De-Ranged Global Power and Air Mobility for the New Millennium ROBERT A. COLELLA, Lt Col, USAF School of Advanced Airpower Studies THESIS PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES, MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA, FOR COMPLETION OF GRADUATION REQUIREMENTS, ACADEMIC YEAR 2000–2001. Air University Press Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6615 July 2002 This School of Advanced Airpower Studies thesis is available electronically at the Air University Research Web site http://research. maxwell.af.mil under “Research Papers” then “Special Collections.” Disclaimer Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release: dis- tribution unlimited. ii Contents Chapter Page DISCLAIMER . ii ABSTRACT . v ABOUT THE AUTHOR . vii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . ix 1 GLOBAL POWER FOR AMERICA . 1 2 WORLD WAR II ORIGINS AND COLD WAR MATURITY . 5 3 GLOBAL POWER––POST–COLD WAR: ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE . 21 4 CASE STUDIES IN GLOBAL POWER . 45 5 EVALUATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . 75 6 CONCLUSIONS . 89 Illustrations Figure 1 Operation Black Buck Refueling Plan . 57 Table 1 Tanker Off-load Capabilities . 81 2 Case Study Tanker Usage . 81 Maps Operation Nickel Grass Routing . 47 Routing through the Mediterranean . 50 Falkland Islands War Global Distances . 54 Operation Eldorado Canyon Overview . 64 iii Abstract This is a story of long-range airpower, from Gen Henry H. “Hap” Arnold’s vi- sion of a global mission to the Global Strike Task Force and expeditionary air forces of the year 2001. It examines global power from its origins as Strategic Air Command built a fleet of bombers and tankers to meet the needs of the global nuclear-deterrent policy of the Cold War. With the end of the Cold War and the changes in force structure that followed, USAF soon lost its historical roots in global power. This evolution is traced through the studies and commissions of the 1990s established to determine the force structure for the twenty-first cen- tury. The assumptions that were made to develop a force focused on expedi- tionary short-range airpower to project global power are established and then examined with four case studies in the application of airpower over long range. Operation Nickel Grass, the US airlift to Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur War; the British airpower experience in the Falkland Islands War with its Vulcan Black Buck missions; Operation Eldorado Canyon; and Operation Desert Strike are used to provide evidence to support and refute the assumptions made dur- ing the 1990s to structure the USAF force structure around short-range expedi- tionary forces with the intention of forward deploying them in a crisis. These case studies are evaluated and recommendations are offered for the force struc- ture of the twenty-first century to ensure an adequate global power force capa- ble of executing a global power strategy. The conclusions of this study do not make recommendations for long- or short-range airpower but rather offer rec- ommendations for methods to enable those forces in the future with a sturdy in- flight refueling force capable of supporting long-range missions free from the en- tanglements of foreign support and reliance on forward basing. v About the Author Lt Col Robert A. Colella (BS, United States Air Force Academy [USAFA]; MS, Louisiana State University, Shreveport) received a regular commission from USAFA in May 1986. After graduation from undergraduate pilot training at Williams AFB, Arizona, in 1987, he was assigned as a pilot in the B-52G at Wurt- smith AFB, Michigan, from March 1988 to March 1992. During this tour he per- formed nuclear alert duties in the B-52 and upgraded to aircraft commander. He was reassigned to Castle AFB, California, in 1992 to the 34th Bomb Squadron attached to the 366th Composite Wing, Mountain Home AFB, Idaho. During this tour Colonel Colella upgraded to instructor pilot, B-52G, and was selected for the USAF Weapons Instructor Course. After graduation from Weapons School, he was assigned to B-52H Formal Training Unit duty at Barksdale AFB, Louisiana, from July 1994 to July 1996. He was selected for the B-2 program at Whiteman AFB, Missouri, in 1996. From June 1996 to June 1999, Colonel Colella was a B-2 mission commander, instructor pilot, and the wing weapons officer for the 509th Bomb Wing. He was the strike planning chief for all B-2 sor- ties flown in Operation Allied Force and was a member of one of the first crews to fly the B-2 into combat during a 30-hour combat mission. As a senior pilot with more than 3,000 flying hours, he was awarded the Air Force Air Medal for his missions over Kosovo and has also been awarded the Meritorious Service Medal. Colonel Colella is a distinguished graduate of Squadron Officers School and a graduate of Air Command and Staff College and the School of Advanced Airpower Studies. In July 2001, he was reassigned to the Pentagon, AF/XOOC––Checkmate. Colonel Colella is married to the former Katherine Page, and they have two children, Allison and Sam. vii Acknowledgments I thank my research advisor, Maj John Terino, and my reader, Col Stephen Chiabotti, for their inspiration and guidance. In addition, I thank all faculty members of the School for Advanced Airpower Studies (SAAS) for their dedica- tion to the mission of educating tomorrow’s airpower strategists. I am grateful to them for their in-depth knowledge and for their dedication as teachers. Last, but certainly not least, I thank my wife and family for their continued support and prayers throughout this year. Katy not only gave birth to our second child, Sam, but was the glue that held our family together over this past year through the academic rigors of SAAS. ix Chapter 1 Global Power for America Russia . does fear our long-range Strategic Air Force, which she cannot as yet match, or as yet understand. In the Strategic Air Force, coupled with our atomic bomb, at this writing we hold the balance of power in the world. —Gen Henry H. “Hap” Arnold —Global Mission Vision for Global Power Gen Henry H. “Hap” Arnold envisioned a “global mission” for airpower where the force structure would meet the challenges of “range, fire power, [and] bombload” to provide what “we [Arnold and Brig Gen William “Billy” Mitchell] all preached and hoped for . the [strategic] independent func- tion of airpower in which we had so long believed.”1 The force structure born under General Arnold in World War II matured within Strategic Air Command (SAC) to provide the global mission of nuclear deterrence throughout the remainder of the twentieth century. Although SAC dis- solved in June 1992, the Air Force did not lose its vision of a global mis- sion for airpower. Secretary of the Air Force Donald B. Rice’s Global Reach—Global Power white paper in 1990 was the vision for the future without the Soviet Union as a focus for the global mission. With the dis- banding of the Soviet Union, a New World Order emerged where threats, conflicts, and obstacles shared uncertainty as their most common attrib- ute. In the United States, pressure to downsize and the promise of a peace dividend led to smaller military budgets that supported a shrinking force burdened by a mission clouded by uncertainty. Although downsizing meant the withdrawal of forward-deployed units around the world, the strategy outlined in Global Reach—Global Power committed America to both the presence and the ability to influence events militarily across the globe. The end of the Cold War also brought demands for thrift and limits on the research, development, and acquisition of new weapon systems to meet the undefined challenges of the New World Order. It is within this context that the strategy contained in Global Reach—Global Power and the force structure to support it evolved as the United States entered the twenty-first century. Global Reach—Global Power detailed a post–Cold War strategy to rapidly deploy forces and assume a forward presence to assure regional stability and firepower wherever required. Within this strategy, long-range forces were central to satisfying “global responsibilities requir[ing] capabilities independent of the need for mobilization and the political baggage some- times inherent in that process.”2 Strategy, however, as Carl H. Builder 1 points out in his book The Masks of War, “is not the only determinant of the purposes and kinds of military force. Institutional preferences, tech- nological developments, [and] opposing forces [all] influence . the ac- quisition of military capabilities.” Builder also points out that strategy should be an honest broker and work outside of the external influences of its “formulation and application.”3 As Builder explains, “If strategy does not adequately take into account or allow for service predilections or dif- fering interpretations of the threat, the military forces will be driven to some degree by factors omitted from strategy. Strategy should drive the forces; if it does not it may reflect the inadequacies of a particular strat- egy rather than the proper role of strategy.”4 This study asks whether the strategy contained in Global Reach—Global Power has evolved credibly with a force structure to project power globally in the twenty-first century. Do the needs of the global power strategy drive the force structure or, as Builder warned, do the “externalities” of institu- tional preference play too large a role in shaping the force structure? Definition Global power is rooted in the World War II and Cold War images of waves of aircraft conducting the long-range strategic attacks described in Gen- eral Arnold’s Global Mission.