Vii . the Second “Going It Alone” in Times of Ending the Cold War: Negotiations with Brussels and Eu Entry 1987–95
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533 VII . THE SECOND “GOING IT ALONE” IN TIMES OF ENDING THE COLD WAR: NEGOTIATIONS WITH BRUSSELS AND EU ENTRY 1987–95 1 . GENERAL INTRODUCTION: SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT, HOME MARKET, GERMAN UNITY, AND THE MAASTRICHT TREATY With the beginning of the 1980s, a concerted German-French integration policy began that was once again inspired by very political and rational considerations. The main players were François Mitterrand, Jacques Delors, and Helmut Kohl. On June 19, 1983, the European Council, meeting in Stuttgart, signed the “ Solemn Declaration on European Union”, and on February 14, 1984, the draft treaty for the founding of the “European Union” was adopted by the European Parliament, signaling a mood of euphoria.1 On January 7, 1985, Delors took over the presidency of the EC Commission. On December 3, 1985, the European Council agreed in principle about the “ Single European Act” (SEA) for the consolidation of the treaty basis of the EC in the sense of the Stuttgart Declaration. The “EC 92” Home Market concept that was launched by the EC Commission starting in 1985, the SEA of February 17–18, 1986 that entered into force on July 1, 1987, the Cecchini Report that was submit- ted in 1988 (“The Cost of Non-Europe”) in which the cost of the non-completion of the Home Market was calculated, the “Delors Package” which provided for a reform of the financing system, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the increasing of the Structural Fund of the EC, and the three-stage “Delors Plan” for the creation of an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) all made the new quality of the integration intentions clear.2 The process of German reunification in 1989–90, which led to the unity of the German state on October 3, 1990, disquieted and alarmed the other EC partners. On December 9–10, 1991, the Heads of State and Government meeting at the sum- mit in Maastricht agreed to the creation of an economic, monetary, and political union with the revaluation of the Western European Union (WEU) and a Com- mon Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The treaty was signed on February 7, 1 Michael GEHLER, Europa. Ideen – Institutionen – Vereinigung – Zusammenhalt, Reinbek/ Hamburg 2018, 325–335, for this chapter see documents 79–86 in the appendix “Documents”. 2 Iibd.; Wilfried LOTH, Helmut Kohl und die Währungsunion, in: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeit- geschichte 60 (2013), 4, 455–480. 534 VII. The Second “Going it Alone” in Times of Ending the Cold War 1992 and turned out to be a success. It was to form a more solid framework for the control of the enlarged Germany. The old Germany-policy motive for the ex- istence of the ECSC and EEC was once again a driving force.3 Starting in 1987–88, officials of the EC Commission and Commissioners vis- ited the capitals of the EFTA neutrals Helsinki, Stockholm, and Vienna with in- creasing frequency. The Commissioner for Single Market Lord Arthur Cockfield, a British Conservative;4 the Commissioner for Industry, Karl-Heinz Narjes, a German CDU member;5 the Commissioner for Financial Affairs, Henning Christophersen, a Danish liberal and later on Vice President of the Commission;6 the Commissioner for External Relations and Trade, Willy De Clercq, a Belgian liberal;7 and last but not least Commission President Jacques Delors8 were the most prominent figures. Two messages were sent by the Commission to govern- ment members of Austria, Sweden, and Finland: the relationship of the EC with EFTA should be based on the “Luxembourg Declaration”, and new initiatives, especially membership applications, should wait until the Community had fin- ished the Delors project of the Single Market program.9 3 Michael GEHLER, Die Unvermeidbarkeit einer politischen Entscheidung. Europa und die deutsche Einheit: Bilanz und zukünftige Forschungsaufgaben, in: IDEM – Maximilian GRAF (Hrsg.), Europa und die deutsche Einheit. Beobachtungen, Entscheidungen und Folgen, Göttingen 2017, 791–830. 4 https://doverhistorian.com/2013/06/01/arthur-cockfield-creator-of-the-european-single-market/ (called up June 2, 2019). 5 Karl-Heinz NARJES, Europäische Integration aus historischer Erfahrung. Ein Zeitzeugen- gespräch mit Michael GEHLER (ZEI Discussion Paper C 135), Bonn 2004. 6 https://www.altinget.dk/artikel/henning-christophersen-doed (called up June 2, 2019). 7 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meps/de/1296/WILLY+C.E.H._DE+CLERCQ/history/5 ( called up June 2, 2019). 8 N. Piers LUDLOW, Jacques Delors (1985–1995): navigating the European stream at full flow, in: Jan VAN DER HARST – Gerrit VOERMAN (Eds.), An Impossible Job? The presidents of the European Commission 1958–2014, London 2015, 173–196; see also http://aei.pitt.edu/74376/1/BIO_-_EN-MULTI_-_van_der_Pas.pdf (June 2, 2019). 9 Many attempts at closer cooperation came from De Clercq and his team. From January 1985 onwards, Nikolaus VAN DER PAS joined De CLERQ’s cabinet. He was given special respon- sibility for relations with the EFTA countries, later to become Head of Unit for ‘Relations with EFTA’, responsible for the negotiations on the European Economic Area (1990–1993) and Director for the Swedish accession negotiations and the EEA in the ‘Enlargement’ Task Force (March 1993-March 1994). For this and the following see also Haakon IKONOMOU – Michael GEHLER, Der Beitritt Österreichs, Finnlands and Schwedens (1995), in: Vincent DUJARDIN et al. (Hrsg.), Die Europäische Kommission 1986–2000 – Geschichte und Erinnerungen einer Institution, Amt für Veröffentlichungen der Europäischen Union, Luxemburg, 2019, 559–574: 562–563; also published in English: IDEM, The accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden (1995), in: Vincent DUJARDIN et al. (Eds.), The European Commission 1986–2000 – History and memories of an institution, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2019, 515–527; Lise RYE, Integration from the Outside. The EC and EFTA from 1960 to the 1995 enlargement, in: Haakon A. IKONOMOU – Aurélie ANDRY – Rebekka BYBERG (Eds.), European Enlargement Across Rounds and Beyond Borders, Routledge 2017, 203–204. 1. General Introduction 535 Gregor Woschnagg, who was deputy to the Austrian EC Ambassador Manfred Scheich from 1987 to 1996, still likes to remember the times of Austrian mem- bership in the small free trade zone, but at the same time he explained also why it could not develop further to a higher level of integration: “EFTA was a cozy club. It was always very pleasant because the EFTA meetings never lasted long. EFTA at the ministerial meetings worked through all its functions when the meetings sometimes lasted 1 1/2 to 2 hours. Then there was another one hour press conference and then there was always a dinner with lots of fish, because we often met in Scandinavia. You were allowed to dance with big Icelandic ladies after dinner. That was always very nice and amus- ing. EFTA would have developed further if it had had the courage to switch from unanimity to qualified majority voting. My Swiss colleague Franz Blankart said: ‘That is out of the question because the Nordic states of Finland, Norway, Sweden and Iceland form a bloc in EFTA. They would always outvote Switzerland and Austria’, which was not at all wrong in the analysis. That is why EFTA always proceeded stubbornly according to the principle of unanimity and the battles for fisheries were about the worst we had experienced in EFTA.”10 Woschnagg recalls a dispute in EFTA in which Austria’s representatives were able to mediate: “Once when I was far too young I had to lead a working group: ‘Liberalisation of trade in fish’. I was the chairman, the other Scandinavians wanted a neutral. At that time Thomas Wieser was in the EFTA Secretariat. Together we tried to settle a dispute where Iceland and Norway had accused Sweden and Finland of unfairly obstructing the fish trade. This gave rise to wild emotions that I would never have expected from the Scandinavians. Thomas Wieser had solved this because he had a brilliant idea. He contacted the OECD secretariat and from there he de- termined an analysis of subsidy coefficients. This brought us to the actual level of national sub- sidies by adding everything together. The Norwegians were accused of subsidising too much. They subsidised too honestly. We have deducted the sum from the budget. With the Swedes, they have hidden the subsidies everywhere in road construction, port construction and in the 10 Original quotation: “Die EFTA war ein gemütlicher Klub. Es war immer sehr angenehm, weil die EFTA-Sitzungen nie lange dauerten. Die EFTA bei den Ministertagungen hat all ihre Funktionen abgearbeitet, wenn die Sitzungen manchmal 1 1/2 bis 2 Stunden gedauert haben. Dann gab es noch eine Stunde Pressekonferenz und danach hat sich immer ein Abend- essen mit viel Fisch angeschlossen, weil wir oft in Skandinavien tagten. Da durfte man mit grossen isländischen Damen nach dem Essen tanzen. Das war immer sehr nett und amüsant. Die EFTA hätte sich weiterentwickelt, wenn sie den Mut gehabt hätte, statt dem Einstimmig- keitsprinzip auf qualifizierte Mehrheitsentscheidungen zu wechseln. Mein Schweizer Kollege Franz Blankart hat gesagt: ‘Das kommt nicht in Frage, weil in der EFTA die nordischen Staa- ten Finnland, Norwegen, Schweden und Island einen Block bilden. Die würden immer die Schweiz und Österreich überstimmen’, was in der Analyse gar nicht falsch war. Daher ist die EFTA immer stur nach dem Einstimmigkeitsprinzip vorgegangen und die Schlachten um die Fischerei waren ungefähr das Schlimmste, was wir in der EFTA erlebt hatten.” Interview with Gregor WOSCHNAAG at the Forum Alpbach, August 2010 (audio recording in the possession of the author); Franz BLANKART was a Swiss diplomat. He represented Switzerland’s eco- nomic policy interests in Europe at these times and was involved in free trade and insurance agreements between the EC and Switzerland.