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The Iranian Sea-Air-Missile Threat to Gulf Shipping Washington, DC 20036 202-887-0200 | the Iranian Sea-Air-Missile Lanham • Boulder • New York • London

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The Iranian Sea-Air-Missile Threat to Gulf Shipping Washington, DC 20036 202-887-0200 | the Iranian Sea-Air-Missile Lanham • Boulder • New York • London 1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW The Iranian Sea-Air-Missile Threat to Gulf Shipping to The Iranian Sea-Air-Missile Threat Washington, DC 20036 202-887-0200 | www.csis.org The Iranian Sea-Air-Missile Lanham • Boulder • New York • London 4501 Forbes Boulevard Lanham, MD 20706 301- 459- 3366 | www.rowman.com Threat to Gulf Cover photo: Shutterstock. Shipping ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN AUTHOR Anthony H. Cordesman with Aaron Lin ISBN 978-1-4422-4076-6 Ë|xHSLEOCy240766z FEBRUARY 2015 v*:+:!:+:! A Report of the CSIS Burke Chair in Strategy Blank The Iranian Sea-Air-Missile Threat to Gulf Shipping AUTHOR Anthony H. Cordesman with Aaron Lin February 2015 A Report of the CSIS Burke Chair in Strategy Lanham • Boulder • New York • London About CSIS For over 50 years, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has worked to develop solutions to the world’s greatest policy challenges. Today, CSIS scholars are providing strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to help decisionmakers chart a course toward a better world. CSIS is a nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C. The Center’s 220 full-time staff and large network of affiliated scholars conduct research and analysis and develop policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change. Founded at the height of the Cold War by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke, CSIS was dedicated to finding ways to sustain American prominence and prosperity as a force for good in the world. Since 1962, CSIS has become one of the world’s preeminent international institutions focused on defense and security; regional stability; and transnational challenges ranging from energy and climate to global health and economic integration. Former U.S. senator Sam Nunn has chaired the CSIS Board of Trustees since 1999. Former deputy secretary of defense John J. Hamre became the Center’s president and chief executive officer in 2000. CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). © 2015 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. ISBN: 978-1-4422-4076-6 (pb); 978-1-4422-4077-3 (eBook) Center for Strategic & International Studies Rowman & Littlefield 1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NW 4501 Forbes Boulevard Washington, DC 20036 Lanham, MD 20706 202-887-0200 | www.csis.org 301-459-3366 | www.rowman.com Table of Contents I. THE ROLE OF ENERGY EXPORTS IN DETERMINING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE IRANIAN THREAT ............................................................................................................ 1 THE GROWING GLOBAL IMPORTANCE OF MARITIME TRAFFIC TO AND FROM THE GULF .......... 2 CHOKEPOINTS AND THE BROADER MARITIME THREAT .............................................................. 5 THE IRANIAN MARITIME THREAT TO IRAN ................................................................................. 7 II. THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF IRAN’S NAVAL FORCES ..................... 13 THE RANGE OF MARITIME THREATS ......................................................................................... 13 Submarines ............................................................................................................................ 21 Corvettes and Major Surface Ships....................................................................................... 24 Missile Patrol Boats .............................................................................................................. 24 Other Patrol Boats and Smaller Vessels ............................................................................... 25 Mine Warfare ........................................................................................................................ 25 Amphibious Vessels ............................................................................................................... 27 Hovercraft ............................................................................................................................. 27 Naval Aviation ...................................................................................................................... 27 Anti-Ship Missile Forces ....................................................................................................... 27 NAVAL GUARDS, MARINES, SPECIAL FORCES, AND MARINES ................................................. 29 Structure and Organization .................................................................................................. 30 Ships and Small Craft ........................................................................................................... 30 Probable Effectiveness .......................................................................................................... 31 THE NAVAL SIDE OF THE SHIFT TO ASYMMETRIC WARFARE ................................................... 33 IRANIAN OFFICERS AND OFFICIALS ON IRAN’S NAVAL POSTURE IN THE GULF ....................... 34 III. THE IRANIAN AIR FORCE: A WEAK AND AGING FORCE..................................... 39 THE UNCERTAINTIES AFFECTING IRAN’S AIRCRAFT AND MODERNIZATION ........................... 39 IRAN’S NAVAL AVIATION BRANCH ........................................................................................... 42 IRANIAN CLAIMS TO AIR MODERNIZATION AND COMBAT CAPABILITY................................... 42 IRAN’S STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES IN FIGHTING A SIGNIFICANT AIR WAR ....................... 44 THE IMPACT OF THE AIR BALANCE: THE US, THE SOUTHERN GULF PROBLEM, AND IRAN’S CAPABILITY FOR AIR COMBAT .................................................................................................. 55 IV. LINKAGES TO IRAN’S BALLISTIC MISSILE AND NUCLEAR PROGRAMS ....... 57 ACCURACY, RELIABILITY, AND NUCLEAR FORCES .................................................................. 57 ASYMMETRIC WARFARE AND WARS OF INTIMIDATION ........................................................... 59 ANTI-SHIP BALLISTIC MISSILE: THE KHALIJ FARS ................................................................... 59 V. FOCUSING ON THE BROADER THREAT FROM ASYMMETRIC FORCES ........... 66 IRANIAN VIEWS OF IRAN’S ASYMMETRIC FORCES ................................................................... 67 ASYMMETRIC FORCES AND THE ART OF LIMITED WAR ........................................................... 69 ONGOING DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN’S GROWING MIX OF ASYMMETRIC WARFARE FORCES ... 70 A PROVEN HISTORY AND UNCERTAIN FUTURE ........................................................................ 71 USING ASYMMETRIC FORCES TO COMPENSATE FOR CONVENTIONAL WEAKNESS .................. 72 VI. “CLOSING THE GULF”: IRAN’S REAL WORLD MILITARY OPTIONS FOR ASYMMETRIC WARFARE...................................................................................................... 73 STRATEGIC, ENERGY, AND GLOBAL ECONOMIC IMPACTS ........................................................ 75 STRATEGIC DEPENDENCE ON THE OVERALL FLOW OF GULF EXPORTS .................................... 78 SHIFTS IN FUTURE GLOBAL DEPENDENCE ................................................................................ 83 The Critical Impact of Asian Dependence on Maritime Traffic Out of the Gulf ................... 83 The Uncertainties in US Import Dependence ....................................................................... 89 GLOBAL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SUSTAINED INTERRUPTIONS .................................................. 92 IRAN’S MILITARY ASSETS FOR SUCH A MISSION ...................................................................... 95 Iran’s Submarines ................................................................................................................. 95 iv | Anthony H. Cordesman Iran’s Submersibles and Midget Submarines, ...................................................................... 98 Swimmer Delivery Vehicles (SDVs), ............................................................................................................ 99 Major Surface Warships, ................................................................................................................................ 99 Fast-attack Watercraft, Speedboats, Patrol Craft, and Hovercraft, ............................................................... 100 Shore and Ship-based ASCMs, .................................................................................................................... 105 Naval Mines ........................................................................................................................ 107 Maritime Patrol Aircraft, .............................................................................................................................. 110 Helicopters .................................................................................................................................................... 111 Torpedoes ..................................................................................................................................................... 111 UCAVs and UAVs................................................................................................................ 112 IRAN’S BASES AND OTHER ASSETS FOR “CLOSING THE GULF” .............................................. 113 Prioritizing These Threats ................................................................................................... 115 VII. US AND ARAB GULF OPTIONS FOR COMPETING WITH IRAN’S ASYMMETRIC FORCES
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