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BR IFIC N° 2683 Index/Indice International Frequency Information Circular (Terrestrial Services) ITU - Radiocommunication Bureau Circular Internacional de Información sobre Frecuencias (Servicios Terrenales) UIT - Oficina de Radiocomunicaciones Circulaire Internationale d'Information sur les Fréquences (Services de Terre) UIT - Bureau des Radiocommunications Part 1 / Partie 1 / Parte 1 Date/Fecha 30.11.2010 Description of Columns Description des colonnes Descripción de columnas No. Sequential number Numéro séquenciel Número sequencial BR Id. BR identification number Numéro d'identification du BR Número de identificación de la BR Adm Notifying Administration Administration notificatrice Administración notificante 1A [MHz] Assigned frequency [MHz] Fréquence assignée [MHz] Frecuencia asignada [MHz] Name of the location of Nom de l'emplacement de Nombre del emplazamiento de 4A/5A transmitting / receiving station la station d'émission / réception estación transmisora / receptora 4B/5B Geographical area Zone géographique Zona geográfica 4C/5C Geographical coordinates Coordonnées géographiques Coordenadas geográficas 6A Class of station Classe de station Clase de estación Purpose of the notification: Objet de la notification: Propósito de la notificación: Intent ADD-addition MOD-modify ADD-ajouter MOD-modifier ADD-añadir MOD-modificar SUP-suppress W/D-withdraw SUP-supprimer W/D-retirer SUP-suprimir W/D-retirar No. BR Id Adm 1A [MHz] 4A/5A 4B/5B 4C/5C 6A Part Intent 1 110106403 ARG 7470.0000 VILLA PARANACITO ARG 58W40'03'' 33S42'52'' FX 1 ADD 2 110106402 ARG 7624.0000 BRAZO LARGO ARG 58W53'16'' 33S52'01'' FX 1 ADD 3 110104497 BEL 1521.0000 ANTWERPEN MULTIPLAZA BEL 4E24'18'' 51N11'23'' FX 1 ADD 4 110105076 BLR 10715.0000 ORSHA BLR 30E27'05'' 54N33'01'' FX 1 ADD 5 110105070 BLR 10735.0000 ZHITKOVICHI BLR 27E53'46'' 52N12'36'' FX 1 ADD 6 110105056 BLR 10755.0000 GOMEL BLR 30E55'25'' 52N25'50'' FX 1 ADD 7 110105069 BLR 10755.0000 SHARKOVSCHINA BLR 27E29'41'' 55N21'38'' FX 1 ADD 8 110105051 BLR 10775.0000 GOMEL BLR 30E55'25'' 52N25'50'' FX 1 ADD 9 110105080 BLR 10795.0000 GLUBOKOE BLR 27E40'26'' 55N07'35'' FX 1 ADD 10 110105072 BLR 10815.0000 ZHITKOVICHI BLR 27E53'46'' 52N12'36'' FX 1 ADD 11 110105075 BLR 10835.0000 KOPTI BLR 30E19'48'' 55N03'40'' FX 1 ADD 12 110105078 BLR 10835.0000 ORSHA BLR 30E27'05'' 54N33'01'' FX 1 ADD 13 110105052 BLR 10955.0000 GOMEL BLR 30E55'25'' 52N25'50'' FX 1 ADD 14 110105049 BLR 10995.0000 BREST BLR 23E42'23'' 52N05'27'' FX 1 ADD BR IFIC N° 2683 30.11.2010 No. BR Id Adm 1A [MHz] 4A/5A 4B/5B 4C/5C 6A Part Intent 15 110105054 BLR 11035.0000 GOMEL BLR 31E00'16'' 52N24'44'' FX 1 ADD 16 110105077 BLR 11245.0000 DUBROVNO BLR 30E42'15'' 54N33'45'' FX 1 ADD 17 110105071 BLR 11265.0000 LYASKOVICHI BLR 28E19'38'' 52N08'00'' FX 1 ADD 18 110105068 BLR 11285.0000 GLUBOKOE BLR 27E40'15'' 55N07'34'' FX 1 ADD 19 110105050 BLR 11285.0000 GOMEL BLR 30E54'40'' 52N25'08'' FX 1 ADD 20 110105057 BLR 11285.0000 GOMEL BLR 30E59'29'' 52N28'15'' FX 1 ADD 21 110105081 BLR 11325.0000 DOKSHITSY BLR 27E45'14'' 54N54'13'' FX 1 ADD 22 110105079 BLR 11365.0000 ORSHA BLR 30E25'40'' 54N28'56'' FX 1 ADD 23 110105074 BLR 11365.0000 VITEBSK BLR 30E13'07'' 55N11'17'' FX 1 ADD 24 110105073 BLR 11375.0000 LYASKOVICHI BLR 28E19'38'' 52N08'00'' FX 1 ADD 25 110105053 BLR 11485.0000 GOMEL BLR 31E00'16'' 52N24'44'' FX 1 ADD 26 110105055 BLR 11565.0000 GOMEL BLR 30E58'13'' 52N26'55'' FX 1 ADD 27 110105066 BLR 12765.0000 GORYANY BLR 29E01'34'' 55N25'25'' FX 1 ADD 28 110105063 BLR 12765.0000 OBOL BLR 29E19'16'' 55N20'55'' FX 1 ADD 29 110105058 BLR 12765.0000 VITEBSK BLR 30E13'07'' 55N11'17'' FX 1 ADD 30 110105065 BLR 12849.0000 GORYANY BLR 29E01'34'' 55N25'25'' FX 1 ADD 31 110105060 BLR 12849.0000 STAROE SELO BLR 29E52'25'' 55N13'41'' FX 1 ADD 32 110105067 BLR 13031.0000 POLOTSK BLR 28E44'48'' 55N28'06'' FX 1 ADD 33 110105062 BLR 13031.0000 SHUMILINO BLR 29E36'38'' 55N17'11'' FX 1 ADD 34 110105059 BLR 13031.0000 STAROE SELO BLR 29E52'25'' 55N13'41'' FX 1 ADD 35 110105064 BLR 13115.0000 OBOL BLR 29E19'16'' 55N20'55'' FX 1 ADD 36 110105061 BLR 13115.0000 SHUMILINO BLR 29E36'38'' 55N17'11'' FX 1 ADD 37 110106180 BLR 37376.5000 BREST BLR 23E39'01'' 52N06'18'' FX 1 ADD 38 110106181 BLR 38636.5000 BREST BLR 23E38'48'' 52N06'11'' FX 1 ADD 39 110106179 BLR 38636.5000 GRODNO BLR 23E49'28'' 53N41'28'' FX 1 ADD 40 110100878 CAN 5.0324 65W42'34'' 66N08'41'' FX 1 ADD 41 110103595 CAN 5.2114 65W42'34'' 66N08'41'' FX 1 ADD 42 110104934 CAN 10617.5000 SURREY BC CAN 122W47'09'' 49N09'36'' FX 1 ADD 43 110106182 D 738.0000 HAMBURG HOELTIGBAUM D 10E11'46'' 53N37'32'' BT 1 ADD 44 110103717 D 778.0000 BERLIN ALEXANDERPLATZ D 13E24'35'' 52N31'15'' BT 1 ADD 45 110103718 D 778.0000 BERLIN SCHAEFERBERG D 13E07'40'' 52N25'02'' BT 1 ADD 46 110103715 D 778.0000 GOETTINGEN HETJERSHAUSEN D 9E51'37'' 51N31'47'' BT 1 ADD 47 110103716 D 778.0000 HARZ WEST D 10E31'55'' 51N48'04'' BT 1 ADD 48 110100494 DNK 474.0000 THISTED DNK 8E41'00'' 56N58'35'' BT 1 MOD 49 110100563 DNK 482.0000 AABENRAA DNK 9E15'00'' 55N02'00'' BT 1 MOD 50 110100561 DNK 482.0000 SVENDBORG DNK 10E37'02'' 55N05'41'' BT 1 MOD 51 110100495 DNK 482.0000 THISTED DNK 8E41'00'' 56N58'35'' BT 1 MOD 52 110100562 DNK 482.0000 TOMMERUP DNK 10E13'39'' 55N18'54'' BT 1 MOD 53 110100585 DNK 546.0000 HEDENSTED DNK 9E37'30'' 55N48'37'' BT 1 MOD 54 110100586 DNK 546.0000 KOLDING DNK 9E27'24'' 55N28'24'' BT 1 MOD BR IFIC N° 2683 30.11.2010 No. BR Id Adm 1A [MHz] 4A/5A 4B/5B 4C/5C 6A Part Intent 55 110100587 DNK 546.0000 VARDE DNK 8E40'21'' 55N39'26'' BT 1 MOD 56 110100588 DNK 546.0000 VEJLE DNK 9E30'08'' 55N40'28'' BT 1 MOD 57 110100597 DNK 554.0000 GLADSAXE DNK 12E30'00'' 55N44'00'' BT 1 MOD 58 110100598 DNK 554.0000 HELSINGOER DNK 12E35'40'' 56N02'46'' BT 1 MOD 59 110100599 DNK 554.0000 JYDERUP DNK 11E27'45'' 55N41'06'' BT 1 MOD 60 110100600 DNK 554.0000 KALUNDBORG DNK 11E04'08'' 55N40'39'' BT 1 MOD 61 110100601 DNK 554.0000 KOEBENHAVN VEST DNK 12E14'18'' 55N43'01'' BT 1 MOD 62 110100602 DNK 554.0000 LYNETTEN DNK 12E36'48'' 55N41'50'' BT 1 MOD 63 110100603 DNK 554.0000 SKAMLEBAEK DNK 11E25'18'' 55N49'45'' BT 1 MOD 64 110100496 DNK 554.0000 THISTED DNK 8E41'00'' 56N58'35'' BT 1 MOD 65 110100557 DNK 562.0000 AABENRAA DNK 9E15'00'' 55N02'00'' BT 1 MOD 66 110100589 DNK 570.0000 HEDENSTED DNK 9E37'30'' 55N48'37'' BT 1 MOD 67 110100590 DNK 570.0000 KOLDING DNK 9E27'24'' 55N28'24'' BT 1 MOD 68 110100591 DNK 570.0000 VARDE DNK 8E40'21'' 55N39'26'' BT 1 MOD 69 110100592 DNK 570.0000 VEJLE DNK 9E30'08'' 55N40'28'' BT 1 MOD 70 110100542 DNK 578.0000 NAKSKOV DNK 11E11'52'' 54N52'22'' BT 1 MOD 71 110100543 DNK 578.0000 VORDINGBORG DNK 11E59'21'' 55N03'08'' BT 1 MOD 72 110100558 DNK 602.0000 AABENRAA DNK 9E15'00'' 55N02'00'' BT 1 MOD 73 110100544 DNK 610.0000 NAKSKOV DNK 11E11'52'' 54N52'22'' BT 1 MOD 74 110100545 DNK 610.0000 VORDINGBORG DNK 11E59'21'' 55N03'08'' BT 1 MOD 75 110100518 DNK 626.0000 LEMVIG DNK 8E18'35'' 56N33'08'' BT 1 MOD 76 110100519 DNK 626.0000 SKIVE DNK 9E02'48'' 56N34'03'' BT 1 MOD 77 110100520 DNK 626.0000 STRUER DNK 8E36'10'' 56N29'38'' BT 1 MOD 78 110100521 DNK 626.0000 VIBORG DNK 9E14'08'' 56N27'44'' BT 1 MOD 79 110100522 DNK 626.0000 VIBORG BY DNK 9E26'46'' 56N28'27'' BT 1 MOD 80 110100523 DNK 626.0000 VIDEBAEK DNK 8E42'22'' 56N08'28'' BT 1 MOD 81 110100548 DNK 642.0000 KALUNDBORG DNK 11E04'08'' 55N40'39'' BT 1 MOD 82 110100549 DNK 642.0000 NAKSKOV DNK 11E11'52'' 54N52'22'' BT 1 MOD 83 110100550 DNK 642.0000 SKAMLEBAEK DNK 11E25'18'' 55N49'45'' BT 1 MOD 84 110100497 DNK 642.0000 THISTED DNK 8E41'00'' 56N58'35'' BT 1 MOD 85 110100551 DNK 642.0000 VORDINGBORG DNK 11E59'21'' 55N03'08'' BT 1 MOD 86 110100499 DNK 650.0000 SVENDBORG DNK 10E37'02'' 55N05'41'' BT 1 MOD 87 110100498 DNK 650.0000 THISTED DNK 8E41'00'' 56N58'35'' BT 1 MOD 88 110100500 DNK 650.0000 TOMMERUP DNK 10E13'39'' 55N18'54'' BT 1 MOD 89 110100593 DNK 674.0000 HEDENSTED DNK 9E37'30'' 55N48'37'' BT 1 MOD 90 110100594 DNK 674.0000 KOLDING DNK 9E27'24'' 55N28'24'' BT 1 MOD 91 110100595 DNK 674.0000 VARDE DNK 8E40'21'' 55N39'26'' BT 1 MOD 92 110100596 DNK 674.0000 VEJLE DNK 9E30'08'' 55N40'28'' BT 1 MOD 93 110100515 DNK 690.0000 LEMVIG DNK 8E18'35'' 56N33'08'' BT 1 MOD 94 110100516 DNK 690.0000 STRUER DNK 8E36'10'' 56N29'38'' BT 1 MOD BR IFIC N° 2683 30.11.2010 No. BR Id Adm 1A [MHz] 4A/5A 4B/5B 4C/5C 6A Part Intent 95 110100517 DNK 690.0000 VIDEBAEK DNK 8E42'22'' 56N08'28'' BT 1 MOD 96 110100501 DNK 698.0000 SVENDBORG DNK 10E37'02'' 55N05'41'' BT 1 MOD 97 110100502 DNK 698.0000 TOMMERUP DNK 10E13'39'' 55N18'54'' BT 1 MOD 98 110100559 DNK 706.0000 AABENRAA DNK 9E15'00'' 55N02'00'' BT 1 MOD 99 110100604 DNK 714.0000 GLADSAXE DNK 12E30'00'' 55N44'00'' BT 1 MOD 100 110100605 DNK 714.0000 HELSINGOER DNK 12E35'40'' 56N02'46'' BT 1 MOD 101 110100606 DNK 714.0000 JYDERUP DNK 11E27'45'' 55N41'06'' BT 1 MOD 102 110100607 DNK 714.0000 KALUNDBORG DNK 11E04'08'' 55N40'39'' BT 1 MOD 103 110100608 DNK 714.0000 KOEBENHAVN VEST DNK 12E14'18'' 55N43'01'' BT 1 MOD 104 110100609 DNK 714.0000 LYNETTEN DNK 12E36'48'' 55N41'50'' BT 1 MOD 105 110100610 DNK 714.0000 SKAMLEBAEK DNK 11E25'18'' 55N49'45'' BT 1 MOD 106 110100524 DNK 722.0000 LEMVIG DNK 8E18'35'' 56N33'08'' BT 1 MOD 107 110100525 DNK 722.0000 SKIVE DNK 9E02'48'' 56N34'03'' BT 1 MOD 108 110100526 DNK 722.0000 STRUER DNK 8E36'10'' 56N29'38'' BT 1 MOD 109 110100527 DNK 722.0000 VIBORG DNK 9E14'08'' 56N27'44'' BT 1 MOD 110 110100528 DNK 722.0000 VIBORG BY DNK 9E26'46'' 56N28'27'' BT 1 MOD 111 110100529 DNK 722.0000 VIDEBAEK DNK 8E42'22'' 56N08'28'' BT 1 MOD 112 110100618 DNK 730.0000 GLADSAXE DNK 12E30'00'' 55N44'00'' BT 1 MOD
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    JournalVol. 20, No.of Agrometeorology 1 20 (1) : 75-77 (March 2018)SOHRAB GHAEDI 75 Short Comminucation Variability and trends of sultry in Hormozgan province in Iran SOHRAB GHAEDI Shahid Chamran University of Ahvaz, Iran [email protected] Sultry weather is always a problem in tropical and sub Table 1: Stations in Hormozgan province of fran tropical counties that adversely affect the human efficiency Station Latitude Longitude Height(m) and its health (Blazejczyk and Matzarakis 2007; Hass 2016) particularly during summer months. Sultriness happens due Abu Musa 25° 52' 55° 1' 110 to warm and humid climatic conditions under which human Bandar Abbas 27° 11' 56° 17' 10 body cannot lose heat easily by sweating. Various workers Bandar Lengeh 26° 33' 54° 53' 14 have given the threshold values for sultriness based on Jask 25° 38' 57° 46' 8 different weather parameters viz. vapor pressure, temperature and humidity, dew point temperature, wind speed either Kish 26° 33' 54° 01' 32 individually or in combinations (Steadman,1979; Lancaster, Minab 27° 09' 57° 04' 27 1898; Dieterichs, 1980). Due to increase in temperature, and change in rainfall pattern as a result of climate change, Table 2: Classification of sultriness intensity index (D) the variability in sultriness has increased (Ghaedi and Class Index (D) Masoudian, 2007; Chattopadhyay and Edwards, 2016; Shi Poor sultry 0.1- 0.49 et al, 2011). Tabatabaei et al. (2014) has prepared the maps Middle sultry 0.5- 0.99 of southern province of Iran showing various zones based on intensity of sultriness. Borna and Shaeri Karimi (2016) Sever sultry 1- 01.49 reported a positive trend in the south of Khuzestan province.

  • Iranians in Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates: Migration, Minorities, and Identities in the Persian Gulf Arab States

    Iranians in Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates: Migration, Minorities, and Identities in the Persian Gulf Arab States Item Type text; Electronic Thesis Authors McCoy, Eric Publisher The University of Arizona. Rights Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author. Download date 27/09/2021 17:09:49 Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/193398 IRANIANS IN BAHRAIN AND THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES MIGRATION, MINORITIES, AND IDENTITIES IN THE PERSIAN GULF ARAB STATES by Eric Andrew McCoy ___________________________ Copyright © Eric A. McCoy 2008 A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the DEPARTMENT OF NEAR EASTERN STUDIES In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS In the Graduate College THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA 2008 2 STATEMENT BY AUTHOR This thesis has been submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for an advanced degree at the University of Arizona and is deposited in the University Library to be made available to borrowers under rules of the Library. Brief quotations from this thesis are allowable without special permission, provided that accurate acknowledgment of source is made. Requests for permission for extended quotation from or reproduction of this manuscript in whole or in part may be granted by the copyright holder. SIGNED: Eric A. McCoy APPROVAL BY THESIS DIRECTOR This thesis has been approved on the date shown below: _______________________________ ______________________ Kamran Talattof Date Professor of Near Eastern Studies 3 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This work would not have been completed without the help of many individuals and organizations, although I only mention a select few here.