Divide and Rule the CREATION of the Alawi STATE AFTER World WAR I

GOETHE-INSTITUT ART&THOUGHT / FIKRUN WA FANN 100 31

The history of Syria in the 20th century is marked by foreign domination, imperialism and the difficult formation of a Syrian identity, linked to questions of territorial integrity and national unity. The creation of a small independent state for the Alawis, under French mandate, after World War I is of great significance in light of current events in Syria. dIVIdE And rUlE THE CREATION OF THE AlAWI STATE AFTER WORld WAR I

BY nEcATI AlkAn

When the Ottoman Empire collapsed in 1918, at the end of FrOm nUSAyrIS TO AlAWIS World War I, its enemies vied with each other for control of its provinces. France conquered the province of Syria (con- The initial negative attitude of the Ottomans – who had con- sisting of modern Syria, lebanon, and Alexandretta / Hatay quered Syria in 1516 – toward the Nusayris changed consid- in Turkey) in 1920, and in the same year erably from the second half of the nine- the league of Nations assigned it the man- In his installation Repair. 5 Acts, teenth century onwards. One factor was date for that region, including the hinter- exhibited in the summer of 2013 at increasing intervention by the European land of latakia, the Nusayri (Alawi) terri- the KW Institute for Contemporary powers in internal Ottoman politics. The tory on the eastern Mediterranean coast, Art in Berlin, the German-based Ottoman state was forced to recognise the which has for centuries been their main Algerian artist Kader Attia Nusayris as a religious community with area of settlement. addresses the fragility and their own rights. Another factor that en- imitation of the body in various couraged the Ottoman administration to The Alawis, previously called ‘Nusayris’ by situations such as war, art, cults, get closer to the Nusayris was the expan- the Ottomans and Europeans, are Arabic- and natural history. The work sion of missionary activities by English speaking members of a heterodox sect includes wooden carvings of the and American Protestants among hetero- with roots in Shia Islam. They had lived in faces of soldiers disfigured in war, dox Muslim minorities. The missionaries’ Ottoman Syria for centuries, keeping their and totem masks exhibited infiltration of the Nusayris compelled Sul- faith secret and living in seclusion, as they alongside stuffed animals. tan Abdülhamid II (r. 1876–1909) to inte- feared persecution by the Sunni ortho- Photo: Stefan Weidner grate the latter into the Muslim communi- doxy. © Goethe-Institut ty and draw them closer to the official GOETHE-INSTITUT ART&THOUGHT / FIKRUN WA FANN 100 32

Hanafi school, one of the four Sunni schools of law. The con- and because they feared that Britain was trying to disadvan- struction of mosques and madrasas (educational schools) in tage them, the French resorted to the power of negotiation. the Nusayri region, and in other places where similar groups were living, was aimed at turning the ‘heretics’ into good and In accordance with Woodrow Wilson’s Principles, the old Ot- loyal subjects. toman provinces could not openly be colonised, and were thus divided into territories, called mandates, assigned by a Official Ottoman documents refer to the conversion of tens ‘general association of nations’, i.e. the future league of Na- of thousands heretics to Sunni Islam: yet Abdülhamid’s ‘civil- tions (14th Principle). Mandates were given to powerful coun- ising project’ was ultimately unsuccessful. In the same vein, tries in order to ensure that the regions they had authority the missionaries, who had been trying to establish a new so- over attained self-determination and became independent. cial order based on the millenarian belief, had little success Gilbert Murray, the British delegate to the league of Nations, in converting heterodox Muslims. The Nusayris also under- said with regard to Turkey that members of ‘this great Socie- went a collective process of transformation during this peri- ty of Nations’ were to assist one another in carrying out ‘a od, by choosing to refer to themselves as ‘Alawi’ (Turkish: most difficult task’, imposed not only by the treaties but also Aleviler, Arabic: ’Alawiyyun). My hypothesis is that this change by the ‘historical necessities of the present time’. Talking in self-designation was part of a socio-political process of about ‘the treaties for the protection of minorities’ and ‘the dissociation from the Ottoman Empire that got underway in application of the clauses’, he remarked that ‘there is no the last decades of the nineteenth century, before its final question of a foreign nation interfering with the domestic af- collapse. fairs of another nation in order to protect the interests of some minority with which it feels special sympathy.’ The name ‘Alawi’ gained acceptance after World War I, with the short-lived ‘State of the Alawis’ (Dawlat al-’Alawiyyin) un- The Western Powers saw themselves as the source of en- der French mandate in Syria as a half-autonomous region, lightenment and moral leadership, the bearers of the torch of and later as one of the ‘Federation States of Syria’. It is com- civilisation, which they had to take to the regions they colo- mon knowledge that the Alawis were transformed into a nised in order to illumine them. France undoubtedly had an dominant sect by the French, who were trying to counter idealised image of itself as a ‘civilised nation’, as opposed to Sunni hegemony in Syria. Research also suggests that the the ‘uncivilised’ non-state of Syria, which was a society di- Alawis had already been prepared for this role by the ten- vided by religions, sects and ethnic groups; ‘fanatical’ people sion between the Ottomans and the Western powers. and ‘savages’ who were fighting each other, and needed to be disciplined by the French. A French study on the Kurds, ThE mAndATE pOWErS In SyrIA AFTEr WOrld WAr I for example, stated: ‘The half-wild races must spend numer- ous years in tutelage before governing themselves … A great Ottoman rule ended with the defeat of the Empire and its fi- power must accept the mandate to administer their country nal dissolution at the end of the First World War. As the vic- and make the teachings, which among other nations are the tors, Britain and France divided the Arab provinces accord- fruit of the experience of centuries, enter their hearts.’ ing to their own interests. Syria, lebanon, Jordan, Palestine and Israel, as we know them today, were geographically dIVISIOnS AccOrdIng TO WESTErn WhIm known as ‘Greater Syria’. Their borders were artificially created and imposed by the two European powers, against the The decisions that Britain and France took at the Conference will of the population. The aim was to make use of their reli- of San Remo in 1920 regarding the partition of the Middle gious, sectarian and ethnic diversity and apply the principle East sealed the fate of the people in the region. In the ten of ‘divide and rule’. years after San Remo, Britain and France divided the population of the Middle East according to their whim. France went For the first time, World War I provided France with hegemo- further, creating semi-autonomous provinces under a nation- ny and a mandate in the region now called the ‘Middle East’, al government in Syria. Self-rule and independence aside, the rather than with military victories. Its desire to gain power two powers drew new, artificial borders and generated so- and land in the Middle East dates back to the years immedi- cial barriers which over time gave rise to regional disrup- ately prior to the war, with the start of the dissolution of the tions. What Wilson had envisaged as the ‘undoubted security Ottoman Empire. After occupying Algeria, Tunisia and Moroc- of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autono- co, France felt the need to control Greater Syria in order to mous development’ for the non-Turks under Ottoman rule balance its power in the Mediterranean. Italy had conquered (12th Principle) did not become a reality for the Arabs. San Tripoli / libya in 1911, and in so doing had dealt a heavy and Remo was a turning point in the history of the Middle East. lasting blow to Ottoman hegemony in North Africa. during Both countries determined how the mandates would look. World War I, France’s military duties were in Europe, and its Not being in agreement with the borders, the French left Pal- weak military presence in the Middle East prevented it from estine and Mosul to the British and accepted about one- assuming an important role in the region. For these reasons, fourth of the petrol in Mosul. GOETHE-INSTITUT ART&THOUGHT / FIKRUN WA FANN 100 33

Greater Syria was a region with an Arab majority, and Pan- ed by French advisers. Hatay, most of whose inhabitants Arab nationalism was the dominant ideology, especially were Turks, was de jure part of Aleppo but de facto autono- among Sunnis. local and political particularism provided a mous. France went further, persistently emphasising the dif- welcome opportunity for the French to divide Syria and rear- ferences of the regionally compact Nusayri and druze peo- range it in accordance with their interests. They claimed that ple. By then France had begun to call the Nusayris ‘Alawis’ by emphasising social differences they were complying with (Alawite). Sunni Arab nationalism threatened French inter- the political realities and requests of the people. This notion ests, Christians, and these heterodox Muslim communities. suited their desire to weaken Arab nationalism and get closer Hence France needed to foster friendly relations with the to Francophile minorities in order to strengthen French he- two peoples. In 1922 the druze Mountain (Jabal al-druze) gemony. Thus, the establishment and continuity of the south of damascus was inhabited, as its name suggests, by a French Mandate was dependent on a weakened and disunit- druze majority, and France had announced a druze State ed Arab nationalism. The strategy was first to create admin- with its own governor and elected assembly under French istrative units in Syria in order to prevent nationalist feelings authority. latakia, with its mountainous area (Nusayriyya / and movements, and then to install a local puppet govern- Ansariyya Mountains) and its large Alawi population, also be- ment that would facilitate French rule. came a separate administrative unit and was named Alawi State. When France occupied damascus in July 1920, it divided Syria into five parts: 1) Greater lebanon, which consisted of After 1922 the regions outside Jabal al-druze were united in important cities such as Tripoli, Beirut, Sayda (Sidon) and Sur; the Syrian Federation. In 1924 this was replaced by the Syri- 2) the Syrian State (Aleppo, Hama, Homs, damascus); 3) Jabal an State, which included Aleppo, damascus and the Sanjak of al-druze (Mountain of the druze); 4) latakia Governorate; Iskenderun. The latter was then named Hatay and became an and 5) Sanjak of Alexandretta (Iskenderun) or Hatay, which autonomous state in September 1938. Nine months later, in in theory was part of Syria but in practice had special ad- June 1939, Hatay was handed over to Turkey after two years ministrative status. Two years after the occupation of da- of difficult negotiations: the French took this step to try to mascus, the Mandate of Syria and lebanon was handed over ensure Turkey’s non-interference in Word War II. The Alawi to France. Even before 23rd October 1923, when the Mandate State was not included in the Syrian Federation. Except for of Syria became effective, France had already made arrange- the years 1936 to 1939, the Alawi and druze States were ad- ments to shape the borders in such a way that the league of ministratively separate from Syria. Nations could not cancel the establishment of French rule there. The separatist and particularist propaganda of France (poli- tique minoritaire), which highlighted geographical, religious, ThE ExAmplE OF lEbAnOn sectarian and social differences, had encouraged a minority identity, and this negatively influenced Syria’s politics long In this process of partition, the first step was the creation of after the period of the French Mandate. This strategy, which a Greater lebanon. Modern lebanon within its existing bor- was applied during almost the whole period of the Mandate, ders was never a state, or even a geographical region, but it had limited the scope and influence of the Arab nationalist had been part of the Ottoman Empire since the 16th century. movement. France had succeeded in keeping rising Arab na- In religious terms, it consisted of Christian Maronites, the tionalism out of the minority areas, and also prevented its druze, Shiites, Sunnis, and other groups such as the Greek influence on the periphery of cities such as damascus, Alep- Orthodox and the Catholics. The Maronites saw France as po, Hama and Homs. their saviour, supported it from the beginning, and were already prepared to rule the region. With the establishment of Most of the religious and ethnic minorities, such as the Greater lebanon their dream came true. Yet the Muslims in Armenians, Kurds, Jews and Eastern Christian communities this region, whose number equalled that of the Christians, in Syria, were loose groupings, and as they did not have a did not want Maronite rule. Over the following years the political and geographic basis there was no political coher- Sunnis fought to become part of Syria. The powerful Jum- ence. By contrast, the Alawis and the druze were concentrat- blatt (Canbulat) and Arslan families, the leaders of the druze, ed in geographical areas and were also politically coherent. also opposed French rule. The Shiites, haunted by the past, France had supported their autonomy wholly in order to ob- wanted to maintain ties with Syria, because of their fear and struct Syrian unity. With their imperialist policy, the French distrust of both the Sunnis and the Christians. were inimical to national independence. The strategy was to deepen and instigate social differentiation in order to nur- Syria’s artificial regional and ethnic partition was the result ture separatism. The separatism and particularism of reli- of classic colonial ‘divide and rule’ politics. After the Aleppo gious and national minorities was encouraged by giving and damascus States were created they were ruled by gov- autonomous status to the regions where they formed a ernors appointed by the local population who were support- majority. GOETHE-INSTITUT ART&THOUGHT / FIKRUN WA FANN 100 34

A mAndATE TO prEVEnT dEVElOpmEnT? lie in the weak administrations and states established by the two European powers. Instead of assisting the states they Throughout the Mandate, the French did not fulfil the provi- created in Greater Syria – Syria, lebanon, Palestine, Israel sions of the regulations of the league of Nations, and con- and Jordan – they made not just their borders problematic, sciously avoided educating people who might become capa- but their very existence. We can say that the imperialist poli- ble statesmen and rule the country. The fact that Syria was cies of Britain and France are the main cause for the ongoing redivided into regions and sub-regions several times during wars, disagreements and political problems in the Middle the Mandate prevented the creation of a class of administra- East. The seeds of dissension that France sowed in Syria pro- tors able to act in concert. When the last French soldiers left duced complex regional problems, resulting in constant ten- Syria in April 1946, the biggest ongoing barrier to political sion and bloodshed. unity in independent Syria was a strong regionalism, even lo- calism. In addition to this, the different political leaders in ThE AlAWIS’ rISE TO pOWEr post-mandate Syria refused to agree on a common vision and goal of Arab unity. They hesitated between Syrian na- The rise of the Alawis, who have ruled Syria since 1970, took tionalism, a Pan-Arab union, and their own interests. Proba- place over about fifty years. In 1920 they were still the de- bly the major tension was between a political union compris- prived minority, as described above, but by 1970 they had a ing all those who shared the Arab language and culture, and firm grasp on political power in Syria. This transformation local or regional concerns. occurred in three stages: 1920–1946 – the period in question, that of the French Mandate; 1946–1963, the years of Sunni The great task the Syrian nationalist leaders faced after inde- authority; and the period of Alawi consolidation in 1963– pendence in 1946 was to integrate scattered minorities, such 1970. as the Kurds, Circassians and Armenians, as well as the Alawis and druze, who were compact minorities. The post-in- The Alawis were pro-French even before the Mandate, be- dependence government of Syria envisaged lessening the cause they opposed King Faisal, the Sunni Arab ruler of Syria number of Alawi and druze representatives in parliament, from 1918 until 1920, and feared his domination. In 1919 they gradually shutting them out altogether. In the same vein, it rebelled against him using French arms, hoping for the dow- planned to take away the rights of those two minorities, fall of the Ottoman Empire. They informed the French that which had been given to them by the French. This, of course, they wanted a Nusayri union under French protection. Al- caused a conflict when the decision was made to abolish though the Alawis rebelled against the French only two years these rights in favour of the establishment of a centralised later, under the leadership of Salih al-Ali, the revolt was in administration. The Sunni leaders in damascus integrated la- fact directed against the alliance of their enemy, the Isma’ilis takia into Syria and so virtually abolished the Alawi State. – another heterodox Islamic sect – with the French. After The Alawi seats in the parliament and the courts, which se- France granted the Alawis autonomy, the latter offered their cured their civil rights, were abolished as well. They became support. More than any other group, the Alawis profited Syrian citizens and had to give up the dream of the Alawi from French rule after World War I. For them, co-operation State. This change, which did not seem particularly important with France meant escaping the control of their Sunni over- at that time, gave way to the beginning of a new era: the po- lords, and thus the State of latakia was established in July litical rise of the Alawis in subsequent decades. 1922. The Alawis enjoyed low taxation and received financial support from the French. What is more, they also gained le- during the mandate period Syria was ruled by French admin- gal autonomy. Sunni control of legal cases was handed on to istrators and advisers who effectively acted in their own in- Alawi jurists. terests. long after the French Mandate, independent Syria was still a country deprived of self-governing institutions Within their own state, Alawis were still economically and so- and regional unity. due to the imperialist French policy, Syri- cially inferior to Sunnis. They could only overcome this and ans were denied loyalty to a nation state; local and regional feel equal by having a jurisdiction of their own. In Ottoman loyalties, despite Pan-Arab sentiments, were strong. Al- times, Sunni Hanafi law regulated everything through Sunni though it had become independent in 1946, Syria was far courts. The Ottomans did not interfere in Alawi custom, from being a nation state and did not have a viable political which had prevailed over their civil matters, but it did not leadership. have legal authority. Under the new order of the French Mandate the Alawis needed the recognised status of a com- Syria’s present situation is the result of the counterproduc- munity, with their own courts and judges. This, however, was tive policies of Britain and France, and their failure to fulfil not easy to achieve, because Alawi custom was dependent the regulations of the mandate as set down by the league of on social authority: it could not be codified and applied to Nations. The whole Middle Eastern region has suffered, and the courts. The solution found in 1922 was the establishment continues to suffer, from unresolved problems whose origins of separate religious Alawi courts that would rule according GOETHE-INSTITUT ART&THOUGHT / FIKRUN WA FANN 100 35

to the Twelver Shia (Jafari) school of law. This law and its tection and arbitration in legal issues between themselves judges were imported from lebanon, since there were no and damascus, and called for Alawi soldiers to stay in the Alawi experts in this school of jurisprudence. French army. The events that followed 1946 were crucial for their seizure of power in Syria in 1970. The urban Sunni elite cOAlITIOn OF ThE AlAWIS And ThE FrEnch inherited the government when the French left Syria, there- by ending the Mandate. The Alawi State was absorbed into The Alawis were pleased with these changes in their favour. Syria, not only for nationalistic but also for strategic reasons, The partition of the country was a blessing for them during namely because it offered the only passage to the Mediter- the rebellions for Syrian independence and unity that fol- ranean. lowed. There were also several other reasons for reabsorbing the When France supported elections in January 1926, most Syr- Alawi State into Syria. To begin with, the Alawi district could ians boycotted them, but the Alawis participated in great not become an independent state because it lacked economic numbers. They provided the government with most of its advantages, such as infrastructure. Simply being a gateway soldiers, served as police, and supplied intelligence. These to Europe by virtue of its Mediterranean coast was not steps were taken by the Alawis to help maintain French rule, enough to support economic development. Only a merger which they publicly favoured. They assisted in the suppres- with Syria could offer this. Secondly, because the Alawi re- sion of Sunni demonstrations, strikes and rebellions and did gion lacked economic and therefore also political importance, everything in their power to ensure the continuation of most European powers were not interested in it. Further- French rule in Syria, because they feared that otherwise the more, unlike the druze, the Alawis did not constitute an ab- Sunnis would reassert their power over them. As an Alawi solute majority even in their own region: in some coastal lo- politician put it, ‘We succeeded in making more progress in cations, regarded as their economic and political centre, they three or four years than we had in three or four centuries. were in fact in the minority. lastly, when Turkey came to an leave us, therefore, in our present situation.’ agreement with France and annexed Hatay in 1939, this resulted in hostility towards Turkey, and a great many Alawis When, in 1936, the Alawi State was temporarily incorporated left the area as they feared that the Turks would spread fur- into Syria, Alawis protested and expressed pro-French senti- ther south along the Mediterranean coast. ment. A petition that same year called a union with the Sun- nis ‘slavery’, and another Alawi leader wrote that incorpora- There seem to be two other important factors that led to the tion would be tantamount to a ‘disastrous catastrophe’. Six Alawis’ unification with Syria. The first was that no Western Alawi leaders – among them Ali Sulayman, the father (some power really supported the Alawis during the late Ottoman say the grandfather) of Hafiz al-Assad, who seized power in period, unlike the druze and the Maronites who had a special Syria in 1970 through a military coup – also wrote to the relationship with Western states. The Alawis had a weak so- French government, referring to Syria as a Sunni state and cial structure and no internal cohesion. Nor did they did saying that the latter regarded the Alawis as infidels. Ending have organised religious and educational establishments, and the Mandate would, they said, expose them to ‘mortal dan- they had been too isolated as to be under the influence of ger’. France should stay in Syria in order to guarantee the Western ideologies. As we have seen above, even the Ameri- Alawis’ freedom and independence. Alawi leaders also as- can missionary influence was not strong enough to persuade sured France that they were not ‘beasts ready for slaughter’ the Alawis to convert, despite offering the chance of escape by the Sunnis, their arch-enemies, who would put them un- from Ottoman oppression. The second factor was that being der their yoke. Were France to abandon the Alawis, the letter part of Syria meant benefiting from various aspects of mo- said, they would truly ‘regret the loss of their friendship and dernity, such as education at Syrian schools. This, in turn, loyal attachment to noble France.’ brought about an improvement in social status, cultural en- richment, material wealth, and emancipation and influence despite the Alawis’ appeals, France ended the autonomy of – and thus also power – in the sphere of politics. latakia in 1936 and integrated it into the damascus administration. However, the region continued to profit from a spe- Army And pArTy cial administration and French financial support. In 1939 the Alawis regained their independence after the armed rebel- Although the urban Sunnis dominated the country until 1970, lion by Sulayman al-Murshid, a self-proclaimed ‘messiah’ and two key institutions assisted the rise of the Alawis. The first ‘miracle-working god’, who gathered around him thousands was the armed forces; the second was the pan-Arab and sec- of followers. He succeeded in preventing damascus from ex- ular Ba‘ath Party. In both institutions, Alawis were dispropor- tending its authority to the Alawis. tionately represented. The army offered them upward mobil- ity, as it did other minorities, as well as rural Sunnis. All The Alawis continued to petition France right up until Syrian these similarly underprivileged groups found in it a common independence in 1946. In 1945 they requested French pro- language and medium for their fight against social and eco- GOETHE-INSTITUT ART&THOUGHT / FIKRUN WA FANN 100 36

nomic discrimination. Also, in contrast to Sunni officers, who himself an Alawi, and persuaded many of his co-religionists dominated the army but plotted against each other, the to join. The socialism of the Ba‘ath, which was especially group of Alawi officers was more cohesive and coordinated. clearly defined after the 1960s, offered economic opportuni- Whereas Sunnis entered the army as individuals, Alawis em- ties for poor Alawis; and secularism united – at least in theo- phasised ethnic solidarity, which offered a more stable foun- ry – different groups under the umbrella of the party with dation of cooperation than the shifting alliances of the Sunni less attention to religious and sectarian differences. The officers. Several military coups from 1949 to 1963 by senior Alawis consolidated their position during the years 1963– Sunni officers resulted in power struggles and a decrease in 1970 through three military coups. The first was in March their number. The Alawis, of course, benefited from this, in- 1963, in which they played a major role and took over im- creasingly taking their place in senior positions and bringing portant positions in the Ba‘ath Party and in government. In in their own kinsmen. This advantage led to the rise of 1966, Sunnis were ousted by the minorities – Alawis, Ismailis Alawis to upper echelons of the military. and druze – following sectarian battles in the party and the military. Hafiz al-Assad, who had by then achieved his rise In general, rich urban Sunnis tended to belittle the army. For through the ranks of the military, pursued a sectarian policy, them, army service between the two World Wars had meant and finally, in 1970, he instigated his own coup d’état and in- serving the French. These nationalistic Sunni families saw it stalled himself as president. His one-man rule lasted until his as a place for the socially underprivileged, the uncultured death in June 2000, after which his son Bashar was ‘elected’ and the rebellious. The Sunni leaders in damascus accorded to succeed him. little importance to the army as a tool of the state, either. They feared its power in internal politics, kept its funds low, Even though the Alawi Ba‘athist regime created a strong and and made a career in the military appear unattractive. They stable Syrian nation-state that became a power to be reck- believed it was sufficient for them to occupy the top military oned with in the region, the Alawi dynasty of the Assads has positions in order to control the army. For a long time Alawis always been challenged. The Alawis were once a wretched did not rise within the military, but the above-mentioned people, oppressed by their Sunni overlords: slaves without power struggle among the Sunni officers changed this. It was rights. They may have become the lords of Syria and, to this as a result of this historic mistake that the Alawis became day, maintained their grip on power, but many still regard the masters of Syria. them as a despised minority. In the 1980s and 1990s Middle East specialists analysing Syria’s Alawi regime surmised first- As for the Ba‘ath Party, its secular and socialist ideology ap- ly that the Assad government would be brought down by pealed to the Alawis and similar poor, rural minorities. From conflicts between the Sunnis and Alawis – a regional revolt, its inception the Ba‘ath attracted the children of migrants for example – and secondly that the Alawi integration with from rural areas who had gone to damascus for their educa- Syria could be reversed. Recent events have proved them tion. They constituted the majority of the Ba‘ath Party mem- right. Given the bloody civil war that has raged in Syria since bership in the capital, as well as in cities such Aleppo and la- 2011, the question is not if but how and when the Assad re- takia. Zaki al-Arsuzi, one of the founders of the party, was gime will be replaced.

nEcATI AlkAn was born in Turkey and educated in Germany. He is a specialist on late Ottoman history and the history of the Nusayris, and was recently an assistant professor at the University of Erfurt, Germany.

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