August 28, 2015 15 News & Analysis Iran The meaning of Iran’s Fateh-313 cruise missile

Sabahat Khan the Fateh-313 has both high accuracy and enhanced capabilities to defeat countermeasures, the Fateh-313 in Dubai itself does not represent a ground- breaking development. ran has unveiled the latest The Iranian missile inventory addition to its weapons in- already boasts the C-802 (120-km ventory — the solid-fuelled range), C201-W (200-km range) and Fateh-313 cruise missile, which Raad (400-km range) cruise mis- has a 500-kilometre range. The siles. Additionally, the Iranian mis- IFateh-313, which was indigenously sile inventory includes the Zelzal developed, is said to have passed 1 & 2 (200-km range), Fateh-110-D operational testing and is to be put (250-km range), Shahab-1 (300- into production. km range) and Shahab-2 (500-km Broadcast August 22nd on televi- range) tactical and short-range bal- sion to mark the national Defence listic missiles, the Shahab 3 (1,300- Industry Day in Iran, the ceremony km range), Shahab 3A (1500-km was attended by Iranian President range), Shahab 3B (2,000-km range) Hassan Rohani, who declared, “We medium-range ballistic missiles, will buy, sell and develop any weap- and the Sejil (2500-km range) inter- ons we need and we will not ask for mediate ballistic missile. permission or abide by any resolu- With its growing missile invento- tion for that.” ry, Iran is bolstering its capabilities to engage land targets right across The cruise and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as well as naval vessels around the ballistic missile Gulf with increasing precision and arsenal being reliability — leaving GCC and US air amassed by Iran and missile defenders as little as presents a three minutes to react with counter- measures from the point of launch. significant offensive The cruise and ballistic missile Iranian President Hassan Rohani, left, listens to Defence Minister Hossein Dehghan after unveiling threat arsenal being amassed by Iran pre- the surface-to-surface Fateh-313 missile in a ceremony in Iran, on August 22, 2015. sents a significant offensive threat The Iranian missile programme, though it can be reduced to some which is controlled by the Islamic extent through countermeasures ing variants using terrain-masking can provide only limited protec- tacks, deterrence achieved through Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), and military responses. technology that make early detec- tion across the Gulf. Also, the Ira- enhanced air power capabilities has been central to its military The MIM-104 Patriot systems op- tion difficult — and Iran is rapidly nian missile programme will re- must be buttressed with a yet to be strategy since the 1980-8 war with erated by Saudi Arabia, the United moving to acquire and develop main more complex and financially realised regionally integrated air Iraq that followed its revolution in Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Bah- these capabilities. draining to counter than it is for Iran and missile defence shield. 1979. With sustained investment rain, as well as the Terminal High to create and sustain. As the Irani- Only a regionally integrated air into developing a growing range of Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) In April, Saudi an missile programme continues and missile defence shield and the cruise and ballistic missile capabili- the UAE has recently stood up rep- Arabia purchased to receive substantial investment supporting early warning network ties, Iran has achieved important resent the best-in-class technology from the Iranian leadership, more that can deliver a near-real time strategic gains to make it one of the to counter missile threats, such as the latest version of sophisticated systems will emerge shared picture can assure the op- preeminent military powers in the those posited by Iran. the PAC-3 Patriot and complicate the security situa- erational capability and readiness region. In April, Saudi Arabia purchased interceptors tion and balance of power with Arab required by Gulf Arab states. The unveiling of the Fateh-313 is the latest version of the PAC-3 Patri- Gulf states. The GCC is at work along these the latest reminder of how the Irani- ot interceptors in a deal reportedly Moreover, the threat of saturated Emerging developments con- lines to respond to the continuing an missile programme continues to worth $2 billion and, in late July, missile attacks — a numbers game nected with missile proliferation developments of the Iranian missile create an increasingly dangerous re- submitted a request for an addition- where Iran is able to launch more in the region will increasingly em- programme and the threat it poses gional environment. Missiles, such al 600 Patriots in a deal that could missiles than regional air and mis- phasise the upgrading of regional to regional security. as Fateh-313, with solid fuel propel- be worth $5 billion. Additionally, sile defences can cope with — is counterforce capabilities, prompt- It will look to international part- lants offer advantages over liquid- Saudi Arabia and Qatar are keen to intensifying with the sustained in- ing the GCC to focus on boosting air ners, especially the United States, fuelled rockets, such as reduced lo- follow the UAE in acquiring THAAD duction of new missile classes into power capabilities with long-range to support its strategy with deeper gistical footprints and preparation for protection against ballistic mis- service under the IRGC, as repre- stand-off targeting weapons that and intensified cooperation. times required for launch. siles. sented by the Fateh-313. can neutralise the capability of Iran Although solid-fuelled missiles Cruise missiles are, however, As such, in the emerging con- to launch missiles in a sustained of- Sabahat Khan is senior analyst for are more sophisticated than liquid- particularly challenging to counter text, even the best missile defence fense. Given the compressed time the Institute for Near East and Gulf fuelled ones and, while Iran claims with reliability, especially low-fly- systems operated by GCC states cycles to react against missile at- Military Analysis. Iran’s impossible return to the 1990s

Ali Alfoneh Republic’s way towards modera- constrains attempts by Rohani and tion then: The death of Grand Aya- Rafsanjani to pursue the updated tollah Ruhollah Khomeini, founder détente policy of the 1990s. Washington of the Islamic Republic, and Iraqi The IRGC was battered and dictator Saddam Hussein’s disas- bruised after the end of the gru- wo men personify the trous decision to invade Kuwait in elling war with Iraq in 1988, but post-revolutionary phase August 1990. has gradually developed into an of the Islamic Republic The triumvirate of Rafsanjani, independent power centre in its in the 1990s: then-presi- Ali Khamenei and Ahmad Khomei- own right and not subjected to any dent Akbar Hashemi Raf- ni, son of the ayatollah, had care- meaningful presidential control. Tsanjani and Hassan Rohani, his Su- fully prepared for the death of the Any serious attempt by Rohani and preme National Security Council charismatic leader of the revolu- Rafsanjani to repair relations with secretary. Rohani’s electoral vic- tion. the Arab states will doubtless be tory in 2014 and the rise of Rafsan- Rafsanjani and Khamenei used met with the unyielding opposi- jani have revived hopes for return Ahmad, Khomeini’s gatekeeper, to tion of the IRGC. of the good old days of the 1990s. plant their own people in the ma- Regional dynamics too prevent a The argument goes that the team chinery of state in preparation for return to the policies of the 1990s. that repaired relations with the the post-Khomeini transition of After the invasion of Kuwait at the Arab monarchies in the 1990s can power. start of the decade, Iraq emerged once again build bridges between They may even have promised as the common enemy of Iran and Iran and its Arab neighbours. The Ahmad that he would succeed his Different era. Mohammad Khatami, elected in 1997. the Gulf states. Tehran and the July 14th agreement aimed at end- father, however unlikely that may Arab monarchies had no choice ing the crisis over Iran’s nuclear seem but, after the revolutionary but to balance the Iraqi threat. programme has given additional leader died, Rafsanjani deftly mar- hani not only managed to reach an This is in part because Khame- Today, no such shared threat ex- credence to such hopes. That as- ginalised Ahmad and put the man- honourable peace agreement with nei fears they could use their dip- ists. Following the United States’ sessment is probably too optimis- tle of leadership on Khamenei’s Saddam — who at all costs desired lomatic triumph with the nuclear military disengagement from Iraq, tic. shoulders. Iran’s neutrality in the Kuwait war agreement to expand their power the Islamic Republic and the mon- In turn, Khamenei, preoccupied — they also quickly mended fenc- base within the regime. archies find themselves in a fierce Those dreaming of with consolidating his position as es with the Gulf monarchies that rivalry to fill the regional power returning to the supreme leader, showed little in- had bankrolled Saddam and with Regional dynamics vacuum. This eliminates possible good old days may terest in diplomacy and gave Raf- which Tehran had been engaged cooperation that marked earlier sanjani a free rein to refashion the in an undeclared state of war since prevent a return to decades. Such dynamics do not soon wake up to the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy. the revolution of 1979. the policies of the bode well for the Islamic Repub- nightmare of 2015 This freedom Rafsanjani and his Clearly, the domestic and re- 1990s lic’s ability to return to its policies young acolyte Rohani adminis- gional dynamics of today are very of the 1990s. Those dreaming of A combination of unique do- tered with the greatest dexterity. different than those of the 1990s. Therefore, Khamenei has neu- returning to the good old days may mestic developments in Iran and Saddam’s terrible miscalculation Khamenei, free of the insecuri- tralised even the slightest meas- soon wake up to the nightmare of regional dynamics propelled the over Kuwait, which the Iraqi tyrant ties he suffered early in his leader- ures taken by Rohani government 2015. Islamic Republic towards modera- had sought to use in his attempt to ship after succeeding the widely officials to normalise relations tion in the 1990s. None of those smother the infant Islamic Repub- revered Khomeini, is obsessed with the United States and its Arab Ali Alfoneh is a specialist on Iran circumstances are in place today lic at birth and steal its oil, actually with counter-balancing Rafsanjani allies in the Middle East. The polit- and the Islamic Revolutionary and one can’t expect an outcome contributed to the duo’s success. and Rohani and is not willing to ically interventionist Islamic Revo- Guards Corps. He is a senior fellow similar to the one in the 1990s. Taking advantage of the Iraqi inva- give them a free hand in conduct- lutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) is at the Foundation for Defense of Two events paved the Islamic sion of Kuwait, Rafsanjani and Ro- ing Iran’s foreign policy. another factor, which severely Democracies in Washington.