view would be intensive bombardment of Berlin. This should be concentrated so far as possible on the administrative centre of the city: and should continue without respite so long as operational factors permit.

By the end of July, the ideas presented above had circulated amongst British and US officials and the idea of bombing Berlin on a massive scale for the purpose of attacking morale was approved, even by US General Spaatz. 60 An Air Ministry minute to the

Deputy Chief of the Air Staff (DCAS) N.H. Bottomley, dated July 28, acknowledged that "General Spaatz is in general agreement with the paper, but would prefer that no reference should be made in it to the concurrence of his unofficial representative at the meeting which discussed it."161 Overall, the above minute establishes that Spaatz and the

157 Ibid., 4. 158 Ibid., 5. 159 Ibid., 6-7. 160 Minute sheet. July 28, 1944. PRO AIR 20/3227; and Top Secret memo from Political Intelligence department of the Foreign Office, July 30, 1944. PRO AIR 8/1229. 161 Minute sheet. July 28, 1944. PRO AIR 20/3227.

58 USAAF were in general agreement about a plan to directly attack German morale in the early planning of Operation THUNDERCLAP.

The bombing ideas presented in the July proposals were, of course, not new.

Although it is difficult to determine who started the practice in WWII, morale bombing and its euphemisms, area bombing, zone bombing, dehousing, terror bombing, were all major components of the early bombing campaigns of the Allies and Axis powers. The bombing of Warsaw on September 24 and 25, 1939, by Nazi bombers, is typically considered the first true terror bombing act of the Second World War. During these raids over four hundred bombers dropped at least 500 tons of bombs and 72 tons of incendiary bombs.162 During the Blitz, Hitler hoped to bring "dreadful sorrow and misfortune" to the British in hopes of destroying their will to resist in 1940. Starting on September 7,

1940, German bombers continually terrorized British cities with increasing tonnage until

May of 1941. Conversely, Allied bombers made devastating thousand bomber raids on towns across Germany; most notably on Cologne on May 20, 1942, and on Hamburg in

July 1943, where severe civilian casualties occurred. Yet, before either of the Great

Wars, most nations recognized the power and possibilities of the bomber as a devastating weapon.

Before 1939, the laws of aerial warfare were inadequately defined and limited.

Perhaps the four most significant pieces of pre-WWII legislation on aerial warfare are found in the 1868 Declaration of St. Petersburg, the Peace Conferences at The Hague in

1899 (Hague II and IV) and 1907 (Hague Convention IV) and The Hague Rules of Air

Warfare of 1923. The 1868 Declaration of St. Petersburg agreed to fix "the technical

162 The term "at least" is used as these figured vary between Luftwaffe sources and other sources where those numbers are doubled. In The Bomber War, Neillands adds that each aircraft made three or four sorties against the city. Neillands, 35.

59 limits at which the necessities of war ought to yield to the requirements of humanity" and to alleviate "as much as possible the calamities of war."163 Its loophole was that it only specifically referred to projectiles launched by military and naval forces and not aerial forces since they did not yet exist; therefore, allowing for some flexibility in the interpretation of the definition. Participating nations discussed and incorporated the ideas of The Declaration of St. Petersburg into the First Peace conference at The Hague in 1899 (Hague II and IV) and at the Second Peace conference in 1907 (Hague

Convention IV.) In 1899, conference participants prohibited "for a term of five years, the launching of projectiles and explosives from balloons, or by other new methods of a similar nature."164 Three years after the decrees of the 1899 conference expired, a second peace conference took place. From it, two specific articles are noteworthy. Article 23 (e) of the Second Peace conference stated that it was forbidden "to employ arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering,"165 while Article 25 stated that

"the attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which are undefended is prohibited."1 Articles 23(e) and 25, however, were limited and confusing because of Article 26. Article 26 declares, "The officer in command of an attacking force must, before commencing a bombardment, except in cases of assault, do all in his power to warn the authorities."167 In other words, the

163 Arthur Eyffinger. The First Hague Peace Conference of 1899: The Parliament of Man, the Federation of the World (Boston: Kluwer Law International,, 1999), 208. 164 Ibid., 233. 165 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The Hague Conventions of 1899 (II) and 1907 (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Pamphlet No. 5 (Washington D.C: The Endowment, 1915), 17. 166 Ibid., 18; Geoffrey Best, "The Trials of Total War," in Humanity in Warfare (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 262-263; Tami Davis Biddle, "Air Power," in The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World, ed. Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos, and Mark R. Shulman (London: Yale University Press, 1994), 142-143.

60 enemy must have a chance to surrender before the bombing attack begins. This, however, would be impossible from the air. It is evident that target definition would be an issue. In this case, Article 26 does not conform to Article 23 (e) and Article 25 of the second Hague conference. Hypothetically speaking, if an undefended town had a valid target such as an ammunition depot within it, how could a bombing force take control of the depot from the air? It would have to destroy it through bombardment. In contrast, in land warfare a ground force could easily accept a surrender and simply walk into the city and take control of the depot with little effort and or damage.

The last and perhaps most specific article dealing with aerial bombing prior to the Second World War can be found in The Hague Rules of Air Warfare. In the winter of 1922-1923, representatives of the United States, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan and the Netherlands organized a commission to further develop the terms and conditions of aerial warfare. In early 1923, they finalized a draft of 62-article codes covering a range of issues. The most important but contentious articles relating to aerial bombardment includes:

ARTICLE XXII Aerial bombardment for the purpose of terrorizing the civilian population, of destroying or damaging private property not of a military character, or of injuring non-combatants is prohibited.

ARTICLE XXIV 1. Aerial bombardment is legitimate only when directed at a military objective, that is to say, an object of which the destruction or injury would constitute a distinct military advantage to the belligerent. 2. Such bombardment is legitimate only when directed exclusively at the following objectives: military forces; military works; military establishments or depots; factories constituting important and well-known centres engaged in the manufacture of arms, ammunition, or distinctively military supplies; lines of communication or transportation used for military purposes.

Also argued in Kennett, 10-11.

61 3. The bombardment of cities, towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings not in the immediate neighborhood of the operations of land forces is prohibited. In cases where the objectives specified in paragraph 2 are so situated, that they cannot be bombarded without the indiscriminate bombardment of the civilian population, the aircraft must abstain from bombardment. 4. In the immediate neighborhood of the operations of land forces, the bombardment of cities, towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings is legitimate provided that there exists a reasonable presumption that the military concentration is sufficiently important to justify such bombardment, having regard to the danger thus caused to the civilian population. 5. A belligerent State is liable to pay compensation for injuries to person or to property caused by the violation by any of its officers or forces of the provisions of this article.

ARTICLE XXV In bombardment by aircraft all necessary steps must be taken by the commander to spare as far as possible buildings dedicated to public worship, art, science, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospital ships, hospitals, and other places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided such buildings, objects or places are not at the time used for military purposes. Such buildings, objects and places must by day be indicated by marks visible to aircraft. The use of marks to indicate other buildings, objects or places than those specified above is to be deemed an act of perfidy. The marks used as aforesaid shall be in the case of buildings protected under the Geneva Convention the red cross on a white ground, and in the case of other protected buildings a large rectangular panel divided diagonally into two pointed [sic] triangular portions, one black and the other white.

A belligerent who desires to secure by right the protection for the hospitals and other privileged buildings above mentioned must take the necessary measures to render the special signs referred to sufficiently visible.169

It would appear that the Hague Rules of Air Warfare had clearly defined what was acceptable in aerial warfare, however, disagreement over the selection of targets for aerial bombardment resulted in the draft of 1923 never being ratified by any nation. In the opening stages of the Second World War, the United States, Britain, and Germany all took steps to ensure that a full out air war did not develop by following the draft recommendations. Roosevelt also pleaded to Hitler and Churchill to limit bombing to

y W. Hays Parks, "Air War and the Law of War." Air Force Law Review 1 (1990), 30; and Biddle, "Air Power," in The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World, 148-149.

62 military targets and to avoid civilians and unfortified cities at all costs. Both Churchill

and Hitler accepted his plea. Hitler ordered limitations on the Luftwaffe's operations in the West and Churchill ordered all RAF planes not to carry bombs over enemy lines so that no accidents could occur.170 These mutual agreements lasted little over a month. The

failure of the major powers to agree on a legally binding treaty in 1923, or at least before the outbreak of war in 1939, offered an opportunity for the full destructiveness of the bomber to be unleashed and ultimately had a direct effect on the lives of hundreds of thousands of civilians during the Second World War and especially during its final few months.

It is clear that by the end of July 1944, moral concerns did not influence Allied aerial planning, as the differences between bombing combatants and non-combatants was blurred. On August 1, 1944, the DBOps and Chairman of the Combined Strategic

Targeting Committee Sydney Button circulated a top secret note titled "OPERATION

'THUNDERCLAP' (Attack on German Civilian Morale.)" Since the discussions involved the Combined Strategic Targeting Committee it can be assumed that both the

USAAF and Bomber Command would play a joint role in these attacks. The goal of this note was to make some initial remarks with respect to "the principals which must be followed to achieve a maximum effect on civilian morale by bombing, with a view to the formulation of a specific plan for such an attack upon Germany."171 The note concluded that the CBO between March 1943 and March 1944 did not have a decisive role in demoralizing the Germans for several reasons. First, the US directed its component of the bombing offensive at precise industries. Second, the use of large

170Kennet, 106, 107 and 109. 171 "Operation THUNDERCLAP (Attack on German Civilian Morale),"August 1, 1944, 1. PRO AIR 8/1229.

63 amounts of incendiary bombs during these raids, rather than high explosives, did not create the potential for high percentages of death to the individual and thus had little effect on the morale of the civilian population.172 In turn, the paper offered several

"principals of bombing for purely morale effect." These principals were as follows:

1. The attack must be delivered in such a density that it imposes as nearly as possible a 100% risk of death to the individual in the area to which it is applied. 2. While maintaining the basic density referred to in I, the total weight of the attack must be such as to produce the effect amounting to a national disaster. 3. The target chosen should be one invoking the maximum associations, both traditional and personal, for the population as a whole. Considerations of economic destruction must not be permitted to influence the selection of the target. 4. Subject to (iii), the area selected should embrace the highest density of population. 5. Attacks of this nature are likely to have the maximum effect when the population has become convinced that its Government is powerless to prevent a repetition. 6. Whether or not such attacks will have a decisive effect will depend upon two factors; (a) The absolute weight of the attack; (b) Whether, at the time, the condition of civilian morale is such that it can sustain a calamity on this scale combined with the immediate threat of an indefinite number of repetitions.173

Throughout the paper, the general tone is that Allied bombers should turn their attention away from attacks on the German economy and focus on targeting German morale. It explains that to achieve 90% devastation of a built up area an HE density formula of 2,000 tons per square mile is required. Also, the target should be one possessing the maximum traditional and personal associations for the German people.

The Allies chose Berlin as the primary target for an "all out attack," because, as the capital of Germany, the city had both the main administrative and government

172 Ibid. 173 Ibid., 5.

64 structures. The paper argued that an attack on Berlin would target all aspects of German society: civil, government and military. During the daytime, the population of Berlin was extremely high. The report explained that if an attack on a two and half-mile area with a density of 2,000 tons per mile occurred, roughly 275,000 people would be killed or seriously injured.174 Furthermore, a massive attack on the capital would not only be observed by Berliners but also by the whole nation. It must be assumed, since the note explained how the population of Berlin was increased during the day, that the USAAF would have a major role in this attack. In the end, the paper proposed that an attack on

Berlin under THUNDERCLAP should occur when "the state of morale in Germany is considered to have deteriorated sufficiently, when the need for retaliation demands and when the effectiveness of such as attack might be increased by bringing in the Fifteenth

AAF and/or following it up with an all incendiary attack by Bomber Command, on the heaviest scale, on the remainder of the city." Subsequent papers reiterated the fact that

Berlin, because of its size, could be attacked during any condition of weather, day or night.176 Nonetheless, the original THUNDERCLAP paper is further proof that the

Allies considered attacks directly against civilians on a scale never before seen during the war, thus pushing the opportunity for moral repercussions to occur.

Incidentally, although he agreed for the most part that Berlin should be the primary target of THUNDERCLAP, the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS), Air Marshall Sir

Charles Portal, in a memorandum to the COS on August 1, raised the idea that "immense devastation could be produced if the entire attack was concentrated on a single big town

174 See Map 2 for the Allied zone map including two and half mile radius from THUNDERCLAP proposal. 175 Ibid., 6. 176 "Attack on Civilian Morale COS (44) 650 (0)," August 2, 1944. PRO AIR 20/3227; and "Attack on Civilian Morale COS (44) 650 (0)," August 3, 1944. PRO AIR 8/1229.

65 other than Berlin and the effect would be especially great if the town was one hitherto relatively undamaged."177 Two days later, the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (ACAS) in charge of policy proposed a similar idea. He argued that a more widespread attack on a

"number of German towns is necessary," since he does not believe that "the population of Germany looks upon Berlin as the centre of its life." As a result, the focus of

THUNDERCLAP was no longer on a single city but possibly several. As the year wound down, further papers agreed with the idea of large scale bombing aimed at

German morale, but also highlighted the need for the attacks to occur when the "moment is ripe."179

By September 1944, the Allies defined the "THUNDERCLAP" style of attack by its massive scale. Allied officials even talked of implementing THUNDERCLAP style attacks against "relatively undamaged city areas in the Ruhr/Rhineland areas of

Germany."180 "The object of such attacks," according to a memo dated September 13,

1944, "would be to create conditions of extreme dislocation and chaos, amounting to panic in these densely populated areas."181 The memo refers to the density formula already proposed for Berlin in the August 1 document. Furthermore, it states, "Of the million of inhabitants of the Ruhr/Rhineland area, masses would be driven to seek panic evacuation, largely by rail, thus throwing a sudden and overwhelming burden upon the transportation system."182 In other words the Allies believed that the resulting chaos from the massive bombing raids would also cause massive transportation disruption,

177 Memorandum by the Chief of Air Staff, COS (44) 650 (0) (Revise), August 1, 1944, 5. PRO AIR 8/1229. 178 "Attack on Civilian Morale, COS (44) 650 (0)." August 3, 1944. PRO AIR 8/1229. 179 Bufton to DCAS and ASP1. August 2, 1944. PRO AIR 20/3227. 180 "Outline Plan for the Employment of the Strategic Bomber Force in Support of the Land Phase during the Final Phase," September 13, 1944, 4. PRO AIR 20/8173. 181 Ibid., 4-5. 182 Ibid., 5.

66 therefore, limiting relief effort to the cities but also troop movement to the front. This idea would become a major component of the revived 1945 THUNDERCLAP plan for eastern German cities. Thus, by September 1944, the Allies envisioned Operation

THUNDERCLAP as a massive attack against Berlin or other, yet to be defined large

German cities, with the purpose of devastating the morale of the German people. The strategic situation in late 1944, however, was not ideal for the Allied bombers to undertake THUNDERCLAP bombings and, as a result, officials shelved the plan for the time being.

In October 1944, American bombing policy took another clear step towards adopting area bombing. In a memorandum dated October 29, the Eighth Air Force revealed a new policy on the subject of bombing secondary and last-resort targets.

1. No town or cities in Germany will be attacked as secondary or last-resort targets, targets of opportunity, or otherwise, unless such towns contain or have immediately adjacent to them, one (1) or more military objectives. Military objectives include railway lines; junctions marshalling yards; railway or bridges, or other communications networks; any industrial plant; and such obvious military objectives as oil storage tanks, military camps and barracks, troop concentrations, motor transport or AFV parks, ordnance or supply depots, ammunition depots; air fields; etc. 2. Combat crews will be briefed before each mission to insure that no targets other than military objectives in Germany are attacked. 3. It has been determined that towns and cities large enough to produce an identifiable return on the H2X scope generally contain a large proportion of the military objectives listed above. These centres, therefore, may be attacked as secondary or last resort targets by the through-overcast bombing technique.183

After clearly adapting non-precise radar technology, the USAAF released this memo as means to justify using radar technology under any condition and against

Memo 55-24, Headquarters Eighth Air Force, Office of the Commanding General, Standard Operating Procedures: Operations, subj: Attack of Secondary and Last resort Targets, October 29, 1944. AFHRC file no. 519.5991-1. Found in Davis, Spaatz and the Air War in Europe, 508

67 virtually any city. Since even the smallest German towns had some form of rail target, no urban area was safe from USAAF bombing. This memo had strong implications for USAAF THUNDERCLAP bombing raids in February, March and

April 1945.

By late 1944, all Allied offensives stalled, allowing Germany time to recover and even produce a menacing counteroffensive against the western Allies in the Ardennes.

The general mission of the strategic air forces in Europe continued to be the

"progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic systems and the direct support of land and naval forces."184 Oil, specifically when weather permitted, remained the first priority of the directive, followed by German lines of communication. The directive also stipulated that when weather or tactical situations were unsuitable, "attacks were to be delivered against area targets using blind bombing techniques when necessary."185

With the coming of 1945, the strategic nature of the war changed significantly. In the Ardennes, the German offensive broke and the Allies began pushing the German army back. The Western Allies, however, would later stall on the lower Rhine and it appeared the Russians were going to reach Berlin first. The Russian offensive which opened between January 12 and 15, 1945, pushed back the German military at an alarming rate forcing them to fight hard inside their own territory on two fronts. It also forced hundreds of thousands of German civilians to flee westward. As a result, eastern

German cities just inside the border became evacuation centres for these refugees. The

Directive No.3 for the Strategic Air Forces ion Europe. January 15, 1945. PRO AIR 14/1220. Second Revision of the Directive to the Strategic Air Forces, 219. DHIST 86/286.

68 Russian drive towards Berlin would end up being a major turning point in the life of

THUNDERCLAP and the overall push to end the war as soon as possible.

In January 1945, the British air planners argued the time was "right" to resurrect the THUNDERCLAP idea. In a memo dated January 22, titled "Operation

'THUNDERCLAP,'" the DBOps, Sydney Button, proposed to Air Marshall Bottomley,

"In view of the Russian progress, I feel the time has arrived for us to think again of the potentialities of Operation THUNDERCLAP."186 It must be assumed that Bufton believed the German defeat in the Ardennes and the Russian offensive in the East, produced the ideal conditions, discussed in summer of 1944, for an all out attack on the morale of German civilians. Bufton expected that an attack on Berlin in coordination with the Russian offensive and westward movement of fleeing refugees would show the

Germans that the Eastern and Western Allies were in close cooperation and therefore increase the impact on morale.187 At no point, however, does the memo declare that the

Western Allies should coordinate their efforts with the Russians before undertaking

THUNDERCLAP attacks. A file titled "OPERATION 'THUNDERCLAP'" is attached to this memo. This attachment reads like a combination of the July 17, 1944 and August

1, 1944 papers mentioned previously. It revisits the ideas of targeting the political, military and civilian morale and the past effects of morale bombing of Germany. It also pinpoints Berlin as the main target of such an attack. Some more insight is offered into the scale of effort that would be used. A force of two thousand bombers from the Eighth

Minute Sheet, "Operation 'THUNDERCLAP,'" January 22, 1944. PRO AIR 20/3227.

69 AAF would carry out the initial attack during the daytime since that was when the streets

I QQ of Berlin were their busiest.

On January 25, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) of the British War Cabinet presented a working paper JIC (45) 31 (O) (Revised Final) entitled "Strategic Bombing in Relation to the Present Russian Offensive." The JIC was a subcommittee of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and was in charge of gathering and organizing the various streams of information that arrived from intelligence gathering organizations. In turn they would release weekly reports and special papers commenting on the war and recent findings, and would hold important meetings with representatives from MI6, MI5, Naval

Intelligence, the Air Ministry and MEW. In this paper the Committee suggested that an aerial bombardment that hindered German troop movement and helped the Russian push would shorten the war. The memo starts by explaining: The degree of success achieved by the present Russian offensive is likely to have a decisive effect on the length of the war. We consider, therefore, that the assistance which might be given to the Russians during the next few weeks by the British and American strategic bomber forces justifies an urgent review of 1 OQ

their employment to this end.

Although the paper highlights that attacks against oil targets should continue to "take precedence over everything else," the general tone of the paper confirmed one of the top priorities of the Allied bombers was massive bombing raids to aid the Russians: "Such attacks might even have a political value in demonstrating, in the best way open to us, to the Russians a desire on the part of the British and Americans to assist them in the present battle."190 There is also a section which comments on the plan to attack Berlin

188 Minute Sheet, "Operation 'THUNDERCLAP,'" January 22, 1944. "Attachment 'OPERATION THUNDERCLAP,'" 6. PRO AIR 20/3227. 189 JIC (45) 31 (O) (Revised Final). January 25, 1945. PRO CAB 81/127.

70 through "heavy and sustained attacks." In reference to the refugee problem facing eastern Germany and Berlin it remarks,

A heavy flow of refugees from Berlin in the depth of winter coinciding with the trekking westwards of a population fleeing from Eastern Germany would be bound to create confusion, interference with the orderly movement of troops to the front and hamper the German military and administrative machine.

The JIC paper concludes that the Germans could reinforce the eastern front with up to forty-two divisions from areas of Germany, Norway, Latvia, Italy, Hungary and regions of the West.

Germany by rail (this movement is probably completed) Norway by sea and rail (one division every fourteen days) Latvia by sea (one division every week) Italy by rail (eleven divisions, three every fornight) Hungary by rail (six Panzer divisions by 15 February) The West by rail (seven divisions of which six Panzer by about 15 February)192

If these predications were accurate, the Allies would not have much time to launch an aerial campaign to counterattack German troop movement to the East. This paper set off a series of talks between Allied officials directly tying the Russian push to the rebirth of

THUNDERCLAP.

On the same day, Prime Minister Churchill, in a personal phone conversation with his Liberal Secretary for Air, Sir Archibald Sinclair, also inquired about the movement of German troops. This conversation not only implicates Churchill's executive role in

THUNDERCLAP but also the direct bombing of German refugees; a position he would eventually regret taking in late March 1945. In his conversation, Churchill candidly asked what plans Bomber Command might have for "basting the Germans in their

191 Ibid. 192 Ibid. See Map 3 for a map showing the rail and transportation network of western Germany in relation to the THUNDERCLAP cities and Map 4 for the rail lines around the THUNDERCLAP cities.

71 retreat from Breslau." By late January 1945, Breslau was in the sights of the advancing Russians and, as a result, newspapers well documented the flight of tens of thousands of refugees from this city. In reply, Sinclair offered his opinion that perhaps retreating Germans from Breslau would be a more appropriate target for their tactical air forces rather than a bomber operating from high altitudes. He believed that the heavy bombers should be concerned with bombing the German oil industry and, when weather conditions prevented more precise attacks, the area bombing of "Berlin and other large cities in eastern Germany such as Leipzig, Dresden and Chemnitz." He justified these cities as targets because they were "not only administrative centres controlling the military and civilian movement but...also main communications centres through which the bulk of traffic moves." In reply, Churchill stated,

I did not ask you last night about plans for harrying the German retreat from Breslau. On the contrary, I asked whether Berlin, and no doubt other large cities in East Germany, should not now be considered especially attractive targets. I am glad this is "under examination." Pray report to me tomorrow what is to be done.194

Churchill's stark reply clearly demonstrates the urgency of the situation and his desire to have a plan promptly developed.

On the twenty-sixth, Portal delivered two notes that responded to the JIC's report from the day before. Three important ideas are revealed here. First, Portal agreed that a large-scale attack against Berlin should occur, but over a longer period than the four days the JIC report proposed. He explained, "The weather is most unlikely to give us 4

193 Min. Freeman (APS to S of S) to Williams (ACAS (Ops)), January 26, 1945. Found in Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air War Against Germany: Victory, Volume III (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1961), 101. 194 Taylor, 183-185.

72 possible nights in close succession"195 and therefore "it is likely that the series of attacks would be extended over a much longer period to achieve this weight of attack."196

Second, Portal believed that since the bombing would be for "primarily morale or psychological effect it is important that it should be delivered with that aim in mind and not spread amongst the outlying districts of the City and aimed at targets such as tank production plants, jet engine factories, etc."197 Both of Portal's recommendations would become characteristics of the THUNDERCLAP plan of late February, March and early

April 1945. Lastly, the CAS argued that it was "certainly not worth while to undertake large scale bombing of communications in the hope of delaying the West-East passage

1 go of German reinforcements to the Eastern Front." Overall, this note can be used to demonstrate how Portal, a high ranking air official, dismissed the idea of

THUNDERCLAP as an operation to aid the Russians by stopping troop movement, and thus gives more credibility to the notion that the Allied knowingly designed

THUNDERCLAP to target civilians.

As discussions between the Chiefs of Air Staff and various other air planners continued throughout January, the nature of THUNDERCLAP gradually changed. After being advised of the Russian progress and German situation in late January, the

THUNDERCLAP plan shifted from a single all out attack on Berlin to a more elaborate operation. Portal proposed that an attack on Berlin should be supplemented, when weather permitted, with an attack on Chemnitz, Leipzig and Dresden, as they were all cities that would "equally share with Berlin the task of housing evacuees from the east

195 Note by CAS to DCAS, January 26, 1945. PRO AIR 20/ 3361. 196 "Strategic Bombing in Relation to the Present Russian Offensive." Note by the Air Staff with particular reference to JIC (45) 31 (0) Final, Dated January 24, 1945, 3. January 26, 1945. PRO AIR 20/3361. 197 Ibid.. 198 Note by CAS to DCAS, January 26, 1945. PRO AIR 20/ 3361.

73 and would equally be concerned in the problems of transportation involved by the present crisis in the East.

On the twenty-seventh, Air Marshal Bottomley agreed that Berlin should not be the only target attacked under THUNDERCLAP. He agreed that Chemnitz, Leipzig, and

Dresden should be targeted but also "associated cities" where a severe blitz will cause mass confusion and disrupt the movement of troops to the East. In an official note to numerous officials, including Harris, and US General Carl Spaatz, Bottomley recommended that Allied bombers undertake THUNDERCLAP style attacks when the appropriate weather and night conditions became available.2 Thus on February 1,

Allied air officials wholeheartedly approved Operation THUNDERCLAP. On the first, the Allies issued a new directive that focused on the importance of time as it may be

"necessary to subordinate targets which, if attacked, would have a long term effect to those likely to produce an effect immediately." In other words, oil targets remained first priority but the new directive allowed for the "employment of the Strategic Bomber

909

Forces in the manner best calculated to exploit the present situation." The section discussing the "Evacuation Centres" is the most controversial aspect of this directive.

The note observed that "Evacuees from German and German occupied provinces to the

East of Berlin are streaming westward through Berlin itself and through Leipzig,

Dresden and other cities in the East of Germany. The administration problems involved 90*3 in receiving the refugees and re-distributing them are immense." As a result, evacuation centres became second on the list of priority with an emphasis to attack these 199 Memo to CAS from Bottomley, January 26, 1945. PRO AIR 20/3361. 200 Memo, January 27, 1945. PRO AIR 20/3361. 201 Note by Air Staff, "Strategic Bombing in Relation to the Present Russian Offensive," February 1, 1945. PRO AIR 20/8173. 202 Ibid. 203 Ibid.

74 targets "at the earliest possible moment and on a heavy scale in priority." By making

evacuation centres a priority target of THUNDERCLAP, the Allies clearly moved away

from attacking industrial centres, industrial workers or enemy transportation hubs, and ultimately turned towards identifying fleeing refugees as their target.

By early February 1945 the overall goal of Operation THUNDERCLAP was to

create chaotic conditions associated with the evacuation of refugees and the movement of troops in eastern German cities. Its main objective was to create severe stress within these city centres so that the German civil and administrative front would collapse, thus

ending the war. Although aiding the Russian offensive is raised several times as a main reason to implement THUNDERCLAP, it is clear that this was not its main goal but rather a catalyst for the rebirth of the original 1944 THUNDERCLAP plan. In reality,

THUNDERCLAP was an operation specifically created to target civilians so that the general populace would become demoralized, rise-up, and pressure the Nazi government to end the war quickly. Subsequently, during the opening week of February, the

Russians reached the Oder River in the Kustrin area and were only 40 miles from Berlin, sending an ever-increasing number of refugees fleeing for safety. By now, Operation

THUNDERCLAP appeared inevitable. The moment was ripe, according to Allied air planners, and THUNDERCLAP attacks received the go ahead even though a finalized list of target cities in eastern Germany was not completed.

In the numerous memos and documents presented above, terms such as "other cities," "similar centres" and more frequently "associated cities" are common, but never specifically defined by Allied officials. At the 16th meeting of the Combined Strategic

Targets Committee on February 2, 1945, Mr. Lawrence, a representative of the FO and

75 MEW, made an inquiry into the definition of "associated cities." After some discussion the members defined "associated cities" as "cities associated with the communications for, or the control of the movement of enemy forces to the Eastern Front and the evacuation of civilians from that area."205 The chairman of the meeting asked for a small committee to form to select the specific targets found under the term "associated cities."

It is also interesting to note that during this meeting officials discussed the first planned

American THUNDERCLAP attack against Berlin scheduled for early February. Under the heading "Attack on Berlin by VIII Air Force," a US representative revealed that

General Spaatz had already ordered the attack on Berlin but he wanted specific objectives within the city, such as industrial plants, administrative headquarters or even railway stations, targeted. The resulting discussion revealed the true nature of the targeting for the THUNDERCLAP attacks. Mr. Lawrence noted in reply: "If the object of the attacks was to cause panic amongst the evacuees, attacks on the administrative centre would achieve little result as the evacuees would not, in fact, be living there."

Another member remarked that military reinforcements would most likely not pass through Berlin but rather by-pass it or be dispersed to sites in the suburbs and not the city centre.207 Lastly, the chairman stated:

He felt that the attack of these cities had been ordered, not merely because of their communications value or for any other single specific object, but because any additional chaos which we could cause at this juncture would make the German administrative and military problems already immense, still more difficult.208

205 Minutes from the 16th Meeting of the Combined Strategic Targets Committee. February 2, 1945. PRO AIR 2/8011. 206 Ibid. 207 Ibid. 208 Ibid.

76 These are important facts to consider when examining the planning and execution of the

THUNDERCLAP attacks and their results, since the aiming points were typically in the centre of the city and never the areas surrounding the city.

On February 7, four days after THUNDERCLAP attacks had begun, the Allies finalized a target list. At a Combined Strategic Targets Committee meeting involving representatives from Airborne Intelligence, the MEW, Bomber Command and the Air

Staff, ten targets were revealed as priority "in relation to the movement of evacuees from, and of military forces to, the Eastern Front."209 Bombing officials from the RAF,

USAAF and Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) received the target list the following day.210 These "evacuation centres," and ultimately the

THUNDERCLAP cities, were as follows and listed in order of priority:

1. BERLIN 2. DRESDEN 3. CHEMNITZ 4. LIEPZIG 5. HALLE 6. PLAUEN 7. DESSAU 8. POTSDAM 9. ERFURT

10. MAGDEDURG

In the contemporary historical literature the "associated cities" receive little to no recognition.211 In any secondary source where Operation THUNDERCLAP is

Appendix to the Minute of the 17th Meeting of the Combined Strategic Committee Held at Air Ministry on Wednesday February 17, 1945. PRO AIR 2/8011. 210 Cypher from Air Ministry to Bomber Command and USSTAF, February 8, 1945. PRO AIR 2/8011 211 The only reference to all ten Thunderclap target cities found by this author is in Brereton Greenhous and others, eds., The Crucible of War, 1939-1945: The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force, Volume III (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 855; Irving, The Destruction of Dresden. Taylor mentions the THUNDERCLAP list in his book, Dresden: Tuesday 13th February, 1945, however he only specifically indicates the top three targets. In Henry Probert, Bomber Harris: His Life and Times (London; Greenhill Books, 2003) 319, the list is mentioned but Berlin and Dresden positions, as number one and two, are only mentioned.

77 mentioned, Dresden appears as the definitive THUNDERCLAP model, followed by

Berlin, and sometimes Chemnitz or Leipzig. Since no definite end to THUNDERCLAP can be found on paper, until Churchill calls an end to area bombing in April of 1945,1 argue that any raid by Bomber Command or USAAF bombers against the ten cities mentioned above, between February and the end of April 1945, is considered a

THUNDERCLAP attack.212

By early February 1945, the Allies finalized plans for Operation

THUNDERCLAP with targets and goals clearly defined. For Bomber Command,

Operation THUNDERCLAP was another area bombing offensive, which would be aimed at the heart of the city centre. For the USAAF, THUNDERCLAP would mark a decisive change in its precision bombing offensive. By selecting marshalling yards as aiming points American bombing officials argued that their bombers were somehow attacking the THUNDERCLAP cities in a more ethical manner. As outlined in the previous chapter, USAAF officials fully understood that hitting a marshalling yard precisely in the winter of 1945, visually or with H2X radar, was virtually impossible without some degree of collateral damage similar to an area bombing raid. As a result, I argue that the Americans knowingly executed THUNDERCLAP without any regard for accuracy or non-military objectives. With the coming of February's first full moon on the third, one of the most destructive and controversial air operations of the Second

World War was set in motion.

212 Excluded fromthi s list are attacks directly aimed at the oil industries or war production industries of the ten THUNDERCLAP cities.

78 Chapter 3

The "THUNDERCLAP Model": The February 13,14 and 15,1945, raids on Dresden

I know that the destruction of so large and splendid a city at this late stage of the war was considered unnecessary even by a good many people who admit that our earlier attacks were as fully justified as any other operation of war. Here I will only say that the attack on Dresden was at the time considered a military necessity by much more important people than myself, and that if their judgment was right the same arguments must apply that I have set out in an earlier chapter in which I said what I think about the ethics of bombing as a whole. Sir Arthur 'Bomber' Harris

In looking to form some judgment over the nature and validity of

THUNDERCLAP, it is important to examine each city independently and, once again, in the context of the war in 1945. What did these cities or towns have to offer as justifiable targets? What was the Allied intelligence about the targets? It is also important to examine how the Allies attacked these cities. Reviewing the available intelligence sources - such as squadron briefing notes, after action reports, interpretation reports, immediate interpretation reports from Bomber Command and the USAAF, and even captured German documents - will offer excellent insight into the priorities, details and results of the attacks against the THUNDERCLAP cities.

One method to analyze the targets is to use the "Bomber's Baedeker: Guide to the Economic Importance of German Towns and Cities," as a guide to understand what rank or priority the Allies assigned to each city and the targets within them. The edition consulted for this thesis was produced by the British Foreign Office and Ministry of

Economic Warfare in 1944 and revised and amplified from the 1943 edition "in light of

79 the latest available intelligence." The Baedeker provides a brief description of the city's background, population and distance from London. The FO and MEW divided the targets within the cities into fourteen different categories:

1. Transportation 2. Public utility services 3. Solid fuels 4. Liquid fuels and substitutes 5. Iron, steel and Ferro-alloys 6. Non-Ferrous metal Smelting, Refining and Manufacture 7. Aircraft and Aero-engines 8. Shipbuilding 9. Other engineering and armament industries 10. Chemicals and Explosives 11. Textiles, rayon, pulp and paper 12. Rubber tyres 13. Leather

14. Food industries

The ranking system, used to prioritize targets within each city, was also based on the latest intelligence possible. The ranking system was as follows: 1+ - Factories of outstanding importance in the German war effort. 1 - Vital factory in primary war industry or major plant in industries or major importance. 2 - Minor plant in major industries or major plants in minor industries. 3 - Subsidiary factories. (-) - Factories which are almost certainly of little importance in the German war effort and establishments concerning which the available information is not sufficient to enable any priority rating to be allocated.214

The Baedeker is a valuable tool to demonstrate what the Allies understood about each city and the targets within it in the winter of 1944-1945. It is very easy as a historian today to apply hindsight when examining and judging a controversial issue such as

Bomber's Baedeker: Guide to the Economic Importance of German Towns and Cities. May 1944. Enenmy Branch of the Foreign Office and Ministry of Economic Warfare. Volume I and II. DHIST 181.009 (D989). 214 Ibid.

80 Operation THUNDERCLAP. Therefore, it is important to examine and apply the information in the Baedeker from 1945 and not what historians know today.

Martin Middlebrook and Chris Everitt's The Bomber Command War Diaries and

Roger A. Freeman's the Mighty Eighth War Diary were the main sources used to determine the various technicalities of each THUNDERCLAP raid, such as the sorties,

91 S • tons dropped, sighting used, cloud-cover and aiming points. Both books offer concise and detailed statistical reports for all the operations of Bomber Command and the Eighth

Air Force, respectively. In some instances there are minor variations between these secondary sources and the official primary documents consulted such as the "RAF

Bomber Command Diary of Operations -March 1944-May 1945," the "United States

Strategic Air Forces in Europe Air Intelligence Summaries," "The Statistical Summary of Eighth Air Force Operations: European Theater, 17 August 1942- 8 May 1945," and various other daily intelligence summaries. In many cases these errors could be the result of a misprint or even miscalculation following the raids. Throughout the tables found in the following chapters and appendices, I have disclosed the most available information for each raid. In other words, if a source offered both the total tonnage of

HE bombs and IB bombs dropped during a specific Allied raid versus only the combined total tonnage, then the more detailed facts are found in the charts.

Lastly, German police reports titled "Reports of Physical Damage Resulting from

Allied Air Attacks on Germany, 1945," taken from the Steiger Collection at the

Directorate of History and Heritage in Ottawa, offer vital insight into the situation within each city after the raids. The reports cover "most of the major raids.. .as far as 215 Martin Middlebrook and Chris Everitt, The Bomber Command War Diaries: An Operational Reference Book, 1939-1945 (Markham: Viking Press, 1985); and Roger A. Freeman. The Mighty Eighth War Diary (New York: Jane's Publishing Incorporated, 1981.)

81 availability of source material permits."216 With respect to THUNDERCLAP, this file covers most of the major raids. The file indicates that the individual police reports were

"made at the time of or shortly after the attacks."217 There are likely some discrepancies found within these reports since it was common for German propaganda offices to skew numbers to make bombing raids appear more severe and appalling. These German police records, however, are still a valuable source when used carefully, as they offer insight into the other side of the bombing offensive against Germany.

The controversy surrounding Dresden is by no means new. In fact, confusion over the strategic nature of Dresden, the attacks and the Allied purpose and intent can be traced back to only hours after the first of several Allied raids hit the city on February

14, 1945. Transcripts from a BBC radio broadcast indicate a Canadian Squadron Leader from the RCAF reported, uncensored,

Shortly after news dispatches from the front announced that Marshal Konlev's army is only 66 miles from Dresden, Lancasters of the Canadian Bomber Group, in company with other heavies of Bomber Command, unleashed a torrent of destruction on that capital of Saxony, leaving endless fires and explosions in their wake.218

He understood Dresden to be a city with a "normal population of 640,000" and that "in peacetime, tobacco, chocolates and confectionary played a major part in the city's industrial activity."219 Furthermore, he explained,

And now, like all German Cities, its industry is devoted almost wholly to war works. It is an important railway centre, the direct line from Berlin to Prague and Vienna passing though it, and has large marshalling yards. There is an inland harbour, and other valuable targets include chemical and munitions

216 "Reports of Physical Damage Resulting from Allied Air Attacks on Germany, 1945." Air Historical Branch, Air Ministry May 1957. SGII264 File 84. 217 Ibid. 218 Number 6 Group Dispatch No. PI. February 14, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D4733). 219 Ibid.

82 plants, an aviation oil refinery, metal works, aero engine shops and a naval armament works.220

The above passages are perfect examples of what modern authors continue to debate; was Dresden a simple town with little or no military targets or was it in fact a city containing valuable military industries? Lastly, the general moral debate about the bombings of Dresden is evident when the Squadron Leader adds to the target list this remark, "In addition, fleeing refugees from the east have crowded into the city to seek

991 haven from the advancing Soviet army. There was no haven early this morning." He later shares the thoughts of one young bomb aimer from Toronto who remarked,

"Believe me, they'll make no more china there for some time."222

The Bomber Command attacks on Dresden during the night of February 13/14 plus the follow up raids by USAAF bombers during the following two days have come to symbolize, not only the definitive THUNDERCLAP attacks, but also the most controversial series of bombing raids of the entire war. Even the devastating area bombing of Japanese cities by American bombers, a technique perfected by the USAAF over Europe in early 1945 and then applied in the Far East, is often overshadowed by the bombing of Dresden. It is important, therefore, to outline the raids and results of the mid-February Dresden bombings in detail before moving on to the other

THUNDERCLAP attacks. Then, by analyzing the other THUNDERCLAP cities attacked and comparing them to the Dresden attacks, it will become apparent that the raids on February 13, 14 and 15 were not isolated acts but rather a small part of a campaign of terror designed to end the war quickly. This chapter will put the Dresden

220 Ibid. 221 Ibid.

83 controversy in context. It will explain how Dresden, as the 'THUNDERCLAP model,' can be used to demonstrate its relationship with the other, lesser known "associated cities." By comparing the characteristics of the city, the plan of attack, the goals and the end results of the attack on Dresden with the attacks on the other cities detailed in the next chapter, this thesis will draw definitive conclusions on the overall purpose of

Operation THUNDERCLAP.

Dresden, according to the Bomber's Baedeker, had a population of roughly

640,000 people. Like most of the other THUNDERCLAP cities, however, hundreds of thousands of refugees flooded the city in 1945 thus making its population somewhat closer to one million. The Elbe River divided the city into the Altstadt (old town) on the left bank and the Neustadt (new town) on the right bank. The Altstadt housed commercial buildings, public buildings and residential housing while the Neustadt contained primarily industrial centres and administration buildings. For several hundred years this cultural centre attracted artists from around the world and was best known for its production of leisure items. Dresden was also primarily known for its non- military activities in the arts, architecture and cultural history of Germany and Europe.

The city received international recognition for its beautiful china and historical buildings such as the Zwinger Palace, the Dresden State Opera House and the large, domed cathedral known as the Frauenkirche.

Besides its international fame as the "Elbflorenz" (Florence on the Elbe),

Germans understood that Dresden was a distant city away from Allied bombing capabilities, and an undamaged and beautiful city that only received the occasional air raid warning throughout the latter stages of the war. For most of the war Dresden, and

223 Baedeker, "Dresden," 154.

84 many of the THUNDERCLAP cities, were geographically too far for Allied bombers to reach.224 It was for these exact reasons that hundreds of thousands of refugees from other devastated cities such as Hamburg and, later, fleeing civilians from the East, made refuge in Dresden and the other Saxon cities in the winter of 1944-1945. It is also why controversy surrounds the bombing of Dresden. After the devastating bombings,

German officials used Dresden's historical and cultural significance as propaganda to denounce the attacks as unjust and as a result Dresden's status as a non-military target in

1945 is still a source of controversy.

From the Baedeker, it is evident that the Allies understood Dresden to be a city of military importance and, for the most part, they were correct. In the general description of the city, the Baedeker explains that in 1944 Dresden contained "a large number of light engineering works and makers of machinery which are now engaged on all kinds of war production, many of which are too small to be listed individually.

Several important factories are making electric motors, precision and optical instruments and chemicals." A closer look reveals that under "Engineering and Armaments," only two companies earned a Priority 1 ranking. Schleifscheiben AG located in the

Lohrmannstr region made abrasives and grinding machines. By 1944, the Allies believed that Schleifscheiben AG was the principle German maker of grinding wheels.226 Zeiss

Ikon AG had three main plants scattered around Dresden in the Altenbergerplatz,

Schandauerstr and Mugelnerstr areas. This company specialized in cameras and optics, and specifically made U-boat periscopes and searchlight lenses. The Allies also believed

224 The Allies, contrary to popular belief, attacked Dresden twice before February 1945. On October 7, 1944, thirty B-17s attacked the city and on January 16, 1945, 133/400 B-24s attacked the city's oil refineries and marshalling yards. 225 Baedeker, "Dresden," 155. 226 Ibid., 158.

85 that this company may have been making torpedo mechanisms at their newest factory in the northwest area of Grossenhainerstr.227 Of the other twenty firms mentioned under

"Engineering and Armaments," there are six Priority 2 targets, twelve Priority 3 targets and two that are of little significance and thus do not receive a ranking.

Since its destruction, the debate over Dresden has been primarily focused on its economic importance in relation to the war. Authors who disagree with the raids tend to overlook the fact that there were obvious war related industries in the city while

99R focusing on Dresden's tradition as an artistic city. In comparison, supporters of the

Dresden bombing, including Allied leaders such as Harris and Spaatz, focus on the importance of Dresden as a military industrial centre at a point in the war when 990

Germany's sprawling economic size was dwindling. The fact remains, however, that

Dresden, and the other THUNDERCLAP cities, were not bombed because of their economic importance. The stated goals of THUNDERCLAP were not to destroy war related industries but rather transportation nodes related to the movement of German reinforcements or evacuation centres for fleeing refugees. It is therefore important to

227 Ibid., 158-159. 228 A recent book which offers a wide variety of interesting opinions and perspectives on the Dresden raids is Paul Addison and Jeremy A. Craig, ed. Firestorm: The Bombing of Dresden, 1945 (London: Pimlico, 2006). Some authors who ignore Dresden's military targets include Stewart Halsey Ross, Strategic Bombing by the United States in World War II: The Myths and the Facts (Jefferson, N.C: McFarland and Co, 2003); Max Hastings, Bomber Command(London: Michael Joseph Limited, 1979); David Irving, Apocalypse 1945: The Destruction of Dresden (London: David Irving and Parforce UK Ltd, 2005) Available [Online]:http://fpp.co.uk/books/Dresden/index.html. Accessed July 19, 2006; and to some degree Ronald Schaffer, Wings of Judgment: American Bombing in World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985). 229 As seen in Robin Neillands, The Bomber War: The Allied Air Offensive Against Nazi Germany (New York: The Overlook Press); Frederick Taylor, Dresden: Tuesday 13 February 1945 (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2004); David Bashow, No Prouder Place: Canadians and the Bomber Command Experience 1939-1945 (St. Catherine's, Ontario: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2005); and an official USAAF study "Historical Analysis of the 14-15 February 1945 Bombings of Dresden." Prepared by Joseph W. Angell, USAAF Historical Division of the Research Studies Institute of he Air University at Maxwell Air Force Base (Maxwell Air Force Base: USAAF Historical Division, 1953) Available [online]: https://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/PopTopics/dresden.htm. Accessed on July 13, 2006.

86 first outline the transportation targets of each THUNDERCLAP city before examining the Allied raids in detail.

According to the Baedeker, Dresden was an important transportation railway centre: "The main connection between South and East Germany and the direct line from

Berlin to Prague and Vienna pass through Dresden whence several branch lines lead to

Leipzig and other parts of industrial Saxony."230 The only marshalling yard mentioned in the Baedeker, however, is found south of the Elbe in the western sector of Dresden called the Friedrichstadt (Priority 2). Its railway repair shops (Priority 2) were located only several rows of houses away. To the north of the Elbe, in the suburb of Pieschen, there were a series of railway repair shops (Priority 2.) The main station

(Hauptbahnof), the Neustadt station and its goods shops were missing from the

Baedeker's list. As with Dresden, and most German cities, the main marshalling yards and rail facilities were traditionally found in the centre of the city. After indicating the various rail related targets, it is, therefore, important to analyze whether the Allies even targeted them and, if so, were they accurately hit. As will be seen, the American effort under THUNDERCLAP was primarily aimed at the marshalling yards and rail centres on paper. As reiterated throughout this thesis, targeting a marshalling yard within a city centre and accurately hitting it was not as easy as it seemed.

The original plan of attack for Dresden in February of 1945 was to have the

US AAF attack the city first on the thirteenth during the day, just hours before Bomber

Command would follow up with a massive night raid on the city. Icy weather conditions, however, grounded US bombers on their airfields in Britain during the

"Ibid., 155. 'ibid., 156.

87 afternoon of the thirteenth. Instead, Bomber Command launched a two-wave attack that night with 5 Group receiving the task of visiting Dresden first (For a complete list of

Dresden's THUNDERCLAP attacks see Appendix V). The "centre of the closely built up area" was the aiming point (A/P) for Bomber Command's first Dresden attack; a common aiming point for all Bomber Command THUNDERCLAP raids. Between 2209 and 2235 hours, 234 Lancasters of a possible 245 deployed (234/245) and all nine

Mosquitos deployed (9/9) successfully bombed Dresden through 9/10 to 10/10 cloud cover, using a target indicating procedure known as NEWHAVEN. The NEWHAVEN technique required "visual pinpointing of the aiming point followed by ground- marking"233 with flares or target indicators, and required clear to very little cloud cover in order to be successful. The reason why Bomber Command used NEWHAVEN on the night of February 13/14 through extremely poor cloud cover remains unclear. Close to three hours later, the second wave of bombers from 1,3,6 and 8 Groups arrived over

Dresden knowing:

Dresden is at present 75 miles from the Russian lines. Doubtle [sic] here are the staff headquarters and the supply centre of the armies opposing Marshal Koniev. There are many refugees from the East. A successful raid will add to the turmoil and the administrative difficulties of the civil authorities, and will be a great help to the Russian Army.

Another 516 Lancasters made effective strikes, using NEWHAVEN, against the city under more favorable weather conditions. Once again the "centre of the old town on

S.W. bank of Elbe and just east of 3 large M/Yds and goods Yds" was the aiming point

This process of the USAAF attacking first and then Bomber Command following up second was common during the larger THUNDERCLAP attacks. 33 Greenhous et al, Crucible of War, 659. 234 Briefing Notes. "Dresden," February 13/14, 1945. No 6 Group. DHIST 181.009 (D3312.)

88 (A/P) for this raid.235 The second wave's objectives were very similar to those of 5

Group: "To destroy the built up area and associated industries and rail facilities."

According to Bomber Command Intelligence Narrative No. 1007, however, the smoke from the early attack "rendered it impossible to identify the A/P with certainty."237 The second wave of bombers, therefore, dropped its bombs off target. In total, Bomber

Command dropped some 1,471.7 tons of HE and 1,175.7 tons of IB on Dresden that night, devastating the city centre.

Almost every post raid report indicates that the results produced during the

British night raids on Dresden were nothing short of hellish. Fires raged throughout the city and returning pilots could see them from as far as 100 miles away.238 As the images from the Photographic Reconnaissance Unit (PRU) began to pour in, it became apparent

9-5Q that "huge fires swept unchecked through blocks of the densely populated areas" while thick smoke blanketed the area and large fires continued to burn for hours and even several days later. One report explained, "What little built-up area can be seen is gutted by fire,"240 while an official narrative from 6 Group bombers who participated in the second wave explains, "Many new fires broke out until, towards the end of the second raid, the whole of the old city was well ablaze, with numerous smaller fires in other sections."241 Furthermore, "When aircraft left the whole main built up area of the city was a mass of flames with smoke rising to 15,000 feet, fires were visible for 100

235 SIO's Briefing Notes. February 14, 1945. DHIST 181.009 (D3313). 236 Ibid. 237 Bomber Command Intelligence Narrative of Operations No 1007. February 13, 1945, 1. DHIST 181.003 (D612.) 238 Ibid. 239 Monthly Summaries of Activities. February 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D2685.) 240 Bomber Command Intelligence Report No. 4589. February 15, 1945, 1. DHIST 181.003 (D611). 241 Bomber Command Narrative for Month of February 1945. February 1945, 8. PRO AIR 72/384.

89 miles on the return journey."242 Later reconnaissance photography revealed that "the old town was virtually wiped out, together with most of the inner suburbs, although the

outer suburbs escaped comparatively lightly."243 It also explained, "Barracks and military industries were less troubled, being mostly situated on the outskirts; and a number of industries escaped for the same reason."244 German police reports echo Allied

intelligence reports: "the Old Town and adjoining districts and the southern suburban

area were almost completely destroyed."245 From the post raid reports and German police signals it appears that no area was left untouched. They also explain that exact figures on destroyed housing cannot be given since the destruction was so widespread and heavy in almost every major district of the city. The Police also had difficulty collecting immediate casualty figures. Police reports did acknowledge that most of the fatalities probably died while trying to leave the city after the first wave. It adds that about 500,000 people were rendered homeless. The casualty rates continue to generate debate amongst historians. Immediately following the attacks, German propaganda claimed the death toll somewhere between 350,000 and 400,000 people; although the document containing that toll has never been found. In his controversial book

Apocalypse 1945: The Destruction of Dresden, David Irving claimed that he discovered the total to be closer to 135,000 dead and he even raised that number to over 200,000 some years later. More recently, historians such as Taylor, argue that the death count

242 Bomber Command Monthly Summary of Activities. "Dresden," February 13/14. February 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D2685.) 243 Bomber Command Report on Night Operations. February, 13/14, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D1518.) 244 Ibid. 245 "Dresden," SRGII, 264 File 84. 246 Ibid. 247 Taylor, 444.

90 was likely between 20,000 and 25,000; however Irving's six-figure number is still regularly cited. Nonetheless, the casualties from the first two February raids against the city were high and by the morning of the fourteenth, the situation in Dresden was utterly chaotic. In one night alone British bombers devastated close to 85% of the built up

249 area.

For the next two days the USAAF pounded the city relentlessly. Around mid-day on the fourteenth, 311 B-17s dropped 487.7 tons of HE and 294.3 tons of IB. This raid proceeded in clear weather; however as a testament to their reliance on H2X, the

US AAF still aimed its bombs at the marshalling yard using blind bombing radar techniques. The following day the US AAF returned with another 211 B-17s. Through

10/10 cover, American bombers dropped 467.1 tons of HE on their primary target and target of opportunity - the city itself. An immediate interpretation report prepared by the Allied Central Interpretation Unit (ACIU), covering up to 1530 hours on the fifteenth, reveals a preliminary list of industrial, and public buildings damaged due to the

February raids against the city. In total eighteen public buildings are listed as damaged; far more than any other target category. 5 From these two raids it is obvious that

US AAF bombing crews depended of H2X in 1945 because they used the device even in clear weather. In comparison, the USAAF's precision bombing policy was so relaxed that American air officials selected an area such as "Dresden" as the primary target and target of opportunity instead of specific military targets within the city.

248 Ibid., 445. 249 Bomber Command Report on Night Operations. February, 13/14, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D1518.) 250 USSAF in Europe Air intelligence Summary No. 67. For week ending February 18, 1945. "Summary of Operations," 26. DHIST 181.003 (D1427.) 251 Supplement to Immediate Interpretation Report NO. K. 3742. February 18, 1945. DHIST (181.003 (D1836.)

91 On paper, the destruction of Dresden is very similar to other attacks on

THUNDERCLAP cities. Attacks on the other THUNDERCLAP cities, however, have not been controversial because tens of thousands of civilians did not die in one single night. What does remain fairly consistent between all the THUNDERCLAP cities is the bombing methods applied by the Allies air forces - in terms of bomb tonnage, sortie rates, aiming points and bombing techniques - and the results produced by their attacks.

Furthermore, the Allied language used to describe many of the attacks is similar in many cases and clearly demonstrates the intended THUNDERCLAP target and purpose. By reviewing the major THUNDERCLAP raids this thesis argues that the popular belief that this operation was a single raid against Dresden, or even Berlin, is false. Instead this thesis will demonstrate that Operation THUNDERCLAP was a joint Anglo-American campaign of terror that focused on intensive bombing to win the war.

92 Chapter 4

Operation THUNDERCLAP: The "associated" cities, February 3,1945 to March 28,1945

We shall bomb Germany by day as well as night in ever increasing measure, casting upon them month by month a heavier discharge of bombs, and making the German people taste and gulp each month a sharper dose of the miseries they have showered

upon mankind.

Winston Churchill, speech, June 22, 1941.

For the crews of the American, British and Canadian bombers, the cities located in eastern Germany presented a new set of challenges and an even newer sense of danger to an already perilous job. In his book, Dresden and the Heavy Bombers, RAF Navigator

Frank Musgrove recounts: Targets in the far eastern region of Germany were always viewed with some apprehension. There was the longer exposure to fighters and flak, the sheer physical strain of flying eight or nine hours instead of five or six to targets in central and western Germany; and above all the greater problems of navigation. The reputation of eastern targets was awesome.

At the beginning of 1945, roughly 4,718,000 people populated the Silesia region. By

February, 1.6 million civilians fled towards eastern German towns such as Dresden,

Chemnitz, Leipzig and the other THUNDERCLAP cities.254 An interesting description of the situation in Germany in February of 1945 is found in a briefing note from an attack against Chemnitz.

German civil administration now struggling with the most desperate situation that has ever confronted the German government officials; a million or more refugees to shelter, feed, clothe; reorganization of war industries now that Silesian area captured by Russians. Military staffs driven from their HQ farther

252 Frank Musgrove, Dresden and the Heavy Bombers: An RAF Navigators Perspective (Barnsley, UK: Pen and Sword Aviation, 2005), 27. 253 Ibid. See Map 1 to see the location of all ten THUNDERCLAP cities in relation to Europe. 254 Irving, 125-126.

93 E. [East] need big centres of communication, centres not only of good roads and railways but of telegraph, telephone and teleprinter lines.255

In addition to the refugees fleeing from the East, many of these previously untouched cities housed hordes of refugees who fled from other bombed out cities in the West and the surrounding area.

By 1945, Bomber Command, although able to bomb more precisely after

OVERLORD, continued to practice area bombing. The USAAF, although well stocked with precision bombers in theory, had not only willingly adopted area-bombing methods but was also relying on them. The pressures of the war forced the USAAF to change its bombing style or literally sit on the runway while Bomber Command carried the war to

Germany. In due course, American visual bombing switched to radar bombing, imprecise formation bombing continued and, finally, USAAF target identification shifted from specific targets to more generally defined targets. By 1945, the Eighth Air

Force devoted the majority of its missions to bombing marshalling yards within German cities. A comparison of USAAF aiming points to damage reports and immediate interpretation reports illustrate that targeting marshalling yards was not precision bombing but rather a euphemism for area bombing. This discredits the declared intent of

USAAF officials to hit specific targets within German cities. As a result, by 1945, the bombing methods and, more importantly, the intent of Bomber Command and the

USAAF were in actuality very similar. Bomber Command focused on aiming at the general centre of cities while the USAAF aimed imprecisely at marshalling yards located within city centres. The Allies, therefore, accepted that damage would be

Briefing Notes, "Chemnitz," February 14/15, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D3313.)

94 widespread and in either case their bombing would result in severe casualties to the civilian population.

Operation THUNDERCLAP opened on February 3, 1945, with a massive USAAF daylight raid against Berlin. This raid, as mentioned, is often identified as the USAAF's main contribution under Operation THUNDERCLAP. Throughout the following chapters and in the various THUNDERCLAP charts, this thesis will demonstrate that the attack on the third was only the first of numerous massive USAAF raids against several

THUNDERCLAP cities (See Appendices IV to XIII). In total, over one thousand

USAAF bombers from the First and Third Air Division left airfields in England for

Berlin accompanied by 613 P-51 escort fighters. During the previous days Combined

Strategic Targets Committee meeting, a member of the committee explained that earlier damage against the city must be taken into account when planning the raid against the capital. "He pointed out," for example, "that it was the Eastern end of the city which was now the most susceptible to incendiary attack, and this part of the city which was more likely to be the scene of military activity rather than the harboring of evacuees." But, from the results and the aiming points, it is evident that American air officials were not wholly concerned with targeting reinforcements in this first THUNDERCLAP attack.

The primary aiming point for the two American bomber divisions was the

Berlin/Tempelhof marshalling yard (Priority 1) located in the southern region of the

Mitte (Central) District. The initial wave of 443 B-17 bombers dropped upwards of

1,061 tons of bombs on the city. Within half an hour of the first wave's raid, 494 B-17s from the Third Air Division arrived over the target. Obscured by clouds and smoke from

256 Minutes from the 16th Meeting of the Combined Strategic Targets Committee. February 2, 1945. PRO AIR 2/8011.

95 the previous raid, the Third Air Division dropped another 1,205.7 tons of bombs over the city. This USAAF raid was one of its largest of the entire war and, after Dresden, is considered one of its most controversial attacks of the air war against Germany. By the end of the first THUNDERCLAP attack the damage reports revealed that "very severe damage is visible in the heart of the city."

The Mitte District of Berlin, which was previously still intact prior to the attack on the third, suffered greatly.258 Post raid photos revealed that the Americans devastated an area of one and a half square miles in the southern area of the Mitte District. The districts neighboring the aiming point, mainly in the East Tiergarten District, Horst

Wessel District, and South Kreuzberg, also suffered damage ranging from moderate to severe.25 It is highly likely that the destruction of these districts occurred during the second wave's obscured attack. Fire damage was also severe within the central area.

Several fires continued to rage five days after the attack. The Allied reports indicate that residential damage was "heavy throughout the area, amounting to almost complete destruction in scores of city blocks." The USAAF hit the city's rail targets, including the Templehof, Anhalter and Potsdamer Station, but not without extensive collateral damage to the residential areas around them; making this American raid an example of the results produced by a typical area bombing attack. The Germans immediately

257 Immediate Interpretation Report No. K 3722. "Berlin." February 10, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D660.) 258 Ibid. Also in USAAF Air Intelligence Summary No. 67. For the Week Ending February 18, 1945, 22. DHIST 181.003 (D99). 259 Immediate Interpretation Report No. K 3722. "Berlin." February 10, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D660.) 260 USAAF Air Intelligence Summary No. 67. For the Week Ending February 18, 1945, 22. DHIST 181.003 (D99). Also found in Immediate Interpretation Report NO. K 3722. "Berlin." February 10, 1945. PRO AIR 181.003 (D660); Bomber Command Intelligence Report NO 4585. February 12, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D906); and Bomber Command Intelligence Report NO 4588. February 14, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D611.)

96 declared this raid a "heavy terror raid" and reports estimated that upwards of 25,000

people died; more recent sources put the figure at a more modest 2,895 people killed,

and thousands of others injured.262 In the end there is little evidence to confirm that the

American bombing substantially halted rail traffic after the raid on the third. Although

the attack was evidently overwhelming and crushing, it is obvious that it failed to

seriously demoralize the Germans to the point of submission since a German surrender

was not offered. The first THUNDERCLAP raid proved to Allied air planners that "an

all out attack" would be insufficient to bring about an end to the war. Instead, Portal's

original concept, that a war ending bombing operation would require a series of

overwhelming raids, was now a reality.

That same day, shadowed by the more documented raid on Berlin, two large waves

of American bombers also attacked Magdeburg (For a full list of THUNDERCLAP

raids on Magdeburg see Appendix XIII.)263 Previously, Allied bombers attacked

Magdeburg thirty times.264 In the Baedeker, Magdeburg receives a great deal of attention but is ranked last on the THUNDERCLAP target list. With its population of 320,000 people, Magdeburg was the largest city in the province of Saxony and its capital. It is

located 80 miles from Berlin and the main part of the town was closely built up on the

261 "Reports of Physical Damage Resulting from Allied Air Attacks on Germany, 1945." "Berlin." DHIST SGRII, 264, File 84. 262 Davis, "OPERATION 'THUNDERCLAP': The US Army Air Forces and the Bombing of Berlin", 106. 263 In what would be the first in a series of destructive raids under THUNDERCLAP, a total of 246 B-24s attacked the marshalling yards in Magdeburg. The American bombers dropped a combined total of 572.5 tons of bombs on the target. Post raid intelligence for this raid was not immediately available. 264The last major attack before THUNDERCLAP operations began occurred during the night of January 16/17, 1945. During this raid 329 Halifaxes, 44 Lancasters and seven Mosquitos of 4, 6 and 8 Groups Bomber Command, leveled 44% of the city. Middlebrook and Everitt, 653. Magdeburg's last raid before THUNDERCLAP began was on the night of February 2/3 by a Mosquito force of 43 bombers.

97 left bank of the River Elbe. Since its earliest history, the city was an important trade

route in Europe due to its location on the Elbe.

The majority of Magdeburg's factories and works were located around the town's perimeter in Neustads and Rothensee in the north and Buckau in the south. In the North, the Polte Armaturen and Maschinenfabrik Works (Priority 1) employed more than ten thousand workers and produced anything from Small Arms Ammunition (SAA) and

shells, to light and heavy caliber and long-range guns. The small factories of Mundles

AG (Priority 3) also manufactured guns in the North industrial sector of the city. Lastly, there was also Priority 1+ Junkers factory in Rothensee. This works employed roughly

fifteen thousand people including many foreign laborers and occupied an area of roughly

190,000 sq. yards.266 The infamous Krupp-Grusonwork (Priority 1+), located in the

southern district of Buckau, shared a spot with Junkers as the top ranked target within

Magdeburg. The works occupied an area of 900,000 sq yards and reportedly employed upwards of thirty-five thousand people. These factories had the tools and buildings to produce armor plating, bow castings for submarines, heavy anchors and chains, and

specialized drilled castings. They also produced armaments such as anti-aircraft guns, gun mountings and heavy naval shells. Lastly, they were the main tank assembly plant for the 23-ton PZ. Mk. IV tank. Two factories of R. Wolf AG (Priority 2) were also located a half-mile apart in the south. The R. Wolf AG works in Buckau fabricated heavy machinery for mining and quarrying while the Salbke works produced naval gear and

Bomber's Baedeker: Guide to the Economic Importance of German Towns and Cities. "Magdeburg," May 1944. Enemy Branch of the Foreign Office and Ministry of Economic Warfare. Volume II, 453. DHIST 181.009 (D989). 266 Ibid., 456.

98 armaments. The Allies believed that collectively the two works employed upwards of eight thousand workers.267

Other noteworthy and important works in Magdeburg included Priority 2 and 3 targets such as the Schaeffer and Budenberg GmbH (Priority 2), which made torpedo components, while Otto Grunson and Co AG (Priority 3) made mine, bomb and shell cases and U-boat components.268 Other listed targets were the Power Station

'Mikramag' (Priority 1) in the Northern industrial area that supplied power to Leipzig, and several gasworks such as Grossgaseri Mitteldeutschland AG (Priority 2), the municipal gasworks (Priority 3) and Gas-und Stromversorgun Magdeburg Studost AG

(Priority (-)).269

Historically, Magdeburg was a transportation hub in the sense that rail lines radiated towards all parts of Germany and Europe.270 Magdeburg had two marshalling yards, one to the south in Buckau (Priority 2) that extended for 2 miles and one in the east in

Rothensee (Priority 3). Both could handle over three thousand wagons a day. There was also a goods station (Priority 3) in the city and a railway repair shop (Priority 3) in the southeastern suburb of Salbke.272 With so many transportation routes leading to all parts of Europe and extensive rail facilities, it is hard to believe that the Allies did not

267 Ibid. 268 Ibid., 456-458. 269 Ibid., 453-455. 270 Branches of the rail junction (Priority 3) lead north to Hamburg and Rostock, east to Berlin and the Baltic ports, southeast to Leipzig and Czechoslovakia, south to Halle, Nurnburg and Munich and west to Hanover and the Ruhr. Ibid., 453. 271 Ibid., 454. 272 Magdeburg also had a fairly substantial inland harbor loaded with numerous facilities (Priority 2.) The two largest docks, die Handelshafena and the Industriehafen were located in the north near the industrial sectors of Neustadt and Rothensee. The various docks were an instrumental part in the movement of the two million waterborne goods arriving and leaving the town each year. Baedeker, "Magdeburg," 453-454. DHIST 181.009 (D989).

99 assign any of Magdeburg's transportation targets a Priority 1 ranking and, more

surprisingly, that the Allies ranked the city last on the THUNDERCLAP list.

By the end of the first day of Operation THUNDERCLAP, the Allies had attacked the top priority city, Berlin, and the last placed city in terms of priority, Magdeburg. In the shadow of these raids, leaders from Great Britain, the United States of America and the Soviet Union met in Yalta to discuss postwar plans and reconstruction. Inevitably, there was some talk about the present war situation. With respect to the strategic bombing of Germany, Allied leaders raised two issues that should be reviewed. The first dealt with the creation of a bomb line in eastern Germany to avoid accidental bombing of the rapidly advancing Russian armies. The second, and most relevant to Operation

THUNDERCLAP, was, "how the western Allies' strategic bomber could best support the Russians and their advance into Germany?"27 Specifically, Russian officials asked the western Allies whether they could "by air action hinder the enemy from carrying out the shifting of his troops to the East from the Western front, from Norway, and from

974

Italy" and, in particular, to "paralyze the junctions of Berlin and Leipzig." There exists a debate over whether or not the Russians specifically requested that Dresden become a target. There is no mention of it in the official transcripts from Yalta, yet, some officers do recall the Russians asking for Dresden to be bombed. As Taylor argues, however, "The question of whether or not the Russians specifically requested a major air raid on Dresden is merely a technical one, especially since the attack had already been ordered in Bottomley's letter to Harris of January 27, 1945."275 In other words, the push to begin THUNDERCLAP style attacks, including the decision to bomb Dresden, had 273 Taylor, 190. 274 Ibid. 275 Ibid, 191.

100 already begun well before the meetings in the Crimea; therefore dismissing the idea that the Russians had a direct influence in the THUNDERCLAP proposal.

Allied bombers returned to bombing THUNDERCLAP targets on the night of

February 5/6. That night Bomber Command deployed sixty-three Mosquito bombers towards Berlin in what would be a common practice under THUNDERCLAP. In terms of total tonnage, the Mosquito bombers dropped significantly less tons than the heavy bombers; however, these frequent, but less damaging, raids were just as demoralizing.

The mere presence of an enemy bomber overhead brought a sense of unidentifiable danger and restlessness to civilians and already bombed out refugees.

Leipzig is the last city to receive widespread recognition as a THUNDERCLAP target in the secondary literature. Located near the confluence of the Pleisse, Parthe, and

Weisse Elster rivers and midway between western and eastern Europe, the city of

720,000 citizens was the largest town in Saxony before the war and fourth on the

THUNDERCLAP list. One briefing note even compared Leipzig to the size of

Toronto.277 The famous Leipzig World Fair drew big crowds from around the world and the city was the headquarters of the German book-publishing industry from the eighteenth century through to World War II. Leipzig also housed two supreme Law

Courts of the Reich. The Bomber's Baedeker describes Leipzig as "highly industrialized, particularly in textiles and engineering."278 The northeastern, southern and western

In Dudley Seward's 'Bomber Harris': The Authorized Biography, a Swiss Military Attache to Berlin describes how he found the frequent visits from Mosquito bombers somewhat more demoralizing as it denied citizens sleep over a period of several night. Dudley Seward, 'Bomber Harris:' The Authorized Biography (London: Cassel Ltd, 1984), 290. 277 SIO Briefing Notes. April 10, 1945. DHIST 181.009 (D3313.) 278 Leipzig is located some 540 miles from London, and only 90 miles southeast of the centre of Berlin, Bomber's Baedeker: Guide to the Economic Importance of German Towns and Cities. "Leipzig," May 1944. Enenmy Branch of the Foreign Office and Ministry of Economic Warfare. Volume II, 428.

101 outskirts of the town housed most of the industries and, according to the Baedeker, could be divided into two groups.

The first group located in the western outskirts of the city contained some of the

"largest wool and cotton spinning mills in Europe and a number of big engineering works."279 These factories, however, receive only a Priority 3 rating:

• Kollmann Werke AG

• Kugellagerfabrik

The second group extended from the main station to the north east and south of the city.

The Hugo Schneider AG (Priority 1) was the most important engineering works located in the second industrial group. These works produced rods, sheets, wire and constructional parts in copper, brass and aluminum. They were also making light arms,

SAA and armament components. During peacetime, the Baedeker notes, that Hugo

Schneider AG made heating, lighting and cooking apparatus'. There also existed a series of aircraft assembly plants in the second group of industries. Erla Maschinerwerk

GmbH was a largely self-contained complex that employed roughly 10,000 workers and was capable of construction and the complete assembly of German Messerschmitt 109 fighters. It had four main plants in Heiterblick (Priority 1), Mockau (Priority 2), and

Aptnaundorf (Priority 3) all in the Northeast suburbs and one in Leipzig (Priority 3).

Allgemeine Transportanlagen GmbH was another important aircraft factory. It too had four plants around the city: the main assembly plant in Mochau (Priority 2), a factory in the Southwest suburb of Grosszschocher (Priority 2), a plant in the north in Eutritz

IU1U, Ibid., 433.

102 (Priority 2) and another to the west in Leutzsch (Priority 3). Lastly, there were several

Priority 2 and 3 motor works located in the Eastern suburbs.

Another Priority 1 target was the AG Sachsische Werke power station located in the

Western area of Bohler. This power station supplied current to several other cities in

eastern Germany including Chemnitz and Dresden. The Espenhain-Molbis power

station, also a Priority 1 target, also sent power to various German cities in the East such

as Dresden and Chemnitz.282

The Baedeker describes Leipzig as the home to the largest railway station in Europe

since "railway lines radiate from the city in all directions, and there are extensive marshalling yards which form an important base for the traffic to the eastern Front."

In the middle of the town there existed a main railway centre, dubbed by the Baedeker as the "largest building of its kind in Europe" and as "an important centre serving many parts of Germany and the Continent." It only receives a Priority 2 ranking.

In particular the rail lines from Leipzig led towards Berlin, Breslau, Dresden,

Frankfurt, Halle and parts of Southern Germany. The marshalling yards (Priority 3) in the eastern suburb of Paunsdorf could handle up to 3,500 wagons per twenty-four-hours while those in the northwestern suburb of Wahren (Priority 3) could handle upwards of

4,500 per twenty-four-hours. Lastly, there were repair shops located 10 miles to the

North in the Leipzig suburb of Delitzsch (Priority 3).

It appears from a squadron report dated February 5/6 that Bomber Command planned a large night attack against Leipzig, yet there is no official reference that the

281 Ibid., 432. 282 Ibid. 283 Ibid., 428. 284 Baedeker, "Leipzig," 428. DHIST 181.009 (D989). 285 Ibid., 428-429.

103 raid actually occurred. Nonetheless, the pre-raid report offers not only important information into the situation within Leipzig but also the Allied intent of the bombing raid. For example, it is clear that Allied officials understood that Leipzig's population had increased significantly by February 1945. The review explains, "In view of the existing internal situation in Germany its present population is no doubt considerably increased."286 It adds, "In the present German crisis these rail lines are no doubt also taxed to the limit in handling the great flow of refugees streaming out of Berlin." The mention of "Berlin" was most likely in reference to the USAAF THUNDERCLAP raid on Berlin from February 3 (For a complete list of executed THUNDERCLAP raids on

Leipzig see Appendix VII). The plan for this night raid was for Bomber Command to send a force of 720 Halifaxes from 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 Groups along with Pathfinder bombers towards Leipzig. The aiming point was "in the centre of a fully built up area and south of the main railway station and marshalling yard;"288 however, its purpose was

"to destroy the built-up area and associated industries and to create maximum administrative disorganization in the area. In this way we can make a very definite contribution to the war on the Eastern front."289 The note ends by explaining:

Leipzig has not been visited by Bomber Command for a year. A number of attacks have been made by the Americans mostly on objectives outside the town and not in strength. 80% of the town remains standing. As the centre of the web of railways radiating to the four corners of Germany, it is an extremely important communication centre.

Accent at the moment is on those lines between LEIPZIG and BERLIN and Leipzig and the Eastern Front.

286 Briefing Note "Leipzig." February 5/6, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D3267). 287 Ibid. 288 Ibid.

104 An attack which paralyzed the flow of military equipment and troops to the East would add considerably to the congestion and dislocation following the daylight attack by the Americans on BERLIN, which caused a considerable volume of traffic from the routes through the capital to be diverted to the LEIPZIG network.

The town has shared with BERLIN the task of sheltering the flow of refugees driven WEST by the Russian advance. The destruction of the town by increasing the administrative chaos at present behind the front would materially assist the Russian armies in their drive into Germany.290

Although, Bomber Command shelved this attack for unexplained reasons, it is obvious from this description that the Allies planned this raid with the THUNDERCLAP intentions in mind.

February 6 was a busy day for USAAF bombers over eastern Germany. That afternoon all three bombing divisions of the Eighth Air Force bombed Chemnitz and

Magdeburg in a continuation of Operation THUNDERCLAP. Before 1945, Chemnitz, like most of the THUNDERCLAP cities, managed to evade any major attack from

Allied bombers because of its long distance from Allied air bases in Great Britain. In fact it had only been previously attacked on September 1944 by 175 USAAF bombers.

Before the winter of 1945, Allied bombers were required to stretch their round trip capabilities in order to bomb Chemnitz. Although its estimated population was 370,000, some of the million or so refugees from the East and even government officials from

Berlin loaded the streets of Chemnitz, much like in Dresden, Leipzig and other eastern

German cities, bringing its total to well over four hundred thousand.291 The Bomber's

Baedeker describes Chemnitz as "third amongst the cities of Saxony and the centre of

290 Ibid. 291 Bomber's Baedeker: Guide to the Economic Importance of German Towns and Cities. "Chemnitz," May 1944. Enenmy Branch of the Foreign Office and Ministry of Economic Warfare. Volume I, 118.

105 Germany's hosiery and underwear manufacturer;"292 yet none of the textile industries mentioned in the Baedeker received a priority ranking.293 A briefing note for Chemnitz offers an interesting metaphor to describe the city centre and thus, the aiming point for

Allied bombers: "In plan Chemnitz suggests an octopus. The body is the compact densely built-up town; large tenements crowded with factory workers. From this, sprawling tentacles reach out in all directions along the valleys, factories and workers dwellings intermingle."294

The Baedeker description goes on to illustrate Chemnitz's light engineering and industrial works, several important makers of machine tools and its large output of motor sidecars and bicycles. The Allies believed that Chemnitz's economy was the primary producer of metal for army transports, small arms, precision tools, lifts and hoists etc.295 Of the close to forty engineering and armaments shops mentioned in the

Baedeker, only one plant received a Priority 1 ranking: the Reinecker plant located in the eastern built-up sector of Gablenz. According to the Baedeker, Reinecker was one of the "most important of all German machine-tool makers"296 since it manufactured milling and gear cutting machines, lathes and various precision machine tools and measuring instruments and employed roughly three thousand employees in 1938.

Most of the thirty-nine Engineering and Armaments targets described in the Baedeker

292 Ibid. Also found in Briefing Notes from February 14, 1945. DHIST 181.002 (D3271). 293 Before the war, over 40% of its workforce worked in the textile industry while only 13.5% worked in the manufacturing of machines and tools. Taylor, 337. 294 Briefing Notes "Chemnitz." March 5/6, 1945. DHIST 181.009 (D3312). 295 Briefing Notes from February 14, 1945. DHIST 181.002 (D3271). In reality, Chemnitz was a major tank production centre for the German military, but the Allies did not fully understand that until after the war. 296 Baedeker, "Chemnitz," 119. DHIST 181.009 (D989). 297 Ibid.

106 receive only a Priority 3 ranking or are not ranked at all. In fact there are only four

298

Priority 2 exceptions.

Incidentally, the Baedeker mentions that Chemnitz was not a major through route for

German transportation. The city was, however, an important centre for the railway system of industrialized Saxony as it was home to one of the largest railway repair shops in Germany. In Chemnitz there were four large rail yards running north and south, located in Kappel, Sonnenberg, Altendorf and Chemnitz-Sud which only receive a

Priority 3 ranking in the Baedeker. The railway repair shop in Hilbersdorf (Priority 2) employed roughly six thousand people and included a marshalling yard with a pre-war capacity of 3,500 wagons per twenty-four-hours.

Under 10/10 cloud cover the Eighth Air Force attacked Chemnitz's marshalling yards on February 6 (For a complete list of THUNDERCLAP attacks against Chemnitz see Appendix VI.) This attack was only a part of a series of raids by the three divisions of the Eighth USAAF on the sixth. Between the hours of 1115 and 1133, using H2X radar, the First Division deployed 535 B-17 bombers, of which 437 B-17s dropped 824.5 tons of bombs. The Third Division deployed another 414 B-17s of which only thirty- seven bombers dropped 92.3 tons.300 Intelligence reports indicate that enemy fighters

298 First, there was the Wanderer Werke in the Schonau district. These works were amongst the leading German makers of typewriters, adding and calculation machines and other office goods. By 1944, the Allies believed that Wanderer Werke engaged in the manufacturing of small arms, armaments components and a variety of other engineering products of military importance. Second, in the Siegmar district of Chemnitz, there was the Auto Union which was an important car manufacturing plant of the Wanderer Werke. Third, the Schubert & Salzer factory was an important maker of textile machinery including dyeing and printing machines. In 1939, they employed some three thousand workers and by 1944 were fully engaged in the manufacturing of small arms and several light engineering products. Finally, Sachsische Textilmaschinenfabrik Richard Hartmann AG made spinning products during the pre-war years but was by 1939 completely converted into the production of machine tools. Ibid., 121. 299 Ibid., 118. 300 USAAF in Europe Air Intelligence Summary No. 66. For the Week Ending February 11, 1945. Summary of Operations; and Freeman's, The Mighty Eighth War Diary, 434.

107 were minimal and that flak fire was light and inaccurate. German police reports reveal that severe destruction occurred to the residential areas of the town centre, northeast sector and Hilsberdorf region. In total this American raid killed fifty people, injured 120, while forty-eight houses were completely destroyed with 380 damaged to various degrees. Some industries and railway tracks, including the Dresden-Zwickau line were also severely damaged.302 The Allies destroyed many coaches at the Hilsberdorf goods station and brought to ruins a rail repair shop in Ebersdorf. Allied intelligence also reported that their bombers heavily damaged the marshalling yards.

That same night, 418 B-24s from the Second Air Division successfully attacked

Magdeburg for the second time under THUNDERCLAP. The American bombers dropped a total of 727.2 tons of bombs on the city. After this attack, Allied intelligence revealed the cumulative damage from the last two raids against Magdeburg. According to an American Intelligence Summary:

A greater part of the old city was ravaged by fire, with the greatest devastation being in the old fortification and extending northwards from the cathedral towards Neustadt. In the target area, almost all important administrative and public buildings, including the Rathus, municipal theater and hospital, the Kaiser Friedrich and the Natural History Museums were destroyed, and the large Ravensburg barracks were gutted. Smaller areas of severe industrial damage was seen in the western suburbs of Wilhelmstadt and Neustadt.304

This description demonstrates that these raids were not precise but rather a genuine area raid much like the ones produced by Bomber Command. By the time Allied officials finalized the THUNDERCLAP list of targets on February 7, Bomber

Command and the USAAF had already completed nine attacks against three cities.

USAAF in Europe Air Intelligence Summary No. 66. For the Week Ending February 11, 1945,4. 302 "Reports of Physical Damage Resulting from Allied Air Attacks on Germany, 1945." "Chemnitz," SGII 264 File 84, 11-12 303 SIO's Briefing Notes, February 14/15, 1945. DHIST 191.009 (D3313). 304 USAAF Air Intelligence Summary No. 67. For the Week Ending February 18, 1945, 22. DHIST181.003(D99)

108 With six Russian armies crossing the Oder River the following day,

THUNDERCLAP attacks became increasingly important. Refugees who had once

found shelter on the opposite bank of the Oder were once again forced westward towards relatively undamaged cities such as Dresden or strongholds such as Berlin.

While the Russians continued their drive across the Oder, American bombers

achieved more THUNDERCLAP raids against Erfurt and Magdeburg on the ninth.305 During the attack on Erfurt, twelve B-17s dropped 32.5 tons of bombs on the city.306 Although not a major raid by any standards, the aiming point was not a

specific target within Erfurt but rather the city itself; making it the first USAAF

THUNDERCLAP raid which officially identified only a general area as its aiming point on paper (For a complete list of THUNDERCLAP raids against Erfurt and their specific details see Appendix XII.)

Erfurt was a smaller THUNDERCLAP city on the railway line between Berlin and

Frankfurt and 485 miles from London. Being situated more westerly than the other

THUNDERCLAP cities, Erfurt dealt with an abundance of refugees fleeing the Easterly moving American ground forces as well as the Russian army closing in from the East.

According to the Baedeker, the city of 148,000 was "chiefly noted for its boot and shoe industry but there are a number of well known engineering plants specializing in the

During the afternoon of the ninth, Liberators from the Second Air Division attacked the marshalling yards in Magdeburg for a third time under THUNDERCLAP. In total, 268 of 313 dispatched B-24s blanketed the city with another 597.3 tons of bombs; yet another instance where American bombers targeted a marshalling yard using H2X radar technology. 306 In the end, severe damage occurred to approximately twenty business/residential units and several industrial buildings. Immediate Interpretation Report No. K. 3761 has further reconnaissance information. DHIST 181.003 (D2854).

109 manufacture of small arms." From the general description of Erfurt there is no indication that this city was a major node in the German railway line. The marshalling yard (Priority 3), located in the East end of town, is the only rail related infrastructure mentioned in the Baedeker.308

With respect to industry, the Allies believed that the 850 workers of Erma Erfurter

Maschinen and Verkzeugfabrik B.Geipel GmbH. (Priority 3) "engaged in the manufacture of rifles, pistols, machine guns and their components."309 Other armament factories found in the Baedeker under Erfurt include the "Gauda" Werkzeug and

Maschinenfabrik (Priority 3), which manufactured automatic pistols and machine guns and employed some sixteen hundred workers. JA Jahn AG (Priority 3) previously specialized in making cooling, heating and cleaning installations. By 1944, however, the

Allies understood that this company engaged in the manufacturing of small arms components and employed some one thousand workers. Lastly, the factories of Olympia

AG (Priority 2) once made typewriters but, by 1944, they were manufacturing small arms and small arms ammunition.

Between February 9 and February 13, there was a break in Operation

THUNDERCLAP bombing. With the beginning of the week dated February 12-18, however, raids in support of Operation THUNDERCLAP dramatically peaked in terms of intensity and frequency. During this week twelve raids targeted five separate cities including the infamous Dresden raids on the thirteenth and fourteenth. Dresden, however, was not the only city visited by Allied bombers during those days. With much

307 Bomber's Baedeker: Guide to the Economic Importance of German Towns and Cities. "Erfurt," May 1944. Enemy Branch of the Foreign Office and Ministry of Economic Warfare. Volume I, 202. DHIST 181.009 (D989). 308 In 1939, the Priority 3 M/Y had a capacity of 2,600 wagons per 24 hours. Ibid. 309 Ibid. 310 Ibid.

110 of Magdeburg's old city devastated and its historical buildings already "ravaged" by fires from the USAAF bombing on the sixth, Allied bombers returned for the first in a series of consecutive days of bombing raids against the city.311

By comparing the statistics found in Dresden's and Magdeburg's charts (Appendix

V and XIII respectively), it is obvious that the Second Air Division dropped more tonnage on Magdeburg during the fourteenth, than the First Air Division did during its

Dresden raid of the same day. Facing little resistance from German fighters, and using

H2X, USAAF bombers dropped 811.1 tons of bombs, 215 of them incendiary devices, on the city through 5- 10/10 cloud cover. In comparison, USAAF bombers dropped a total of 782 tons during their February 15 raid on Dresden. The Second Air Division aimed its bombs at Magdeburg's marshalling yard; however, photographs from February

21 demonstrate that there were numerous incidents of damage to residential and business sectors around the city; making this, in effect, an area raid. Even American intelligence added that this attack inflicted "widely scattered industrial damage" and that large craters could be seen in the previously devastated city areas and in open land to the south.313 By the twenty-first, there were widely scattered points of new damage

311 According to the USAAF Intelligence Summary No. 67. For the Week Ending February 18, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D99) the devastation from previous raids "extended northwards from the cathedral towards Neustadt. In the target area, almost all important administrative and public buildings, including the Rathaus (city hall,) municipal theater and hospital, the Kaiser Friedrich and Natural History Museum were destroyed." Between 2130 and 2141 hours on the night of the thirteenth, Bomber Command's 8 Group attacked with sixty-one Mosquitos. Only 3.5 hours later, between 0056 and 0112 hours, another nine Mosquitos returned. Through 10/10 cloud cover, the two raiding parties dropped a total of 85.9 tons of bombs. The largest of the three consecutive raids occurred on the fourteenth, between the hours of 1224 and 1245. During the daytime raid, the Second Air Division dispatched 340 B-24s, with full escort, towards the city. 312 Bomber Command Intelligence Report No 4607. "Raid Assessment Summary for 24 of February, 1945." February 25, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D611). 313 Air Intelligence Summary No. 69. For week Ending March 4, 1945, 21. DHIST 181.003 (D1427.) Much of the industrial damage was limited to the Buckau area where the Krupp-Grusonwork works received damage to a large unidentified building, its machine shops and labor huts. Two large buildings of the railway workshops received heavy damage and the water works in the eastern areas of Buckau were

111 throughout Magdeburg. British intelligence reported, "From Rothensee to the North through Buckau district to the South there are scattered incidents of damage to business, residential and small industrial premises with some damage to roads and rail lines."

The two main marshalling yards at Buckau and Rothensee received little damage and remained at 5% and 1% unserviceable respectively, while the Main Station sustained more damage and remained 40% unserviceable.315

Two other major raids of this week occurred back to back during the afternoon of

February 14 and the night of February 14/15. Almost simultaneous to the Second Air

Division attack on Magdeburg, 294 escorted B-17s from the Third Air Division performed one of its heaviest February raids against the marshalling yards at Chemnitz between 1224 and 1247 hours. 10/10 cloud cover once again denied visual identification of the target; however, using H2X radar the American bombers dropped

501 tons of HE and 217.5 tons of IB. According to German reports, bombing

•3 1 O concentration occurred in the outlying districts in the southern part of the town.

Like the original Dresden plan for the night of February 14/15, Bomber Command followed up the Eighth Air Force day attack against Chemnitz with its own heavy raid under the moonlit sky. That night 499 Lancasters and 218 Halifaxes of No 1, 3, 4, 6 and damaged. Bomber Command Intelligence Report No. 4607. "Raid Assessment Summary for 24 of February, 1945." February 25, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D611.) 314 Bomber Command Intelligence Report No 4607. "Raid Assessment Summary for 24 of February, 1945." February 25, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D611). 315 Immediate Interpretation Report. No. K. 5805. February 25, 1945. 316 Davis notes in his biography of Spaatz, that on the target list, beside Dresden and Chemnitz, a small note by the planners read "Beat'em up." Davis, Carl A. Spaatz and the Air War in Europe, 556. 317 Eighth USAAF Intops Summary No. 290. February 14, 1945. PRO AIR 40/1092. 318 In the districts of Adelsberg, Zschopauerstrasse, Alt Chemnitz and Bernsdorf, the bombers destroyed fifteen houses, severely damaged twenty-nine, medium damaged twenty-one and slightly damaged 160. In total, this American raid killed 34 people, injured 43 and buried 59. They also damaged numerous industries including the Faradit Works, the Auto Union, Witt Spinning Mill, the Schubert and Salzer Engineering Works, however, there is no indication that the bombers damaged any transportation targets. SGII 264 File 84, "Chemnitz," 11-12.

112 8 Groups continued bombing the built up areas and marshalling yards of Chemnitz with the intent of "paralyzing the German rear behind Dresden."319 Briefing notes from 6

Group pins the "importance" of the nighttime raid on the fact that the textile machinery in Chemnitz was "virtually worth its weight in gold" since civilian and military clothing was desperately needed during this period of the war. This was the first

THUNDERCLAP attack against Chemnitz by Bomber Command. By February, the

Soviets were a mere 100 miles to the east of Chemnitz and the Western Allies believed that an attack on this city would not only help "good old Stalin and his Marshal Zhukov" but "combined with last night's two efforts, Chemnitz and Rositz tonight should do much to hasten the end of the whole Berlin, Leipzig, Merseberg area."321 The raid occurred in two phases, three hours apart and under difficult bombing conditions of 4/10 to 10/10 cloud cover.322 The "centre of the city" was the aiming point for the two waves.323 A very elaborate diversion plan succeeded in keeping bomber casualties down but, in the end, it was not necessary as flak defence was minimal and fighter opposition

"negligible."

Both bombing parties found the target area covered by thick cloud cover and could only employ NEWHAVEN. There were even several instances where crews bombed

319 Briefing notes. February 14, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D3271) 320 Briefing Notes. "Chemnitz," February 13/14, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D3313.) 321 Squadron 427 and 429 briefing notes. February 14/15, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D3267). 322 Bomber Command Narrative of Operations No 1008. Feb 15, 1945. DHIST 181.002 (D612.) The first phase, which occurred somewhere between 2101 and 2118, saw 56 Halifaxes and 50 Lancasters from the Canadian 6 Group, 132 Halifaxes from 4 Group and 57 Lancasters from 8 Group Pathfinders head towards the city with only six planes being lost. The second wave occurred three hours later and saw 189 Lancasters of 1 Group, 133 Lancasters of 3 Group and 29 Lancasters of 8 Group head towards Chemnitz with only five aircraft being lost. 323 SIO's Briefing Notes. February 14/15, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D3313); and "Briefing Notes," February 14, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D3271.)

113 using the glow of the fires on the ground as markers. In the end, the British bombers dropped 788.8 tons of HE and 1,319.8 tons of IB. In fact, Bomber Command used more incendiary bombs in these raids than during the two waves against Dresden the previous night. During the attacks, a carpet of incendiary bombs and orange fires raged in six separate areas of the city while pilots reported the southern area of the city as "well ablaze."325 According to German sources this attack was a "heavy terror raid" with bombing concentrated on the central, southern and southwestern section of the town.

Post-raid reconnaissance revealed mixed results. Some reports indicate that built-up parts of the city to the southeast and west were hit but damage was mainly scattered across the city. Interpretation Report No.K 3767 lists a series of industries damaged by

Bomber Command. Specifically the report mentioned that the marshalling yard facilities were "virtually undamaged" and through rail lines were fully serviceable.327 Other

Bomber Command reports confirmed that "no area was devastated" and the rail facilities were unaffected. In general, the plan for Chemnitz and Dresden for the night of the

14/15 was very similar. In the end, the Allies leveled Dresden, while the citizens of

Chemnitz avoided the complete destruction of their city. The combined Anglo-American attack on Chemnitz was not as destructive as the Dresden raid because many of Bomber

Commands target indicators fell off target resulting in its bombs falling in "open fields

324 Analysis of Results for 6 Group. Chemnitz night February 14/15. DHIST 74/250. 325 Ibid. 326 The bombing raids destroyed 69 houses, severely damaged 103, medium damaged sixty and slightly damaged 1197 while fueling fifteen major, fifty-two medium and 108 smaller fires. It also produced casualties ranging from 115 dead, 360 injured, 300 missing and 1,600 homeless. SGII 264 File 84, "Chemnitz," 13. 327 Immediate Interpretation Report No. K 3767. February 18, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D3703.) An American intelligence summary for the week ending February 25 explains, "Apart from minor damage to a building in the railway workshops the rail facilities were undamaged." USAAF in Europe Air Intelligence Summary No. 68. For the Week Ending February 25, 1945, 15. 328 Bomber Command Report on Night Operations February 14/15, 1945, 2. DHIST 181.003 (D1518); See also "rail facilities undamaged" in Briefing Notes, "Chemnitz," March 5/6, 1945, 19. March, 1945. DHIST 181.009 (D3313.)

114 and in scarcely built up areas to the Southeast and West of the town." One narrative from 6 Group explains: "The Master Bomber, at least in the early part of the attack, was having a night off but his work improved as the raid progressed..."

By February 19, some of Bomber Command's and the USAAF's largest raids of the war were complete. Allied bombers had largely devastated cities such as Chemnitz and

Madgeburg with tonnages comparable to those dropped on Dresden during the February raids. From the large USAAF raid on the third to the devastating attacks throughout early-mid February and culminating with the Dresden attacks on the 13, 14 and 15,

Operation THUNDERCLAP failed in completely destroying the morale of German citizens to the point of submission. Furthermore, there is little evidence to prove that the

Allies seriously delayed German reinforcements to the East by February 15; a date they predicted when the Germans would have the majority of their reinforcements from the

West in the Eastern Front. Operation THUNDERCLAP, however, was not abandoned but rather intensified towards the end of February and throughout March.

Bomber Command and the USAAF performed numerous raids against many

THUNDERCLAP targets from mid February until the twenty-sixth. From examining the charts in Appendices IV to XIII, it is obvious that an attack by American bombers against the marshalling yard in Plauen on February 23 was the largest raid during this period. During the day the First Air Division deployed 460 B-17s against a variety of targets throughout Germany. Of the 460 bombers deployed, 110 successfully released

325 tons of bombs over Plauen using H2X. Once again, an intelligence memo defines

329 Bomber Command Report on Night Operations February 14/15, 1945, 2. DHIST 181.003 (D1518.) Within the pages of Bomber Command's Monthly Summary of Activities for February 1945, the Chemnitz raid received an assessment of "poor", while the Dresden raid received an "excellent" assessment. 330 6 Group Narrative for February 1945, 6. February 1945. PRO AIR 72/384.

115 the aiming point for this attack as the city proper. In 1945 Plauen was a small provincial city with a population of 113,000, located in the southwestern corner of

Saxony on the Weisse Elster River. A seventeenth-century castle and a Gothic church were two of the architectural features of Plauen. The Baedeker describes Plauen's main industry as shirt making, knitted wear and lace but as the home to several other engineering works and other industries such as printing works, piano and furniture factories and makers of leather goods.

In general, little over a page is reserved for Plauen within the pages of the Baedeker.

There are, for example, only four industrial targets listed:

• the Gasworks (Priority 3) located in central Plauen, • Plauener Baumwollspinnerei AG (Priority 3), • the Zellwolle AG textile plant (Priority 3) and,

• Vomag Maschinenfabrik AG (Priority 2).333

The Baedeker description also explains that Plauen was an important railway link on the routes from North to South because of its main junction (Priority 3.) This junction linked the line from Dresden to Leipzig and two branches towards Hof to the south and Eger in northern Hungary. The description mentions a main railway junction in the northern part of Plauen at the main railway station, while a more minor branch line followed through

331 The Allies defined previous attacks against Plauen into three categories; Tank and Cellulose factories; Marshalling Yards and Town. Intelligence memo up to 1745 B hours on April 16, 1945. "Plauen." June 3, 1945. DHIST 181.009 (D1852). 332 Bomber's Baedeker: Guide to the Economic Importance of German Towns and Cities. "Plauen," May 1944. Enemy Branch of the Foreign Office and Ministry of Economic Warfare. Volume II, 552. DHIST 181.009 (D989). 333 The Vomag Maschinenfabrik AG was the city's highest prioritized target. It was located in the Southwest district of Cranachstr on the River Elster. Before the war, Vomag previously made printing, textile and lace making machinery, but as the prospect of war loomed they began making their own heavy transport machines. By 1944, the Allies believed they were making Diesel engines, tanks and tank engines, and other various types of military transportation such as semi-tracked troop carriers. In total Allied intelligence believed Vomag employed some eighth thousand workers. Baedeker, "Plauen," 552- 553. DHIST 181.009 (D989).

116 the eastern outskirts of town to join the main line four miles to the South. None of these routes, however, receive any further ranking or mention under the heading

"Transportation Targets." From the aiming point of February 23, it appears the USAAF considered none of these targets.

Three days later, three massive waves of American bombers attacked Berlin between the hours of 1155 and 1300. Bombing officials instructed both the first wave of 363 B-

17s and the second wave of 418 B-l7s to drop their bombs on the primary aiming points listed as Berlin/Schlesischer Railway Station (Priority 1) and Berlin/Alexanderplatz

Railway Station (Priority 3) respectively. In other words the Americans targeted both the city and the Rail Stations. In the Baedeker, the Schlesischer and Alexanderplatz Railway

Stations were each described as passenger stations. Meanwhile, USAAF officials instructed the third wave, consisting of 285 B-24s from the Second Air Division, to drop their bombs on the North Railway Station. It would appear that the goal of these raids was to cause chaos in the city mainly because of the nature of the targets chosen. During the Monday lunch hour civilians would have occupied both the city centre as well as the passenger stations. All three divisions bombed through thick 10/10 cloud cover using

H2X. In total, a devastating 2,796.5 tons of American bombs scattered the city. In what

German Police reports later described as a "heavy terror raid on the whole city area," initial intelligence reported over 470 deaths, 913 injuries, 600 buried and some 102,000 people homeless. It added that "numerous major fires and heavy damage to house property occurred and a large number of public buildings were hit."335 Without being specific, the report also acknowledged that "considerable disruption occurred in both

334 Ibid., 552. 335 SGII 264 File 84, "Berlin," 2.

117 long distance, local and municipal transport" while "a large number of stations and railway installations were hit."

Another indication this USAAF raid was an area attack in practice, is that American photo-reconnaissance reveals "scattered damage extending from Prenzlauerberg and

Weissensee in the North through Neukolln and Lichtenberg in the south and east."

According to Allied Interpretation Report No. K. 4021 for the Schoneweide marshalling yard, "Although no fresh damage or craters are seen in the marshalling yard, scattered damage and craters are visible in the industrial area adjacent to the north, the factory airfield to the south, and the lightly built up residential area on the east."338 By the end of the twenty-sixth, more relentless waves of American bombers devastated Berlin's city centre. As the month wound down, the USAAF had 5,543 heavy bombers available in the ETO, up from 5,334 in January.339 Combined with a decrease in losses from January,

USAAF bombers participated in Operation THUNDERCLAP with more strength and freedom.340

On February 27, the Americans continued their THUNDERCLAP contribution with larger raids against Leipzig and Halle. This was the first Allied THUNDERCLAP raid executed against Leipzig; however, unlike many of the THUNDERCLAP targets, previous Allied raids had already severely damaged the city. Between August 1942 and the end of the bomber war, the Allies attacked Leipzig twenty-four times. Previous raids did not grant Leipzig protection from the THUNDERCLAP plan. Early in the afternoon,

336 SGII 264 File 84, "Berlin," 2. 337 USAAF Air Intelligence Summary No. 73. For the Week Ending April 1, 1945, 21. DHIST 181.003 (D1427.) 338 Immediate Interpretation Report NO. K. 4021. March 18, 1945. 339 Davis, Spaatz and the Air War in Europe. Appendix 8 340 USAAF losses dropped from 365 in January to 222 throughout February. Davis, Spaatz and the Air War in Europe. Appendix 11.

118 a large force of 717 Fortresses from the US First and Third Air Division dropped 1,459.3 tons of HE, 461.6 tons of IB and 11.8 tons of Frag341 bombs on the communication centre of the city using H2X radar. This amount clearly dwarfed the total tonnage and sorties for the USAAF February 14 or 15 raids on Dresden. There is little doubt that refugees fleeing from the previous day's devastating three wave attack against Berlin crowded the main routes and rail line from the German capital to Leipzig. Photographs in mid-March revealed that the USSAF raid achieved "good results." Not only was there significant damage to the railways' facilities but the factories and residential areas in the southwest also suffered severely.342

That same day the USAAF targeted Halle.343 According to the Baedeker, Halle was a

"compact and densely populated town."344 A large percentage of the 210,000 people worked in the outlying districts. In the north and south there existed large brown-coal deposits where several firms exploited those resources. The town's most important

341 Smaller American bombers generally dropped frag bombs but the B-17s and B-24s occasionally used them as well. These bombs had a proximity fuse that would be set to go off at approximately 50 feet off the ground. They would shred the ground below and anything or anyone around that area. They were especially useful in demoralizing troops on the battlefield. Ross, 106. 342 Bomber Command Intelligence Report No 4642. Raid Assessment Summary March 18, 1945. March 19, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D8106). Other photos revealed varying degrees of damage to the workshops and other buildings at the Mitteldoutaco Motorwerke (Priority 2) aircraft engine works in the northeastern suburb of Seegeritz. Bomber Command Intelligence Report No 4642. Raid Assessment Summary March 21, 1945. March 22, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D906). German sources indicate that damage was mainly located in the South and in the town centre. The raids destroyed 209 houses, severely damaged 177 and caused medium damage to another 214. The raid also fueled 140 major and 459 medium and smaller fires in the city. Casualties ranged from 137 dead to 186 injured while 161 remained buried. SGII264 File 84, "Leipzig,"46. 343 Bomber's Baedeker: Guide to the Economic Importance of German Towns and Cities. "Halle," May 1944. Enenmy Branch of the Foreign Office and Ministry of Economic Warfare. Volume I, 299. DHIST 181.009 (D989). During the raid on February 27, 314 out of 351 B-24s deployed from the Second Air Division successfully dropped 723.8 tons of bombs on the city using H2X. This heavy raid was aimed at the marshalling yard. American intelligence reveals that damage "affected chiefly the industries located south of the city proper, although there was damage also to the main marshalling yards." Reconnaissance pictures also identified that several groups of bombs fell along the Saale River and as a result the USAAF destroyed two unidentified factories. Air Intelligence Summary No. 70 For the Week Ending March 11, 1945, 22. DHIST 181.003 (D1427). 344 Bomber's Baedeker: Guide to the Economic Importance of German Towns and Cities. "Halle," May 1944. Enenmy Branch of the Foreign Office and Ministry of Economic Warfare. Volume I, 299. DHIST 181.009 (D989).

119 industry was perhaps the Siebel Flugzeugwerk aircraft plant (Priority 1), located at an airfield in the northern district of town. This company made its own two-engine plane before the war, but, by 1944, played a role in the assembly of the German bomber

Junker Ju 88. Specifically this factory was responsible for fabricating wings and control components. 5 The remainder of the industrial targets mentioned are Priority 3 plants or firms dealing with the production of pumps and pipes:

• Weisse Sohne • Weisse & Monski • Rohrenwerke AG • Lange & Geilen • F. Pampe • Wegelin & Hubner AG • Hallesche Maschinenfabrik

The Baedeker also described Halle as a railway centre of "great importance."346 Its location between Berlin and Frankfurt and its close proximity to Leipzig helped to justify this town as the "focal point of the railway system of industrial Saxony."347 The railway junction (Priority 1) of the main Berlin-Frankfurt line approached from the East and joined important branches from Magdeburg and Torgau. Further branches connected from Halberstadt and Aschersleben. The track then led north to south along the Western edge of town and then lines branched away towards Leipzig and to Eisleben. There were also notable marshalling yards (Priority 2) in the north and railway repairs shops

(Priority 2) to the south of the city.348

During February, 10,667 Allied sorties dropped a total of 19,931.2 tons of bombs on nine THUNDERCLAP cities in forty-eight separate raids. February marked a defining

345 Ibid., 301. 346 Ibid., 299. 347 Ibid. 348 Baedeker, "Halle," 299. DHIST 181.009 (D989).

120 change in USAAF policy from intended "precision" bombing to unrestrained area

bombing. From the twenty USAAF raids the Americans directed seventeen against

marshalling yards and three against the city itself. Furthermore, USAAF bombers used

H2X during nineteen of the twenty attacks. These USAAF raids are important indicators

that general targeting methods took precedence over precision based targeting within

city centres. During the opening seven days of March, the USAAF took a major role in the bombing of several THUNDERCLAP targets including the already devastated city

of Dresden.

As noted in Appendix V, the USAAF returned to Dresden on March 2 with a

substantial wave of bombers to continue THUNDERCLAP bombing.349 Once again poor visibility ranging from 8-10/10 cloud cover plagued the attack aimed at Dresden's city

area. German police reports indicate that severe damage scattered across the Neustadt,

Altstadt and Niedersebnitz districts.350 American intelligence reports specify that

"extensive destruction is visible throughout the city and its suburbs, with the shipyard heavily damaged and two aircraft factories nearly destroyed. Severe damage, too, was

seen in the marshalling yards where shops and roundhouses suffered."351 According to

Immediate Intelligence Report No. K. 4020, covering all USAAF and Bomber

Command raids up to March 16:

It is now apparent that the whole central, south, and eastern sections of Dresden have been extensively gutted. Damage reaches devastating proportions in the city centre and in the districts of Johannstadt, Neustadt, and Plauen. Outside this area there is severe damage extending to the northern, eastern and southern

349 During the Dresden raid 406 Flying Fortresses of the Third Division dropped 940.2 tons of HE and 140.5 tons of IB on the city. 350 SGII264 File 84, "Dresden," 21. 351 USSAF in Europe Air intelligence Summary No. 73. For the Week Ending April 1, 1945, 22. DHIST 181.003 (D1427.)

121 extremities of the city. In addition, considerable HE destruction is visible in the southwestern portion, south of the Friedrichstadt marshalling yard.352

Following this passage a list of damaged buildings, factories, transportation and utility targets follows. A comprehensive report dated April 19, covering attacks up to and including the USAAF raid from March 2 reveals, "Damage to tracks in the city marshalling yards had by the date of the photography [March 16 and 22] been repaired."354 The report also indicates the extent of the destruction in the following chart.

Gross Acres destroyed or Net acres destroyed or Percentage of Zone seriously damaged seriously damaged property affected Fully Built Up 853 375 85% 50%-70% Built Up 828 265 45%

Cumulative Assessment of Damage for Dresden up to March 16,1945.

The destruction of Dresden left no sector of the city unscathed. By the end of the first four Allied raids against the city, the damage was so devastating that reconnaissance interpreters could not positively identify industrial buildings. According to the April report, it was "probable" that the Zeiss Ikon AG (Priority 1) factory sustained "major damage to important buildings" while it was also probable that several other Priority 2 and 3 industries sustained damage ranging from "entire works devastated" to "minor damage." The transportation sector suffered heavily as numerous

^Immediate Interpretation Report No. K. 4020. March 18, 1945. DHIST 181.003(D1836.) 353 Within the list it is revealed that amongst the carnage the main passenger station sustained heavy roof damage and the Friedrichstadt Station received heavy damage. Immediate Interpretation Report No. K. 4020. March 18, 1945. DHIST 181.003(D1836.) Further reports emphasize the damage to the varying sections of the city while revealing, "the northern western section of town, which was previously obscured by dense smoke clouds is now seen to be heavily damaged." Supplement to Immediate Interpretation Report No. K. 4020. March 24, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D1836.) 354 Interpretation Report No. K. 4171. April 19, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D1836.) 355 Interpretation Report No. K. 4171. April 19, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D1836.) In the file there is no indication how Bomber Command Headquarters calculated it's gross and net acres destroyed. For the purpose of this thesis the third column dealing with the "percentage of property affected" is most important because it demonstrates that the centre of the city was the primary aiming point for Allied raids against Dresden.

122 goods sheds, depots, passenger stations and workshops sustained various degrees of damage. Specifically, the railway repair shops in Friedrichstadt (Priority 2) had "one large shop damaged and some small sheds gutted" while the railway workshops in

Pieschen (Priority 3) had "one wagon shed gutted and another half destroyed."

During the early days of March, USAAF bombers attacked the city of Chemnitz on consecutive days (The statistics from these raids can be found in Appendix VI.) This series of American attacks produced extensive damage to a wide area of the city and are only a few testaments to the fact that USAAF bombing was far from precise.357 The police reports indicate that these three raids destroyed 3,215 houses, severely damaged another 858, and left 1,038 and 3,232 with medium or slight damage respectively.

Casualties from these attacks were 900 dead, 750 injured and some 90,000 rendered homeless. German police reports also estimated that American bombers produced roughly 350 major and three thousand smaller fires.

Following the daylight raids by USAAF bombers on Chemnitz, the British performed a substantial night-time attack on the already exhausted city much like they

356 Ibid. 357 During the attack on the second, RAF officials instructed the bombers to aim at the general city itself and not even at any specific targets within the city area. Destruction from this area attack was not surprising, as mainly the town area, the area around Central Station and the neighborhoods of Lutherkirche, Reichenhain and Siegmar-Schoenau were affected. SGII264 File 84, "Chemnitz," 14. The following day a substantial force of B-17s attacked the city was again. American bombers aimed at the Chemnitz marshalling yard but in actuality this raid affected several areas of the city including the districts of Ebersdorf, Sonnenberg, Gablenz, Bernsdof, Falkeplatz, Kassberg and the Dresdener Strasse. SGII 264 File 84, "Chemnitz," 14. Lastly, on the fifth, American officials instructed their bombers to once again target the city proper using H2X. 358 Specifically, industrial damage was substantial. USAAF bombers damaged the Wanderer Werke (Priority 2) to the extent that production decreased 100%. They also severely damaged the Reinecker Machine Tool works (Priority 1), the Hilscher Machine works and the firm of Viktor Koeppen over the period of the attacks. Reports also indicate that during the three raids the city's transportation infrastructure was also hit. Specifically, the Siegmar-Schoenau station sustained severe damage while the Central Station only received minor damage. It was also noted that the bombers interrupted the lines leading to Plauen. SGII 264 File 84. "Chemnitz," 14 and 15.

123 did on February 14/15.359 According to briefing notes for the Bomber Command raid on

March 5/6, the aiming point was "the centre of the built up area, 700 yards S/W of a

marshalling yard,"360 while another simply suggested it was "the centre of the city."361

By March 1945, the Allies believed that many of the refugees that survived the Dresden

attack chose to migrate towards Chemnitz. A briefing note explained, "The German

Press is screaming now about Dresden, 40 miles N.E. being written off. Many of the one million refugees there will [be] on their way to Chemnitz. Let's keep them on the move and at the same time help the Russians to continue her drive to the West."362 This briefing note is a great example that reiterates the primary goal of THUNDERCLAP as an attack aimed at civilians rather than any valid military target. Incidentally, briefing notes from 6 Group echo those from the February 14/15 Chemnitz raid when they once again explain that the textile machinery in Chemnitz would have been "virtually worth its weight in gold."363 These Allied statements prove that Allied air officials designed the THUNDERCLAP raids to demoralize the enemy population and not hinder the transportation of reinforcements. A report dated April 12 explains that "the intention," of the March 5/6 raid, "was to destroy built up area and associated industries and rail facilities," however, "the old town and area surrounding it, stretching to the North as far as the main railway centre, were completely devastated."364 It would appear that the

359 The British bombers dropped a total of 1,112.1 tons of HE and 859.2 tons of IB through 10/10 cloud cover using sky markers while "the Mosquitos followed up two hours later to drop bombs on the mass of flames which were well concentrated and burning fiercely." Bomber Command Report on Night Operations March 5/6, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (DHIST 1518.) 365 Briefing Note. "Chemnitz." March 5/6, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D3267). Also found in SIO's Briefing Notes, February 14/15, 1945. DHIST 191.009 (D3313). 361 SIO's Briefing Notes, March 5, 1945. DHIST 181.009 (D3313.) 362 Ibid. 363 As already seen in Briefing Note. "Chemnitz." February 14-15, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D3313); Also found in Briefing Notes. "Chemnitz." March 5/6, 1945. March 19, 1945. DHIST 181.009 (D3313). 364 Bomber Command Report on Night Operations March 5/6, 1945. April 12, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D1518).

124 Anglo-American operations on Chemnitz during the opening days of March were most

likely a second attempt at leveling the city after the botched raid of February.

It is hard to believe that the massive combined Anglo-American raids of the fifth and 5/6 only took a total of 2,105 lives. All the details of aiming points, tonnage, and

sorties are similar between these Chemnitz raids in March and the Dresden raids of

February. The casualties, however, are not. In his recent book, Peter Hessel, a former citizen of Chemnitz, explains:

The reason casualties in Dresden had been so extraordinarily high was that thousands, perhaps a few hundred thousand, of refugees from Germany's eastern provinces were temporarily housed in unsheltered areas of buildings, and - in spite of reason - even in the open. When the March attack came against Chemnitz, the lessons of Dresden had been learned. Relatively few people were left unprotected."365

Although the March attack did not cause comparable casualties to that of Dresden, the Allies performed this raid with the same THUNDERCLAP goals and intent in mind; to demoralize the average German citizen.

The week of intense bombing by USAAF and Bomber Command bombers left the relatively undamaged city of Chemnitz in a now skeleton form. A cumulative assessment of damage up to the sixteenth is found below.

Gross Acres Net acres destroyed or Percentage of property Zone destroyed or seriously seriously damaged affected. damaged Fully Built Up 326 147 56% 50%-70% Built Up 267 83 29%

Cumulative Assessment of Damage for Chemnitz up to March 16', 1945.

Peter Hessel, The Mystery ofFrankenberg's Canadian Airman. (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company Ltd, 2005), 75. 366 Interpretation Report No. K. 3899. April 19, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D1770.) American intelligence explains that the "hard hit industrial centre of the city was completely burnt out." USAAF in Europe Air Intelligence Summary No. 71. For the Week Ending March 18, 1945, 20. DHIST 181.003 (D1427.) The

125 Although some damage occurred to the transportation network, it was not as devastating as to the other city infrastructure since its operating facilities were not damaged. The terminal was left 30% unserviceable and the through lines were only 10% unserviceable.367 According to Interpretation Report No. K 3899, covering the raids between February 17, 1945 and March 15, 1945, "Of the fifty priority industries of the town, seventeen have been damaged," while more may have been affected. The report indicates, however, little damage to main railway installations which would have done nothing to hinder the transportation of military related goods and people. This report also refers to Chemnitz in the past tense as if it no longer existed: "Chemnitz, the third largest city of Saxony, was an industrial town.. .It had a peculiar central built up area, housing a large part of the population in tenements."

On March 7, Allied ground forces began to cross the Rhine after the capture of

Cologne and looked to secure a bridgehead to prepare their final advance to Berlin.

Although fighting would continue to be fierce, the war was heading into its final phase.

Bombing to win the war continued in full force for the remainder of March and well into devastation continued into the northern sections of the town towards the main railway centre while the bombers gutted the majority of buildings in the areas of Gablenz in the East and Kassberg in the West. Immediate Interpretation Report No. K. 3899. March 8, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D1770); Supplement to Immediate Interpretation Report No. K. 3899. March 17, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D1770); and USAAF in Europe Air Intelligence Summary No. 71. For the Week Ending March 18, 1945, 20. Intelligence also explains that the marshalling yard in the South and its surrounding buildings were also burning and severely devastated. Pathfinder Force Monthly Summaries. March 1945, 3. DHIST 181.003 (D435). Intelligence also noted that fires still raged around town the day after the attack. USAAF in Europe Air Intelligence Summary No. 71. For the Week Ending March 18, 1945, 20. 367 Supplement to Immediate Interpretation Report No. K. 3899. March 17, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D1770.) 368 Interpretation Report No. K. 3899. April 19, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D1770.) 369 Ibid. The March 5 and 5/6 attacks on Chemnitz would be its last major raids of the war. Heading into April, the Allies already attacked Chemnitz eleven times under THUNDERCLAP and completely devastated much of the city, leaving it an unidentifiable target. The only April attacks and last attack on Chemnitz during the war was by 20 Mosquitos from 8 Group on the night of April 10/11. In comparison to what the citizens of Chemnitz experienced in February and March, the medium bombers scattered a meager 18.1 tons across the city in conditions of clear visibility and no opposition. Bomber Command Report on Night Operations April 10/11, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D1518); and USAAF in Europe. Daily Operations Intelligence Summaries. No 1020. April 11, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D 4321.)

126 April. In fact, several THUNDERCLAP cities were still to receive their share of the bombing.

Although Mosquito bombers visited Dessau several times in February, as seen in

Dessau's THUNDERCLAP chart in Appendix X, the largest raid against the city

occurred on the night of March 7/8. Dessau, with a population of about 120,000, was the

capital of the Duchy of Anhalt and is located at the meeting of the Mulde and Elbe

Rivers. It is situated south-west of Halle and between Wurzburg and Berlin.370 Two main administrative sectors defined the northern and southern areas of the city. They were Wallwitz and Rosslau respectively.371 According to the brief description found in the Baedeker, Dessau was the main headquarters for Junkers production as it had four separate works and an airfield close to the town. The Junkers airfield (Priority 1) in the

Western sector of town was home to the parent works of Junkers Flugzeug and

Motorenwerk AG. One engine works located in the South-west corner of the airfield, otherwise known as the village of Alten, produced both diesel and petrol engines.

Overall, the plants located throughout the airfield were mainly used in the construction and testing of numerous prototype aircraft. Several other armament engineering works located in the town did not merit a Priority 1 rating. The only other two Priority 2 targets in the area included Berlin-Anhaltische Maschinenbau AG and the ship building yards of Gebruder Sachsenberg AG located on the north bank of Elbe and in the suburb of

Rosslau. Both companies produced naval goods such as armaments and small crafts.372

It is approximately 30 miles from both Magdeburg and Leipzig and 530 miles from London. Bomber's Baedeker: Guide to the Economic Importance of German Towns and Cities. "Dessau," May 1944. Enenmy Branch of the Foreign Office and Ministry of Economic Warfare. Volume I, 137. DHIST 181.009 (D989). 371 Ibid. 372 Ibid., 138-139.

127 Dessau was located along one of the main railway connections between

Northwestern Germany and Saxony. The railway junction (Priority 3) in the city had a branch that led to Wittenburg on the main Berlin to Southwest Germany line and another two that lead to the main Magdeburg to Halle line and to Western Germany. In the

southern outskirts there existed a Priority 3 railway shop. The description of Dessau discusses a goods yard and small marshalling yard immediately north of the main railway station, however, none are mentioned in the Baedeker as separate targets of importance.

Under the night skies of March 7/8, Bomber Command dispatched 526 Lancasters and five Mosquitos of 1, 3, 6 and 8 Groups to attack Dessau between the hours of 2152 and 2232. This raid, although not quite big as the Dresden raids, was still substantial and carried out with similar intent in mind.374 The pre-raid report for this attack once again indicates, that Bomber Command's "intention was to destroy the built up area and associated industries and rail facilities" of Dessau.375 It also indicates the aiming point as the centre of the built up area half a mile west of the Mulde River and the post office.376

A Senior Intelligence Officer's (SIO) briefing note from March 7 specifies the raid's intention as follows; "Since the very successful attacks on Dresden and Chemnitz these lines are very crowded with refugees - we must keep them out of Dessau."377 This comment certainly lends itself towards the controversy of bombing fleeing refugees.

According to Immediate Interpretation Report No. K 3920, "Dessau, mainly important

373 Ibid., 137. 374 On that night, the bombers dropped 744.7 tons of HE and 959.9 tons of IB through conditions of varying cloud cover ranging from 8/10 to 10/10, devastating much of the city. 375 Bomber Command Report on Night Operations March 7/8, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D1518.) 376 SIO's Briefing Notes. March 7/8, 1945. DHIST 181.009 (D3313). Also found in Briefing Notes "Dessau," March 7, 1945. March 20, 1945. DHIST 181.009 (D3312). 377 SIO's Briefing Notes, March 7/8, 1945. DHIST 181.009 (D3313).

128 as a headquarters of the Junkers Concern, is now almost wholly devastated. The damage is spread over the entire target area where squares of gutted business/residential buildings and badly damaged industrial premises are all that are left of this town."378 The report also acknowledges that the largest concentration of damage is related to the destruction of residential and business sectors: "Business/residential property and public buildings were affected most heavily by the attack which virtually wiped out all property in the town centre." Once again returning bomber crews witnessed fires burning from a hundred miles away, indicating the extent of the destruction in Dessau.380 One pilot described the size of a fire as "2 miles long and 1 mile wide." German sources reported that the damage affected mostly the South-east area of the town, where incidentally no major transportation targets existed, and that Allied bombers destroyed or severely damaged 80% of dwelling houses.382 It is important to note that this attack against a "main railway connection between N.W. Germany and Saxony" yielded little damage to the railway infrastructure. An immediate interpretation report reveals that

"through rail transportation does not appear to have been affected too seriously by the

378 Immediate Interpretation Report No. 3920. March 10, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D237); and USAAF in Europe Air Intelligence Summary No. 71. For the Week Ending March 18, 1945, 19. 379 Immediate Interpretation Report No. 3920. April 1, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D786). In fact, no more than a dozen buildings down the main street of Dessau had roofs left. Other public buildings destroyed included the Rathaus (city hall), the Registry Law courts and the historic 16th century Ducal Palace. Immediate Interpretation Report No. 3920. April 1, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D786). 380 Bomber Command Report on Night Operations March 7/8, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D1518). 381 Pathfinder Force Monthly Summary. March 1945,4. DHIST 181.003 (D435). 382 German officials believed that the number of confirmed dead would rise beyond the reported 400. With respect to industry, several factories absorbed considerable damage; especially those associated with Junkers as all four of its factories received varying degrees of damage. The parent factory of Junkers Flugzeug and Motorwerk AG (Priority 1) located at an airfield in the southwest of the city sustained heavy new damage. This factory built aero engines and jet units. Bomber Command severely damaged the Kaloriferfwerk Hugo Junkers GmbH (Priority 3) factory that built fuel injector pumps was. SGII 264 File 84, "Dessau," 18. It was also reported that very severe damage was seen in the Dessau Sugar and Chemical plant. Air Intelligence Summary No. 71. For the Week Ending March 18, 1945, 19. DHIST 181.003 (D1427.)

129 attack...all lines appear open."383 From all available intelligence it appears the Allies

failed in achieving one of the stated purposes of the THUNDERCLAP plan: the

destruction of the rail facilities and main transportation route into Dessau.

Between March 17 and 19, the USAAF executed its finals raids of the month. A

USAAF two-wave attack on two separate rail targets in Berlin was arguably the largest

THUNDERCLAP raid between mid March and April. The first wave comprised of 421

B-17s dropping a colossal 1,067.4 tons of bombs aimed at the Berlin/Schlesischer

Railway Station. During the second wave 495 effective B-17s dropped an even larger

1,419.3 tons of bombs over the Berlin/Nord Freight Station. German police reports indicate the casualties as 227 people dead, 849 injured, 450 missing and 65,000

-IRS homeless. Immediate Intelligence Report No. K. 4109 covering these attacks and the attack from February 26, revealed some interesting insight into the USAAF bombing of

Berlin. The provisional statement of damage explains: Damage is widespread and distributed throughout almost the whole of the city. There are some areas of extensive damage to business/residential property.

Although there is some damage to railway buildings and a few hits on railway tracks damage to transportation targets is slight.

No large industrial plant has been damaged, but a number of small concerns, mostly unidentified, have been hit.386

383 The Radegaster Station, which served the southwest of the town on the Leipzig line had only moderate damage to its roof while the main station did suffer severe damage. Several goods buildings and platforms were severely damaged to the point of inoperability. Immediate Interpretation Report No. 3920. April 1, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D786.) 384 Allied intelligence revealed after the smaller March 17 USAAF raid against Erfurt, in which 51 B-17s targeted the marshalling yard with 142.7 tons of HE, that the marshalling yard was not damaged at all. There was however, "at least 14 instances of fresh damage to business/residential buildings" in the North­ east sector of the town. Immediate Interpretation Report. No. K. 4031. March 20, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D2854.) 385 SGII 264 File 84, "Berlin," 3. 386 Immediate Interpretation Report No. 4109. March 24, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D108.)

130 Immediate Intelligence Report No. K 4045 written shortly after the raid explained, "The most extensive damage is seen in the neighborhood of the Gorlitzer Station on both sides of which whole blocks of business/residential property are burnt out. A number of bombs have fallen on the station itself; some tracks are cut and the loco roundhouse has

•JOT suffered additional damage." Further intelligence from several days later lists the

February 26 and March 18 attacks under the target definition of "Tempelhof area." The fact the USAAF lists the attacks under an area defined target and not specifically the

Tempelhof marshalling yard is interesting. The interpretation report also reveals, under the heading "Business/Residential," that the USAAF bombing on the twenty-sixth created areas of widespread damage around the Alexanderplatz sector, while isolated areas of damage existed to the areas north and north-east of the North Station and around the Schlesischer area from previous USAAF raids.

The following day, the USAAF implemented its final THUNDERCLAP raid until the end of the month.389 The First and Third Air Division deployed over 450 B-17s towards Plauen.390 After reading the numerous immediate intelligence reports produced in February and March 1945, there is little doubt that the USAAF was clearly performing area bombing raids under the disguise of precision bombing raids on paper.

In the Pacific, USAAF bombers were also relying on aggressive area bombing attacks to end the war with Japan. Initially, American officials designed US bombing policy in the

Far East to target specific industries within the Japanese economy; however, USAAF 387 Immediate Interpretation Report No. 4045. March 21, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D108.) 388 Ibid. 389 From March 19 to March 27, Bomber Command did not perform any major THUNDERCLAP attacks. Instead they deployed their Mosquito bombers in twelve raids against Berlin, Magdeburg and Erfurt for a total of 475 sorties. During these raids, the Mosquito bombers dropped close to 570 tons on the three cities. 390 Through 8-10/10 cloud cover and using H2X, the bombers dropped 1,103.4 tons of bombs against their aiming point; the city.

131 leaders quickly realized that precision bombing was not a possibility because of enemy defences and the nature of the dispersed Japanese economy. As a result, USAAF leaders began to experiment with area bombing over Japanese cities as early as late January

1945. Throughout February and March 1945, B-29s loaded with destructive payloads of incendiary bombs, flew night-time raids at very high altitudes to avoid flak and fighters.

Ultimately, the bombers dropped their bombs from speeds and heights too great for

TQ1 precision bombing. From the air, American bombers ruined entire Japanese cities.

Although the American bombers used in the Pacific were capable of carrying larger payloads than the B-17 and B-24 and the Japanese urban situation and layout was far different than that of a German city, similarities exist in the USAAF bombing policies and intent developed in Germany and eventually applied over Japanese cities.

By March 27, 1945, the strategic and political situation in Europe changed dramatically. Several days earlier, the Western Allies established and secured a much needed bridgehead on the Eastern banks of the Rhine to mount a final drive towards

Berlin. Soon after, Allied ground forces set up dozens of temporary bridges at various locations along the Rhine allowing western forces to cross in substantial numbers. In due course Patton's Third Army crossed at Oppenheim, while the British Second, Canadian

First and US Ninth crossed at Wesel. Further east, the Soviets moved steadily towards

Berlin through Poland. Although fierce fighting still remained, the fact became evident that it would be virtually impossible for Germany to push the Allies back.

One of the most destructive raids of the entire war occurred on the night of March 9/10 against the city of Tokyo. American bombers destroyed a total of sixteen square miles of the city, including over 250,000 residential houses. American bombing studies written after the war indicate that this raid killed some 87,792 people, injured 40,918 and left over 1 million people homeless. Neillands, 378. Other massive USAAF raids in the Pacific targeted cities such as Tokyo, Nagasaki, Osaka, Nagoya, Yokohama, Kobe and Kawasaki.

132 In the United Kingdom and North America, there was an emerging controversy

over the Allied winter bombing offensive against Germany. Within a week of the

February Dresden raids, German propaganda sources and the free press revealed to the

world the massive destruction and turmoil caused by Allied bombs. On February 16,

during a SHAEF press conference, Air Commodore CM Grierson, a RAF press officer,

answered reporters' questions about the bombing of eastern cities in Germany including

Dresden. In reply he insisted:

First of all they are the centres to which evacuees are being moved. They are centres of communication through which traffic is moving across to the Russian Front, and from the Western Front to the East, and they are sufficiently close to the Russian Front for the Russians to continue the successful prosecution of their battle. I think these three reasons probably cover the bombing.392

Following Grierson's response another reporter asked whether the principal goal of the bombing was to create confusion amongst the refugees or to disrupt military communications routes and supplies. He simply replied by reaffirming that the Dresden raid was for primarily communication reasons but he did add in a remark about trying to destroy "what was left of German morale."393 In short, he denied that Allied bombing policy promoted terror attacks but he did imply that "the bombing of eastern German cities was mainly intended to produce hordes of refugees and to increase civilian suffering."394 The end result was a dramatic report by Howard Cowan, a member of the

Associated Press, which somehow leaked through the military censors to the media.

By February 18, newspapers such as the Washington Star, and later the Toronto

Star, published his report and revealed that "Allied air chiefs have made the long- awaited decision to adopt deliberate terror bombing of great German population centres

392 Transcript of briefing in NARA, Washington DC, RG331. Found in Taylor, 361. 393 Ibid. 394 Davis, Carl. A. Spaatz and the Air War in Europe, 558-559.

133 as a ruthless expedient to hasten Hitler's doom."395 This report was a catastrophe for the

image of American government officials, and more importantly the USAAF, as

advocates of precision bombing. Immediately, the Americans went on the defensive and

Roosevelt sent his secretary of war, Henry L. Stimson, to reiterate, "Our policy has never been to inflict terror bombing on civilian populations." The USAAF and

Eisenhower chose not to deny the attacks but rather have its public relations officers tell reporters that "there was no change in their current bombing policy" but only, "a shift

of emphasis from West to East to weaken German defenses against the Russian

Offensive." They emphasized that civilian lives would always be in danger when attacking targets in populated areas but that the USAAF would continue to strive to achieve the "greatest possible concentration of bombs directly on military targets selected for attack."399 This damage control was simply more public propaganda reminding the citizens of the United States that the USAAF was a strictly precision bombing force and it did not attack enemy citizens. From its role in the

THUNDERCLAP bombing raids of February through to March 1945, it is evident that these USAAF statements were completely misleading; even after the outrage over

Dresden.

In Britain, Cowan's news report was not widely published. For British air officials and Churchill, however, reaction to the bombing of Dresden opened a debate in parliament. On March 6, a Labour backbencher named Richard Riper

395 "Allies Planning Terror Bombing to Kayo Reich." The Toronto Star. Monday, February 19, 1945. 1- News 396 "1,134,992 Nazis Taken by Allies on Three Fronts." The Toronto Star. Thursday, February 22, 1945. 2 - News. 397 Davis, Carl. A. Spaatz and the Air War in Europe, 562 398 Msg UA-64603, Anderson to Arnold. February 20, 1945, Spaatz Papers. Diary. As found in Davis, Carl. A. Spaatz and the Air War in Europe, 562 399 Ibid.

134 Stokes raised a question regarding the bombing of Dresden in the British House of

Commons. Stokes read off several reports, including the news release produced by

Cowan. Stokes pressed the issue for several hours, although it never fully erupted

within parliament. Yet, this parliamentary debate made the Allied bombing of

Dresden a broader issue in the public realm. It was under these strategic and political conditions that Churchill wrote one of his most contentious memos of the war.

On March 28, 1945, Churchill sent out the following memo to the head of the Chief of Staff General Ismay for his COS Committee and the Chief of the Air

Staff.

It seems to me that the moment has come when the question of area bombing of German cities simply for the sake of increasing the terror, though under other pretexts, should be reviewed. Otherwise we shall come into control of an utterly ruined land. We shall not, for instance, be able to get housing materials out of Germany for our own needs because some temporary provision would have to be made for the Germans themselves. The destruction of Dresden remains a serious query against the conduct of Allied bombing. I am of the opinion that military objectives must henceforward be more strictly studied in our own interest rather than that of the enemy.

The Foreign Secretary has spoken to me on this subject, and I feel the need for more precise concentration upon military objectives, such as oil and communications behind the immediate battle-zone, rather than on mere acts of terror and wanton destruction, however impressive.

(Intld.) W.S.C

To Portal, Harris and all those involved in the strategic bombing offensive against

Germany, Churchill's memo came as a great surprise and without a doubt a disappointment. Before replying to the Prime Minister, Portal sent a draft of his reply to Harris, via Bottomley, seeking his views. Harris replied quickly and

Note by Air Staff titled "AREA BOMBING." April 3, 1945. PRO AIR 20/3361.

135 aggressively insisting that Churchill's remarks about "terror bombing" were an

insult to both the Air Ministry's policy and the way Bomber Command executed

it.401 Churchill's memo, as the official historians of Bomber Command describe it, was "among the least felicitous of the Prime Minister's long series of war-time minutes."402 It was clearly an attempt by Churchill to distance himself from a policy

of terror bombing that he enquired about in July 1944, and even insisted on in late

January 1945; a policy he ultimately supported. At the same time, Churchill pushed the blame onto his subordinate officials in Bomber Command and the Air Ministry such as Harris and Portal. In fact, it was more realistically a way of defending his political image against the growing domestic resentment against area bombing and especially the destruction of Dresden at a time when his bomber force was still laying waste to cities under Operation THUNDERCLAP and other bombing operations.

Overall, after examining the THUNDERCLAP attacks of February and most of March 1945, it is possible to make several important observations about the nature of the operation heading into its final weeks. First, similar tactics applied by

Bomber Command and the USAAF throughout each THUNDERCLAP attack, produced similar damage reports from city to city. For example, most of the briefing reports explain that the centre of the city was the aiming point for Bomber

Command's raids, however, in the tradition of a true area bombing raid, widespread damage to various districts was persistently reported. Although marshalling yards were identified as the primary aiming point for many of the USAAF's raids, after

401 Henry Probert. Bomber Harris: His Life and Times (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001), 322; Taylor, 377-378. 402 Webster and Frankland. The Strategic Air War Against Germany: Victory, Volume III, 112.

136 action reports reveal that they too produced areas of widespread damage. If one were to read exclusively any after action report for any major USAAF

THUNDERCLAP raid, it would be impossible to identify the aiming point for that raid because of the various areas affected. Furthermore, I argue that in most cases, the rail infrastructure of each THUNDERCLAP city was never rendered fully

inoperable by any of the raids of Bomber Command or the USAAF bombers, therefore, raising questions about the effectiveness and intent of Operation

THUNDERCLAP.403 By April 1945, Churchill's March 28 memo left the bombing

offensive, and those players involved, in a state of shock.

403 Other points of interests are that the Allies attacked many cities through a series of consecutive raids in which the USAAF attacked a city by day and Bomber Command would follow up at night with a raid of its own; both characteristics of early THUNDERCLAP planning.

137 Chapter 5

Operation THUNDERCLAP: The final weeks, March 29,1945 to April 21,1945

The population is reported as increased now due to refugees and soldiers streaming fast away from our rapidly advancing armies. It therefore presents a very interesting and worthwhile target and a good solid punch at it will add much to the Jerries confusion, break down civilian morale even lower than it is, assist our armies and bring the war nearer an end.

Squadron report DHIST 181.003(D3267) on Erfurt raid dated April 3, 1945.

After much debate and uproar from senior bombing officials and the Chief of Staff the COS committee received on April 2 an edited version of Churchill's March 28 memo. The revised version was significantly altered and devoid of any references to the

issue of Dresden or the now controversial area bombing policy of Bomber Command.

This memo, however, still focused on the main point of ceasing area bombing, but not

for moral reasons, rather for the sake of aiding the advancing ground armies and

smoothing postwar relief efforts. It reads:

It seems to me that the moment has come when the question of so called area bombing of German cities should be reviewed from the point of view of our own interests. If we come into control of an utterly ruined land, there will be a shortage of accommodation for ourselves and our Allies; and we shall be unable to get housing materials out of Germany for own needs because some temporary provision would have to be made for the Germans themselves. We must see to it that our attacks do not do more harm to ourselves in the long run than they do to the enemy's immediate war effort. Pray let me have your 404

views.

In reply, the Air Staff presented Churchill with a note titled "AREA BOMBING" to defend its practice throughout the war. This note reminded the Prime Minister of the primary objective of the Combined Bomber Offensive from 1943 and also that of the

"Bombing Policy" Minute by the Prime Minister. COS (45) 233 (0). April 2, 1945. PRO AIR 20/3361.

138 then current bombing directive created in September 1944. It added, "It is only in recent months that the development of night bombing techniques has enabled us successfully to undertake the night attack of specific industrial plants and other precise objectives."405

The Air Staff "recognized that at this advanced stage of the war no great or immediate additional economic advantage can be expected from the attack of the remaining industrial centres of Germany. It seems probable that the full effects of further area attacks upon the enemy's war industries are unlikely to have time to mature before hostilities cease."406 The note did agree with Churchill's revamped memo on the current bombing policy, however, it also concluded that "there should be no alteration to the current bombing directive such as would exclude area bombing" but that "area bombing designed solely with the object of destroying or disorganizing industrial areas should be discontinued."407 In other words, area bombing would not be abandoned altogether but rather, the practice could still be employed if German armed resistance reorganized.

In response to the Churchill memo, USAAF officials released their own comment about the issue of area bombing on April 10. As Spaatz's biographer Richard G. Davis explains, the USAAF area bombing comment "revealed the contradiction in its own policies."408 It reads, "The U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe have not at any time had a policy of making area bombing attacks upon German cities. Even our attacks against the Berlin area were always directed against military objectives."4 This statement is dubious since the American raids already covered in the previous chapter indicate that

405 Note by Air Staff. "AREA BOMBING." PRO AIR 20/3361. April 3, 1945. 406 Ibid. 407 Ibid. 408 Davis, Spaatz and the Air War in Europe, 582. 409 Memo, F.L. Anderson, subj: "Comments Re Cablegram WAR 6558 (USSTAF IN28993)," April 10, 1945. AF/CHO microfilm reel A 5616, frame 154. Found in Davis, Spaatz and the Air War in Europe, 582.

139 the aiming points for raids on Berlin were usually the town area and a transportation target within the city such as a rail centre or a marshalling yard. The comment added,

"Our Pathfinder (H2X) attacks against communication centres have often resulted in an

area type of bombing because of the inaccuracy of this type of bombing."410 It was clear that these statements were simply another example of the USAAF showcasing its

"precision" image for the general public. As already demonstrated, American post-

THUNDERCLAP raid reconnaissance proves the USAAF practice of picking specific targets within a city, such as marshalling yards or rail centres, and actually hitting them accurately was virtually impossible. Collateral damage from raids targeting marshalling yards always occurred. It also argues that USAAF targeting by March 1945 was not even selecting specific targets as its aiming points but rather clearly selecting general city areas. During the month of March, eight out of a possible fifteen American

THUNDERCLAP raids targeted the general city area. Furthermore, only two attacks by

US bombers occurred visually. Nonetheless, Operation THUNDERCLAP did not end with Churchill's challenge in late March 1945. In fact, forty-seven raids of varying intensity occurred between March 28 and the end of Operation THUNDERCLAP in late

April 1945.

An intelligence briefing report from a proposed Bomber Command raid scheduled for sometime on March 28 offers interesting insight into the ground situation in late

March/early-April as well as the Allied intentions of that attack. The report indicates that the rail lines in Erfurt were important and that "we are therefore helping General Patton very much if we put it out of commission."411 It adds, "We have immobilized Jerries

410 Ibid. 411 Intelligence Briefing for March 28, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D3267).

140 motor transport and plane by destroying his oil supplies and his trains by knocking out

marshalling yards. Now we will stop the production of shoes and so stop his running

away to hide."412 For this raid the aiming point was "Just north of the centre of the built up area about 1 mile N.W. of the main Marshalling Yards" with the purpose of

destroying the built up area and associated rail facilities and industries.413 In total

Bomber Command, allocated 100 Lancasters from 6 Group and another 200 Lancasters

from 1 Group for this raid; yet it never occurred.

The US AAF quickly resumed THUNDERCLAP bombing after the late March area- bombing dispute. In fact, for the remainder of operation THUNDERCLAP, the USAAF took a leading role in implementing the plan. Of the remaining forty-seven

THUNDERCLAP attacks, only four involved Bomber Command's heavy bombers while the Mosquito bombing force performed twenty-nine smaller raids. In comparison, the USAAF carried out fourteen raids. During the afternoon of March 31, the USAAF began its final stretch of THUNDERCLAP bombing raids beginning with a major attack on Halle and later two minor attacks, on the targets of opportunity, Leipzig and Erfurt, as seen in Appendices VII and XII.414

By April 1, 1945, the Russians were outside Berlin. For the next two weeks they built up forces in preparation for the upcoming ground battle for the heavily contested capital. In the meantime, the USAAF continued to take a leading role in delivering the larger THUNDERCLAP bombing raids entering into April. Throughout March the

4,2 Ibid. 413 Ibid. 414 The attack aimed at the Halle marshalling yard involved a force of 369 B-17s from the First Air Division. In total, the American bombers dropped 1,069.3 tons of bombs on the city. Photos taken one and a half hours afterwards revealed "many fires burning throughout the town centre and in the marshalling yard." Bomber Command Intelligence Report NO 4665. April 2, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D 2000.) As already demonstrated these damage characteristics were all typical of USAAF "precision bombing" during THUNDERCLAP and especially by April 1945.

141 USAAF dispatched 5,427 of the total 8,477 combined sorties while dropping 8,202.8 of the 13,497.6 tons of bombs released over THUNDERCLAP target cities. In other words, the USAAF accounted for over 50 percent of the March THUNDERCLAP effort while

Bomber Command's contribution began to fizzle. In relation to the overall bomber

offensive, increased USAAF participation in THUNDERCLAP bombing was very

characteristic of the final months of aerial operation in Europe and especially the month

of March. After examining the overall bomber offensive statistics for March, Bomber

Command and the USAAF dispatched a combined total of 134,793 sorties and dropped

133,599 tons of bombs on various types of targets.415 Specifically, the USAAF dispatched a totaled of 111,472 bombers, of which 104,795 effectively dropped 65,962 tons of bombs. In fact, March 1945 marked the biggest month of all of the war for the

USAAF.

Throughout April, Bomber Command continued to deploy their Mosquito force on a more frequent basis. For example, the remaining attacks against Magdeburg were by 8

Group's Mosquitos and in many cases they carried out smaller raids. During the first week of April, Mosquito forces attacked the city three times. The raids are presented in the table below along with other Mosquitos raids of the first seven days of April 1945.

Deployed Effective Tons Tons Total Cloud Aiming Date City Sorties Sorties HE IB Tons Cover Point April Magdeburg 50 Mosqs 48 78.4 78.4 Town 2/3 April Berlin 54 Mosqs 54 44.3 Town 2/3 April Berlin 94 Mosqs 114.5 Town 3/4 90 April Magdeburg 5 Mosqs 6 * Town 3/4

415 USAAF sorties taken from Davis, Carl A. Spaatz and the Air War in Europe, Appendix 12 and 13 and then added to Webster and Frankland Volume IV, Appendix 40, 433; Total tonnage taken from Webster and Frankland, Volume IV, Appendix 44, 457. Also found in Max Hastings, Bomber Command (London: Michael Joseph, 1979) Appendix A, 354. Furthermore, Bomber Command sorties include daytime and nighttime statistics.

142 April Plauen 8 Mosqs 8 7.1 7.1 Town 3/4 April Magdeburg 31 Mosqs 31 54.4 54.4 Town 4/5 April Berlin 35 Mosqs 35 43.3 Town 4/5 * Represents a minimal tonnage below 3 tons.

RAF Mosquito Raids on Magdeburg during the opening week of April 1945.

On April 3, another briefing report for a planned raid against Erfurt explained the situation facing Germany and reiterated the true nature of THUNDERCLAP. From this report it is understood that by early April the American army was only 30 miles away from Erfurt and as a result;

The population is reported as immensely increased now due to refugees and soldiers streaming fast away from our rapidly advancing armies. It therefore presents a very interesting and worthwhile target and a good solid punch at it will add much to the Jerries confusion, break down civilian morale even lower than it is, assist our armies and bring the war nearer an end. A blow like this may just be the blow needed to make up Jerries mind.416

From the above passage it is clear that, even after Churchill's late March anti-area bombing position paper, morale bombing still had precedence within Bomber

Command. It also proves that Allied air planners still considered the smaller

THUNDERCLAP cities important targets in early April 1945. Like the previous raid scheduled for March 28, this raid did not occur. Bomber Command defined its aiming point as the "centre of barracks area one mile due south of the M/Y - South East corner of the city" with a purpose to "kill military personnel evacuated from Berlin to those barracks."417 Throughout the last winter of the war Erfurt did not receive any large bomber raids as such, but the Allies clearly planned the attacks against the city with the

416 Intelligence Briefing for April 3, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D3267). 417 Ibid. The plan for this raid was to have 80 Halifaxes and 80 Lancasters from 6 Group and 150 Halifaxes from 4 Group attack the city.

143 THUNDERCLAP goals and, ultimately, the THUNDERCLAP intent in mind. The US

Third Army captured Erfurt on April 12.

Following Bomber Command's Mosquito raids during the opening week of April, the USAAF returned to attacking the THUNDERCLAP cities in full force with attacks planned against Plauen, Halle and Leipzig (See Appendix IX, VIII and VII respectively to review the specific details of the raids.)418 The First and Third Air Divisions' attack against the main station and marshalling yard in Leipzig on the sixth was the largest raid. In total, 321 B-17s dropped 949.7 tons of bombs on the city. American intelligence reports, "showed the weight of the attack to have fallen across the junction of the three main lines northeast of the main station. All through lines were blocked at the time of photography, and sidings and sheds in the freight yards and storage sidings were destroyed, as were two locomotive depots."419 From German police reports it is understood that Allied bombers interrupted the main line to Merseburg and destroyed

April 5, 1945, Plauen: This attack marked the twenty-fifth time USAAF bombers attacked a marshalling yard in a THUNDERCLAP city. April 6, 1945, Halle: USAAF bombers actually attacked Halle twice on the 6. The initial attack on the city occurred during the morning between the hours of 0935 and 1030. The American A/P for this raid was the Halle marshalling yard and the bombers used H2X radar. German police reports indicate that the Central Station, the surrounding districts and the southern part of the town were hit hardest. The bombers destroyed roughly 115 houses, severely damaged fifty, medium damaged 200 and slightly damaged 500. They also produced over 300 fires. In fact, damage to the railway lines was so substantial that only traffic between suburban stations could operate. The report also indicates that they killed some 120 people, injured another 280, buried eighty and left 600 homeless. SGII264 File 84, "Halle," 29. Later that day, eleven more B-17s attacked Halle in what would be the last attack on the city during the war. April 8, 1945, Plauen: On the eighth, 86 B-17s from the Third Air Division attacked the marshalling yards in Plauen under 10/10 cloud cover. Using H2X, the Flying Fortresses dropped a total of 208.6 tons of HE and 46 tons of IB on the city. A major by-product of this raid was the number of fires fueled by the incendiary bombs dropped. Fires caused by the bombing were still visible for several hours after the attack in the town centre and the suburbs to the south. German sources indicate that this "heavy" raid created over 150 fires, destroyed 139 houses, severely damaged 75, medium damaged 100 and slightly damaged fifty. In addition, this raid killed twelve people, injured another thirty-five, buried forty-five and left roughly 8,000 people homeless. It also reports that the USAAF caused severe structural damage to Vo-Metall-AG. SGII 264 File 84, "Plauen," 63. Photoreconnaissance from the same day showed that the cellulose and textile factory of Sachsische Zellwolle was burning and left with slight damage. Furthermore, the bombers gutted the Schloss and it was surrounded by an area of devastation leading across the Elster River. Bomber Command Intelligence Report No 4675. Raid Assessment Summary April 10, 1945. April 11, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D2000). 419 USAAF in Europe Air Intelligence Summary No. 71. For the Week Ending April 15, 1945, 21-22.

144 the tracks at the central station along with hundreds of goods coaches or trucks. Damage also occurred to the three main lines north-east of the station. It is also understood, however, that the attack resulted in heavy damage to the city centre and the regions of

Klein-Zschocher, Leutsch, Plagwitz, Moeckern and Anger-Crottendorf.420

Several days later, in conditions of perfect visibility, two separate forces of Bomber

Command attacked the Engelsdorf Marshalling Yard and Wahren Marshalling Yard in

Leipzig. The intention of Bomber Command was to "destroy rolling stock concentrated

491 in the Western marshalling yard, block through routes and destroy railway facilities."

From two pre-raid briefing reports it is clear that the Allies considered Leipzig a key transportation route against both the Russian and American front. Interestingly the briefings do not identify the need to attack fleeing refugees or to attack the morale of the citizens of Leipzig as in past THUNDERCLAP briefings. This was perhaps a sign that

Bomber Command was no longer focusing on targeting civilians but rather transportation attacks through more precise and discriminate bombing. Both the

Lancasters and Halifax's had their own separate aiming point; neither directed at the rail centres. British air planners directed the 110 Lancasters to aim four miles east of the centre of the city while the 90 Halifaxes were to aim to the north of the railway centre.422

After only 30 minutes, fierce fires and smoke pouring from the centre of the city represented the devastation of the attack. In the end, the British bombers caused severe damage to the railway facilities. The bombers cut all lines at the Engelsdorf marshalling 420 It should be noted that water supplies and electricity services were either interrupted or severely damaged in some parts of town. In the end, the raid killed 150 citizens, injured 303, buried 137 and left 20,000 homeless. The bombers ignited over 5,000 fires, while damage to housing resulted in the complete destruction of 163 buildings, severe damage to 134, medium damage to 127 and slight damage to 463. SGII 264 File 84, "Leipzig," 47. 421 Bomber Command Report on Night Operations April 10/11, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (DHIST 1518); and SIO Briefing Notes. April 10, 1945. DHIST 181.009 (D3313.) 422 SIO's Briefing Notes. April 10, 1945. DHIST 181.009 (D3313).

145 yard, while they destroyed or damaged most of its rolling stock. The marshalling yard at

Wahren suffered a similar fate with all its lines being cut and its rail houses and buildings destroyed.423 In the end immediate reconnaissance revealed that the British bombers cut or blocked at least 50 percent of the rail lines leading out of the city while

80 percent of them were unserviceable. Photos from the eleventh showed that Bomber

Command was successful in cutting all lines and in destroying several wagons and engines as well as most rail buildings.424 From all available sources, these two raids appear to be Bomber Command's more precise THUNDERCLAP attacks while it designed the raids as true transportation attacks that did not target the morale of fleeing refugees or local citizens. After the successful raid against Leipzig during the daytime on the tenth, British bombers returned to Leipzig that night for the city's last raid of the war.425 The US First Army captured both Halle and Leipzig eight days later, on the nineteenth and twentieth respectively.

On April 10/11, Plauen received its largest THUNDERCLAP raid between 2305 and 2325 hours. In total 304 Lancasters from 1 Group and six Mosquitoes from 8 Group dropped a massive 1,126.5 tons of HE and 15.1 tons of IB on the city from cloudless

42J USAAF in Europe Daily Intelligence Summaries. No 1022. April 13, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D4321); and Bomber Command Intelligence Report No. 4676. April 12, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D2000.) Bomber Command intelligence also indicates that British bombers also damaged some business and residential buildings in the area of Engelsdorf. Supplement to Immediate Interpretation Report No. K. 4230. April 12, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D2117.) It is also revealed from Immediate Interpretation reports that the area outside the Wahren M/Y only suffered slight damage. Immediate Interpretation Report. No. 4234. April 12, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D2117.) 424 Bomber Command Intelligence Report No 4676. Raid Assessment Summary. April 12, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D2000). 425 During the night, 76 Lancasters and 19 Mosquitos of 5 and 8 Groups attacked the Wahren railway yards in Leipzig. In total, they dropped 305.5 tons of bombs and caused severe damage to the Eastern half of the yard and the through lines located here. In relation to collateral damage, there was very slight damage done to property outside of the marshalling property although some damage to business/residential properties occurred to the Southeast of the yard. Immediate Interpretation Report NO.K. 4236. Locality: Leipzig/Wahren marshalling yard. April 12, 1945. 181.003 (D2117.) Once again it would appear that Bomber Command performed an accurate raid against Leipzig except this one occurred during the nighttime hours.

146 skies. Bomber Command's intended goal was to destroy the railway facilities and block

4-Oft through routes in the marshalling yards north and south of the town. Immediate interpretation reports suggest that the attack was "mainly concentrated in the Northern half of the built-up area" since photo-reconnaissance showed fires still raging and that smoke obscured much of the northern parts of town hours after the raid. Further intelligence revealed that the North-east sector was completely devastated and still burning days after the attack.427 Furthermore, "the majority of the buildings in approximately forty city blocks visible on either side of the smoke pall are either destroyed or gutted."428 Eventually, Bomber Command and the USAAF determined that their bombers destroyed 365 acres, or 51 percent, of Plauen's built-up area.429

German sources reported that the raid was the heaviest to hit Plauen to date, with most of the town area affected, but particularly the West, centre sector and district of

Haselbrunn.430 By April 16, damage from all the February, March and April

THUNDERCLAP raids on Plauen, was "heavy and concentrated in the centre of the town where large areas of business/residential property have been destroyed by HE or gutted by fire. Damage incidents are more scattered in the outskirts."431 Like the

426 Bomber Command Report on Night Operations April 10/11, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (DHIST 1518). 427 Immediate Interpretation Report No. 4235. April 12, 1945. DHIST 181.002 (D 1852). See also Pathfinder Force Monthly Summary. April 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D977). 428 Ibid. Other reports also indicate that damage is heavy and concentrated in the centre of the town where "large scale areas of business/residential property have been destroyed," while it was reported that fires were also burning in the central area of the town. Bomber Command Intelligence Report No 4675. Raid Assessment Summary, April 10, 1945. April 11, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D2000). 429 Middlebrook and Everitt, 694. It is interesting to note that one report acknowledges that "many small industrial concerns, a large number of which would appear to be textile factories or spinning mills are scattered throughout the town, and a high proportion of these have been involved in the general destruction of the built-up areas." Interpretation Report K 4235. "Locality: Plauen." June 3, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D1852.) 430 This raid started over 260 fires and destroyed 150 houses, severely damaged 179, plus slightly-medium damaged over 300. The raid killed fifteen people, injured 118, buried 155 and left 6,000 homeless. SGII 264 File 84, "Plauen," 64. 431 Interpretation Report K 4235. "Locality: Plauen." June 3, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D1852).

147 majority of THUNDERCLAP cities, the Allied destruction left most of Plauen and its factories unidentifiable. Allied intelligence only recognized Vomag Maschinenfabrik

AG (Priority 2) and Sachsische Zellwolle AG (Priority 3).

With respect to transportation targets, USAAF intelligence quickly understood that bomb craters blocked the lines leading from the south rail yard. In the north, the rail yard was hit hard as fires still raged throughout the next day, while reports indicated that severe damage occurred to its surrounding infrastructure. In addition, American intelligence reported that fires continued to burn and fresh damage was visible in the built up area between the north and south rail yards. The Allies severely damaged the

"important rail junction," as well as many stations, goods sheds and depots. The report revealed "at least one through line on the Reichenbach-Hof route was open," while, the Germans managed to repair transportation damage within five days of this final raid

i • 434 on the city.

Bomber Command's last major raid in the ETO was, incidentally, against the last

THUNDERCLAP city to be attacked under the 1945 operation. Potsdam was another

German city that went literally unscathed until the last days of the war.435 Potsdam's presence in the Bomber's Baedeker is by far the briefest of all THUNDERCLAP cities.

The city receives a short paragraph description that focuses mainly on its history as a military centre to the great German Emperors. The Baedeker notes that "apart from the railway repair shops there are no industries," and Potsdam is "mainly a residential town,

432 USSAF in Europe Daily Intelligence Summaries, No 1022, April 13, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D4321); and Bomber Command Intelligence Report No 4676. April 12, 1945. "PRU Sorties for Bomber Command (4676-April 12, 1945.)" April 12, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D2000). 433 Interpretation Report K 4235. "Locality: Plauen." June 3, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D1852). 434 Ibid. 435 Because of its close proximity to the centre of Berlin, at roughly 18 miles, the 126,000 residents of Potsdam were used to the sounds of air raid sirens.

148 with a large portion of retired military and government officials."436 However, it mentions no administrative or military targets. Furthermore, the only target noted in the

Baedeker is a Priority 2 railway repair shop that employed some 3,500 workers.4 7

On the night of April 14/15, roughly 500 Lancasters from the 1,3 and 8 Groups along with a dozen Mosquitoes from 8 Group departed for Potsdam. Between 2250-2302 hours, 491 aircraft dropped a total of 1,717.1 tons of HE on the city. This tonnage far outnumbered the tonnages dropped on Dresden in February. The targets for this raid were the barracks housing military and Nazi personnel and the railway facility all located within the primary aiming point (the centre of the city).438 Optimum bombing conditions greeted the bombing crews allowing them to visually identify the targets.

According to one interpretation report, intense bombing on the target produced successful and devastating results. The report also detailed severe damage in the vicinity of the railway centre, while scattered damage extended across the city from the southeastern sector of Nowawes to the northwest suburb of Nauner.439 The central area of the town also suffered heavy damage. The British bombers destroyed or heavily damaged all the main targets including the railway station, the locomotive depot, the goods station, the passenger station and carriage and wagon shops. They also devastated the majority of buildings surrounding the rail yard and severely damaged one building of the barracks while another smaller one was not damaged.440 German police reports believed that close to five hundred people died in the inner town area of Babelsberg

436 Bomber's Baedeker: Guide to the Economic Importance of German Towns and Cities. "Potsdam," May 1944. Enemy Branch of the Foreign Office and Ministry of Economic Warfare. Volume II, 554. DHIST 181.009 (D989). 437 Ibid. 438 Bomber Command Report on Night Operations April 14/15, 1945. June 5, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D1518). 439 ,Immediat e Interpretation Report. No. K. 4273. April 17, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D1861). 440 5Ibid ; and Pathfinder Force Monthly Summary, April 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D977).

149 alone where severe property damage occurred and fires continued to rage long after the raid. The same report adds that this Allied raid injured and buried a large amount of people.441 The weakness of Germany in April 1945 was truly evident as British bombers encountered only minimal anti-aircraft fire and almost non-existent Luftwaffe fighters.

Bomber Command only lost one Lancaster due to enemy fighter activity. On the twenty- eighth, the Russians took control of the ruined city.

The attack on Potsdam generated a simple but demanding response from Prime

Minster Churchill on April 19. In his note he asked, "What was the point of going and blowing down Potsdam?"442 The next day Portal defended the attack by assuring the

Prime Minister that Potsdam was important in the sense that it was an attack on the

German Government machine adding that the Luftwaffe relocated its operational headquarters to Potsdam. Furthermore, Portal argued that Potsdam was important as a communication centre leading west from Berlin, and the home to a barracks housing military and Nazi personnel. Overall the attack on Potsdam, in the opinion of Portal and the JIC, "was calculated to hasten the disintegration of enemy resistance."443

By mid-April the ground situation in Germany was frantic. On April 16, the First and Second Belorussian Fronts and the First Ukrainian Front, which boxed in Berlin from the North, West, and South, made their final push on the city. Similarly, American ground forces made a final push into Magdeburg and secured the city the following day.

From February to April 1945, the Allies attacked Magdeburg seventeen times under

THUNDERCLAP and the city was wholly devastated by the time American forces captured the city. By now, the Allies had virtually reduced Dresden to a ruined city. On

441 SGII264 File 84, "Potsdam," 65. 442 Personal minute to Portal from Churchill. April 19, 1945. PRO AIR 20/2796. 443 Note from Portal to Churchill. April 20, 1945. PRO AIR 20/2796.

150 April 17, however, the USAAF attacked the city in what would be its last major raid in the European theater. At around 1350 hours, 428 B-17 bombers from the First Air

Division and 162 B-17s from the Third Air Division arrived over Dresden and spent an hour and half dropping a combined total of 1,738.8 tons of bombs with H2X radar and visual marking. Incidentally, the raid by USAAF bombers on April 17 was one of the largest single raids against the city. American bombers had few viable targets since previous raids as completely leveled most of the city. German police reports indicate,

"Most of the bombs fell on former bombed-out sites." Ironically, it was, as Frederic

Taylor argues in his book Dresden, Tuesday 13 February 1945, one of the most accurate and justifiable raids against the city. For this raid, the Americans selected the last remaining rail line heading North to South in the Reich as the aiming point. According to intelligence reports from the twentieth and twenty-first and German Police reports, severe damage occurred to the marshalling yard sidings, to rail facilities, rolling stock and to the tracks at the rail centre, stalling rail traffic for several days.445 The USAAF accurately hit its targets within Dresden, finally leaving the city a non-vital transportation route. On May 8, Russian forces entered Dresden and captured it.

For the remainder of the war, Bomber Command focused on sending Mosquito bombers to Berlin including its final raid against the capital on April 20/21. Only four days later Russian ground forces completely surrounded the city. As in March, the Allies targeted nine of the ten THUNDERCLAP cities in April 1945. In total they dispatched

5,088 sorties to drop over 9,100 tons during thirty seven raids. Specifically, Bomber

444 SGRII, 264 File 84, "Dresden," 22. 445 As seen in Bomber Command Intelligence reports No. 4690. "Raid Assessment summary of 19 April" April 21, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D2000); Bomber Command Intelligence reports No. 4692. "Raid Assessment summary of 21 April, 1945." April 22, 1945. DHIST 181.003 (D906); and SGRII, 264 File 84, "Dresden." 22

151 Command dropped over 5,500.7 tons of bombs and deployed 2,406 sorties of which

1,256 or 52 percent were Mosquito bombers. In comparison, the USAAF dispatched over 50 percent of the sorties for a total of 2,682. During eleven of its raids, the USAAF aimed ten at a marshalling yard and one at the city proper. There were only two raids performed visually; therefore, once again demonstrating USAAF dependency on blind bombing radar. Although the USAAF only dropped 3,614.4 tons of the over 9,100 total tons in April, it did perform the larger and consistently more damaging raids. Bomber

Command's Mosquitos bombers dropped roughly 1,546 tons or just over one quarter of its total tonnage when not accompanied by a heavy bomber, therefore, contributing to a significant portion of the British THUNDERCLAP raids in April.

By late April 1945, all ten THUNDERCLAP targets had experienced, to some extent, the destructive powers of the Allied strategic bombers. 46 As demonstrated throughout this thesis, the Allies attacked several cities on numerous occasions and sometimes on consecutive days while other cities received less frequent but heavier raids. When the heavy bombers were not busy, the Mosquito bombers made smaller consecutive raids night after night. Furthermore, the goal of bombing Dresden and the other THUNDERCLAP cities was not to hit specific military related industries within the city area but to aim at areas where the greatest impact would be felt; the city centre.

The primary purpose of THUNDERCLAP was to attack civilians as a means to create demoralizing conditions, which in turn, would bring about a quick end to the war. As a result, Allied officials predetermined that civilians were targets. In a letter to Air

446 See Appendix XIV for a chart detailing the total combined tonnage dropped by Bomber Command and the USAAF on the THUNDERCLAP cities between February and April 1945. See Appendix XVI for a chart listing all the THUNDERCLAP attacks on each city by day.

152 Commodore Bufton dated February 17, 1945, the acting Director of Air, Brigadier A.B.

Davies made some revealing remarks regarding the selection of the THUNDERCLAP targets and its operational purpose. He wrote,

As an area bombing target list, and from the point of view of causing chaotic conditions owing to the evacuee problem, the War Office agrees with the list. I have, however, been asked to say that from a transportation point of view, our Intelligence considers that a greater dividend could be gained by bombing transportation targets in West and Central Germany.447

Although the conditions of January 1945 may have revived the THUNDERCLAP plan of 1944, the main purpose/goals had not changed.

During February, March and April 1945, roughly 18,400/24,495 Bomber

Command and Eighth USAAF sorties dropped over a combined 42,551 tons of bombs on the ten THUNDERCLAP cities. In context to the overall strategic bombing offensive in early 1945, these numbers are a small percentage of the total sorties and tonnages for the two bombing forces. For example, the Allies dispatched a combined total of 122,284 sorties and dropped roughly 302,162 tons of bombs on various enemy targets in February, March and April 1945.448 Specifically, Bomber

Command focused 36.6 percent of its effort to attacking cities across Germany with special attention to cities in the Ruhr area and those bordering the Rhine.449 In many instances the Allies deployed record sorties and massive tonnages dropped on cities

44' Letter from Davies to Bufton, February 17, 1945. PRO AIR 2/8011 448 The American statistics cover heavy bomber sorties while Bomber Command's sorties cover bombers of all types. USAAF sorties taken from Davis, Carl A. Spaatz and the Air War in Europe, Appendix 13 and then added to Bomber Command sorties found in Webster and Frankland Volume IV, Appendix 40, 433; Total tonnage taken from Webster and Frankland, Volume IV, Appendix 44, 457. Once again Bomber Command sorties include daytime raids. See Appendix XV for two charts comparing the total tonnage dropped by Bomber Command and Eighth USAAF on Germany between February-April 1945 and total tonnage dropped by Bomber Command and Eighth USAAF on THUNDERCLAP cities between February-April 1945. 4 David L. Bashow, No Prouder Place: Canadians and the Bomber Command Experience 1939-1945. (St Catherines: Vanwell Publishing, 2005), 381; and Terraine, 679.

153 such as Essen, Dortmund, Nuremburg, Hanover, Hamburg and Cologne. Bomber

Command also focused on attacking oil, transportation and naval targets. In comparison, the USAAF primarily focused on attacking marshalling yards, industries relating to the GAF and oil plants. Numerous USAAF attacks on targets of opportunity such as general city areas also occurred throughout February, March and April. Nonetheless, although Operation THUNDERCLAP amounts to a small proportion of the total Allied bomber offensive in 1945, it remains the Allies' most controversial operation of the Second World War.

154 Conclusion

More than sixty years later, historians continue to symbolize the February 1945 bombing of Dresden as the most destructive and notorious use of airpower during the course of the Second World War. Yet, after analyzing Operation THUNDERCLAP in its entirety, this thesis demonstrates that Dresden was only one of several cities targeted within a larger controversial campaign. In fact, there are several raids under

THUNDERCLAP where the Allies employed more sorties and even larger tonnages against cities other than Dresden. Although Dresden definitely stands alone in terms of the tragic loss of life and severe destruction in one city, during one raid, modern authors should not isolate Dresden as the symbol of "wanton destruction" from the other

THUNDERCLAP cities when examining the final months of the Allied bombing offensive. Instead of focusing on simply the outcome of individual bombing raids in

1945, historians must examine the Allied intent in attacking the eastern German cities and more specifically the overall direction and purpose of Operation THUNDERCLAP.

By February 1945, Allied officials developed the official policy of

THUNDERCLAP into a series of overpowering raids on eastern German cities to impede the flow of Nazi reinforcements. This official policy, however, was built on the prevailing idea that direct attacks on civilians and urban centres as a means to ending the war through bombardment was acceptable. As demonstrated in previous chapters, the

Allies fully understood that eastern German cities were evacuation centres by late

January 1945 and, as a result, the transportation lines leading into these cities, their central transportation hubs and, ultimately, the city centres, were all primary locations for refuge. Within the pages of various Allied intelligence and after action reports one

155 similar characteristic of the THUNDERCLAP raids remains consistent; the aiming point for the bombers. On paper the individual bombing policies of Bomber Command and the

USAAF may have differentiated, however, in practice and to the civilians on the ground they did not.

In all but four of Bomber Command's THUNDERCLAP raids, the aiming point is described as a general target area such as the "centre of the built up area" or the "centre of the city" and not specific transportation targets associated with the city. The USAAF sold its effort under THUNDERCLAP as very characteristic of its "precision bombing" abilities in the last year of the war in Europe. On paper, most of the Eighth Air Force

THUNDERCLAP attacks appear to be aimed at precise targets such as marshalling yards or rail depots, using H2X radar. Long before THUNDERCLAP raids began, the

USAAF undeniably knew that H2X directed bombing was not accurate but continued to promote its bombing doctrine as precision-based. When the plan to execute

THUNDERCLAP arose, Spaatz agreed to participate as long as the USAAF bombers aimed their bombs at specific targets. Nonetheless, between February and May 1945, the

USAAF performed most of its THUNDERCLAP attacks under 10/10 cloud cover using blind bombing techniques. Out of the total forty-six USAAF THUNDERCLAP attacks, it performed only four raids under clear to 4/10 cover while during three of these raids it still used H2X radar. On the other hand the USAAF conducted twenty-one raids in 5/10-

10/10 cloud cover, via H2X, along with eighteen raids that occurred under unknown conditions, also with H2X. Taking into account the statistics presented above and the fact that only five USAAF raids used visual targeting methods, it is clear that USAAF

156 bombing relied heavily on H2X radar during THUNDERCLAP. It is also important to note that there were increasing instances where USAAF target definition was very similar to that of its counterpart, Bomber Command. At least twelve USAAF attacks indicate that the town area was the designated aiming point.451 In fact, as early as mid-

February, and then more commonly in March and April, USAAF aiming points for

THUNDERCLAP raids were general city areas and not specific targets. Concurrently, after action reports consistently reveal that damage from USAAF raids was widespread proving that American bombing produced area bombing results and, more importantly,

American precision bombing during the Second World War was simply a myth.

In general, the Allied bomber offensive, and the strategic bomber itself, were without doubt integral components in the war against Germany. In 1942, the strategic bomber was the only means by which Churchill could counterattack the Nazi offensive and ultimately relieve the pressure on his nation. The POINTBLANK Directive, specifically the operations to eliminate the Luftwaffe, Germany's oil supplies, transportation infrastructure in France and bombing operations in direct support of the Allied armies in

Normandy, were instrumental in helping the land forces achieve continental superiority.

By 1945, the Allied bomber forces peaked in available firepower resulting in the overall offensive generating substantial momentum. Combined with diminishing German ground defences and the decline of the Luftwaffe, the strategic bomber offensive was perhaps the Allies most powerful weapon. Arguing that Allied air planners were wrong

450 Four of these raids used visual targeting in unknown conditions. There were also three raids were USAAF bombers encountered mixed bombing conditions and therefore some bombers employed H2X while some used visual bombing techniques. 451 They include Dresden twice on 15/2/45, once on 17/4/45; Plauen on 3/3/45 and twice on 19/3/45; Leipzig on 31/3/45; Chemnitz on 2/3/45 and twice on 5/3/45; and Erfurt on 9/2/45 and on 31/3/45. There are also seven instances where USAAF bomber target Berlin as well as a rail centre.

157 in wanting to end the war quickly through air power is difficult and mistaken. It would have been impossible and impractical for Allied air officials and leaders to let their bombers sit in the United Kingdom while the ground forces fought the Nazis deep within Germany. The main point of contention, however, is how the Allies applied their powerful bomber forces at a time when it was already obvious that the average German would not, and arguably could not, rise up to revolt against the Nazi leadership.

Ultimately the main source of controversy is the indiscriminate nature of the February,

March and April 1945 THUNDERCLAP bombing campaign. The Allies designed

Operation THUNDERCLAP to attack civilians from the start. From the pre-

THUNDERCLAP stages in 1944/1945, which isolated civilian morale and "evacuation centres" as the main THUNDERCLAP targets, to the various briefing and interpretation notes for the THUNDERCLAP raids, which boldly repeat the fact that refugees were the intended target, it is evident that the Allies blurred the line between attacking combatants and non-combatants.

Alternatively, Allied officials could have employed Bomber Command and the

USAAF to effectively support the advancing armies with attacks on true military targets such as oil installations or through close support operations as seen in Normandy. Even more discriminate raids against marshalling yards, as achieved in the pre-OVERLORD bombing phase, should have occurred in February, March and April 1945. Several bombing raids late in the THUNDERCLAP campaign were testaments to the newfound capabilities of the two bomber forces in early 1945. For example, Bomber Command's

April 10/11 raid on Leipzig and the USAAF's April 17 raid on Dresden prove that

158 Allied bombing could be discriminate and achieve some level of accuracy against

specific transportation targets.

Operation THUNDERCLAP ultimately characterized the momentum and weight of the Allied bombing offensive in 1945. It was also a failure. There is little evidence to suggest that THUNDERCLAP effectively halted the movement of reinforcements. In fact, from most of the post-THUNDERCLAP damage reports it is evident that rail infrastructure was not severely damage and, in most cases, easily repaired. More importantly, THUNDERCLAP did not end the Second World War. The destruction of

Berlin, Dresden, Chemnitz, Leipzig, Halle, Plauen, Dessau, Potsdam, Erfurt and

Magdeburg in 1945 was ultimately a black spot in the conduct of the Allies during the

Second World War. Instead of producing an Allied victory, THUNDERCLAP ultimately produced a tainted reputation that continues to haunt Bomber Command and the USAAF today, while, fueling controversies that will surely be debated for years to come.

159 Appendix I

RAF and USAAF Bomber Specifications

RAF Bombers

AVRO Lancaster B.Mk I

Source:http://www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/aircraft.html

Powerplant: Four 1,223 kW (1,750 hp) Merlin inverted inline piston engines Maximum Speed: 462 km/h (287 mph) at 2,500 m (11,480 ft) Cruising Speed: 322 km/h (200 mph) Range: 4,072 km (2,530 mi) with 3,178 kg (7,000 lb) bomb load Service Ceiling: 5,793 m (19.000 ft) Weapons: Eight 7.7 mm (.303 cal) Browning machine guns (two in nose turret, two in mid upper turret, four in tail turret. Early models also had ventral turret with a single .303 machine gun. Special versions were stripped of armament to carry increased bomb loads Bomb Load: Up to 22,000 lb bombs carried internally. Later versions modified to carry a variety of single high explosive bombs of 8,000 lb (3,632kg), 12,000 lb (5,448 kg) or 22,000 lb (9,988 kg) for special missions Weight: 16, 783 (36,923 lb) empty; loaded 30, 845 kg (67,859 lb) Dimensions: Wingspan 31.00 m (102 ft) Length 21.08 m (69 ft 4 in) Height 6.23 m (20 ft 6 in)

160 DE Havilland Mosquito

Source:http://www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/aircraft.html

B.XVI

Powerplant: Two Rolls Royce Merlin 72 or 73s of l,680hp each or two Merlin 76 or 77sof 1,71 Ohp each Maximum Speed: 669 km/h (415 mph) Range: 2,395km (1,485 m) with 1,816kg (4,0001b) bombload Service Ceiling: 11,273 m (37,000 ft) Weapons: none Bomb Load: 1,816 kg (4,000 lb) Weight: 6,400 (14,440 lb) empty; 10,200 kg (22,440 lb) loaded Dimensions: Wingspan 16.50 m (54 ft 2 in) Length 12.64 m (41 ft 6 in) Height 4.65 m (15 ft 3in)

161 USAAF Bombers

Boeing B-17G Flying Fortress

Source:http://www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/aircraft.html

Powerplant: Four 895 kW (1,200 hp) Wright R-l820-97 Cyclone Turbocharged radial piston engines Maximum Speed: 462 km/p (287 mph) at 7,690 m (25,230 ft) Range: 3,220 km (2000 mi) with 2,725 kg (6,007 lb) load Weapons: Thirteen 12.7 mm (.50 cal) machine guns in twin turrets; plus single dorsal and fore and aft beam positions Bomb Load: 8,000 kg (17,640 lb) maximum bombload Weight: 16,391 kg (36,136 lb) empty; 29,710 kg (65,499 lb) loaded Dimensions: Span 31.62 m (103 ft 9 in) Length 22.66 m (74 ft 4 in) Height 5.82 m (19 ft 1 in)

162 Consolidated B-24D Liberator

Source: http://history.acusd.edu/gen/st/~jcollins/specifications.html

Powerplant: Four 895 kW (1,200 hp) Pratt & Whitney R-l830-43 Twin Wasp radial piston engines Maximum Speed: 488 km/h (300 mph) Cruising Speed: 322km/h (200 mph) Range: 3,703 km (2,300 mi) Service Ceiling: 9,753 m (32,000 ft) Weapons: Eleven 12.7mm (.50 cal) machine guns (one in the nose, left & right cheek, two in the top turret, two in the ball turret and two in the left and right waist and tail) Bomb Load: maximum internal bombload of 3,629 kg (8,800 lb) Weight: 14,786 kg (32,605 lb) empty; 27,210 kg (60,000 lb) maximum Dimensions: Wingspan 33.52 m (110 ft) Length 20.22 m (66 ft 4 in) Height 5.46m(17ftllin)

163 Appendix II

H2X image of the Normandy beachhead at Grave-Sur-Mer on June 6th, 1944.

Source: http://www.486th.org/Photos/AC3/Mickey4.htm

164 Appendix III

Comparison of Total Training Hours of Fighter Pilots GAF, RAF and USAAF

COMPARISON OF TOTAL TRAINING HOURS OF FIGHTER PILOTS. G.A.F. R.A.F. AND U-S.A.A.F.

G.A.F. 1939 TO ::= SEPT 1942. 1 IR.A.F . -1 OCT »942 C.A.F. TO -1 JUNE 1943 R.A.F. .-i U.S.A.A.F. i:::3

G.A.F. JULY 1943 ]] TO t JUNE 1944 R.A.F. .1 U.S. A.A.F. I::J

G.A.F. JULY 1944 R.A.F. TO i END 1 U.S.A.A.F i j

.NUMBE r R OF FLYING HOURS I 50 ,QO ,5° 200 25° 300 35<3 400

| [ MINIMUM HOURS

• 1 MAXIMUM HOURS.

FIGURE 31

Source: "Report of the British Bombing Survey Unit." Found in The Strategic Air War Against Germany 1939-1945 (Frank Class: London, 1998), 100.

165 Group/ Deployed Effective Tons Tons Tons Cloud Date Who Division Sorties Sorties H.E. LB. Frag Total Tons Sighting Cover Aiming Point Feb 3 USAAF 1st AD 467B-17s 443 1061.0 VIS Clear Berlin/Tempelhof 3rd AD 536B-17s 494 1205.7 H2X M/Y(P) Feb 5/6 RAF 8 Group 63 Mosqs 55 56.9 2.2 59.1 10/10 Feb 8/9 RAF 8 Group 47 Mosqs 47 Feb 14/15 RAF 8 Group 46 Mosqs 40 Sky 10/10 markers Feb 18/19 RAF 8 Group 6 Mosqs 5 4.5 4.5 H2S Feb 20/21 RAF 8 Group 65 Mosqs 62 70.5 2.3 72.8 Feb 21/22 RAF 8 Group 77 Mosqs 70 76.4 2.3 78.7 Feb 22/23 RAF 8 Group 73 Mosqs 72 79.0 1.1 80.1 Feb 23/24 RAF 8 Group 70 Mosqs 68 87.7 1.3 89.0 Feb 24/25 RAF 8 Group 63 Mosqs 63 76.1 3.1 79.2 Feb 25/26 RAF 8 Group 10 Mosqs 10 Feb 26 USAAF 1st AD 377 B-17s 363 895.5 H2X 10/10 Berlin/Scleischer u > RR Station (P) •a 3rd AD 446 B-17s 418 1250.7 Berlin/Alexanderpla a n tz RR Station (P) m S OS nd a 2 AD 361 B-24s 285 650.3 Berlin North RR o Station (P) r Feb 26/27 RAF 8 Group 38 Mosqs 36 28.8 Town > Feb 27/28 RAF 8 Group 96 Mosqs 96 112.4 Town Feb 28/1 RAF 8 Group 74 Mosqs 73 95.1 Town o Marl/2 RAF 8 Group 55 Mosqs 50 40.9 Town & Berlin THUNDERCLAP Chart (cont'd)

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167 Effective Tons Tons Tons Cloud Aiming Date Who Group/Division Deployed Sorties Sorties H.E. LB. Frag Total Tons Sighting Cover Point Mar 23/24 RAF 8 Group 65 Mosqs 63 78.9 Town Mar 24/25 RAF 8 Group 67 Mosqs 62 78.9 Town Mar 25/26 RAF 8 Group 8 Mosqs 8 6.3 Town Mar 26/27 RAF 8 Group 86 Mosqs 80 110.9 Town Mar 27/28 RAF 8 Group 82 Mosqs 79 101.0 Town

Mar 29/30 RAF 8 Group 48 Mosqs 46 59.1 Town td Mar 30/31 RAF 8 Group 43 Mosqs 40 48.9 Town i-t Apr 2/3 RAF 8 Group 54 Mosqs 54 44.3 Town Apr 3/4 RAF 8 Group 94 Mosqs 90 114.5 u Apr 4/5 RAF 8 Group 35 Mosqs 35 43.3 o Apr 8/9 RAF 8 Group 28 Mosqs 27 30.0 w

ON Apr 9/10 RAF 8 Group 44 Mosqs 41 49.2 o oo Apr 10/11 RAF 8 Group 28 Mosqs 28 98.7 1.7 100.4 Clear > 21 Mosqs 19 28 Mosqs 25 O Apr 11/12 RAF 8 Group 107 Mosqs 128.9 cr (3 Waves) SB Apr 12/13 RAF 8 Group 97 Mosqs 93 128.7 o o Apr 14/15 RAF 8 Group 62 Mosqs 60 89.3 3 Apr 15/16 RAF 8 Group 106 Mosqs 103 133.1 Apr 16/17 RAF 8 Group 64 Mosqs 62 86.6 Apr 17/18 RAF 8 Group 61 Mosqs 56 73.1 Apr 18/19 RAF 8 Group 57 Mosqs 54 75.1 Apr 19/20 RAF 8 Group 79 Mosqs 73 100.1 Apr 20/21 RAF 8 Group 76 Mosqs 64 75.7 Group/ Deployed Effective Tons Tons Tons Total Date Who Sighting Cloud Cover Aiming Point Division Sorties Sorties H.E. LB. Frag Tons Feb RAF 5 Group 254 Lanes 244 1477.7 1181.6 2659.3 NEWHAVEN w/ 9-10/10 Centre of closely 13/14 sector bombing and built up Alstadt (1M skymarking area wave) Feb RAF 1 Group 261 Lanes 251 NEWHAVEN w/ Clear-4/10 13/14 3 Group 162 Lanes 147 Skymarking and (2nd 6 Group 67 Lanes 66 later centre of fires wave) 8 Group 61 Lanes 60 Feb 14 USAAF 1st AD 461 B-17s 311 487.7 294.3 782.0 H2X Clear M/Y(P)

Feb 15 USAAF 3rd AD 459B-17s 1 2.5 464.4 H2X 10/10 Dresden (O) 1st AD 224 B-17s 210 461.9 Dresden (S) o March USAAF 3rd AD 455 B-17s 406 940.3 140.5 1080.8 H2X 8-10/10 M/Y(S) >-s 2 VI April USAAF 1st AD 450B-17s 152 430.4 1732.8 H2X Rail Centre (P) 17 276 845.9 M/Y(P) H 3rd AD 410B-17s 76 211.2 VIS Dresden- X > Neustadt (P) 86 245.3 M/Y(S) sa ON wo a. o > o Date Who Group/ Deployed Effective Tons H.E. Tons Tons Total Sighting Cloud Aiming Division Sorties Sorties LB. Frag Tons Cover Point Feb 6 USAAF 3rd AD 535 B-17s 437 1046.7 85.0 1131.7 H2X 10/10 M/Y(S) 1st AD 414B-17s 37 M/Y(S) Feb 14 USAAF 3rd AD 457B-17s 294 519.0 228.0 747.0 H2X 10/10 M/Y(P)

Feb RAF 4 Group 152 Hals 140 794.8 1284.6 2079.4 NEWHAVEN w/ 10/10 Centre of 14/15 6 Group 52 Lanes 51 H2S or glow of City (Is' 66 Hals 64 fires wave) 8 Group 59 Lanes 58 Feb RAF 1 Group 202 Lanes 192 NEWHAVEN 9-10/10 Centre of 14/15 3 Group 151 Lanes 137 W H2S or glow City (2nd 8 Group 35 Lanes 29 of fires o wave) Mar 2 USAAF 1st AD 450B-17s 255 594.2 594.2 H2X/VIS 2-10/10 Chemnitz (S) S! Mar 3 USAAF 1 AD 222B-17S 166 399.1 399.1 H2X 7-10/10 M/Y(S) N Mar 5 USAAF Is'AD 151B-17s 128 303.6 1.4 305.0 H2X 10/10 Chemnitz H > 3rd AD 152B-17s 105 257.4 257.4 H2X (S) T3 Chemnitz 3 ^1 (S) O 2". o Mar RAF 1 Group 239 Lanes 229 1112.1 859.2 1971.3 Skymarking and 10/10 Centre of 5/6 4 Group 196 Hals 179 H2S built up m < (1st 6 Group 101 Hals 92 area. wave) 84 Lanes 84 o 8 Group 94 Lanes 93 r > Mar RAF 8 Group 6 Mosqs 6 O 5/6 (2nd wave) Apr RAF 8 Group 21 Mosqs 20 13.6 4.5 18.1 Town 10/11 Group/ Deployed Effective Tons Tons Tons Total Cloud Date Who Sighting Aiming Point Division Sorties Sorties H.E. LB. Frag Tons Cover Feb 27 USAAF 3rd AD 378B-17s 355 1459.3 461.6 11.8 1932.7 H2X 10/10 Leipzig C/C 1st AD 378B-17s 362 H2X Leipzig C/C Mar 31 USAAF 1st AD 432B-17s 8 21.2 1.0 22.2 H2X Leipzig (O)

Ap6 USAAF 1st AD 230B-17s 215 817.2 132.5 949.7 H2X Main Station and M/Y (S) 3rd AD 222 B-17s 106 H2X Main Station and M/Y (S) Apr 10 RAF 6 Group 134 Lanes 134 Clear 4 miles due East of Centre of City

1 (EngelsdorfM/Y) t- 6 Mosqs 6 CD North of Railway 5' Centre N 90 Clear (Mockau M/Y) 90 Hals £)' > Apr RAF 5 Group 76 Lanes, 70 297.1 8.4 305.5 NEWHAVEN w/ Clear Leipzig/ H 10/11 11 Mosqs 11 preliminary Wahren Railway X -B 8 Group 8 Mosqs 3 OBOE Centre S groundmarking o a. o t-1 > o 13* 5 Who Group/ Deployed Effective Tons Tons Tons Total Sighting Cloud Aiming Date Division Sorties Sorties H.E. LB. Frag Tons Cover Point Feb 24/25 RAF 8 Group 3 'siren tour' 1 .8 .8

Feb 27 USAAF 2nd AD 351B-24S 314 617.8 113.8 731.6 H2X 10/10 M/Y(P)

Mar 12/13 RAF 8 Group 3 3

Mar 20/21 RAF 5 Group 12 Lanes 12 56.2 56.2 (feint) Mar 31 USAAF 1st AD 432B-17s 369 1116.9 13.6 1130.4 H2X M/Y(S)

Apr 6 USAAF 2nd AD 207 B-24s 183 165.9 91.8 294.5 H2X M/Y(P) 1st AD 230B-17 11 36.8 H2X M/Y(0)

fT H X > c o S ^1 m & a or > o & Date Who Group/ Deployed EffectiveSorti Tons Tons Tons Total Sighting Cloud Aiming Division Sorties es H.E. LB. Frag Tons Cover Point Feb 23 USAAF 1st AD 460B-17s 110 325.0 325.0 H2X 10/10 M/Y(P)

Mar 3 USAAF 1st AD 222 B-17s 11 27.5 27.5 VIS Plauen (O)

Mar 19 USAAF 3rd AD 496 B-17s 32 85.5 83.7 96.0 H2X 8-10/10 Plauen (O) Is' AD 436B-17s 404 930.3 1014.0 H2X Plauen (S) Apr 3/4 RAF 8 Group 8 Mosqs 8 7.1 7.1 Town

Apr 5 USAAF 2nd AD 397 B-24s 151 327.2 16.8 348.4 H2X 10/10 M/Y(P)

Apr 8 USAAF 3rd AD 522B-17s 86 208.6 46.0 258.3 H2X 10/10 M/Y(P)

Apr 9/10 RAF 8 Group 37 Mosqs 36 51.1 51.1 4-7/10 Town C Apr 10/11 RAF 1 Group 304 Lanes 1126.5 15.1 1141.6 Newhaven Clear Railway n 8 Group 8 Mosqs Centre 3 H > §X ^1 D s hrt & *a o x > n Group/ Deployed Effective Tons Tons Tons Total Cloud Aiming Date Who Sighting Division Sorties Sorties H.E. LB. Frag Tons Cover Point Feb 14/15 RAF 8 Group 14Mosqs 13 13.2 1.0 14.2 Town

Feb 24/25 RAF 8 Group 3 Mosqs 1 .8 .8 Town (Siren Tour) Mar 7/8 RAF 1 Group 243 Lanes 234 744.7 959.9 1704.6 NEWHAVEN w/ 8-10/10 Centre of 3 Group 124 Lanes 119 Skymarking built up 6 Group 82 Lanes 81 area and 8 Group 71 Lanes 66 post office 6 Mosqs 6 Apr 8/9 RAF 8 Group 71 Mosqs 60 71.7 71.7 Town Apr 10/11 USAAF 493 BG 14 B-24s 13 15.5 15.2 30.7 H2X Rail goods o depot W p C H > a T3 cJ T3 a s m a n X > n Group/ Deployed Effective Tons Tons Tons Total Cloud Aiming Date Who Sighting Division Sorties Sorties H.E. LB. Frag Tons Cover Point Apr 14/15 RAF 1 Group 212 Lanes 206 1717.1 34.8 1751.9 OBOE Clear Centre of 3 Group 198 Lanes 194 groundmarking city 8 Group 90 Lanes 89 12 Mosqs 2

o

P B H > -a sre ^1 O w X n X. •a o Group/ Deployed Effective Tons Tons Tons Total Aiming Date Who Sighting Cloud Cover Division Sorties Sorties H.E. LB. Frag Tons Point Feb 9 USAAF 1st AD 304 B-17s 12 32.5 32.5 H2X Some cloud Erfurt (S)

Feb 19/20 RAF 8 Group 82 Mosqs 79 99.1 .7 99.8 4-10/10 Town

Feb 22/23 RAF 8 Group 4 Mosqs 3 7.1 7.1 Town

Feb 24/25 RAF 8 Group 3 Mosqs 1 .8 .8 Town (Siren raid) Feb 25/26 RAF 8 Group 63 Mosqs 59 72.8 72.8 Scattered Town cloud Marl/2 RAF 8 Group 40 Mosqs 39 65.4 65.4 10/10 Town m Mar 13/14 RAF 8 Group 6 Mosqs 6 Town B a Mar 15/16 RAF 8 Group 22 Mosqs 19 26.5 29.5 Town H (two raids) RAF 8 Group 5 Mosqs 3 3 > March 17 USAAF 1st AD 449 B-17s 51 142.7 3.5 146.2 H2X 10/10 M/Y(S) -a « Mar 26/27 RAF 8 Group 2 Mosqs 2 3.6 3.6 Town a s ^1 w a Mar 27/28 RAF 8 Group 4 Mosqs 4 7.1 7.1 Town o March 31 USAAF 3rd AD 229 B-17s 25 70.3 70.3 VIS Erfurt (O) > O B Group/ Deployed Effective Tons Tons Tons Total Cloud Date Who Sighting Aiming Point Division Sorties Sorties H.E. LB. Frag Tons Cover Feb 3 USAAF 2nd AD 434 B-24s 246 616.2 .5 616.7 H2X M/Y(L)

Feb 4/5 RAF 8 Group 4 Mosqs 4 Town

Feb 5/6 RAF 8 Group 7 Mosqs 7 Town

Feb 6 USAAF 2nd AD 434 B-24s 418 947.5 1.8 949.3 H2X Main Stn and M/Y(S) Feb 7/8 RAF 8 Group 38 Mosqs 37 40.4 40.4 Town

Feb 9 USAAF 2nd AD 313B-24s 268 596.5 .8 597.3 H2X M/Y(S) Feb 13/14 RAF 8 Group 71 Mosqs 70 84.2 84.2 10/10 Town

nd Feb 14 USAAF 2 AD 375 B-24s 340 583.0 215.5 798.5 H2X M/Y(S) a" Mar 2 USAAF 2nd AD 321 B-24s 257 543.9 29.2 573.0 H2X M/Y(P) H Mar 11/12 RAF 8 Group 6 Mosqs Town H

Mar 12/13 RAF 8 Group 3 Mosqs Town S •^1 Mar 24/25 RAF 8 Group 2 Mosqs 2 Siren Town tour o Mar 26/27 RAF 8 Group 2 Mosqs 1 Siren Town X tour o Mar 27/28 RAF 8 Group 3 Mosqs 2 2.0 2.0 Town t-1 Apr 2/3 RAF 8 Group 50 Mosqs 48 78.4 78.4 Town >

Apr 3/4 RAF 8 Group 5 Mosqs 5 Town o

Apr 4/5 RAF 8 Group 31 Mosqs 31 54.4 54.4 Town Appendix XIV

Total Combined Tonnage Dropped by Bomber Command and the USAAF on the THUNDERCLAP Cities between February and April 1945.

City Sorties Combined Bomber (Effective/Deployed) Command/USAAF Tonnage Dropped (Tons) Berlin 5,795/6,547 10,977.0 Dresden 2,286/3,564 6,719.3 Chemnitz 2,796/3,839 7,503.2 Leipzig 1,360/1,965 3,965.8 Halle 893/1,238 2,213.5 Plauen 1,147/2,890 3,269.0 Dessau 593/628 1,822.0 Potsdam 491/512 1,751.9 Erfurt 303/1,213 535.1 Magdeburg 1,736/2,099 3,798.2

42,555.0 (with Berlin) Total 18,400/25,495 31,578.0 (without Berlin) Appendix XV

Comparison Charts of Total Tonnage dropped by Bomber Command and Eighth USAAF on Germany between February-April 1945 and Total Tonnage dropped by Bomber Command and Eighth USAAF on THUNDERCLAP cities between February- April 1945

Month Bomber Command USAAF Total/Month February 45,889 46,008 91,897 March 67,637 65,962 133,599 April 34,954 41,632 76,586

Total 148,480 153,602 302,082

Total Tonnage dropped by Bomber Command and Eighth USAAF on Germany between February- April 1945.

Month Bomber Command USAAF Total/Month February 5,759.3 14,171.9 19,931.2 March 5,294.8 8,202.8 13,497.6 April 5,507.8 3,614.4 9,122.2

Total 16,561.9 25,989.1 42,551.0

Total Tonnage dropped by Bomber Command and Eighth USAAF on THUNDERCLAP cities between February-April 1945.

179 Appendix XVI

THUNDERCLAP Attacks on Each City bv Day. Fe b 9 Fe b 3 Fe b 6 Fe b 1 4 Fe b 4/ 5 Fe b 5/ 6 Fe b 7/ 8 Marc h 2 Apri l 2/ 3 Apri l 3/ 4 Apri l 4/ 5 Fe b 13/1 4 Marc h 11/1 2 Marc h 24/2 5 Marc h 26/2 7 Marc h 27/2 8 Marc h 12/1 3 Magdebur g Fe b 9 Erfur t Marc h 1 7 Fe b 19/2 0 Fe b 22/2 3 Fe b 24/2 5 Fe b 25/2 6 Marc h 1/ 2 Marc h 3 1 Marc h 13/1 4 Marc h 15/1 6 Marc h 26/2 7 Marc h 27/2 8 Potsda m Apri l 14/1 5 Dessa u Apri l 8/ 9 Fe b 14/1 5 Fe b 24/2 5 Marc h 7/ 8 Apri l 10/1 1 Fe b 2 3 Apri l 8 Apri l 5 Marc h 3 Plaue n Apri l 3/ 4 Marc h 1 9 Apri l 9/1 0 Apri l 10/1 1 Fe b 2 7 Hall e Apri l 6 Fe b 24/2 5 Marc h 3 1 Marc h 12/1 3 Marc h 20/2 1 10/1 1 Apri l Fe b 2 7 Apri l 6 Apri l 1 0 Leipzi g Marc h 3 1 Fe b 6 Fe b 1 4 Marc h 5 Marc h 2 Marc h 3 Fe b 14/1 5 Marc h 5/ 6 Apri l 10/1 1

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180 J u. ;•...•»• '•••J '.iV "*•=*• •X .Til lift - li\..>». -

Map 1

Map of Europe, 1944

Source: "Europe, 1944: Allied Gains in Europe." United States Military Academy's Department of History. Available [Online]: http://wvyrw.dean.usma.edu/histoi-v/web03/atlases/ww2%20europe/ww2%20europe%20pages/ww2%20europe%20map%2060.htm. Accessed July 20, 2006,

181 Map 2

Allied "Zone Map" of Berlin including two and half mile radius from THUNDERCLAP proposal

Source: PRO 20/4826 "Operation "Thunderclap": bombing attacks to break German morale: aerial photographs 1944 Aug."

182 *tf>fff*f f?>i.'f*'C

0 fii'K^r&vr,. .:'.:<;• fhi.

fglhct .Nordhamen^

Leipzig

Weimar .Dresden »\ f-i-eihrrjj

$aa(7e/£ ""*•«-»' J r ;•tn/'frl * N~. " PLAl« N A^ , Cohura -4T fKarhl- ~Jb^v»k\ ><«/• * ^ *!•• s PRA6UT ^S. TlWn ^ >^^ C 2 E z/T*n O ] S i f 1i \x WIS IN 1 F \ # ) I i\ S \ rcA %bor 1 •'***"" ^v

ens

Map 3

Railway lines around THUNDERCLAP targets

Source: PRO AIR 2/8011

183 Bibliography

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191 Curriculum Vitae

Kevin Ross Norris

University of Waterloo, 1999-2003, Honors BA in History and an International Studies Option

"Project APHRODITE" 6th Annual History International Graduate Conference University of Maine Orono, Maine, USA October 15-17,2004

"Bombsights, Flying Fortresses and Pickle Barrels: The Myth of US Precision Bombing During World War II" Eleventh Annual Underhill Graduate Student Colloquium Carleton University Ottawa, Ontario March 3-4, 2005

"Bombing Auschwitz: What Could the Allies Have Done?" History Across the Disciplines 2005 Dalhousie University Halifax, Nova Scotia March 11-13,2005

"Bombing to Win the War: Operation THUNDERCLAP and the Bombing of Eastern Germany." 16th Military History Colloquium University of Waterloo Waterloo, Ontario May 6-7, 2005