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Iran's Missile Program: Past and Present

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Iran's Missile Program: Past and Present Iran's Missile Program: Past and Present KEY SYSTEMS SHORT- RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES MEDIUM - RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLES (SLVs) Ranges up to 1,000 km; can reach Iraq, Ranges up to about 2,000 km; can reach Use many of the same technologies as Syria, and Persian Gulf countries Israel, Lebanon, parts of Eastern Europe long-range missiles; "shortens the timeline to an ICBM" according to U.S. intelligence Fateh family: single-stage, solid-fueled; Shahab-3: derived from Scuds/DPRK No- variants include Zolfaghar, Dezful, and Dong; single-stage, liquid-fueled; nuclear- Safir and Simorgh rockets: two-stage, Raad-500 capable; variants include Ghadr, Emad liquid-fueled rockets; use Shahab-3 components; recent launch failures Shahab 1 and 2: modified versions of Sejil: two-stage, solid-fueled; nuclear Soviet Scuds; single-stage, liquid-fueled; capable; no tests reported since 2012 Qased: three-stage rocket; uses solid and variants include Qiam liquid fuel; successful launch by IRGC Khorramshahr: derived from DPRK Musudan; Aerospace Force in 2020 single-stage, liquid-fueled; tested in 2018 KEY ENTITIES, SANCTIONS, AND FOREIGN SUPPLY IRGC Aerospace Force (IRGC-AF): controls U.N. Security Council resolution 2231 calls Iran continues to depend on foreign Iran's deployed missiles; oversees upon Iran "not to undertake any activity suppliers for missile components and development and production of missiles, related to ballistic missiles designed to be technology, according to U.S. intelligence launchers, silos; led by Amir Ali Hajizadeh capable of delivering nuclear weapons" Receives support from North Korea and Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO): Resolution also restricts procurement of entities in China and Russia designs and produces missiles; subsidiary missile technology; sanctions key missile Runs an expansive illicit procurement of Iran's defense ministry entities network to obtain export-controlled Shahid Hemat Industrial Group (SHIG): All U.N. missile restrictions set to expire in missile technology and relevant items produces liquid-fueled missiles; subordinate 2023 below control thresholds to AIO; U.N.-sanctioned U.S., EU, and other countries continue to Seeking advanced materials and Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG): apply more expansive sanctions on Iran's components to improve missile guidance, produces solid-fueled missiles; subordinate missile program fuel, re-entry vehicles to AIO; U.N.-sanctioned Missile Missions: Nuclear Weapon Delivery and Conventional Combat Iran has developed a number of solid and liquid fueled ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons. An IAEA investigation found that Iran had a "coordinated" nuclear weapon development program until 2003, with efforts to integrate a nuclear warhead into its Shahab-3 ballistic missiles. Iran increasingly using cruise and ballistic missiles in conventional combat, demonstrating improved accuracy. Iran has transferred missiles and production equipment to regional proxies, including Hezbollah, Shi'ite militias in Iraq, and Yemen's Houthis. Read the full report here Iran Watch is published by The Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, a non-profit, non-partisan organization that conducts research, advocacy, and public education aimed at inhibiting strategic trade from contributing to the proliferation of WMD. @WisconsinProj WisconsinProject.
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