The Quest: Haywood Hansell and American Strategic
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
The Quest Haywood Hansell and American Strategic Bombing in World War II CHARLES GRIFFITH Air University Press Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama September 1999 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Griffith, Charles, 1957– The quest : Haywood Hansell and American strategic bombing in World War II / Charles Griffith. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. World War, 1939–1945—Aerial operations, American. 2. Bombing, Aerial—History. 3. Strategy. 4. Hansell, Haywood S. 5. Generals—United States Biography. 6. United States. Army Air Forces Biography. I. Title. D790.G732 1999 940.54’4973—dc21 99-43324 CIP ISBN 1-58566-069-8 Disclaimer Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited. ii This book is dedicated to my son, Alexander Griffith, and to the memory of Lt Col Theodore B. Brydges, USAF. Contents Chapter Page DISCLAIMER . ii FOREWORD . vii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . ix INTRODUCTION . xi 1 THE PROBLEMS OF AIRPOWER . 1 Notes . 19 2 THE EARLY YEARS: EDUCATION AND ACTS . 23 Notes . 53 3 PLANNING . 57 Notes . 85 4 THE FRICTIONS OF WAR . 91 Notes . 123 5 THE GLOBAL BOMBER FORCE . 129 Notes . 152 6 TRIUMPH . 155 Notes . 184 7 TRAGEDY . 189 Notes . 210 BIBLIOGRAPHY . 213 INDEX . 223 v Photographs Page B-1 Bomber . 2 Z-1 Zeppelin . 6 British Handley-Page Bomber . 9 Boeing B-17 Bombers . 16 Maj Gen Haywood S. Hansell Jr. 24 Boeing P-12 . 32 Martin B-10 Bombers . 44 B-29 Very Heavy Bomber . 75 B-26 Medium Bomber . 76 B-24 Bomber . 97 Douglas A-20 Bomber . 104 Generals LeMay and Hansell . 197 B-2 Bomber . 205 B-52 Bomber . 206 C-47 Transport Aircraft . 208 vi Foreword Maj Gen Haywood “Possum” Hansell Jr. was the first legendary airman from the interwar years and World War II I had the opportunity to meet on a personal basis. This happened in 1972 when I was on the faculty of the history department at the Air Force Academy. From that experience I became a lifelong admirer of General Hansell and his gracious wife, Dotta. He was a gentleman of great intellect who continued throughout his life to be an active student of history, a lecturer, and a spokesman who articulated the advantages of airpower. I first heard of Hansell 12 years earlier when I was a cadet studying the history of airpower. The Air Force had been an independent service for less than 15 years. Much of the history being taught focused on the contributions of a few airmen who were visionary thinkers with an almost zealous belief in the potential of airpower to change the nature of warfare. The key to achieving the promise was the ability to conduct air operations independent of ground forces with an objective of taking the war directly to the enemy heartland in daylight precision attacks against key industrial and military targets. The theory held that such attacks conducted against a strategic target array would destroy an enemy’s ability to field and support military forces by destroying his capacity to manufacture and transport war materials. In his book The Quest: Haywood Hansell and American Strategic Bombing in World War II, Charles Griffith makes a major contribution in detailing the role played by General Hansell from his early days as an instructor at the Air Corps Tactical School to the heady days and nights as a young war planner developing the air war plan used by the United States during World War II to his triumphs and disappointments as a commander in the field. While the book tells this story well, it does more than just relate the life and times of Possum Hansell. The book goes a long way toward explaining the origins of many of the arguments about the utility of airpower in the closing decade of the twentieth century. vii The bottom line is Hansell had it right—technology and time have made his vision a reality as evidenced by Desert Storm in 1991, Bosnia in 1995, and most recently in Kosovo. At the heart of his vision was the idea of airpower as a tool for precision engagement, not an indiscriminate weapon of mass destruction. A tool that, if properly understood and employed, would allow the United States to prevail while greatly reducing the price of victory. RONALD R. FOGLEMAN General, USAF, Retired viii About the Author CHARLES GRIFFITH Charles Griffith received a bachelor’s and master’s degree in history from East Tennessee State University and earned his doctorate in military history from the University of Tennessee. He teaches advance placement American history and serves as chairman of the social studies department at Science Hill High School in Johnson City, Tennessee. Dr. Griffith also serves as adjunct professor of history at East Tennessee State University. ix Introduction On the night of 24 November 1944, B-29 Superfortresses landed in the darkness of Saipan with only smudge pots along- side the runway to light their path. Inside the control tower an anxious Brig Gen Haywood Hansell awaited their return. The bombers were returning from the first bombing mission over Tokyo since Jimmy Doolittle’s famous raid in 1942. This time the raid consisted of 111 heavy bombers. Their target was the Nakajima-Musashino aircraft factory complex, not token targets to boost American morale. Hansell had been warned by the chief of the Army Air Forces, Gen Henry H. “Hap” Arnold, that experts had predicted that the raid as Hansell had planned it was almost certainly doomed to fail, and Arnold had placed full responsibility for the raid on Hansell’s shoulders. In addition to this ominous warning, Brig Gen Emmett “Rosie” O’Donnell, commander of the 73d Bombardment Wing, which was executing the mission, had written a letter to Hansell in which he advocated abandoning the planned daylight mission in favor of a safer night mission. Since the very idea of a night bombing mission ran counter to all that Hansell believed about strategic bombing, Hansell rejected the idea. Now, after hours of “sweating out” the mission, Hansell’s decision was vindicated. Of the 111 bombers that had launched early that morning, 88 had attacked targets in Japan and only two B-29s failed to return; Hansell had proved that American heavy bombers could conduct daylight operations over the Japanese home islands without prohibitive losses. This was Hansell’s moment of triumph. This triumph would all too soon be followed by the tragedy of his dismissal, the end of his career, and the temporary end of the strategic bombing doctrine he had done so much to formulate and execute. Haywood Hansell is arguably the most important proponent and practitioner of high-altitude, daylight precision bombing in the United States Army Air Forces in World War II. Even though his name is not as immediately recognized as the names of Chennault, Spaatz, Doolittle, LeMay, Eaker, or xi Arnold, Hansell’s accomplishments are significant and impressive. He flew as a stunt pilot in the barnstorming days with Claire Chennault. He later attended and taught at the Air Corps Tactical School, where he helped formulate America’s prewar air doctrine. He then took a leading role in preparing the three great air war plans (AWPD-1, AWPD-42, and the plan for the Combined Bomber Offensive) for the strategic bombing campaign against Nazi Germany. He commanded the only operational B-17 wing in England from January to June 1943 and had thus directed the first American bombing missions over Germany. Then, at the request of General Arnold, he returned to Washington to create the world’s first global striking force, the Twentieth Air Force. As chief of staff of the Twentieth Air Force, Hansell was given virtually a free hand to oversee the early missions of the XX Bomber Command in distant China. Then as commander of the XXI Bomber Command in the Marianas, Hansell overcame many operational difficulties to direct the first B-29 raids over Tokyo and successfully established the basis for the sustained strategic bombing campaign against Japan, which ultimately contributed greatly to the collapse of the Japanese Empire. Hansell was ahead of his time. In view of recent operations carried out against Iraq and Serbia, it is clear that Hansell’s vision for American strategic air doctrine was ultimately made possible by advances in technology. In the classrooms of the Air Corps Tactical School in Alabama and in the old munitions building in Washington, Hansell and his colleagues Harold George, Kenneth Walker, and Laurence Kuter had literally sweated out the details of what would become America’s unique doctrine of bombing predetermined, specific economic/military targets using heavy bombers operating in broad daylight. This doctrine came to life in Europe when the United States Eighth Air Force began its legendary campaign against Hitler’s war machine. Kenneth Walker was killed in action in a bombing raid over New Britain, and Harold George and Laurence Kuter were both assigned to duties in the States during most of the war. It was up to Hansell, the only one of the original planners to have the opportunity to influence actual operations, to see that their doctrine of daylight precision bombardment was carried out during World War II. xii In Europe the frictions of war meant that Hansell would see his vision of strategic air war altered by the needs of ground operations in the Mediterranean and in Operation Overlord, the fierce resistance of the Luftwaffe and German antiaircraft defenses, and by other factors such as weather and an ever- changing target list.