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• PARAMILITARY CE Be PARAMILITARY • PARAMILITARY CE Be PARAMILITARY JohnAndrade M TOCKTON SPRE 5 5 © Macmillan Publishers Ltd, 1985 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1995 978-0-333-38629-3 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without permission. First published in the United Kingdom by MACMILLAN PUBLISHERS LTD, (Journals Division), 1985 Distributed by Globe Book Services Ltd, Brunei Road, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Rants RG21 2XS, England. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Andrade, John World police and paramilitary forces. 1. Police 2. Paramilitary forces I. Title 363.3 HV7921 ISBN 978-1-349-07784-7 ISBN 978-1-349-07782-3 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-07782-3 Published in the United States and Canada by Stockton Press, 1985 15 East 26th Street, New York, N.Y. 10010, USA. Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Andrade, John M. World police and paramilitary forces. Bibliography: p. 1. Police-Handbooks, manuals, etc. 2. Paramilitary forces--Handbooks, manuals, etc. I. Title. HV7921.A59 1985 363.2 85-17247 ISBN 978-0-943818-14-6 GazeUehelicopter. First flown in 1967and in productionsince 1971,the AerospatialeSA 341GazeUeis typicalofthehelicopters currently in use by police and paramilitary forces. TheSA 342M illustrated has the markings ofthe French Gendermarie and is fitted with a PA system for crowd control duties. Saracen and Wheelbarrow. Many types ofarmouredvehicleare in service with paramilitary forces. TheAlvis FV 603(C) Saracen armoured personnel carrier shown is used by the British Army in Northern Ireland in support ofthe local internal security forces. The reverse flow cooling system indicates that it was built for use in the Middle East. Note the turret traversed to the rear and the ring mount for a 7.62 mm machinegun. Tothe rightofthepictureis a WheelbarrowMk7, a remote-controlledbombdisposalmachine. Thephotograph was taken at Templemore Avenue, East Belfast, in May 1977 following a report of a suspect car which had been abandoned. A. Ruger revolver. The Ruger Police Service Six is the revolver most widely used by US police forces and government agencies , and by certain LatinAmerican police forces. Itis availablein blued or stainless steel finish, in a choiceofbarrel lengths andin three calibres - .357 Magnum (shown here),.38 Special, and 9mm Parabellum. B. BrowningFN pistol. Designed in 1925by John M. Browning, the 9 mm Browning High-Power has been built in Belgium byFN under licence since 1935.One ofthemost reliableself-loadingpistols currentlyavailable, it isin service with militaryand police forces ofover 50 countries. The model illustrated here is the British Army Pistol, Browning FN, 9mm, High Power No 2, Mk 1. Co Uzi submachine gun. The 9mm Uzi submachine gun was developed from the Czech models 23 and 25 SMGs by Lt Uziel Gal and is in production by IMI at Ramat HaSharon, Israel, and FN at Herstal, Belgium. It is available with a folding metal stock, as shown, or with a wooden stock, and is popular with the NAill armed and paramilitary forces because of its simplicity and reliability. Sankey armoured vehicle. The GKN Sankey AT 105 was developed from the earlier AT 104and is available in a number ofversions, including the AT 105-E armoured personnel carrier and the AT 105-P internal security vehicle (shown here). The standard AT 105-P has an optional7.62mm machinegun in theturret, bulletproofwindscreen, and provision for rotating beacons, siren, hand-operated searchlights, and a PA system. It may be adapted for bomb disposal duties. Shorland. The Shorland was developed in 1965to meet the requirements ofthe Royal Ulster Constabulary, and entered production as an armouredpatrolcar; otherversions weresubsequentlyintroduced. The Shorlandillustratedhere isthe Mk 3, based on the 109-inch wheelbase Land Rover, and powered by a 2.6 litre Rover engine rated at 91hp. Armament consists ofa 7.62 mm GPMG in a manually operatedturret. AllRUeShorlands weretransferredto the UlsterDefenceRegiment and BritishArmy units in NorthernIrelandduring the late 1970s. The Shorland is also in use with the Dutch, Portuguese, and other paramilitary forces. China, People's Republic of 45 CONTENTS Ciskei 183 Colombia 47 Preface and Acknowledgements viii Comoros 49 Introduction IX Congo 50 Selected Bibliography xiii Costa Rica 51 Afghanistan 1 Cuba 52 Albania 2 Cyprus 53 Algeria 3 Czechoslovakia 54 Andorra 4 Denmark 55 Angola 5 Djibouti 56 Anguilla 6 Dominica 57 Antigua and Barbuda 7 Dominican Republic 58 Argentina 8 Ecuador 59 Australia 10 Egypt 60 Austria 14 EISalvador 61 Bahamas 16 Equatorial Guinea 62 Bahrain 17 Ethiopia 63 Bangladesh 18 Falkland Islands 64 Barbados 19 Fiji 65 Belgium 20 Finland 66 Belize 22 France 67 Benin 23 Guiana 73 Bermuda 24 Gabon 74 Bhutan 25 Gambia 75 Bolivia 26 German Democratic Republic 76 Bophuthatswana 182 German Federal Republic 77 Botswana 27 Ghana 79 Brazil 28 Gibraltar 80 Brunei 30 Greece 81 Bulgaria 31 Burkina Faso 32 Grenada 82 Burma 33 Guatemala 83 Burundi 34 Guinea 84 Cambodia 35 Guinea-Bissau 85 Cameroon 36 Guyana 86 Canada 37 Haiti 87 Cape Verde 39 Honduras 88 Cayman Islands 40 Hong Kong 89 Central African Republic 41 Hungary 90 Chad 42 Iceland 91 Chile 43 India 92 v WORLD POLICE AND PARAMILITARY FORCES Indonesia 94 Niger 148 Iran 95 Nigeria 149 Iraq 96 Norway 150 Ireland 97 Oman 152 Israel 99 Pakistan 153 Italy 101 Panama 154 Ivory Coast 106 Papua New Guinea 155 Jamaica 107 Paraguay 156 Japan 109 Peru 157 Jordan 112 Philippines 158 Kenya 113 Poland 159 Kiribati 114 Portugal 161 Korea, North 115 Puerto Rico 225 Korea, South 116 Qatar 164 Kuwait 117 Romania 165 Laos 118 Rwanda 166 Lebanon 119 St Christopher 167 Lesotho 120 StHelena 168 Liberia 121 StLucia 169 Libya 122 St Vincent and the Grenadines 170 Liechtenstein 123 Samoa, Western 233 Luxembourg 124 San Marino 171 Madagascar 125 Sao Tome e Principe 172 Malawi 126 Saudi Arabia 173 Malaysia 127 Sengal 174 Maldives 128 Seychelles 175 Mali 129 Sierra Leone 176 Malta 130 Singapore 177 Mauritania 131 Solomon Islands 178 Mauritius 132 Somalia 179 Mexico 133 South Africa 180 Monaco 135 South West Africa 184 Mongolian Republic 136 Spain 187 Montserrat 137 Sri Lanka 189 Morocco 138 Sudan 190 Mozambique 13.9 Suriname 191 Nauru 140 Swaziland 192 Nepal 141 Sweden 193 Netherlands 142 Switzerland 195 Netherlands Antilles 144 Syria 198 New Zealand 145 Taiwan 46 Nicaragua 147 Tanzania 199 VI CONTENTS Thailand 200 Vanuatu 228 Togo 201 Vatican City State 229 Tonga 202 Venda 186 Transkei 185 Venezuela 230 Trinidad and Tobago 203 Vietnam 231 Tunisia 204 Virgin Islands (Br.) 232 Turkey 205 Virgin Islands (USA) 226 Turks and Caicos Islands 206 Yemen Arab Republic 234 Tuvalu 207 Yemen, People's Democratic Uganda 208 Republic of 235 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 209 Yugoslavia 236 United Arab Emirates 212 ZaIre 237 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Zambia 238 Northern Ireland 213 Zimbabwe 239 United States of America 221 Uruguay 227 Equipment 241 vii Preface and Acknowledgements The text of the present book is based on notes taken by the author, when he was connected with a major intelligence organization in his country of origin. Much has changed since then and additions and corrections to the original text have been made to ensure accuracy. However, a directory of this magnitude could not have been written without the collaboration of other individuals and organizations. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance provided by: Jose Luis Afonso, former intelli­ gence operative; Dennis T. Brett, former Librarian-Cura­ tor, Police Staff College; Adrian J. English, specialist in defence -and security matters; Dr Fernando Marques, specialist in paramilitary and internal security forces; Jorge Manuel Pimenta, researcher; Denis Vinot, historian and intelligence specialist. Also Christopher K. and Martin O'Shaughnessy, for their assistance during the revision of the typescript; various police and diplomatic personnel; and all the anons. Finally, special thanks go to Robert Kean, without whose constant assistance and encouragement this book would have never been finished. No book is perfect, however careful the author may have been. Some information may have been omitted that merits inclusion; there may be up-to-date additions that could be made. The author would like to have such points drawn to his attention in order to prepare for the next edition. Likewise, constructive criticism will be welcome. Countries are listed in alphabetical order. Most entries are divided into three parts: Introduction (historical notes), Organization (details), and Operations (current and potential situation). Many developed countries have a brief note on their main private security companies. Vlll WORLD POLICE AND PARAMILITARY FORCES strued as undermining the democratic freedom of the people it is theoretically meant to serve. On the other hand, the INTRODUCTION police exist to enforce the law and do not (or should not) take any sides in such disputes. Consequently, civil libertarians often regard the police as intrinsically undemocratic, authori­ There is no agreement about where the first police force came tarian or even proto-fascist. into being. Anthropologists suggest, and in all probability they are right, that the need for a police force became Current trends in police work apparent when the first organized society emerged. This was For better or worse, society is changing, and police forces an empirical response to the realities of communal life; the have had to change accordingly. Operational procedures fact that mass psychology differs from individual psychology, thought unlikely to be adopted ten years ago are now and that an individual may respect the law when alone and commonplace. Communities are no longer as homogenous break it when a part of an anonymous group, was recognized and law abiding as they used to be; the era of the unarmed in practice long before it was formulated in theory.
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