The Devastating 1943 Bombing of Hamburg Shook the Nazi Regime As Never Before
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Operation Gomorrah The devastating 1943 bombing of Hamburg shook the Nazi regime as never before. By Rebecca Grant Corbis photo AF Bomber Command all but threw 2,355 sorties at Hamburg in three in the above-ground flames and melting R annihilated the German city of massive nighttime raids on July 24-25, asphalt of the streets. Hamburg at the close of July 1943. In July 28, and July 30. The United States By contrast, the Luftwaffe’s Nov. 14, the view of Air Chief Marshal Arthur Army Air Forces also flung itself into 1940 firestorm-bombing of the English T. Harris, the attacks on the so-called the attacks; Eighth Air Force, based city of Coventry killed 538 Britons. “second city of the Reich” were “incom- in Britain, generated 235 daylight The Hamburg raid was a shock to parably more terrible” than any Germany sorties in two raids during July 25 the Fuehrer, Adolf Hitler, and his air had suffered to that point. The name and July 26. force chief, Hermann Goering. For- bestowed on this series of raids seemed The main result was a horrendous mer reichsminister Albert Speer wrote to fit its wrath-of-God nature. The RAF July 28 firestorm that killed more than years later, “Hamburg had suffered the called it Operation Gomorrah. 40,000 persons in and around Hamburg. fate Hitler and Goering conceived for The redoubtable “Bomber” Harris Most died of asphyxiation while hud- London in 1940.” was right. His Bomber Command dling for shelter in their basements, or The situation looked very different 66 AIR FORCE Magazine / March 2007 focus, turning it to the generation of mass city bombing. The choice of tactics came from experience, not theory. Harris in 1942 had tried low-level daylight bombing with his new Lancaster bombers. The results had been disastrous, with the RAF losing many bombers for little gain. From a tactical perspective, Harris thought, the British experience showed that the only way to achieve results was to fly at night and to carpet-bomb entire city areas. “Hit the Workers” Harris pursued cities for tactical reasons, but he had a clear operational premise, too. “De-housing” the German workers—and killing many of them along the way—could be as effective as blowing up factories, he concluded. Churchill’s science advisor, Lord Cher- well, calculated that 22 million Germans Above and left: The remains of buildings in Hamburg after the RAF’s devastating lived in the Reich’s 58 largest cities and Raid Two on July 28, 1943. The RAF dropped more than 2,326 tons of bombs there. that turning them out of their homes would weaken German morale. “If you can’t hit the works, hit the from the Allied side. Harris described soon executed city-busting raids on Eng- workers,” Harris said in a famous, and the RAF’s own losses (57 aircraft in land, notably in the blitz against London infamous, formulation. the three raids) as “minute.” Hamburg’s and the firebombing attack on Coventry. Ultimately, Bomber Command would fate, in British eyes, could only be called Nearly three years later, it would be the do both. By the summer of 1943, Harris just. “What happened at Hamburg was cities of the Third Reich suffering the had built and trained a force geared for what happened when Bomber Command effects of these tactics. taking part in 1,000-aircraft night attacks ‘got everything right,’ ” wrote historian Despite the drift of strategic talk in the on German cities. The Americans were Martin Middlebrook in his definitive 1930s, neither the Luftwaffe nor the RAF ready for mass raids, too. However, the 1980 account of the attacks, The Battle built top-class strategic bomber fleets Allies faced a major problem: The air of Hamburg. before the war. At Bomber Command, war in mid-1943 had not yet turned de- Few doubted that Bomber Command the first years of the air war featured cisively in favor of the Allies, and, until had taken the World War II air war to only desultory bombing activity. Initial it did, the whole plan for the Normandy a new level. results were poor and losses high. invasion was at risk. Then, in September 1941, Prime The most important task was gaining Total Air War Minister Winston Churchill approved a air superiority. Here the Allies were in It was a level that had been con- plan to build 4,000 bombers, devoting a tough contest. The more they bombed ceived—even expected—a decade one-third of the British war production Germany, the more fighters the Nazis earlier. Prosecution of “total war” on capacity to the effort. pulled from the Mediterranean and cities and civilians as well as armies Churchill believed a bomber offensive other theaters to stiffen defenses. The was part of interwar military thought against Germany was a way of “breaking Great Depression of the 1930s had left in both England and Germany. In 1932, her war will,” and he ranked the impor- Germany with tremendous industrial British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin tance of the effort “second only to the overcapacity; war leaders quickly ex- famously predicted, “The bomber will largest military operations which can be ploited this, and German fighter produc- always get through. The only defense conducted on the Continent.” tion actually grew in 1943. is offense, which means that you have Churchill put Harris in charge of The air war was at a crossroads. to kill more women and children more Bomber Command in early 1942. When London and Washington, being slow in quickly than the enemy [does] if you it came to faith in the power of the building their strength, had to use their want to save yourself.” bomber, there was no bigger believer bombers to cripple German industrial The concept resonated with the Luft- than Harris. (See “Bomber Harris,” production before it was too late. The waffe, according to American historian January 2005, p. 68.) He took over a Americans geared up for August attacks Williamson Murray. One Luftwaffe command that was expending more than on Schweinfurt and Regensburg. Harris theoretician argued in May 1933 that a quarter of its effort against naval targets, picked Hamburg. “terrorizing of the enemy’s chief cities a policy he ridiculed as “frightening Many factors made Hamburg an ideal and industrial regions through bombing cod.” The campaign against German target. It was an industrial city, home to would lead that much more quickly to industrial targets got about the same Blohm & Voss shipyards and hundreds a collapse of morale.” level of effort. of other, small manufacturers grouped When war finally came, the Luftwaffe Harris redirected the command’s around the city center. In addition, flying AIR FORCE Magazine / March 2007 67 use of Window.” However, Harris scoffed at this concern. It was folly, he thought, to Bettmann/Corbis assume the Germans didn’t know about electronic countermeasures. “The biggest mistake anybody can make, militarily,” Harris said, “is to credit themselves with being so damn clever that, between two evenly balanced industrial nations, you dare not disclose Photo by Heinrich Hoffman, © Adolf Hitler and Hermann Goer- ing were shocked by the raids. a particular weapon or device to the Former reichsminister Albert enemy for fear of giving him something Speer wrote, years later, that he doesn’t already have.” “Hamburg had suffered the fate As the Hamburg raids approached, that Hitler and Goering con- “the power of the enemy defenses ceived for London.” required drastic counteraction,” said Harris. “The morning of July 24, 1943 began as a summer day should, warm and bright,” wrote RAF Flight Lt. A.J.F. Davidson, who was already a veteran of 39 bomber missions over Europe. to Hamburg would be easier than flying Long-range Freya radars picked up Soon word came that “ops” were on to most other German cities. To reach bombers at their assembly points about for the night and “my gut began its Hamburg, the bomber stream could fly 80 miles from the British coast. From familiar crawl.” eastward over the North Sea, slip past early 1942, the Luftwaffe also had a For the 791 bomber crews who took anti-aircraft guns and night fighters in dense line of Wurzburg radars that gave off for Hamburg that night, Window occupied Holland, and reach Hamburg ground controllers accurate vectors to the was a new device. More than a few without having to fly over more than a bombers. The Wurzburgs also assisted of them had doubts about whether it sliver of German land. flak gun-laying. would work over heavily defended RAF Bomber Command crews had Hamburg. bombed Hamburg several times before, Fool the Wurzburgs Certainly the device didn’t look like but this mission was different. Bomber Window’s job was to fool the Wurz- much. Thin aluminum strips, blackened Command had top-notch Lancaster burgs. Window was tested and ready by on one side, were tied in bundles. A crew bombers, trained crews, technical advan- early 1942, but then a strange self-deter- member crouched over a flare chute deep tages, and a daylight partner in Eighth rence took over and the RAF declined in the fuselage and hand-dispensed one Air Force. Now, as Harris said, “for the to use it. bundle per minute until his bomber was first time, the command found itself in Harris said the overriding reason out of Wurzburg range. a position, under suitable conditions, to the system did not go into use was the With more than an hour’s warn- inflict severe material damage on almost government’s “fear of retaliation in kind ing from the Freya radars, Hamburg’s any industrial center in Germany.” at a time when our own radar defenses intricate defenses swung into action.