> East Asian geopolitics revisited

Chen Shuibian and Annette Lü celebrate their victory in 2000

Shuibian of wanting to ‘change the sta- tus quo unilaterally’. Mounting pressure finally forced Chen to compromise. He replaced the original referendum question with two awkwardly worded queries that addressed funding for national defence, and the creation of a special department to promote peaceful relations with the PRC. The referendum failed to pass the threshold required by law (an absolute majority of eligible voters had to vote in favour). Only 45% of eligible voters par- ticipated, though 90% of them voted in favour of the two proposals. The refer- endum, however, demonstrated strong Taiwanese assertion in the face of pressure from both Beijing and Washington. As the campaign ended, Chen regained the presidency by a margin of

ANP/AFP file ANP/AFP 0.2%. Protests questioning the legiti- macy of Chen’s victory plunged Taipei into chaos for weeks. Taiwan’s voters are now divided into two camps. The Taiwan’s democratic movement first, Pan Green Camp, led by the cur- rent DPP government, sees the PRC as an immanent threat. While they may desire better relations with China, their and push for independence main concern is Taiwan’s hard-earned democracy, prosperity and pride. The Taiwanese nationalism can be traced back to resistance against Japanese colonialism in the 2003, China, including Hong Kong, DPP, under the pretext of improving Research > early 1920s. Upon Japan’s defeat in 1945, Taiwan was returned to the ‘motherland’, the accounted for about one fourth of Tai- government efficiency, wants to revise Taiwan Republic of China. Taiwanese rebelled in 1947; the Guomindang’s suppression of the wan’s trade surplus, and about one-half or draft a new Taiwanese constitution. uprising – the February 28 Incident – alienated the population and helped create the of Taiwan’s foreign investment. To fur- As openly pushing for independence contemporary Taiwanese independence movement. ther complicate matters, an estimated remains risky, the Pan Green Camp has one million Taiwanese live, study, do chosen a defensive approach to the sov- By Chang Mau-kuei by the GMD’s desire to retain domi- with Taiwanese consciousness resulted business or travel in China every day; ereignty issue: resistance to unification, nance; without its transformation, the in the break-up of the GMD, first with others have chosen to live on the main- and, as a last resort, insistence on the s is well known, there were two GMD would likely have lost power the emergence of the New Party in land more permanently. The number right to declare independence should AChinas after 1949; following the much earlier. Institutionally, indigeni- 1993, and again in 2000 with the emer- of cross-Straits marriages has also Beijing invade. Communist victory on the mainland, sation included phasing out the Nation- gence of the People First Party. Feuds risen. As a result, China can now play The Pan Blue Camp is led by the the island of Taiwan became the last al Assembly, which in theory still rep- within the GMD benefited the DPP, Taiwan’s domestic political game by GMD and other opposition parties. holdout of Jiang Zieshi’s Guomindang resented all of China, and revisions to allowing it to win key elections. The manipulating Taiwan’s vested and per- Viewing China as the land of econom- (GMD) regime. Until the mid 1980s, the constitution to accommodate dem- DPP not only sided with the GMD-pro- ceived interests. This has made Tai- ic opportunity, they want Taiwan to the GMD ruled Taiwan with an iron fist; ocratic politics and direct presidential moted indigenisation campaign, but wanese party politics a nastier game, make use of its relative advantages in the name of countering communist elections. allied with Li in his intra-party fight, with both sides mobilizing appeals to before it is too late. They do not ‘wish’ insurgency, the regime was inclined to From 1986 onwards, the GMD had helping to split the GMD. Li led the national identity. for better relations with China; they punish all signs of political assertion to compete with the newly formed GMD and the country until he was Li Denghui’s visit to the US in June demand the government improves rela- from below. During this period, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). In expelled in 2000 for ‘destroying the 1995, followed by his ‘provocative’ state- tions immediately. Criticizing Tai- independence movement was forced addition, the GMD had to face Tai- party and selling the country’. ments on ‘two countries’, triggered the wanese independence as parochial and underground or into exile; it had little wanese self-assertion from within the The ‘silent revolution’ encouraged 1995-96 Taiwan Straits crisis which risky, they present themselves as the or no impact on cross-Straits relations party – led by its own chairman Li citizens to cultivate their love and loy- saw large-scale military exercises in true sons of the ROC. or on Taiwan’s domestic politics, Denghui. Li came to power in 1988, alty to Taiwan. Though the name and southern China, and the shooting of Taiwan’s domestic politics – the though resentment against the ROC succeeding the last strongman of the constitution of the ROC remain, peo- ballistic missiles into Taiwanese waters. processes of indigenisation, democra- – the ‘Chinese outsider regime’ – ROC, Jiang Jingguo. Li’s twelve-year ple can now justifiably think of the ROC This was followed by Hong Kong’s tisation and electoral competition – are remained. rule – termed the ‘silent revolution’ – as equivalent to ‘Taiwan’, a source for uncontested return to the mainland in driving the country’s zigzagged route Increased prosperity in the 1970s featured indigenisation as its basic phi- new loyalty and pride. 1997, which Taiwanese viewed with towards self-assertion. So far, the Tai- created a social base desiring political losophy in international relations and alarm. For the PRC, Taiwan remains wanese have been unable to establish a change. Opposition to the GMD grew, domestic politics, in trade and culture, The current dilemma the last lost territory, the final wound clear and sustainable consensus over especially after 1978 when the US and the military and education. Beijing’s influence on Taiwanese caused by a century and a half of their own future. The island is pulled the PRC established diplomatic ties. Unsurprisingly, the programme pro- domestic politics has grown since the national humiliation. Many suspect by forces from different directions, and Diplomatically isolated and its legiti- voked backlash. The power struggle mid 1990s. This can be attributed to that, if provoked, Beijing will use force is plagued by internal divisions. The macy challenged, the GMD had to within the GMD, the expulsion and China’s new economic weight, and the to unify China; no one in power in Bei- overall trend, however, is in favour of loosen its grip to include more Tai- marginalisation of mainlander elites need felt by Taiwanese businesses to ‘go jing can afford to appear soft on Taiwan. greater sovereignty. The dust is far from wanese in politics. This set the back- from important positions, and the west’ across the Straits to compete suc- Despite Beijing’s repeated warnings, settled, and the trouble is likely to con- ground for the political struggle during replacement of Chinese nationalism cessfully in the global economy. In Taiwan held its first-ever referendum tinue. < the process of democratisation between on March 20, 2004. Coinciding with 1986 and 1995. presidential elections, the referendum Chang Mau-kuei (IIAS fellow December was to call on China to remove its 500 2003-June 2004) is a political sociologist at Indigenising Taiwanese mid-range missiles aimed at Taiwan. the Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica, politics The proposed referendum invited citi- Taiwan. His research interests include Tai- The opposition to the GMD regime zens to vote on Beijing’s stand – the wanese social movements and the ethnog- called for democracy, social reform, and legitimacy of its option to use force to raphy of the Dachen people, resettled from the assertion of Taiwanese identity and Poster outside oppo- unify China. The referendum drew crit- a Zhejiang Province island to Taiwan in pride. The call to determine Taiwan’s sition Guomindang icism from the US, where President 1954, and now dispersed around the world. own future grew as control over the building the day Bush accused Taiwan’s President Chen [email protected] levers of political power and cultural before Chen-Shui- domination shifted from Mainland Chi- bian’s inauguration This article originated from the IIAS workshop 'Emerging National Self-assertion in East nese to Taiwanese. Political indigeni- as President. Taipei, Asia' held in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 25 May 2004. Longer versions are forthcoming.

sation was prompted first and foremost file ANP/AFP May 18, 2004

IIAS Newsletter | #34 | July 2004 11