John D. Dunne. Foundations of Dharmakīrti's Philosophy. Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2004. xx + 467 pp. $39.95, cloth, ISBN 978-0-86171-184-0.

Reviewed by Christian Coseru

Published on H-Buddhism (June, 2010)

The continuing surge in work on Dharmakīrti intent of this work is thus to provide an overall represents one of the most fertile enterprises perspective on the historical development of Bud‐ within the feld of Buddhist Studies. The only dhist thought as refected in the pramāṇa litera‐ South Asian philosopher to have been the subject ture. While Dunne is committed to constraining of four international conferences, Dharmakīrti his approach in "historical terms," he does not ig‐ commands a veritable legacy of scholarship, nore its hermeneutical implications: the historical whether directly, through the translation and distance cannot be bridged without the inter‐ study of his own works, or indirectly, through the preter's active participation in, and sharing of, study of his followers, commentators, and one- some of the concerns and presuppositions that in‐ time opponents.[1] In the context of this burgeon‐ form the Buddhist tradition, with the caveat that ing enterprise, characterized by a high degree of "reverence for an infuential thinker" need not specialization, any attempt to bear on the totality imply a willingness to "bow unconditionally at of Dharmakīrti's thought is challenging at best Dharmakīrti's feet" (p. 11). and downright frustrating at worst. John Dunne's Dunne starts with a reconstruction of the con‐ recent volume, Foundations of Dharmakīrti's Phi‐ ceptual context of the pramāṇa discourse, with its losophy, meets this challenge in a novel and efec‐ emphasis on the analysis of the process of know‐ tive way. ing. Here Dunne marks the diference between Unlike most attempts to interpret Dharmakīr‐ the early Naiyāyika philosophers Vātsyāyana and ti, which deploy the lenses of his most infuential Uddyotakara, for whom the act of knowing in‐ commentators, Dunne proposes a "restricted" in‐ volves a relation between the knowing agent and terpretation of his philosophy based on "the the object of knowledge, and Dignāga and Dhar‐ painstaking task of separating commentarial lay‐ makīrti, who confate the cognitive event with the ers so as to learn the insights that characterize sources of knowledge. The rest of this introducto‐ each commentator's work" (p. 11). The primary ry section examines perception and inference (the H-Net Reviews two criteria of knowledge deemed reliable by this strategy of hierarchical inclusivism exploits nearly all pramāṇa theorists), concluding with a the familiar Buddhist trope of "skill in means" detailed review of the dispute over the ontological (upāyakauśalya)--the Buddha's skill in addressing status of "real" particulars. These themes are then any given audience depending on its specifc explored at length in the remaining three chap‐ needs. ters of the book, starting with Dharmakīrti's On the basis of a summary of Dharmakīrti's method and ontology (chapter 2), continuing with employment of this sliding scale of analysis, his examination of the relation among the terms Dunne identifes, in ascending order, the follow‐ of a valid inference (chapter 3), and concluding ing four specifc positions: (1) the belief of ordi‐ with Dharmakīrti's extensive account of the pur‐ nary persons, seen as the most basic and "most in‐ posive function (arthakriyā) of cognition (chapter accurate description of reality"; (2) the Abhidhar‐ 4). Dharmakīrti's principal work, the ma typology, with its doctrines of the aggregate Pramāṇavārttika (and its autocommentary), and momentary nature of phenomena, which rep‐ along with the two early commentaries of Deven‐ resents a higher and more accurate description of drabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi (and several other reality; (3) external realism, in the form of the the‐ primary sources), are cited at length throughout ory of external things as unique, momentary par‐ the book. Dunne provides expanded portions of ticles--a view (generally associated with the all these citations in a fnal appendix of transla‐ Sautrāntika school) that postulates the existence tions--a useful addition that makes this volume of mereologically irreducible extra-mental enti‐ one of the most comprehensive anthologies of pri‐ ties; and (4) idealism, the notion that all entities mary sources for Dharmakīrti's philosophy in any are mental. This highest level of analysis, associat‐ modern language. ed with Yogācāra, is a view that relegates the sub‐ Dunne's main interpretive stance has it that ject-object duality to ignorance and essentially Dharmakīrti's philosophical method relies on contends that "objects of awareness are internal" multiple descriptions of reality that appear to be (p. 59). mutually contradictory. This method, character‐ While these four ontological positions encom‐ ized by Dharmakīrti scholars as involving an "as‐ pass the whole range of Dharmakīrti's philosophi‐ cending" or "sliding" scale of analysis, refects cal method, it is the defense of his peculiar notion Dharmakīrti's pragmatic approach to ontological of external realism that the sliding scale of analy‐ questions--an approach according to which difer‐ sis is apparently aimed at. Other than treating ent descriptions of reality can be seen as hierar‐ them as svalakṣaṇas, in the specifc sense that chically structured.[2] Scrutinizing Dharmakīrti's term has for Buddhist pramāṇa theorists, Dhar‐ motives for the employment of such a method, makīrti's commentators generally disagree on the Dunne contends that in some instances "a less ac‐ precise nature of external objects. Dharmakīrti's curate description is didactically or soteriological‐ extended treatment of the svalakṣaṇas, under‐ ly preferable" (p. 53). Dharmakīrti's reliance on stood as irreducible real individuals and not as apparently contradictory ontological positions in real properties of dharmas (as Vasubandhu sees his philosophical analysis is certainly not new. His them in his Abhidharmakośa), might suggest that rationale is provided by the pragmatic need, en‐ Dharmakīrti is committed to external realism. countered in nearly all Mahāyāna thinkers, of dis‐ Even so, Dharmakīrti's most frequently adopted tancing their views from those of early Buddhists position, that of external realism, is not held from by incorporating the latter as provisional stages an ultimate point of view. on the path to a higher understanding. Rather than rejecting divergent or early views wholesale,

2 H-Net Reviews

Dunne's discussion of Dharmakīrti's use of ex‐ vancing a "theory of unconscious error," taken ternal realism is further framed by an analysis of here to mean that, on Dharmakīrti's view, we ef‐ the objects of cognition (prameya), which con‐ fectively "mistake" the content of our conceptual cludes with a detailed exposition of the apoha cognitions, or our representations, for the actual doctrine in its specifcally Dharmakīrtian formu‐ particulars (p. 143). lation. On Dunne's interpretation, the operation of The last two chapters of the book are devoted apoha gives us the "isolated," the "extracted" and to a detailed analysis of Dharmakīrti's novel con‐ the "excluded," that from which all others have tributions, frst, to obtaining reliable inferential been excluded, in other words, "an utterly unique knowledge, and second, to justifying the "instru‐ entity" (p. 133). Thus, while Dharmakīrti's main mentality" (prāmāṇya) of the two sources of opponents, the Naiyāyikas, would regard univer‐ knowledge (perception and inference) accepted sals as real and essential to bridging the gap be‐ by the Buddhist pramāṇa theorists. In the frst tween perception and cognition, Dharmakīrti case, it is well known that Dharmakīrti's innova‐ himself sees them as pragmatically efcient (or, to tions are centered on his interpretation of the re‐ use Dunne's felicitous terminology, as performing lation among the diferent terms of an inference. a "telic" function) in their heuristic role: aids that Responding to critics of Dignāga's triple inferen‐ help reach the only true real--the particular itself. tial method (trairūpya), Dharmakīrti seeks to In unpacking the epistemological implications ground the pervasion relation (vyāpti) that ob‐ of the apoha doctrine, Dunne develops a notewor‐ tains between the reason (hetu) and what is to be thy discussion of a threefold defnition of the par‐ proved thereby (sādhya) on a stronger foundation ticular by Śākyabuddhi, which is also an explana‐ than mere appeal to "observation and nonobser‐ tion of the function of the Sanskrit compound vation." Dharmakīrti's theory of the basis for in‐ anyāpoha. First, the particular or the excluded ference thus centers on the notion of svabhā‐ (the vyāvṛtta) is "that from which other is exclud‐ vapratibandha--the notion that there must exist ed." Second, the gesture by which the particular is some sort of nomological rule to control the rela‐ excluded, i.e., the exclusion itself (vyāvṛtti), is sim‐ tion between evidence and conclusion. (Dunne in‐ ply the "exclusion of the other." Third, the cogni‐ terprets this to mean that the "conceptually con‐ tive image or the internal representation is what structed sameness that accounts for a correct provides the support for the exclusion of the oth‐ judgement's reference" is based on the "nomologi‐ er (p. 133). Dunne examines the implications of cal natures of causally efcient things" [p. 332f.].) this threefold interpretive schema for each of the This is one of the most technical aspects of Dhar‐ four problems that any apoha-theorist must ad‐ makīrti's theory of inference, marked by his pecu‐ dress: the relation between the universal and the liar use of the notion of essential nature (svabhā‐ particular; the universal's extension or "distribu‐ va). By forging a new, if at times idiosyncratic, tion," which allows it to apply to all the members technical vocabulary, including types such as "sv‐ of a given class of particulars; the question of abhāva-nature," "svabhāva-evidence" and "prop‐ what mental content, if any, corresponds to the erty-svabhāva," Dunne's schematic and compre‐ particular, especially when negatively construed hensive presentation does a good job of explain‐ (as the "absence" of the other); and the role of ing the various aspects and implications of this mental image in the construction of universals. theory for pramāṇa theorists. Coming to terms with Dharmakīrti's unique ac‐ Dunne's propensity toward "terminological count of the role of mental images in the construc‐ habits" (p. 225) becomes all-pervasive in his dis‐ tion of universals, Dunne takes recourse to Tille‐ cussion of the status of perception and inference mans's proposal that we see Dharmakīrti as ad‐

3 H-Net Reviews as reliable sources of knowledge. Here we are of‐ analysis. It could well be that the philosophical fered both a critique of the usage of current philo‐ categories of neither epistemology nor logic ex‐ sophical concepts in translating Dharmakīrti's haustively map the types of activities subsumed ideas, and alternatives to prevailing terminologi‐ under pramāṇavāda. Perhaps we are dealing cal standards. By his own admission, Dunne's ren‐ here with attempts to devise a cohesive "cognitive dition of prāmāṇya as "instrumentality" (based on theory" in the sense in which "cognitive" is cur‐ its being a derivative form of pramāṇa, which rently used in cognitive psychology or in the sci‐ Dunne sometimes renders as "instrument"), may ences of cognition. Either way, mere text-critical not be well received in philosophical circles, studies of his philosophical works will not aford where Dharmakīrti's ideas ought to have the most Dharmakīrti (or, for that matter, any other South impact. For Dharmakīrti, prāmāṇya pertains not Asian philosopher) the kind of transparency re‐ only to "that which is a means of knowledge," but quired to make his ideas intelligible to a receptive also to its result (pramāṇaphala), and to knowl‐ Western philosophical audience. edge itself (pramā). "Instrumentality" would thus Throughout this book, Dunne displays a com‐ cover only one of the senses in which prāmāṇya mendable mastery of primary and secondary is used by Dharmakīrti, that of "means" or sources, and, given the semantic fuidity of San‐ "sources," leaving the resulting knowledge ("the skrit technical terms, an admirable stylistic con‐ truth") and the question of justifcation out. As sistency. Terminological issues aside, Foundations Dunne rightly points out "Dharmakīrti's discus‐ of Dharmakīrti's Philosophy stands as one of the sion of prāmāṇya is more closely allied with ques‐ most innovative and sophisticated attempts to en‐ tions of justifcation" (p. 225), but the issue of how gage with Dharmakīrti's project in a systematic to account for cognitions that are true, yet do not way. and cannot count as instruments of knowledge, Notes remains problematic on a translation of pramāṇa as "instrument of knowledge." [1]. The frst conference took place in Kyoto (1982), followed by Vienna (1989), Hiroshima Dharmakīrti's discussion of the cognitive (1997), and Vienna (2005). The proceedings of the function of universals is linked both to his theory second and third Dharmakīrti Conferences have of word meaning and to his pragmatics of purpo‐ appeared in print as E. Steinkellner , ed., Studies sive action (arthakriyā). Whether we are dealing in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition: Pro‐ here with an externalist, reliabilist theory of justi‐ ceedings of the Second International Dharmakīrti fcation or with an internalist, evidential theory of Conference (Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen truth is open to discussion. Dunne rightly points Akademie der Wissenschaften 1991); and S. Kat‐ out that using "truth" or "validity" for prāmāṇya sura, ed., Dharmakīrti's Thought and Its Impact (and thus talking, for instance, about "valid per‐ on Indian and Tibetan Philosophy: Proceedings of ception") can either obscure or limit our under‐ the Third International Dharmakīrti Conference, standing of whether or not we are dealing here (Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der with problems of justifcation and/or with a for‐ Wissenschaften, (1997). mal theory of truth (p. 225f). In using "instrumen‐ tality" and epistemic "warrant" as equivalents for [2]. See, e.g., Georges Dreyfus, Recognizing Re‐ prāmāṇya and pramāṇa, respectively, Dunne ality: Dharmakīrti's Philosophy and Its Tibetan shows greater sensitivity to current debates in Interpretations (Albany: SUNY Press, 1997), pp. 83, epistemology than one usually encounters in the 99, 104. scholarly literature on Dharmakīrti, even though his analysis is largely confned to issues of textual

4 H-Net Reviews

If there is additional discussion of this review, you may access it through the network, at https://networks.h-net.org/h-buddhism

Citation: Christian Coseru. Review of Dunne, John D. Foundations of Dharmakīrti's Philosophy. H- Buddhism, H-Net Reviews. June, 2010.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=11720

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.

5