behind it—chieflythe tive powersandtheeliteeducationalsystem said abouttheFifthRepublic,withitsvastexecu- ret Thatcher). pos-sible solutions(essentially to thecountry’s systemicmaladiesandtheir recently dedicatedafourteen-pagespecialreport plain abouttheirproblems—theverb Although theFrenchhavealwayslovedtocom- By ReuelMarcGerechtandGaryJ.Schmitt A whine, issynonymouswith umph ofthesocialists,forall theirearlyeconomic captured thepresidencyin1981—and thetri François MitterrandandhisSocialistPartyfirst has becomemuchhealthierthanitwaswhen (ENA)—is inthepast.AlthoughFrenchsociety school, theÉcoleNationaled’Administration always-fragile gloryhasfractured. no onereallydissentsfromtheviewthatFrance’s antiglobalist, anticapitalistextremeFrenchRight, ist extremeFrenchLefttotheMcDonald’s-hating, the McDonald’s-hating, antiglobalist,anticapital- overly centralized,administrative-lawstate.From sourness thatcomesfrombeingsubservienttoan happening nowismorethanthejustusual nuclear weapons—suggeststhatFrancemayalreadyberecoveringfromits which hasbecomenoticeablylessanti-AmericansincetheIraqwarandtoughertowardIran’s questfor cally, andevengastronomically, Franceseemstohavesignificantlydiminished.ButFrench foreignpolicy— French, European,andAmericancircles.Economically, culturally, educationally, militarily, diplomati- 10SvnenhSre,NW,Wsigo,DC 03 0.6.80www.aei.org 202.862.5800 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 Since thesuburbanriotslastAugust,perceptionthatFranceisindeclinehasbecome far off. American France—asurrealideaformanyforeign-affairspractitionersinWashington—may notbethat Schmitt ([email protected])are resident scholarsatAEI. Reuel MarcGerecht([email protected]) andGaryJ. It is hard to disagree. The good thatcanbe It ishardtodisagree.Thegood Post-Gaullist, Pro-AmericanFrance? haut fonctionnaire être , bring onMarga- , to be—whatis The Economist rouspéter finishing - , to fought theUnitedStatesin the run-uptoIraq ent personthantheChirac who sotenaciously visit nowappeartobelong acompletelydiffer- the warmcolloquialEnglish hespokeduringhis Gaullist mission).Hisinformality investing inFrance(initself,ashockinglynon- expatriate Frenchentrepreneurstoconsider the winterof1996,inparttotryconvince at leastseemed,quitereal.HevisitedChicagoin ful travelsandworkintheUnitedStatesseems,or Gaullist tradition.Chirac’s affectionforhisyouth- sincere pro-Americansentimentsnotatallinthe Jacques Chirac,whocameintoofficewithsome beliefs. InthisregardheissimilartoPresident profound sinceitisnoteasytoidentifyhiscore toward Americareflectssomethingunalterably difficult totellwhetherSarkozy’s warmerattitude that heisnotan never failstoremindtheFrenchandforeigners his sometimes-right,sometimes-leftpopulism cal landscape,justmaybeanexceptionbecause Sarkozy, whoishardlynewtotheParisianpoliti- to thevoters. lenting monotony culture seemsincreasinglysclerotic.With unre- country’s cultureandpolitics—France’s political insanity, breathedmuch-neededfreshairintothe The right-wingpresidentialaspirantNicolas No. 1 énarch , déclinisme the samefaceskeepreturning (a graduateofENA).Itis • December 2006 . A de rigueur , more pro- joviality, and in

European Outlook - 2- war, or the Chirac who tried in recent years to lord it in its approach to the Middle East. Dominique de over the eastern Europeans and his own countrymen. Villepin, France’s much-disliked Napoleon-obssessed Sarkozy’s pro-American attitude seems cut from a dif- prime minister who zealously traveled the world to build ferent cloth. When he was in Washington in September an alliance against the United States and its allies before 2006, Sarkozy embraced the United States rhetorically March 2003, still seems intellectually anxious whenever in a way unimaginable to a convinced he hears criticism of France for being Gaullist or even a French socialist The safe bet is that insufficiently anti-American. He has who has a soft spot for America’s open, been quick to reprimand Sarkozy for both ethnic-loving society. “I’m not a coward,” France will not his presidential pretensions in discussing Sarkozy said. “I’m proud of this friend- cast off its reflexive French foreign policy on American soil ship, and I proclaim it gladly.”1 In the and for his pro-American views.4 Chirac preface to his soon-to-be published book anti-Americanism and Villepin have at least once referred Testimony, Sarkozy affirms that “I stand and tiers-mondisme to the Islamic Republic of Ayatollah Ali by this friendship, I’m proud of it, and Khamenei and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad I have no intention of apologizing for in its approach to as a responsible, regional power.5 feeling an affinity with the greatest And while Chirac’s Middle Eastern the Middle East. democracy in the world.”2 applause has faded, he certainly enjoyed Sarkozy’s comments on many sensitive his increased stature in the Arab world in issues put him on the cutting edge of the Parisian politi- 2003 and 2004. The whole superstructure of French– cal elite—he is easily the boldest in his pro-American Middle Eastern social, cultural, and intellectual relations remarks—and historically in a class by himself. As has been premised on the understanding that France the Washington Post reported, Sarkozy “described the would be reliably “pro-Arab” in international forums— government in Tehran as an ‘outlaw nation’ and said at least more so than any other Western European coun- the prospect of it obtaining nuclear weapons would be a try. Beyond its serious scholarly objectives, the Institut ‘terrifying’ development that would ‘open the way for a du Monde Arabe, France’s beautiful, Moorish glass- murderous arms race in the region.’ Hinting at military and-steel tribute to Arab and Muslim culture built action, he added that ‘diplomacy must be our main under François Mitterrand in the heart of the Latin weapon, but we must leave all options open.’” Quarter, is the reification of the idea of France’s suppos- On Israel, Sarkozy avoids the harsh language of most edly special and privileged political relationship with of the French political and intellectual elite, who usually Arab lands.6 suggest that Israel is, at best, an annoyance for the West, that Palestinian terrorism has its roots in Israeli misbe- A New French Foreign Policy? havior and territorial greed, and that Jews in general (but Israeli and American Jews in particular) are, to France may well already be on the cusp of a major, posi- borrow from De Gaulle, “an elite people, sure of itself tive transformation, at least in foreign affairs. Although and dominating.” it has been little remarked in both the American and Sarkozy’s take on Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda is British presses, France under Jacques Chirac has appar- also a bit different from elite Parisian opinion that often ently broken with French practice in its diplomacy gives the impression that America provoked the events toward the Islamic Republic of Iran. Understood in a of September 11 through its misguided actions—chiefly French context, Paris’s Iran policy within the European its excessive support for Israel. Sarkozy very flatly stated, Union’s (EU) efforts to halt the growth of Tehran’s “We have the same adversaries. Bin Laden targeted New nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile programs has York, but he might just as well have targeted Paris.”3 It is verged on the revolutionary, threatening to downgrade, too early to suggest that Sarkozy’s view represents a deci- if not discard, anti-Americanism, tiers-mondisme, and sive change in Parisian thought about the United States commercial self-interest as France’s guiding lights in the and the threats that Washington sees as preeminent. Middle East. If the French continue their hard-line pol- There have been many false starts in bettering Franco- icy toward clerical Iran—and again, it is important to American relations. The safe bet is that France will not note that France’s approach within the context of the cast off its reflexive anti-Americanism and tiers-mondisme EU-3 negotiations merits the description “hard-line”—it - 3- could quite conceivably convulse the way France French practice, but the seriousness with which Paris has conducts its foreign policy everywhere. France’s “pro- approached Iran on this issue is real and unexpected by American” Iran policy is a potentially landmark turn. many in France and in the United States. Note, for According to French and German diplomats, the example, that Ségolène Royal—the socialist candidate French have been tougher—at times considerably for the presidency and a woman not known for many tougher—in their stance on Iran’s nuclear-weapons foreign-policy positions, let alone hard-line ones— program than either the Germans or the British. The suggested in a recent presidential debate that the Islamic Germans, even under Chancellor Angela Merkel— Republic could not be trusted even with a civilian who, unlike her predecessor, believes sincerely in robust nuclear program.7 This goes beyond the stated position transatlantic ties—are the softest partner in the EU-3. of Paris, London, and Berlin in the EU-3 negotiations. Unlike the French and the British, senior German offi- And even Le Monde took to chastising Chirac and cials regularly hint in private that they Villepin for their commentary on Iran really would not mind if the clerical According to French playing a “stabilizing” role in the Middle regime developed a “monitored” enrich- East. Le Monde, which is the New York ment capacity inside Iran. Even with the and German diplomats, Times of France, encouraged the govern- British, whom the Americans expected ment to move more quickly to the discus- the French have been to be the most concerned over the cleri- sion of sanctions against Tehran at the cal nuclear threat, one often gets the tougher—at times United Nations.8 impression from Foreign Office officials Yet it is precisely because Paris has who handle Iran’s atomic dossier that considerably tougher— been steadfast in the EU-3 negotiations Great Britain’s stance, too, is not ironclad in their stance on Iran’s under Chirac and Villepin that one can on the question of domestic enrichment. believe that a transformation might be So far, the French have brusquely—at nuclear-weapons afoot. Although France, like Great least in the German view—dismissed program than either the Britain and Germany, began the EU-3 local enrichment as an irretrievable cave- approach to Iran to forestall the possibil- in to Tehran that would guarantee the Germans or the British. ity that President George W. Bush might mullahs an atomic weapon. Paris’s posi- preemptively attack another member tion is surprising given that French diplo- of the axis of evil, the continuation of mats and scholars who deal with the Middle East usually this process has created its own dynamic in Europe, had, at least before the American invasion of Iraq, a especially in France, where negotiations with Iran have somewhat laissez-passer attitude toward the clerics’ quest become a significant test of Europe’s ability to engage for the bomb. Paris had no illusions about the clerical in meaningful global diplomacy. Paris is not indifferent regime’s intentions: French intelligence about the to European hopes and pretensions, even if the Quai Islamic Republic’s nuclear program has for nearly twenty d’Orsay, France’s foreign ministry, has never had any years been decent, often more detailed than the informa- illusions about the likelihood of EU-3 success against tion obtained by American intelligence. This has made the clerical regime. The failure to ratify the EU’s Paris more pessimistic than the British, Germans, or constitution—and the French non more than the Dutch even the Americans about the likely delivery date of a veto killed this initiative—has also probably helped nuclear weapon. France become more serious about, if not more effective The French government, according to French in, its foreign policy. The Iraq war, which so roiled officials involved with Iranian negotiations, conducted America’s transatlantic ties, also paradoxically made an internal evaluation of the possible effects of non- French foreign policy more oriented toward the United petroleum-related European sanctions against the cleri- States. In private, French officials are quick to say that cal regime and concluded, unexpectedly, that Europe, things got out of hand with Villepin and Chirac. Wash- if it chose to, could do considerable damage to Iran’s ington’s good relations with Paris on Iran are in part the economy. The evaluation concluded that sanctions, if rebound from this excess; they are also an expression of they were to have any effect on the mullahs, should France trying to find itself—a new center of gravity that commence massively rather than be deployed in a piece- has more meaning than Gaullism and its reflex to meal fashion. French theory is almost always better than oppose America’s hyper-puissance. - 4- The Sources of Change middle-sized European country whose status was more likely to fall than rise. He emphasized something which An important repercussion of this soul-searching has been many Frenchmen have known but few have been willing the fading of tiers-mondisme in the French academe and to confess. French foreign affairs have consistently been the Quai, especially when it comes to looking at the conducted in ways degrading to the dignity and decency Middle East. Third-worldism is now stronger in American of the country, to the all-essential honor of a nation universities than it is in France, the birthplace of this without which the successful conduct of foreign policy is romantic, anti-Western creed. Talk to the well-known, impossible. It is worth quoting Grange at length: first-rate scholars Gilles Kepel and Olivier Roy, or France’s director of Iranian studies at the Centre National de la The redefinition of our foreign policy arrives by Recherche Scientifique Bernard Hourcade, and to their recalling the basic principles on which it must be students, and it will become immediately apparent that founded since it cannot be reduced to a simple the study of the Middle East and Islam in France is actu- score card for the world as it is. A foreign policy ally less politically charged than it is in the United States. must defend the values of the nation. It must reflect There is an experimental bravery in French scholarship the democratic character of French society. With- today generated in part by the fatigue resulting from years out sacrificing realism, a sound foreign policy of too much ideological rigidity and conformity. implies the deliberate renunciation of Realpolitik, The turning point probably came in the early 1990s, which ignores the moral obligations and principles when France was on the verge of implementing Quebec- to which a democratic nation adheres. The time is style anti-English laws for commerce and culture. The no longer of Talleyrand’s because the world that Parisian elite pulled back, clearly seeing this path could gave it meaning is dead. With clarity and firmness, only lead to parochialism, irrelevancy, French foreign policy should and bigotry. Afterward, it became easier As surreal as this may express these moral obligations and to express affection more openly for the principles, the guarantor of the United States. As a sustaining creed, sound to an American honor and dignity of France. . . . Gaullism died. audience, morality is on It is undeniable that France has In November 1992, the journal Esprit tried too often to play all sides. . . . published an article by a senior French the rise in French It plays up at every opportunity the diplomat writing under the pseudonym of theme of the rights of man while foreign policy. Didier Grange. Entitled “Pour une nou- being one of the rare countries to velle politique étrangère” [For a New For- send its minister of foreign affairs to eign Policy], it caused a minor earthquake in Parisian Beijing and Tehran. It condemns terrorism yet foreign-policy circles. Essentially, Grange, who is now a maintains relations with openly terrorist factions of very senior official in the foreign ministry, argued that the PLO [Palestinian Liberation Organization]. It French foreign policy was bankrupt—and had been for defends the right of self-determination but was as years. In every direction—toward Europe, the North slow as possible in recognizing Croatia and Slovenia Atlantic Treaty Organization, Russia, Africa, Cuba, and condemning actions by Serbia. It maintains its the Middle East (especially Israel, Iraq, and Iran), and impartiality [in the Middle East] but never misses America—the Gaullist Cold War–approach no longer an opportunity to vilify Israel, all the while it rests made any sense. Grange underscored the essential need strangely silent about all the human-rights abuses in for France to have a much closer alliance with the Arab lands. . . . [T]he list [of French contradictions] United States than the rhetoric of Gaullism had publicly is long, from Algiers to black Africa. . . . The time allowed. He scathingly deconstructed his country’s poli- is long past when our ignominies overseas are no tique Arabe, showing it to be vainglorious, counterpro- longer known beyond our chancelleries. Today, ductive for both the French and the Arabs, and at times sooner or later, they become public and turn against deeply immoral. He recommended a policy supportive of the authors of these actions.10 democracy and capitalism throughout the third world.9 According to Grange, Paris urgently needed to down- It is a good bet that a lot of Frenchmen today, even grade its great-power search for glory. France was a among the more anti-American elite, have many of the - 5- same concerns that Grange had fourteen years ago. It is private stance. According to French and American officials also a good guess that many of them had such anxiety who have dealt with Chirac on Iran, the president seems to when Grange published his seminal work. The shock of have a particular animus against Shiite Muslims, perhaps Grange’s piece at the time was not that he was outra- owing to the death in 2005 of his friend, former Lebanese geously novel; it was that he had the temerity, especially prime minister Rafiq Hariri, at the hands of the Iranian- as a serving diplomat, to say what so many knew to be backed Syrian regime, or because of Tehran’s proxy bombing true. Grange defied the pensée unique—the intuitive of Paris in 1986 during the Iran-Iraq War. The clerical ability of Frenchmen to collectively and sheepishly self- regime’s murder in 1991 of former Iranian prime minister Sha- censor themselves. Nicolas Sarkozy probably has a great pur Bakhtiyar, who was a decorated soldier in the French deal of company, on the left and on the right, in suggest- Army in World War II and who was under the French state’s ing that France’s priorities overseas, especially during the protection when he was assassinated, also may have soured twelve-year dominion of Chirac, have been unbalanced. Chirac on Iranians. As surreal as this may sound to an American audience, 6. For a devastating left-wing critique of Chirac’s politique morality is on the rise in French foreign policy. If the Arabe, see Éric Aeschimann and Christophe Boltanski Grasset, dignity and honor of France get redefined along the lines Chirac d’Arabie: Les mirages d’une politique française [Chirac of that Grange hoped—and we think Grange is likely to Arabia: The Illusions of a French Policy] (Paris: Grasset, 2006). become the most farsighted foreign-affairs analyst of 7. Constance Baudry, “Turquie, Iran: les présidentiables post–Cold War France—then anti-Americanism will socialistes font entendre leurs différences” [Turkey, Iran: The cease being central to the identity of France overseas. Socialist Potential Presidential Candidates Make Their Differ- The Quai d’Orsay will no longer default to doing the ences Understood], Le Monde, November 11, 2006.. opposite of les américains. It is ironic, of course, that in 8. Editorial, “Face à l’Iran” [Confronting Iran]. the aftershock of the Iraq war so many in Washington 9. Didier Grange, “Pour une nouvelle politique étrangère” are running in the opposite, Realpolitik direction. In a [For a New Foreign Policy], Esprit 11 (November 1992): 35. decade’s time, if the United States loses les obligations Grange was way ahead of the Bush administration: morales et les principes auxquels adhère une nation démocra- “Le refus de soutenir financièrement ou économiquement tique,11 Grange’s commentary on France might be les dictatures va de soi mais il faudrait également mani- apposite across the Atlantic. fester une solidarité naturelle avec les démocraties: mettre sur un meme pied Israël et la Syrie est indigne . . . le tiers- AEI research assistant Rachel Hoff and AEI editorial associate Nicole Passan worked with Mr. Gerecht and Mr. Schmitt to edit mondisme est mort d’abord parce que la notion de tiers and produce this European Outlook. monde ne correspond aujourd’hui à rien, si tant qu’elle ait jamais eu un sens. La meillure manière d’aider le ‘tiers Notes monde’ serait, en tout état de cause, d’y proner la démocra- tie et l’économie de marché qui vont de pair et qui se sont 1. Glenn Kessler, “Visiting French Presidential Hopeful révélées, à l’usage et malgré leurs défauts, le moins mauvais Lauds U.S. in Speech,” Washington Post, September 13, 2006. système.” [The refusal to support financially or economi- 2. Nicolas Sarkozy, Testimony (New York: Pantheon Books, cally dictatorships goes without saying, but we ought to forthcoming). English translation of the preface (and the book) also show a natural solidarity with democracies. Treating was kindly provided by Philip Gordon, a senior fellow at the Israel and Syria in the same way is shameful. . . . [T]hird- Brookings Institution. worldism is dead first because the notion of the third world 3. Glenn Kessler, “Visiting French Presidential Hopeful doesn’t correspond to anything real today, if it ever had Lauds U.S. in Speech.” any meaning at all. The best way to aid the “third world” 4. “Villepin suggère à Sarkozy de ‘bien réfléchir’ en matière would be in any case to extol in this region democracy and de politique étrangère” [Villepin Suggests to Sarkozy That He the market economy, which go together and are clearly, ‘Think Carefully’ in Matters of Foreign Policy], Le Monde, despite their problems, the least bad system possible.] August 10, 2006. 10. Ibid., 21–22. 5. Editorial, “Face à l’Iran” [Confronting Iran], Le Monde, 11. Translated as: “the moral obligations and principles to August 31, 2006. This is incongruent with Chirac’s general which a democratic nation adheres.”

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