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The Continuity of Madhyamaka and Yogacara in Indian THE CONTINUITY OF MADHYAMAKA AND YOGACARA IN INDIAN MAHAYANA BUDDHISM by IAN CHARLES HARRIS Submitted for the degree of PhD DEPARTMENT OF RELIGIOUS STUDIES THE UNIVERSITY OF LANCSTER JUNE 1985 ProQuest Number: 11003643 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com plete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. uest ProQuest 11003643 Published by ProQuest LLC(2018). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. ProQuest LLC. 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346 DESTRUAM ET AEDIFICABO - Proudhon ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS To my wife Gwen, without whose support this would not have been possible, and to my supervisor, Andrew Rawlinson,for his helpful comments, criticisms and comradeship. Authors Ian Charles Harris Titles The Continuity of Madhyamaka and Yogaoara in Indian Mahay ana Buddhism* Degrees PhD Dates June 1935* ABSTRACT In the history of Buddhist scholarship it has been the convention to treat the Madhyamaka and Yogacarip strands of the Mahayana as . separate and fundamentally opposed schools of thought. This thesis represents an attempt to explore the relationship between the two in some detail and comes to the conclusion that earlier assessments are not justified by either textual evidence, or by underlying trends in the history of the development of Buddhist thought as such. The overall substance of the thesis is a general reappraisal of the ontological and epistemological doctrines contained in the writings of Nagirjuna, Asanga and Vasubandhu with particular reference to the earliest Buddhist philosophical texts available. By turning to the texts themselves, and assigning a lesser significance to the commentarial literature of a later period, it is possible to show considerable overlap in all areas of doctrine, but particularly the treatment of the levels of truth, the understanding of the enlight­ ened and the unenlightened states and their relation to an indeterminate existence realm, the nature of that real^1, and finally the function and status of language and thought. As a result of these investigations it is possible to erect a new theory to explain the proliferation of Indian Mahayana Buddhism which does not operate on a schismatic basis, but rather accounts for variety as the consequence of individual authors addressing new audiences, and specific contemporary problems, from a firm and consistent doctrinal bedrock. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iii ABSTRACT iv INTRODUCTION vi / CHAPTER I : A PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION 1 OF MADHYAMAKA ONTOLOGY CHAPTER II : NAGARJUNA AND LOGIC 31 y/ CHAPTER III : NAGARJUNA AND THE CONTINUITY 65 OF TRADITION CHAPTER IV : THE PROBLEM OF MAHAYANA •"SCHOOLS" 96 yj CHAPTER V : THE CONCEPTION OF TRUTH IN THE 125 HINAYANA x/ CHAPTER VI : THE TWO TRUTHS AND THE THREE NATURES 155 CHAPTER VII : THE NATURE OF REALITY 198 v/ CHAPTER VIII : THE PROBLEM OF IDEALISM 233 yf CONCLUSION 263 BIBLIOGRAPHY 267 ABBREVIATIONS 274 v INTRODUCTION VERITAS SEQUITUR ESSE RERUM - AQUINAS In the first chapter the intention will be to demonstrate that Nagarjuna accepts the distinction between the enlightened and the unenlightened state. These states may be understood implicitly in terms of states of mind. The former will then be represented A — w . — _ by jnana/prajna, while the latter corresponds to vijnana. The tA _ essential difference between the two is that vijnana is contaminated by a variety of mental concomitants such as prapanca and vikalpa; _ _ vt _ jnana is not. Conditioned by avidya, vijnana is unable to reproduce a true picture of things. The world appears to be constructed of substantial entities. Jnana results in the destruction of this erroneous world view. Through jnana things are understood not as independent, but as interdependent (pratityasamutpanna). However, and this is a discussion which is examined in more detail in Chapter 5, since language is itself a form of expression entirely implicated in the distorted world view, it follows that the truth about reality must be inexpressible. Chapter 2 examines the logical stance taken by Nagarjuna. This clearly shows that he does not adhere to the prasahga method often associated with him. His method is based on certain axioms common to Buddhist tradition as a whole, and one would be wrong, in consequence, in assigning him the status of seminal thinker. It is the view of this thesis that Nagarjuna both adheres to the doctrine of the vi inexpressibility of truth, and maintains the existence of an onto­ logical truth realm, ie.he is not a nihilist. Truth is revealed beyond the borders of language. In a sense then it would be correct to say that for Nagarjuna the true nature of things lies midway between the dichotomies of language - between existence and non­ existence. The structure of language cannot exhaust the way things truly are. This being so one cannot deny the existence of reality nihilistically, and in consequence, one will be forced to admit an ontologically indeterminate realm, a realm which cannot be determined in terms of existence or non-existence. The doctrine of sunyata is intimately tied to this. The true nature of things is dependently originated (pratityasamutpada). This state is falsely cognised in the unenlightened state. Bodhi therefore rep­ resents the enlightened mind purged of avidya, etc. Bodhi then is sunyati in the sense that it is empty of the defilements of ignorance. Sunyata is not an ontological state, but rather a state of mind in which there is a true identification of cogniser and cognised - a state incapable of articulation. In Chapter 3 we analyse Nagirjuna’s connection with early Buddhism and find a general continuity of thought. We go on to contrast the nirvapa/samsara dichotomy with what we have already discussed. As a result nirvana can be clearly associated with bodhi - that state of mind in which the dichotomies generated by prapanca have been eradicated, while samsara becomes identified with the world A — —- picture composed through the agency of vijnana. Both nirvana and samsara then do not represent ontological states. On the contrary, they are shown to be orientations to one ontological, vii though unpredic-able realm, which is itself the base for the arising of both vijnana and jnana/prajna. With chapter 4 we turn our attention to the Yogacira. We question the view of the older generation of scholars who wished to establish radical differences between this school and the position of Nigarjuna. We show that many of these attempts are based both on an interpretation of Nagarjuna’s teaching passed down through Candrakirti, and on certain presuppositions inherited from the history of Western thought. Candrakirti’s understanding of Yogacara was that it was preliminary to the study of Madhyamaka. We are able to show that this is simply not so. Candrakirti misunderstands the basis of the Yogacara teachings and attributes positions to them which they do not hold. In fact the axioms of the Madhyamaka and Yogacara are common. The idea of an initiatory scheme of Buddhist teaching, with the Madhyamaka at the top is exposed as a very late development in the history of Indian Mahayana Buddhism. The important doctrine of the levels of truth as it crops up throughout the history of Buddhist thought is explored in Chapters 5 and 6. We discover a bewildering assortment of differing formulations which can however be simplified quite consistently. Two strands can be identified in the early material. Both are underpinned by a theory of language, though these theories are divergent. In the first two separate areas of discourse may be identified; implicit (nitattha) language about things, and that which is termed explicit (neyattha). The former is in accordance with conventional usage, while the latter reflects the Buddhist understanding of things. The latter is therefore viii accurate and supplies a true picture of the world. This particular teaching is the forerunner of the dharma theory of the Abhidharma which seems to be refuted in the writings of the Mahayana. In the Abhidharma language which takes into account the dharmic constitution of things is said to be ultimately true (paramattha), while that which does not is only conventionally so (sammuti). The theory of truths which is developed in the Mahayana can also be found in the early tradition. This theory is entirely consistent with the understanding of language discussed in Chapters 1 and 2 and accepted by both the Madhyamaka and the Yogacara. According to this particular strand of thinking, whatever is expressed is *\ — essentially contaminated by vijnana and its mental concomitants, and as such constitutes a false picture of things. Ultimately truth, and hence the teaching of the Buddha, is equated with silence. It may not be attained through the processes of thought, but rather through their elimination. The problem with this particular formulation is that by accepting it one must automatically hold to the corrolary; that everything which is expressed is false. The doctrine of three v \ _ _ _ natures (trisvabhava) expounded in the Prajnaparamita and by the Yogacara is an attempt to show that the two truth doctrine should not be taken in such a manner. There are no essential differences between the two and three nature formulations - the latter simply makes explicit what was implicit in the former. This takes us back to our distinction between an ontologically indeterminate realm and the two orientations towards it. In the Madhyamaka it is quite clear that the ultimate (paramartha) and the conventional ix (saipvrti) truths refer to the perspectives associated with jnana and vijnana respectively.
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