Evidentiary Value of Maps in Sovereignty Disputes Over Territory

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Evidentiary Value of Maps in Sovereignty Disputes Over Territory Chapter 10 Evidentiary Value of Maps in Sovereignty Disputes over Territory The conclusions reached in this work on the parties’ respective claims of sovereignty over Abu Musa and the Tunbs have not relied on map evidence, and in certain cases, have rejected that evidence as unreliable or unpersuasive. This was the case, for example, with respect to an 1886 British War Office map which colored the islands in the same color as the Persian mainland that was handed to the Shah in July 1888. Indeed, it is the case that Iran has specifically relied on the asserted existence of map evidence (including most particularly the 1886 map) to support its claim of sovereignty over the islands.1 During the Security Council debate over the islands that took place on 9 December 1971, the Iranian representative stated that “[f]or more than a century, beginning in 1770, British maps marked the Tunb islands as being Persian.”2 A number of scholars who support the Iranian claim have also referenced numerous of- ficial, semi-official and unofficial maps (one particular scholar has cited up to twenty-eight maps) from the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries which they claim all confirm that all three islands belong to Iran.3 Another 1 E.g., Patricia L. Toye, ed., The Lower Gulf Islands: Abu Musa and The Tunbs (Slough, England: Archive Editions, 1993), Vol. 2, 79, containing a message from the Shah dated August 1888; ibid., Vol. 2, 121, with a message from Sir Drummond Wolff to the Marquis of Salisbury, dated September 7, 1888 highlighting that “with regard to the Island of Sirri the Shah has quoted the map in which that Island is marked in the Persian colours as a bar to any argument on our part in favour of the Chiefs who lay claim to it.” 2 Security Council Official Records, 26th year, 1610th Meeting, December 9, 1971, un Doc. S/ PV.1610, 18. 3 Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh, Security and Territoriality in the Persian Gulf (1999; reprint, London: Routledge-Curzon, 2003), 236–238; Farhang Mehr, A Colonial Legacy. The Dispute Over the Islands of Abu Musa, and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1997), 196–200; Davoud H. Bavand, “The Legal Basis of Iran’s Sovereignty over Abu Musa Island,” in Small Islands, Big Politics. The Tonbs and Abu Musa in the Persian Gulf, ed. Hooshang Amirahmadi (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 87–89. See also, Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh, “The United Arab Emirates and the Iranian Islands of Tunbs and Abu Musa,” in The Three Iranian Islands of the Persian Gulf. Based on Documents and Historical Evidence, ed. Ali Rastbeen (Paris: Institut International D’Études Stratégiques, 2008), 81–84 (where some of the same maps included in previous publications of the same author are mentioned). © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi �0.��63/9789004�36�96_0�� <UN> 760 Chapter 10 scholar has referred to other maps that depict the Tunbs as Iranian,4 although he noted with respect to the statement of Iran at the Security Council men- tioned above that his “research has not uncovered any map, British or other, which might be viewed as a cartographical representation of the status of the Tambs, Persian or other, in so early a date as 1770.”5 In light of the reliance which has been placed on map evidence by Iran and its supporters, we have sought to locate and review as many of the maps they have cited as possible.6 The results of this exercise, including high resolution images of the maps which were found, are set out below. As will be seen, far from confirming that the three disputed islands are and have been consistently associated with Persian/Iranian sovereignty since the eighteenth century, in their totality these maps paint an inconsistent and contradictory picture. Thus, while several of the maps cited as supporting the Iranian claims do color one or another of the islands in the color of the Persian coastline, others color one or more of the islands in the color of the Arabian coastline, yet the majority of the maps cited do not tie the ownership of the islands to any State or power at all. Moreover, of the maps which color one or another of the islands in the color of the Persian coastline, it appears that in a number of cases the coloring was added at a later stage and not as part of the original work, making it un- likely that the original cartographer intended to associate an island with Persia in any case. Although it will not be considered in any detail here, it is also rel- evant with regard to the maps cited from the eighteenth and nineteenth cen- turies that the coastal areas of the Persian mainland in proximity to the islands 4 Guive Mirfendereski, “The Ownership of the Tonb Islands: A Legal Analysis”, in Small Islands, Big Politics. The Tonbs and Abu Musa in the Persian Gulf, ed. Hooshang Amirahmadi (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 126–134. 5 Guive Mirfendereski, “The Tamb Islands Controversy, 1887–1971: A case Study in Claims to Territory in International Law” (PhD diss., Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts Uni- versity, 1985), 396. 6 While the authors were successful in locating the vast majority of the maps relied upon by scholars in the works referenced, it is of course not possible to have absolute certainty that the maps viewed are the exact same maps – or versions of those maps – that those scholars have themselves had in front of their eyes. Indeed, in many cases the discrepancy as to what is depicted in the maps found and other versions of the same maps further reinforces that no definite conclusions as to who is the proper sovereign of Abu Musa and the Tunbs can be derived from cartographic evidence. Moreover, it is important to note that the fact that we believe that the research we carried out in many cases evinces discrepancies as to what scholars supporting the Iranian position claim a certain map depicts in no way is an accusa- tion of academic partiality against these scholars. Again, the results of our archival research simply show that the maps of the islands are not to be relied upon to derive conclusions as to which State is the sovereign of the islands. <UN>.
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