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PAUL VAN CALDENBORGH VAN PAUL during the French mandate period mandate French the during The incorporation of the Alawi community into the Syrian state the into state Syrian community the Alawi of incorporation The Savage Human Beasts or the PurestArabs P

Savage Human Beasts er the Purest Arabs P paul van caldenborgh

Savage human beasts or the purest Arabs? ISBN: 90-6464-836-0

Copyright © 2005 Paul Van Caldenborgh Savage human beasts or the purest Arabs?

The incorporation of the Alawi community into the Syrian state during the French mandate period (1918-1946)

een wetenschappelijke proeve op het gebied van de Letteren

Proefschrift

ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen op gezag van de Rector Magnificus, prof. dr. C.W.P.M. Blom, volgens besluit van het College van Decanen in het openbaar te verdedigen op maandag 14 maart 2005 des namiddags om 1.30 uur precies

door

Paulus Petrus Theresa Wilhelmina Van Caldenborgh

geboren op 9 september 1975 te Eindhoven Promotor: prof. dr. C.H.M. Versteegh

Copromotores: dr. D. Douwes (ISIM, Leiden) dr. R. Meijer

Manuscriptcommissie: prof. dr. P.J.A.N. Rietbergen prof. dr. T. Atabaki (Universiteit Utrecht) prof. dr. E.J. Zürcher (Universiteit Leiden) Contents

Acknowledgements 1

Note on transcription 2

Introduction 3 The Alawi community 3 State of the art 7 The present study 10 Segmentary organisation 11 Politicisation of ethnicity 12 Structure of the study 14 Assessment of the sources 16 French archival sources 16 The Service de Renseignements 17 French conceptions of the Alawi community 19 British archival sources 21 Syrian newspapers 22

1. From Ottoman province to Syrian state 25

1.1 Defensive modernisation of the Ottoman Empire 26 1.1.1 The Ottoman Empire during the period of reforms 27 1.1.2 The Syrian provincial bureaucracy 29 1.1.3 French interests in the Levant 30 1.2 French mandate policy 34 1.2.1 Territorial partition 34 1.2.2 City against countryside 36 1.2.3 Elite against elite 37 1.2.4 Administrative organisation 37 1.2.5 Failure of French policy 38 1.3 Quest for Syrian unity (1918-1946) 1.3.1 Period of confrontation ( 1918-1927) 1.3.2 Period of honourable cooperation (1927-1939) 1.3.3 World War II & Anglo-French rivalry ( 1939-1946)

2. The birth of Alawi particularism (1918-1926)

2.1 The Alawi revolt of sheikh Salih al-Ali (1919-1921) 2.1.1 Origins of the revolt 2.1.2 Sharifian patronage & Kemalist support 2.2 The institutionalisation of Alawi politics (1920-1926) 2.2.1 The creation of an Alawi state 2.2.2 The federal experiment 2.2.3 Organic Law 2.3 Conclusion

3. The question of Syrian unity (1926-1936)

3.1 The rise of Sulayman al-Murshid 3.2 Unionism gains ground 3.3 Sectarian tensions: the 'rubber ball' incident 3.4 Status quo 3.5 A stab in the back? The events of 1936 3.6 Conclusion

4. Nationalist politics in the Province of Latakia (1936-1939)

4.1 Creating centralised rule 4.2 Parliamentary elections in the Province of Latakia 4.3 Politics of division 4.4 Land disputes 4.4.1 The Ba'amra dispute 4.4.2 The Khandaq dispute 4.4.3 The Stamu dispute 4.5 The French take over 4.6 Conclusion 5. Incorporation into Syria (1939-1946) 155 5 1 Decline of French authonty corruption 156 5 2 The Alawi triumvirate 161 5 3 Sulayman al-Murshid 170 5 4 Independence and unity 179 5 5 Conclusion 184

Conclusion 185

The 'Alawi revolt' and the 'isabat movement 185 The birth of Alawi particularism 186 Challenges to Alawi particularism 188 Incorporation into the Syrian state 189

Appendices 193

Reference list for the principal Alawi clans and clan leaders 193 Alawi deputies to the Syrian Federal Councils and Alawi Representative Councils 194 Petition congress of Tartus 195

Reference list 197

Samenvatting 205

Curriculum vitae 211

Acknowledgements

This research project was carried out within the framework of the Institute for Historical, Literary and Cultural Studies (HLCS) in Nijmegen and the Centre for Non-Western Studies (CNWS) in Leiden.

Many thanks to the staff of the Centre des Archives diplomatiques in Nantes, the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the Quai d'Orsay in Paris, the Service historique de l'Armée de Terre in Vincennes, the Public Record Office in London, and the Institut Français d'Etudes arabes and the Asad Library in Damascus, for helping me find the numerous documents and newspapers on which this study is based.

I would like to address a special word of thanks to Ms. Kim Duistermaat of the Netherlands Institute for Academic Studies in Damascus (NIASD) for her support and hospitality during my stay in Syria. Notes on transcription

In the transcription of terms in Arabie and Arabie names, no diacritic signs have been used except for the 'ayn (') and the hamza (')· For Arabic toponyms, the common English forms have been used where possible: for example, Damascus instead of Dimashq.

The French mandate authorities do not seem to have employed a consequent and clear system of transcription of terms in Arabic and Arabic names. To prevent confusion, I have replaced the French transcription in the references and in full quotes with the system of transcription outlined above. Introduction

This study will provide a narrative account and analysis of the political development of the Alawi community under French mandate rule (1918-1946), and of the role it played in the complex process that led to the formation of the Syrian state that became independent in 1946'. In the first section of this introduction, I discuss some basic characteristics of the Alawi community, with a focus on its relationships with its neighbours and the state. Then, I present a state of the art with the principal studies that have been published about the Alawi community during the French mandate period and about the French mandate period in general. The third section presents the main questions this study seeks to answer, as well as some theoretical concepts with which to answer them. The final section discusses the three principal types of sources on which this study is based: French and British archival sources, and contemporary Syrian newspapers.

The Alawi community

The Alawi community is best characterised as a heterodox-Islamic rural-based community, consisting of kinship groups or clans. On the principles of Alawi religion not much is known, and the existing literature is highly speculative (see for example Bar-Asher & Kofsky 2002, Moosa 1988)2. However, as Douwes (1993) has argued, the popular manifestations of Alawi religion such as the veneration of sheikhs and saints were widely shared among the rural

With the French mandate period, I refer to the period starting from the arrival of the first French troops in the Levant in October 1918 to the evacuation of the last French troops in April 1946. Officially, it was only on 22 July 1922 that the League of Nations promulgated the Mandate Chart and that the mandate over Syria and Lebanon, granted to the French during the conference of San Remo on 25 April 1920, became official Given the confusing developments of World War II, it is not clear when the French mandate ended (see section 13 3) On 30 April 1946, the last French troops led Syria. The Alawis distinguish between an apparent (zahir) and inner (batin) meaning, the latter being known only to a select group of initiated adult males. The lack of knowledge on the Alawi religion is caused also by the second characteristic of Alawi faith, the principle oftaqiya or dissimulation, which may be defined as "dispensation from the requirements of religion under compulsion or threat of injury" (Encyclopaedia oj Islam, 1913-1936, Vol. X 628). The principle of taqiya offered the Alawis the possibility to adapt outwardly to their surroundings to integrate or avoid persecution, while remaining faithful to their own religion In practice, it made the Alawis vulnerable to attacks of immorality and infidelity A third major charactenslic of the Alawi religion is the concept of metempsychosis, or the transmigration of souls, which appears to be closely related to cosmology 4 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 population of Ottoman Syria. The religious sheikhs knew the secret world of the Alawi faith, and they formed the only source of that knowledge. Normally, the religious sheikhs passed on their knowledge to their sons, developing religious lineages. Each religious sheikh had a particular sirr or secret with which he could help the people by relating worldly matters to the 'true meaning'. Some religious sheikhs, for example, were known for their power to cure the ill, but they also gave advice on harvest times, children's names, and all sorts of everyday affairs. The religious sheikhs also acted as guardians of the shrines of the saints, the most important of which was Khidr3. Some religious sheikhs reached the status of saint themselves. On the eve of the French mandate period (1918-1946), most Alawis lived concentrated in and around a small mountain range on the Mediterranean coast, the Alawi Mountain, which stretches from the north of present-day Lebanon to the city of Antakya in present-day Turkey. To the east of the mountain range lies the Ghab, a fertile plain separated from the mountain by the river Orontes, and to the northeast lies the hilly region of Zawiya Mountain. The average height of the Alawi Mountain is one thousand metres, while the summits in the northern part of the mountain can reach up to two thousand metres. Its peaks lie close together, separated by narrow valleys, and are covered by thick forests and maquis. Near the coast a number of foothills can be found, in the valleys in between lie the larger towns and villages, such as Latakia, Jabla, Banyas, and Tartus. In popular speech, the coastal region was divided in the sahil and thtjabal, the 'coast' and the 'mountain'. The sahil consisted of the accessible coastal plains and the hilly region in the south, while the jabal consisted of the more inaccessible higher mountains in the northern part of the coastal region4. Alawis constituted the largest community in the coastal region. Most of them lived, scattered over a range of villages, in the mountainous and hilly parts of the coastal region. The second major community, that of the Sunnis, was found primarily in the northern districts and in the coastal villages. A third major group, that of the Greek-Orthodox Christians, for the most part lived scattered over the southern districts of the coastal region, where also some small pockets of Maronites and Ismailis could be found. French and British statistics indicate that the total population of the coastal region increased from 258,091 in 1921 to 409,343 in 1941, and that the Alawi population increased from 152,076 in 1924 to 252,062 in 1941. The statistics demonstrate that the Alawis held a numerical superiority in the coastal region where they lived; the scholarly literature has often referred to this characteristic with the term 'compact minority'

In his elaborate study, Franke (2000 2) characterises Khidr as follows· "Obwohl al-HiJr nirgendwo im Koran erwähnt wird, steigt er im Laufe mehrerer Jahrhunderte ganz allmählich zu einer zentralen Position im islamischen Weltbild auf Er wird verschiedenen Nalurelementen zugeordnet, zu den heiligen Statten des Islam in Beziehung gesetzt und in die islamischen Vor- und Endzeitvorstellungen integriert Darüber hinaus wird er zu einem wichtigen Personlichkeitsideal in der islamischen Mystik und in verschiedenen Kontexten zum Symbol der religiösen Autonsierung" In his study Le payi dei alaouilei, the French geographer Weulersse (1940) provides an extremely detailed description of the topography, modes of subsistence, and economic structures in the Alawi region Another interesting source is Wilayat Bayrul (1916), in which two Ottoman officers, Bahjat and Tamimi, provide an elaborate account of their travels in the vilayet of Beirut, of which the Alawi region was part Introduction 5

(see Hourani 1947 & Rabinovich 1979, see also 'State of the Art') The statistics also emphasise the rural character of the Alawi community In 1941, only just over 1 percent of the Alawi population lived in the towns and larger villages, against 16 percent for the total population5 Society in the coastal region was determined largely by patronage-systems, large landownership, and the clan structure of its largest community, the Alawis I will distinguish between three levels of organisation withm the Alawi clan structure the bayt or extended family, the 'ashira or clan (a group of extended families), and the confederation (a group of clans), which is also referred to as 'ashira On the eve of the French mandate period, the Alawi community consisted of four such confederations the Khayyatin, the Haddadin, the Matawira, and the Kalbiyya (see appendix 1) Between the confederations, a certain hierarchy of power and influence existed, although no confederation could dominate another Generally, one can say that the more powerful clans were located in the sahil, the coastal plains and hilly regions, where its leaders held large plots of land The accessibility of the coastal plains and the hilly regions allowed them to maintain economic and political relations with the predominantly Sunni coastal towns of Tartus, Banyas, Jabla, and Latakia, or the predominantly Sunni inland cities of Horns and Hama However, in the plains directly surrounding the city of Latakia, where Alawi peasants worked the lands of Sunni and Christian landowners, clan structure had completely collapsed The less powerful clans lived in the relatively inaccessibleyafoj/, the Alawi Mountain proper, and the marshes to the east of the mountain Consequently, the clans of the mountain and the marshes had less access to administrative and political institutions in comparison to the clans of the coastal plains and hilly regions, while political structure and social life in thejabal as a rule was more divided than in the sahil The other communities, such as the Sunni, Greek-Orthodox and Maronite communities, were headed by a few dominant landowning and merchant families such as the Sunni Harun, Shuraytih, Mahmud, and 'Abd al-Razzaq families, the Greek-Orthodox Bashur family, and the Maronite Sa'adah and Ilyas families Many Alawis worked, besides the lands of their chiefs, those of the Sunni and Christian families, or sold their yields through the intermediary of these families The Alawi peasantry was exploited by its masters, whether they were leading Alawis, Sunms, or Christians, which caused poor living conditions poverty, disease, illiteracy, and in some case even famine During Ottoman times, the Alawis of the coastal mountains led a relatively isolated life Generally, the state left them alone as long as they paid their taxes In the second half of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire, under pressure from Europe, implemented far-reaching reforms that focused on administrative centralisation For the Alawi community these reforms became evident in attempts to integrate them in the provincial administration and to conscript them in the Ottoman army According to Douwes (1993, 1999), the attempts at conscription led

CADN 464 Elude sur le particulansme alaouite (2/1924) CADN 500 Recensement de la population de l'Etal des Alaouites 1921 Recensement de la population de l'Etat des Alaouites 1925 WO 208/3082 A note on the Alawis (2/1943) 6 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 to a discussion on the issue of religious identity. As officially only Muslims were allowed to carry arms, the attempts to conscript Alawis into the Ottoman army amounted to an implicit recognition of the heterodox Alawis as Muslims. Moreover, incorporation of the Alawis in the Muslim millet would deny the European powers a pretext to intervene on their behalf, as they had done for example in the case of the Maronites. In order to integrate them into the Ottoman state, whether through conscription or administrative representation, the Alawis in some form had to be accepted as Muslims. Almost simultaneously with these Ottoman attempts, towards the end of the nineteenth century, a process of religious emancipation started within the Alawi community, the aim of which was to improve the, at least in the eyes of the Sunni Muslim majority, dubious standing of the Alawis as Muslims, and hence their political legitimacy and respectability. During the mandate period, this process of emancipation reached a peak, when the French divided the Syrian population along sectarian lines. Simultaneously, the predominantly Sunni Muslim nationalists tried to construct a new secular Syrian-Arab identity in which the heterodox-Muslim communities could be incorporated, an identity referring to an idealised pre-Islamic Arab past, in which religion was of minor importance. In 1918, after the Ottoman defeat in World War I, the Alawis became part of a polity, which France administrated not as a colony, as it had wished, but as a mandate on behalf of the League of Nations, with the official aim to facilitate the progressive development of two independent states in the Levant, Syria and Lebanon (see the Mandate Act in Méouchy 2002: 421-428). This was not an easy task, as Levantine society at the beginning of the twentieth century was markedly diverse in its religious and ethnic orientations. Apart from variations in religion and ethnicity, economic and administrative orientations differed considerably, in particular in the case of Aleppo, which entertained close relations with Anatolia, and Damascus with its traditional orientation on the south. Furthermore, lifestyles and modes of subsistence in the coastal areas, where horticulture and seaborne trade dominated, contrasted with the inland plains, where settled farming and nomadism coexisted. During Ottoman times, Syria did not exist as a political entity, but rather referred to a region that roughly included the Ottoman provinces of Aleppo, Damascus, and Beirut, which stretched well into present-day Israel, Palestine, Jordan, Iraq, and Turkey. After the provincial reforms of 1864, the term 'Syria' came to refer to the province of Syria, which included the cities of Damascus, Horns, and Hama, and their hinterlands. After World War I, the term 'Syria' was used for an artificially bordered polity that roughly corresponded with the borders of present-day Syria. During the mandate period, the nationalist movements that aspired to the establishment of an independent Arab state came to accept the imposition of the artificial outer borders of the entire region under French mandate, and even the division ofthat mandate region itself into two states. These nationalists considered the mandate region referred to as Syria to be one state, inhabited by Arabs, and did not accept the further division of this region. As such, they considered the coastal region, which the French had granted an autonomous existence, to be an integral part of Syria. A majority of the population of this region, mostly Alawis, opposed their incorporation into the Syrian state, since they did not consider themselves to be Syrians, and Introduction 7 demanded a large measure of autonomy. The Syrian nationalists accused the French of secretly stimulating and even orchestrating Alawi particularism in order to divide the Syrian population. By dividing the Syrian population, the French hoped to prevent the development of a unified democratic Syrian state, in which case, the Mandate Act stated, France had completed its task as mandatory ruler and should leave the region; an accusation that has found much resonance in the scholarly literature.

State of the art The history of the Alawi community during the French mandate period is a rather neglected part of Syrian history, which is surprising given the Alawi community's meteoric rise to power after World War II. In Syria, many historiographie studies on the mandate period in general (for example Hindi 1962, Jundi 1960, Qarqut 1975) and the Alawi community in particular have been produced with the aim to portray the Alawis as Arabs and faithful Muslims (for example 'Abbas 1987; Hasan n.d.; Hawash 1997; Khayyir 1996; Sharif 1946; 'Uthman 1994, 1996, 1997; Yunus 1947). These studies tell a lot about the political discourse and 'invention of tradition' in independent Syria, but are useless in the context of this study. An exception is Tawil's Tankh al- 'alawiyyin (History of the Alawis), published in 1924, which I will discuss in more detail in section 2.1. Only two scholarly studies, both unpublished PhD-dissertations, have dealt specifically with the history of the Alawi community during the French mandate period. Mendenhall's study, Class, cult and tribe. The politics of 'Alawi separatism in French mandate Syria (1991), is concerned mostly with the later part of the mandate period, while Yaffe's Between separatism and union: The autonomy of the Alawi region in Syria, 1920-1936 (1992) deals primarily with the early mandate period. In his study, Mendenhall (1991: 5) argues that the Alawis, "being divided by class, cult and tribe, did not comprise an ethnic group", and that "kinship, not sect, provided the effective locus of social cohesion". I agree with Mendenhall's rejection of the concept of the 'sect-class', and indirectly also of the concept of the 'compact minority', as these concepts overlook political, economic, social, geographical, ecological, and religious variation within the different communities that made up society in the coastal region (Mendenhall 1991: 21-29). Consequently, I also agree with Mendenhall's rejection of the common assumption that the Alawis "were united in a common position [vis-à-vis] the Sunnis and Christians", and his thesis that "middling and large Alawi landlords exploited their coreligionaries alone and in collusion with Sunni and Christian landlords" (Mendenhall 1991: 25). Mendenhall (1991: 2), however, is specifically concerned with the claim of some analysts of modem Syria that the Alawis, in the case they would fall from power, would establish their own independent Alawi state; a claim he rejects. He argues that the Alawi community during the French mandate period failed (and still fails) to meet the necessary conditions for a successful separatist movement; a movement, moreover, which he considers to be the result of the French policy of divide and rule before all 8 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 else (Mendenhall 1991: 249)6. As will become clear below, I consider the French policy of divide and rule to be too simple an explanation for the rise of Alawi particularism, as it denies any initiative on the part of the Alawi community in determining its future. As will be argued in the next section, the French presence in the Levant merely provided an environment in which Alawi clan politics could flourish, and Alawi clan politics had a decisive influence on questions concerning autonomy or unity. The second study, Yaffe's dissertation, was unavailable for the current research. However, two articles in Middle Eastern Studies, in her own words based on her dissertation, have been published, and it is fair to assume that they reflect its main theses. The first article (1993) on the early career of Sulayman al-Murshid, an important Alawi leader, has a rather descriptive character, and will be discussed later on in section 3.1. The second article analyses the circumstances in which a congress of Alawi leaders took place in the build-up to negotiations for the Franco-Syrian treaty between Syrian nationalists and the French government in Paris in 1936. Yaffe (1995) argues that a new horizontal form of organisation was rising in Alawi society, and she claims that the congress of Tartus demonstrates that "the extremely traditional society in the Alawi region started getting characteristics of a mixed, more modem society". According to Yaffe (1995: 30-31), the congress constituted a "sudden and total change, concerning the question of unity with Syria", which entailed "the Alawis' decision to approve of the unity, against which they had been campaigning for 14 years". After reviewing the exact sources and documents used by Yaffe, to be found primarily in the archives in Nantes, I have not found any support for her thesis or any of the arguments she has brought forward to support it7.1 will present a different reading of the event, and in section 3.5 it will be contended that while during the mandate period the Alawi clan structure started to weaken to the benefit of a new class of young Alawi intellectuals and professionals, the scale of this transformation should not be overestimated. Moreover, this transformation can certainly not be tied to the Alawi congress of 25 February 1936. It will be demonstrated that this new class of intellectuals and professionals had strong affiliations with certain clans, and that, in contrast to Yaffe's findings, the congress of Tartus and its aftermath constituted a strong confirmation of the authority of the old guard of clan leaders, whose interests at that time were best served with autonomy. Several studies, of a more limited scale, have been published on the Alawi community during the French mandate period, mostly with a focus on the career of Sulayman al-Murshid, one of the dominant Alawi leaders during the mandate period. Besides Mendenhall's

Mendenhall (1991 249) defines Ihese necessary conditions as follows Ihe presence of elite competition for local control, the existence of the means to communicate the selected symbols of identity to other social classes within the ethnic group, the existence of a socially mobilized population to whom the symbols of identity can be communicated; and the absence of intense class cleavage or other difficulties in communication between elites and other social classes Mendenhall (1991· 250) also defines a set of sufficient conditions a prudential determination on the part of the group elite seeking secession that separation would be of net economic benefit, the existence of a favourable external political and military environment 7 Most documents that Yaffe has used are kept in CADN 410 Introduction 9

dissertation, which uses Murshid's movement as an example of a failed separatist movement, and Yaffe's article (1993), Franke has published two studies on Murshid's career These studies have a rather descriptive character, and will be discussed, together with Yaffe's study, in section 3 1 A third article by Yaffe (1990), written together with Itamar Rabinovich, discusses the career of the famous anthropologist Captain Evans-Pntchard, political officer for the Spears Mission, in the Alawi region in 1942, and analyses how the Alawi region became involved in the Anglo-Free French rivalry (see sections 1 3 3 and chapter 5) Since the publication of Philip Khoury's Syria and the French mandate The politics of Arab nationalism 1920-45 in 1987, and the release of the majority of the French archival sources concerning the mandate period, a number of studies on this episode of Syrian history have appeared, focusing mainly on nationalism and state formation In the next paragraphs, I will present three major studies that all have offered alternative analytical frameworks and that all have added new insights to the existing knowledge on the formation of the Syrian state Khoury's Syria and the French mandate (1987), which will be discussed in more detail in chapter 1, has become accepted as a standard work in the field of mandate studies Its main argument concerns the development of Arab nationalism in Syria's urban centres, and its embrace by a small elite of urban landowning bureaucrats Khoury argues that this small elite by its embrace of nationalism and by its adoption of the so-called 'politics of notables' succeeded in dominating politics during the French mandate period In a later article, Khoury (1997) reassesses this focus on elite nationalism, and admits that during the French mandate period the base of the nationalist movement gradually but irreversibly shifted towards new institutions such as secondary schools, trade unions, youth organisations, and sporting clubs He argues that vertical and horizontal ties of organisation coexisted, and that the control of the urban notables over the population was not absolute Only in the post-World War II years, the popular movements were able to break out of the old framework of family-based factions Khoury (1997 273-275), moreover, points to what he calls the 'ideological hegemony' of nationalism in the study of Middle Eastern history "In trying to include the many groups who make up Arab society we may become guilty of overdeterminmg their behaviour, of calling their behaviour nationalist because of our needs rather than their realities" As Khoury (1997 286-287) has argued, it is necessary to look beyond Arab nationalism "On the one hand, we may be able to recognise more clearly the self-interestedness of the nationalist elites On the other, we may find that advancing national ideals is not the sole measure of historical agency in the twentieth- century Arab world" Another important study is James Gelvin's Divided loyalties Nationalism and mass politics at the close of empire (1998), which focuses on popular nationalism and contending constructions of nations and nationalisms Basing his argument on an elaborate discussion of mass politics during emir Faysal's rule over parts of present-day Syria (1918-1920), Gelvin argues that the dominant trend in the discussion of Middle Eastern nationalism has focused for a long time on a small group of indigenous elites, to the exclusion of large portions of the population For Gelvin, nationalism was not only an affair of the urban notability, but also of the 10 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 population at large. Especially in times of crises, vertical ties of dependence (the patronage networks of the land-owning bureaucratic class) were put to the test and relationships along horizontal lines (popular organisation) became more practicable. According to Gelvin (1998: 7), the focus on elite urban nationalism has led to the construction of a nationalism "that achieved a retrospective homogeneity and coherence [...] that it never achieved in reality". When events did not fit the established framework, scholars simply left them out as irrelevant exceptions. For example, in July 1920, on the eve of the French invasion, parts of the Damascene and Aleppine populations rebelled against emir Faysal in response to his willingness to negotiate with the French. According to Gelvin, most historical works simply dismiss this episode as mob violence or do not mention it at all. Gelvin (1998: 1-4, 287) himself considers this episode to be an expression of popular nationalism, given the specific targets, slogans shouted, and prior and subsequent actions of the crowd. A third publication, which uses the concept of gender to present a radically new analytical framework concerning mandate studies, is Elizabeth Thompson's Colonial citizens. Republican rights, paternal privilege, and gender in French Syria and Lebanon (2000). Thompson (2000: 1) presents her book as "a study of how states and their citizens are constructed under colonialism and then bequeathed to their postcolonial successors". Leaving behind Khoury's focus on elite nationalism and Gelvin's attention for mass politics, Thompson (2000: 1) argues that "even as colonial peoples waged nationalist battles for independence they inevitably participated in the very political order that they rejected". In this way, Thompson's study (2000: 1) draws attention to the fact that the French and later the Syrian nationalists "could not and did not unilaterally impose a system of rule. Colonialism involved, as do most other political systems, constant negotiation of power relationships and identities". Thompson's approach is a forceful reminder that under the 'surface' of nationalism other dynamics lay hidden.

The present study In the present study, I will provide a narrative account of the political development of the Alawi community under French mandate rule (1918-1946). Moreover, I will provide a perspective towards the formation of the Syrian state that will complement the perspectives formulated by KJioury, Gelvin, and Thompson. Instead of studying predominantly Sunni Muslim urban nationalist movements as the primary agencies in the process of Syrian state formation, I will focus on a rural heterodox-Islamic community in the periphery of the Syrian state. In this study, I will seek to explain how the Alawis, out of a loosely structured group of clans, developed into a community with an encompassing feeling of identity. In addition, I will seek to explain, with the help of the concept of 'politicisation of ethnicity', how this identity came to encompass diverging notions of nationalism and religion, and how these notions became assets in the political bargaining of the Alawi leaders. I will argue that the Alawi leadership had its own Introduction 11 particular form of politics, called segmentary politics, with its own rules, its own objectives, and its own political horizon The Alawis were not merely instruments of the French policy of divide and rule, as for example Mendenhall (1991) has argued The advent of French rule in the Alawi region and the establishment of state-like institutions, however, did offer the Alawi leadership a multitude of new possibilities with which to pursue their clan interests I will also argue that, despite the fact that Alawi political life became subject to the ideological hegemony of the nationalist discourses formulated in Syria's urban centres and by the French mandate authorities, segmentary politics remained the primary agency in Alawi political life In the remainder of this section, I will present two basic concepts, 'segmentary organisation' and the 'politicisation of ethnicity', which in my view offer excellent tools to relate the dynamics of Alawi political life to the dynamics of the formation of the Syrian state

Segmentary organisation Two interrelated concepts of the theory of 'segmentary lineage organisation', namely the concepts of'balanced opposition' and 'mediation', provide excellent tools with which to explain the political mechanisms operative in Alawi society during the French mandate period The segmentary model seeks to explain the maintenance of order in those societies in which a central authority such as the state is absent There is considerable controversy over this model because the facts often do not seem to fit the model One objection might be that the segmentary model is foremost a native ideal, or an anthropologist's or colonial administrator's model of reality, but that empirical reality is different (Eickelman 1998, Tapper 1990) Unlike critics such as Munson (1989, 1993, 1995) who use this observation to dismiss the model altogether, I agree with Kraus (1998 16) that the segmentary model "must not be read as an unduly abstracted ethnographic description but as a formal model of logical relations which does not claim to describe social reality" A second objection to the model might be that it posits that the segments must be defined on the basis of kinship, while in reality this is often not the case (Munson 1993), or that there is disagreement "as to whether tribes should be identified culturally (a descent ideology) or structurally (chiefship and/or politicoterritonal unity)" (Tapper 1990 53) While it is true that the relationship between segmentation and lineage theory is often tenuous, I believe Dresch (1986) is right when he says that lineage theory and segmentation are two different things, and that lineage theory is best discarded while segmentation remains a useful idea As has been mentioned above, the segmentary model seeks to explain the maintenance of order in a society in the absence of a central authority It presupposes an ideal-typical society consisting of equally powerful 'segments' (confederations, clans, extended families) or ad hoc coalitions of 'segments' (the principle of 'nesting'), which are organised into a pyramid-like structure in a relation of 'balanced opposition' Protagonists of the model such as Gellner (1968, 1990, 1995) and critics of the model alike agree that such an ideal-typical society does not exist in reality, given the inequalities in manpower, resources, effective leadership, and access to the 12 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 state. I would argue that the existence of inequality between the different segments is essential for the model, in order to give the otherwise static model a dynamic character. The dynamics of a segmentary society such the Alawi society must be explained by using the segmentary model as an exploratory model: by identifying internal and external factors that create these inequalities, such as demographic, social, and economic developments, changes in leadership, and the rising impact of state power. The principle of balanced opposition does not mean that each segment is equally powerful to any other segment, but rather it implies that no segment is able to dominate any other segment, and that each coalition of segments will be met by another coalition of segments. Moreover, as Alawi politics during the French mandate period demonstrate, segments actively seek such a balance. To put it simply, a segment might compensate its lack of manpower by establishing external relations, or compensate its lack of economic resources with effective leadership or a political alliance. This constant concern for a balance of power is crucial in understanding Alawi politics during the French mandate period. 'Mediation' constitutes the second important political mechanism in Alawi political life. Mediation is crucial for segmentary societies, as conflicts in a situation of balanced opposition cannot be resolved by force and continue indefinitely. To prevent conflicts from escalating onto higher levels of organisation and threatening the entire system, segmentary societies are geared towards the prevention of conflict: a segment is collectively responsible for the actions of individual members ofthat segment, and actively polices its members. In the case of a conflict between two segments, one segment collectively pays blood money to the disadvantaged group, which again provides a strong incentive to police its individual members. In the case that a segment does not pay the required blood money, the disadvantaged party will use force to obtain satisfaction, causing the conflict to escalate into a feud. In this final stage of conflict, mediation is required to prevent a feud from getting out of hand. For this reason, segmentary organisation is characterised by a division and a certain balance of power between religious and lay authorities. Lay political leaders are responsible for the exercise of violence, while the function of the religious authorities is to maintain a certain level of violence, necessary for the functioning of the system, but with a minimum of bloodshed. Mediation is by no means a solution for violence. This mechanism of 'mediation' continued to exist during the French mandate period, as did the distinction between lay and religious sheikhs, although this distinction became increasingly blurred.

Politicisation of ethnicity

In order to relate the dynamics of Alawi politics to the dynamics of the formation of the Syrian state, I will use the concept of the 'politicisation of ethnicity'. Many theories on nationalism and state formation exist, but the sheer number of contradictory approaches has blurred rather than facilitated our understanding of nationalism, to such an extent that scholars have resorted to the Introduction 13 formulation of typologies of explanatory models, and cannot even agree upon those8. Many of these theories, because of their bias towards European examples and reductionist explanations that focus on aspects such as the development of capitalism, industry, secularism, urbanisation, bureaucratisation, and egalitarian high culture, are useless in the context of the present study, which seeks to analyse the role of a predominantly illiterate, rural, segmentary community in a process of nation state formation. Other models, which focus on the role of primordial and perennial identities, conceive of rather static and fixed identities, while the example of the Alawi community during the French mandate period demonstrates the great fluidity of collective identities. To overcome these problems, I will make use of Wimmer's theory of social and cultural dynamics, which focuses on "an analysis of modem state formation and the politicisation of ethnicity 'from the outside', i.e. without using a terminology already coloured by the basic principles of the contemporary world divided into nation-states" (Wimmer 2002: 19). With its focus on nationalist exclusion, this model allows for an explanation of unsuccessful examples of state formation and their consequences for those groups that are subject to its results. Wimmer's theory of social and cultural dynamics conceives of nationalism as a particular form of a 'cultural compromise', in which people relate their individual long-term interests and aims, based on their 'internalised cultures', to one another. The resulting agreement on and acceptation of cultural compromises consequently leads to 'social closure': the demarcation of boundaries between participants in the cultural compromise and outsiders. Wimmer (2002: 33) argues that social closure expresses itself in community building and the increasing importance of boundary markers such as dress codes, modes of speech, or "the consumption of vast amounts of melted cheese, which only those initiated in a certain national culture are able to digest" (Wimmer is from Switzerland). For a cultural compromise to be accepted as valid and legitimate, Wimmer (2002: 30) argues, "it has to consider the interests of everybody concerned by the matter in need of regulation, and it should embody the will, which all can reflect jointly in their own respective interests, as the will of the 'generalised other' ". It follows that cultural compromises cannot be imposed, but have to be consented to, and consequently that they can be challenged. According to Wimmer (2002: 32), certain cultural compromises involve "an exchange of the guarantee of political loyalty for the promise of participation and security", and lead to the development of nations and nationalisms. This exchange does not always run smoothly and completely. Wimmer (2002: 66-67) argues that

For recent overviews of theories of nationalism, see for example Smith (1998) and Òzkinmli (2000) Smith distinguishes between three main paradigms: the perennialisl/primordialisl, the modernist, and the ethno-symbolist paradigms Özkirimli prefers a typology consisting of 'essentialist' and 'constructivist' approaches. Smith (1998: 222) distinguishes several basic problems in the study of nationalism: "the failure to reach a consensus on the delimitation of the field"; "the notorious terminological difficulties", "the failure to reach even a preliminary agreement on the definitions of key concepts"; and the disagreement "about the fundamental theoretical objectives" Smith argues that "very often, we are dealing with theories, models and approaches which are equally plausible and valid, even if they appear to be based on opposed premises, because they seek answers to quite different questions". 14 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 when state elites do not have sufficient political, legal and economic resources at their disposal to allow for a non-discriminatory integration of the entire population, and when state formation precedes the establishment of a democratic civil society, the state elites mobilise existing forms of solidarity and networks of dependency to gain a political following. In this way, ethnic, religious, and tribal groups are transformed into categories directly relating to state power and legitimacy, or conversely, directly excluded from them. This entails favouritism on the part of the state elites for their own ethnic, religious, regional, or other groups in the granting of political participation, economic benefits, access to the judicial system, and so on. Wimmer calls this process the 'ethnicisation of bureaucracy'. Wimmer (2002: 38-39) argues, cultural compromises may entail 'power effects', which is of specific importance to this study. He explains: "In limiting the field of legitimate arguments, cultural compromises force groups that have not participated in the formation of the cultural compromise and entered the political arena for the first time, to address themselves to the generally accepted forms of collective representations and in that way to enforce their validity and legitimacy. Any way of making sense of the social world that does not at least connect to the prevailing cultural compromise is not understood and quickly marginalised in public debates". Alternatively, people who do not consent to the prevailing cultural compromise may develop a new social group with its own cultural compromise. To explain the rise of the nation state model in the Middle-Eastern context, Wimmer (2002: 71-78) argues that the model spread from Europe to the Middle East because of the imposition of colonial states, 'learning and imitation effects', the 'domino effects' resulting from the break-up of empires, and the ascendancy of the principal of national self-determination at the end of World War I. However, local factors determined the specific forms and degree of success of these new nation states.

Structure of the study

The remainder of this study is divided into five chapters, which, with the exception of chapter 1, are ordered in a chronological fashion. Chapter 1 provides the historical context for this study. It discusses the politicisation of Arab identity in the late-Ottoman period, and the rise of the nationalist movements that were to dominate Syrian political life during the mandate period. It demonstrates that France became interested in the Alawi community only after World War I, as an instrument with which to divide and rule and to secure France's hold on the strategically important coastal region. Finally, chapter 1 presents a chronological outline of the interplay of French and Syrian nationalist politics during the mandate period itself. Chapter 2 discusses the period of 1918-1926 that witnessed the so-called Alawi revolt of sheikh Salih al-'Ali (1919-1921), which is remembered in Syrian historiography as the first nationalist revolt against French rule. It will place the revolt in the context of the 'isabat movement that engulfed the rural areas of the Levant. The Alawi revolt, in addition, will provide Introduction 15 a case study for the mechanisms of conflict management in a segmentary society I will argue that the focus on the Alawi revolt has obscured the fact that this episode of political life in the coastal region coincided with the rise of Alawi particularism and the politicisation of Alawi identity This distinct Alawi consciousness, or Alawi particularism, will be explained as being the power effect, as defined by Wimmer, of the dominant cultural compromise and discourses then current Arab nationalism and the French discourse of patriotism and national self- determination The rise of Alawi particularism was further stimulated by its temporary participation in the Syrian Federation (1922-1924), which may be termed an 'ethmcised state', characterised by what Wimmer has termed the 'ethmcisation of bureaucracy' Chapter 3 deals with the tumultuous period of 1926-1936 that was characterised by structural changes in the Alawi clan structure and a growing debate among the Alawi leadership over the question of Syrian unity These changes caused some clan leaders (those losing power within the clan structure) to seek additional political assets to restore the principle of balanced opposition a rapprochement with local nationalists and even the nationalists in Syria's urban centres I will demonstrate that the rise of state power in the coastal region slowly began eroding the segmentary structure of Alawi society, as an increasing number of Alawis no longer was dependent on its clan chiefs As a result, small groups of Alawis began settling in the predominantly Sunni coastal villages, where competition over jobs and housing sparked off sectarian incidents Given the debate on Syrian unity that was already current among the Alawis because of the rapprochement of some Alawi leaders with the nationalists, these incidents soon gained a political dimension and brought to the fore some important questions relating to Alawi identity Are the Alawis Muslims9 Are the Alawis Arabs9 The evidence suggests that these discussions became the object of political bargaining - unionist Alawis and nationalist Sunnis arguing that they were Muslims, and particularistic Alawis arguing that they were not Chapter 4 discusses the period of 1936-1939 that witnessed the temporary incorporation of the coastal region into the Syrian state, following the Franco-Syrian treaty of 9 September 1936 The Syrian state manifested itself as an 'ethmcised state' to the Alawis by filling the provincial bureaucracy with Sunni officials and excluding Alawis from it, or at least this was how the Alawis claimed they perceived the situation The sudden ascendancy of the Syrian state and the ill-fated policies of the two successive Syrian provincial governors caused major divisions between and within the Alawi clans, to such an extent that in the summer of 1938, they were at the brink of a civil war The sudden realignment of the principal Alawi clans following mediation, however, demonstrates that Alawi politics before all else was segmentary politics Chapter 5, finally, discusses the period of 1939-1946, from the beginning of World War II to Syrian independence The decline of French power, Anglo-French rivalry, and the abuse of the administrative apparatus by certain Alawi clans allowed the Syrian government to establish its authority over the coastal region The granting of executive power to certain Alawi clans ultimately broke the principle of balanced opposition on which Alawi segmentary society rested Faced with the threat of direct hostile control, the Alawi clans did not unite as they had done 16 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 before, and this allowed the Syrian government to break the back of those clans that were capable of opposing it.

Assessment of the sources In addition to the secondary sources discussed in the State of the Art, this study is based on three types of primary sources: French archival sources from the Centre des Archives diplomatiques in Nantes (CADN in the references) and the Foreign Ministry archives of the Quai d'Orsay (MAE) and its archives concerning the League of Nations (MAE-SDN); British archival sources from the Foreign Office (FO), Colonial Office (CO) and War Office (WO); and a selection of Syrian newspapers. I have relied heavily on the French and British archival sources and less on the Syrian newspapers, as their quality and quantity, for reasons that will be explained in the next sections, limited their usefulness for this study. The French military archives of the Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre (SH) unfortunately were closed during much of the research period for this study: sources on the early period of confrontation, important from a military point of view, had already been collected. The Markaz al-Watha'iq, the archives of the Syrian government, proved inaccessible for the present research. I have used a variety of sources written about Alawis, but, with a few exceptions, not written by Alawis themselves. The reason for this is simple: a large majority of the Alawis, including many of the leading clan chiefs, was illiterate. With the exception of a small number of petitions left in the French archives, the Alawis have not left any accessible written sources. Newspapers were published on some occasions, but were extremely short-lived. Sheikh Muhammad al-Tawil's (1924) Tarikh al-'alawiyyin, to my knowledge the only book written during the French mandate period by an Alawi about Alawis, provides an overtly apologetic discourse of Alawi history, which seeks a rapprochement between the Alawi and Sunni religions to restore the former Alawi grandeur that had been lost because of sectarian strife and rivalries between Alawi clans. The opinion of ordinary Alawis on politics, nationalism, religion, and French rule remains largely unknown. Abdallah Hanna's oral history of the Syrian peasantry (2002) may shed some light on these issues, but the history of the Alawis during the French mandate period that will be related in the next chapters will focus, faute de mieux, on Alawi elites.

French archival sources

In their study on French archival sources. Fournie & Trégan (2004) point out the lacunae in the material as a result of several wars. In 1940, almost all the important papers for the period 1932- 1940 in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the Quai d'Orsay in Paris were burnt in anticipation of the German advance. Attempts to reconstitute the archives after the war with Introduction 17 pieces taken from embassies, consulates, and other overseas representations have been largely unsuccessful In addition, High Commissioner General Dentz (1940-1941) destroyed many archives of the important office of the Secretary-General and the archives of the representatives in Damascus, Aleppo, Suwayda, and Latakia The unrest of 1945 in Syria and the civil wars in Lebanon destroyed much of what was left of the French archives on the Levant Fournie & Trégan (2004 48) conclude that the archival sources kept in Nantes, at first sight an impressive amount, in effect represent only a fraction of the original "On aura beau chercher, au Centre des Archives diplomatiques de Nantes, des fonds d'une certaine consistance qui pourraient correspondre à l'activité, pendant un quart de siècle, des délégations du Haut-Commissaire à Damas, a Alep, Damas, Latakia ou Suwayda ces archives ont bel et bien disparu suite a leur destruction sur l'ordre des autorités françaises, a leur abandon sur place, à leur dispersion" This is certainly true for the sources concerning the Alawi region Concerning the period 1918-1921, on the revolt of sheikh Salih al-'Ah, no consistent body of intelligence bulletins is preserved Perhaps such material never existed, as the French in that period had only limited resources at their disposal, and had other priorities Much of the information used in this study has been pieced together from incomplete series of fragments of telegrams, military reports, and internal correspondence For the period 1922-1930, a wider variety of sources is available although its consistency and scope remain limited The sources focus on important events such as the elections of 1923 and 1926, and the break-up of the Syrian Federation (1922- 1924), but shed very little light on the Alawi community's internal dynamics The period 1930- 1938 is well documented and relatively consistent due to the preservation of the weekly intelligence bulletins, which allows an analysis of the Alawi community's internal dynamics and political orientation Information on the period 1939-1946 is again very poor due to the circumstances sketched above, while, additionally, certain files for the period 1941-1946 are still classified and thus inaccessible to researchers

TTîe Service de Renseignements

The French archival sources in the Centre des Archives diplomatiques in Nantes that form the bulk of the sources for this study can be divided into two parts information gathered by the intelligence services, and correspondence between the different ministries and directorates that dealt with the Levant In his article "French intelligence-gathering in the Syrian mandate, 1920- 40", Thomas (2002 3-5) explains that the French intelligence services in the Levant consisted of several departments the Service de Renseignements, the Section de Centralisation de Renseignements, and the Sûreté Générale, officially Sûreté Nationale since 1934 In the sources, the security services from approximately 1938 onwards are also referred to as the Services Spéciaux The Service de Renseignements and the Section de Centralisation de Renseignements reported to the Deuxième Bureau, the military intelligence service, which was linked to the Section d'Etudes du Levant of the High Commission's Civil Cabinet in Beirut The Levant section of the Service de Renseignements was created in June 1921 Initially, it was composed of 18 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 the military administrators that were already on the spot, but soon highly qualified and experienced officers arrived from Morocco. At its peak in 1921, the intelligence service consisted of eighty-seven officers for the entire mandate region. It was the official task of these officers to provide the policymakers of the High Commission with information on threats to national security, while the Section de Centralisation de Renseignements acted as a counter­ espionage agency. The Section d'Etudes du Levant, for its part, reported to the Ministry of War in Paris and the French military staff. The Sûreté Générale, on the other hand, was part of the civil police force. In practice, however, the distinction between the military Service de Renseignements and the civil Sûreté Générale was blurred, as both provided information on local politics to the Section d'Etudes du Levant. The official role of the intelligence officers as advisers for both the High Commission and the indigenous governments soon gained new dimensions. As Thomas (2002: 13) convincingly argues, "Military intelligence officers were not only the eyes and ears of French rule in Syrian tribal regions but, increasingly, the key practitioners of imperial governance. [...] In an environment where the maintenance of French power rested upon early detection of actual or potential disorder, military intelligence was fundamental to the survival of the mandate. [...] But where did real authority reside? Within the high commissioner's secretariat or with the SR officers responsible for the decisive reportage on threats to order?". His answer is that "SR officers in particular not only tendered specialist advice but took key policy decisions with lasting ramifications for the stability of the mandate" (Thomas 2002: 26). Similar questions must certainly be asked concerning French policy and administration in the Alawi region. Intelligence officers, one for each administrative district, on a regular basis reported to the governor's office in Latakia, whose staff compiled the bulletins d'information hebdomadaires, or weekly intelligence bulletins. These bulletins were subsequently dispatched to military and civil authorities in other parts of Syria and Lebanon, and to the High Commission. Larger thematic or chronological reports from the governor directly to the High Commission usually amounted to a compilation of verbatim parts of these weekly bulletins. The intelligence officers in the field gathered their information through personal contacts with the population and personal observation, and they made use of informants. The point is that the assessment of the reliability of intelligence was made on this local level, on the level of intelligence officers in their districts, and that, higher up in the hierarchy, officials trusted and had to trust this information blindly. In his article, Thomas (2002: 3-6) argues that, in the Levant, intelligence gathering and imperial consolidation were inseparably linked, as French administrative control was based on the manipulation of the relations between ethnic and religious groups. Therefore, "effective French control demanded good political intelligence". Presumably, bad political intelligence, for example because of personal likes and dislikes, incompetence or corruption, thus led to ineffective control. Thomas (2002: 15) himself points to the danger that "The line between the objective evaluation of sources and the political sympathies of the evaluating officers and their informants was often impossible to see". The danger was even greater in the case of corrupt Introduction 19 officers. As we shall see, in the case of the Alawi region, it appears that corrupt intelligence officers, who had created personal fiefs and built up a local clientele, manipulated intelligence reports to further their personal interests. In chapter 5,1 will discuss the case of Captain Blondel, which involves such a corrupt source of information. An additional problem, during World War II, was that, after the 1941 British-Free French invasion, France no longer reigned supreme and that the possibilities for political intrigues increased. Moreover, the massive British presence led to Anglophobia among the French, who feared the British intended to remove France from the Middle East altogether. In short, from the beginning of World War II onwards, the quality and quantity of French intelligence gathering diminished, much of which, moreover, got lost. The correspondence between the High Commission and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the Quai d'Orsay usually had a more abstract nature. The archives in Paris do not hold any information that the Quai d'Orsay took an active interest in internal Alawi affairs; it usually referred to the Alawi region as a monolithic entity that could be used in the overall French policy of divide and rule, or as a strategically important position in the Eastern Mediterranean.

French conceptions of the Alawi community Early in 1920, a French intelligence officer, charged with producing a 'tableau de commandement' of the Alawi clans, was baffled by the fragmentation of clans and the lack of a clear structure. As a solution, he advised that "Il faudrait augmenter la cohésion des tribus et aider à leur homogénéité, on ne serait plus ainsi obligé de composer avec chacune d'elles pour une affaire d'un intérêt général et toujours craindre en s'adressant à l'une plutôt qu'à l'autre de mécontenter la seconde et de la voire s'écarter par jalousie ou vexation"9. Two years later, in 1922, Colonel Niéger, the governor of the Alawi region, produced his 'tableau de commandement' of the Alawi clans, used in the suppression of the Alawi revolt. This time it had the well ordered tree-like structure, typical of segmentary organisation. Critics of the segmentary model such as Eickelman (1998) and Tapper (1990) have called this the colonial administrator's model of society. It is no doubt true that the French brought to the Levant their conceptions and misconceptions about the nature and organisation of Levantine society. Yet, one should also consider that the French actively sought to reorder that society: because of French military power and political dominance, developing French classifications and categorisations of Levantine society became principal organising elements within that society. The early French reports on the Alawi community demonstrate French preoccupation with questions of race and religion, which led them to make simplistic categorisations and accept existing prejudice. The earliest French reports on the Alawi community that I have come across date back to 1917. The reports are written by intelligence officers stationed on the island of Arwad, off the coast of Tartus, who gathered information on the question whether "ces montagnards sauvages" might be induced to revolt against the Ottomans. The report rather

CADN 148 Notice sur les Ansanehs ou Alaouites du districi de Latakia (14/4/1920) 20 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 optimistically states that although the Alawis constituted "une race très rude et très endurante", they were "certainement éducable"10. The words 'très' were added with a pencil in the original text, as if there existed a distinction between 'wild' and 'very wild' people. Follow-up reports in 1919 and 1920 concluded that the Alawi 'race' was not only "une race très rude et très endurante", but also "une race saine. Un peu lourds et épais, les Alaouis ont le moral de leur physique". Like many intelligence and army officers, the authors were infused with France's romantic colonial discourse, which obscured and simplified reality. They considered that the Alawis expected France, "la traditionnelle libératrice des opprimés", to change their miserable sort and that "leur amour pour la France est à peu près général". However, this love for France should not be taken for granted, and the reports advise that the French should continuously flatter the 'simple and primitive' Alawis, "car ils sont orgueilleux et naïfs comme de grands enfants"". Things had not improved much a year later, when the French had granted the Alawis self-government: "Les Nosairis du Djebel sont demeurés des êtres primitifs, profondément ignorants, fermés à tout progrès, rebelles à toute idée d'organisation"12. The early French reports also observed that the Alawis could not be Muslims, as they did not live up to the requirements of the five pillars of Islam. Moreover, they argued that Muslims do not greet Alawis with al-salamu 'alaykum and never answer such salute from an Alawi, while they do not eat the meat of animals killed by Alawis, and do not allow their women to marry Alawis11. The position of the Alawi woman, the French considered, was even worse than that of a Muslim woman. She had to stay indoors and was not allowed to leave it or even talk to anyone. The reports relate this to the emphasis the Alawis put on the purity of their 'race'. For this reason, an Alawi man was allowed to marry a non-Alawi woman, but an Alawi woman was not allowed to marry a non-Alawi man. To substantiate this thesis further, the reports relied on the many prejudices prevalent among the Alawis' neighbours. "Le dévergondage des femmes est sévèrement puni et peut entraîner la peine de mort qui est prononcée par le père, le frère ou le mari". Alawi women were not considered to have souls and could not be initiated into the Alawi religion. According to one report, one group of Alawis did accept women as true believers, but on the condition that they had sex with an Alawi man with the reputation of a 'true believer"4.1 have not been able to find ethnographic descriptions of the Alawi community other than these early series of reports. It must be noted, however, that later intelligence reports, compiled by officers in the field, have a far more realistic character and are far less prejudiced.

CADN 568: Extraits des renseignements généraux de l'Etat-major de la Division Navale de Syrie (1/6/1917). " CADN 568: Ansane ou Alaoui (15/3/1919). CADN 148: Notice sur les Ansanehs (14/4/1920). CADN 568 Annexe au bulletin de renseignements (26/6/1921) 13 CADN 568 Note sur les Arabes (fellahs) de Cilicie (15/10/1920). 14 CADN 148 Notice sur les Ansanehs (14/4/1920). CADN 568 Ansane ou Alaoui (15/3/1919). CADN 2336: Les Noussainés (16/10/1919) Introduction 21

British archival sources In addition to French information, British archival sources have been used from the Foreign Office, Colonial Office, and War Office, which are kept in the Public Record Office in London. These sources focus primarily on the period British presence in the Levant, from 1941 to 1946. From the archives, it has become clear that the British authorities did not take an active interest in Alawi affairs other than to counter French influence. Intelligence concerning Alawi political life itself is scarce and, as will be shown below, coloured. After the invasion of Syria and Lebanon in 1941, the British sent a mission to the Levant to serve as a liaison between the Free French movement and the British offices that dealt with the Middle East, such as the Foreign Office, the Minister of State's Office in Cairo, and the British Middle Eastern military command. The leader of this mission was Sir Edward Spears, a noted Francophile, and the 'father' and protector of Charles de Gaulle's Free French movement. However, during the 1941 Anglo-Free French invasion of Syria and Lebanon, relations between Spears and De Gaulle deteriorated; they became bitter enemies. Spears used all the means at his disposal, including his personal friendship with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, to combat the Free French movement, in disregard of Foreign Office instructions. The Levant would become the battlefield for this struggle. Indicative of the bitterness of the conflict is a remark by a British official, who noted that "A member of [Spears'] staff, writing home recently, said that he had never known what was meant by animals eating their young until he had seen Sir E. Spears devouring the Free French movement" (quoted in Roshwald 1986: 904). According to stated British policy, the British presence in the Levant was not to encroach on French prerogatives in the region. The British were responsible for military security, and could override Free French decisions only on the ground of military security questions. The military command and the Spears Mission had strict instructions not to meddle in politics. The reality on the ground, however, was altogether different. Spears succeeded in convincing his superiors that it was necessary to employ political and economic experts in the region, so-called 'political officers', to report on political and military issues, and who would be responsible to him and not the British military command. In the Alawi region, Spears used his political officers to work against the French. Already in 1942, relations between the French and the British were extremely disturbed in the Alawi region. In September 1942, the political officer in Latakia, Captain Evans-Pritchard, even had to appear before a military court. The court, however, took a light view on the affair and acquitted him, probably because he had acted under Spears' direct orders. The British military commander, General Holmes, was less charmed of Evans-Pritchard and Spears' actions, and stated that "Captain Evans-Pritchard [...] is on bad terms with the local French officials, his reports are coloured and his usefulness impaired" (quoted in Yaffe & Rabinovich 1990: 178). As I will demonstrate, in several cases concerning the Alawi region, Spears coloured his reports to the Foreign Office and the military command to convince them of the necessity, on the grounds of military security, of a showdown with the Free French. 22 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946

Syrian newspapers In his book The Arab press, Rugh (1987: xxvi) takes as a basic assumption for his analysis of the functioning of the press in the Arab world that "news media institutions do not exist independently of their environments but rather take on the 'form and coloration of the social and political structures' within which they operate. There is an intimate, organic relationship between the media institutions and society in the way those institutions are organized and controlled". Rugh (1987: 6-8) refers to the colonial period during which many newspapers were founded, which were controlled by either the colonial administration or, more commonly, by the opposition to that colonial administration. Economic conditions caused many newspapers to seek financial support from government and wealthy individuals, who had come to recognise the importance of the press and were willing to place it under their patronage. Divisions within the political leadership were reflected by a growing variety of newspapers, which resulted, according to Rugh (1987: 10), in "a proliferation of newspapers in most Arab countries beyond the number warranted by literacy rates". In addition, newspapers tended to be concentrated in urban regions, which were the centres of culture and politics, while low levels of literacy and the lack of proper distribution systems prevented dissemination in the rural areas (Rugh 1987: 11). These factors contributed to a cultural and political bias in the content of the newspapers. As Rugh (1987: 17-18) argues, "Political bias is usually a conscious act in which the editor has deliberately compromised the truth as he saw it because of the consequences of presenting the truth. Cultural bias, by contrast, is usually unconscious conformity with accepted norms". In other words, the newspapers both deliberately and unconsciously tended to reinforce the dominant political, cultural, and social currents. Rugh's general remarks on the Arab press certainly apply to the Syrian case, of which Ayalon (1995: 83) provides a succinct description: "The typical Syrian newspaper during the French mandate was poor in appearance, stridently vocal, and short-lived, sometimes suppressed by the French or the local government but more often simply unable to hold its own financially". According to Gelvin (1998: 237-239), newspapers constituted an easy and inexpensive means to spread information and mobilise the population. To those who could not read or write the newspapers were read aloud. On the downside, the newspapers could be easily influenced by threats of censorship or by simply bribing them. During emir Faysal's reign, for example, which lasted from October 1918 to July 1920, 42 newspapers and 13 periodicals were started, the majority of which appeared in Damascus (23 newspapers and 11 periodicals). Most papers sold between 500 and 1,500 copies each. From July 1920 to the end of World War II, 128 newspapers and 129 periodicals appeared in Syria, more than half of them in Damascus (71 newspapers and 80 periodicals). The circulation of the popular Syrian daily newspapers averaged 4,000 copies in the mid-1930s; other newspapers and periodicals sold far less. Ayalon (1995: 83-84) also provides an example of the life span of newspapers: of the approximately 80 newspapers started between 1920 and 1931, only six or seven still existed in 1932. Introduction 23

Most newspapers suffered from the strict censorship by the French mandatory authorities, and, after 1936, by the successive Syrian governments. According to Ayalon (1995: 87), the Bloc newspaper al-Qabas was suspended for more than a third of the mandate period; on average, he estimated, a Syrian newspaper was closed for ten to twenty percent of the time. These figures do not include the removal of particular articles the censors considered unfit for publication. I have selected three newspapers, which more or less reflect the principal currents of Syrian political life. In 1920, Muhammad Kurd 'Ali founded the Damascus daily newspaper al- Muqtabas. In 1928, the newspaper, renamed al-Qabas, became affiliated with the dominant National Bloc under the leadership of Najib al-Rayyis. The newspaper al-Ayyam was founded in 1930 by prominent Bloc members such as Hashim al-Atasi, Lutfi al-Haffar, Sa'dallah al-Jabiri, Ibrahim al-Hananu, 'Arif al-Nakadi, and Fakhri al-Barudi. Although the newspaper in 1931 was sold to a Bloc sympathiser, Nasuh Babil, during the 1930s al-Ayyam took an increasingly critical stance on the National Bloc. From the late 1930s onwards, it even became affiliated to the rising Shahbandarist opposition to the National Bloc. The newspaper AlifBa ', founded in Damascus in 1920 by the Palestinian Christian Yusuf al-'Isa, appears to have been politically independent, although it clearly had PanArab nationalist tendencies, which made it the most respected and long-lasting Syrian newspaper of the French mandate period, and even thereafter15. The coverage of Alawi affairs in these three newspapers was sporadic at best, and overtly hostile to the dominant autonomist elements. In part, the hostility to the autonomist elements stemmed from the fact that reporters in the Alawi region were drawn from the predominantly unionist Sunni community, or educated and unionist Alawis and Ismailis, such as Yusuf Taqla, Rashad Ruwayha, and Ahmad al-Fil. Distance also contributed to the poor coverage of Alawi affairs. News from the Alawi region reached the editors usually only after a few days. Correspondents, especially up to the mid-1930s, had to put their articles in the mail, which took several days to reach Damascus. After that, correspondents started sending their articles by cable or reading them out over the telephone to the editor, although the mail remained the primary instrument of communication. Up to the negotiations for the Franco-Syrian treaty of 1936, coverage of Alawi affairs focused on non-political issues such as the awqaf, troubles within the Greek-Orthodox community, and all sorts of trivialities. The elections for the Representative Council in 1930 and the sectarian incidents of 1933 received some attention, but coverage was clearly biased and partisan. The newspapers constantly downplayed the importance of the autonomist elements,

Ayalon (1995: 150-151) gives estimations of the circulation of newspapers in Syria. Period 1919-1920, 500 to 1,000 copies, average per daily newspaper. Period 1920-1935, 1,000 to 3,500 copies, average for leading daily newspapers. Period 1920-1945, 500 to 800 copies, average for non-dailies Penod 1930, 30,000 copies, total circulation. Period 1935-1936, 4,000 copies, average for leading daily newspapers, 1,000 to 2,000 for second-rank daily newspapers Period 1939-1945, 1,000 to 2,500 copies, average for daily newspapers He also provides some figures on the newspapers selected for this study (1995: 148-149). Al-Ayyam and al-Qabas on average sold some 6,000 to 8,000 copies per day in the penod 1936 to 1938. AlifBa' sold4,000 copies in 1941, while in 1944 all three newspapers sold some 2,200 to 2,300 copies per day 24 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 and seldom named the principal autonomist leaders by name. Articles did not fail to highlight the contrast between what they considered the backward Alawi separatist feudal leadership and the progressive and enlightened nationalists. All this suddenly changed in the euphoria of the signing of the Franco-Syrian treaty in 1936 and the first months of 1937, when hundreds of articles heralded the triumph of Syrian unity. Letters from all over the Alawi region arrived with descriptions of unionist manifestations'6 and verbatim accounts of patriotic speeches made by important and, more often, unimportant people, which may be an indication for popular nationalism in the coastal region. Despite the massive amount of published articles, the coverage of Alawi affairs remained extremely superficial. For example, the actions of unionists from Latakia during the 1937 elections, which squarely contradicted government policy, did not receive any attention. When the autonomist current regained the upper hand in late 1937, the three newspapers returned to their old habit of ignoring Alawi affairs and downplaying their importance. In late 1938, with the Alawi region on the brink of civil war, the average Syrian newspaper gave the impression that all was quiet in the Province of Latakia. During World War II, with Syria under military occupation, the subsequent censorship and the poor economic conditions prevented the Syrian press from providing serious coverage of Syrian politics, let alone Alawi affairs. The Alawi community itself did not produce any newspapers during the French mandate period, with the exception of some extremely short-lived ones, for example al-Sawt al- 'Alawi. The Greek-Orthodox and Sunni communities in the Alawi region, on the other hand, did publish some newspapers, but only on a very irregular basis. It follows that the Alawi autonomists did not have a medium to express their views, to convey information to their supporters, or to mount an effective opposition to the unionists, other than by mouth-to-mouth communication on a local scale. This placed them at a disadvantage to the unionists, who could express their opinions in the press and on a national scale, or the Christians who had access to the Lebanese newspapers. Consequently, a public debate between autonomists and unionists on the future of the Alawi region never emerged, while the Syrian population at large could not but form a biased opinion on Alawi affairs. To borrow a phrase from Benedict Anderson, the Sunni nationalists and unionists could 'imagine their community', while the Alawis could not.

The Synan newspapers call manifestations organised by autonomists (separatists in their terms) ijlima'al (meetings), while unionist manifestations are called hajalat (festivities) 1

From Ottoman province to Syrian state

This chapter will provide the historical context for the formation and political development of the Alawi community the transition of the Ottoman province of Syria into the Syrian state Section 1 1 provides a short outline of nineteenth-century Ottoman history with a focus on the centralising reforms, which have become known as the tcmzimat The centralising reforms have greatly influenced political life in the Syrian province, which in that period was largely an affair of the urban notability, and they have contributed to the politicisation of Arab identity and the rise of the nationalist movements that would dominate Syrian politics during the French mandate period Despite the centralising reforms, European powers such as France were able to make deeper economic, political, and moral inroads in the Ottoman Empire After the defeat of World War I, the pre-eminent position of France in the Levant, which it had carefully developed during the nineteenth century, found its reflex in the granting of the mandate over Syria and Lebanon by the League of Nations Section 1 2 discusses the inherent paradox in the mandate system, and its reflex in French mandate policies, which Shambrook (1998 130) has characterised as 'schizophrenic' The international political conditions prevailing after World War I, especially the discourse of self-determination promoted by the American president Wilson, prevented the French from incorporating the Syrian province of the former Ottoman Empire into their colonial empire, as they had wished Instead, the League of Nations charged France with the mandate to facilitate the progressive development of two independent states - Syria and Lebanon - in the Levant, while taking into account the right to self-determination of the different ethnic and religious communities that together made up Levantine society The League of Nations charged France with a task she had no intention to fulfil, as, according to the Mandate Act, its fulfilment would end the need and legitimisation for French presence in the region To avoid the development of Syria and Lebanon into independent states, France attempted to frustrate the political integration of the population of these two countries by creating internal divisions, first, by creating separate Lebanese, Damascene and Aleppine states, second, by creating autonomous Alawi and Druze territories Officially, France legitimised these divisions by pointing to the Mandate Act, which stated that it should take into account the right to self-determination of the different ethnic and 26 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 religious communities. The separate status of Palestine, granted by the League of Nations, too, albeit unintended, contributed to French efforts to frustrate the nationalist movements. An additional motive for the French to attempt the elimination of Arab nationalism, or at least hinder its development, was the fear that it would spread to North Africa, the heart of the French overseas empire. Section 1.3 discusses the French mandate period from the perspective of its two major actors, the French and the different nationalist movements. In the initial stages of the French mandate period, in a period that was characterised by rural mobilisations, France attempted to break the back of the Syrian nationalists. French thinking restricted the influence of nationalism to the urban notables, but failed to gauge the appeal of nationalism among the urban masses. In 1925, the two currents of rural mobilisation and urban nationalism converged in the so-called Great Revolt, which took the French two years to suppress. After the revolt, the nationalists acknowledged that they could not win Syrian unity by force, while the French acknowledged that they could not break nationalist influence by force. This mutual understanding led to the formulation of a policy of 'honourable cooperation', through which the parties involved sought to accommodate both French strategic needs and nationalist wishes for a unified state. The period of 'honourable cooperation' culminated in the Franco-Syrian treaty of September 1936, when a nationalist government assumed authority over Syria, including the autonomous Alawi region that became the Province of Latakia. In 1939, with World War II looming, France took over control in all of Syria, which after the defeat of metropolitan France in June 1940 came under the administration of Vichy France. The Anglo-Free French invasion in June 1941 finally sealed the fate of the French presence in the Levant. The Syrian nationalists claimed the independence of the Syrian state, while the British on several occasions made it clear that they would not allow the French to use force to prevent it. In 1946, the last British and French forces evacuated the independent Syrian Arab Republic.

1.1 Defensive modernisation of the Ottoman Empire

In the nineteenth century, Ottoman reformers devised the project of defensive modernisation to protect the Ottoman Empire against growing European influence and loss of territory. The Ottoman reforms, known as the tanzimat, will be shortly discussed in section 1.1.1. The Ottoman decline and subsequent reforms opened possibilities for local and regional leaderships to develop. Section 1.1.2 will discuss the rise of a specific type of provincial leadership in the Syrian province of the Ottoman Empire, and explain why within this leadership the ideology of Arabism developed. Despite the attempts at modernisation and centralisation, the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire allowed the European powers to create spheres of influence. Section 1.1.3 discusses the interests in the Levant that the French developed in the late Ottoman period; interests that allowed France to state its claim on the Levant in the case of an Ottoman collapse, which would finally materialise in 1918. From Ottoman province to Syrian state 27

1.1.1 The Ottoman Empire during the period of reforms' In the nineteenth century, a combination of military weakness and economic pressure led the Ottomans to realise that military, economic, social, and political reforms were necessary to save the Empire from collapse. These concerns culminated in a period of reforms, known as the Tanzimat period (1839-1876), which consisted of the centralisation of power and the modernisation of the military, the system of government, and the economy. Rationalisation, specialisation, and bureaucratisation along European lines constituted the leading principles in these reforms aimed at the defensive modernisation of the empire. Through the introduction of military conscription and the establishment of European-style military schools, the reformers hoped to restore Ottoman military power and to defend the empire against new forces of disintegration. The reforms stipulated that all Ottoman subjects, irrespective of religion, enjoyed equality before the law to prevent the development of nationalism and separatism, especially among the minorities. Until the reform period, the population that fell within the Ottoman sphere of influence had been divided primarily along religious lines. The great divide was between those whom the Ottomans considered Muslims (the Sunnis) and those whom the Ottomans considered non-Muslims, such the Christian and Jewish communities, but also heterodox- Islamic communities like the Alawis and the Druze. In contrast to the heterodox-Islamic communities, the Christians and Jews were incorporated into the Ottoman Empire through their status of dhimmis, of 'protected people'. With the reforms, the Ottomans had hoped that the granting of equal rights to the Christian and Jewish communities would prevent the further development of separatist and nationalist movements among these communities. The reformers' hopes soon evaporated. Nationalist and separatist movements did develop, and the European powers used regional revolts as pretexts to intervene diplomatically and sometimes even militarily in internal Ottoman affairs, as happened in regions such as Lebanon, Greece, and Serbia. In this way, Russia was able to claim the protection over the Orthodox and Armenian Christians, the British and Americans the protection over the Protestants and Druze, and France and the Habsburg Empire over the Catholics and the Maronites. Money constituted the Achilles heel for the reforms: the growing bureaucracy and the purchase of modem weaponry for the army required money the Ottoman government did not have. To circumvent this problem, the Ottoman Empire negotiated loans with the European powers, which were happy to oblige. The European powers, aware of the Ottomans' need for money, negotiated high interest rates. Soon the Ottoman Empire was unable to pay the interests on those loans, which allowed the European powers to demand new privileges on top of the already existing ones2, or grant new loans with which to pay off the old ones. To repay its debts,

Some interesting studies (many more exist) on the period of Ottoman reforms are Faruqhi, McGowan, Quataert & Pamuk (1997), Fmdley (1980), Qualaert (2000), Zürcher (1993) From the early sixteenth century onwards, the Ottomans had granted so-called Capitulations (commercial privileges such as low tariff rales and tax exemption) to subjects of friendly European powers to encourage 28 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 the Ottoman Empire also increased the tax burden, which in combination with other grievances led to revolt, for example among the peasants of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria. These revolts then provided a pretext for the European powers to intervene and demand new concessions. In the period 1871-1878, the Ottoman Empire's loss of territory was enormous: Rumania, Bulgaria, the Balkan, Thessaly (in the north of present-day Greece), Cyprus, and even parts of Anatolia (Zürcher 1995: 75-90). After this enormous loss of territory, manpower (estimated at a third of its territory and one fifth of its population), and consequently taxes, the Ottoman Empire could no longer pay its debts. In 1881, the European creditors forced upon the Ottoman Empire the establishment of the Caisse de la Dette publique ottomane. The Ottoman Public Debt was a European run financial administration that took direct control over parts of the Ottoman treasury, such as the control over the taxes of some Ottoman provinces, the monopolies on the salt and tobacco trade, and taxes related to the production and trade of silk, alcoholic beverages, and fishery. Gradually, the Ottoman Empire developed into the 'sick man of Europe', whose continued existence depended on the European unwillingness to let it collapse, the consequence of which would be a disturbance of the European balance of power. Resentment under the population culminated in a Muslim reaction against the reforms, and sometimes focused on the Christian communities, which, under the protection of the European powers, had visibly gained in wealth and power. This resentment was one of the factors that contributed to the massacre of some five thousand Christians by a Muslim mob in Damascus, in 1860. The resentment also reached sultan Abdülhamit (1876-1908) in Istanbul, who, in his capacity as caliph, began emphasising the Islamic character of the Ottoman Empire. He rejected the ideas of liberalism, nationalism, and constitutionalism that were associated with the reforms, and in vain attempted to combat them. During his long reign as sultan, Abdülhamit did not succeed in turning the tide. In 1908, amid social unrest and under threat of a war with Russia, the Young Turks, a reformist group of military officers and bureaucrats, seized power. Their association with Germany and the Habsburg Empire during World War I, after 1918 known as the 'wrong side', signalled the end of the Ottoman Empire.

commercial relations. Under the conditions of the Capitulations, these European subjects fell within the legal jurisdiction of their consuls, and outside of Ottoman law. From the eighteenth century onwards, the European powers no longer considered the Capitulations as granted privileges but as rights that deserved protection. Moreover, the European powers widened the scope of the Capitulations as they claimed the protection of local Christians, who, as nominal subjects of European states, came to enjoy the commercial privileges and protection as stipulated in the Capitulations From Ottoman province to Syrian state 29

1.1.2 The Syrian provincial bureaucracy3 Khoury (1983), in his book Urban notables and Arab nationalism: The politics of Damascus, 1860-1920, analyses the influence of the Ottoman reforms and capitalist penetration in the city of Damascus, the most prominent administrative centre of the region then known as Bilad al- Sham. Khoury posits that, in the second half of the nineteenth century, the combined process of centralising reforms and agrarian commercialisation produced a class of landowning bureaucrats and a certain kind of politics, the 'politics of notables'. Moreover, Khoury (1983: 1) argues, Arabism as a political movement developed within this class of landowning bureaucrats as the result of a struggle for power between two rival factions. This 'politics of notables', in combination with the idea of Arabism, was to dominate politics during the French mandate period, and even well into Syrian independence. During the early nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire's incorporation into the world market resulted in agrarian commercialisation, which allowed three distinct groups of urban notables - the religious leadership, military leaders, and merchants - to obtain private property on a large scale. Their control over land and trade allowed them to acquire large networks of patronage and consequently political power. Simultaneously, the reformist Ottoman authorities sought to increase their control over the provinces. They dispatched governors from Istanbul to take direct control over provincial affairs, but, as Khoury contends, most of them lacked any knowledge of local affairs and did not speak Arabic, while insufficient military backing prevented them from imposing direct Ottoman rule. To assist them, the governors looked for local notables with independent influence over the population: the religious leadership, the military leaders, and the merchants with their patronage networks. These groups used their influence in local society to gain influence with the Ottoman authorities on the provincial level and even in the imperial capital. Simultaneously they used their increased influence with the Ottoman authorities to extend their control over the local population and acquire more land and private property. The convergence of interests and intermarriage led to the increased interrelationship between the different sectors of the urban notability, and subsequently led to the formation of the landowning bureaucratic class, which, through its intermediary position between Ottoman state and patronage networks, developed the 'politics of notables'. The 'politics of notables' was a delicate balancing act. If a local notable identified too closely with the interests of the Ottoman authorities, he risked estranging his local patronage network, which in tum impaired his usefulness for the Ottoman authorities. The notables revealed themselves as the defenders of the status quo, of the existing social order from which they derived their influence. Only rarely did they use their local influence to oppose the central government. One of these occasions arose after 1908, when the Young Turk movement gained power in Istanbul. The Young Turks transformed the outlook of the Ottoman Empire under Abdülhamit, of an Islamic state of Arabs and Turks, into a secular empire dominated by Turks.

3 This seclion is largely based on Khoury (1983) 30 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946

This change of policy caused a split within the urban notability in the Syrian province. Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, the landowning bureaucratic class identified itself with the ideology of Ottomanism, and many landowners and bureaucrats went to Istanbul or sent their children there for education. Others did not go to Istanbul, nor did they send their children to school there. The divide came to the fore after the 1908 revolution of the Young Turks, who promoted secularism and constitutionalism; two concepts, the notables considered, that challenged the social and political status quo under which they had prospered. The Young Turk's centralising policy in the Syrian province amounted to the replacement of locals in key positions by Turks, and the imposition of the Turkish language in administrative institutions, the courts, and in schools. Especially hard hit were those notables who had not frequented the Ottoman capital and Ottoman schools, and who now lost influence and position. These notables embraced the idea of Arabism as a means of opposition to Istanbul in an effort to restore their former positions. The transition from Ottoman to French rule did not change the mechanism of the 'politics of notables'. The French, however, were not legitimate rulers in their eyes and in the eyes of the population, as they were not Muslims. The urban notables could not operate on behalf of an illegitimate authority, but to completely reject the French administration would have meant the collapse of the political system. To prevent this, they embraced Arab nationalism, which gave them legitimacy in the eyes of the population, while at the same time it showed the French that they were the only force that could check the 'nationalist ardour' of the population. In this way, the urban notables were able to dominate Syrian politics during the mandate period.

1.1.3 French interests in the Levant

During the nineteenth century, the European rivalry over colonial expansion and spheres of influence reached the Levant. Economic contacts between Europe and the Levant increased, while the Ottoman Empire, 'the sick man of Europe', slowly disintegrated. Increased European involvement and the weakening of the Ottoman state enabled many local political movements to voice their grievances and formulate ideas for reforms. As a result, the Levant played an important role in the development of nationalism in the Middle East. France's involvement in the region has to be placed in this context. In his analysis of French interests in the Levant before World War I, Khoury (1987: 27- 32) discerns three interlocking spheres of influence, which he calls the three pillars of moral, political, and economic influence, which represented France's underlying strategic needs. France's moral influence in the Levant gained strength after 1860, following the violence between Maronites and Druze in Mount Lebanon and the anti-Christian violence in Damascus. France claimed the position of patron of the Christians ('la protectrice des chrétiens en Orient'), a position that became manifest through missionary and educational activities, and on occasions through direct political and even military intervention such as in the case of the Maronites of From Ottoman province to Syrian state 31

Mount Lebanon in 1860. Although they ofFicially pledged to preserve the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, from the late nineteenth century onwards the French supported nationalist and reformist movements in an effort to widen the base of their political influence. Many of the movements consisted of Muslims as well as Christians. Generally, they held secular ideals and argued for decentralization. Additional demands included the institution of Arabic as the official language in the Ottoman Empire's Arab provinces, the fulfilment of military service in Arab territory, and more influence for Arabs in Istanbul (see also Shorrock 1976 & Prätor 1993). From the 1870s onwards, the French considerably expanded their economic interests in the Ottoman Empire and the Levant. France was the major creditor of the Ottoman Public Debt and a major investor: France held almost two-thirds of the Ottoman Public Debt, and her investments in Syria were double those of Germany, the second largest investor. French companies built and owned all the railway lines in Syria and Lebanon, with the exception of the Hijaz railway (Shorrock 1976). In addition, the French held a strong position in the cotton and silk industry for which the Levant and Cilicia were major producers of raw materials, while the Régie du Tabac held the monopoly over the tobacco trade. The Latakia region, in the north of the Alawi Mountain, was responsible for two-thirds of the Levantine tobacco production. The Régie de Tabac, a French-owned company established in 1883, completely replaced the Ottoman government in determining the mode of tobacco production in the Empire and collecting taxes on the crop and customs duties on all imports and exports of tobacco products by 1904. It appeared at a time when tobacco growing in Syria was undergoing a major revival, which led the Régie to construct tobacco-processing factories in Damascus and Aleppo (Khoury 1987:31-32,43). The self-interest of France's moral, political, and economic policies in the Levant manifested itself in the events of 1913-1914. In order to increase her moral and political influence among the local population, France allowed a congress of Arab nationalist and reformist movements to take place in Paris in 1913. The congress led to the drafting of a list of demands vis-à-vis the Ottoman government. When the Ottoman Empire in late 1913 asked France to grant a new loan, Arab nationalists and reformists expected the French government to state their list of demands as a condition for the loan. In 1914, however, imperialist considerations prevailed, and the French government granted the loan in exchange for exclusive railroad concessions and formal guarantees for France's religious protectorate in the Levant. No mention was made of the Arab nationalists' or the reformists' demands. The next phase of French involvement in the region was inaugurated in 1916, when France formally established its claim in the Levant through the secret Sykes-Picot agreement. The agreement between England, France and Russia stipulated that, once the war was over and won, the Syrian coastal area together with the regions of Cilicia and Mosul, would be placed under direct French administration, while an Arab government, under the guidance of France, would be allowed to govern the Syrian interior. England claimed the control over Mesopotamia; Palestine would be placed under international supervision. Russia also signed the agreement, but withdrew after the Russian revolution. The parti colonial, a small group of officials, politicians, 32 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 businessmen, scholars, and missionaries, staked the claim for imperial expansion in the Levant. It could attain such a result largely because of the disinterest of French public opinion. By couching its demands in a nationalist idiom and making appeals to national prestige4, the parti colonial was able to commit the French government to a renewed imperial expansion after World War I5. In the end, strategic considerations played a predominant role for the French government. The Mediterranean held a central place in French strategic thinking. The occupation of a foothold in the Levant would round off France's Mediterranean policy and ensure the protection of her all-important North African possessions. Moreover, French policymakers hoped that the occupation of Damascus, one of the principal cities of Islam and a starting point of the hajj, would establish France as a Muslim power. This would strengthen the French position vis-à-vis rising Pan-Islamic tendencies, which French policymakers perceived as a direct threat to North Africa. In addition, they hoped that the occupation of the Levant would enable them to crush anti-European nationalism in its heartland, before it could spread to North Africa or damage French investments in the Levant itself. Finally, the need to form a counterweight to British dominance in the Middle East provided a further incentive for the French occupation of the Levant. The French accused Britain of aspiring to achieve hegemony over the Middle East and to take from France what was rightfully hers. During the war, the British war effort in the Middle East dwarfed the French contribution. The Détachement français de Palestine-Syrie, five thousand strong in comparison to hundreds of thousands of British troops, played no role of significance in the defeat of the Ottoman Empire and only had a symbolical fiinction6. The British argument, namely that a French sphere of influence, as stipulated in the Sykes-Picot agreement, was no longer in accordance with reality, led to near Anglophobia among French policymakers. Indicative is the view of some policymakers that Arab nationalism was nothing more than a British plot to drive the French out of the Middle

Some of the protagonists were driven by the idea of a mimon civilualnce, others argued that the imperial question was a matter of defence against rival powers In 1926, Robert de Caix, the former Secretary General of the High Commission (1919-1924) and a leading exponent of the purti colonial, wrote "Les partisans les plus determines de notre établissement en Syrie a la fin de la guerre n'auraient pas, en principe, souhaite pour la France des possessions territoriales dans le Levant Ils trouvaient seulement intolérable que l'effet d'une victoire que nous avons payée plus cher qu'aucun de nos alliés fui, en aboutissant a un nouveau démembrement de l'Empire ottoman, de nous évincer d'une partie du monde ou une action généreuse, menée depuis des siècles nous avait fait une situation prééminente [ .] La suprématie de notre culture contribuait à nous donner celle situation eminente que nous avions dans les grandes entreprises économiques du Levant et spécialement en Syrie [ ] Il fallut que l'initiative de la Russie qui voulait Constantinople el une partie de l'Arménie et la république [sic1] de l'Angleterre qui réclamait en compensation la Mésopotamie nous forçassent la main pour incliner a une politique de domination en Syrie" CADN 1362 Robert de Caix, L'organisation donnée à la Syrie et au Liban de 1920 à 1923 et la crise actuelle (6/10/1926) From 1924 to 1938, De Caix acted as France's representative m the Permanent Mandates Commission, a body of the League ofNalions that supervised mandatory policy

See the senes of articles published in The Hutoncal Journal by Andrew & Kanya-Forstner 1971, 1974a, 1974b, 1976 CADN 2140 La France en Syne et en Cihcie (1/1922) From Ottoman province to Syrian state 33

East7. Ultimately, strategic considerations dominated. Given the fear of renewed German aggression, both Britain and France decided not to risk their alliance in Europe over their interests in the Middle East. The French overestimated and misinterpreted the depth and reach of their influence. France's tendency to interpret social and cultural differences in the Levant in religious terms severely limited her moral and political influence. According to Khoury (1987: 28, 30), the French overlooked the ability "of the different religious communities to undertake collective political action", and failed "to gauge the depth of [their] national sentiment". Shorrock (1976: 73-74, 120) argues that the French, because of isolated instances, mistakenly assumed that a majority of Christians as well as Muslims would prefer a French protectorate to independence, once the Ottoman Empire had ceased to exist. Moreover, French influence was one-sided. The pattern of investments clearly illustrates the imbalance: investments were concentrated in the coastal areas and generally were to the benefit of the Christian communities, creating an economic division between the coast and the interior, and between a Christian and a Muslim bourgeoisie. Shorrock (1976: 164) dryly concludes that, when Syria was finally assigned as a mandate to France after the war, "the Syrians were somewhat less than enthusiastic". During World War I, Britain and France occupied large parts of the Ottoman Empire. In comparison to the British forces, French military presence in 1918 was relatively small and concentrated in Lebanon and Syria in a strip of land stretching along the Mediterranean coast from Tyre in the south into Cilicia in the north. British troops, supported by Arab forces led by emir Faysal, controlled the Syrian interior. Faysal Ibn Husayn, son of the sharif of Mecca and Medina, was the leader of the Arab revolt that started in the Hijaz in 1916, after the British government had promised the Arabs an independent state consisting of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire in the case of an Allied victory. These promises contradicted the Sykes-Picot agreement and the Balfour declaration, in which the British government promised the Jews an independent state in Palestine under British protection. When in the summer of 1918 Ottoman resistance collapsed, British forces, supported by a French unit and emir Faysal's Arab army, invaded Syria. On 1 October 1918, Damascus was occupied, and, on 31 October, the Ottomans signed the armistice of Mudrus. The victors placed the areas evacuated by the Ottomans under the authority of the Occupied Enemy Territories Administration (O.E.T.A.), headed by the British Field Marshal Allenby, and divided them into occupation zones based on the Sykes-Picot agreement. The British assigned the O.E.T.A. West, a coastal strip from Tyre in the south to Cilicia in the north (originally O.E.T.A. North), to the French, while Faysal's Arab army took possession of the four cities of Damascus, Aleppo,

Shorrock (1976) argues that French Anglophobia had its background in the prewar Franco-British competition for economic and political influence in Syria. Other French views on nationalism included the belief that Arab nationalism was nothing more than anti-Western Muslim fanaticism, or an infectious disease that had to be eradicated before it could spread to North Africa (Khoury 1987. 52-55). Shambrook (1998) counters this view and argues that the French, on the contrary, had a sound knowledge of the Syrian reality, especially in the later years of the mandate. 34 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946

Horns, and Hama, and the Syrian interior (O.E.T.A. East). The British army remained in overall command of these areas for another year, before handing over authority to the French and the Arabs in September 1919. In July 1920, with British forces out of the way, a French army commanded by General Gouraud occupied the Eastern Zone and ended Faysal's rule (see section 1.3.1). In 1922, France's pre-eminent position in the Levant found expression in the League of Nation's decision to grant France the mandate over the Levant.

1.2 French mandate policy

In 1922, the League of Nations granted the mandate over 'la Syrie et le Liban' to France, on account of France's historical influence in the region and as a reflection of the situation on the ground: France's military occupation of the region. The idea of the 'mandate' was a compromise between the United States' insistence on the right of self-determination, and Britain and France's wish for colonial expansion. France was now obliged, on behalf of the League of Nations, to educate the people under her mandate, to develop viable democratic and economic institutions, and to guide them towards independence. In practice, the French mandate over 'la Syrie et le Liban' served as a front for outright colonial expansion. France had no intention to fulfil her task as mandatory, which would lead to the end of her presence in the Levant. The contradiction between the transitory nature of the principle of the mandate and French intentions would severely obstruct the development of a viable French policy. To control her mandated territories, France adopted a policy that had served it well in Morocco. Given France's limited postwar military capabilities and economic resources, and the idea of the mandate, the 'Moroccan formula' seemed perfect for the Levant. Based on the idea of association, of native self- government under French protection, the 'Moroccan formula' depended on three interlocking strategies: exploitation of differences between minorities through territorial partition; intensification of tensions between the city and the countryside; and dividing the political elite (see Burke 1973 & Khoury 1987: 55-70).

1.2.1 Territorial partition After granting the Maronites their own State of Greater Lebanon consisting of the Lebanon Mountain proper and four surrounding Muslim districts, the French started out by dividing the region they called 'la Syrie' into a number of autonomous states and regions, arguing that its political structure should reflect its religious and ethnical diversity, as it was stated in the Mandate Act. Minority groups like the Alawis and the Druze should govern themselves, as autonomous regions under the protection of France. Given their political underdevelopment, the French argued, it would be the best way to assure their political evolution. Territorial partition was not a work of division, but, as High Commissioner Ponsot argued before the Permanent From Ottoman province to Syrian state 35

Mandates Commission of the League of Nations in 1932, 'a constructive work of preparation' to facilitate the development of a viable democratic Syrian state (Shambrook 1998: 104). The French further divided 'la Syrie' between the States of Damascus and Aleppo, which would do justice to Aleppo's traditional orientation on Turkey and Damascus' orientation on the Arabs. Effectively, the Mandate Act provided the French with a legitimate instrument to postpone the possibility of a unified and independent Syrian state indefinitely. Although the French justified the territorial partition of 'la Syrie' by referring to religious and ethnic pluralism, in reality, partition was a strategy designed to divide and rule, to control the population at minimum cost. In this manner, the French hoped to contain the ascendant nationalist movements in their major centres, the cities, and to prevent the spread of nationalism to the rural areas and the minorities. They also hoped that territorial partition would split nationalist ranks and cause an internal struggle. During the mandate period, 'la Syrie' underwent several contradictory phases of territorial partition, an indication that 'doing justice to the wishes of Syria's heterogeneous population' was only of secondary importance. In 1920, the French divided 'la Syrie' into six regions: the States of Greater Lebanon, Aleppo and Damascus, and the autonomous regions of the Alawis and the Druze (part of the State of Damascus). In addition, the province of Alexandretta that held a considerable Turkish minority became an autonomous region within the State of Aleppo. The region disputed between France and the Turkish nationalist movement received the status of'les confins militaires', and in 1921 was handed over to the Turks. In 1922, the French incorporated Aleppo, Damascus (including the Druze region), and the Alawi region into the Syrian Federation. In 1924, however, the French reconsidered their policy. They granted autonomy to the Alawi region and detached the autonomous Druze region from Damascus; Aleppo and Damascus merged into a unitary state called Syria. In 1936, after the conclusion of a treaty between France and the Syrian nationalists, the autonomous Alawi and Druze regions merged with the Syrian state. After the outbreak of World War II in 1939, the French again granted the Alawi and Druze regions a large measure of autonomy, only to rescind this policy again in 1942. Throughout the mandate period, France's task of mandatory remained clearly subordinate to her strategic considerations. In order to soften the British position on the French presence in the Levant, France dropped her claim to the oil-rich region of Mosul and parts of Palestine, the economic hinterlands of Aleppo and Damascus respectively, in favour of Britain. In 1920, because of strategic and moral considerations, France created the State of Greater Lebanon out of the Lebanon Mountain proper, dominated by the Maronites, and four surrounding Muslim districts. In 1921, France, on the brink of achieving a victory over the Turkish nationalist forces that disputed French control over Cilicia, ceded the region, of major importance for the cotton industry and part of Aleppo's economic hinterland, to the Turks. France considered a friendly Turkey more important. In 1939, the French ceded the province of Alexandretta, with its important port facilities and oil-pipeline to Mosul, to Turkey: the price Syria had to pay for France's desire of Turkish neutrality during the war. Many nationalists felt 36 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 that their aspirations were crossed out against French needs and considered the transfer of these regions as a bitter humiliation (J. Mardam Bey 1994: xi-xii).

1.2.2 City against countryside During much of the mandate period, nationalism in Syria remained restricted to the urban notables. This was partly due to the nature and organisation of nationalism itself, but also to the French tactic that succeeded in pitting city against countryside. Since the Alawi and Druze regions were predominantly rural in nature and the large cities of Aleppo and Damascus dominated their respective states, territorial partition reinforced this tactic. Within the Alawi region, the division between city and countryside coincided with religious divisions. According to Khoury (1987: 7) and Shambrook (1998: 9-10), one of the major tenets of urban politics was that the countryside should be excluded from any political struggle. The peasants' low level of political consciousness made it difficult to organise them and, above all, agitation in the countryside could only harm agrarian production, the basis of urban wealth and power. The French were well aware of this delicate relationship and sought to exploit it. By improving the conditions of the peasantry and breaking the relations of dependency with their landlords, the French hoped to weaken the foundations of urban power and wealth. The French tactic to play off city against countryside focused on land reforms. Sharecropping was the most common form of tenancy in Syria. According to this system, the tenant had no definite lease on the property, but shared in the harvest, of which usually more than half went to the landlord. Another common form of tenancy obstructing rural development was the musha', according to which a village held the collective tenure over a plot of land. Since the land was redistributed periodically among individual villagers, the incentive to invest and develop the land was low. Moreover, the last decades of Ottoman rule had left the land registry in disarray, a situation that was advantageous for those holding power, the urban landlords. It was the task of the Régie du Cadastre, through cadastral surveys, to bring uniformity into the land registry and to break the unproductive musha' system. The land reforms, in turn, would enable the French to impose a fairer taxation system, making the peasantry more dependent on them (Khoury 1987:60-62). The land reforms were not successful, and even led to the enlargement of urban estates. The limited amount of revenue available for the costly land reforms severely restricted the scale of the land surveys. An additional obstacle was the lack of trained surveyors. Moreover, the peasantry denounced the French reforms as an attempt to destroy its traditional way of life. Above all, Khoury (1987: 65) argues, in order for the land reforms to succeed, the French needed the cooperation of local intermediaries "with past administrative experience and, preferably, with their own independent influence": the urban notables. After the Great Revolt (1925-1927), the French largely abandoned this strategy, which made the landowning class certain of its political and economic ascendancy. From Ottoman province to Syrian state 37

1.2.3 Elite against elite The third major French strategy aimed at exploiting divisions within the Syrian political elite by binding cooperative elements to the French administration, and then playing them off against anti-French factions. In the predominantly nationalist urban environment, this proved to be a difficult task. Nevertheless, Khoury (1987: 67-69) argues, two groups were prepared to collaborate with the French: the Christian bourgeoisie and those notables who belonged to the former Ottoman administration. The latter publicly argued that only a strong external force, France, could provide political stability and economic prosperity. Privately, they realised that collaboration with the French was their only chance to regain high political office, since they were powerless to compete with the nationalists for influence in Syrian society. In the end, the distrust of the population against foreign rule proved too great, and many notables realised that not much could be gained by collaborating with the French. The policy to distribute political offices according to loyalty rather than competence, and the tendency of these officials to appoint clients and family members to lower administrative posts, resulted in widespread corruption and misadministration. Because the French wanted to satisfy as many collaborators and their clients as possible, the turnover of officials in top political offices was high. As the distrust of the population grew and the expansion of local government proved too costly for the French, Khoury (1987: 80) argues, it became increasingly difficult for the pro- French notables to develop a following that could compete with that of the nationalists.

1.2.4 Administrative organisation

Since Ottoman administrative institutions had completely broken down, the French could easily replace them with their own administrative systems. The French administrative system was headed by the High Commissioner, who had his headquarters in Beirut. Although he was directly responsible to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, he had a great deal of autonomy in the determination of French policy. He could issue, independently of Paris, any law he pleased by simply issuing an arrêté or decree. The High Commissioner depended on the advice of his Secretary General, whose role was similar to that of the top official of a ministry, and on the information of the intelligence services. Although the different territories under mandate had their own ministries and governmental departments, matters of interest to both Syria and Lebanon (the Intérêts communs) fell under the direct control of the High Commissioner; the Common Interests included customs, postal and telegraph services, and the control of concessionary companies. Each state or autonomous region was led by a French Délégué who worked side by side with a qa 'immaqam or native governor. The Delegates, in tum, depended on a staff of advisers and native directors for the administration of the different departments. The native directors hired their own staff of French advisers, the so-called 'indirect agents' in contrast to the 'direct 38 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 agents', like the Delegates and Assistant Delegates. In reality, the advisers were appointed and paid for by the High Commissioner. As for example Khoury (1987: 77-79) and Joarder (1977: 71-72) have argued, the system of 'indirect agents' probably was an effort to disguise the direct nature of French rule. The relationship between the French administrators and the native directors was not a relationship of equality: the Delegates held veto power over their native counterparts. Legislation officially was the domain of the Administrative Councils (later Representative Councils), but these had very little power. The combination of French and native administrators could be found on all administrative levels. Although ostensibly bound by a system of indirect rule, the French controlled all areas of administration. Any French objection to a local initiative had to be referred to a higher authority, even up to the High Commissioner. This would take so much time that it stifled any initiative. In addition, French dominance over the judicial system was as complete as it was over the administrative system. French dominance was strengthened by the military background of many French administrators in the initial years of the mandate, who preferred firm rule to advice and guidance and who were often out of touch with local sentiments (Joarder 1977: 74-87).

1.2.5 Failure of French policy

Apart from the bureaucratic nature of the French-imposed administration, described in the preceding section, several other factors contributed to the failure of French policy. French banking and monetary practices, the excessive share of the Syrian budget that went to unproductive defence expenditures, the preferential treatment of French nationals, and the repayment of the Syrian share of the Ottoman Public Debt weighed heavily on local development. The Syrian pound was linked to the unstable French franc, with disastrous consequences for the Syrian economy, especially during the period of world depression. Khoury (1987: 87-88) argues that

"In the realm of public finance, the High Commission's primary goal was to have Syria and Lebanon pay for themselves [and] the flow of public revenues was in the direction of French, not Syrian, priorities. Public expenditure on defence, public security, administration, and justice were as strikingly high [80 percent] as expenditures for economic development and social services were low".

The transitory nature of the mandate and the low priority of the Levant in French long-term strategic thinking (see section 1.1.3) in the end ensured that French investors preferred to neglect the area. Administrative alienation, due to the inappropriateness of the Moroccan formula for the Syrian case, also formed an important part of the failure of French policy in Syria. Since the system was paternalistic, Burke (1973: 178) argues, French administrators had to be highly From Ottoman province to Syrian state 39 qualified: they should be familiar with local customs, be fluent in Arabic, and respect Islamic traditions. As the mandate developed and perspectives for French rule in Syria grew sombre, many qualified officers left Syria for better career opportunities elsewhere in the French empire, only to be replaced with officials who were not qualified for the task. Syria became, in the words of Joarder (1977: 77), "the dumping ground of undesirable functionaries". Khoury (1987: 74- 76), moreover, argues that personal jealousies between French officials and the high turnover of High Commissioners and administrative personnel strengthened the anti-French sentiment among the Syrian population. Shambrook (1998: 131) argues this is only true to a certain extent. The high turnover of mandate officials contrasted sharply with the exceedingly small turnover of personnel at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (see also Joarder 1977: 71). Administrative alienation was further enhanced by the fact that for the Syrian population the reality of French rule did not correspond with French rhetoric. Khoury (1987: 83) points to

"the contradiction between what the French claimed to be the establishment of a greatly improved judicial system and the stark reality of life in a garrison state in which the French arrested and jailed or exiled scores of their political opponents, using specially constituted military tribunals headed by Frenchmen".

Burke (1973) argues that the French regarded Syria mistakenly as a second Morocco, since Syria was socially and politically much more advanced. According to Burke (1973: 178), the 'Moroccan formula' was based on "a romantic view of traditional native authority, custom and religion, and the moral superiority of the countryside over the city". The 'Moroccan formula' simply did not fit Syrian reality. In Syria, nationalism was on the rise, while a strong urban leadership dominated political life. As Stephen Roberts (1963), an observer of French colonial policy, concluded:

"There is no doubt of the French failure in Syria. They thought to make it a second Morocco; they have succeeded in making it a second Rif. In a land where everything depended on the co-operation of the natives, the natives have been alienated" (quoted in Burke 1973: 184).

1.3 Quest for Syrian unity (1918-1946)

This section discusses the French mandate period from the perspective of its two major actors, the French and the Syrian nationalists. In the initial stages of the French mandate period, in a period that was characterised by rural mobilisations and confrontation, France attempted to establish direct control in all comers of Syria and to break to back of the Syrian nationalists. French thinking restricted the influence of nationalism to the urban notables, but failed to gauge the appeal of nationalism among the urban masses. In 1925, the two currents of rural 40 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 mobilisation and urban nationalism converged in the so-called Great Revolt, which took the French two years to suppress (section 1.3.1). After the revolt, the French and the Syrian nationalists formulated the policy of 'honourable cooperation', which culminated in the Franco- Syrian treaty of September 1936, when a nationalist government assumed authority over Syria, including the autonomous Alawi region that became the Province of Latakia (section 1.3.2). In 1939, with World War 11 looming, France took over control in all of Syria, which after the defeat of metropolitan France in June 1940 came under Vichy rule. The Anglo-Free French invasion in June 1941 finally sealed the fate of the French presence in the Levant. The Syrian nationalists claimed the independence of the Syrian state, while the British made it clear that they would not allow the French to use force to prevent it. In 1946, the last British and French forces evacuated the independent Syrian Arab Republic (section 1.3.3).

1.3.1 Period of confrontation (1918-1927)'

In October 1918, Arab forces under the command of emir Faysal entered Damascus. From there, the Arab forces, together with British forces, occupied the cities of the Levantine interior, while French forces under British command occupied the Levantine littoral and Cilicia. Gelvin (1998: 169) has argued that Faysal's legitimacy as a ruler was primarily based on his leadership in the Arab revolt against the Ottomans; a claim that was not widely shared in the cities under his control. Many urban notables, who after the defeat of the Ottomans had switched their allegiance from Ottomanism to Arabism, felt excluded by the emir, who appointed his own men in the important positions; corruption and nepotism increased greatly, while his Hijazi troops frequently misbehaved. Besides the ravages of war, French control over the Levantine littoral threatened to choke the landlocked Arab state to death. Moreover, the French made no secret of their desire to occupy the interior, especially as towards the end of 1919 British forces evacuated the area, leaving it to Faysal in an isolated position to come to an agreement with the French in bilateral negotiations. The hopelessness of his position and the lack of a local powerbase pushed Faysal towards radical nationalist organisations and confrontation with the French. During a nationalist congress in March 1920, Faysal proclaimed himself king of Syria. Faysal increasingly supported armed bands that operated in the French-controlled littoral, which on some occasions were supported by regulars and irregulars from Faysal's Sharifian army. Most of the activities of these armed bands were not related to nationalist political motives (see section 2.1 on the 'isabat), but the participation of Faysal's troops allowed the nationalists to capitalise on the agitation. Throughout the first half of 1920, agitation continued in Lebanon, around Aleppo, in the tribal

This section draws heavily on Khoury (1987), particularly parts II and III. For the period of Faysal's rule, see Gelvin (1998). From Ottoman province to Syrian state 41 zones, the Alawi region, and the Alexandretta region. Rushdi Bey, the commander of the Sharifian forces in Aleppo, summarised:

"Since officially we cannot yet declare war on France, we will flood the country with armed bands that will destroy the French to the bone"9.

Although the bands did not constitute a serious military threat, attacks on communication lines with Cilicia, where the French until October 1921 were bogged down in a fight with Turkish nationalist (or Kemalist) forces, were a nuisance, since they immobilised forces that could have been put to better use elsewhere. In the end, the use of armed bands proved self-defeating as it provided France with a legitimate excuse to invade inland Syria and oust emir Faysal. In July 1920, the French routed the Sharifian forces at the battle of Maysalun. As Khoury (1983: 92) concludes,

"The Arab Kingdom in Syria had been laid to rest. Damascus - the heart of Arabism - was under the strict supervision of France, and in her service was the core of conservative urban notables who had managed to weather the chaos and upheaval of the previous two years".

After their occupation of the Syrian interior, and with most nationalist leaders in exile in Cairo and Amman, the French began with the implementation of their policy of territorial partition. Instead of co-opting the nationalist urban notables, who were willing and ready to cooperate, the French, from the outset, considered them as enemies to be confronted, and they implemented a policy aimed to limit nationalist influence. Towards the end of 1921, with much of Syria pacified. High Commissioner General Gouraud granted an amnesty to many nationalists who had fled abroad after the fall of Damascus in July 1920. Gouraud soon regretted this amnesty, as back in Damascus, one of those returned exiles, 'Abd al-Rahman Shahbandar, founded the Iron Hand Society, branches of which soon spread to other Syrian cities. On 5 April 1922, on the occasion of a visit of Charles Crane, member of an American commission that in 1919 investigated popular sentiments about the political future of the region, the Iron Hand Society staged demonstrations in Damascus. As long as Crane was in town, the Iron Hand Society could openly challenge the French. Immediately after Crane's departure, French security forces cracked down on the Iron Hand Society and arrested Shahbandar. Khoury (1987: 119- 126) considers this period of unrest, which ended within a period of three weeks, as the beginnings of urban resistance against the French. As Khoury (1987: 126) has argued, the show of force of the Iron Hand Society convinced High Commissioner Gouraud to experiment with a new form of administrative

CADN 2140: La France en Syne et en Cilicie (1/1922). 42 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 organisation to meet nationalist wishes for a unified state. On 28 June 1922, he decreed the formation of the Syrian Federation, consisting of the States of Damascus, Aleppo, and the Autonomous Alawi Territory - by decree 1470 of 12 July 1922 renamed 'State of the Alawis"0. A French-appointed Federal Council was to run the daily affairs of the Federation, which initially consisted of the drafting of general laws and running centralised services such as the Customs, Public Works, and Post & Telegraphs departments. In time, the French wanted the Federation to take over other departments. The Federal Council soon became the centre of dispute. To the indignation of the nationalists of Damascus and Aleppo, the French only assigned 'Francophile' deputies to the Council, and assigned to the relatively small and backward State of the Alawis an equal number of deputies as the States of Damascus and Aleppo. In addition, many non-nationalist Aleppine notables, with their traditional orientation on Turkey, preferred the State of Aleppo to remain autonomous. The decision of the High Commissioner to establish the Federal Council and the accompanying administrative services on a permanent basis in Damascus strengthened the fear in Aleppo that Damascus would dominate the political scene. In the meantime, the dissatisfaction about the pace of fédéralisation among the Sunni community in the Alawi region and the States of Aleppo and Damascus had grown. According to a French document, called "Historique du Gouvernement de Latakia", disappointed Sunnis from Latakia urged the newly elected nationalist deputies from the States of Aleppo and Damascus to prepare a motion on Syrian unity, in order to put the French authorities before a fait accompli and to outmanoeuvre the Alawis". In a special session of the Federal Council on 15 January 1924, the nationalists passed the motion by majority vote. The Alawis vehemently protested, arguing that the Federal Council could only make such important decisions with unanimous consent12, and withdrew from the Council, a move the nationalists considered as a stab in the back'3. The vote for Syrian unity and the rejection of French issued money for the French Banque de Syrie constituted the last straw for the French, who considered the federal experiment a complete failure. According to a French report, Sunnis dominated the important positions in the federal government, while the States of Aleppo and Damascus received a disproportionate

CADN 1842: Rapport tnmeslnel de l'Etat des Alaouites (1-3/1923). CADN 2129· Historique du Gouvernement de Latakia (9/1934) CADN 2129: Histonque (9/1934). See also: Alif Ba (3/1/1924) "The Alawis and unity" Khoury (1987: 136) argues that the rumours announced in the AlifBa' newspaper of 12 January 1924, that ihe sanjaq of Alexandreita would be annexed to the Alawi stale and be administered separately from Aleppo and Damascus, played an important role in the vole. However, the abovementioned Alif Ba' article is dated 12 February; in other words, these rumours cannot have played a role in the preparation of the motion. MAE 217: Protestation des membres alaouites du Conseil fédéral à propos du vole de ce Conseil (15/1/1924) relatif à l'union syrienne. MAE 228: Pétition de notables de l'Etal des Alaouites à Weygand (2/4/1924) See the article on the Federal Council, written by 'One of Them' (one of the nationalist deputies), in AlifBa' (14/5/1924). From Ottoman province to Syrian state 43 amount of the Federation's resources Moreover, the report continues, the Federation's central services simply ignored the needs and wishes of the State of the Alawis The quality of the judiciary and the cadastral service had seriously deteriorated, while the Post & Telegraph services could no longer ensure communications1'' In addition to the Federal Council exceeding its competence, the federal system with its enormous bureaucracy - each state maintained its own institutions - proved too costly Economic problems in France had already led to budget cuts for the High Commission, while the plummeting French franc further aggravated the situation An increase of the tax burden would only further alienate the population, especially since the Syrian pound that was coupled to the French franc had also plummeted On 5 December 1924, the French by decree 2979 proclaimed the independence under French protection of the State of the Alawis, to be effective from 1 January 19251'' The States of Aleppo and Damascus merged to become Syria The sanjaq of Alexandretta was incorporated into the new Syrian state as an autonomous province, while the State of Jabal Druze became independent In this way, Khoury (1987 136-139) argues, the French effectively isolated the Alawi and Druze minorities from the influences of Arab nationalism, while at the same time isolating the Syrian state from the coast In 1925, several factors combined to produce what is today remembered as the Great Revolt (1925-1927) Within the cities, economic conditions had deteriorated because of territorial partition and European economic penetration, which had led to large-scale unemployment and rising inflation Moreover, the suppression of the Syrian Federation fed the disillusionment The rural areas also suffered from the economic crisis, while a severe winter and subsequent drought had led to widespread disorder as Bedouin transferred their migratory circle into the cultivated areas The revolt started in the Druze region to the south of Damascus, where Druze grievances focused on the erosion of the traditional family hierarchies that had characterised the configuration of power in the Jabal Druze for two centuries Under the leadership of the powerful Atrash family, the Druze revolted In Damascus, the nationalist People's Party, the successor of the Iron Hand Society, capitalised on the Druze revolt to demonstrate to the French that it commanded public support not only in the cities, but also in the outlying areas In Damascus and Hama, urban revolts started, after which the disorders soon spread to other parts of Syria, and even Lebanon It took the French, who moved over 50,000 troops into the Levant, two years to crush the revolt The Great Revolt constituted one of the formative events of Syrian history, during which the heterogeneous Syrian population united to combat the French The atmosphere among the Alawis, however, was an atmosphere of total disinterest Shocked by the scale and intensity of the Great Revolt, the French recognised that their policy of confrontation with the nationalists had been a costly failure The nationalists, for

14 CADN1843 Rapport trimestriel (1-3/1924) CADN2129 Historique (9/1934) 15 CADN1843 Rapport trimestriel (10-12/1924) CADN2129 Hislonque (9/1934) 44 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 their part, had painfully discovered they could not militarily challenge a superpower like France, and accepted that Syrian independence could be achieved only with political negotiation.

1.3.2 Honourable cooperation & nationalist politics (1927-1939)"

In 1927, Henri Ponsot was installed in Beirut as High Commissioner, a position he would hold for six years. Like his predecessors, Ponsot's freedom of action was limited by the mandate system, which, despite the fact that they had interests in the Levant they wanted to defend, called upon the French to administrate their mandate in a spirit of disinterested goodwill. The resulting policies, according to Shambrook (1998: 129-130), could not be but "schizophrenic: partially determined by the legal and moral conception of the Mandate and partially by self-interest". This schizophrenia was stimulated by the Quai d'Orsay, which on several occasions provided Ponsot with mutually exclusive instructions. Ponsot's policy focused on the exploitation of the divisions within the nationalist movement, by cultivating those nationalists willing to cooperate with him and isolating the others. Ironically, it would be the same divisions he exploited, which would prevent Ponsot from achieving his goals: the establishment of a Syrian constitution and a treaty that recognised France's interests and predominant position in the Levant. In the spring of 1927, Ponsot, together with the Quai d'Orsay, devised a plan for Syria's future. In July 1927, Colonel Catroux, Ponsot's Delegate in Damascus, publicly spoke of French intentions to integrate the Druze and Alawi regions into the Syrian state, and to draft a constitution in which the rights of the minorities and, above all, France's interests would be recognised, after which the Syrians would be allowed to govern themselves. Reactions among the nationalists were negative: they simply did not believe France was genuinely prepared to negotiate in the wake of a crushing military victory. Moreover, the speech did not mention anything about a treaty, and the ideas forwarded in it, in effect, amounted to continued French rule. Although the nationalists were reserved in their reactions to the plans, Catroux's speech would form the basis for the policy of 'honourable cooperation', which was adopted during a meeting of urban notables in Lebanon, which sought to accommodate nationalist wishes for a unified state and French strategic needs. With the militant nationalist leadership of the Great Revolt in exile, the urban notables sought to restore their favourite 'politics of notables' by attempting to monopolise the access of the nationalist elements of the population to the French, and by intermittently mobilising their urban networks to show the French that only they could control the urban population and the nationalist elements in particular. Through the formation of a new political organisation, the National Bloc, the urban notables hoped to restore their former influence, and protect their interests against attacks from popular nationalist organisations. The French, for their part, sought the recognition by the National Bloc of France's pre-eminent

This section draws heavily on Shambrook (1998). See also Khoury (1987), particularly Parts V and VI. From Ottoman province to Syrian state 45 position in the Levant, and wanted safeguards, in the form of a Syrian constitution or a Franco- Syrian treaty, for her strategic and economic interests. The first step towards 'honourable cooperation' was Ponsot's announcement that elections for a Constituent Assembly would take place in April 1928. To guarantee a favourable outcome of the elections, the French began promoting friendly notables in the rural areas, where no political parties existed. Ponsot was worried about the elections in the cities, where he considered nationalist victories were unavoidable. To prevent the spread of nationalist influence to the rural areas, the French clung to the Ottoman electoral law, whose 'clause of residence' stated that a person could stand candidate only in the district where he lived. As numerous nationalist candidates lived in the same district, this automatically prevented a large number of them from being elected. To split nationalist ranks, Ponsot, in March 1928, allowed a number of leaders from the Great Revolt to return from exile. In addition, Ponsot broached the possibility of a Syrian kingdom, about which he knew serious differences of opinion existed among the nationalists. In April 1928, the elections went ahead according to Ponsot's plans, or so he thought. Although they only won twenty-two out of seventy seats, the nationalists, because of their common interests and high education, succeeded in completely dominating the forty-eight deputies from the rural areas, and they turned the Constituent Assembly into an anti-French institution. Dominated by the nationalists, the Constituent Assembly soon drew up a constitution that, following Shambrook (1998: 20), was "to cause considerable indigestion in Paris". Six articles in particular were unacceptable to the French: one article stressed the unity of Syria, including Lebanon, Transjordan and Palestine; another stated that the Syrian government was to establish a national army; four more articles empowered the Syrian president to grant pardons, conclude treaties, receive ambassadors, and declare martial law. In vain, Ponsot attempted to dissuade the Assembly from accepting the constitution. As an illustration of nationalist dominance, during the final session of the Constituent Assembly on 9 August 1928, only one out of seventy deputies dared to support Ponsot, who subsequently suspended the Assembly. After another round of unproductive negotiations in September and October, Ponsot received instructions to suspend the Assembly sine die. According to Shambrook (1998: 24-25),

"Ponsot was caught between an 'un-evolving' traditional Quai d'Orsay vision of the Mandate and an evolving situation on the ground. By allowing the establishment of an elected Assembly, Paris had, in effect, unscrewed the top of a toothpaste tube; given the (nationalist) pressure, the toothpaste was coming out and it would have been extremely difficult for Ponsot, or any High Commissioner, to get the toothpaste back into the tube".

Consequently, the pace of Syrian political life slowed down considerably. Shambrook (1998: 46) argues that Ponsot adopted a fast track and a slow track program. Although they publicly embraced a policy of administrative and economic reforms to meet the nationalists, privately the 46 The Alawis of Syria. 1918-1946

French pursued a "politique temporisatrice - to keep the constitutional process moving as slowly as possible". During the spring and summer of 1929, discussions continued between the nationalists and the High Commission; the nationalists occasionally were supported by public rallies that, in the spirit of the 'politics of notables', aimed to remind the French of the notables' force and to consolidate their support among the population. Despite rising dissatisfaction, Ponsot unilaterally promulgated the Syrian constitution tailored to French needs, and also the Organic Laws for the autonomous Alawi and Druze regions that effectively confirmed the existing divisions. Ponsot even received the backing of the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations in Geneva for his policies. In despair, the National Bloc, early in 1931, stated its willingness to accept the constitution promulgated by Ponsot and participate in new elections, on the conditions that the outlines of a possible treaty would be made public beforehand and that guarantees for fair elections were given. It was only in November 1931 that Ponsot considered the time ripe for new political initiatives. By decree, he established a Consultative Council that should advise him on the application of the constitution. In addition, Ponsot assumed the function of head of state to overlook the parliamentary elections, which, he announced, would take place in two rounds on 20 December 1931 and 4 January 1932. To ensure success in the elections, the French resorted to fraud and outright intimidation: security forces intimidated potential candidates and voters, electoral districts were reapportioned to exclude nationalist candidates (the 'clause of residence' still existed), newspapers friendly to the nationalists were suppressed, and in some places, for example in Duma, the French had stuffed the voting boxes so full that when the first voters arrived no more ballots could be inserted (Shambrook 1998: 69). The National Bloc ordered a total boycott of the elections, and, inspired by the Nationalist Youth militia, riots broke out all over Damascus. During 1932, secret negotiations followed between the Damascus wing of the National Bloc and the High Commission to remedy the situation. They agreed that the French would allow free elections in the Damascus and Hama constituencies on the condition that the National Bloc would present candidates for only six of the nine contested seats in Damascus. For the French, this meant that at least three friendly deputies would be elected in a constituency in which the nationalists would be assured of total success in free elections, while the Damascus nationalists preferred participation in government to standing on the sideline. For Jamil Mardam Bey, the leader of the Damascus wing of the National Bloc, the deal meant a victory over the more radical wing of the Bloc in Aleppo that did not want to make compromises. During new elections in April 1932, the National Bloc won fourteen out of sixty-nine seats. As in 1928, the nationalists considered they could impose their will on the other less educated and less united candidates. After the elections for the Syrian parliament, the question of the presidency rose. The president, elected for a period of five years, would receive extensive powers within the From Ottoman province to Syrian state 47 framework of the mandate, and as such would be the central intermediary between the High Commission and the local authorities The French needed a Syrian president who enjoyed some measure of popularity among the population and who was sympathetic towards the mandate After a series of intrigues, negotiations, and manoeuvring in parliament, they found such a man in the person of Muhammad 'Ah al-'Abid, who on 11 June 1932 was elected the first president of Syria 'Abid, for his part, nominated the Francophile Haqqi al-'Azm as his Prime Minister, while his cabinet included three nationalist ministers (Jamil Mardam Bey, Salim Jambart, and Mazhar Pasha al-Raslan) With this mixed group of Francophiles and moderate nationalists, Ponsot hoped to have set a first step towards a favourable Franco-Syrian treaty However, opposition by the more radical nationalists (the National Bloc in Aleppo, and Pan-Arabist circles within and outside of Syria) and the growing economic depression would block Ponsot's plans The election of a centre-left cabinet in France that favoured a possible treaty and the political evolution in Iraq where a new Anglo-Iraqi treaty was signed, convinced Ponsot that the time was ripe to open negotiations for a Franco-Syrian treaty, which started officially on 5 November 1932 Despite strong divisions within the nationalist leadership and especially the National Bloc, it was agreed, during nationalist congresses in Sofar and in Horns in October and November 1932, that the president and his cabinet would be allowed to participate in the negotiations, on the condition that the French, in writing and in advance, would make public the basis on which the negotiations would take place The nationalists, under pressure from the Aleppo wing of the National Bloc, stuck to the proviso of 'no unity, no treaty', while the French refused to commit themselves In November 1932, before the Permanent Mandates Commission in Geneva, Ponsot even defended the division of the Levant into two states, Syria and Lebanon, and he continued the old French argument that the autonomy of the Alawi and Druze regions was the best way to assure their political evolution Although the negotiations appeared deadlocked, the Syrian cabinet and the French continued the negotiations Shambrook (1998 111) argues that the Syrian government needed a treaty soon, as it feared that otherwise the Syrian parliament, during its session of March 1933, would vote it out office For the French, the successful negotiation of a treaty became pressing after an attack in the January 1933 session of the Permanent Mandates Commission, where Germany and Italy called for the independence of Syria and Lebanon Both countries feared that France wanted to establish itself permanently on the strategic Levantine coast, in anticipation of conflict in Europe Ponsot needed a treaty to counter this threat before the June 1933 session of the Permanent Mandates Commission, in which the situation in Syria and Lebanon would be reviewed The nationalists, on their part, viewed the German and Italian interventions as a sign of international support for their desire to include the question of unity in the treaty negotiations, something Ponsot had refused to accept so far In February 1933, congresses were convened in the Alawi and Druze regions to address the issue (see section 3 4) In the following months, neither the French nor the nationalists made concessions, and the negotiations came to a standstill In April 1933, Jamil Mardam and Mazhar Raslan, under pressure from the radical Aleppo wing of the National Bloc, resigned from the Syrian cabinet, effectively ending the 48 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 treaty negotiations French diplomatic efforts before the session of the Permanent Mandates Commission prevented damage there Soon after, Ponsot was transferred to Morocco Ponsot's successor as High Commissioner, count Damien de Martel, set himself as a task to revive Syria's economy, which suffered from the world depression, and to divert public attention from politics to economy De Martel soon persuaded president 'Abid and the remaining Syrian cabinet to sign the treaty, with very unfavourable terms for the nationalists He realised, however, that with the nationalists out of government positions, the difficulty with the treaty was not its signing but its ratification Indeed, the nationalist deputies, despite their minority, managed to convince their colleagues to vote against the treaty Immediately, parliament was suspended According to Shambrook (1998 149), De Martel considered that the treaty "would keep its value as long as it had not been officially rejected by the Chamber" Demonstrations took place all over Syria The divided National Bloc attempted to find a common position During a congress in Horns in February 1934, the hardliners scored an important victory National Bloc demands now included the complete unity of Syria, including the Alawi and Druze regions, and the four districts that had been attached to Greater Lebanon in 1920 Moreover, the nationalists demanded national sovereignty, complete independence in the field of politics and economy, and a general political amnesty The French decided to put politics on a hold De Martel suspended the parliament sine die rather than dissolve it, and in March 1934 installed the political stooge sheikh Taj al-Din al-Hasam as Prime Minister on the condition that he would deal with economic, financial and administrative matters only Politics was put to sleep until 1936 In January 1936, a general strike broke out in Syria, following the arrest of some leading Syrian politicians, the closure of a National Bloc office, and a police raid on the house ot Ibrahim Hananu, who had died in December 1935 After two months of strikes that paralysed Syria, the French government gave in On 22 March 1936, a delegation of the National Bloc left Damascus for Pans to negotiate the future of the territories it considered to constitute the Syrian state The first round of negotiations between the French and the nationalist delegation took place in April 1936 and focused on three principal issues that directly concerned the Alawi region unity, French military presence, and the protection of the minorities The negotiations concerning Syrian unity, which focused on the incorporation of the Alawi and Druze regions into a future Syrian state, did not produce any results, as the French were not prepared to make any concessions This French position was due primarily to a difference of opinion between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the High Commissioner The former, according to Shambrook (1998 208-209), argued

"that it was impossible [ ] to decide and formulate laws concerning territories which were not Syrian, thus prejudging the result of a popular consultation that must take place after the coming into force of the treaty". From Ottoman province to Syrian state 49 while the latter argued

"that no treaty would be possible which did not provide for, in one way or another, the immediate re-attachment of the Jabal Druze and Alawite regions to the Damascus government".

The nationalists stuck to the position they had held since the early 1930s and that had safeguarded their legitimacy: there could be no treaty without unity. On the issue of the future French military presence in Syria, the French again proved inflexible. The Ministry of War considered the French military presence in Syria to be the keystone of French dominance in the Eastern Mediterranean, while, Shambrook (1998: 209-210) argues, the Syrian delegation stressed

"the impossibility of selling a treaty to Syrian public opinion if the former consecrated the country's occupation, rather than its independence".

Eventually, the Ministry of War, under pressure from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was prepared to give up the occupation of the principal Syrian towns, but the evacuation of the Alawi and Druze regions could not be considered. The French, with war in Europe looming, were particularly concerned about their military position in the strategic Eastern Mediterranean. A letter of the French commander of the Army of the Levant, General Caillault, to High Commissioner de Martel on the eve of World War II indicates the importance the French military attributed to the coastal region, to the extent that all other issues were subordinate to it.

"Lors de la mise en vigueur de ces traités, la France conservera un établissement militaire au Liban, complété et couvert au Nord par l'occupation du muhafaza de Latakia. Cette occupation complémentaire, que nous avons l'intention de prolonger sine die, a pour but essentiel d'interposer une marche frontière entre le Hatay, désormais passé dans l'obédience turque, et le centre vital de notre établissement; elle répond en même temps au besoin que nous avons de conserver dans notre orbite une population qui nous est jusqu'ici attachée et où nous puisons nos meilleurs contingents militaires locaux. Enfin, du fait que nous devons conserver à Alep une base aérienne et une garnison, Latakia se trouve placé sur une ligne d'étapes dont le libre usage nous est indispensable"17.

The question of the protection of the minorities on which the question of Syrian unity hinged also reached a deadlock. The nationalist delegation considered the issue to be an internal

17 CADN978 Caillault à Martel (3/12/1938). 50 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946

Syrian affair, while the French claimed that French public opinion would not accept the renouncement of France's right to intervene on behalf of the minorities. The French and Syrian nationalist negotiators were diametrically opposed on all three central issues. The negotiations, suspended during May, officially resumed towards the end of June 1936 and gained a new momentum when the Blum government took office. During this second round, the negotiations centred on the question of Syrian unity that was of crucial importance to the nationalist delegation. According to Shambrook (1998: 216), the French offered to accept the principle of Syrian unity on the condition that the nationalists would budge on the issues of the French military presence and the protection of the minorities. Concerning the Alawi and Druze regions, the negotiators soon reached an agreement in principle. A decree of the High Commissioner would incorporate both regions into the future Syrian state. The timing of this decree, however, became a new point of contention. The nationalists wanted the decree of the High Commissioner to be included in the treaty. As Shambrook (1998: 216-217) argues,

"This would give it an immediate validity. Deputies from the two regions would participate, in the Syrian parliament, in the vote of ratification. The consultation of the elected local councils, Alawite and Druze, would thus become a formality, of no practical significance. Unity would have been achieved over their heads".

The French insisted that the future Syrian parliament would have to ratify the treaty before the High Commission could promulgate the decree. Moreover, the French demanded that, after the incorporation of the Alawi and Druze regions, the French governors would remain in office for the duration of the treaty, which would also provide for a continued presence of French troops in Syria for an unspecified time. Last-minute French concessions solved the deadlock. Concerning the decree of incorporation, Shambrook (1998: 216-218) argues,

"The French conceded that the High Commissioner's decree would be incorporated into the treaty. But in a distinctly subtle move - to put it no more strongly - both sides secretly agreed that the text of the treaty would not be made public until after the [the nationalist delegation] and the High Commissioner had returned to Syria, taken both local councils in hand, and Obtained' their consent to the reattachment. In that way, the fiction of the 'consultation of the elected representatives' of the two regions would be safeguarded".

Concerning the military question, the French promised to withdraw their forces from the Alawi and Druze regions five years after the coming into force of the treaty, if the Syrian government would request them to do so. The Franco-Syrian treaty, signed on 9 September 1936 and ratified by the Syrian parliament on 27 December ofthat year, was to form the basis for future Franco-Syrian relations From Ottoman province to Syrian state 51 for a period of twenty-five years. After a probationary period of three years, France would ensure Syria's admission to the League of Nations; France, in return, would be allowed to maintain military forces in Syria during the currency of the treaty. The nationalists were thrilled as all their principal claims had been satisfied. After the signing of the treaty, the problem for the French and the nationalists concerning the Alawis was "to make them agree to their re­ attachment to Damascus"18. After the signing of the Franco-Syrian treaty, the Government of Latakia was incorporated into the Syrian state as the Province of Latakia. For the nationalists in Syria, the incorporation of the Alawi and Druze regions into a unified Syrian state constituted the culmination of two decades of struggle with the French. However, autonomist movements in the Province of Latakia, the Jabal Druze, and the Jazira, and the annexation of the sanjaq of Alexandretta to Turkey successfully challenged the unity of the state. In addition, factionalism reigned supreme among the Syrian nationalists, and the fall of the Blum government in 1937 prevented the French parliament from ratification of the treaty. Nationalist hopes were finally dashed, when, after the expiration of the probationary period in 1939, World War II broke out and the French resumed full control over Syria.

1.3.3 World War II & Anglo-French rivalry (1939-1946)

After the conquest of metropolitan France by the Germans in the summer of 1940, the French overseas territories, including the Syrian and Lebanese mandates, came under Vichy French control. Great Britain considered this to be a hazard for her military position in the Eastern Mediterranean, which was already threatened by a large Italian army in Libya and unrest in Egypt and Iraq. Therefore, the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, and the leader of the new Free French movement, Charles de Gaulle, decided that the Levant should be secured. In the end, this led to the Anglo-Free French invasion of Syria and Lebanon in June 1941. The Levant soon became the battleground for Anglo-French rivalry. Whereas Britain insisted that 'friendly control' over the Levant was sufficient, General de Gaulle intended to change the Levant into the centre of Free French power. He considered the Levant to be a vital strategic position in both the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, while he considered that the Army of the Levant, some 70,000 men strong, could form the backbone of a future Free French army. However, Anglophobia led De Gaulle to fear that Great Britain wanted more than just 'friendly control' over the Levant, but full control. In his bid to secure the Levant for the Free French movement, General de Gaulle was supported by the former British liaison officer to France, Sir Edward Spears, under whose care and protection the Free French movement had come into being (Gaunson 1984: 697-698, Roshwald 1986: 897-898, Shambrook 1998: 253, 259).

Shambrook 1998 218-219, 222. MAE 494: Note sur l'accord franco-synen (10/9/1936) 52 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946

As Gaunson (1984: 698-702) has argued, De Gaulle and his right-hand, General Catroux, wanted to provoke a spontaneous defection of Vichy ranks in the Levant states, after which the Free French could take over control. The British Middle Eastern Command and the Minister of State in Cairo, responsible for British policies in the Middle East, dismissed the idea outright. In addition, they opposed an invasion. The British military commander, in the spring of 1941 faced with a German advance towards Egypt, a German invasion in Crete, and the pro- Axis Rashid 'Ali revolt in Iraq, argued he simply did not have the resources for any action in the Levant. Instead, he preferred to encourage the neutrality of the Vichy High Commissioner General Dentz. Spears was not to take no for an answer for his Free French protégés and contacted his personal friend Winston Churchill to push for a more active policy concerning the Levant, especially as the granting of landing rights to German and Italian aircraft in Syria and Lebanon in support of the Rashid 'Ali revolt had compromised the neutrality of the Vichy forces there. In this way, the decision to invade the Levant was forced upon the British military command. However, when this decision had already been taken, De Gaulle and Catroux, contrary to their expectations, had to confess that the Vichy forces were preparing for resistance. A spontaneous defection of Vichy French ranks seemed improbable. After the military question had been settled, the political question was raised, as Britain, with an eye on its own Arab possessions, could not accept that Vichy French power in the Levant would simply be replaced by Free French power, without any commitment on the part of the Free French to grant Syria and Lebanon their independence. Spears and Catroux reached an agreement on a joint proclamation, to be announced on the eve of the invasion, an idea, however, that was flatly rejected by De Gaulle, who, unaware of the negotiations between Spears and Catroux, regarded the joint declaration as an intrusion on French prerogatives in the Levant. Therefore, two separate announcements were made. The first, made by General Catroux on 8 June 1941, stated:

"I have come to terminate the mandatory regime and proclaim you free and independent. You are therefore henceforth sovereign and independent peoples... Your [new] status will be guaranteed by a treaty which will also define our reciprocal relations" (Quoted in Gaunson 1984: 703).

The British, on their part, issued a separate statement in which they endorsed Catroux's proclamation and denied having any ambitions in the Levant. According to Gaunson (1984: 703- 705), Catroux's proclamation marked the beginning of the end for the French presence in the Levant. Early in the morning of 8 June 1941, Operation Exporter, the invasion of the Levant, started. Catroux, who still believed he could win over the Vichy French, issued a statement.

"French soldiers of the Levant: are there those who would block my route when I march against the enemy?" (Quoted in Gaunson 1984: 705). Front Ottoman province to Syrian state 53

A month of ferocious fighting that lasted until 12 July suggests the answer to that question was 'yes'. During the armistice talks, the British commander of the Ninth Army, General Wilson, made a huge error, as, during a meeting with the Vichy French commander Dentz, who refused to deal with the Free French, he accepted the Vichy French surrender to British forces alone, without making any reference to the Free French. Wilson, who did not want to exclude the Free French, allowed General Catroux to be present during the armistice talks, but refused him to sign the armistice agreement, a formula that was acceptable to all parties. In addition, Wilson and Dentz agreed to a secret protocol that effectively denied the Free French the possibility to recruit from the Army of the Levant. Instead, this army was to be repatriated to Vichy France. The agreement enraged General de Gaulle, who saw his suspicion confirmed that the British wanted to take over the Levant. General de Gaulle threatened with a complete break with the British, if the armistice agreement was not revised according to his wishes, as was ultimately done in the so-called Lyttleton-De Gaulle agreement of 25 July. In the agreement, the Free French acknowledged the British authority over questions concerning security, while the British granted the Free French the territorial command in Syria and Lebanon. In wartime, however, as will be seen in chapter 5, the distinction between political and security questions was far from clear. The threat to break with Great Britain had seriously damaged Anglo-Free French relations and turned Spears into De Gaulle's most bitter enemy (Gaunson 1984: 706-712, Roshwald 1986: 898-899, Yaffe & Rabinovich 1990). A first indication of this alienation became manifest, when Churchill in the British parliament declared:

"Syria shall be handed back to the Syrians. [...] There must be no question even in wartime of a mere substitution of Free French interests for Vichy French interests" (Quoted in Gaunson 1984: 712).

After the invasion, the future for the French in Levant did not look bright. Spears, whether out of hostility to the Free French or because of sympathy for the Arab nationalist movement, adopted the view, according to Yaffe & Rabinovich (1990: 178-180),

"that saw the Arab nationalist movement as a natural ally and its victory as beneficial to British interests. From these premises there emanated a rejection of France's pre­ eminence in the Levant and the set of French policies that were designed to preserve it. One of these French policies was the cultivation of Alawi separatism".

After the invasion of Syria and Lebanon, Spears continued to function as the liaison between the Free French movement and the British offices concerned with the Middle East, such as the Foreign Office, the Minister of State's Office in Cairo, and the British Middle Eastern military command. Although the Spears Mission was to serve only as a diplomatic representation, Spears succeeded in convincing his superiors that it was necessary to employ political and economic 54 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 experts in the region, so-called political officers, to report on political and military issues. He demanded that these officers, who received military ranks (Spears himself became a Major General), would be assigned to the Spears Mission rather than to the Ninth Army, which allowed him to build up a powerbase. As Roshwald (1986: 901) argues,

"Spears had, in effect, established a British shadow administration in Syria and Lebanon. When the weight of British military forces in the region was also taken into account, Free French predominance in the Levant began to look more like a legal fiction than a political reality".

From the invasion in June 1941 to December 1944, when General Spears was dismissed, several major clashes between Spears and the Free French occurred. The first emerged shortly after the occupation of the Levant in July 1941. An alarming shortage of wheat existed in the Levant", and to prevent popular unrest, Spears brought huge amounts of British grain on the market in Syria, an unfortunate gesture that the French Delegate General Catroux (the term High Commissioner had been abolished on British insistence) interpreted as an attempt to make the French seem incompetent in the eyes of the population. Spears' efforts soon failed as merchants started hoarding stocks. As Syria had always been self-sufficient in its grain needs, General Catroux proposed to set up the Office des Céréales panifiables (Wheat Office), which was to monopolise and control the grain trade in Syria and Lebanon and which was authorised to force hoarders to put their stocks on to the market. The Syrian government, led by Taj al-Din al- Hasani, refused to accept Catroux's plan as the principal hoarders were large landowners who backed his regime, and because he feared that exclusive French control over the Wheat Office would further erode his already weak authority. For his objections, he found a ready ear with General Spears. Spears argued that as the British treasury financed the Free French movement, the British would in fact finance the Wheat Office. He forced upon Catroux the choice: either the Syrian government would take control of the Wheat Office, or the British army would do so. In the end a compromise was reached. The Wheat Office was placed under the authority of the Lebanese and Syrian governments, but Catroux and Spears together assumed a supervisory function. The Free French, and the Syrian population, could not but interpret this as a defeat and a loss of Free French power and prestige20.

Concerning the food supplies, the French Assistant Delegate in Lalakia, Des Essars, reported that in April 1943 the ration of wheat had fallen to 200 grams a day per person in the coastal villages, and to 125 grams in the hinterland Des Essars feared disturbances, as the population could not tail to notice that the ration was 500 grams in Damascus He criticised the conduct of the staff of the Wheat Office, and complained that, as it received its orders directly from Damascus, it acted as a state in a state in the Alawi region, ignoring the local French and Syrian authorities CADN 791 Des Essars à Collet (13/4/1943) Roshwald 1986 901-902 FO 371/31471 Cairo to Foreign Office (27/2/1942) Weekly political review (7/3/1942) FO 371/31474 Weekly political summary (5/8/1942) FO 660/35 Spears to Eden (19/6/1943) on the Wheat Office (Office des Céréales panifiables) From Ottoman province to Syrian state 55

A second protracted confrontation focused on the Syrian and Lebanese elections. Britain wanted to keep the promise the French had made in the proclamation of June 1941 of which the British were the guarantors, especially with an eye on their own Arab possessions. Spears demanded that, after the elections, the French should hand over their executive and legislative powers to the Syrian and Lebanese governments and parliaments, and restrict themselves to the position of advisers. The Free French, on their part, were not ready to grant Syria and Lebanon their independence or even to relinquish their executive power; first, they wanted a treaty that would safeguard France's military, economic, and cultural interests in the Levant. Spears, however, continued to interfere in Syrian and Lebanese politics (Roshwald 1986: 902-906). The discussions continued throughout 1942, but finally the Free French agreed to hold elections in July 1943. North Africa, conquered by the Allies in early 1943, had replaced the Levant as the centre of Free French power. In addition, the British government had promised De Gaulle administrative control over Madagascar in return for his willingness to go ahead with the elections in the Levant. The elections in Lebanon, with Spears' encouragement, led to the formation of a nationalist cabinet, whose program included the unilateral removal from the Lebanese constitution of all references to France's position as a mandatory. Before the French could act, the Lebanese parliament adopted the program. In a reaction, Jean Helleu, General Catroux's successor as Delegate General, ordered the arrest of the Lebanese cabinet and the suspension of the parliament. Riots broke out throughout Lebanon, and Egypt and Iraq called upon Britain to intervene. Spears had effectively forced the British government's hand in his rivalry with the Free French, and the government demanded the release from custody and the reinstatement of the Lebanese government and parliament. In the case of a French refusal, the British government threatened, the British army would take over power in Lebanon. The Free French had no option but to comply (Roshwald 1986: 905-913; Shambrook 1998: 270-275). As many observers have commented, French authority over the Levant was effectively ended by this affair: the success of the Lebanese in resisting the French provided a powerful example for the Syrians to follow. It was now clear that the British would never permit the French to employ the ultimate threat offeree in any negotiations. The French, Roshwald (1986: 913) argues, "had thus lost their ultimate bargaining chip". By 1944, the British Foreign Office had become fed up with Spears' interventions that often contradicted stated policy, and he was replaced. In 1945, Syria and Lebanon demanded their independence, and severe riots broke out. In an attempt to break the uprising, the French bombed Damascus. Thousands of people were killed or injured, and the Syrian parliament building was destroyed. Commenting on the episode, Khoury (1987: 617) sarcastically remarks that it was

"a bitter reminder of France's quarter-century of commitment to educating the people under her Mandate in the values of Western civilization and democracy". 56 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946

British tanks moved into Damascus and forced the French troops at gunpoint to return to their barracks. This humiliating episode effectively ended French rule in Syria. French forces remained confined to their barracks until their evacuation in 1946. This chapter has provided a chronological outline of Syrian mandate history, which will be helpful in relating and contextualising the history of the Alawi community during the French mandate period. This chapter also suggests that the interplay of French policies to divide and rule and the creation of bureaucratic and administrative institutions to further that policy on the one hand, and the nature of political and social organisation of the dominant elements within Syrian society, the urban notables and their politicised networks, on the other hand, determined that nation state formation in Syria followed the ethnic variant of political modernisation, in which an urban-based nationalism became the dominant cultural compromise. In the next chapters, I will demonstrate that the combination of these same factors stimulated the politicisation of the Alawi leadership, and that the expanded political arena and the new discourse of nationalism provided Alawi clan leaders with opportunities to further the local dominance of their clans. 2

The birth of Alawi particularism

1918 -1926

In the spring of 1919, simmering tensions between Alawis and Ismailis in the district of Qadmus escalated into open warfare As the French authorities, because of inadequate intelligence and insufficient forces, were unable to restore order, the fighting spread to other parts of the coastal region, where more and more people, attracted by the prospect of looting, joined the armed bands The activities of the armed bands did not occur in a political vacuum As has been discussed in section 13 1, during 1919, tensions rose between the French authorities in the Levant and the Shanfian government led by emir Faysal in Damascus, while in Cihcia the French were bogged down in a bitter struggle with Turkish nationalist or Kemalist forces Both the Sharifîans and the Kemahsts supported the armed bands that operated in the French zone of occupation, supplying them with weapons, leadership, and legitimacy In the spring of 1921, the French concentrated a large military force in the coastal region, and disarmed the population Syrian historiography remembers the activities of armed bands in the coastal mountains as the Alawi revolt of sheikh Sahh al-'Ah This revolt will be discussed in section 2 1 Syrian historiography's projection of the activities of armed bands in the coastal region as the first nationalist revolt against French occupation has obscured the fact that a great majority of the population in the coastal region - Alawis, Christians, and Ismailis - supported French rule Important leaders from these communities actively supported the French in suppressing the armed bands On several occasions, they expressed their loyalty to the French authorities and put forward their demands for political autonomy under French protection When the French authorities in July 1920, after the occupation of the Syrian interior, began with their policy of territorial partition, they created the Territoire autonome des Alaouites, an autonomous political entity in the coastal region with a predominantly Alawi population A large majority of Alawi clan leaders welcomed the creation of this Autonomous Alawi Territory The Arab and Syrian nationalists, with the image of the popular Alawi revolt in mind, argued that the French actively stimulated and directed an Alawi separatist movement (al-harakat al-mfisaliyya) to 58 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 frustrate the development of the Syrian national idea, while the French claimed they had only lent a ready ear to existing Alawi demands. Moreover, they argued that their decision to create the Autonomous Alawi Territory was in conformity with the Mandate Act, which stated that the political structure of the mandated territories should reflect their religious and ethnic diversity, as well as the different levels of political consciousness and social awareness of their inhabitants. In 1922, the French began with the federal experiment (see section 1.3.1), which placed the Alawi Territory, renamed State of the Alawis {Etat des Alaouites), together with the States of Aleppo and Damascus, in a federal framework. In 1924, the French dissolved the federation, which they considered a failure. The French policy of territorial partition and its results concerning the coastal region will be discussed in section 2.2.

2.1 The Alawi revolt of sheikh Salih al-'Ali (1919-1921)

Since the publication of studies such as Khoury (1987), Moosa (1988), Méouchy (1989), and Mendenhall (1991), which have touched upon the Alawi revolt on the basis of Syrian historiographie sources, French archival sources concerning the period 1918-1921 have been released. Analysis of these archival sources has produced some new insights concerning the Alawi revolt, which I will present in this section. This study will place the activities of armed bands in the coastal region in the tradition of the 'isabat. Méouchy (2004: 655-656), who has written several studies (1989, 2002) on rural mobilisations in the Levant, defines the 'isabat as small units of mujahidin consisting of members of a certain family, clan, village or region, drawn from one ethnic or religious community. According to her, a certain hierarchy existed among the 'isabat, which, on occasion, allowed them to join forces. The 'isabat specialised in guerrilla warfare and sustained themselves through looting and levying taxes. Méouchy (2004: 656) argues that the mobilisation of the 'isabat must be explained by the activation of primordial identities resulting from the déstabilisation of and transformations within the old social order after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the creation of borders, and the establishment of centralising states. Moreover, these rural mobilisations actively defined the relationship between the city and the countryside. The 'isaba grouped around sheikh Salih al-'Ali was not the only 'isaba operative in the coastal region, or the Levant in general. Besides, Méouchy (2004: 649) argues, the harakat al- 'isabat continued until the end of the Great Revolt in 1927, when the era of urban mobilisation and resistance began. In the next sections, I will refer to the 'isabat organised around the Sunni Dandashi family of Tallkalakh (1918-1919) and the Sunni Harun family of Latakia (1919-1920), the 'isaba led by 'Umar al-Baytar (1920-1921), the Sunni leader of the Sahyun (later renamed Haffa) district. To the north of the Alawi region, in the district of Antioch and in the Zawiya Mountain, 'isabat grouped around the Sunni notables Subhi Bey Barakat (1919) and Ibrahim Hananu (1919-1921) operated. In addition, during the years 1920-1921, Turkish irregular The birth of Alawi particularism, 1918-1926 59 soldiers, referred to as çetes, operated in the district to the north of the Alawi Mountain, while also certain Bedouin families constantly threatened French communication lines. Section 2.1.1 will discuss the origins and escalation of the revolt, which lies in the French mismanagement of a conflict between Ismailis and Alawis in the region of Qadmus. Section 2.1.2 will discuss the Sharifian patronage of and Kemalist support for the armed bands.

2.1.1 Origins and escalation of the revolt On 19 March 1919, Alawi fighters of the Khayyatin and Basharigha clans under the command of sheikh Salih al-'Ali attacked some Ismaili settlements near the village of Qadmus. Although disputes over land and cattle between Alawis and Ismailis existed and sometimes escalated into violent conflict, the immediate cause for the Alawi attack was the Ismaili refusal to pay the blood money for the death, in February 1919, of an Alawi boy, the son of a chief of the Khayyatin clan, who had been shot by an Ismaili. To understand the Ismaili refusal to pay the blood money, it is necessary to describe some developments within the Ismaili community of Qadmus. The Ismaili population of the Qadmus region was divided into two rival parties, which struggled for power. Over time, the traditional leadership of hereditary emirs had grown oppressive, which had led to the development of a rival leadership that in 1919 controlled a majority of the population. Tensions between the two rival leaderships flared up in January 1919, when the Sharifian authorities of Hama, to which Qadmus administratively belonged, received a delegation of hereditary emirs as the Ismaili leaders of the Qadmus region, to the dismay of the rival leadership. The death of the Alawi boy in February 1919 further strained the already tense relations between the two rival factions, as the emirs refused to pay their share of the customary blood money, arguing that a supporter of the rival leadership was responsible. In an attempt to play the rival leadership a little trick and regain some of the power lost to them, the emirs urged the Alawis not to accept the blood money for an accidental death but to demand the double amount for murder, an amount that the rival leadership would not be able to pay on its own. It would either have to ask the emirs for support and make concessions to them, or refuse payment and face the possibility of an Alawi attack. Meanwhile, attempts at mediation by two Alawi chiefs, Isma'il Bey Hawash (Matawira) and Isma'il Pasha Junayd (Rashawina), and a Sharifian official, Jamil Bey Ulshi, only led to the further deterioration of relations. The French subsequently offered their mediation, and all the parties concerned agreed to a peaceful settlement. However, incidents continued to occur, and, at the time the Alawis made their first attack on 19 March 1919, the conflict had already escalated into open warfare1.

CADN 2335. Rapport concernant les événements de Qadmus (31/3/1919). Rapport concernant les affaires de Qadmus (15/4/1919). SH 4H9: Hamehn à Commandant 7ème Hindou (16/6/1919). 60 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946

At this point, the French intervened. They ordered both Alawi and Ismaili leaders to come to Qadmus to settle their affairs peacefully. All parties agreed to the French ultimatum for the return of all stolen goods and the payment of the blood money. In order to stop the violence, the French threatened with severe repercussions. Only Salih al-'Ali and Isma'il Bey Hawash did not attend the meeting. A French unit, sent to collect Salih al-'Ali - Hawash lived in the Eastern Zone (O.E.T.A. East) and was outside French control - and bring him to the meeting, was ambushed near the village of Niha on 3 April 19192. Although the French routed the attackers, Salih al-'Ali could escape. The commander of the French unit reported:

"Nous avons montré que si la France était intraitable avec les bandits, elle était aussi la mère protectrice des intérêts des faibles. Nous avons gagné là, le coeur de milliers de gens opprimés jusqu'à ce jour-là, par des chefs sans scrupules"3.

The French, infused with a romantic colonial and military discourse, were confident that their show of force sufficed to pacify the region and let the ultimatum, set at the meeting in Qadmus, expire without a single condition having been met4. French sources suggest that sheikh Salih al-'Ali already in 1918 had a reputation as a rebel. For this reason, the Dandashi from Tallkalakh and nationalists from Horns and Hama called upon him to revolt in December 1918. Salih al-'Ali, however, ignored the call and refused to give shelter to the rebels5. Just before World War I, he killed two Ottoman police officers who had harassed one of his father's wives. When because of the outbreak of World War I an Ottoman reaction did not materialise, Salih al-'Ali could escape unharmed with the prestige of a man who had successfully resisted the government. An additional asset, the report suggests, which may have allowed him to gather a following that exceeded his direct command over a section of the Basharigha clan, may be his reputation as a miracle worker. Salih al-'Ali's father had been a venerated religious sheikh with the reputation of a saint. At a shrine, erected by Salih al-'Ali to his father's honour, it was believed miracles took place. It was said that once a bag of sand, placed in the shrine, had changed into wheat overnight, while small offerings were believed to ensure a rich posterity. Apart from his reputation as a rebel and a miracle worker, Salih al-'Ali had no additional assets. He did not possess great material wealth, nor did he

In a letter, sent in advance, the French had expressed their friendly intentions - they did not come to arrest him, but to invite him to come to Qadmus for discussions SH 4H9 Minault à Copin (16/6/1919) CADN 2335 Rapport concernant les événements de Qadmus (15/4/1919) CADN 2335 Rapport concernant les affaires de Qadmus (15/4/1919) CADN 2336 Rapport Copin (21/7/1919) SH4H9 Rapport Coux (10/5/1919) CADN 2357 Note sur les événements de Tallkalakh (12-15/12/1918) Syrian historiography (for example Yunus 1947, Jundi 1960), on the other hand, claims that in December 1918 Salih al-'Ah convoked Alawi clan leaders to his residence in Shaykh Badr, and called upon them to revolt against the French in the name of Arab nationalism This claim, which several scholarly works (Khoury 1987, Mendenhall 1990, Méouchy 1989) have copied, seems highly unlikely Sheikh Salih al-'Ali was a petty chief, who was not in a position to convoke other clan leaders The birth of Alawi particularism, 1918-1926 61 command a large following. According to French sources, the section of the Basharigha clan under his direct command amounted to three hundred people, and could mobilise one hundred armed men at most6. In other words, sheikh Salih al-'Ali's rebellious stance and reputation, fuelled by indecisive French action, acquired him a charisma and authority that far exceeded the influence and prestige of a second rank petty chief. On 17 May, a new phase in the conflict was initiated when Alawi fighters for the second time attacked Ismaili settlements near Qadmus, this time killing more than a hundred people. After this, the fighting spread to Khawabi, another predominantly Ismaili region. Despite the high number of casualties, French intervention again was indecisive, allowing the agitation to spread throughout the coastal region. Thousands of refugees flooded the coastal town of Tartus. Moreover, the already discontented population of the Banyas, Jabla and Sahyun districts capitalised on the unrest to refuse the payment of taxes, which constituted a serious threat to French authority and prestige7. The rural population was especially discontented with the new system of the fixation of the tenth, while a shortage of workers seriously hampered agricultural production. In addition, they had to pay the taxes in Egyptian pounds instead of the more common Turkish piasters. Meanwhile, the high cost of living, especially in the larger villages, led to the hoarding of grain and real estate. This caused serious shortages, which were aggravated by the unwillingness of the Sharifian and British authorities of the Eastern Zone to export foodstuffs to the French zone8. The French considered that the surrender, capture, or death of sheikh Salih al-'Ali, whom they considered to be the principal agitator, was necessary to restore their prestige, as their military impotence created an atmosphere of insecurity, reminiscent of Ottoman times, that fuelled looting and internal rivalries. On 12 June, a large military unit, dispatched from Tripoli, occupied Qadmus without opposition; however, an attempt to arrest the sheikh on 21 June failed as he had fled to the Eastern Zone9. Subsequent negotiations soon broke down and the French once more attempted to arrest him on 21 July. Salih al-'Ali, however, had anticipated the move, and prepared an ambush near the village of Murayqab. Although they inflicted heavy casualties on their attackers, the French once again failed to gain a decisive victory10. According to General Hamelin, the French commander, the French army only left behind "la preuve de son impuissance et les haines qu'elle a semées"". The French asked for a joint Anglo-French

CADN 464: Notice sur le cheikh Salih (4/5/1920). CADN 2342: Rapport politique sur les événements dans la montagne Ansaneh du 20 février au 25 mars 1920 (23/3/1920). CADN 2335: Copin à Georges-Picot (13/6/1919). CADN 2336 Copin à Georges-Picot (17/7/1919). CADN 2338 Information (24/6/1919). CADN 2342 Note de service (4/7/1919) MAE 14: Copin à Hamelin (24/6/1919) MAE 17: Minault à Copin (7/7/1919). SH 4H9: Rapport Niéger (29/7/1919). See also Méouchy 2002: 317. CADN 2336: Rapport politique mensuel (15/8/1919). CADN 2336: Rapport Copin (21/7/1919). SH 4H9: Minault à Copin (16/6/1919). CADN 2200: Jean à Hamelin (22/7/1919). CADN 2336: Rapport politique mensuel (15/8/1919) SH 4H9 Hamelin à Georges-Picot (5/7/1919). 62 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 military operation, but the British high command ordered the suspension of all ftirther military operations against the Alawis12. Meanwhile, the agitation spread. In the beginning of August, several Maronite and Greek-Orthodox villages in Banyas and Tartus districts were sacked; in some places, tax was collected in sheikh Salih al-'Ali's name13. To stop the unrest, Field Marshal Allenby, the supreme commander of British and French forces in the region, ordered the French to enter into negotiations with all parties concerned14. Towards the end of August, an Anglo-French military delegation was dispatched to the region, which brought about a general but temporary reconciliation of Alawis, Ismailis, Sunnis, Maronites, and Greek-Orthodox. The findings of this delegation revealed some of the underlying problems that contributed to the outbreak and escalation of the fighting15. Of central importance was the role played by the Maronite Ilyas family, which dominated the district of Banyas to which Qadmus belonged and regarded it as a personal fief. The head of the family, district governor Khalil Ilyas, had hoped to obtain exclusive access to the French by setting the different communities, clans, and villages against each other, and against the French16. He was believed to be responsible for the incidents in February and March 1919 concerning the blood money for the Alawi boy, inciting 'Ali Agha Zaydan, the leader of a local Khayyatin section (Makhalisa), to demand the blood money for murder on behalf of the parents17. Zaydan was made to believe that he could obtain the position of mudir of Qadmus through his participation in the attack. The powerful Haddadin clan was mobilised as the result of a personal rivalry between its chief, Ahmad Effendi al-Hamid, and Ilyas18. In the case of the Khawabi conflict, Ilyas had set the Ismailis against the Sunni mudir Ahmad Bey al-Mahmud, who then asked the Alawis of the region, under the influence of a strong anti-Ismaili propaganda from the Qadmus region, to intervene on his behalf. Ilyas had hoped to use the unrest as a pretext to replace Mahmud as mudir of Khawabi with one of his clients19. In a written statement to the Anglo- French delegation, Salih al-'Ali too complained about Ilyas. He argued that, because his property and land were situated in the middle of Ismaili villages near Qadmus, he was the constant victim of harassments and theft. He also claimed that the Ismailis had bribed Ilyas to

SH4H9 Hamelin à Guerre (9/11/1919), (22/9/1919) 13 SH4H1 Bulletin d'information (8/1919). 14 MAE 17 De Laforcade à Pichon (26/8/1919) SH 4H9 Hamelin à Jean (5/8/1919) The next section is based primarily on the report established by this joint Anglo-French delegation, which can be found in CADN 2357 Journal de la Mission politique des Alaouites (8/10/1919) 16 Sec also CADN 568 Rapport Joanms (25/10/1919) This had already been reported in the Damascene newspaper al-Muqtabm (24/7/1919), translation in CADN 2336 De Courson à Beirut (20/8/1919) Initially, the French considered Ahmad al-Hamid of the Haddadin confederation to be the cause of all trouble In July 1919, he was arrested CADN 2335 Rapport de Jabla (20/3/1919) CADN 2336 Rapport politique mensuel, mois de juillet (1/8/1919) MAE 17 Rapport politique mensuel de juin (7/7/1919) The birth of Alawi particularism, 1918-1926 63 intervene in his affairs and to accuse him falsely of not paying his taxes In his statement, Salih al-'Ali, moreover, denied all responsibility for the attacks on the French His men had only fired in the direction of French troops in order to protect their harvest and possessions, which were threatened by an Ismaili mob that followed in the wake of the French troops, an accusation, the French admitted, that was true20 Although it is difficult to assess the truth of the accusations made against Ilyas, it is clear that the French sacked him as district governor of Banyas He was replaced by Ibrahim Agha al-Kinj, the leader of the Bam 'Ali clan, who was to become one of the dominant Alawi politicians of the mandate period21 On 28 August 1919, after a commission of nine notables, from all communities, was established to work out the details of the reconciliation, the principal leaders of all communities gathered near the shrine of sheikh Badr, venerated by all All swore

"I swear by God, while I place my hand on the shrine of sheikh Badr, with my heart and soul, that I will keep the peace and will not be the cause of any unrest among the population When it does occur, I will do my best to make it stop We are all one soul in several bodies, brothers without distinction in sect and religion"22

French officials such as governor Niéger considered the escalating violence to be the result of French mismanagement of the situation caused by a lack of knowledge In a letter to his superiors, he complained about a lack of competent intelligence officers, and called for an increase in staff and less administrative hassle, which would enable officers to leave their posts and to get to know the population23 Military expeditions, like the one of July 1919, received specific instructions to gather information about clan structure24 Despite all these good intentions, the French realised the peace would be short-lived The French commander, General Hamelin, argued that the negotiations only increased the pretensions of small chiefs, since the negotiations had shown them to be important25 Salih al-'Ali, for example, did not comply with the conditions of his surrender, although he was granted the benefit of the doubt and offered reparations for the damage inflicted on his property by French troops Soon after the Anglo- French delegation had left, he refused to pay his taxes and tried to elude disarmament His prestige increased, especially in the southern parts of the Alawi Mountain, and for a short period

CADN2336 Rapport Nieger(l 1/9/1919) CADN 2357 Journal de la Mission politique des Alaouites-appendice 1(8/10/1919) 21 CADN 2337 Nieger a Georges-Picot (25/9/1919) CADN 2357 Wethered to Allenby (26/8/1919) 22 CADN 2357 Journal de la Mission politique des Alaouites (8/10/1919) 23 CADN 2336 Rapport Nieger (11/9/1919), (12/9/1919) CADN 2342 Rapport Nieger (15/9/1919) See also MAh 17 Jean a Hamelin (13/7/1919) 24 CADN 2342 Note de service (4/7/1919) MAE 17 Jean a Hamelin (13/7/1919) 25 CADN 2325 Bulletin d'information (17/10/1919) SH 4H9 Hamelin a Allenby (20/9/1919) 64 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 even in the 'Akkar plain in northern Lebanon26. The French, solely responsible for the security in the region after the withdrawal of the British forces in the wake of the Anglo-French agreement of 15 September 1919, did nothing27. They realised their weakness, but the postwar demobilisation and the unwillingness of the French government to finance a large army of occupation prevented the quick arrival of reinforcements. It was only in the spring of 1921 that the French were able to free enough soldiers to pacify the Alawi region (section 2.1.2). In the meantime, they aimed to check the violence by progressively occupying the country through the establishment of a chain of military posts around the agitated area, and the building of roads in order to facilitate the operation of mobile columns28. A question that imposes itself is why Salih al-'Ali, after six months of successful resistance that had brought him considerable influence and prestige, accepted Anglo-French mediation? Why did he subsequently fail to live up to the conditions imposed upon him? The simple answer may be that, this time, in contrast to earlier attempts at mediation, the British supported the French effort. The British still had considerable forces in the region that heavily outnumbered the French, and it must have been clear to Salih al-'Ali that, although he could resist the French at that time, resisting the British would mean suicide. However, shortly after the departure of the Anglo-French delegation, British forces withdrew from the French and Arab zones (the Western Zone including Cilicia and the Eastern Zone respectively). If we include other French mediation attempts in our analysis, the evidence suggests that the parties involved accepted French mediation, but breached their promises as soon as the French had turned their back. Clearly, they wanted the conflict to remain an internal affair and to continue with their business as usual. The French underestimated the importance of the principle of collective responsibility. Within such a system of collective responsibility, characterised by the practices of feud and blood money, it is difficult to part with that responsibility and to accept the interference of a third party, as it would cause the system to collapse. In this respect, it is necessary to emphasise the distinction between the violence resulting from local rivalries for which many groups were responsible, and the violence that was aimed directly at the French and for which only the armed band led by sheikh Salih al-'Ali was responsible. The large majority of clans did not resist French rule. In late 1919, the overall political situation had changed. The local conflict had gained a political dimension because of Sharifian and Kemalist support for the armed bands (section 2.1.2), while the French had started with the administrative organisation of the Alawi region (section 2.2). The administrative organisation of the Alawi region gave the larger and more

CADN 2336 Rapport politique du mois d'octobre (30/10/1919). Information (1/11/1919) Rapport politique (11/11/1919) 27 SH 4H9: Hamelin à Guerre (29/7/1919) CADN 2336 Instruction Nicgcrà Jean (20/9/1919) 28 CADN 2200 Jean à Hamelin (22/7/1919) CADN 2336 Instruction Nicgcr a Jean (20/9/1919) CADN 2374 Rapport de Monsieur Bart sur les affaires de la région Tartus-Banyas (3/4/1920) SH 4H9 Hamelin à Guerre (29/7/1919) Hamehn à Allenby (20/9/1919). The birth of Alawi particularism, 1918-1926 65 powerful clans the incentive to cooperate with the French, while it created a new form of politics, with new rules and new arguments, alongside clan politics, and a communal identity alongside clan identity The smaller and less influential clans, on the contrary, with Shanfian and later Kemahst support, were drawn into opposition to the French The scope of the armed resistance against the French increased considerably, especially among the smaller clans, and its centre moved from the south to the north, from the sahd to the relatively inaccessible jabal where most of the smaller clans lived

2.1.2 Sharifian patronage & Kemalist support

In April 1920, a doctor from Damascus visited sheikh Salih al-'Ah In a letter to his brother, the doctor told him that he had read stories in the nationalist newspapers about Salih al-'Ali's heroic exploits and his patriotic movement29 The tone of the letter soon grew sombre, as he claimed that Salih al-'Ali's actions consisted only of theft, pillage, and common banditry, and not of defence of the fatherland and not of an Arab revolution He claimed that the sheikh had influence over no more than twenty people, and he wondered where the thousands of people were - the troops about which the newspapers were writing According to the doctor, the French ('those idiots') too clearly had no idea about their enemy, arguing that they fired their cannons incessantly, as if they were face-to-face with one of the great powers, without hitting anyone Moreover, the writer claimed that the 'coward' Salih al-'Ali sold the weaponry and munitions sent to him by the Shanfians, and had even killed members of the Arab army to sell their uniform Yet, the activity of a few armed bands in the coastal region has come to be remembered as the first nationalist revolt against French occupation Syrian nationalist historiography has carefully cultivated this image and, even today, sheikh Salih al-'Ali is remembered as a nationalist hero (see for example Hasan η d , Hawash 1997, Jundi 1960, Yunus 1947) As has been discussed in section 13 1, the armed bands in the French zone of occupation received Sharifian and Kemahst support For the Kemahsts, the armed bands served a direct military purpose the immobilisation of French forces and the constant harassment of their lines of communication For the Shanfians, the activities of armed bands served political ends They stimulated the image of sheikh Salih al-'Ali as a just hero struggling against the French, an image that was important at a time when they themselves were impotent to confront the French Moreover, the image of popular discontent would weaken the French claim for a mandate over the Levant before the League of Nations The activities of armed bands in the Alawi region took on a political dimension when the Shanfians sought the confrontation with the French, especially after the withdrawal of the

29 CADN 2358 Traduction de la lettre adressée a Damas par un docteur envoyé auprès du cheikh Sahh (21/4/1920) 66 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946

British forces and the occupation of the Bekaa valley by Sharifian forces30. During the summer of 1919, the Sharifians had carefully monitored the events through officials like Rashid Tali', the Druze governor of Hama province (and former governor of Latakia), Muhammad Ahmad, district governor of Misyaf, a liaison-officer called Anis Mahmud Abu Farid, and a Sunni notable from Latakia 'Aziz Bey Harun. In addition, they had gained the support of the two principal Alawi leaders of the Eastern Zone, Isma'il Bey Hawash of the Matawira and Isma'il Pasha Junayd of the Rashawina3'. Through these intermediaries, who could move freely between the Eastern and Western Zones, the Sharifians supplied weapons and money to the armed bands. Sharifian patronage became especially apparent at the time the Syrian Congress was convened in Damascus, early March 1920. Towards the end of February, fighting flared up in the already agitated Banyas and Qadmus regions. French authorities considered the aims of the attacks to be threefold: the division of the group of pro-French Alawi leaders that was slowly emerging (see section 2.2); the immobilisation of French forces in a period when Kemalist attacks threatened the French position in Cilicia32; and the damaging of French prestige at the time Faysal was crowned king of Syria33. At the same time that the fighting flared up in the Alawi region, an armed band in the Alexandretta region led by Subhi Bey Barakat penetrated the city of Antioch. In Beirut, the imams started prayer in the name of king Faysal34, while in the regions of Tallkalakh, Homs, Hama, Marj 'Ayun and Qunaytira, infested with armed Bedouin bands, insecurity reigned supreme35. The Alawi bands that attacked Tartus on 22 February 1920, an attack remembered by Syrian historiography as a major military operation, soon disintegrated for fear of French reprisals36. The French again lacked the necessary troops to respond decisively, which allowed

CADN 2344. Gouraud à Diplomatie (25/11/1919). SH 4H9: Niéger à Hamelin (16/10/1919). SH 4H60 Bulletin hebdomadaire (11-18/12/1919), (19-27/12/1919), (4-10/1/1920). In exchange for his support, Isma'il Bey Hawash was nominated justice of the peace in Misyaf and his son 'Aziz Bey mudtr of Wadi al-'Uyun. CADN 2332 Bulletin de renseignements (16/12/1919). For the role of Rashid Tali', see· CADN 2336 Rapport politique mensuel, mois de juillet (1/8/1919). Rapport politique mensuel (15/8/1919). Rapport Niéger (11/9/1919), (12/9/1919) MAE 17· Jean à Hamelin (13/7/1919) SH 4H9 Rapport Niéger (29/7/1919). CADN 2374: Rapport Bart (3/4/1920). Rashid Tali' also played an instrumental role in the revolts in northern Syria, when he, in his capacity of governor of Aleppo, united the efforts of Ibrahim Hananu and Subhi Bey Barakat (Méouchy 2004: 659). The French had to evacuate the city of Marash after a long siege. MAE 25: Bulletin politique hebdomadaire (30/3/1920). SH 4H43: Gouraud à Diplomatie (3/3/1920) CADN 2342: Rapport politique (23/3/1920) CADN 2346 Gouraud à Diplomatie (21/3/1920). CADN 2374: Rapport Bart (3/4/1920) MAE 25: Gouraud à Diplomatie (28/3/1920) SH 4H43: Gouraud à Diplomatie (17/3/1920) Gouraud threatened to deport imams who did not immediately stop this. MAE 26 Gouraud à Diplomatie (9/4/1920). CADN 2345: Gouraud à Guerre (1/3/1920) SH 4H60: Bulletin hebdomadaire (24/2-1/3/1920), (27/2-5/3/1920). SH 4H130: Information (9/3/1920). French intelligence estimated the core of the band at 200, some 300 Alawis of the region joined in after the looting had started. SH 4H60: Bulletin hebdomadaire (17-23/2/1920), (24/2-1/3/1920). SH 4H130: Rapport Mensier (5/3/1920). The birth of Alawiparticularism, 1918-1926 67 the bands to regroup and extend the fighting to the district of Safita and Misyaf. On 11 March, an armed band led by Salih al-'Ali attacked and occupied the Ismaili village of Qadmus. The band was supported by a nationalist militia led 'Aziz Bey Harun, a nationalist notable from Latakia, that included regular soldiers from Faysal's army37. Simultaneously, bands under the leadership of Ahmad Bey al-Mahmud, the mudir of Khawabi, started looting Christian villages along the coast. The inhabitants reportedly had been told that the looting would stop in exchange for their allegiance to king Faysal18. As a result of these activities, Tartus and other coastal villages were flooded with thousands of Christian and Ismaili refugees. As he had insufficient forces to protect the refugees, General Gouraud ordered the French navy to shell 'rebel villages'39. The attacks clearly had a political character. By demonstrating French impotence in maintaining security, the Sharifians had hoped to estrange the population from its new French rulers, and replace French authority by the nationalist authority40. Faysal denied all responsibility for the attacks, arguing the armed bands only used his name as a pretext to loot. Moreover, he claimed, such agitation was to be expected as the French were actively propagating the autonomy of the Alawi region, and were arming the Christians'". Despite Faysal's denials, Salih al-'Ali claimed the title 'emir of the Alawi Mountain', allowing him to pose as champion of the Alawi cause42. Moreover, emir Faysal, after an initial denial, admitted to the presence of a liaison officer of the Sharifian army, Ghalib Bey al-Sha'lan, but argued that Sha'lan was there to prevent violence43. While the looting continued in the Banyas-Tartus region, more than a thousand predominantly Sunni rebels, led by Sharifian and Kemalist officers, attacked the French military

CADN 2345: Gouraud à Guerre (1/3/1920). MAE 33' Note sur des rapports entre le Haut-commissaire et l'émir Faysal (7/1920) sur les troubles fomentés en Zone Ouest. SH 4H43: Gouraud à Diplomatie (21/3/1920). Interesting is the participation of the Ismaili emir Milhim in the attack, an enemy of the Ismailis of Qadmus CADN 2374: Rapport Bart (3/4/1920) 38 CADN 148 Bulletin politique hebdomadaire (16-22/3/1920). SH 4H60: Bulletin hebdomadaire (9-16/2/1920), (17-23/2/1920) 39 CADN 2358: Gouraud à Faysal (7/4/1920). MAE 25: Gouraud à Diplomatie (28/3/1920). SH 4H43: Gouraud à Diplomatie (21/3/1920) SH 4H57: Gouraud à Guerre (12/3/1920). SH 4H60 Bulletin hebdomadaire (2-8/3/1920), (9-15/3/1920), ( 16-22/3/1920). 40 CADN 2342: Rapport politique (23/3/1920). Rapport politique de Safita (25/3/1920) CADN 2345: Rapport politique (1/5/1920). CADN 2346: Gouraud à Diplomatie (21/3/1920) SH 4H60 Bulletin hebdomadaire (16- 22/3/1920), (23-29/3/1920). 41 CADN 2358: Gouraud à Faysal (7/4/1920) Cousse à Gouraud (2/4/1920), (15/5/1920) Shahbandar à Gouraud (16/5/1920). 42 CADN 2344: Gouraud à Diplomatie (28/3/1920). CADN 2374 Rapport Bart (3/4/1920) SH 4H246: Rapport sur les opérations de la colonne de Tarlus (5/4/1920). MAE 33: Note sur des rapports entre le Haut-commissaire et l'émir Faysal (7/1920) sur les troubles fomentés en Zone Ouest. Gouraud ordered his commanders in the field to look out for regular army officers within the armed bands in order to build his political case against emir Faysal. For example, see SH 4H130: Instruction Gouraud à Debieuvre (26/1/1920). 68 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 post of Babana, to the northeast of the village of Haffa44. The attack occurred shortly before the conference of San Remo on 25 April during which it was decided to grant the mandate over Syria and Lebanon to France. The French offered to recognise Faysal as king of Syria in exchange for his acceptance of the mandate. Faysal, who was under pressure from radical nationalist elements, refused the French offer and openly prepared for war. Attempts to recruit conscripts for the Sharifian army and to collect taxes, however, led to resistance, and Faysal's authority completely collapsed (see section 1.3.1). Meanwhile, the agitation continued and gained strength in the Alawi region. Towards the end of June 1920, some 1,500 rebels roamed around the countryside45. On 14 July, General Gouraud sent emir Faysal an ultimatum. Besides the control over the Rayaq-Aleppo railway, which was crucial to the French war effort in Cilicia, Gouraud demanded the demobilisation of the Sharifian army. In addition, the French demanded that Faysal would allow French forces to enter Aleppo unopposed, accept the mandate, introduce the French-issued Syrian-Lebanese money, and arrest those responsible for the attacks of the armed bands. After a short delay, Faysal unconditionally accepted all French demands. Gouraud, however, ignored this capitulation, and, on 24 July, French forces marched into the Eastern Zone. The Sharifian army was routed and Faysal fled to Transjordan. The Sharifian defeat had serious repercussions for the armed bands operating in the coastal region. Not only did shortages of weapons and munitions arise, but also, more importantly, the bands lost their refuge in the Eastern Zone. The majority of the bands quickly disintegrated, and towards the end of July 1920, the agitation was limited to parts of the Latakia and Banyas districts. Salih al-'Ali sought refuge in Qadmus, where he constituted a 'national government' and raised the Sharifian flag46. The Kemalists were ready to fill the political vacuum, left by the collapse of Faysal's regime, especially after the French, confident because of their victory against the Arab nationalists, had gained the initiative in Cilicia. The Kemalists attempted to increase the pressure on the French by stimulating the simmering unrest in the districts of Sahyun and Jabal al- Akrad47. In addition, they sought the cooperation of the armed bands that, under the leadership of Ibrahim Hananu that had started in the spring of 1919, operated in the regions of Aleppo and Alexandretta. Despite increasing Kemalist support, more and more Alawi leaders surrendered to

CADN 2344: Gouraud à Diplomatie (28/3/1920). Gouraud à Guerre (23/4/1920). Rapport du Zone Ouest (17/4/1920). CADN 2345' Rapport à Affaires étrangères (1/5/1920) SH 4H60 Bulletin hebdomadaire (30/3- 4/4/1920), (6-12/4/1920), (13-19/4/1920), (20-26/4/1920), (27/4-3/5/1920) SH 4H246 Rapport Magnn-Vemercy (2/7/1920). Rapport Goybet (5/5/1920). Captain Magrin-Vemerey, the later legendary General Mondar, governor of the Province of Latakia in the 1940s, commanded the post. 45 CADN 2337: Bulletin quotidien de Tartus (29/5/1920). SH 4H57· Gouraud à Guerre (23/6/1920). SH 4H60 Bulletin hebdomadaire (4-10/5/1920), (11-17/5/1920), (18-24/5/1920), (25-31/5/1920), (1-7/6/1920), (8- 14/6/1920), (15-21/6/1920), (22-28/6/1920). 46 CADN 2337 Bulletin hebdomadaire (1/8/1920), (6/8/1920). SH 4H58: Bulletin hebdomadaire (29/6-5/7/1920), (5-12/7/1920), (13-19/7/1920), (19-27/7/1920), (29/7-4/8/1920). Rapport sur les conséquences politiques de la chute de Faysal (30/7/1920). 47 SH 4H58 Bulletin hebdomadaire (15-21/9/1920), (22-29/9/1920) The birth of Alawiparticularism, 1918-1926 69 the French, among whom Isma'il Bey Hawash and Isma'il Pasha Junayd, the powerful chiefs from the former Eastern Zone. However, tactless French action soon led to new agitation. 'Aziz Bey Hawash, who had lived at odds with his father Isma'il Bey, had hoped the French would support him in his bid to replace his father as leader of the Matawira clan48. As the French flatly rejected his overtures, he sought contact with sheikh Salih al-'Ali. Moreover, accusations against the French of giving preferential treatment to the Ismailis led to new discontentment in the districts Qadmus and Banyas, which allowed 'Aziz Bey Hawash and Salih al-'Ali to join forces. The threat of a Turkish offensive postponed French repression until the end of October, when a French unit captured the fortified position of Qadmus. Towards the end of November 1920, the pacification of the southern half of the Alawi Mountain was complete. Salih al-'Ali fled to the jabal proper that the Alawis considered impenetrable49. The centre of gravity of the agitation slowly shifted north, from the sahil to the jabal. In part, this was due to Kemalist support and the presence of other armed bands to the north of the Alawi Mountain, to which the remaining bands looked for support. In addition, the French policy of seeking the participation of the larger clans in local administration (section 2.2.1) ensured the hostility of the less influential but independent clans - generally, those situated in the jabal, which had no stake in a peaceful settlement of affairs that would mean submission to French-backed chieftains. The last clans to be pacified in 1921 were the small clans in the centre of the jabal, like the Numaylatiyya, Basharigha, Saramita, Qarahila and Nawasira clans50. In December 1920, as the fighting in Cilicia flared up again, the Kemalists tried to group all the armed bands in northern Syria in an effort to immobilise French forces and cut communication lines. When on 2 December 1920 the Kemalists went into the offensive in Cilicia, Ibrahim Hananu attacked Jisr al-Shughur, the Bedouin chief Hashim Bey crossed the Euphrates River, while an Alawi band attacked a French convoy near Jabla. On 3 December, the French camp at 'Ayn al-Sharqiyya was attacked. On 15 December, Alawis and çetes (bands of Turkish irregular soldiers) raided the strategically important Hama-Aleppo railway line near Idlib51. The French struck back in force and, towards the end of January 1921, agitation was

CADN 2342 Note confidenliel sur 'Aziz Bey Hawash (24/3/1920) Note confidentiel sur Isma'il Bey Hawash et 'Aziz Bey Hawash (29/3/1920). CADN 2200: Rapport sur territoire des alaouites (10-11/1920). CADN 2337: Bulletin d'information (2/9/1920), (13/9/1920). MAE 14 Copin à Hamelin (24/6/1919). MAE 113: De Caix à Diplomatie (12/11/1920) De Caix à Gouraud (24/11/1920). SH 4H57: Gouraud à Guerre (2/9/1920) SH 4H58: Bulletin hebdomadaire (5-11/8/1920), (12-18/8/1920), (18-24/8/1920), (25-31/8/1920), (1-6/9/1920), (7-14/9/1920), (15-21/9/1920), (22-29/9/1920), (30/9-5/10/1920), (6-12/10/1920), (13-19/10/1920), (20-26/10/1920), (27/10-2/11/1920), (3-9/11/1920), (10- 16/11/1920), (17-23/11/1920), (24-30/11/1920). SH 4H60· Bulletin quotidien (20/8/1920), (23/8/1920), (25/8/1920), (14/9/1920). SH 4H249: Rapport sur les opérations dans le territoire alaouite (27/5/1921). Gouraud à Guerre (24/11/1921). Rapport Niéger sur les colonnes des Alaouites (9/8/1921). CADN 2199: Gamier-Duplessis à Gouraud (22/12/1920). CADN 2200 Rapport sur le territoire des alaouites (12/1920-1/1921). CADN 2361: Gouraud à Guerre (14/12/1920). MAE 113 De Caix à Berthelot (16/12/1920). SH 4H43: Gamier-Duplessis à Guerre (15/12/1920). SH 4H57: Gamier-Duplessis à Guerre (6/12/1920), 70 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 limited to the jabal proper, Jabal al-Zawiya (Ibrahim Hananu) and Sahyun, where the Sunni leader 'Umar al-Baytar had organised an armed band. At Kemalist instigation, attacks on railroads, road construction sites, and telegraph lines continued52. In February 1921, the French regained the initiative in Cilicia, while the London agreement of March 1921 and a powerful Greek offensive in the west of Turkey enabled them to concentrate a large force in the still agitated Alawi Mountain53. Towards the end of April, the French had cleared the area to the north of the Alawi Mountain, and, in May, operations started against the jabal54. Towards the end of June 1921, the operation was completed and the Alawi Mountain pacified55. Salih al-'Ali escaped arrest, but after failed attempts to recruit a new band, he surrendered himself to the French in Latakia. The French pardoned him on the condition that he would never again meddle in politics56.

2.2 The institutionalisation of Alawi politics (1920-1926) After the withdrawal of the Ottoman forces from the Levant in October 1918, it did not take long for the administrative services in the coastal mountains to collapse completely. Although the principal Alawi leaders had already rejected Faysal's rule and subjected themselves to French rule57, early in 1919, local incidents and outside interference led to the outbreak of the 'Alawi revolt'. According to the French, only the participation of the population's principal leaders in the region's administration could ensure tranquillity. Already in 1919, Alawi leaders had put forward demands for their own state. The French were prepared to grant the Alawis an

(11/12/1920) Gouraud à Guerre (8/12/1920), (27/12/1920). SH 4H58: Bulletin hebdomadaire (1-7/12/1920), (8- 14/12/1920), (15-21/12/1920) SH 4H60 Bulletin quotidien (22/12/1920). SH 4H58: Bulletin hebdomadaire (22-28/12/1920). SH 4H59: Rapport hebdomadaire (28/12/1920-4/1/1921), (5- 11/1/1921), (12-18/1/1921), (19-25/1/1921). SH 4H60 Bulletin quotidien (4/1/1921), (19/1/1921), (24/1/1921). CADN 1369 Rapport sur la situation en Syrie (1-6/1921). SH 4H43: Information (25/3/1921), (7/4/1921) SH 4H57: Gamier-Duplessis à Guerre (29/3/1921) SH 4H59 Rapport hebdomadaire (26/1-1/2/1921), (2-8/2/1921), (9-15/2/1921), (16-22/2/1921), (23/2-1/3/1921), (2-8/3/1921), (8-15/3/1921), (16-22/3/1921), (23-29/3/1921), (30/3-5/4/1921), (6-13/4/1921), (13-20/4/1921), (21-27/4/1921). SH 4H60: Bulletin de renseignements (23/2/1921), (25/3/1921), (26/3/1921), (29/3/1921), (5/4/1921) CADN 2380: Instruction personnelle et secrète (29/4/1921) SH 4H249: Gouraud à Guerre (24/11/1921). SH 4H59: Rapport hebdomadaire (28/4-4/5/1921), (5-11/5/1921), (12-18/5/1921), (19-25/5/1921), (26/5- 1/6/1921), (2-8/6/1921), (9-16/6/1921), (17-23/6/1921), (23-30/6/1921), (1-7/7/1921), (7-14/7/1921), (14- 21/7/1921). SH 4H107: Rapport trimestriel (4-6/1921). SH 4H249: Rapport Niéger (9/8/1921). Rapport Gouraud sur les opérations des Alaouites (24/11/1921). CADN 974: Extrait du rapport hebdomadaire (20-27/4/1922) Gouraud à Guerre (9/6/1922) CADN 1533 Gouraud à Diplomatie (8/8/1921). Billotte à Gouraud (13/9/1921). CADN 1842 Rapport trimestriel (7-9/1922), (10-12/1922). MAE 427c: Bulletin périodique (1-20/3/1922), (20/3-12/4/1922), (20/5-10/6/1922), (11/6-1/7/1922) SH 4H59: Bulletin périodique de renseignements (21/7-5/8/1921), (5-16/8/1921), (16/8-5/9/1921), (5-20/9/1921), (21/9-5/10/1921), (20/10-5/11/1921), (20/11-5/12/1921), (5/12/1921-5/1/1922) 57 CADN 2358: Information (2/11/1918), (11/11/1918). The birth of Alawiparticularism, 1918-1926 71 autonomous entity in which they would constitute a majority. However, they objected to the idea of self-government for that entity, because of what they considered the Alawis' inferior intellectual and social level. The French thought of the Alawis as a group of illiterate and querulous peasants with no political experience and only a limited social horizon, who were not yet able to govern themselves, and whose government the Sunni and Christian communities would not accept. On 1 September 1920, the French created the Territoire autonome des Alaouites and placed it under direct French rule. In 1922, the French began with the federal experiment (see section 1.3.1), which placed the Alawi entity, renamed State of the Alawis, together with the States of Damascus and Aleppo, into a federal framework. The French considered the experiment a failure and dissolved the so-called Fédération des Etats de Syrie in 1924, after which the State of the Alawis was renamed Etat indépendant des Alaouites. This section is divided into three subsections. Section 2.2.1 discusses the creation by the French of the Autonomous Alawi Territory. Section 2.2.2 discusses the experiment of the Syrian Federation. Finally, section 2.2.3 analyses the reports of a popular consultation executed by a French parliamentary committee to seek advice on the future constitution of the Alawi entity, which the Mandate Act required.

2.2.1 The creation of an Alawi state At the outbreak of the 'Alawi revolt' in 1919, several Alawi clans participated in the fighting and political intrigue. Soon, however, the principal leaders of the larger clans such as the Haddadin and the Khayyatin pledged their allegiance to the French. They considered the fighting to be to their detriment, as they lost some of their authority to the armed bands that acted on their own account. The French stimulated attempts of Alawi leaders to seek a rapprochement through the establishment of schools, the distribution of subsidies for the purchase of sowing seeds, and, more importantly, the granting of public functions58. For example, Jabir Effendi al-'Abbas, the supreme leader of the Khayyatin confederation and an important religious chief, was appointed private adviser to the French governor, and received the prestigious Légion d'Honneur. Ibrahim Agha al-Kinj, the leader of the powerfìil Bani 'Ali clan of the Haddadin confederation was appointed district governor of Banyas, and received the Légion d'Honneur for his active support in the suppression of the armed bands59. Both men would dominate Alawi politics during much of the mandate period. Ahmad Effendi al-Hamid, the supreme leader of the Haddadin confederation, who initially opposed the French, was awarded the position of district governor of Jabla after he had rallied to the French, and ultimately hoped to become governor of the

CADN 568 Rapport Fumey (25/11/1919). CADN 743 Rapport sur la situation en Syne, en Cilicie, à Chypre et en Egypte (9/1/1920). SH 4H9- Rapport Niéger (29/7/1919) CADN 1533 Gouraud à Diplomatie (8/8/1921). 72 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946

Alawi Territory, while the former rebel, 'Ali Baddur, received the Légion d'Honneur for his role in the repression of 192160. The principal Alawi supporters and beneficiaries of the armed bands, Isma'il Bey Hawash of the Matawira and Isma'il Pasha Junayd of the Rashawina, also rallied to the French. Until July 1920, the arbitrary border between the Western and Eastern Zones of occupation, which placed them both in the French and the Sharifian sphere of influence, had enabled them to bet on two horses. Hawash, for example, on the one hand acted as a mediator during the Anglo- French mediation attempt of August 1919; efforts for which he was awarded with the release of his son, an Ottoman officer, from a British prisoner of war camp. On the other hand, by supporting the bands he was able to obtain the functions of first justice of the peace, and later district governor of Misyaf. After the French occupation of the Syrian interior, both Hawash and Junayd surrendered and declared themselves to be loyal allies of France, since they expected to be awarded with a position in the future Alawi government as the French overheard them speculating in their Beirut hotel room61. Despite the prevalent image of a popular revolt, in reality a large majority of Alawi leaders was rallied to the French. In fact, already in 1919 and 1920 the French deployed Alawi militias to protect villages against the armed bands, albeit with varying success - in one case, a militia looted the village it was ordered to protect62. In the same period, Alawi leaders put forward their requests for administrative organisation in a number of petitions to the French authorities. They called for the creation of an autonomous entity led by an Alawi governor, but under the exclusive and direct protection of France. Although the Alawis should form a majority in this entity, they considered that all communities should have representatives in all administrative and judicial bodies according to their number. In addition, they advocated the construction of roads and communication lines, and the establishment of banks, schools, and hospitals. Finally, they demanded the creation of an indigenous military force, police, and gendarmerie, with the provision that Alawis would never take part in operations outside the Alawi entity63. On 1 September 1920, around the same time they proclaimed the States of Greater Lebanon, Aleppo, and Damascus, the French created the Territoire autonome des Alaouites out

CADN 568: Rapport Joanms (25/10/1919) CADN 1842- Rapport trimestriel (7-9/1922) CADN 2338: Hamelin à Copin & Georges-Picot ( 15/6/1919). SH 4H58 Bulletin hebdomadaire (18-24/8/1920), (25-31/8/1920). CADN 2342: Rapport politique (23/3/1920). CADN 2374: Rapport Bart (3/4/1920). SH 4H130· Note de service (23/3/1920). 1 have not been able to trace these petitions. However, summanes and discussions of these petitions can be found in CADN 568: Projet d'organisation de la Province autonome des Monts Ansanehs (28/7/1920). CADN 2340 Les revendications des Ansanehs (1920). These reports do not reveal the names of the petitioners, except that they were "the most important chiefs of the Western Zone, speaking in the name of all the clans" See also CADN 2336. Rapport Niéger (12/9/1919). CADN 2358: Information (2/11/1918), (11/11/1918) MAE 17: Jean à Hamelm (13/7/1919). SH 4H9: Hamelin à Georges-Picot (5/7/1919). The birth of Alawi particularism, 1918-1926 73 of the districts of the former sanjaqs of Latakia, Hama, and Tripoli in which the Alawis formed a majority The Autonomous Alawi Territory was divided into two sanjaqs, Jabla and Tartus, and six qada's or districts Jabla, Sahyun, Banyas (sanjaq of Jabla), Tartus, Tallkalakh, Safita (sanjaq of Tartus) The autonomous territory included the municipality of Latakia, to which in 1921 were added the nahiyas or sub-districts of Ba'ir, Bassit, and Akrad The island of Arwad, off the coast of Tartus, was added to the district of Tartus On 18 February 1922, following decree 1264 of the High Commissioner, the administrative divisions ot the Alawi Territory took on a new form The sanjaq of Latakia (districts of Jabla, Sahyun (renamed Haffa), and Latakia) replaced the sanjaq of Jabla, while the districts of Misyaf and Banyas were added to the sanjaq of Tartus (districts of Tartus, Banyas, Tallkalakh (renamed Husn), and Misyaf) In 1934, decree 2568 of the High Commissioner abolished the administrative level of the sanjaq, as it had become too expensive and hindered the centralisation of power64 Concerning the future of the municipality of Latakia, French policymakers had considered two options The first one amounted to the annexation of Latakia to the Alexandretta region on account of the apparent similarity of its religious composition (predominantly Sunni) and social characteristics (high level of education) The proponents of the second option, which advocated its annexation to the future Alawi entity, argued that the peasants of the lands owned by the proprietors of Latakia were largely of Alawi origin and that only a small elite of Latakia's population had a relatively high intellectual level In addition, they considered it unwise to place the Muslim and Christian elites of Latakia outside the jurisdiction of the future Alawi entity, as these elites would continue to exert influence on the surrounding Alawi population, while placing them as a minority in a predominantly Alawi entity would make them more dependent on the French and hinder the development of potential anti-French sentiments Finally, the proponents of the second option considered that an Alawi entity could not develop a viable economy without the port facilities of Latakia, while its bureaucracy could not function without the support of the Sunni and Christian officials who had provided the region's administrative cadres during Ottoman times65 The French considered that the Alawis were not yet ready for self-government, given their 'social and political backwardness' and their preoccupation with 'family quarrels'66 Subsequently, the administrative institutions the French created for the Alawi Territory had a bureaucratic character that put all initiative with the French A French governor, whose principal task consisted of the execution of the instructions of the High Commissioner and the maintenance of public order and security, stood at the apex of the administration He controlled the budget and saw to the collection of taxes French officials represented the governor in every province (sanjaq), district (qada'), and sub-district (nahiya), where they supervised the

64 Weulersse 1940 119-121 CADN 464 Arrête 2568 (2/2/1934) CADN 2141 Orgamsalion politique et économique du Territoire des Alaouites CADN 2129 Historique du Gouvernement de Latakia (9/1934) CADN 568 Note sur la frontiere nord de la future confederation ansarieh (8/7/1920) 66 CADN 2340 Les revendications des Ansanehs ( 1920) 74 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 indigenous functionaries (the mutasarrif, the qa'immaqam, and the mudir respectively). Individual villages were administrated by a mukhtar, who was responsible to the mudir and his French counterpart. In effect, the French officials doubled the indigenous bureaucracy that could not take any initiative without consultation. To represent the population, the French appointed administrative councils on all levels, the most important of which was the council that advised the French governor. In 1923, the French replaced the administrative councils with partly elected representative councils. These councils only had advisory powers; executive power throughout the early mandate period remained in French hands. At the highest level of administration, the French set up seven departments: Interior Affairs, Justice, Public Instruction, Finance, Posts & Telegraphs, Economy & Agriculture, and Public Works. The French created 'departments' or 'services', rather than ministries, as they considered them cheaper than ministries and in order not to create the impression that the Alawi Territory constituted an independent and sovereign country. This would be in breach of the Mandate Act that allowed for the creation of two states, Syria and Lebanon, only67. In addition to altering the administrative set-up of the Alawi Territory and the creation of administrative institutions, the French attempted to set up a distinct judicial system for the Alawis. According to Kramer (1987: 240), this proved to be a "daunting task, for Alawi custom was too dependent upon traditional social authority to be reduced to codified principles and applied in the courts". In 1922, the High Commissioner ordered the Sunni law courts to refrain from trying cases involving Alawis. After a period in which Twelver Shiite judges from Lebanon were imported, Alawi judges henceforth tried Alawis. As Kramer (1987: 239-240) argues, since the Twelver Shiite law courts were as remote from Alawi custom as any other, it is obvious that the French merely intended to place the Alawis outside the jurisdiction of the Sunnis, in an effort to further isolate them from nationalist tendencies68. As Weulersse (1940: 120-121) has argued, the French realised that the Alawi Territory because of its relative poverty, small size, and expensive administrative organisation could never develop a viable economy. To avoid the simple attachment of the Alawi Territory to the State of Aleppo or State of Damascus, but to meet the demands of the nationalists for a unified state, the French High Commissioner, General Gouraud, on 28 June 1922 decreed the formation of the Syrian Federation. On 12 July 1922, the Alawi Territory was renamed State of the Alawis69. The nationalists opposed this new denomination, because it led to confusion on whether 'Alawis' referred to a member of the Alawi religion or a subject of the Alawi state. They argued that administrative divisions should be based on geographical and not religious considerations70.

CADN 568: Projet d'orgamsalion (28/7/1920) CADN 2129 Organisation politique el admmislrative (1935). CADN 2340: Rapport confidentiel (1920) See also Joarder 1977 82 CADN 1842: Rapport trimestriel (7-9/1922) See also chapter 2 for the activities of 'Abd al-Rahman Shahbandar's Iron Hand Society, and the riots surrounding the visit of Charles Crane See for example CADN 974: Lettre du Pays des Alaouiles - traduction résumée (3/2/1924). The birth of Alawi particularism, 1918-1926 75

2.2.2 The federal experiment

In June 1922, the French by decree created the Syrian Federation. A French-appointed Federal Council was to run the daily affairs of the Federation, which initially consisted of the drafting of general laws and the running of centralised services such as the Customs, Public Works, and Post & Telegraphs departments. In time, the French wanted an elected Federal Council to take over other departments71. The Federal Council soon became the centre of dispute. To the indignation of the nationalists of Damascus and Aleppo, the French only assigned 'Francophile' deputies to the Council, and assigned to the relatively small and backward State of the Alawis a number of deputies equal to that of the States of Damascus and Aleppo72. In addition, many non nationalist Aleppine notables preferred the State of Aleppo to remain autonomous. The decision of the High Commissioner to establish the Federal Council and the accompanying administrative services on a permanent basis in Damascus strengthened the fear in Aleppo that Damascus would dominate the political scene as it had done during the Faysal era (Khoury 1987: 127-128). From the outset, the Alawis considered the Syrian Federation to be an economic federation, since each participating state maintained its autonomous administrative organisation. When the French in December 1922 decreed the fédéralisation of the judiciary and the gendarmerie, the Alawis feared renewed oppression at the hands of the Sunnis, as in the federal judicial system they would become dependent on the Sunni court of Aleppo. Alawi anxieties about Sunni dominance were further strengthened by the uncertainty over Franco-Turkish relations due to the delays of the Lausanne negotiations, the news of the defeat of the Greek army in Anatolia, the continued presence of Turkish irregular forces near the Turkish-Syrian border and armed bands in the region of Jisr al-Shughur, and rumours on border adjustments73. Supported by the Christian and Ismaili communities in the Alawi region, the Alawis opposed every expansion of federal power. In the beginning of 1923, petitions started circulating in the villages. In their protests, the Alawis received the support of the famous French Orientalist and member of the French parliament, Maurice Barrés, whose attention was drawn to the protests by a propaganda campaign in the French press that was organised by governor Cayla of the State of the Alawis (which, of course, points to tensions within the French administration). To meet Alawi anxieties, the French authorities provided for the creation of a Court of Appeals in Latakia, with locally recruited members. This prospect split the Alawis, Christians, and Ismailis who had opposed the fédéralisation of services en bloc. During a meeting in Tartus in

Khoury 1987: 127. CADN 2129: Historique du Gouvernement de Latakia (9/1934) CADN 1842: Rapport trimestriel (1-3/1923) The French governor of the Alawi territory, General Bilione, assigned the following members to the Federal Council Ahmad al-Hamid (Haddadin), Jabir al-'Abbas (Khayyatin), Isma'il Bey Hawash (Matawira), Ishaq Nasri (Christian), and 'Abd al-Muhammad Harun (Sunni). CADN 974: Billette à Gouraud (17/6/1922) CADN 974 Bulletin de renseignements (3-17/6/1923). CADN 1842: Rapport trimestriel (10-12/1922), (1-3/1923) MAE 267 Pétition notables du Territoire des Alaouiles (7/5/1922). MAE 286 Bulletin périodique (16/1- 1/2/1923) MAE 427c: Bulletin périodique (1-20/5/1922), (11/6-1/7/1922), (21/8-7/9/1922), (25/12/1922- 25/1/1923), (10-26/7/1923) SH 4H59 Bulletin périodique de renseignements (5/12/1921-5/1/1922). 76 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946

July 1923, representatives of the sanjaq of Tartus accused representatives of the sanjaq of Latakia of sacrificing their common cause to the prospect of offices, which their proximity to the administrative centre of Latakia brought them. In the end, the intervention of Jabir al-'Abbas, who considered himself to be an Alawi statesman, led to a general, though temporary, reconciliation7,1. The predominantly Sunni nationalists of the State of the Alawis welcomed the Syrian Federation, according to the French because they resented being a minority in a state dominated by Alawis. They argued that the incorporation of the State of the Alawis into a Syrian state was only natural, since Alawis and Sunnis were brothers of Islam driven apart by 'a simple misunderstanding'. They promised tax reductions and stimulation of the economy, as the Federation would directly link the Alawi region to Aleppo, its natural economic outlet. To underline their demands, the nationalists also used the tactics of intimidation. When the peace talks in Lausanne between France and Turkey reached a temporary stalemate, the Sunnis threatened the 'friends of France' with violence in the case of renewed hostilities75. In August 1923, High Commissioner General Weygand, General Gouraud's successor, initiated a new phase in the development of the Syrian Federation with the announcement of elections in October 1923 for Representative Councils in the three states of the Federation. Each of these three Representative Councils would appoint five of its members to the Federal Council that was to replace the current Federal Council appointed by the French. In the State of the Alawis, tensions rose between the Alawi chiefs of the two electoral districts, the sanjaqs of Latakia and Tartus. The list of candidates shows that in the sanjaq of Latakia (which included thejabal) sixteen Alawis competed for four seats, while in the sanjaq of Tartus (sahil) with its powerful and large clans only three candidates competed for two seats. The chiefs of the smaller clans in the sanjaq of Latakia generally opposed the elections, as they considered that the number of deputies reserved for this sanjaq was too small with respect to the number of candidates representing the large number of small clans. To overcome the opposition, the High Commissioner decreed the nomination of part of the Representative Council in order to ensure what he called the fair representation of all communities and regions76. In the subsequent elections, the French in all three states continued the Ottoman two- tier system, which was disadvantageous for the politicised (usually anti-French urban) elements of society. In the first round of elections, propertied males, over twenty-five years of age, voted

Fournie & Riccioli 1996: 101 CADN 1842: Rapport Irimcstriel (1-3/1923), (4-6/1923), (7-9/1923). MAE 267 Note sur une démarche de Maurice Barrés (3/9/1923) Weygand à Barrés (12/9/1923). Weygand à Affaires étrangères (22/9/1923). MAE 427c: Bulletin périodique (25/12/1922-25/1/1923), (16/1-1/2/1923), (6-26/2/1923), (15/3-5/4/1923). CADN 974: Bulletin de renseignements (3-17/6/1923). CADN 1842 Rapport tnmestnel (1-3/1923), (7-9/1923). MAE 127 Bilione à Gouraud (16/1/1922). MAE 217: Enquête portant sur l'unité syrienne auprles des personnalités politiques les plus marquants (13/2/1924) MAE 427c: Bulletin périodique (15/3-5/4/1923), (1- 20/5/1923) 76 CADN 1842 Rapport tnmestnel (7-9/1923), (10-12/1923) The birth of Alawiparticularism, 1918-1926 77 for so-called electors (one elector representing six thousand voters on average), while in the second round of elections the electors selected the deputies for the Representative Councils (one deputy representing on average one hundred electors). According to Khoury (1987: 129-130), the French considered they could more easily divide and manipulate the smaller group of electors, while they used a weighted census to ensure that the less-politicised rural areas would select a disproportionately large number of electors77. In the State of the Alawis, thirty-two candidates competed for thirteen seats of which six seats were reserved for Alawis, three for Sunnis, two for Greek-Orthodox, one for an Ismaili, and one for a Maronite. Voters, however, could cast their votes for candidates of other communities. Concerning the two-tier system, the French considered the population of the coastal region incapable of rationally electing a candidate, a decision that should be left to a smaller group of better-educated electors. The turnout at the elections was large: seventy-seven percent of the voters cast their votes in the first round of elections, and 509 out of 513 electors in the second round. The French considered the elections for the Alawi Representative Council tantamount to a plebiscite on autonomy; not surprisingly, a majority of the deputies favoured the continued autonomy of the coastal region. During the first session of the Representative Council in November 1923, the five members for the Federal Council were elected (see appendix 2)78. With the exception of one Sunni deputy ('un musulman d'opinion modérée') who was appointed by the High Commissioner, they favoured the autonomy of the coastal region under French protection and opposed the Federation79. As has been discussed in section 1.3.1, the dissatisfaction about the pace of fédéralisation caused the Federal Council to exceed its competences by adopting a motion calling for Syrian unity. In reaction, some months later in October 1924, the Representative Council of the State of the Alawis adopted a motion that called for direct French rule. In the words of the president of the Council, Jabir al-'Abbas:

"En demandant un gouverneur français, les alaouites ont la conviction qu'ils n'aliènent aucun de leurs droits puisqu'ils font appel à un frère"80.

By decree 2979 of 5 December 1924, General Weygand dissolved the Syrian Federation. On 1 January 1925, the State of the Alawis regained its autonomy under French protection under its

For an account of the elections in the slates of Damascus and Aleppo, see Khoury 1987· 130-133 Note that Ibrahim al-Kinj replaced Ahmad al-Hamid in the Federal Council as representative for the Haddadin confederation. This may indicate a shift in the balance of power within the Haddadin confederation See also chapter 3. CADN 1842: Rapport Inmestnel (7-9/1923), (10-12/1923). MAE 191 Fauconnier à Weygand (10/1923). Weygand à Affaires étrangères (11/12/1923) sur les élections pour le Conseil représentatif. AUJ Ba' (24/11/1923) MAE 477: Ponsol à Affaires étrangères (22/1/1930) sur le régime électorale du Territoire de Lalakia. CADN 1843: Rapport trimestriel (7-9/1924), (10-12/1924). MAE 218: Weygand à Affaires étrangères ( 16/10/1924) sur le vote du Conseil représentatif. AlifBa ' ( 10/10/1924). 78 The Alawis ofSyria, 1918-1946 new name, Etat indépendant des Alaouites, while the States of Aleppo and Damascus merged to become the Etat de Syrie%\

2.2.3 Organic law On 15 June 1925, just before the outbreak of the Great Revolt, the French government charged a parliamentary committee with the elaboration of the future constitutions, or Statuts organiques in the French terminology, for the mandated territories, as required by the Mandate Act. This committee requested a popular consultation, and asked the High Commission to select a number of clan leaders and notables from all communities to give their opinion on the future organisation of the State of the Alawis and its relations with the surrounding states of Syria and Lebanon. The instructions of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the new High Commissioner, General Sarrail, clearly reflect the ambiguity and vagueness of the Mandate Act, and also French thinking on the minorities:

"Juridiquement nous ne sommes tenus qu'à maintenir deux états indépendants, ceux que nomme le mandat donné 'pour la Syrie et le Liban'. Mais politiquement nous pouvons avoir des raisons de ménager le particularisme de certaines minorités intéressantes en dehors de celles qu'abrite le Liban, et nous devons leur assurer un régime plus ou moins autonome dans l'esprit d'un mandat qui nous invite à favoriser 'les autonomies locales dans toute la mesure où les circonstances s'y prêteront'. L'accomplissement de cette obligation peut se concevoir sous plusieurs formes dans le cadre du mandat qui nous impose en tous cas d'assurer la souveraineté et l'indépendance de la Syrie et le Liban mais sans nous imposer rien de plus en ce qui concerne le nombre des états".

The Quai d'Orsay considered four possibilities: four independent states (Syria, Lebanon, the State of the Alawis, the State of Jabal Druze); two independent states (Lebanon and a Syrian Federation consisting of the States of Syria, of the Alawis, and of Jabal Druze); two independent states (Lebanon and Syria, including the autonomous provinces of the Alawis and the Jabal Druze); three independent states (Lebanon, the State of the Alawis, and Syria including the autonomous province of Jabal Druze)82. The Quai d'Orsay as well as General Sarrail favoured the latter option. General Sarrail, answering to the instructions of the Quai d'Orsay, considered the consultations superfluous.

CADN 1843 Rapport tnmestnel (10-12/1924). CADN 2129: Historique du Gouvernement de Latakia (9/1934). MAE 219: Affaires étrangères à Sarrail (6/8/1925) sur le Statut organique pour la Syrie et le Liban. The birth of Alawi particularism, 1918-1926 79

"Pour les musulmans sunnites, l'idée de patrie n'existe pas; elle est absorbée par l'idée de la plus grande Arabie. Un musulman de langue et de race arabe ne peut pas penser autrement. Ceci n'est pas un paradoxe mais une réalité éclairant le problème pour qui connaît l'âme syrienne"83.

Ironically, around the same time the Great Revolt started, one of its principal causes being Sarrail's deep misunderstanding of the Syrian reality. With the consultations underway, Sarrail agreed with the Minister for Foreign Affairs that the High Commissioner should have the right of veto to block decisions which he considered contrary to his interpretation of the interests of the different states under mandate, and the mandate itself. Moreover, Sarrail advised that the High Commissioner should have the right to enforce decisions in the interests of the states which he considered the governments were not prepared to take, such as environmental planning, elaboration of laws, and the modernisation of public services and the tax system. In addition, Sarrail considered that French officials should continue to supervise indigenous officials, while the police and gendarmerie had to remain under strict French control. Finally, French authorities should control the relations between the different states concerning common economic interests84. In practice, the new plans meant the continuation of a policy on which the populations concerned had little influence. Concerning the Alawi region, Sarrail favoured the maintenance of the current situation, as it ensured French control over the coast, and thus the Syrian interior. He did not consider the attachment of the State of the Alawis to the Syrian state even as a remote possibility, as he feared it would lead to a new Alawi revolt 8\ As the High Commissioner and the Minister for Foreign Affairs already had made up their minds on the direction to follow, the popular consultation had become rather superfluous as a political advice. Nevertheless, the results of the popular consultations that continued as planned do provide interesting information on the state of mind and the level of political consciousness of the leaders of the different communities86. The Alawi and Ismaili respondents unanimously demanded autonomy under French protection and control. They did not substantiate their claim, but merely stated that the overwhelming majority of the population wanted it. They admitted the necessity of French administration in view of the lack of political and technical expertise among the population, and its low level of political consciousness.

MAE 221 Sarrail à Affaires étrangères (19/9/1925) sur le Statut organique pour la Syrie et le Liban. MAE 221 Sarrail à Affaires étrangères (19/9/1925). MAE 224: Note à Sarrail sur les consultations des populations (21/11/1925). MAE 221. Sarrail à Affaires étrangères (19/9/1925). For the Alawis: Jabir al-'Abbas, 'Aziz Bey Hawash, Ibrahim al-Kinj, Yusuf al-Hamid, Saqr Khayr Bey, Isma'il Pasha Junayd, 'Ali Agha Sulayman Zaydan, sheikh 'Ali 'Abd al-Hamid, Ibrahim Layka. For the Sunnis Muhammad Harun, Muharraj 'Ali Dib, Muhammad Wahid Harun, 'Abd al-üham Isnb, Jamil Shuman, and 'Abd al-Qadir Shuraytih. For the Ismailis: Muhyi al-Din al-Ahmad, Tamir 'Ali For the Greek-Orthodox Edouard Sa'adah, Wadi' Sa'adah, and Gabriel Bashur. For the Maronites Ilyas 'Ashi. For the French M Gras, M. Roussel, M Odinot, M. Nicolas, and M. Lafemère Their reports are kept in: MAE 222 & MAE 223 80 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946

Differences of opinion only existed on matters of detail, as for example the electoral system (direct suffrage or a two-tier system). The Christian respondents, like the Alawi and Ismaili ones, argued for autonomy and the maintenance of the status quo, but they based their advice on historical experience, arguing that unity with Syria could not but lead to Sunni hegemony, which they obviously considered a bad thing. Only the autonomy of the Alawi region could prevent abuse. They also used an economic argument: the sound Alawi economy could only weaken after incorporation into a Syrian union. In addition to not wanting to fall under Sunni administration, the Christians did not like the prospect of Alawi administration either; therefore, they asked for direct French rule. The Sunnis, like the Christians, based their advice on historical experience and economic arguments, but their conclusion was exactly the opposite. They claimed that the Alawi region, because of its community of language, customs, traditions, economic and social interests, was a natural part of Syria, while the Alawi economy could only improve after incorporation into a unified Syrian state. Some Sunnis, like 'Abd al-Qadir Shuraytih, a leading nationalist from Latakia, vehemently attacked the French, whom he accused of encouraging Alawi separatism:

"Le mandat a été donné sur la Syrie parce que la Société des Nations croit que ce pays est encore incapable de se gouverner par lui-même et a besoin d'être guidé dans la vie politique. Le devoir du Gouvernement est donc de guider les Syriens vers la vérité et de ne pas accepter leurs opinions erronées""7.

Analysis of the reports to the committee reveals several things. All respondents (the principal leaders of the Alawi, Ismaili, Christian, and Sunni communities) pleaded for a republican and representative system in which citizens with equal rights would enjoy freedom of religion and education. As will become clear in the remainder of this study, the respondents probably used the vocabulary of equality and freedom offered by the French to disguise their personal interests that lay in the hierarchical organisation of society. In addition, the similarity of responses on for example the issues of economic cooperation between the mandated areas and the freedom of religion suggests that the formulations of the questionnaire may have influenced the responses, or that respondents gave 'socially desirable' answers (the 'power effects' of the dominant discourse)88. Second, the vocabulary used in the advice points to a different level of political consciousness. While the Sunnis and Christians made more use of abstract arguments to buttress their claims, the Alawis and Ismailis drew on practical experience. The Ismaili emir Tamir 'Ali, for example, advised that one of the articles of the constitution must state that it should be forbidden for gendarmes to forage freely in the villages and to hit or insult people. In addition, he argued that two brothers, or a father and a son, should not be allowed to become

87 MAE 223. Rapport établi à l'occasion de la préparation du Statut organique de 'Abd al-Qadir Shuraytih, musulman sunnite, président de la Chambre de Commerce de Latakia (16/9/1925) Unfortunately, I have not been able to trace such a questionnaire The birth of Alawi particularism, 1918-1926 81 members of the Representative Council at the same time89. Thirdly, Alawi insistence on the creation of an Alawi nationality and an Alawi flag - perhaps inspired by the questionnaire - suggests that something of an Alawi political consciousness had developed. The events of an extraordinary session of the newly elected Representative Council in May 1926, during which the deputies discussed proposals for the future Organic Law, further strengthen the suggestion that an Alawi political consciousness had developed. The Alawi deputies vehemently attacked Sunni and Christian pre-eminence with respect to public employment. They demanded the attribution of administrative functions in proportion to the size of the different communities, and demanded competition for offices within communities only. As the French flatly rejected this demand, the Alawi deputies demanded the responsibility of the directors of the different services before the Council, which was also refused. In addition, a proposed change of name - 'State of the Alawis' into 'Western Syria' - did not meet with much enthusiasm90. Although the session closed without any concrete results, the Alawis had made clear that in any future state they had a right to a share of power in proportion to their numbers. As a French report on the session concluded:

"Ainsi un nationalisme rituel alaouite est né. Il a pris corps et se développe. Il serait vain de ne le dissimuler et dangereux de n'en pas tenir compte"91.

2.3 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have discussed the mobilisation of armed Alawi bands in the period immediately following the French occupation, and the rise of Alawi particularism. The mobilisation of armed bands in the Alawi region has become known as the Alawi revolt of sheikh Salih al-'Ali (1919-1921). Although the revolt had local origins that lay in a protracted dispute between Alawis and Ismailis over land and cattle, the mobilisations followed a pattern that was characteristic of rural mobilisations elsewhere in the Levant, of the harakat al-'isabat. The immediate cause for the fighting lay in the non-payment of blood money on the part of the Ismaili community of Qadmus for the death of an Alawi, which following the logic of segmentary organisation caused the Alawis to attack in order to obtain satisfaction. The subsequent escalation of the conflict was caused primarily by the intrigues of the Maronite district governor of Banyas, who used his knowledge of local power relations and rivalries to his advantage. The French, on the other hand, totally failed to grasp the nature of local power relations and modes of conflict management. Their ill-fated interventions only caused the

MAE 223 Rapport établi à l'occasion de la préparation du Statut organique d'emir Tamir 'Ali, membre ismaélite du Conseil représentatif de l'Etat des Alaouitcs. 90 CADN 1844. Rapport trimestriel (4-6/1926) MAE 267 Extrait du bulletin de renseignements (14/6/1926) 9 ' CADN 1844: Rapport trimestriel (4-6/1926) 82 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 conflict to escalate further, adding an anti-French dimension that thrived in the unfavourable economic conditions of the time With the exception of the actions of sheikh Sahh al-'Ah, against whom French repression was concentrated, the violence soon stopped as the majority of the clan leaders sought a rapprochement with the French in the expectation of obtaining benefits Sheikh Salih al-'Ali, however, needed to sustain his armed band in order to prevent his arrest by the French He needed the support which the Shanfians and Kemahsts were willing to offer, his embrace of Arab nationalism was purely pragmatic Simultaneously, the 'isabat movement gained strength, as the smaller clans of the jabal, considering that French rule was to be especially beneficial to the larger clans of the sahil, refused to accept French rule, offered Sahh al-'Ali a new refuge, and occasionally participated in attacks against the French Although the transition from Ottoman to French rule was characterised by a tremendous increase of state power, it did not change the basic mechanisms of Alawi politics that centred on the Alawi clan structure Out of a marginal position in a large empire, the Alawis suddenly had become the dominant community in a circumscribed autonomous polity The institutionalisation of politics stimulated Alawi clan leaders to participate in the administration of the political entity the French had created for them In addition, the French presence, more than the Ottoman state had done, brought them benefits in the form of official positions, money, infrastructure, education, healthcare, protection, sowing seeds, etc, which gave them a stake in the maintenance of the autonomy of the Alawi region, and, associated with that, of courting the French The common interest of the Alawi leaders - the maintenance of the autonomous status of the coastal region from which they profited - formed the nucleus for a developing feeling of Alawi community The fact that the Syrian Federation (1922-1924) ignored Alawi needs and excluded them from the process of political decision-making accelerated the development of Alawi communal identity, which in this early period was embraced primarily by the Alawi leadership A new form of Alawi communal politics emerged alongside the existent form of clan politics, which, due to the power effects of the dominant cultural compromise of nationalism, expressed itself in the language of Alawi particularism Until the end of the 1920s, clan politics and the new communal politics blended perfectly In the next chapter, I will argue that, from the end of the 1920s onwards, several developments within the Alawi clan structure, in the coastal region, and in the relationship between the French and the Synan nationalists, undermined the legitimacy and validity of this newly developed cultural compromise of Alawi particularism 3

The question of Syrian unity

1926 -1936

After the collapse of the Syrian Federation and the return to autonomy of the State of the Alawis, the Alawi community turned to the economic development of the state, while constantly demonstrating its loyalty to France and the mandate1. For several years, Alawi political life developed untouched by the political and social currents surrounding it. The Great Revolt of 1925-1927 generally left the population indifferent. In February 1926, a few months after the outbreak of the revolt, the newly elected Representative Council unanimously adopted a motion expressing its loyalty to the mandate, and then continued with its deliberations on fishery2. Even the heavy losses suffered by the Second Battalion of the Levant, which included many Alawis, in the initial confrontations of the revolt did not lead to anti-French demonstrations or even criticism. On the contrary, French intelligence reports suggest that the Alawis generally condemned the revolt and called for its quick and severe repression1. Other defining moments of Arab history in this period, such as the revolt in Palestine in 1929'', did not in the least interest the Alawis, although Muhammad Sulayman al-Ahmad, one of the leading autonomist Alawi politicians of the era, on more than one occasion expressed his admiration for the Jewish settlers in Palestine, who had brought "gold, progress, and benefaction"5.

1 CADN 1844: Rapport trimestriel (1-3/1925), (4-6/1925). MAE 201: Bulletin d'information (16/1/1927). MAE 427b Bulletin hebdomadaire (11-18/4/1925), (2-9/5/1925) 2 CADN 401: Rapport (8/2/1926) sur la session extraordinaire (4/2/1925) du Conseil représentatif. MAE 267 Jouvenel à Diplomatie (5/2/1926) See also AlifBa (10/2/1926) 3 CADN 1844: Rapport trimestriel (7-9/1925) 4 CADN 975: Compte-rendu de Lalakia (31/8/1929). MAE 433: Bulletin d'information mensuel (3-6/1928) MAE 434 Bulletin d'information mensuel (8-10/1929) Bulletin hebdomadaire (17-24/2/1929) MAE 435: Bulletin hebdomadaire (21-28/7/1929) 5 MAE-SDN 598: Petition of Muhammad Sulayman al-Ahmad (14/5/1936). 84 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946

Nevertheless, as has been discussed in section 1.3.2, the political tide was slowly turning to the advantage of the Syrian nationalists and unionists. After the Great Revolt, France acknowledged that it could no longer control the mandated territories by force. Therefore, the French drafted a political program that aimed to satisfy France's needs (its continued presence in the Levant) and accommodate nationalist wishes (a unified state). This program envisaged the election of a Constituent Assembly that would draw up a Syrian constitution as required by the Mandate Act, and the negotiation of a Franco-Syrian treaty. Simultaneously, the nationalists, organised in the National Bloc, realised that armed resistance could only lead to failure and defeat, and discretely sought a rapprochement to the French. On 9 September 1936, the resulting policy of'honourable cooperation' (1927-1936) culminated in the signing of the Franco-Syrian treaty. With regard to the shifting balance of power between and within the Alawi clans, the rise of the new Murshidiyya-Ghasasina confederation was of crucial importance. Section 3.1 will discuss the early career of its leader, the charismatic Sulayman al-Murshid, whom his followers revered as a God. Murshid, who in a state of trance was believed to be able to communicate with the prophet Khidr, succeeded in amassing large plots of land and attracting a large following among the Alawi population. Although Murshid's political ascendancy would reach its zenith only in the late 1930s and early 1940s, his influence was already considerable in the late 1920s and early 1930s. His ascendancy largely went at the expense of the Khayyatin confederation led by Jabir al-'Abbas, since many of his followers shifted their allegiance from him to Murshid. The rise of Murshid and other, less spectacular, developments within the Alawi clan structure, and the subsequent decline of 'Abbas' power became painfully manifest in the 1930 elections for the Representative Council, as will be discussed in section 3.2. After he lost the presidency of the council to his rival Ibrahim al-Kinj of the Bani 'Ali clan, 'Abbas, until then the leading protagonist of Alawi autonomy, embraced the idea of 'Syrian unity with administrative decentralization', and increasingly looked to the unionists within the coastal region and the Syrian nationalists outside of the coastal region for support. 'Abbas broke the relative isolation of the coastal region from the Syrian interior that the French and the autonomists had sought. Given the shift in the relationship between the French and the Syrian nationalists, this meant that the nationalists were able to make deeper inroads in the coastal region. Alawi politics had reached a new level. The French presence had two contradictory consequences for the traditional Alawi, Sunni, and Christian leaderships in the coastal region. On the one hand, the French need for local intermediaries willing to participate in the administrative and judicial institutions strengthened the position of these leaderships, while, on the other hand, the establishment of administrative and judicial institutions, complete security, a healthcare system, schools, a cadastre, infrastructure, and the Troupes Spéciales (native auxiliary soldiers), gradually diminished the dependency of the people on their clan leaders and patrons. These developments enhanced the physical and social mobility of the population, and allowed a number of people, among them many Alawis, to settle in the predominantly Sunni coastal towns and villages, a The question of Syrian unity, 1926-1936 85 drift that stimulated a competition for jobs and housing In addition, the deployment of the Troupes Speciales, which included many Alawis, in the coastal towns led to the blurring of the physical boundaries that had existed between the two communities up to that time Violent incidents started to occur in these coastal towns and villages, the most notorious incident being the confrontation between Sunni civilians and Sunni, Christian, and Alawi members of the Troupes Speciales in Latakia in January 1933 (see section 3 3) Most Alawis and Sunnis, as well as the French, interpreted this confrontation in sectarian terms, as a confrontation between Sunnis and Alawis Some used the confrontation, and especially its perceived sectarian background, as a legitimisation for Alawi political autonomy, while others avoided the issue of sectarianism and blamed the French The incident brought to the fore some important questions relating to Alawi identity that were already current among the Alawi population are the Alawis Muslims9 Are the Alawis Arabs9 The evidence suggests that these discussions became the object of political bargaining - unionist Alawis and nationalist Sunnis arguing that they were Muslims, and particularistic Alawis arguing that they were not Associated with the weakening of the vertical forms of organisation was the emergence, from the 1930s onwards, of horizontally organised cross-sectarian political organisations that included young educated Alawis (sections 3 4 & 3 5) Some scholars (for example Gubser 1979, Yaffe-Schatzmann 1995) have interpreted the emergence of these organisations as a challenge to the traditional leadership of the vertically organised clans It is my argument that these organisations should not be considered as a challenge but as a complement to the traditional leadership These organisations only had a limited following, while most of them belonged, not coincidentally, to the Khayyatin confederation led by Jabir al-'Abbas Although some cracks in the traditional Alawi leadership seemed to develop because of the slow rise of horizontal organisations, the clan structure remained firmly in place, and Alawi politics for the time being primarily remained elite clan politics As I will demonstrate in chapter 4, it was the traditional Alawi leadership that would deal a near fatal blow to the Syrian union scheme when its authority was challenged

3.1 The rise of Sulayman al-Murshid

One of the most important Alawi leaders of the mandate period was Sulayman al-Murshid The charismatic Murshid, whom his followers considered to be a deity, was the spiritual and worldly leader of the Murshidiyya-Ghasasina contederation, which from the early 1930s onwards developed into the single most powerful Alawi confederation Not only did he completely change the Alawi political constellation, he also founded a new Alawi sect, the Murshidiyya, alongside the existing Haydanyya and Kalaziyya sects The Murshidiyya-Ghasasina developed largely at the expense of clans belonging to the Khayyatin and Kalbiyya confederations such as the 'Amamira and the Darawisa, which demonstrates the dynamic character of segmentary societies In contrast to the Khayyatin, Haddadin, Matawira, and Kalbiyya confederations. 86 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 within which certain clans were looked upon as dominant6, the Murshidiyya-Ghasasina had a highly centralised organisation at the apex of which stood its founder, Sulayman al-Murshid. Murshid's humble background - he was bom in 1907 as a shepherd - stood in stark contrast with the other dominant Alawi leaders. Most of these leaders had held official positions in the Ottoman administration, judiciary, and army in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as their titles demonstrate: Jabir al-'Abbas and Ahmad al-Hamid held the title of Effendi, Ibrahim al-Kinj the title of Agha, Isma'il al-Hawash the title of Bey, and Isma'il al-Junayd the title of Pasha. The early career of Sulayman al-Murshid, during which his religious movement developed into a political movement, has been the subject of several descriptive studies, based on a variety of sources. Yaffe (1993) makes extensive use of the French archives, while Franke (1993) conducted fieldwork in the Alawi Mountain, and draws on a rather hostile biography of Murshid written in 1947 by George Dakar, a Greek-Orthodox Christian from Latakia. In a later article (1997), Franke draws on a written statement by Saji al-Murshid, the current leader of the Murshidiyya sect, which constitutes the first authorised Murshidi document in history. Despite the wide variety of sources, much remains unclear; in fact, the sources used are often contradictory. Even Murshid's name is disputed; Saji al-Murshid claims it is Salman and not Sulayman (Franke 1997: 186). This section provides an outline of Sulayman al-Murshid's early career, and focuses on the shift of Murshid's movement from a religious to a religious-political movement. In contrast to the studies mentioned above, this study will focus on the role of the Murshidiyya-Ghasasina confederation in Alawi politics (see also chapters 4 and 5). In this section, I will discuss the early career of Sulayman al-Murshid. On the exact origins of his prophecy, many contradictory explanations exist; the most accepted explanation being that Murshid's followers, originally members of the 'Amamira and Darawisa clans and affiliated with the Haydari sect, believed that during a state of trance Murshid could communicate with the popular deity Khidr. Sulayman al-Murshid himself belonged to the 'Amamira clan of the Khayyatin confederation and the Haydari sect. Yaffe (1993: 626) considers Murshid's Haydari affiliation of central importance to the rise and spread of his movement. She argues that three local sheikhs, aware of the great need of the Haydaris for mysticism, organised religious ceremonies, which, from the descriptions, may be identified as popular religion7. Franke (1997: 181), instead of three sheikhs, mentions only two sheikhs, while Saji al-Murshid argues that

Within Ihe Khayyatin confederation, the Khayyatin clan led by the 'Abbas family was looked upon ab the leading clan of the Khayyatin confederation, while in the Haddadin confederation this position shifted during the mandate period from the Haddadin clan led by the Hamid family to the Bam 'Ali clan led by the Kmj family of the Bayl Fadl Within the Matawira confederation, the dominance of the Matawira clan of the Hawash family shifted towards the 'Isa family of that same Matawira clan Within the Kalbiyya confederation, finally, the Rashawina clan led by the Junayd family was dominant 7 See also CADN 974 Rapport Tommy-Martin (2/5/1925) The question of Syrian unity, 1926-1936 87

"it was the boy who admonished even the clergymen themselves to give up all their wickedness and to return on the way of penitence and virtue back to God. [...] The truth is that they fought Salman from the very beginning, that they belonged to the most ardent opponents of his religious call (da 'wa) and that they were heading the faction of persons who were denouncing him to the French authorities and instigating people to fight him and his followers" (quoted in Franke 1997: 186).

An informant of the French intelligence service linked the rise and spread of the movement to the miserable economic and social conditions prevailing at the time. The informant pointed to illegal and arbitrary actions on the part of the gendarmerie that foraged freely in the villages, the imposition of forced labour by the French for the building and maintenance of roads, and the rising level of taxes. These factors, combined with the growing economic crisis, according to the informant, prevented the population from paying its usual gifts to the sheikhs, who, in order to gain more leverage over the population to extract more money, created the prophecy of Sulayman al-Murshid. In December 1923, Murshid was arrested8. According to Franke (1997: 181), Murshid made use of his absence by claiming that he had not been in jail, but rather that Khidr had brought him to paradise. At this point, Franke argues, Murshid gained the standing of a prophet (up to that time, he was recognised only as a medium). As with Alawi religion in general, much remains unclear about the Murshidi religion. Franke (1997: 178), while making numerous reservations, considers it to be "the expression of a deep religious feeling affecting wide circles of the Alawi community during the early twenties". He relates the rise of Murshid's movement to grievances within the Alawi community such as backwardness, poverty, and discrimination by its predominantly Sunni neighbours, and draws a parallel with the work of a contemporary Alawi historian, Muhammad al-Tawil (1987: 525-534), who distinguished between the glorious Alawi past and the Alawis' current weakness because of poverty, the division of the Alawis in clans and sects, Sunni oppression, and ignorance. As a remedy, Tawil (1987: 535-537) argued for a rapprochement between the two religious groups, and claimed that the Alawis were Ja'fari Shiite Muslims (muslimun shi'iyyun ja'fariyyuri). Both Yaffe and Franke report that some Haydari chiefs, in an effort to curb rumours about the sect, sought or feigned (invoking the principle of taqiya) a rapprochement with Sunni Islam, which constituted a considerable break with Alawi custom. They opened public prayer sites, and sometimes even held gatherings in Jabla's mosque. According to Yaffe (1993: 627), this constituted a first attempt on the part of the Haydaris "to earn a degree of legitimation from other Islamic trends, or at least moderate their criticism, by imitating their lifestyle, since it was an established fact that Alawis had no mosques". Franke (1997: 183) claims it was said that Murshid ordered his followers to honour the Islamic pillars of Ramadan and prayer, that he prohibited the consumption of alcohol, and favoured the instruction of women, which

CADN 974: Rapport d'informateur (valeur 7/10) sur le nouveau prophète des alaouites. CADN 1842 Rapport trimestriel (10-12/1923). 88 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 constituted a clear break with custom. Major Tommy-Martin, the head of the French intelligence service, confirmed some of these changes in custom, but also suggests that it was not a question of seeking a rapprochement with Sunni Islam, but of contempt for the ancient Alawi cult and doctrine9. This suggestion is strengthened by Bou-Nacklie (1998: 281n29), who argues that the Sunnis were deeply offended by Murshid's blasphemous acts such as the claim that Murshid would raise the dead as a prelude to the end of the world. Given the rapid spread of the religious movement over the Alawi Mountain, Murshid's message must have been popular. From Murshid's home village of Jawbat Burghal, the movement soon gained the districts of Haffa, Misyaf, and Husn, the region around Horns10 and even the town of Hama. Yaffe (1993: 628) considered the Shiite tradition of da'wa, which she describes as "the despatch of pioneer missionaries and propagandists to new territories, in order to create a bridgehead for the rest of the community to follow", of primary importance for the spread of the movement. Saji al-Murshid argues that no active missionary work was undertaken by the movement, but that the message spread itself through people who had visited Murshid in Jawbat Burghal and had become impressed by the 'honesty and genuineness' of his message (Franke 1997: 186). Yaffe's analysis is strengthened by the events in April 1925 in the village of 'Aliyat, twenty kilometres to the southeast of Horns, where inhabitants who had embraced Murshid's message massacred some forty others who had refused to do so. French troops, sent to the village to investigate, met with fierce resistance and had to make use of armoured vehicles to enter the village. The soldiers surrounding the village witnessed some bizarre events. At one time during the siege, several men, women and children appeared on the roofs of the houses, flapping with their arms while shouting "Ya 'Ali, ya 'Ali, 'Ali Allah, 'Ali Allah". Reportedly, the village sheikh had told them they could fly away". The position of the French in the early period of Murshid's movement remains ambiguous. Yaffe (1993: 626-627) argues that the French chose not to interfere as long as the movement did not threaten the security of the region. However, as the rise of Murshid awakened old hatreds and led to economic competition between Kalazi and Haydari notables, the French did send a local official to Jawbat Burghal to restore order. Yaffe (1993: 627) gives as an example the economic competition over the marketing of the famous Abu Riha tobacco, produced by the 'Amamira clan to which, at this stage, many of Murshid's followers belonged. Yaffe argues that the farmers only wanted to sell to Haydari traders, and chased away Kalazi and

9 CADN 974: Rapport Tommy-Martin (2/5/1925) In 1925, only five out of seventy villages in the Horns region adhered to the movement. CADN 974 Notice sur les événements de 'Aliyat ( 11/1926) " CADN 974· Rapport Burthe d'Annelet (2/5/1925) Rapport Tommy-Martin (2/5/1925). Rapport Coux sur son enquête dans la région de Shin (Jabal Hulw) au sujet des événements qui ont eu comme théâtre le village de 'Aliyat (3/5/1926) Schoeffler à Sarrail (4/5/1925) Rapport Maitrot (13/5/1925) Pnvat-Aubouard à Sarrail (17/7/1925) Notice sur les événements de 'Aliyat (11/1926). See also Al if Ba' (5/5/1925) Weulersse's (1940 335) often used description of people charging the French with wooden sticks that they believed would turn into rifles cannot be substantiated from these reports The accuracy of Weulersse's report is doubtful, as it places the massacre in 1924 and not 1925 The question of Syrian unity, 1926-1936 89

Christian merchants, which could lead to escalation. Franke (1997: 185), on the contrary, argues that the French on several occasions tried to dissolve the new sect, because they considered it a threat to public security. Bou-Nacklie (1998: 282) argues that, although the French intelligence services in their official reports appeared surprised about this 'sudden burst of religious fanaticism', it appears that some intelligence officers followed their own agendas. He claims that, in 1925, certain French officers secretly supported Murshid with arms and impunity to intimidate anti-French forces in Hama, where Murshid had a large following among the population. It is certain that, after the incidents in 'Aliyat, the French sent Murshid into exile in Raqqa in northern Syria, where he would remain until August 1927. Murshid's arrest temporarily halted the spread of his movement, although the 'miraculous' birth of his first son in March 1926, the story being similar to that of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin Mary, sparked off new religious fervour among his followers12. Both Franke (1997: 185) and Yaffe (1993: 632-633) signal a change in the French policy concerning Murshid towards the end of the 1920s, perhaps because of a change of French staff in the Alawi region. As Franke concludes,

"From now on he was no longer considered a troublemaker dangerous to public security, but a potential ally in the French fight against the Syrian nationalist movements within the Alawi territory. [...] It was obvious in that time that ephemeric political interests supplanted the originally religious motivation of Mursid's movement".

3.2 Unionism gains ground Although Sulayman al-Murshid's movement started as a purely religious movement within the current clan structure, the sheer number of his followers acquired him a political influence, especially as many of them began acknowledging his authority in worldly affairs. As such, Murshid's followers, united in the Murshidiyya-Ghasasina confederation, gained in political power. Together with developments in the southern part of the coastal region, the gradual rise of the Murshidiyya-Ghasasina confederation seriously upset the balance of power within the Alawi community, which became manifest in the elections for the Representative Council in April 1930. As has been discussed in the introduction to this chapter, the period of 1930-1936 was characterised by a relative decline in power of the Khayyatin confederation of Jabir al-'Abbas, who subsequently shifted his allegiance from Alawi autonomy to the idea of 'Syrian unity with administrative decentralization', and looked to the unionists within the coastal region and the Syrian nationalists outside the coastal region for support. This section will link the changing

CADN 1844 Rapport tnmeslncl (1-3/1926) 90 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 power relations within the Alawi clan structure directly to the rise of unionism among certain clans. Up to 1929, a balance of power existed between an alliance of the Khayyatin and Matawira confederations on the one hand, and the Haddadin on the other hand. The death in March 1929 of the supreme religious and worldly leader of the Haddadin, sheikh Ahmad Effendi al-Hamid, seriously upset this balance, as did a quarrel over the presidency of the Representative Council between the incumbent president Jabir al-'Abbas and his challenger 'Aziz Bey Hawash, the leaders of the Khayyatin and the Matawira respectively. In order to gain numerical superiority in the forthcoming elections, due for 6 April 1930, 'Abbas, much to the dismay of Hawash, sought a rapprochement with the new leader of the Haddadin, Yusuf al-Hamid. The numerical superiority of this alliance would make Hawash's election as deputy for the Representative Council for the southern sanjaq virtually impossible. In addition, 'Abbas sought a rapprochement with Ibrahim al-Kinj, leader of the Bani 'Ali clan, whom he considered his principal rival for the presidency. Hawash, in tum, made overtures to 'Ali Muhammad Kamil, a popular religious sheikh of the Numaylatiyya clan of the Matawira confederation13. In contrast to previous elections, the electors in the second round of the elections would cast their votes directly in order to prevent the selling of votes. In addition, the votes would be cast by community to protect the smaller communities. For example, in previous elections, the numerically weak Ismaili community did not have much influence in the election of its deputy, which was determined by the numerically superior Alawi and Sunni communities, the leaders of which could order their electors to support a certain Ismaili candidate. Thirdly, the number of deputies increased from fifteen to sixteen (including two appointed Alawi deputies, one appointed Sunni, and one appointed Greek-Orthodox), and their mandate was extended from four to five years. Candidates competed for twelve seats in three constituencies. In the sanjaq of Latakia, the candidates could compete for five Alawi seats and one Sunni seat; in the sanjaq of Tartus, candidates could compete for two Alawi seats and one Sunni seat. In addition, three seats were reserved for a Greek-Orthodox Christian, a non-Greek-Orthodox Christian, and an Ismaili; seats that could be disputed by candidates from both the sanjaqs of Latakia and Tartus. The High Commissioner would nominate an additional four candidates 'to ensure the fair representation of all communities and regions'. Finally, the 'clause of residence' was suppressed, which stipulated that a candidate should have lived at least six months in his electoral district directly prior to the elections'4. The different candidates in the elections did not present any programs. It was known among the population whether a candidate favoured the continued autonomy of the coastal

13 CADN 840 Compte-rendu de Latakia (25/1/1930), (1/2/1930), (8/2/1930), (22/2/1930), (8/3/1930) CADN 975 Compte-rendu de Latakia (23/3/1929), (30/3/1929), (8/6/1929), (14/12/1929) MAE 435 Bulletin hebdomadaire (24-31/3/1929), (28/5-5/5/1929) 14 CADN 401 Schoeffler à Ponsot ( 15/4/1930) MAE 477 Ponsot à Affaires étrangères (22/1/1930) sur le régime électoral du Territoire de Latakia The question of Syrian unity, 1926-1936 91 region or Syrian unity, but it is highly unlikely that this knowledge influenced the elections, as generally voters voted for their notable or chief, irrespective of their ideas or political aspirations. Some candidates tried to influence the voters by claiming that their adversaries favoured the introduction of military conscription. In the election, for the first time, a younger generation of Alawis with unionist sympathies made itself heard (see also section 3.5). One of them, 'Abd al-Karim al-Khayyir (a leading author of Alawi apologetic studies in post- independence Syria), vehemently attacked the old guard of clan leaders:

"The old people in the Council are the slaves of the mandatory power. The time has come for them to be replaced by the young who do not accept anything without discussion and stand up for their rights"15.

In total, 82 percent of the voters cast their vote. The elections in the sanjaq of Tartus turned out to be an open-and-shut case, as Jabir al-'Abbas and Yusuf al-Hamid in the competition for the two Alawi seats gained an easy victory over the third candidate, 'Aziz Bey Hawash. The elections in the sanjaq of Latakia, on the contrary, led to a surprise as Muhammad Khalil Khartabil was elected at the expense of sheikh 'Ali Muhammad Kamil16. The election of Khartabil was indicative of the rapidly rising power of the Murshidiyya-Ghasasina confederation under the leadership of Sulayman al-Murshid, described in the preceding section. In his quest to gain political footage, Murshid had received the support of several Alawi notables like 'Ali Agha Baddur of the Darawisa clan, and Saqr Darwish of the Mahaliba clan17. However, for some reason, Murshid did not stand as a candidate himself. Instead, he put forward his second in command, the former village constable or blacksmith of Jawbat Burghal, Muhammad al- Khartabil. Yaffe (1993: 633) argues that, in the build-up to the elections, Murshid and Khartabil had also enlisted the support of Ibrahim al-Kinj, but she does not explain this. In my opinion, Kinj willingly supported the election of Khartabil, as it would be at the expense of sheikh 'Ali Muhammad Kamil, with whom he lived at odds, while it would at the same time constitute a defeat for his principal rival 'Abbas, since Murshid and Khartabil's clan primarily consisted of members of the 'Amamira fraction of the Khayyatin confederation, led by 'Abbas. On 25 April 1930, the new Representative Council elected Ibrahim al-Kinj, who could count on the support of the Alawi deputies from the sanjaq of Latakia (his own electoral district), as its president, and not Jabir al-'Abbas who had held the office since 1923. 'Abbas held the French authorities responsible for his defeat, and, subsequently, he refused to sign the

15 CADN 840 Comple-rendu de Latakia (29/3/1930). See also CADN 401 Schoeffler à Ponsot (15/4/1930) MAh 477 Ponsot à Affaires étrangères (22/1/1930) CADN 464. Rapport du service de renseignements (25/8/1930) sur les elections alaouites CADN 840. Comple- rendu de Latakia (12/4/1930), (19/4/1930) MAE 475: Note sur l'élection pour le renouvellement des membres du Conseil représentatif de l'Etal des Alaouites (2/4/1930). 17 Yaffe 1993 632. CADN 975-Bulletin de renseignements (7/8/1929). 92 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 customary declaration of loyalty and collaboration of the Representative Council to the High Commissioner. In order to save face, Jabir al-'Abbas attempted to pose as an Alawi statesman who stood above the factions, as the commotion over the new Organic Law, promulgated on 22 May 1930, suggests. Although the Organic Law in effect was nothing more than the formal reflection of the existing conditions, the Alawis immediately protested against the suppression of the words 'Alawi' and 'state' in the region's name, which, on 14 May 1930, had been renamed 'Government of Latakia' by decree 3113 of the High Commissioner. The autonomists considered this change of name to be the first step towards incorporation into a Syrian state, especially as the Organic Law did not fix the boundaries of the territory or the Alawi 'nationality'. In addition, the Organic Law formally allowed the (French) governor to pass laws and control the budget without prior consultation of the Representative Council, which was to meet only once instead of twice a year. Many of the protests against this perceived intrusion on Alawi autonomy and demands for increased competences for the Representative Council were initiated by Jabir al-'Abbas. At the same time, however, 'Abbas sought a rapprochement with the unionists in the Government of Latakia. In July 1930, he refused to sign a telegram from the Representative Council to the League of Nations, in which the deputies protested against a unionist petition demanding the incorporation of the Government of Latakia into Syria18. On 10 August 1930, 'Abbas had a meeting with members of the nationalist Dandashi family of Tallkalakh at the instigation of Khalil Atasi, a cousin of the important nationalist leader Hashim Atasi. As 'Abbas, although weakened, still constituted a force to be reckoned with, the autonomists attempted to lure him back into their camp by promising him the position of president of the Representative Council (a promise they could not keep, as 'Abbas did not participate in the November session of the Representative Council)'9. In addition, the autonomists promised the transfer of the administrative capital of Safita district from the village of Safita to Draykish, an old wish of 'Abbas20, and promised to discourage the conversions to Christianity (I will return to these conversions later in this section)2'. Other Alawi leaders who had been unsuccessful in the elections, the most important of whom was sheikh 'Ali Muhammad Kamil, openly sought the support of the unionists within the coastal region and the Syrian nationalists outside of it. Kamil blamed the leading autonomist

CADN 464- Conseil représentatif à Ponsot (1/5/1930) sur la déclaration d'attachement et de collaboration Rapport du direction du service de renseignements -(25/8/1930). CADN 840: Compte-rendu de Latakia (26/4/1930), (17/5/1930), (24/5/1930), (5/7/1930). MAE 477: Ponsot à Affaires étrangères (18/1/1930) sur le Statut organique du Territoire de Latakia MAE 478 Note sur le Statut organique (17/4/1930) MAE 479 Ponsot à Affaires étrangères (29/5/1930). For the petitions of the autonomist members of the Representative Council against the suppression of the name State of the Alawis, see MAE 479 (24/5/1930), (26/5/1930). CADN 840· Compte-rendu de Latakia (13/12/1930). See for example CADN 974- Bulletin hebdomadaire (3-17/6/1923). During Ottoman times, the Alawi village of Draykish had been the administrative centre of Safita district, but shortly after World War I the French had moved it to the predominantly Christian village of Safita, where belter roads and communication lines existed. Due to the presence of administrative institutions, the economy of Safita developed rapidly 21 CADN 464: Notice de renseignements sur l'attitude actuelle de Jabir al-Abbas (26/8/1930) The question of Syrian unity, 1926-1936 93

Ibrahim al-Kinj for his failure to be elected, and would become his fiercest opponent. Together with sheikh 'Ali Shihab and 'Abd al-Karim al-Khayyir, he organised a unionist movement among the Alawis, which received the support of the Greek-Orthodox Nicolas Bashur, another former autonomist turned unionist after his failure to get elected in the Representative Council22. Throughout 1931 and 1932, together with the leading unionist Sunnis 'Abd al-Qadir Shuraytih, 'Abd al-Wahid Harun, Majid al-Safiya, and the Maronite Fa'iz Ilyas, they drew up petitions demanding the incorporation of the Government of Latakia into the Syrian state23. In order to counter the dominance of the autonomist Alawis, grouped around Ibrahim al-Kinj, 'Ali Muhammad Kamil attempted to bring about a reconciliation between Jabir al- 'Abbas, Yusuf al-Hamid, and 'Aziz Bey Hawash24. This attempt at reconciliation failed as 'Abbas, in order to weaken Hawash, urged a faction of the Numaylatiyya, until that time dependent on the Matawira of Hawash, to follow sheikh Mansur al-'Isa of the Numaylatiyya of Bira - member of the Representative Council, a close friend of 'Abbas, and an enemy of Hawash. Throughout 1931 and 1932, 'Abbas endeavoured to divide the Matawira. In August 1932, after a conflict between 'Aziz Bey Hawash and the esteemed religious sheikh Muhammad Dib al-Khayyir, the latter, advised by 'Abbas, urged his followers among the Matawira clan to pledge allegiance to the son of Mansur al-'Isa, and no longer follow 'Aziz Bey Hawash2\ On his part, Hawash, in order to play 'Abbas a nasty trick, stimulated the conversion to Catholicism of members of the Rasalina clan, dependent on 'Abbas, who in his tum blamed the French for the conversions. The reconciliation of the Kalbiyya, until then split into two rival blocs, constituted another setback for Kamil, the author ofthat division26. The conversions of Alawis to Christianity resulted from two converging developments: the political intrigues between the different clans and the need for such a conversion on the part of the converts. The majority of the conversions took place among the Rasalina clan (Kalbiyya confederation), which was led by Amin Agha Milhim al-Raslan27. After the death of his uncle in 1918, Raslan violently seized power of the Rasalina to the detriment of the two sons of his uncle. As his rule was illegitimate and unstable, Raslan often resorted to force in order to hold on to his position. In the build-up to the 1930 elections, Raslan allied himself with his close friend Jabir al-'Abbas against Hawash, while Hawash lent his support to Raslan's two cousins to

See CADN 1661 Bulletin hebdomadaire (29/8/1931). CADN 464 Rapport du service de renseignements (25/8/1930). CADN 840 Compte-rendu de Lalakia (26/4/1930), (17/5/1930), (5/7/1930). CADN 1661: Bulletin hebdomadaire (28/2/1931), (4/4/1931), (27/6/1931), (4/7/1931) CADN 1989 Bulletin hebdomadaire (29/10/1932) CADN 1661 Bulletin hebdomadaire (25/6/1932). CADN 1661 Bulletin hebdomadaire (14/2/1931), (21/3/1931), (25/6/1932), (6/8/1932), (27/8/1932). CADN 1661 Bulletin hebdomadaire (17/7/1931). Amin al-Ra&lan had been a judge in Ottoman times and was a close friend of Jabir al-'Abbas. He was married to the daughter of Isma'il Pasha Junayd, the leader of the dominant Rashawina clan of the Kalbiyya confederation. In 1940, he was assassinated by his brother. 94 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 take over the leadership of the Rasalina. Moreover, Hawash brought members of Raslan's clan into contact with the monastery of Safita and later the Jesuits, who in 1928 had already converted some Greek-Orthodox in Tallkalakh. When Raslan resorted to violence to restore his control over the Rasalina, he drove his peasants right into the hands of the Catholic missionaries. For the peasants, conversion constituted a simple means to withdraw themselves from his oppressive rule and claim French protection. Although the movement died down soon, after only some 75 conversions had taken place, in the following years similar situations would arise, especially among Jabir al-'Abbas' Khayyatin clan. 'Abbas and Raslan, on this occasion, were supported by the unionists of Latakia, who called on the converts to return to Islam28. Although the movement soon halted, it had set a precedent. The mechanism was simple: incorporate yourself into a community that you think is able to defend your interests against your chiefs before the civilian authorities29. So when in the spring of 1931 peasants of the village of Dayr Shumayyil, belonging to the Khayyatin of Jabir al-'Abbas, came into conflict with their landlords, the Sunni notables of Hama, they hoped with the threat of conversion to gain the support of the governor. However, this movement soon died down after a bargain between the two parties was struck30. The conversions never reached a large scale. At the beginning of 1933, only 211 individuals had converted of whom nineteen had reconverted. In the wake of the sectarian incidents of Latakia in January 1933 (see section 3.3) and the reunion of Latakia in February (section 3.4), a delegation, led by Ibrahim al-Kinj and Jabir al-'Abbas, was dispatched to protest these conversions and once again protest of their loyalty on behalf of the Representative Council31. Petitions to the High Commissioner were sent from Horns, Tripoli, and, curiously, from Damascus. The latter petition, signed by students of Law and Medicine from Damascus, protested against proselytism among the 'Alawi Muslims' of the Latakia region. They considered it "an evident aggression against our beliefs and our nationalism"32. The delegation argued that the Alawis had isolated themselves in the mountains in order to defend their religion, and demanded that it should be respected. Since they considered that the problem dealt with the liberty of conscience, the French abstained from any action against the Jesuits31. As will be discussed in the next section, the conversions were not the only incidents in which religion and politics blended.

CADN 464' Rapport sur le mouvement de conversion au christianisme dans les villages alaouites de Satlta (25/8/1930) CADN 840: Compte-rendu de Latakia (22/3/1930), (2/8/1930). MAE-SDN 598. Ponsot à la Société des Nations (19/6/1933) sur la pétition contre le prosélytisme des pères jésuites MAE-SDN 598: Ponsot à la Société des Nations (19/6/1933). CADN 1661· Bulletin hebdomadaire (6/6/1931), (4/7/1931), (8/8/1931) CADN 1989: Bulletin hebdomadaire (29/4/1933) Latakia MAE 484 Ponsot à Affaires étrangères (26/4/1933) sur le maintien de l'autonomie des alaouites. Annexed to MAE-SDN 598 Ponsot à la Société des Nations (19/6/1933) CADN 1989: Bulletin hebdomadaire (29/4/1933) MAE 484: Ponsot à Affaires étrangères (26/4/1933). MAE-SDN 598: Ponsot à la Société des Nations ( 19/6/1933) The question of Syrian unity, 1926-1936 95

3.3 Sectarian tensions: the 'rubber ball' incident On 29 January 1933, during the festivities of the end of Ramadan, riots broke out in Latakia's central Shaykh Zahir square between soldiers of the Second Battalion of the Levant (Troupes Spéciales) and civilians. One civilian was killed and seven others wounded, while nineteen soldiers (thirteen Alawis, two Sunnis, two Greek-Orthodox, and two Frenchmen) received injuries. The immediate cause for the fighting was trivial: a Sunni boy, playing, accidentally hit an Alawi soldier with his rubber ball. The latter considered this to be a deliberate insult and slapped the boy. A discussion between the soldier and onlookers ensued and quickly degenerated into fighting as the civilians started throwing rocks, while shouting 'down with the Alawis', and the soldiers fixed their bayonets34. The simmering tensions between the original inhabitants of Latakia and the newly arrived migrants and Troupes Spéciales formed the underlying cause for the incident that expressed itself in sectarian terms. The Sunnis closed down their shops, and the funeral of the victim ended in a manifestation against the 'savage human beasts'15, as the Alawis were called, and the French36. The next day. Sunni proprietors evicted Alawi families from their houses in Latakia, sometimes resorting to violence, while small groups of youth attacked Alawis and gravely wounded a number of them. As exaggerated accounts of the events reached them, Alawis from all over the Mountain swore revenge and prepared for retaliation. An Alawi member of the Representative Council, Muhammad Sulayman al-Ahmad, whose father, the revered sheikh Sulayman al-Ahmad, had been assaulted, warned the French:

"They have attacked our houses, insulted our beliefs, hurt our self-respect, and beaten our women, children, and religious sheikhs. [...] If the Government does not take drastic action, the Alawis of the Mountain will know how to protect the Alawis of Latakia, and defend their religion and dignity"17.

On the coastal roads and in the villages surrounding Latakia, confrontations between Sunnis and Alawis occurred; rumours quickly spread in Latakia that the Alawis had 'descended from the

The Troupes Spéciales constituted a local auxiliary corps to the French army in the Levant. For an interesting analysis of the recruitment of these troops in relation to the French policy of divide and rule, see Bou-Nacklie 1993 Bou-Nacklie (1993 653) discerns a relative over-representation of Alawi and Christian soldiers in the Troupes Spéciales, although Sunni Muslim soldiers throughout the mandate period held a numerical supenonly To give an indication of numbers, the number of troops rose from 5,203 in 1925 to 22,619 in 1944. In 1925, 2,468 Sunnis (47.4%), 993 Alawis (19.1%), and 1,633 Christians (31.4%) served in the Troupes Spéciales, while in 1944 6,959 Sunnis (30.7%), 5,124 Alawis (22.6%), and 6,952 Christians (30.7%) served. CADN 976: Pamphlet du comité chargé de l'organisation des obsèques (30/1/1933) MAE 483: Ponsot à Diplomatie (30/1/1933). CADN 976· Muhammad Sulayman al-Ahmad à Ponsot (30/1/1933). For another version of the telegram, see MAE-SDN 598 Among the signatories of this telegram of protest are the Alawi lawyer 'Abdallah al-'Abdallah and the journalist Ibrahim 'Uthman, the founding members of the Alawi-Muslim Youth Association in 1936. 96 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946

Mountain' and were marching on Latakia. In panic, the inhabitants set up militias and put up roadblocks. According to the French, only the intervention of leading Alawi notables prevented a massacre. On 2 February, Senegalese army units, rushed in by the French, took control of Latakia and restored order38. The 'rubber ball' incident did not constitute the first or the last of such incidents involving the Troupes Spéciales. Similar incidents had taken place before in April 1926, December 1929, and November 193239, all in Latakia and all because of trivial causes. On 25 February 1937, also during the festivities of the end of Ramadan, a violent confrontation took place in Latakia between Troupes Spéciales, Senegalese forces, and Steel Shirts (a nationalist youth militia). The cause of the incident again was trivial: a group of musicians, belonging to the Steel Shirts, played too close to the army barracks of Camp Saillard in the centre of Latakia to the liking of the guard. One soldier, who asked it to move, was assaulted, after which a unit was dispatched to relieve him. Immediately, armed Steel Shirts surrounded the barracks. The Troupes Spéciales and Senegalese troops opened fire, killing seven Steel Shirts and wounding several others40. It is interesting to see the reactions and analyses of the events of January 1933 by the French, the Alawis, and the Sunnis, who all fitted them in their respective discourses. The French Delegate in Latakia, Emest Schoeffler, interpreted the incident in sectarian terms, notwithstanding the fact that also Sunni and Greek-Orthodox members of the Troupes Spéciales fought with Sunni civilians. He explained the incident in terms of the increasing Alawi emancipation that was supported and maintained by the French. He argued that, although a majority of the Alawis still worked the lands of Sunni landowners and still lived in houses owned by the Sunnis, with French support they increasingly acquired their own lands and strengthened their independence vis-à-vis the Sunnis. In his view, the Alawis did not consider themselves outcasts any longer. Especially, members of the Troupes Spéciales who had a high esprit de corps could no longer be insulted at will. More and more Alawis moved to the coastal towns, where they occupied themselves as small artisans, and where slowly an Alawi bourgeoisie of notables, lawyers, and doctors emerged41. According to Schoeffler, the Alawis started to demand more rights and an equal partition of governmental functions, especially where the sectarian element was consequential, for example justice.

A number of reports have been written on the incident. CADN 976 Rapport sur les événements survenus à Latakia pendant les journées des 29 cl 30 janvier 1933 (31/1/1933). CADN 976. Schoeffler a Ponsot (1/2/1933) Schoeffler à Ponsot (2/2/1933) sur les troubles a Latakia Schoeffler à Ponsot (3/2/1933). Ponsot à Affaires étrangères (10/2/1933) MAE 483: Ponsot à Diplomatie (30/1/1933). MAE-SDN 598 Ponsot à la Société des Nations (19/6/1933) sur les pétitions relatives aux incidents de Latakia Information to be found in MAE 198: Etal-Major de l'Armée (29/4/1926). Al-Ahrar (19/12/1929). CADN 1989 Bulletin hebdomadaire (12/11/1932) See also CADN 976 Schoeffler à Ponsot (2/2/1933) CADN 492 Martel à Diplomatie (25/2/1937), (26/2/1937). CADN 1938 Bulletin hebdomadaire (2/3/1937), (9/3/1937). CADN 976. Schoeffler à Ponsot (2/2/1933) Ponsot à Affaires étrangères (10/2/1933) The question of Syrian unity, 1926-1936 97

"La justice, il faut bien en convenir, a, malgré nos efforts, une religion. Tantôt musulmane, tantôt chrétienne, elle ne devient alaouite que lorsque l'évidence force la décision du juge. Les alaouites s'en rendent compte tous les jours et réclament une représentation accrue dans le personnel judiciaire pour assurer la défense de leurs intérêts. Il est difficile de dire qu'ils exagèrent"42.

The predominantly Sunni nationalists, who initially attacked the Alawis as the 'savage human beasts', quickly changed tactics and blamed the French, carefully avoiding any mention of the sectarian nature of the incident. In a speech during the funeral of the Sunni victim, the French were vehemently attacked:

"The soldier has hit to satisfy his master; his master is the Government; what has this Government done to prevent similar incidents that have occurred three times already from happening? Nothing! They profit from your silence to treat you in such an undignified manner. That's why you should ask for a Syrian confederation"43.

The nationalists probably changed tactics, or were even instructed to do so44, in view of the negotiations for a Franco-Syrian treaty that were underway in Damascus, and the opening of the January session of the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations. As the English consul-general Satow argued, they did not wish to let it appear "that there was any feeling between them and the Alawites such as might seem to conflict with the Syrian unity theory"45. This can also be deduced from an article in the popular daily newspaper al-Ayyam, in which any reference to the sectarian character of the incident was circumvented46. According to the article, a row between a 'woman from Latakia' (meaning a Sunni woman) and a 'woman from the country' (an Alawi woman) formed the immediate cause for the incident. The row attracted some volunteer soldiers (the Troupes Spéciales), who defended the 'woman from the country', and some youths, who took sides with the 'woman from Latakia'. As more people started to interfere, the soldiers went to their barracks to mobilise their comrades. Some time later, they returned with a hundred men and unexpectedly attacked the population. The incidents after the fighting on Shaykh Zahir square also were the result of the actions of the 'people from the country', who attacked everybody they saw in the streets of Latakia in response to which the bazaars closed. An editorial in the same newspaper placed the incident - a 'disgraceful

CADN 976· Schoeffler à Ponsol (2/2/1933). CADN 976: Schoeffler à Ponsot (31/1/1933). Ponsot points to the role of the nationalist leaders of Aleppo, among them Ihsan al-Jabin, who claimed that Alawis and Sunms were brothers of Islam. CADN 412: Schoeffler à Ponsot (2/3/1933) sur l'article de Ihsan al-Jabin. MAE 483 Ponsot à Affaires étrangères (3/2/1933) sur l'évolution de la situation à la suite des débats de Genève. F0371/16973 Satow to Foreign Office (9/2/1933) 16 Al-Ayyam (2/2/1933). 98 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 manoeuvre' - in the context of the crisis of confidence that had existed between France and Syria since 1928, and linked it to the current negotiations for a treaty, "which the Syrians wanted to conduct on the basis of unity before anything else". The editorial went on to state that never before a religious sect had demanded independence for itself, and never had such demands been made in Latakia; yet, such a demand was made at the time the French and Syrians prepared to negotiate the end of the mandate. Why, the editor asked himself, did the people protesting against the aggression against them demand autonomy, and not the punishment of those they considered guilty47? The Alawi political leaders had a different interpretation. Led on this occasion by Muhammad Sulayman al-Ahmad, they put the blame on the Sunnis with their, what they called, 'fanatical religious hatred' of the Alawis. Muhammad Sulayman al-Ahmad argued that the Sunni treatment of the Alawis could be compared with the treatment of the untouchables of India, and called upon the population to reftise all political relations with the Syrian nationalists48. In May 1933, he even launched a pamphlet, called "The Alawis before and after the mandate: the Alawis are not Muslims", to make sure that there could be no question of union49. The pamphlet is indicative of the political connotations of the discussion on whether the Alawis are Muslims. The discussion began in the late-Ottoman period (see Introduction), largely because of political reasons, and regained importance in the early 1930s. In February 1932, 17,000 Alawis in the Lebanese 'Akkar region had been forced to register themselves as 'Alawi Muslims' during a census50. In September 1932, French reports indicated a pro-Muslim movement initiated by sheikh Salih al-'Ali, the former rebel leader, who argued that the Alawis should register themselves as Muslims in order to demand Syrian unity, which in turn would mean less taxes. The French considered it as an attempt to intimidate them, as Salih al-'Ali had been the subject of judicial pursuits because of financial debts and had not been able to influence the court in his favour51. On 7 and 8 April 1933, a religious congress took place in Bayt Yunus in the Safita district under the presidency of Jabir al-'Abbas to decide on the question whether the Alawis should be called just 'Alawis', 'Alawi Muslims', or 'Muslims'. A French report states that:

"'Musulmane-alaouite' déplaisait même à la plupart des cheikhs du Nord qui estimaient plus normal d'indiquer dans le texte le mot 'alaouite' sans plus",

Al-Ayyam (6/2/1933) CADN 976: Schoeffler à Ponsot (2/2/1933). The petitions can be found in CADN 976 & MAE-SDN 598. MAE 485: Pamphlet by Muhammad Sulayman al-Ahmad (12/5/1933) I have not been able to trace the original pamphlet, the archives only hold a French translation. CADN 1661: Bulletin hebdomadaire (13/2/1932). CADN 1661: Bulletin hebdomadaire (3/9/1932), (10/9/1932). The question of Syrian unity, 1926-1936 99 implying that most sheikhs favoured the word 'Alawi'52. According to the French, the aim of the conference was to organise all Alawis without distinction of sect or clan into a union of Alawis, the leadership of which would be entrusted to fifteen trusted persons53. Again, in May 1935, a group of Alawi sheikhs under the leadership of the unionist sheikh 'Ali Muhammad Kamil asked the Alawis "to register their names as Muslims and not as a sect separated from Islam"54, while also sheikh Salih al-'Ali voiced his opinion on the subject during an interview with the nationalist Tawfiq Harun from Latakia55. Unfortunately, the French archives do not hold any further information on the subject. The debate, however, would come to the fore again in 1936, during the battle over Syrian unity.

3.4 Status quo As has been referred to in the previous section, the incidents in Latakia came at a bad time for both the French and the Syrian nationalists as they were in the middle of negotiations over a treaty in which the future Franco-Syrian relations would be formally laid down (see section 1.3.2). The Syrian nationalists considered the incidents as an outright attempt of the Alawis to thwart the negotiations. For the French, the incident came at an awkward moment, as Germany and Italy heavily attacked the French policies in the Levant in the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations. Germany and Italy feared that France, with a treaty, intended to extend its control over the strategically important Levant indefinitely in anticipation of a war in Europe. To prevent this and hold some measure of control, Germany and Italy

Until the advent of French rule, the Alawis were known as Nusayris. Because of the pejorative meanings associated with the term nusaynyya, today they prefer to be called Alawis, in an attempt to project themselves as genuine Shnte Muslims ('alawi meaning 'belonging to 'Ah') and thus to gain legitimacy and respectability as a Muslim sect The claim that 'alawi means 'follower of 'Ah' is not undisputed, as some have interpreted the name as a derivative of a'ali, which, they suppose, refers to the fact that the Alawis live in the high mountains The term nusayn has been interpreted as the diminutive ofnasara and meaning 'little Christians' Other interpretations hold that the term is a derivative of the village of Nasrayya, where the presumed founder of the Nusayn sect had lived, or that the term is a derivative of Jabal al-Nusayra, the mountain where most Nusayris lived Today, the most accepted theory is that the Nusayris were named after Muhammad Ibn Nusayr al-Namm al-Bakri al-'Abdi, the presumed founder of the sect who died in 883. The shift from the term nusayn to 'alawi is abrupt, and may be related to the advent of French rule French sources indicate that during World War I contacts existed between the Alawis and French mannes stationed on the island of Arwad off the coast of Tartus During these contacts, the Alawis had asked the French to call them Alawis instead of Nusayris in case the French would gain control of the region after the war. Dussaud (1900). Moosa (1988). CADN 148 Notice sur les Ansariehs ou Alaouites du district de Latakia (14/4/1920). CADN 568 Annexe au bulletin de renseignements (26/6/1921). CADN 2129 Historique du Gouvernement de Latakia (9/1934). In an essay on the foundations of Alevism in Turkey, Mélikoff (1992 15) suggests that the substitution of the term alevi for hzilbac happened after the substitution of 'alawi for nusayn

CADN 1989: Bulletin hebdomadaire (15/4/1933). Al-Qabas (29/5/1935). The newspapers' correspondent was present at the meeting of sheikhs, and was asked to publish its decision. He also interviewed sheikh 'Ah Muhammad Kamil, who did not answer the question of why the Alawis should register as Muslims. He just stated that the Alawis are Muslims, and that Syria and the Alawi region had to become one. 55 Al-Ayyam (30/11/1935). 100 The Alawìs of Syria, 1918-1946 sharply criticised French policies, and demanded that France would immediately present its plans for the future treaty to the Permanent Mandates Commission, which would have to approve them before they could be put into effect (Shambrook 1998: 108). Because of these German and Italian interventions in Geneva, the question of Syrian unity had come in the spotlights in the Government of Latakia. From 13 to 15 February 1933, the most important Alawi leaders held a reunion in Latakia in order to reach agreement on the question of unity or autonomy56. Jabir al-'Abbas at first refused to attend the meeting, arguing that his colleagues of the northern sanjaq had not interested themselves in the conversions of Alawis to Catholicism that were taking place in his home district of Safita. In the end, he promised to come on the condition that Yusuf al-Hamid and 'Aziz Bey Hawash, the two other principal leaders of the southern sanjaq, would attend the meeting too, to which they agreed. 'Abbas clearly did not want to make a move that could potentially weaken his position vis-à-vis his regional rivals. Also interesting was the attendance of the unionist sheikhs 'Ali Muhammad Kamil and 'Ali Shihab. They were probably sent by the unionist Maronite Fa'iz Ilyas in order to bring about reconciliation between Alawis and Sunnis in the wake of the incidents of Latakia in January 1933. During the meeting, the participants drew up a motion demanding the maintenance of the autonomy of the Government of Latakia under French mandate, the extension of the competence of the Representative Council, the assignment of public functions to Alawis in proportion to their numbers, revision of the tax system (taxes should not be higher than in 'Syria'), and an end to the conversions57. All participants, including sheikh 'Ali Muhammad Kamil and sheikh 'Ali Shihab, signed the petition. The former had allied himself with Jabir al-'Abbas, who with the section condemning the conversions of Alawis to Catholicism could now pose as a defender of the Alawi faith, while the latter had, according to a French report, lost so much of his influence that his family had threatened him with murder, if he would continue his unionist stance58. The Syrian nationalists were shocked to find out that, besides the Alawis, also the Druze, their allies in the Great Revolt, had asked for the continuation of their autonomy. They now made it clear to the French that without unity there could be no negotiations for a treaty59. In 1934, after a period of relative quiet, the preparations for the 1935 election for the Representative Council started with the publication of unionist propaganda pamphlets, like the "Appeal of the Alawi youth to the proud Alawi people", "The Youth of Salvation to the honourable Alawi chiefs", and a pamphlet of the Syrian communist party. The pro-unionist

Shambrook (1998: 113) calls this meeting "carefully orchestrated by High Commission officials", as around the same time a similar meeting took place in the Jabal Druze, omitting the peculiar circumstances then current in Latakia because of the incident of 29 January CADN410 Information de Latakia (15/2/1933), (18/2/1933) CADN 1989: Bulletin hebdomadaire (18/2/1933) CADN 976: Schoeffler à Ponsot (22/2/1933). F037I/I6973 Satow to Foreign Office (23/3/1933). MAE 483: Ponsot à Affaires étrangères (3/3/1933) sur la réunion de notables druzes et alaouites en faveur de l'autonomie. The question of Syrian unity, 1926-1936 101 propaganda that was spread did not have any success, besides providing the Alawi chiefs with a new opportunity to demonstrate once again their loyalty to the mandate and their wish for autonomy60. At the nationalist congress of Horns not a single representative from the Government of Latakia, not even the unionist leader 'Abd al-Wahid Harun who was personally invited, attended. Instead, the unionists planned a manifestation to protest against the large proportion of Christians in official functions61. High Commissioner de Martel's policy of putting politics to sleep, following the failure of the treaty negotiations, clearly worked (see section 1.3.2). As they had done in 1930, the elections of 1935 led to a realignment of clan loyalties, aimed at strengthening the coherence of the confederations. The different fractions of the Kalbiyya reconciled themselves, while 'Aziz Bey Hawash initiated talks between the two brothers-in-law and rival chiefs of the Numaylatiyya faction of the Matawira confederation, sheikh 'Ali Muhammad Kamil (unionist) and Muhammad Sulayman al-Ahmad (a fervent autonomist, at that time), in order to bring about their reconciliation under his leadership62. A third attempt at regrouping was made between the Darawisa (Kalbiyya), Mahaliba (Haddadin), and ' Amamira (Khayyatin), who in addition made overtures to the Alawis of the plains around Latakia, who were not affiliated to any clan. The aim was to strengthen the Murshidiyya- Ghasasina confederation for the oncoming elections, which had been weakened because of rivalry between its leader Sulayman al-Murshid and his second in command, the incumbent member of the Representative Council, Muhammad al-Khartabil61. Ibrahim al-Kinj reconciled himself with his brother 'Ali al-Kinj, the district governor of Haffa, with whom he had lived at odds for personal reasons64. Finally, Jabir al-'Abbas on 11 June 1934 convoked all notables of the Khayyatin confederation of the Misyaf district to elect a single leader6\ In preparation also for the elections, Jabir al-'Abbas asked Sulayman al-Murshid to unite himself with the Khayyatin, to which Murshid reserved his response66. French intelligence services reported in March 1936 that Murshid had taken over the authority over some 10,000 members of the Khayyatin confederation. The fact that Jabir al-'Abbas asked Murshid to associate himself with the Khayyatin may be interpreted as a sign of weakness and an indication of 'Abbas' fear for Murshid's competition. Two French documents from March 1933, in total

CADN 1866: Bulletin hebdomadaire (3/2/1934), (10/3/1934). CADN 1877: Bulletin hebdomadaire (23/3/1935) CADN 1866: Bulletin hebdomadaire (10/2/1934), (7/4/1934). CADN 1866 Bulletin hebdomadaire (10/3/1934), (17/3/1934), (24/3/1934), (31/3/1934), (14/4/1934), (25/8/1934). CADN 1661 Bulletin hebdomadaire (7/3/1931), (8/8/1931), (22/8/1931), (29/8/1931), (19/9/1931), (12/12/1931). CADN 1866: Bulletin hebdomadaire (24/3/1934) CADN 1866. Bulletin hebdomadaire (11/8/1934), (1/9/1934) CADN 1866: Bulletin hebdomadaire (7/4/1934), (16/6/1934). CADN 1866: Bulletin hebdomadaire (5/5/1934). 102 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 only six lines, strengthen this interpretation. The first document states that, on 10 March 1933, several Alawi religious sheikhs of the Kalaziyya and Haydariyya sects were due to attend a conference in Safita to discuss the rapprochement of both sects, and their submission to one authority67. The second report indicates that the conference did not take place because some sheikhs feared it constituted a manoeuvre by Jabir al-'Abbas (a powerful Kalaziyya sheikh) to extend his influence over other Alawi clans, which may be interpreted as meaning the Haydariyya clans, or, more specifically, Murshid's clan68. Perhaps, the religious congress of Bayt Yunus of April 1933, discussed in section 3.3, should also be interpreted in this context. The 'Abbas family, losing political influence among the clan leaders and out of grace with the French, only had one chance to regain its former status: association with Syrian unity - an association that eventually paid off, as we shall see in the next chapters69. The build-up to the elections brought to light divisions within Sunni and unionist ranks in the sanjaq of Latakia. The conflict between the old guard of nationalists, led by 'Abd al- Wahid Harun, 'Abd al-Qadir Shuraytih, and Majid al-Din al-Azhari, and a younger generation, led by the mufti of Latakia, the lawyer Majid al-Safiya, and 'Abd al-Ghani Isrib, probably originated from a conflict over the control of the awqaf early in 1934, and now expressed itself in the failure, despite intense negotiations, to present a single candidate for the seat reserved for a Sunni Muslim in the sanjaq of Latakia70. The event of the elections was the abstaining of Jabir al-'Abbas in favour of his son Munir al-'Abbas71. Three Alawi lists participated in the elections: two for the northern sanjaq and one for the southern sanjaq. The southern list consisted of Munir al-'Abbas, Yusuf al- Hamid, and Amin al-Raslan. 'Aziz Bey Hawash, probably acknowledging the futility of his partaking, did not participate in the elections. In the north, the 'autonomist' list72 of Ibrahim al- Kinj opposed the Alawi 'unionist' list73 of sheikh 'Ali Muhammad Kamil74. The unionists of Latakia, who wanted to present it as an Alawi opposition list, heavily sponsored this 'Alawi

CADN 1989: Bulletin hebdomadaire (11/3/1933). A French source suggests that, in 1932, an attempt to establish a single religious authority for all Alawis had failed, as the clan leaders feared that they would lose some of their power to the religious sheikhs CADN 1989: Bulletin hebdomadaire (19/11/1932). CADN 1989: Bulletin hebdomadaire (18/3/1933). CADN 414: Meyrier à Diplomatie (5/7/1936). CADN 1913: Bulletin hebdomadaire (15/8/1936) CADN 1866: Bulletin hebdomadaire (3/3/1934), (7/4/1934) CADN 1877: Bulletin hebdomadaire (2/3/1935). No surprises on this list: Ibrahim al-Kinj, Saqr Khayr Bey, Muhammad Bey Junayd, Muhammad Sulayman al- Ahmad, sheikh Dib al-Khayyir (who had the support of all the Khayyatin of the north). This list consisted mainly of small notables sheikh 'Ali Muhammad Kamil, Salih Ibrahim Nasir, 'Ah Salim Dirgham, Ibrahim al-Duwi, and 'Ali Sulayman al-Asad (grandfather of the current Syrian president, Bashar al- Asad) 74 CADN 1877: Bulletin hebdomadaire (30/3/1935) The question of Syrian unity, 1926-1936 103 unionist' list75 The elections took place on 6 April 1935 The voter turnout reached over eighty percent The results proved devastating for the unionist list, which did not get any of its members elected (21,739 against 3,945 votes) Concerning the Sunni seat in the northern sanjaq, Majid al-Din al-Azhan narrowly defeated 'Abd al-Gham Isrib (4,973 against 4,195 votes) The elections in the southern sanjaq were not particularly exciting, since there were only three candidates for three seats Voter turnout here was only 63 percent Shortly after the elections 'Abd al-Wahid Harun received a letter from the Aleppine nationalists asking to ally himself with Munir al-'Abbas, and to secure his support for the unionist cause76 In the south, the High Commissioner nominated 'Aziz Bey Hawash to form a counterweight against the bloc 'Abbas- Hamid-Raslan, and in the north Isma'il Badr, an important Haydari sheikh and a friend of Ibrahim al-K.inj77 The delay in the nominations led to concern among the Alawis, which was exploited by the unionists who claimed the delays were due to the fact that the incorporation of the Government of Latakia into a Syrian Federation was imminent The tensions were indicative of the uncertainty over the policies of High Commissioner de Martel, which existed since the summer of 1934 (see section 1 3 2)78 After the elections, life in the Government of Latakia soon turned to the worsening economic situation In its first session, in which Ibrahim al-Kinj was re-elected president, the Representative Council demanded lower taxes, while it insisted that the money reserved for the Common Interests should be spent on improving the local financial situation The Council argued that the money at the time was used only for large public works in Syria and Lebanon, which did not have any interest for the Government of Latakia in view of its geographical and economic position79 In Latakia, the unionists began protests against the high level of taxation and against the Tobacco Monopoly, which had been reintroduced on 1 March 1935 In 1930, the old monopoly of the Regie de Tabac (see section 1 1 3) had been replaced by the banderole system, which placed the production and industry of tobacco in the hands of privately owned companies, who paid taxes (40 percent in Syria) to the French authorities through a system of tax stamps (banderoles), attached to the cigarette cases The banderole system was a complete failure, as, also due to the depression, prices fell dramatically, while the producers suffered from overproduction The reintroduction of the monopoly was intended to regulate prices and production However, the new Franco-Lebanese Compagnie libano-synenne de Tabacs provoked many protests, as it was accused of favouring Lebanese producers and industries (Khoury 1987 451-452) In October 1935, the protests against the monopoly came to a head

CADN401 Schoefïlera Martel (12/4/1935) CADN 1877 Bulletin hebdomadaire (8/4/1935) CADN 401 Schoefïler a Martel (12/4/1935) CADN 1877 Bulletin hebdomadaire (8/4/1935), (13/4/1935), (27/4/1935) CADN 401 Schoeffler a Martel (7/5/1935) CADN 1866 Bulletin hebdomadaire (29/9/1934), (27/10/1934), (10/11/1934) CADN 1877 Bulletin hebdomadaire (12/5/1935), (18/5/1935) CADN 1877 Bulletin hebdomadaire (8/6/1935) 104 The Alawis of Syria, J 918-1946 when rumours went that the Compagnie wanted to limit the production of tobacco in the Alawi region to the benefit of Lebanese producers80. At a meeting at the house of 'Abd al-Qadir Shuraytih, the unionists decided to oppose the operations of the Compagnie, if need be by force81. In an effort to strengthen the movement, they tried to attract Alawis and Christians82. The protests culminated in the economic congress of Tartus, on 15 August 1935, to which the principal Alawi chiefs of the southern sanjaq gave their support83. The congress, under the presidency of Jabir al-'Abbas, 'Abd al-Qadir Shuraytih, and Wadi' Sa'adah, was charged to study measures to improve the economic and financial situation of the country. Only the Alawi chiefs from the northern sanjaq refrained from participation, as they feared that the congress was only meant as an instrument for protesting against the government and autonomy84. Although the closing statement was aimed especially at demanding the lowering of all sorts of taxes and the method with which these taxes were collected, the government was blamed for the bad economic situation. In addition, the participants in the conference asked for the reduction of the local administration "d'une manière compatible avec sa capacité et la possibilité de son petit et malingre corps", a veiled call for Syrian unity8\ The only concrete steps taken were the installation of an executive committee to research the polities of the Tobacco Monopoly, and the drafting of petitions to protest against it86.

3.5 A stab in the back? The events of 1936

In January 1936, the general strike that had broken out in Syria's urban centres reached the Government of Latakia (see section 1.3.2). In Latakia, commemorative ceremonies for the Aleppine nationalist leader Ibrahim Hananu, held the traditional forty days after his death, led to riots as members of nationalist youth organisations provocatively paraded through the town, while police intervention led to the closing of the bazaars87. The National Bloc immediately issued a statement, protesting against the French violation of the freedom of speech in this region, which was supposedly Arab in its language, traditions, history, and religion88. The events

CADN 1877: Bulletin hebdomadaire (7/9/1935), (21/9/1935), (5/10/1935). CADN 1877· Bulletin hebdomadaire (13/7/1935), (20/7 /1935) CADN 1877: Bulletin hebdomadaire (20/7/1935). CADN 1877: Bulletin hebdomadaire (10/8/1935). CADN 1877: Bulletin hebdomadaire (17/8/1935). CADN 977 Rapport sur le congrès économique de Tartus (15/8/1935). CADN 1877 Bulletin hebdomadaire (7/9/1935). CADN 1913: Bulletin hebdomadaire (6/1/1936) MAE 492: Martel à Affaires étrangères (3/1/1936). Al-Avyam (24/12/1935) Al-Ayyam (7/1/1936). The question of Syrian unity, 1926-1936 105 in the Syrian interior prompted the unionist elements of the Government of Latakia to dispatch large amounts of petitions, telegrams, and tracts, while unionist speeches were held in the mosques On several occasions, they organised the closure of the bazaars89 In order to counter the growing agitation in Syria, High Commissioner de Martel announced a plan for administrative decentralization (Shambrook 2002, 1998 158-170) The unionists of Latakia used this change to intimidate the autonomists, they argued that the reorganisation formed the prelude for annexation of the Alawi region to Syria90 During the unrest of January and February 1936, the Alawis remained calm and even indifferent This changed after Paul Bastid, the French president of the parliamentary committee for Foreign Affairs, made some remarks in support of the incorporation of the Government of Latakia into Syria This immediately provoked an Alawi reaction the convening of an Alawi congress in Tartus on 25 February 1936 to decide on the future of the Alawi region" Some 150 Alawi chiefs participated in the meeting, which was organised by Jabir and Munir al-'Abbas During the meeting, two positions could be discerned The unionists, led by Munir al-'Abbas, called for Syrian unity based on administrative and financial decentralization The autonomists, led by Ibrahim al-Kinj and Muhammad Sulayman al-Ahmad, on the other hand, called for the continuation of the current Organic Law In addition, they argued in favour of complete independence under French guidance for the Government of Latakia, which had to be renamed 'State of the Alawis' The autonomists, according to the French intelligence services, received an overwhelming support - 145 signatures were placed on the autonomist petition to the High Commissioner and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, drawn up at the end of the meeting Only the 'Abbas clan did not sign the petition92 Another 95 of the participants signed a telegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, protesting against the declarations made by Bastid91 In protest against the outcome of the congress, which they considered biased, the nationalists closed down the bazaars of Latakia from 27 February to 7 March

CADN 1913 Bullelin hebdomadaire (25/1/1936), (1/2/1936), (15/2/1936) Al-Awam (24/1/1936)

Yaffe-Schatzmann 1995 29 CADN 1913 Bulletin hebdomadaire (1/2/1936) AI-Α warn (27/2/1936)

CADN 410 Schoeffler a Meyner (31/3/1936) sur la situation politique du Gouvernement de Latakia

According to Yaffe-Schatzmann (1995 30-31), the congress constituted a "sudden and total change, concerning the question of unity with Syria", which entailed "the Alawis' decision to approve of the unity, against which they had been campaigning for 14 years" (see 'State of the Art') However, the petition drafted on the occasion squarely contradicts this statement The petition, holding 145 signatures, is kept in the French archives in CADN 410 For the text of the petition, see appendix 3

I have not been able to trace this document CADN 410 Schoeffler a Meyner (31/3/1936) CADN 977 Information de Latakia (2/3/1936) CADN 1913 Bulletin hebdomadaire (29/2/1936), (7/3/1936) CADN 410 Bulletin hebdomadaire (3-9/3/1936) CADN 977 Information de Latakia (2/3/1936) 106 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 forward their demands95. The departure of a delegation of the National Bloc to Paris to negotiate a Franco-Syrian treaty gave further rise to anxiety on the part of the autonomists, as it was uncertain whether the Alawi region was included in the talks96. In order to support the Syrian delegation that would be sent to Paris to negotiate the Franco-Syrian treaty, the unionists of the Government of Latakia started a campaign of petitions in favour of unity. Unionist emissaries promised the peasantry that Syrian unity would bring them prosperity, as it would lead to lower taxes, the free cultivation of tobacco and cutting down of trees, provide positions in the new administration, and contribute to the augmentation of salaries. At the same time, the emissaries gave money to the notables to buy their compliance. On the other hand, peasants who refused to sign the petitions were threatened with expulsion from their land and maltreatment, or were simply forced to sign. A French report provides the example of fifty Alawi villages, owned by the Sunni Dandashi family of Tallkalakh. The Dandashi simply ordered the mukhtars of the villages to collect the cachets of the inhabitants and hand them over97. (Although the French archives do not hold information on the subject, the autonomists probably used the same methods). The unionists were triumphant. In early March, the unionist delegation, which had visited Beirut, visited Damascus. Afterwards, the return of the delegation to the Alawi region received wide coverage in the Syrian press, which claimed that the delegation, cheered by tens of thousands of people, made a triumphal tour through Tali'i (the village of Jabir al-'Abbas that was called a 'fortress of the unionist spirit'), Tartus, Banyas, Jabla, and finally Latakia98. French intelligence reports, however, only mention the visit of an Alawi delegation led by Munir al-'Abbas to Damascus, which makes it difficult to interpret the press coverage and the scale of events99. The unionists continued with their petition campaigns until the departure of the Syrian delegation for Paris on 22 March 1936, to enable the delegation

The autonomist delegation included all the important Alawi clans (including Ibrahim al-Kinj, Yusuf al-Hamid, Muhammad Sulayman al-Ahmad, Saqr Khayr Bey, Muhammad Junayd, 'Aziz Hawash, Isma'il Badr, Sulayman al-Murshid, Hasan al-'Abud, Muhammad Agha Isma'il), with the exception of the KJiayyatin, who led the unionist delegation, which included - next to some Sunni nationalist leaders, the leaders of the Nationalist Youth movement, and a number of Christian lawyers - the 'Muslim Alawis' Shawkat al-'Abbas, sheikh 'Ali Muhammad Kamil, Isma'il Bey Hawash (the father of 'Aziz Bey (see AlifBa' (15/3/1936)), and 'Abdallah al-'Abdallah. CADN 410: Schocffler à Meyrier (31/3/1936). Bulletin hebdomadaire (3-9/3/1936) CADN 1913 Bulletin hebdomadaire (29/2/1936), (7/3/1936), ( 14/3/1936). Al-Qabas (4/3/1936). CADN 410: Schoefflcr à Meyrier (28/3/1936) sur la question de l'unité, which includes. Rapport Qa'immaqam Amuq du district de Tallkalakh (10/3/1936). Schoeffler à Meyrier (31/3/1936) CADN 1913: Bulletin hebdomadaire (14/3/1936) Al-Qabas (5/3/1936) See al-Qabas (11/3/1936), al-Ayyam (11/3/1936), AlifBa' (11/3/1936), (12/3/1936) on the return of the unionist delegations. See also al-Qabas (10/3/1936) on the visit of a Christian unionist delegation. CADN 410: Information de Beirut (5/3/1936). The weekly intelligence bulletins for the beginning of March do not mention any Alawi manifestations in favour of unity taking place, but mention increased pro-unitary propaganda For example· "La propagande pro-umlaire signalée s'est encore amplifiée au cours de la semaine, dès après le retour à Latakia de la délégation mixte qui, au lendemain de la réception par le Haut-commissaire, s'était rendu à Bkerké chez le patriarche maronite, puis à Damas. La méthode employée est simple et parfaitement adaptée au milieu primitif auquel elle s'applique De nombreux émissaires parcourent les villages en déclarant que l'unité est The question of Syrian unity, 1926-1936 107

"de recueillir la plus grande masse possible de signatures afin de pouvoir, au cours des négociations, invoquer contre le principe de l'autonomie du territoire le sentiment des populations elles-mêmes"'00.

Then, for the time being, unionist activity subsided considerably101. In order to counter the unionist propaganda, on 11 March, the autonomists founded the Committee for Independence under the leadership of Muhammad Sulayman al-Ahmad to coordinate autonomist activities102. The autonomist action continued throughout March with the organisation of meetings to which a few hundreds of people attended'03. They scored an important success on 2 April, when Ibrahim al-Kinj and Muhammad Sulayman al-Ahmad succeeded in gathering a crowd of over 15,000 people in the predominantly Sunni village of Banyas - the first mass demonstration of Alawis during the mandate period104. The French authorities were showered with petitions of unionists condemning the intervention of the government in organising this 'violent and criminal demonstration in the name of people who represented nobody but themselves', and petitions of autonomists protesting against the fact that the French had completely abandoned their loyal Alawi allies'05. The autonomists, moreover, protested against attacks by the Syrian press on leading autonomists such as Muhammad Sulayman al-Ahmad106. Governor Schoeffler commented on the attacks:

"lis [the Alawis] ne peuvent d'ailleurs se défendre efficacement: ils n'ont pas de journaux, la presse libanaise et syrienne leur refuse ses colonnes, et ils n'osent pas même intenter des poursuites judiciaires onéreuses, dont les résultats, disent-ils, sont acquis d'avance en raison des facilités que les extrémistes trouvent trop facilement auprès des tribunaux syriens et libanais"107.

Among the senders of the letters of protest was the Alawi-Muslim Youth Association {rabitat al-shabab al-muslimi al- 'alawi). This association of young and educated Alawis was

d'ores et déjà réalisée et que les Français vont incessamment quitter le pays". CADN 1913 Bulletin hebdomadaire (14/3/1936). CADN 1913· Bulletin hebdomadaire (21/3/1936). CADN 1913 Bulletin hebdomadaire (28/3/1936). CADN 1913 Bulletin hebdomadaire (14/3/1936). CADN 1913 Bulletin hebdomadaire (28/3/1936). CADN 1913: Bulletin hebdomadaire (4/4/1936). See also CADN 410 Schoeffler à Meyrier (11/4/1936) sur une protestation du parti unitiare. Examples will be presented further on in this section. See for example: Al-Ayyam (19/3/1936). al-Qabas (19/3/1936), (13/4/1936). AhfBa (17/3/1936) CADN 410: Schoeffler à Meyrier (11/4/1936) 108 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 founded on 27 March 1936 in Latakia under the leadership of Shawkat al-'Abbas, son of Jabir al-'Abbas, and 'Uthman Agha Hasan Isbir, a youth leader from Qardaha. The association had two secretaries, Muhsin 'Ali 'Abbas (lawyer) and Ahmad 'Ali Kamil (law student, son of sheikh 'Ali Muhammad Kamil), and members included 'Abdallah al-'Abdallah (lawyer), Jamil As'ad 'Uthman (electricity engineer), Ahmad al-Khayyir (law student), Muhyi al-Din Kamil (Journalist), Sulayman Ahmad al-Khayyir (student), Ahmad 'Aziz Isma'il (graduate of the Ottoman War Office), Muhammad Hasan Nasur (of the Bayt Abu Shalha), and 'Uthman Zaydan (journalist). Its aim, according to the newspaper al-Qabas, was to serve the cause of the Syrian nation, irrespective of sectarian, political, or personal ambitions108. Unfortunately, neither the French archives nor the Syrian newspapers hold much information on the Alawi-Muslim Youth Association, and it is unclear whether it had a concrete political program. A letter to High Commissioner de Martel, sent by 'Uthman Zaydan, may shed some light on its ideas. In this letter, Zaydan complains about the extreme under-representation of the Alawis in official functions. He condemns the argument often used by the French to justify this under- representation, namely that the Alawis are backward and incompetent.

"If the Government has not been able, [during fifteen years], to educate the Alawi youth in such a way as to enable them to participate in the administration of their own country, when will it be able to do that? [...] Have they founded enough schools in the Alawi villages to ensure the education of the youth? Have the crops progressed so much to enable farmers to let their children finish their study at one of the principal universities? The taxes that are imposed on them, have they diminished? The dignity and the rights of the Alawis, have they been protected? To all these questions, one has to answer in the negative"109.

The association's sympathy for the idea of Syrian unity may be deduced from the fact that one of its leading members, 'Abdallah al-'Abdallah, was also a principal member of the Nationalist Youth movement {al-shabab al-watani) that was clearly associated with the unionist movement of Latakia, which further consisted of As'ad Harun (secretary), Nadim Shuman, Yusuf Zurayq (treasurer), Tawfiq Harun, Riyad Ruwayha (Alawi), and 'Adnan Azhari (secretary)"0. From this evidence, one might deduce that the Alawi-Muslim Youth Association propagated the emancipation of the Alawi people within the framework of Syrian unity. Syrian unity did not constitute an aim in itself, but the Alawi-Muslim Youth Association expected it to provide a better framework for Alawi emancipation than direct French rule. As will be demonstrated in the next chapter, the association was to be disappointed, and quickly turned

AlifBa'(10/4/1936) Al-Qabm (8/4/1936) 109 CADN977 Zaydan à Martel (14/1/1936) "0 Al-Qabas (10/2/1936) The question of Syrian unity, 1926-1936 109 away from propagating Syrian unity. Secondly, the reference 'Alawi-Muslim' in the context of an exclusive Alawi membership of the association points to the fact that it considered Alawis to be Muslims, and considered the recognition of the Alawis as such as a necessary step for Alawi emancipation within the framework of Syrian unity. Finally, three remarks must be made with regard to the membership of the Alawi-Muslim Youth Association and the Nationalist Youth movement: first, the majority of the Alawis belonged to the Khayyatin confederation; second, the members were the sons of, or a younger generation directly related to, the traditional unionist leadership; third, all members belonged to a class of educated professionals. In other words, these organisations had two faces. On the one hand, they were horizontally organised and, with regard to the Nationalist Youth, cross-sectarian; on the other hand, the correlation between the traditional leadership and the leading members of these new horizontally organised cross- sectarian movements concerning clan and family is too strong to be ignored. This conclusion corroborates the idea that these new organisations did not constitute a challenge to the traditional leadership, but were complementary to it. Until the departure of the delegation of the National Bloc to Paris on 22 March 1936, the autonomists were confident about their position, and devoted their efforts to counter the unionist propaganda among the Alawis. A day after the departure of the Syrian delegation for Paris, they distributed a pamphlet among the population, entitled "To the noble Alawi people". In it, the authors argued that Syrian unity would mean obligatory military service, the annihilation of Alawi traditions and customs, and the rise of taxes, because someone had to pay for aviation, ministries, ships, and the embassies of the Syrian state. The authors demanded increased power for the Representative Council, more Alawi officials, more schools, less taxes, and that the Government of Latakia should be renamed 'State of the Alawis"". Soon, however, the confidence of the autonomists gave way to distrust and disbelief as it became clear that France would no longer back them. Already on 23 April, Ibrahim al-Kinj wrote to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs to warn him:

"Contraindre le peuple alaouite à se rattacher à la Syrie, c'est lui imposer un asservissement odieux. Nous tenons en trop haute estime la France pour la supposer capable de le tolérer [...] Nous défendrons notre indépendance et ne livrerons aux Syriens que ruines et sépultures""2.

Throughout the spring and summer of 1936, the political manifestations of both unionists and autonomists continued. As information from the negotiations in Paris reached the Alawi region, the autonomists grew increasingly sombre and their relationship with the French

CADN 977: Tract "Au noble people alaouite" (23/3/1936), written by Ibrahim al-Kinj, Yusuf al-Hamid, Amin al- Raslan, Muhammad Sulayman al-Ahmad, Saqr Khayr Bey, 'Aziz Bey Hawash, Muhammad Bey Junayd, Isma'il Badr. CADN 1913: Petition oflbrahim al-Kinj, annexed to: Bulletin hebdomadaire (25/4/1936) 110 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 deteriorated"1. Sensing they were losing ground, especially as the socialist congress in France passed a motion favourable towards Syrian unity, the autonomists sent petitions to the French authorities, calling on their moral obligations to protect the weak against the strong, invoking historical and religious examples"4. Interesting in this respect is a petition written by Muhammad Sulayman al-Ahmad, in which he pointed out the religious hatred of the 'Muslim Arabs' for the Alawis, indicating he did not consider the Alawis to be Muslims or Arabs.

"Nous n'avons pas de preuves plus éclatantes et plus palpables de la violence de la haine religieuse chez les musulmans arabes pour tout ce qui n'est pas leur religion que la situation des juifs de Palestine. Ces derniers sont venus apporter aux Arabes musulmans la fortune, la civilisation et la paix; ils ont semé sur le sol de la Palestine l'or, le progrès et les bienfaits; ils n'ont nui à personne; ils n'ont rien enlevé par la force; malgré cela les Arabes musulmans ont déclaré contre eux la Guerre Sainte et n'ont pas hésité à les massacrer jusqu'aux femmes et enfants et ce malgré la présence de l'Angleterre en Palestine et de la France en Syrie. Quel sort attendra les juifs et les autres minorités en cas de suppression des mandats et d'unification de la Syrie arabe musulmane avec la Palestine arabe musulmane, leur suprême idéal?""5.

Quite a statement for the later cabinet minister and member of parliament of the independent Syrian Arab republic... In Alawi unionist circles, denials on the part of the autonomists to the effect that the Alawis were not Muslims and Arabs, provoked vehement reactions, as did a petition that linked 'the inhabitants of the northwestern part of Syria' to 'the expeditions of the Crusaders' and their mixing with the population"6. One protest, signed by 'Alawi-Muslim' 'ulama ' (among them the leading unionists Jabir al-'Abbas and 'Ali Muhammad Kamil), issued the followingyôAva:

"Every Alawi is a Muslim, believes in the two dogmas (one God and Muhammad is his Prophet), and practices the five pillars of the religion. Every Alawi who does not accept his Islamism, who denies that the Koran is his holy book and that Muhammad is his Prophet, cannot be considered Alawi following the Koran and the Holy Scriptures. He cannot belong [in any way] to the Muslim Alawis and cannot be considered but a stranger by the Muslims""7.

113 CADN 1913 Bulletin hebdomadaire (2/5/1936) IN MAE 492 Kinj à Blum (8/6/1936) MAE-SDN 598 Petition ofMuhammad Sulayman al-Ahmad (14/5/1936). 115 MAE-SDN 598 Petition ofMuhammad Sulayman al-Ahmad (14/5/1936). 116 MAE 493: Petition of the autonomist party (3/7/1936) 117 MAE 493. Letter of Alawi religious notables (15/7/1936). See also CADN 410 Petition of the unionist party (2/7/1936) The latter petition is signed amongst other by sheikh Sahh al-'Ali, the former rebel leader, and 'All Sulayman al-Asad, grandfather of the current Syrian president. The question of Syrian unity, 1926-1936 111

In a letter to the chief French negotiator in Paris, Vienot, Munir al-'Abbas explained the fatwa

"Les alaouites n'ont jamais cesse d'être de fervents musulmans de purs Arabes On peut affirmer sans nulle exagération que la race arabe est plus pure chez les alaouites que chez leurs autres frères de Syrie ou de Liban Quant a la ferveur de l'islamisme des alaouites il suffit afin de s'en rendre compte de feuilleter l'histoire musulmane pour rencontrer dans chacune de ses pages des preuves éclatantes de l'attachement des alaouites a la dynastie du Prophete gardien des traditions arabes et musulmanes les plus pures Les 'ulama' musulmans alaouites ont voulu par l'acte qu'ils viennent d'accomplir eclaircir un point sur lequel du point de vue islamo-alaouite il n'est pas permis d'avoir des doutes""8

Around the same time, and probably at Arab nationalist instigation, the Sunm mufti of Palestine and president of the General Islamic Congress in Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husaym, issued a fatwa concerning the Alawis, in which he found them to be good Muslims and called on all Muslims to work with them for mutual good, in a spirit of Islamic brotherhood"9 The question also received attention in the Syrian press under headings like "The venom of sectarianism Disgraceful manoeuvres in Latakia - They want the Alawis to negate their Islam"120 Autonomist hopes were further dashed after a socialist cabinet led by Leon Blum took power in France, which recognised the Syrian rights to independence The anger and exasperation of the autonomists increased, and they started making moral reproaches against the French

"Combien grande fut notre stupefaction quand nous vîmes que les Français responsables, au premier petit choc reçu des Syriens, oublient toutes leurs promesses9 [ ] Nous serons fiers que l'histoire enregistrera que nous sommes tombes au champ d'honneur pour la defense de notre communauté et que la France, mere de la liberté, a écrase tout un petit peuple qui revendiquait sa liberté, et auquel on peut reprocher que sa confiance, sa fidélité et son dévouement envers elle"

They demanded the publication of an official document in which France would declare that it respected and guaranteed Alawi independence, and that an official Alawi delegation was to be allowed to go to Pans'21, or that a French parliamentary commission would be sent to examine

118 MAE493 'Abbas a Vienot (29/7/1936) '" For the text of Ihefalwa, see Boneschi (1940) and Kramer (1987) 120 Al Qabas (20/7/1936) See also al Qabas (30/7/1936) 121 CADN410 Petition of the autonomist party (8/6/1936) 112 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 the impossibility of the annexation of the Alawi region to Syria122. Both requests were turned down by the Quai d'Orsay and the local French authorities, who were accused of "cherchant à nous endormir"121. Accusations were hurled at the French that they sacrificed Alawi rights, which they could so easily defend, in order to facilitate an agreement with Syria124. The autonomists now decided to take the initiative and demanded the incorporation of the Alawi region into the Lebanese state, on the condition that Lebanon would remain independent under French protection, and that the Alawis would keep a large autonomy. A French report summarises the Alawis' arguments. Historically, the protagonists argued, the Alawi region constituted part of the vilayet of Beirut, with which it maintained and maintains strong economic ties. In addition, the legislation of the Alawi region was more similar to the Lebanese legislation than it was to Syrian legislation, which would lead to considerable upset in local customs. The protagonists considered it easier to incorporate the Alawi and other minority communities into the Lebanese state, which they considered to be a state of minorities, rather than to incorporate it into a Sunni Muslim dominated Syrian state. In addition, the incorporation of the Alawi region into Lebanon would bring about a numerical equality between the Lebanese and Syrian states (1.3 million and 1.7 million inhabitants respectively)125. The Syrian newspaper al-Ayyam, which devoted a few lines to the plan, considered it unrealistic as it claimed that the Syrian districts that were annexed to Lebanon in 1920 were protesting against their annexation and wanted to return to Syria126. The autonomists, on their part, countered this criticism, arguing that if forced annexation constituted no problem for the French, the voluntary annexation of districts could raise no objection at all. The French, however, did not consider this scheme a serious option for tackling their problems. As we will see in the next chapter, they adopted the policy that the Alawis themselves were to discuss their future in direct negotiations with the Syrians127. Towards the end of August 1936, when the French still had not responded to the autonomist requests, the Alawis threatened with violence, but to no avail. On 9 September 1936, the Franco-Syrian treaty was signed with far-reaching consequences for the Alawi region. They will be discussed in the next chapter.

CADN 410. Petition of the autonomist party (11/6/1936) CADN 1913 Pelition of the autonomist party (24/6/1936) 123 MAE 493: Viénot à Meyrier (25/8/1936). 124 CADN 1913 Bulletin hebdomadaire (9/5/1936). MAE-SDN 578: Meyrier à Diplomatie (9/7/1936) CADN 977: Aide-mémoire des représentants officiels du pays alaouite (3/7/1937). 126 Al-Ayyam (22/6/1936) 127 CADN 410: Petition of the autonomist party (10/7/1936). CADN 414: Meyner à Diplomatie (5/7/1936). CADN 977: Aide-mémoire (3/7/1937). Petition of the autonomist party (7/7/1936). CADN 1913: Bulletin hebdomadaire (6/6/1936), (20/6/1936), (4/7/1936). Petition of the autonomist party (24/6/1936) MAE 493: Petition of the autonomist party (24/6/1936), (25/6/1936), (20/8/1936) (22/8/1936). The question of Syrian unity, 1926-Ì 936 113

3.6 Conclusion In this chapter, I have discussed the rising challenges to the dominant cultural compromise of Alawi particularism due to structural changes that developed within the Alawi clan structure from the mid-1920s onwards the rise of Sulayman al-Murshid, the increasing influence of the Bam 'Ah clan led by Ibrahim al-Kinj that replaced the Haddadin clan led by the Hamid family as the most important clan within the Haddadin confederation, and the decline of the Khayyatin confederation led by Jabir al-'Abbas Although these structural changes had been developing for several years, the 1930 elections for the Representative Council made them, for some, painfully manifest Those losing power within the Alawi clan structure searched for new assets to restore the situation of balanced opposition, and, given the shift in Franco-Syrian relations after the Great Revolt of 1925-1927, a rapprochement with the Syrian nationalists became a serious option The rapprochement of certain Alawi leaders with the Syrian nationalists coincided with Franco-Syrian negotiations that focused on the question of Syrian unity The Alawis were drawn into the debate and, due to the divisions within the Alawi leadership, Alawi identity became the object of political bargaining Communal politics no longer followed the dominant cultural compromise of Alawi particularism that favoured Alawi autonomy under French protection, and new groups emerged that did not consider their long-term interests to be represented in the existing cultural compromise One trend, Alawi unionism, developed among a group of former Alawi particularistic clan leaders such as Jabir al-'Abbas and 'Ah Muhammad Kamil, who considered that the Alawi region should become part of a decentralised Syria Alawi nationalism constituted a second trend, and was promoted primarily by the horizontally organised parties such as the Alawi-Mushm Youth Association, which considered that Alawi rights and interests would be best cared for within the context of an independent Syrian state Although these parties were closely related to certain clans and its principal members even related to certain clan leaders, their rise was indicative of the growing number of people willing and able to participate in the different cultural compromises current in the Alawi region, which were no longer the exclusive domain of the clan leaders The growing number of politically conscious Alawis was clearly associated with the rise of state power, which gradually made the Alawis less dependent on their clan leaders These developments also enhanced the physical and social mobility of part of the population, and led to the migration of Alawis to the predominantly Sunni coastal villages Sectarian incidents occurred, which the particularistic and nationalist leaderships used to stake political claims Among the Alawi population, especially the incident of 1933 mobilised primordial feelings, a sense that the Alawis in general were threatened For the first and last time during the mandate period, the Alawi community mobilised to defend itself against a perceived threat Neither the French occupation nor the nationalist governments that ruled over the Alawi region between 1936 and 1939 and from 1942 onwards led to such mobilisation In 1936, when Ibrahim al-Kinj, faced with the incorporation of the Alawi region into the Syrian state, threatened to hand over to 114 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 the Syrians nothing but ruins and graveyards, the Alawi masses could not be bothered to mobilise. 4

Nationalist politics in the Province of Latakia

1936 - 1939

After the signing of the Franco-Syrian treaty on 9 September 1936, the Alawi region was incorporated into the Syrian state as the Province of Latakia For the Syrian nationalists, the incorporation of the Province of Latakia and the Province of Jabal Druze constituted the culmination of nearly two decades of struggle with the French However, the unfavourable economic situation, the refusal of the French parliament to ratify the Franco-Syrian treaty, and factionalism within the Syrian nationalist leadership, hindered the development of a viable Syrian state Moreover, autonomist movements in the Province of Latakia, the Jabal Druze, and the Jazira, directly challenged the unity of the new Syrian state, as did the annexation of the sanjaq of Alexandretta to Turkey In 1939, the outbreak of World War II provided France, which still had not ratified the Franco-Syrian treaty, with a pretext to take over full control in Syria, and grant the coastal region and the Jabal Druze renewed autonomy (see section 13 3) The sudden and unexpected incorporation of the Government of Latakia into Syria forced many Alawi leaders to reconsider their positions concerning the question of autonomy and unity Whereas a large majority of them had embraced the idea of autonomy, after the signing of the Franco-Syrian treaty, many of them came to accept the idea of Syrian unity As they felt that autonomy for the region was no longer a valid option and the expansion of the political arena offered them new possibilities, many autonomists sought a rapprochement with the Syrian state and the Syrian nationalists Their rapprochement with the Syrian government and the Syrian nationalists and the election of some of them in the Syrian parliament provided them with access to the press The Syrian press took a great interest in political developments in the Province of Latakia, albeit from a rather partisan point of view On the downside, the Latakia branch of the National Bloc refused to take orders from the Syrian government, which thwarted any attempts by the government to establish a rapprochement with the autonomist leaders in the Province of Latakia, and gradually drove those Alawis who had rallied to the Syrian nationalists back to the autonomist camp To control the situation, the Syrian administrators of the region 116 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 initiated a policy of divide and rule, which capitalised on the divisions within Alawi society that had developed since the early 1930s, and they filled the provincial bureaucracy and administration with predominantly Sunni political stooges, a process that Wimmer in more general terms has called the 'ethnicisation of bureaucracy'. As a result, by the summer of 1938 the coastal region was on the brink of a civil war. Skirmishes and violent confrontations occurred between Alawi clans, and even within Alawi clans, while sectarian violence increased. When the violence reached its zenith and the principal Alawi leaders were at each other's throats, they suddenly closed ranks, demanded renewed autonomy and self-rule, and created a commission of chiefs and sheikhs to mediate in other conflicts between clans. In view of the situation in Europe, France in 1939 took over power in Syria. It formally detached the Province of Latakia from the Syrian state, granted it a renewed autonomous existence, and placed it under the control of an Alawi governor, Shawkat al-'Abbas. This chapter is divided into six sections. Section 4.1 will analyse the efforts of the French and the Syrian nationalists to obtain the formal acceptance of the Representative Council of the Government of Latakia of the Franco-Syrian treaty. These efforts culminated in the conclusion of the Beirut Agreement of 4 December 1936, after which the Government of Latakia was formally incorporated into the Syrian state as the Province of Latakia. In addition, this section will discuss the principal problems that the Syrian government encountered in its efforts to establish centralised rule in the Province of Latakia; problems that will be elaborated in the next sections. Section 4.2 discusses the build-up to the elections of deputies from the Province of Latakia for the Syrian parliament. The Syrian government charged the first Syrian governor of the province, Mazhar Pasha al-Raslan, with the task to prepare the elections, and ensure the election of the principal autonomist members of the Representative Council in the Syrian parliament, where they would constitute a harmless minority. The Latakia branch of the National Bloc, however, refused to follow directives of the National Bloc government, and thwarted governor Raslan's efforts. The deputies elected for the Syrian parliament were all nationalists. Sections 4.3 and 4.4 discuss the policy of divide and rule, initiated by Ihsan Bey al- Jabiri, Mazhar Pasha al-Raslan's successor as governor. Governor Jabiri ultimately failed in his efforts to divide the Alawi clans and provoke sectarian incidents, as the Alawis closed ranks against him. Section 4.5 shortly discusses French motives for taking over power in the Province of Latakia, while section 4.6 presents the principal conclusions of this chapter.

4.1 Creating centralised rule

On 9 September 1936, the conclusion of the Franco-Syrian treaty presented the Government of Latakia with afait accompli: its incorporation into the Syrian state. The signing of the Franco- Syrian treaty profoundly shocked the autonomists. After eighteen years of loyal cooperation with the French, they had handed them over to the nationalists without their consent or even consultation. As has been discussed in section 1.3.3, the principal task of the French and the Nationalist politics in the Province ofLatakia, 1936-1939 117

Syrian government concerning the in majority autonomist Alawis was 'to make them agree to their re-attachment to Damascus'. Their efforts, in the form of negotiations between the autonomist members of the Representative Council and representatives of the Syrian government under the auspices of the High Commissioner, resulted in the informal Beirut Agreement of 4 December 1936. In this agreement, the autonomists accepted the incorporation of the Government ofLatakia into the Syrian state in exchange for a special status. This section will discuss the developments leading to the conclusion of the Beirut Agreement, and the subsequent problems the Syrian administrators encountered in their efforts to create centralised rule. After the signing of the Franco-Syrian treaty, both the French and the Syrian nationalists acknowledged the delicacy of the situation with regard to the coastal region. The Syrian nationalists advised their supporters in the Government of Latakia to celebrate their victory quietly, as the autonomists might consider such celebrations as provocations'. Generally, the situation remained calm as the unionists kept a low profile, and sent delegations to Damascus, Hama, and Horns to celebrate2. Nevertheless, incidents occurred near Duwayr al- Khatib, the home village of Ibrahim al-Kinj, while some time later, following a rumour, the unionist chiefs of Tartus asked the French 'to save and protect' the village from attack by the Matawira clan. In the village of Qadmus, one person died and fifteen were wounded in a clash between Ismaili autonomists and unionists3. Although their initial fear of an Alawi revolt did not materialise, the French feared that nationalist militias like the Steel Shirts and National Guards, which had been formed in 1936 following the examples in the Syrian interior, would attempt to substitute themselves for the official police and gendarmerie forces, and provoke violent reactions. This had occurred in Aleppo, where eight people were killed and more than a hundred people wounded in a clash between Steel Shirts and the Christian Iron Badge militia4. Once recovered from the shock, the autonomists held several meetings to discuss the consequences of the Franco-Syrian treaty. In the largest of these meetings, near the shrine of sheikh 'Ali in the

These instructions were published in the Syrian newspapers, for example al-Aviam (10/9/1936) The departures and returns of the different delegations to celebrate the return of the Pans delegation in Damascus received large press coverage. Al-Ayyam (6/10/1936) Alif Bo' (25/9/1936), (8/10/1936), (9/10/1936) Al-Qabas (30/9/1936), (6/10/1936), (8/10/1936) An Alawi delegation led by the 'Abbas family and unionists from the southern part of the Alawi region visited Horns and Hama, while sheikh Salih al-'Ali received a national hero's welcome in Horns and Hama Ah) Ba (13/9/1936), (16/9/1936), (22/9/1936) Al-A\\um (13/9/1936) Al-Qubas (25/9/1936), (2/10/1936) A French intelligence bulletin points to the fact that the visit of Salih al-'Ali coincided with an increase of the flow of weapons from the Syrian interior to unionist elements of the Khayyatin confederation CADN 1913 Bulletin hebdomadaire (28/9/1936)

CADN 413 Meyncr à Affaires étrangères (18/9/1936) sur le traite franco-syrien et ses répercussions en Syrie CADN 1913 Bulletin hebdomadaire (3/10/1936) Λ/ι/Βα' (10/9/1936), (15/9/1936). (4/10/1936), (9/10/1936), (3/11/1936)

CADN 413 Meyner à Affaires étrangères (18/9/1936) Bulletin hebdomadaire (3/10/1936) MAE 494 Note sur l'accord franco-syrien (10/9/1936) Shambrook 1998· 226 118 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 village of Snobar, some two to three thousand people participated. Unfortunately, not much is known about these meetings, as the French were no longer welcome5. After the return of the nationalist delegation from Paris, High Commissioner de Martel transferred a number of French officials, including governor Schoeffler, from the Alawi region6. The French moved fast to fiilfil their part of the agreement:

"de prendre contact avec les populations, chez lesquelles nous avons encouragé le développement de sentiments autonomistes, pour leur faire admettre le rattachement à Damas. Cette opération doit être menée rapidement, car nous nous sommes engagés, à l'égard de la délégation, à promulguer assez tôt le rattachement pour qu'elle puisse en faire état au cours de l'élection les arrêtés portant ce rattachement"7.

During a special session of the predominantly autonomist Representative Council, the newly appointed interim-governor of the Government of Latakia, David, and the head of the Political Cabinet of the High Commission, Kieffer, explained the consequences of the Franco-Syrian treaty for the Government of Latakia. They told the Council that the Syrian nationalists, in accordance with the requirements of the League of Nations, had agreed to the principle of autonomy for the Alawi minority, and explained that French troops would remain in the region for at least eight years to protect the rights of the Alawis (Shambrook mentions five years, see section 1.3.2). The autonomists countered that they could not accept a treaty, which they considered as a stab in the back, since the French, after years of loyal cooperation, handed them over to Sunni domination against which they had struggled for thirteen centuries. Muhammad Sulayman al-Ahmad threatened that the Alawi people would resist incorporation and fight until the end. The Representative Council set an ultimatum to the French: if the decision to incorporate the Government of Latakia into the Syrian state would not be reneged within eight days, it would proclaim civil disobedience8. The newspaper AlifBa ' claimed that 'those who fish in muddy waters' (the autonomist members of the Representative Council) had even threatened to demand a Turkish mandate9. In order to appease the Representative Council, the support of which they needed to implement or even make public the treaty and maintain the 'fiction of consultation of the elected

CADN 413 Meyrier a Affaires élrangères (18/9/1936). CADN 1913· Bulletin hebdomadaire (12/9/1936), (19/9/1936), (28/9/1936), (3/10/1936) MAE 494: Noie sur l'accord franco-syrien (10/9/1936) AUfBa1 (19/9/1936), (2/10/1936), (6/10/1936), (9/10/1936) The unionists of the Alawi region and the nationalists presented Schoeffler's removal as a victory their numerous complaints sent to the High Commission and the campaigns in the Damascus press had exposed Schoeffler as the one who "during many years many forms of oppression" had stimulated "anarchy", and aided and protected "the aggressions of the separatists". MAE 494 Note sur l'accord franco-syrien (10/9/1936) CADN 497: Martel à Affaires élrangères (21/10/1936) sur la protestation à Genève des alaouiles séparatistes CADN 1913 Bulletin hebdomadaire (10/10/1936). MAE-SDN 572 Martel à Diplomatie (4/10/1936) AhfBa ' (6/10/1936), (8/11/1936) Nationalist politics in the Province ofLatakia, 1936-1939 119 representatives', the French put pressure on the Syrian nationalists to offer several concessions. During a meeting with High Commissioner de Martel on 6 October, they offered to recognise the powers of the Representative Council for the remainder of its term of office, which would end in 1939, and to take into account 'reasonable suggestions' with regard to the future Syrian constitution and the choice of governor. In addition, they agreed to the continuation of a large degree of administrative and financial autonomy for the Alawi region10. The autonomists, for their part, closely monitored the situation in the sanjaq of Alexandretta, where they expected the Syrian nationalists to be prepared to make more far-reaching concessions under Turkish pressure, which they considered would strengthen their own bargaining position vis-à-vis the Syrian nationalists". The French increased the pressure on the Representative Council to discuss its demands directly with the Syrian nationalists, and, on 31 October, the Council finally accepted negotiations. The discussions focused on the mode of designation of the governor, the extension of the competences of the Representative Council, the attribution of public offices, the deployment of locally recruited military and gendarmerie forces, and an extension of French guarantees such as the nomination of French inspectors for the administrative, financial, and judicial services. On 4 December 1936, after long negotiations, the autonomists accepted the incorporation of the Government ofLatakia into the Syrian state in exchange for a special status. Unfortunately, no written record of this informal agreement exists, and therefore it is unclear how this special status was defined. The decree concerning the incorporation of the Government ofLatakia was published on 13 December in the Syrian press. The French assignment to make the Alawis accept their incorporation into Syria seemed to have been completed peacefully, and the nationalists were euphoric12. With the conclusion of the Beirut Agreement and the ratification of the Franco-Syrian treaty by the Syrian parliament, the Syrian government proceeded with the appointment, on 10 January 1937, of Mazhar Pasha al-Raslan as governor (muhafiz) of the Province of Latakia (muhafazat al-Ladhiqiyya). In the presence of the Syrian Minister of the Interior and for Foreign Affairs, Sa'dallah Bey al-Jabiri, and leading personalities of the National Bloc, governor Raslan took office, while the Syrian flag was raised over the government buildings in Latakia13.

MAE 495: Note sur le traité franco-syrien et la protection des minorités (15/10/1936). MAE-SDN 572: Martel à Diplomatie (6/10/1936). CADN 1913: Bulletin hebdomadaire (17/10/1936). CADN 497: Martel à Diplomatie (21/10/1936) MAE 495 Viénot à Martel (22/10/1936). Note sur la situation en Syrie (27/10/1936) CADN 497: Martel à Diplomatie (31/10/1936), (4/12/1936). Note sur les revendications alaouites (11/1936) CADN 1913: Bulletin hebdomadaire (24/10/1936), (31/10/1936), (7/11/1936), (7/12/1936), (12/12/1936). MAE 495 Note sur la situation en Syrie (27/10/1936). MAE-SDN 572: Martel à Diplomatie (28/11/1936) Al-Ayyam (25/10/1936), (29/10/1936) Alif Ba' (3/11/1936), (3/12/1936), (4/12/1936), (5/12/1936), (6/12/1936), (18/12/1936). Al-Qabas (4/12/1936), (5/12/1936), (9/12/1936). For the decree, see Al-Ayyam (13/12/1936) AttJ Ba • (13/12/1936). Al-Qabas (13/12/1936) The Syrian press minutely covered the festivities. Al-Ayyam (10/1/1937), (12/1/1937) Alif Ba' (2/1/1937), (12/1/1937). Al-Qabas (10/1/1937), (11/1/1937), (12/1/1937), (13/1/1937), (17/1/1937). Also commented were the festivities around his attendance to the Friday prayers: Al-Qabas (19/1/1937), (27/1/1937). The secrecy left room for practical jokers. In early January, a man claiming to be the assistant of the new governor called the central 120 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946

Raslan's principal task, the preparation of the elections of local deputies for the Syrian parliament in Damascus, was complicated by several problems, which would also hinder the tenure of his successor as governor, Ihsan Bey al-Jabiri, who was appointed on 13 November 1937. From the outset, the government in Damascus lacked the necessary power and authority to establish a modem centralised government. The conclusion of the Beirut Agreement on 4 December 1936 was symptomatic of this lack of authority. Although the conclusion of this agreement was a necessary step towards the incorporation of the coastal region into the Syrian state, it also contradicted the principal idea, or even conditio sine qua non, of nascent modem states: the centralisation of power. In addition, a dispute would soon arise between the autonomists and the Syrian government over the question whether the Beirut Agreement was a formal agreement that had to be observed or an informal agreement that could be ignored. For example, the first decision that the Syrian government took concerning the Province of Latakia, the appointment of governor Raslan, ended in a controversy, as the autonomist members of the Representative Council claimed that, following the Beirut Agreement, they should have been consulted in the appointment. The Syrian government, on the other hand, claimed that the understanding reached in Beirut was not formal and only included the provision that, in return for the appointment of a Syrian governor in Latakia, the Alawis might be asked to put forward candidates for public offices elsewhere in the country14. For the Syrian government, aspiring to establish a centralised state authority, this informal form of politics in the Province of Latakia proved self-defeating as it undermined its authority. As has been discussed in section 1.3.2, the authority of the Syrian government was further undermined by the development of strong separatist movements in Jabal Druze and Jazira, the constant threat of French intervention because of the non-ratification of the Franco-Syrian treaty by the French parliament, and the Turkish advance into the Alexandretta region. Given the special status of the Alawi region, the dominant antipathy of the politically conscious and active local population towards the idea of Syrian unity, the weakness of the Syrian government, and the fact that the French troops remained in the region to protect the rights of the Alawis, the virtue of their office did not endow the successive governors with much authority either. Ultimately, they resorted to a kind of informal politics for which the Beirut Agreement had set a precedent. For example, in the same manner as the informal and controversial Beirut Agreement accompanied the formal decree incorporating the Government of Latakia into the Syrian state, the formal announcement of free democratic elections in the

hotel in Latakia to prepare for the arrival of 'governor Shihabi' that night, and to spread the news. Immediately, preparations for the festivities began. The following morning, the shops closed and nationalist militias assembled before the hotel to welcome the new governor After waiting for several hours in the freezing cold, the disappointed crowd returned home AhJBa ' (5/1/1937) Al-Qabas (6/1/1937) CADN 497 Martel à Diplomatie (8/1/1937) Information de Latakia (11/1/1937) sur les protestes de Ibrahim al- Kinj et Muhammad Sulayman al-Ahmad MAE 530: Martel a Diplomatie (27/1/1937) FO371/20848. Damascus Quarterly Report (1/1-31/3/1937) Al-Avvam (30/12/1936). AlifBci (2/1/1937) Al-Qabas (3/1/1937). Nationalist politics in the Province ofLatakia, 1936-1939 121

Province ofLatakia in 1937 was accompanied by futile attempts to settle them beforehand. On the level of provincial politics, this kind of informal politics developed into a series of broken promises by the successive governors. The Syrian provincial governors had to walk on a tightrope. They could not send in the cavalry to establish their control, as they did not have one and did not want to give the French an excuse not to ratify the Franco-Syrian treaty. They needed to develop and maintain a local powerbase in a polarised environment in such a way that it would not further antagonise the autonomists and estrange the nationalists. In practice, the creation of a local powerbase meant that the governors dismissed officials loyal to the mandate or sympathetic to the autonomist viewpoint, and replaced them by nationalist officials, or, in an alternative interpretation, they replaced Alawi and Christian officials with Sunni officials. Naturally, the autonomist leaders, and even some leaders who had rallied to the Syrian nationalists, interpreted the dismissal of their supporters and the nomination of their opponents - officially their 'fellow citizens' - as a threat to their authority, and an encroachment on the administrative autonomy of the province. Ironically, the growing opposition increased the dependency of the governors on the local nationalist leadership, and, in this way, a vicious circle developed. The development of such a local powerbase was further hindered by the fact that the local nationalist leadership, united in the Latakia branch of the National Bloc led by the 'Abd al- Qadir Shuraytih and 'Abd al-Wahid Harun, followed its own agenda in spite of government and National Bloc directives. The small nationalist opposition movement to the National Bloc, led by the lawyer Majid al-Safiya, was virtually powerless, although it would gain strength in the 1940s (see section 3.4 on the division within nationalist ranks in Latakia). The dependency of the governors on the local nationalist leadership brought them in an awkward position. In October 1937, for example, despite appeals from the governor. Prime Minister Jamil Mardam Bey, and Minister of the Interior Sa'dallah Bey al-Jabiri, the Latakia branch of the National Bloc thwarted governor Raslan's efforts to settle the parliamentary elections of 1937 beforehand and ensure the election of prominent autonomist Alawis. The elections that ended in a total nationalist victory ironically constituted a defeat for governor Raslan and the Syrian government. With the election of leading autonomists into the Syrian parliament, where they would constitute only a harmless minority, the Syrian government had hoped to prevent a further polarisation between autonomists and nationalists, while at the same time it would have neutralised the influence of the Representative Council. With regard to the Alawi and Christian accusations of favouritism of the governor in the appointments of Sunnis in the provincial bureaucracy, French statistics show that in February 1938 the Christian community, numerically and proportionally, still held the largest portion of public offices, as it had done under French rule15. In other words, statistics do not corroborate

CADN 497 Renseignements de Latakia (16/2/1938). The Alawi community made up approximately 63 percent of the population and their share of public offices was 21 percent an under-represcntation of 42 percent The Sunni community made up approximately 19 percent of the population and had a 38 percent share in public offices an 122 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 the Alawi and Christian claims and French accusations that the Sunnis took over the administrative system. The under-representation of the Alawi community merely constituted a continuation of French practice: the French had always argued that the Alawis, with their low level of political consciousness, did not have the persons to fit the job. It is true that certain positions came in Sunni hands. The French cite as an example the appointment, early in 1937, of two Sunni magistrates from Homs, governor Raslan's hometown, as president and examining judge of the Latakia court as replacements for the two incumbent Christian magistrates16. The French, Alawis, and Christians interpreted these appointments as favouritism; the fact that Raslan recruited these magistrates from outside the province can also be interpreted as an attempt to establish a power base, independent of the local nationalist leadership. Moreover, both governors did offer positions to Alawis in reward for their support to the nationalist cause and to autonomists as a sign of good will, which the autonomists subsequently interpreted as an attempt to buy their allegiance. As politics generally left the rural population indifferent, the autonomists used the deteriorating economic situation and the increasing level of taxes to mobilise the population. The governors, who obviously could not solve the world economic crisis, were certainly held responsible for its consequences. Opposition in the economic sphere was particularly strong in questions concerning taxes and the cultivation of tobacco, which affected the entire population. Moreover, the Alawis accused the governors of spending a disproportionate amount of money for the benefit of the Sunni and the Christian communities, who had already been favoured by appointments in the provincial bureaucracy and administration17. Alawi popular discontent focused primarily on the agents of the Tobacco Monopoly and tax collectors, especially after the Tobacco Monopoly had refused to buy the tobacco surplus of 1937; a purchase promised to the tobacco farmers by governor Raslan. In addition, the Tobacco Monopoly only offered non- remunerative prices for the tobacco, while the rumours went round that for 1938 a considerable reduction of the areas allocated for the cultivation of tobacco was imminent. A large contraband of tobacco developed, which regularly led to confrontations with agents of the Tobacco Monopoly. On 20 March 1938, for example, riots broke out in Jabla as agents of the Tobacco Monopoly, escorted by gendarmes, attempted to confiscate tobacco stocks". To counter the discontent, government officials started roaming the countryside, promising tax reductions, the free cultivation of tobacco, and the chopping down of trees without permit - promises that would never be held and therefore only caused more discontent19.

over-representation of 19 percent. Finally, the Christian communities made up 18 percent of the population and held a 41 percent share in public offices, an over-representation of 23 percent. 16 CADN542 Bart à Puaux (11/3/1939) 17 CADN 1938: Bulletin hebdomadaire (9/3/1937) 18 CADN 1956 Bulletin hebdomadaire (11-17/1/1938), (25-31/1/1938), (14-21/2/1938), (14-20/3/1938). 19 CADN 497: Bulletin hebdomadaire (14/3/1937) CADN 1938 Bulletin hebdomadaire (26/3/1937) Nationalist politics in the Province ofLatakia, 1936-1939 123

A contemporary French analysis considered that the Syrian governors, and especially Jabiri, actively stimulated divisions between and within the Alawi clans, and between the Alawis and other communities, in an attempt to divide and rule, which was inspired by

"l'intolérance politique et [le] fanatisme religieux qui domine tous les actes gouvernementaux"20.

Indeed, Syrian policy in the Province of Latakia in the end amounted to nothing more than favouritism and attempts to divide and rule. However, the French ignored the fact that the Syrian governor's task was simply difficult, if not impossible. The French did acknowledge the power of the local nationalist leadership, but failed to grasp the inability of the successive Syrian governors to negate its influence. Moreover, they ignored the fact that they themselves had needed more than two years, from November 1918 to July 1921, to impose their rule in the coastal region, despite the fact that the majority of the population, including the dominant Alawi clans, was sympathetic to their rule. In the final two-month campaign of pacification, the French deployed seventeen battalions equipped with machineguns and artillery. Governor Jabiri, in 1938 confronted with an in majority hostile population, which since 1921 had grown from 260,000 to around 400,000 people, only had 331 lightly armed police officers and gendarmes at his disposal2'. In this context, the governors appointed to administrate the Province of Latakia were sent on a mission impossible. In 1938, their policies had brought the coastal region at the brink of civil war. The next section will analyse the developments in the Province of Latakia during Mazhar Pasha al-Raslan's tenure of office, which was dominated by the preparation for the parliamentary elections.

4.2 Parliamentary elections in the Province of Latakia

This section discusses the build-up to the elections of deputies from the Province of Latakia for the Syrian parliament. As has been mentioned above, it was governor Mazhar Pasha al-Raslan's principal task to prepare these elections, and ensure the election of the principal autonomist members of the Representative Council into the Syrian parliament. Some of the autonomist leaders immediately switched their allegiance to the nationalists, while others were prepared, although grudgingly, to participate in the elections. Nonetheless, governor Raslan did not succeed in accomplishing his task, as all deputies that were sent to Parliament in October 1937 were nationalists. The principal reason for this was the opposition of the Latakia branch of the

CADN 542: Rapport sur la sécurité dans la province alaouile depuis son rallachemenl à la Sync (10/3/1939). Bart à Puaux (11/3/1939) sur les résultats de l'administration syrienne en 1937 et 1938 CADN 542: Rapport sur la sécurité (10/3/1939) 124 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946

National Bloc, which refused to follow directives of the National Bloc government. In addition, Syrian electoral law itself made the election of some of the autonomist leaders impossible. An atmosphere of insecurity and intrigues developed in the Province of Latakia, which allowed the importance of the Alawi clans to increase, and divisions within and between them to widen. The local nationalists constituted governor Raslan's main problem, and a range of incidents hampered his efforts to establish his authority. On 23 January 1937, for example, he presided over the first session of the Administrative Council, the new name of the Representative Council, to discuss the budget of the province. The gathering of the Administrative Council was not undisputed, as it had been agreed upon in advance that the presidency and the secretariat would remain the same, in defiance of the local nationalist leadership that considered this to be a setback for the necessary reforms22. A more serious incident occurred in Latakia on 25 February 1937, when, after a range of smaller incidents varying from intimidation and beatings of newsvendors, journalists, and political opponents, to the closing of cinemas to women, nationalist militias clashed with Troupes Spéciales and Senegalese soldiers (see section 3.3). The incident took place during the festivities of the end of Ramadan, when Boy Scouts from Damascus, Antioch, and Tartus visited Latakia to participate in parades of the Steel Shirts and National Guards. The situation escalated, when a group of musicians, belonging to the Steel Shirts, played too close to the army barracks in the centre of Latakia to the liking of the guard, who was assaulted when he asked the musicians to go away. Some skirmishes occurred, after which the garrison, consisting of Troupes Spéciales and Senegalese forces, opened fire, killing seven people and wounding several others. Unlike the 'rubber ball' incident of January 1933, the disorder remained limited to the town of Latakia. High Commissioner de Martel blamed governor Raslan for the incident, as he claimed that governor Raslan's visit to the Steel Shirts two days before the incident had boosted their morale. In reaction to the incident, governor Raslan banned further manifestations and military trainings of the Steel Shirts and National Guards; in addition, he later prohibited members of these militias to wear their uniforms23.

Meetings of the Representative Council normally went unnoticed in the Syrian press, but now received large coverage (4/1/1937), Al-Ayyam (21/1/1937), (28/1/1937), (12/3/1937), (14/3/1937) Alrf Ba' (26/1/1937), (27/1/1937), (31/1/1937), (6/2/1937), (12/3/1937) Al-Qabas (18/1/1937), (24/1/1937), (26/1/1937) CADN 492 Martel a Diplomatie (8/1/1937), (25/2/1937), (26/2/1937) CADN 1938 Bulletin hebdomadaire (11/1/1937), (2/3/1937), (9/3/1937) Ahf Ba (11/2/1937) Al-Qabas (29/1/1937). The nationalist newspapers provided an altogether different interpretation of the events. "What happened in Latakia9 Volunteer soldiers fire on the people", headed the newspaper AhfBa ' According to the newspaper's correspondent, the volunteer soldiers started throwing rocks at the Boy Scouts when they entered the town and gathered near the army barracks Next, the volunteer soldiers opened fire on the unarmed crowd with rifles and machine guns, killing four people and wounding fifty others The reason for the attack of the volunteer soldiers, according to the correspondent, was that the crowd only slowly complied with the order of the voluntary soldiers guard to disperse AIifBa' (26/2/1937), (27/2/1937) The Syrian press largely elaborated upon several arrests made in Latakia and Ihe proceedings of the French commission of inquiry Al-Ayyam (28/2/1937), (2/3/1937), (3/3/1937), (8/3/1937), (28/2/1937), (21/3/1937), (11/4/1937). Ahf Ba (28/2/1937), (7/3/1937), (9/3/1937), (12/3/1937) Al-Avvam's correspondent was more cautious, claiming the passageway was too narrow for the crowds to disperse, and that in the subsequent uproar, rocks were thrown - leaving [aside] who threw the rocks Al-Anam (27/2/1937) Nationalist politics in the Province ofLatakia, 1936-1939 125

Immediately after his arrival in January 1937, governor Raslan set to his task of preparing the elections for local deputies for the Syrian parliament in Damascus, which initially he believed could take place the same month, but which were ultimately postponed until October 1937. Governor Raslan declared the elections could go ahead only if the Alawis could agree upon a single list that would have to include Ibrahim al-Kinj as the leading autonomist, and, ideally, the other Alawi members of the Administrative Council. This would ensure the election of the principal Alawi leaders and autonomists in the parliament, where they would constitute a harmless minority, and would prevent them from forming a strong opposition in the Administrative Council, where they constituted an overwhelming majority. In addition, the formation of a single Alawi list would prevent disturbances and rivalries between Alawi candidates that could seriously delay the elections, which the Syrian government and the French desperately needed for the maintenance of the 'fiction of consultation of the elected representatives'24. Governor Raslan failed to accomplish his mission. The Syrian electoral law itself hindered his efforts. In the elections, to be held in two rounds, sixteen seats could be contested in eight electoral districts; ten seats were reserved for Alawis, three for Sunnis, two for Greek- Orthodox candidates, and one for a residual category of 'minorities'. These seats, moreover, were reserved for certain electoral districts25. Combined with the electoral law's clause of residence, which stated that a person could stand as a candidate only in the district where he lived, effectively prevented certain autonomist leaders from being elected. The electoral district of Safita, for example, could only send one deputy to the Syrian parliament, while four prominent members of the Representative Council (Munir al-'Abbas, Yusuf al-Hamid, 'Aziz Bey Hawash, and Amin al-Raslan) 'resided' in that district. The clause of residence moreover prevented them from standing candidate in the electoral districts of Tallkalakh and Tartus, which could not present any influential or representative Alawi candidate to oppose the nationalist candidates26. Candidates of the smaller communities, like the Ismailis, considered their defeat inevitable, since the Syrian electoral law stated that in each electoral district six thousand male voters could elect one representative for parliament, a number that had been 4,500 in the electoral law for the former Government ofLatakia. In 1941, the entire Ismaili population of the Alawi region comprised around 7,200 people, male and female27. In short, many autonomist candidates feared they would not be elected or would even be prevented from standing

CADN 1938: Bullelin hebdomadaire (2/2/1937), (9/2/1937), (16/2/1937) Al-Qabas (29/1/1937) 3 seats in Latakia (1 Sunm/l Alawi/1 'minonly représentative'), 2 seals in Haffa (1 Sunm/l Alawi); 2 seats in Jabla (2 Alawis), 1 seat in Banyas (1 Alawi); 1 seat in Misyaf (1 Alawi); 2 seals in Tarlus (1 Sunm/l Alawi); 3 seats in Safita (Alawis/1 Greek-Orthodox); 2 seats in Tallkalakh (1 Alawi/1 Greek-Orthodox) CADN 497: Cahour à Martel (21/1/1937) sur l'élection prochaine des députés au parlement syrien CADN 1938- Bulletin hebdomadaire (2/2/1937). The electoral law was published in the newspapers, for example· al-Ayyam (7/1/1937), (8/1/1937) WO 208/3092: Population of the Alawi Mountain by district and community (31/12/1941). 126 The A lams of Syria, 1918-1946 candidate Moreover, they considered that their past cooperation with the French would work against them, and that the Syrian government would use every possible means to prevent their election (as will become clear, the opposite was true) Some of them sought a rapprochement with the local nationalist leadership, which used this rapprochement to challenge the remaining heavily divided autonomist candidates in all electoral districts, despite appeals of the governor and the government not to do so The divisions within autonomist ranks had become apparent already after the ratification of the Franco-Syrian treaty by the Syrian parliament in December 1936, when pré­ électoral discussions and manoeuvres started in the Province of Latakia that were reminiscent of the elections for the former Representative Councils All over the Province of Latakia, clan leaders and notables held meetings to settle disputes - creating new ones on some occasions - and to agree upon mutual support in the elections28 It soon became apparent that a united Alawi front would not continue for long, as some autonomist leaders made contacts with the nationalist party of Majid al-Safiya that opposed the National Bloc The newspaper al-Ayyam, for example, reported that a (apparently not so) secret meeting took place between Ibrahim al-Kinj, Saqr Khayr Bey, sheikh Sahh al-'Ah, and Majid al-Safiya, to discuss 'patriotic affairs'29 Already in October 1936, the nationalist position had been strengthened with Sulayman al-Murshid's defection from autonomist ranks His position, however, remained ambiguous as, in March 1937, Murshid became the leader of the Committee for Alawi Independence, which aimed to unite the Alawi autonomists and to counter the growing Sunni and nationalist influence30 In addition, in January 1937, Muhammad Sulayman al-Ahmad, who as one of the leading autonomists had claimed that he would fight until the end against the incorporation of the coastal region into Syria, suddenly changed course after a meeting with governor Raslan, and offered to stand candidate for the elections on the National Bloc list31 The futility of governor Raslan's efforts to constitute a single Alawi list soon became obvious, although the Syrian press remained optimistic that the elections would soon be held32 Governor Raslan publicly denied any involvement in the constitution of such a list and played down its importance In an interview with al-Ayyam, he argued

"It is not appropriate for me to intervene in any way I have dismissed intervention in their affairs [ ] and I have left them to their business I never had any contact with

CADN 1938 Bulletin hebdomadaire (2/2/1937), (9/2/1937), (16/2/1937) CADN 1913 Bulletin hebdomadaire (29/12/1936) CADN 1938 Bulletin hebdomadaire (2/1/1937) Al-Avvam (3/1/1937) CADN 1938 Bulletin hebdomadaire (9/3/1937) (14/3/1937) CADN 497 Rapport de la gendarmerie (5/11/1936) CADN 1913 Bulletin hebdomadaire (17/10/1936), (7/11/1936) AliJBa (6/3/1937) AI-Qabai (19/1/1937) CADN 1938 Bulletin hebdomadaire (9/2/1937) Al-Anam (20/2/1937), (3/3/1937), (19/3/1937) Alif Ba (21/2/1937), (6/3/1937), (29/3/1937) Nationalist politics in the Province ofLatakia, 1936-1939 127

them. If they come to an agreement, then that is excellent. If not, we will move on along our path. Their agreement or lack thereof will not obstruct that"33.

The Syrian press ignored his comments and praised his efforts to bring the Alawi leadership to agreement over the electoral list. It argued in a critical note that it would be appropriate for such a list to include

"those devoted personalities that have sacrificed so much for the sake of their patriotic beliefs and efforts in the former regime, leaders like sheikh 'Ali Kamil, Hamid al- Mahmud, and sheikh 'Ali Shihab"34.

These remarks just contradicted Raslan's policy and certainly did not make his task easier. The autonomists, on their part, accused the governor of wanting to divide the autonomists to the benefit of the nationalists. In their interpretation of the Beirut Agreement, the members of the Administrative Council had to be the official candidates for the parliamentary elections. The autonomists further complained that the Syrian government did not keep its end of the agreement and that the Syrian press constantly attacked them as traitors and criminals. In addition, they protested against the uneven and unfair repartition of the areas reserved for the cultivation of tobacco, the nomination of Sunni and Christian unionists in the administrative and judicial services, and the mutations of those officials they considered neutral35. During a meeting with the High Commissioner in late March 1937, the Alawis Ibrahim al-Kinj, 'Aziz Bey Hawash, Yusuf al-Hamid, Saqr Khayr Bey, Amin al-Raslan16, and the Ismaili Muhyi al-Din al- Ahmad made it clear that they would not participate in the elections, and that if the Syrian government would not keep the promises it had made in Beirut, they feared serious disturbances37. Instead of placing their complaints before the Syrian government, which held political responsibility in the Alawi region, the autonomists chose to address their complaints to High Commissioner de Martel, which in turn created ill feeling with the nationalists. In addition, as has been discussed in section 4.1, some of the complaints were not entirely justified. Concerning the attacks in the press, the nationalist negotiators in Beirut already in December 1936 had issued a stem warning to press correspondents to be reticent in their articles, and 'not

Al-Ayyam (21/3/1937) In an interview a month later, he staled he himself got his information concerning the Alawi question from the press. Al-Ayyam (16/4/1937), (21/4/1937) AlifBa'(17/2/1937), (6/3/1937) According loAlifBa', Mahmud had a right to a seat in parliament, as he was one of the few Alawis who had stuck to his nationalism during the congress of Tartus of 25 February 1936. He was even granted an audience with the governor to discuss 'electoral matters' on 16 March. Ahf Ba '(18/3/1937). CADN 497: Kinj à Martel (3/1937). CADN 1938: Bulletin hebdomadaire (26/3/1937). The participation of Raslan in this meeting is cunous, as he was dependent on Jabir al-Abbas, the Alawi unionist leader. CADN 497: Bulletin d'information (26/3/1937) Kinj à Martel (3/1937) Martel à Diplomatie (27/3/1937) CADN 1938 Bulletin hebdomadaire (26/3/1937), (2/4/1937). 128 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 to hurt the feelings of one of their brothers, the sons ofthat region'. The newspaper al-Ayyam complained that some reporters 'do not understand the nationalist cause' and merely vent 'their malice and hatred', and pointed to the danger of new divisions because of 'some foolish reporters'. In April 1937, governor Raslan threatened with severe punishment the 'evil hands' that had infiltrated the press and those supporters who harmed the public interest38. The fear of disturbances would soon become a reality, as the population started to arm itself. In March 1937, a quarrel between two Sunni villages in the district of Haffa almost led to a confrontation between Sunnis and Alawis, as rumours went that autonomist Alawis had attacked the villages39. In the region of 'Ayn al-Kurum, the Alawi Jalqiyya clan refused to accept the authority of the government, and started collecting taxes and settling their disputes without appealing to the judicial services. The French rather strangely interpreted this indication of the growing level of discord among the Alawis as a 'characteristic but isolated manifestation of Alawi particularism"10. In April, the governor made the unfortunate decision to replace some forty officials, predominantly Christians and others loyal to the mandate, by confidants of the local nationalist leadership41. In order to counter the growing discontent and criticism of his rule, the governor invited a delegation of autonomist Alawi chiefs to come to Damascus to state their grievances before the Prime Minister, Jamil Mardam Bey. The meeting did not produce the desired results and only led to more misunderstandings. The head of the delegation, Ibrahim al-Kinj, interpreted the visit, which consisted of a series of banquets and only a few private conversations, merely as a visit of courtesy. The Syrian nationalists, on their part, interpreted the non-political character of the meeting as proof that Alawi particularism in fact was nothing but a French fabrication, as the autonomists had not put forward any demands since they were in control. According to al- Ayyam, two delegations from the Province of Latakia visited Damascus, one consisting of nationalists and Alawi unionists and one consisting of autonomists and moderate nationalists. The political commentator could not conceal his delight as he saw the two delegations depart together to work in unison for the benefit of their nation42. The meeting did bring to light new divisions within autonomist ranks, as 'Aziz Bey Hawash and Yusuf al-Hamid refused to follow Ibrahim al-Kinj to Damascus. According to a French intelligence report, governor Raslan tried to capitalise on this by telling Kinj that the High Commissioner had told the Syrian Prime Minister that the French no longer supported Hawash, whose line of conduct was not considered

J0 Al-Ayyam (30/12/1936), (18/4/1937) 39 CADN 1938 Bullelin hebdomadaire (14/3/1937) 40 CADN 1938: Bulletin hebdomadaire (9/3/1937)

41 CADN 1938 Bulletin hebdomadaire (2/4/1937), (10/4/1937) a For the new administrative setup, see al-Avyam (16/4/1937) 42 CADN 1938: Bulletin hebdomadaire (20/4/1937), (26/4-2/5/1937). Al-A\vam (25/4/1937), (27/4/1937), (3/5/1937) Interview with governor Raslan in Al-Aviam (4/5/1937). Nationalist politics in the Province ofLatakia, 1936-1939 129 to be French or Syrian43. Whatever the truth of this story, any goodwill the governor might have created with Kinj was nullified by his visit a few days later to Jamil 'Ali Adib, a nationalist from Jabla and long-time enemy of Kinj44. A month after this affair, the security in the region of Wadi al-'Uyun rapidly deteriorated as an armed band, under the protection of a disgruntled Hawash, started roaming the countryside. In July, Hawash turned members of the band in to the authorities in return for their amnesty and a position in the Syrian administration. In a statement on the affair, published in the newspaper al-Ayyam, governor Raslan did not mention the involvement of Hawash, as he wanted to rally him to the nationalist camp. Subsequently, during the elections of October 1937, he was nominated governor of Hawran district in the south of Syria. Later in March 1939, he was even appointed governor of Damascus45. Although the affair constituted an apparent success for governor Raslan, who had succeeded in neutralising a powerful autonomist leader, the affair unintentionally set a dangerous precedent, as it demonstrated the governor's powerlessness or unwillingness to enforce the law. Instead of claiming the monopoly on the use of violence for the central government, of crucial importance for a strong modem state, the governor allowed political considerations to prevail over the enforcement of the law, and so turned the use of violence into political capital for his opponents and supporters: violence could be awarded with concessions. In the Alawi context, this meant that the importance of clans and networks of clients increased to the detriment of the community or the state; for the pursuit of Syrian unity, this amounted to a recipe for disaster. The autonomists had increasing difficulties to disguise their internal discord and rivalries, while the polarisation between autonomists and nationalists developed into an atmosphere of latent insecurity, fear and intimidation. As a French report indicates:

"Des incidents parfaitement révoltants se produisent périodiquement sur lesquels, fait caractéristique, victimes et agresseurs gardent un silence obstiné"46.

The discord among the autonomists became manifest in the night of 5 to 6 July 1937, when some five hundred armed men belonging to the Nawasira clan of the Kalbiyya confederation and the Kalbiyya clan of the Qardaha region gathered near Jawbat Burghal, the residence of Sulayman al-Murshid, the leader of the Murshidiyya-Ghasasina confederation, in

' CADN 497: Meyner à Martel (1/5/1937). CADN 1938· Bullelin hebdomadaire (26/4-2/5/1937). 44 CADN 1938: Bulletin hebdomadaire (3-9/5/1937). 45 CADN 401: Martel à Diplomatie (13/10/1937). CADN 1938· Bulletin hebdomadaire (7-13/6/1937), (14- 20/6/1937), (21-27/6/1937). For the Statement of the governor, see al-Ayyam (5/7/1937), (29/6/1937) published a telegram of Ahmad al-Fil from Misyaf, in which he describes a fire fight between criminals and the gendarmerie near the house of "their leader", justice of the peace Sulayman al-'Ali, who together with his cousin 'Aziz Bey Hawash, had used his influential office to combat the government CADN 1938: Bulletin hebdomadaire (7-13/6/1937), (28/6^/7/1937) 130 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 order to assassinate him The attempt failed as Murshid was absent Murshid held Ibrahim al- Kinj and Saqr Khayr Bey, under whose sphere of influence the Nawasira and Kalbiyya fell, personally responsible for the attack47 Neither the French archives nor the Syrian newspapers provide any clue on the causes of these attacks, but drawing a parallel to a similar incident in 1938 (see section 4 3), it may be concluded that Murshid's proselytism for his clan among the neighbouring clans, the Kalbiyya and Nawasira, had antagonised their leadership, and thus provoked the attack In a reaction, Murshid, with the help of the Latakia branch of the National Bloc, began arming and reorganising his clan, unhindered by governor Raslan However, the reorganisation of the clan's leadership brought Murshid into conflict with his lieutenant Hasan al-'Abud As we will see in section 4 3, the nationalists would not forget the rivalry that for the time being was settled peacefully Moreover, Murshid's attempts to further widen his sphere of influence increasingly antagonised Ibrahim al-Kinj and Saqr Khayr Bey, who now accused the governor of arming Murshid to keep their influence in check48 Despite several meetings in Tartus and Latakia, the Alawi chiefs remained hopelessly divided, and the security situation further deteriorated In August 1937, Ibrahim al-Kinj came into conflict with Bahjat al-Nasur, his cousin, the leader of the Bayt Abu Shalha family of the Bam 'Ah clan of the Haddadin of Jabla, of which Ibrahim al-Kinj as head of the Bayt Fadl was the principal chief Kinj believed that governor Raslan had pushed Nasur to challenge his authority49 As we shall see in the next section, as with the rivalry between Murshid and 'Abud, the nationalists would not forget this rivalry The rumours that the elections were due soon again led to a temporary entente within the Alawi leadership and a series of meetings In an unexpected move, Sulayman al-Murshid concluded an alliance with Ibrahim al-Kinj Murshid probably feared that he would not be elected deputy because of the hostility of the Nawasira clan that primarily lived in his electoral district Through an alliance with Kinj, to whose sphere of influence the Nawasira belonged, he hoped to secure his election In Damascus, rumours went round that the Alawi chiefs even had decided on a single list consisting of members of the Representative Council50 On 20 August 1937, the Alawi-Muslim Youth Association held a meeting in Banyas under the presidency of Yusuf Taqla Some eighty participants, primarily members of the Khayyatin clan but not Munir and Shawkat al-'Abbas, drew up a petition to the Syrian Prime Minister, Jamil Mardam Bey They demanded the implementation of the Beirut Agreement, the development of primary and professional education in the Alawi region, the fair repartition of public offices, lower taxes, revision of the tobacco regime, and the strengthening of the

CADN 1938 Bulletin hebdomadaire (5-11/7/1937), (12-18/7/1937) CADN497 Rapport sur la siluation dans la province de Latakia (28/8/1937) CADN 1938 Bulletin hebdomadaire (12-18/7/1937), (2-9/8/1937) (10-16/8/1937) CADN 1938 Bulletin hebdomadaire (19-25/7/1937), (2-9/8/1937) CADN 401 Information de Damas (2/9/1937) CADN 497 Rapport sur la situation (28/8/1937) CADN 1938 Bulletin hebdomadaire (17-23/8/1937), (24-30/8/1937) Al-Ayyam (29/8/1937) Nationalist politics in the Province ofLatakia, 1936-1939 131 confessional Alawi tribunals to defend the religion, customs, and prestige of the Alawis. The petition was then discussed at a meeting of Alawi leaders in Ras al-Khashufa, the village of Yusuf al-Hamid, which supported the petition and sent it on to the Damascus. The demand to remove governor Raslan, who "acted against the interests of the country in general and the Alawis in particular", was left out of the petition, in anticipation of the return of governor Raslan from Damascus, where he discussed the application of the Beirut Agreement51. In reaction to the congress of Banyas and the apparent alliance between Murshid and Kinj, the Syrian nationalists on 27 August organised a meeting in Tallkalakh, which Jabir and Munir al-'Abbas attended. During the meeting, the Dandashi family of Tallkalakh promised Munir al-'Abbas its support in case he wanted to stand candidate for the district of Tallkalakh (the clause of residence had been suppressed in the course of 1937)". On 5 September, the autonomist leaders organised a new meeting in Banyas, and formulated a program, based on the Beirut Agreement, which the governor had to accept as basis for the elections. The success of the meeting was severely tempered because of the absence of Sulayman al-Murshid and Amin al-Raslan, who had sought a rapprochement with the 'Abbas family, his former protectors, to increase his chances in the coming elections51. At the same time the autonomists threatened to boycott the elections if their conditions were not met, the Syrian press put pressure on the governor to go ahead with the elections, claiming that the incorporation of the Alawi region into Syria would become a reality only when deputies from that region would participate in the Syrian parliament, for which a new session was due in October'4. Governor Raslan showered the Alawi chiefs with attention and obtained the support of 'Aziz Bey Hawash and Sulayman al-Murshid. Even Ibrahim al-Kinj, the champion of Alawi autonomy, conciliated himself with the governor. Behind the scenes, the mediation of the Minister of the Interior, who had visited the region shortly before the Banyas conference, had led to a tacit agreement, which stipulated that the local National Bloc would only put forward candidates for the seats reserved for Sunnis in return for the participation of the autonomists in the elections. By decree 819 of 12 September 1937, governor Raslan set the date for the elections on 2 and 11 October55.

CADN 497: Rapport sur la situation (28/8/1937). Al-Ayyam (22/8/1937), (29/8/1937) For the signatories, see al- Ayyam (23/8/1937) For a transcript of a speech 'indicative of the prevailing atmosphere' at the conference, and the text of the petition, see: al-Ayyam (25/8/1937), (2/9/1937). CADN 497 Rapport sur la situation (28/8/1937) The Syrian press strangely enough does not report on the conference of Tallkalakh, while al-Ayyam (29/8/1937) even reports that Jabir al-'Abbas had reached an agreement with the other Alawi chiefs. CADN 497 Rapport sur la situation (28/8/1937) CADN 1938: Bulletin hebdomadaire (31/8-6/9/1937). Al-Ayyam (1/9/1937), (8/9/1937), (9/9/1937), (14/9/1937). MAE 531 Revue de la presse libanaise et synenne (27/9-3/10/1937). Al-Ayyam (17/8/1937), (20/8/1937), (23/8/1937). See decree 819 of 12 September 1937, m al-Ayyam (14/9/1937). 132 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946

Despite the efforts and appeals of governor Raslan and the Syrian government, the local National Bloc did not stick to its end of the bargain and so thwarted the cautious Syrian policy aimed at reconciliation. Instead of putting forward candidates for the Sunni seats only, it decided to present candidates in all districts and for all seats. It openly campaigned against the Alawi candidates and nominated its own Alawi candidates, leading to new threats on the part of the autonomists to boycott the elections; the situation was back to square one. Moreover, the local National Bloc on some occasions resorted to violence to intimidate opponents. Just before the elections, for example, Majid al-Safiya, the Sunni nationalist lawyer who opposed the Latakia branch of the National Bloc, was seriously injured in an attack by Steel Shirts56. To limit the damage, the Syrian government made feverish attempts to conciliate the autonomist chiefs. The government promised to support the candidature of Ibrahim al-Kinj in Jabla on the condition that he would support the unionist candidate Muhammad Sulayman al-Ahmad in Banyas57. Sulayman al-Murshid concluded an agreement of mutual support with 'Umar al-Baytar, one of the principal Sunni leaders in his home district of Haffa58. On 24 September, sheikh 'Ali Muhammad Kamil surprisingly withdrew his candidature in favour of sheikh 'Ali Shihab. The former, a long-time unionist, made overtures to the champion of Alawi autonomy, Ibrahim al- Kinj59. Towards the end of September, Prime Minister Jamil Mardam Bey visited Latakia, officially to study the economic situation; in reality, he attempted in vain to check the action of the local National Bloc60. The first round of the elections was held on 2 and 3 October 1937 with disastrous results for the autonomists, as the unionists and nationalists, who lived in the highly politicised towns, voted en bloc whereas the autonomists, whose constituency primarily consisted of non- politicised peasants, were heavily divided61. In all districts, the nationalist lists triumphed over the autonomist lists, a success that even surpassed the already highly-strung nationalist expectations. In Jabla, the list headed by Ibrahim al-Kinj and Saqr Khayr Bey was defeated by the Bloc list headed by the unknown Alawis Muhammad Hasan Isbir and Janim Khadur (Qarahila). The autonomists were enraged and accused the Syrian government of having framed

56 CADN 401: Information de Latakia (20/9/1937), (24/9/1937) Note sur les élections dans le territoire de Latakia (27/10/1937). CADN 1938 Bulletin hebdomadaire (31/8-6/9/1937), (7-13/9/1937), (14-20/9/1937) MAE 531: Revue de la presse libanaise et syrienne (27/9-3/10/1937) For the visit of the Minister of the Interior, sec al- Ayyam (29/8/1937), (6/9/1937) 57 CADN 401. Information de Latakia (27/9/1937). 58 CADN 401 Information de Latakia (24/9/1937) 59 CADN 401 Information de Latakia (24/9/1937) 60 CADN 497. Martel à Diplomatie (28/9/1937) Meyrier à Affaires étrangères (28/9/1937) MAE 531 Revue de la presse libanaise et syrienne (27/9-3/10/1937). MAE-SDN 598 Martel à Société des Nations (27/5/1938) Al- Ayyam (27/9/1937), (29/9/1937), (30/9/1937), (1/10/1937). Already in February 1937, the French reported "La problème de la répartition des sièges de députés domine actuellement tout l'activité politique. Dominant la confusion politique et les luttes de personnes, s'affirme l'intime union des Sunnites, assurés de leur droit à la prépondérance et résolus à la conquérir a tout prix". CADN 1938 Bulletin hebdomadaire (9/2/1937). For lists of candidates, see: ai-Awam (26/9/1937), (28/9/1937), (29/9/1937) Nationalist politics in the Province ofLatakia, 1936-1939 133 the elections. They pointed to the visits of several high-ranking Syrian politicians to the region, for example the Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior62. These ministers, like the governor, were not at all pleased with the results, as they realised it would only lead to further polarisation. After a discussion with High Commissioner de Martel, the Syrian government promised to lobby for the election of the autonomist leaders Ibrahim al-Kinj, Saqr Khayr Bey, Yusuf al-Hamid, and 'Aziz Bey Hawash, by asking the Latakia branch of the National Bloc to withdraw certain candidates and even entire lists in the second round of the elections63. As the local National Bloc only accepted the possible election of Ibrahim al-Kinj, the Syrian government offered 'Aziz Bey Hawash the position of governor of Hawran province, which he accepted, while it promised Yusuf al-Hamid and Saqr Khayr Bey the positions of president and vice-president of the Administrative Council64. This only led to further accusations of the autonomists against the government of 'buying' candidates and influencing the elections. Kinj did not want to isolate himself, and together with Yusuf al-Hamid and Saqr Khayr Bey withdrew from the elections65. The second round of the elections, nevertheless, went ahead after a few days of postponement on 17 and 20 October, the National Bloc candidates winning in every constituency66. The nationalist victory in the parliamentary elections in the Province of Latakia, ironically, constituted a serious defeat for governor Raslan and the Syrian government, who with the election of the autonomist Alawi leadership in parliament had hoped to neutralise their influence. The elections in a sense also constituted a defeat for the French, for whom it had become rather difficult to uphold the 'fiction of the consultation of the elected representatives' before the League of Nations. The elections had drawn the lines of battle, and Ibrahim al-Kinj, together with the remaining autonomists, prepared for resistance. The situation grew extremely tense. When the newly elected members of parliament left for Damascus on 28 October 1937,

CADN 1938: Bulletin hebdomadaire (21/9-4/10/1937). MAE 531 Revue de la presse libanaise el syrienne (4- 10/10/1937). CADN 401 Note sur les élections dans le territoire de Latakia (27/10/1937). CADN 497: Martel à Diplomatie (8/10/1937) MAE-SDN 598: Martel à Société des Nations (27/5/1938) CADN 401: Martel à Diplomatie (13/10/1937). Information de Latakia (11/10/1937), (12/10/1937) CADN 1938 Bulletin hebdomadaire (5-11 /l0/1937) CADN 401- Information de Hama (8/10/1937). CADN 497: Pétition Ibrahim al-Kinj, sheikh 'Ali Muhammad Kamil, Saqr Khayr Bey, Khayn Saqr Khayr Bey, Nadim Isma'il, Kamil Hasan Qasim (16/10/1937). CADN 1938 Bulletin hebdomadaire (12-21/10/1937). MAE 531 Revue de la presse libanaise et syrienne (11-17/10/1937). MAE-SDN 572: Martel à Diplomatie (18/10/1937). MAE-SDN 598: Martel à Société des Nations (27/5/1938). Al- Ayyam (5/10/1937), (6/10/1937), (7/10/1937), (11/10/1937). Elected were: 'Abd al-Qadir Shuraytih (Sunni), sheikh 'Ali Shihab (Alawi), and Fa'iz Ilyas (Maronite/minonty) in Latakia; Sulayman al-Murshid (Alawi) and 'Umar al-Baytar (Sunni) in Haffa, Muhammad Hasan Isbir (Alawi) and Jamm Khadur (Alawi) in Jabla, Muhammad Sulayman al-Ahmad (Alawi) in Banyas; Muhammad Bey Junayd (Alawi) in Misyaf; Mahmud 'Abd al-Razzaq (Sunni) and Muhammad Isma'il (Alawi) in Tartus, Munir al-'Abbas (Alawi), Amin Milhim al-Raslan (Alawi), and a Greek-Orthodox candidate ([Jabrah] al-Hulw or Isbir Pasha Bashur) m Safita; Shawkat al-'Abbas (Alawi) and Ilyas Jirjis (Greek-Orthodox) in Tallkalakh. CADN 401 Note sur les élections dans le territoire de Latakia (27/10/1937). 134 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 they considered it wise to do so under armed escort67. The Syrian government decided to put the blame on governor Raslan, and three months before the official end of his term of office, he was replaced by Ihsan Bey al-Jabiri.

4.3 Politics of division

From the outset, governor Jabiri's term of office was destined to failure. Taking office on the political chaos his predecessor left, governor Jabiri did not have sufficient authority to normalise the situation or the power to enforce that normalisation. His position was untenable, as he was torn between the demands of local nationalist groups, who wanted as much influence as possible for themselves, the Syrian administration that did not want to give the French mandate authorities an excuse not to ratify the Franco-Syrian treaty, and the fear that the French actively sought to frustrate his efforts. To wield influence, governor Jabiri embarked on a policy of divide and rule. Initially, his policy of division focused on Ibrahim al-Kinj and Sulayman al- Murshid, whose authority he hoped to limit through the support of internal rivals for the leadership of their clans, the Bani 'Ali and the Murshidiyya-Ghasasina respectively. In addition, he attempted to realign the highly fragmented Kalbiyya confederation to form a counterweight to Murshid's growing influence, while, simultaneously, he counted on Murshid to keep Kinj's power in check. It did not take long for the parties concerned to realise that the governor was playing one against the other, and the most powerful elements of the Murshidiyya-Ghasasina, Haddadin, Khayyatin, and Kalbiyya confederations closed ranks, after which other clans soon followed. The policy of Jabiri's predecessor, governor Raslan, had severely weakened autonomist ranks. The visit of Ibrahim al-Kinj and his supporters to the High Commissioner in Beirut in November 1937 made this clearly visible. Ibrahim al-Kinj's retinue consisted of only eight Alawi and Christian notables. Yusuf al-Hamid and Saqr Khayr Bey, his long-time allies, were his most powerful supporters. Surprising was the presence in Beirut of the newly elected member of parliament, the unionist Muhammad Isma'il. Isma'il, whose daughter was married to Kinj's son, had refused to attend the October session of the Syrian parliament, and instead preferred to support his patron. Surprising also was the support of sheikh 'Ali Muhammad Kamil and Nadim Isma'il, long-time unionists who were disappointed that their support for Syrian unity had not been translated in official positions. The same applied to the intellectuals Ibrahim 'Uthman, an Alawi lawyer and a leading member of the Alawi-Muslim Youth Association, and Nawfal Ilyas, a Maronite lawyer and member of the local National Bloc. Finally, Kinj received the support of the leader of the Darawisa clan, 'Ali Baddur68. Baddur's support for Ibrahim al-Kinj is remarkable as his influence was primarily based on the authority

67 CADN 1938: Bulletin hebdomadaire (22-28/10/1937), (26/10-1/11/1937). 68 CADN 497- Note sur les gnefs d'Ibrahim al-Kinj (2/11/1937). CADN 1938. Bulletin hebdomadaire (2-8/11/1937) Nationalist politics in the Province ofLatakia, 1936-1939 135 of his brother-in-law, Sulayman al-Murshid, (Baddur was also the father-in-law of Hasan al- 'Abud, Murshid's lieutenant, who had also married one of Murshid's sisters) who had recently come into conflict with Ibrahim al-Kinj, after the latter had protested against Murshid's election as a member of parliament on the grounds that he could not read or write69. Moreover, Baddur had been the object of harassment on the part of nationalist militias, who had violated his wife and had cut off the beard of a religious sheikh during a visit to Baddur's house, which constituted a grave insult70. In Beirut, the delegation presented a series of complaints to the High Commissioner that focused on the alleged Syrian policy of Sunnification of the administration, the bureaucracy, the judiciary, and the educational system. They complained that Sunnis could harass Alawis and Christians with impunity, as the judiciary refused to act against them. To end this situation, they proposed that a new governor should be elected by the, in majority autonomist, Administrative Council to form a counterweight against the Syrian nationalists, or, alternatively, that the governor should share certain competences with the French Delegate in Latakia. If these propositions proved unacceptable, they argued, the French would have to withdraw from the region after which all means would be permitted. The High Commissioner, on his part, refused the propositions and told the delegation to present them before the Administrative Council. After the visit, disappointed members of the delegation were seen in the consulates of Italy and Turkey to look for support71. Back in the Province of Latakia, Ibrahim al-Kinj organised a movement of civil disobedience, and ordered his men to refuse to pay taxes or sell tobacco to the Tobacco Monopoly - except for a good price. At the same time, armed bands, probably organised by 'Ali Baddur, started roaming the countryside, conducting small raids on gendarmerie units and postal services72. With the security situation rapidly deteriorating, the Syrian government hastily went ahead with the replacement of governor Mazhar Pasha al-Raslan. Governor Ihsan Bey al-Jabiri made a forceful entry on 13 November 1937: he immediately ordered units of gendarmerie from Horns and Hama to the villages of Ibrahim al-Kinj and 'Ali Muhammad Kamil to contain the movement of civil disobedience, and he ordered the complete disarmament of the population. Ibrahim al-Kinj, in reaction, announced a boycott of the government. He continued to arm his clan, and ordered armed men to surround his villages and ward off attacks from the gendarmerie. Early in January 1938, after long negotiations, Kinj promised to end his opposition in return for

CADN 497: Bulletin d'information de la Province de Latakia (5/11/1937). CADN 1938 Bulletin hebdomadaire (22-28/10/1937). CADN 497. Note sur les griefs d'Ibrahim al-Kinj (2/11/1937) Martel à Affaires étrangères (17/11/1937). Bulletin d'information (5/11/1937). CADN 497: Note sur les griefs d'Ibrahim al-Kinj (2/11/1937). Pétition de chrétiens du Territoire de Latakia (8/11/1937) Martel à Affaires étrangères ( 17/11/1937). CADN 1938: Bulletin hebdomadaire (2-8/11/1937) CADN 497: Bulletin d'information (5/11/1937). Martel à Affaires étrangères (17/11/1937). CADN 1938: Bulletin hebdomadaire ( 16-22/11 /1937) 136 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946

Jabiri's promises to look into his grievances; promises Jabiri did not keep. The French clearly were very happy with the détente, which they attributed to the personal action and political skills of the new governor". Jabiri's relations with Ibrahim al-Kinj became strained again, when, during a session of the Administrative Council on 17 February 1938, Jabiri, in an attempt to capitalise on his recent political success and probably at the instigation of 'Abd al-Qadir Shuraytih and 'Abd al-Wahid Harun, claimed the presidency of the Council. Ibrahim al-Kinj and Wadi' Sa'adah were elected vice-presidents. Jabiri's claim to the presidency directly conflicted with the Beirut Agreement, which stipulated that the authority of the Representative Council would not be challenged for the remainder of its term of office. The French considered the session as an indication for "ce qu'il demeure de résistance parmi les plus notables représentants de la population alaouite". The offer, in early February 1938, of a position in the Syrian administration to Nawfal Ilyas, Ibrahim al-Kinj's political counsellor, probably intended as a sign of good will on the part of governor, was certainly not interpreted as such by Kinj74. The claim to the presidency may have been associated with the visit of the French deputy Grat, a member of the parliamentary committee for Foreign Affairs. On Grafs arrival, the Administrative Council unanimously passed a motion calling on the French parliament to ratify the Franco-Syrian treaty. The governor and the local National Bloc had put pressure on the autonomists to support the motion, and tried to prevent any private meeting between the autonomists and Grat from taking place. Nevertheless, Kinj and Wadi' Sa'adah succeeded in meeting Grat and presenting him their complaints". Jabiri's relative popularity would soon be overshadowed by the growing discontent over the economy and his administrative reorganisations. It was in this context that the first real test for the new governor came in late March 1938, when the members of parliament from the Province of Latakia withdrew from the parliament en bloc. To solve the crisis, governor Jabiri had to carefully manoeuvre between the demands of local autonomists and nationalists, and the Syrian government. Probably, the parliamentary crisis of March 1938 confronted the governor with the inherent weakness of his position, for soon afterwards he began with his policy of division. The crisis began when local nationalists disputed the confirmation as member of parliament of Muhammad Isma'il, who as a unionist loyal to Kinj had refused to attend the parliamentary session of October 1937. The nationalists demanded that another candidate should

CADN 497: Martel à Diplomatie (13/11/1937). Kinj à Martel (13/11/1937). Saqr Khayr Bey à Martel (12/11/1937). Ali Muhammad Kamil à Martel (13/11/1937). Martel à Affaires étrangères (17/11/1937), (15/12/1937), (22/12/1937). CADN 1938: Bulletin hebdomadaire (9-15/11/1937), (16-22/11/1937), (23- 29/11/1937), (30/11-13/12/1937), (14-20/12/1937), (21-27/12/1937). CADN 1956 Bulletin hebdomadaire (28/12/1937-3/1/1938), (11-17/1/1938), (18-24/1938). 74 CADN 1956: Bulletin hebdomadaire (1-7/2/1938), (8-14/2/1938), (14-21/2/1938), (22-28/2/1938). 75 CADN 497: Martel à Affaires étrangères (23/3/1938) sur la visite du député Grat CADN 1956: Bulletin hebdomadaire (8-13/3/1938). Alif Ba' (20/3/1938). The newspaper reports that Kinj did have a private meeting with Gral, during which he expressed his wish to see the ratification of the treaty and his trust in the government Nationalist politics in the Province ofLatakia, 1936-1939 137 be appointed instead. However, Muhammad Isma'il, the only representative of the Haddadin confederation in the Syrian parliament, received the unexpected support of sheikh Salih al-'Ali, the former rebel leader and long-time unionist. He considered the potential non-representation of the Haddadin confederation in the Syrian parliament unacceptable. The Syrian government considered a coalition between Ibrahim al-Kinj and sheikh Salih al-'Ali to be a severe threat, as the latter had already started to develop into a national icon. The government insistently asked the Syrian parliament to confirm the appointment of Muhammad Isma'il, to the dismay of the deputies of the Province of Latakia, who resigned en bloc. They did so probably at the instigation of Jabir al-'Abbas and 'Umar al-Baytar, the Sunni member of parliament for the district of Haffa. Since 1930, Jabir al-'Abbas had campaigned for Syrian unity, on the condition that the Alawi region would have a special regime, unity with administrative decentralization, with a central position reserved for himself. With this manoeuvre, he probably wanted to show his force and authority in an attempt to intimidate the governor whose centralising policies he did not agree with. 'Umar al-Baytar's stand simply was the result of the insolent manner with which the Minister of the Interior, Sa'dallah Bey al-Jabiri, had treated him in public. The affair put governor Jabiri in an awkward situation, as he had to manoeuvre between the autonomist faction led by Ibrahim al-Kinj and the Syrian government on the one hand, and the local National Bloc and Jabir al-'Abbas on the other hand. Jabiri succeeded in temporarily settling the affair by promising the non-confirmation of Muhammad Isma'il to appease Jabir al- 'Abbas and the local National Bloc, and promising more appointments of non-Sunni officials in the provincial administration, which appeased the autonomists, and also Jabir al-'Abbas76. In April, the governor appointed 'Ali Najib, Kinj's son-in-law, as governor of the district of Misyaf, and later, 'Ali al-Kinj, Ibrahim's brother, was appointed inspector of the province's administrative services. According to the French, this 'policy of attraction' of the governor was meant to prevent the realignment of the Alawis and to withdraw himself from the tutelage of the local National Bloc77. Sulayman al-Murshid constituted another problem with which governor Jabiri had to deal, as events in Damascus during the parliamentary session of October 1937 had led to a total volte-face on the part of Murshid. During the session, the illiterate Murshid was appointed member of the commission for Public Instruction to the general hilarity of the Syrian parliament. Humiliated, he returned home, where he stepped up the armament of his clan and transformed his residence in Jawbat Burghal into a veritable fortress. Murshid reorganised his clan and

CADN 401 Information de Damas (1/4/1938), (5/4/1938), (6/4/1938). CADN 1956: Bulletin hebdomadaire (21- 27/3/1938), (28/3-3/4/1938), (16-22/5/1938) MAE 533 Extraits de la presse damascene de langue arabe (31/3/1938), (3-4/4/1938). Revue de la presse libanaise et syrienne (28/3-3/4/1938). The available data contradicts itself on the question of the validation, as a French report indicates his membership was validated, while another report indicates that sheikh Salih al-'Ali in May 1938 was angered by the non-validation of Ismail. The newspaper Alif Ba' relates that in September 1938 new elections for the disputed scat were held. AliJ Ba' (2/9/1938), (11/9/1938). 77 CADN 1956: Bulletin hebdomadaire (11-18/4/1938), (18-24/4/1938). 138 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 attracted elements of other clans, thus creating a formidable force. He accorded monthly payments to religious and worldly leaders, organised his own tribunals, and created a ftind for the poor and destitute. In order to pay for all this, he instituted taxes on marriages, tobacco, and the income of his followers. In addition, he was the primary beneficiary of the arms smuggle. His followers openly carried arms and made it virtually impossible for the gendarmerie to operate in his zone of influence. Effectively, he had built up a state in a state. Murshid's overall political position remained ambiguous as he remained in contact with both the Syrian government and the French. He argued that he only acted in accordance with the wishes of his followers, that he could not change those wishes, but that his own sentiments concerning Syrian unity had not changed78. Governor Jabiri's attention focused on containing Murshid's influence without ftirther antagonising him, as he was at this stage still considered a potential ally. Jabiri turned his attention to the Kalbiyya confederation, which, despite its numerous divisions, held a general dislike of Sulayman al-Murshid, because his growing dominance primarily affected his predominantly Kalbiyya neighbours. Jabiri stimulated Muhammad Bey Junayd, leader of the Rashawina clan of the Kalbiyya confederation and member of parliament for the district of Misyaf, to attempt the realignment of the confederation79. Junayd and Jabiri's interests converged on this matter, as the realignment would strengthen Junayd's authority, while for the latter the realignment constituted a counterweight for Sulayman al-Murshid's growing influence. For the time being, the realignment did not materialise. Because of the manoeuvres of governor Jabiri and the growing influence of Murshid in the northern part of the Alawi region, which was detrimental to his own authority, Ibrahim al- Kinj attempted to realign the Haddadin confederation and the Kalbiyya confederation of the northern region. On 27 April, Kinj organised a meeting in the village of Snobar, which the Kalbiyya chiefs sheikh 'Ali Muhammad Kamil, Saqr Khayr Bey and his son Khayri, and Nadim Isma'il attended, as well as the chiefs of the Nawasira clan, Tamir Sudan, As'ad Muhanna, and Ghazi Isma'il80. In addition, discussions started between Kinj and sheikh Salih al-'Ali, who was angered by the non-confirmation of the appointment of Muhammad Isma'il as member of parliament in May 193881. Governor Jabiri faced an unpleasant situation, as a French report summarises:

"Le mécontentement grandit dans toutes les sphères; d'une part, Sulayman al-Murshid s'affranchit ouvertement de la tutelle gouvernementale, alors que Ibrahim al-Kinj met le

CADN 497: Martel à Affaires étrangèreb (22/12/1937) CADN 1938 Bullelin hebdomadaire (16-22/11/1937), (30/11-13/12/1937). CADN 1956: Bulletin hebdomadaire (28/12/1937-3/1/1938), (1-7/2/1938), (22-28/2/1938), (2-8/5/1938), (9-15/5/1938), (22-29/5/1938). CADN 1956 Bulletin hebdomadaire (1-7/3/1938) CADN 1956: Bulletin hebdomadaire (25/4-1/5/1938), (2-8/5/1938), (16-22/5/1938). 81 CADN 1956: Bulletin hebdomadaire (16-22/5/1938). Nationalist politics in the Province ofLatakia, 1936-1939 139

gouverneur dans l'obligation d'envisager le règlement équitable de diverses réclamations présentées par ce chef'82.

Even some of the Alawis who had wholeheartedly rallied to the nationalists started to oppose the governor. Their position is best summarised by a pamphlet published by the Committee for the Alawi Defence, spread in April 1938. The assumed author of the pamphlet was Yusuf Taqla, leader of the Alawi-Muslim Youth Association, whose members were disappointed that they had not been awarded in official positions.

"Alawis, you have been mobilised to demand the independence and unity of the country, which you have obtained with considerable effort. [...] You have not failed to support the national government [...], hoping [it] would follow a wise policy, it would walk along the path of justice and equality, and would adopt a system that would make you forget Sunni oppression and despotism, from which you have suffered so long. Your high hopes have evaporated. Here is the government that has made the painful old times come back, that has robbed you of your belongings and your prestige. [...] Announce the disobedience, do not pay taxes, and boycott this despotic government. [...] Alawis, do not pay your money to someone who uses it to reduce you to slavery"83.

Jabiri was also heavily attacked about his policies concerning the Sunnification of the administrative services, and was under great pressure from the Syrian government itself. In an interview with several nationalist newspapers he defended himself. He argued that discontented persons had used simple administrative measures such as appointments and mutations of officials for political reasons. He claimed that Alawi chiefs had flooded him with lists of potential officials, which the local budget was insufficient to pay for. Moreover, potential officials had paid these chiefs for their support. Jabiri's statement, in return, led to indignation among the Alawi chiefs, and subsequently the Syrian government demanded an explanation^. In an effort to curb his growing influence, Jabiri decided to undermine Ibrahim al- Kinj's authority over the Bani 'Ali clan of the Haddadin confederation (see section 4.2). The Bani 'Ali clan itself was divided into three families of which Kinj's Bayt Fadl was dominant. Kinj's main challenger for dominance was Bahjat al-Nasur of the Bayt Abu Shalha, who in the 1930s had allied himself with the unionists in order to challenge Kinj. During the parliamentary elections of October 1937, he had actively campaigned against Kinj. As he had not obtained any favours for his actions from the nationalists, Nasur, dissatisfied, sought a rapprochement with

CADN 1956: Bulletin hebdomadaire (22-29/5/1938). CADN 497 Tracte imprimé et signé par le Comité de la Défense Alaouite (7/4/1938) CADN 1956: Bulletin hebdomadaire (4-10/1/1938) CADN 1956: Bulletin hebdomadaire (28/3-3/4/1938), (4-10/4/1938). MAE 533 Extraits de la presse libanaise de langue arabe (1/4/1938), (4/4/1938). 140 The Alawìs of Syria, 1918-1946

Ibrahim al-Kinj. To prevent the realignment of the Bani 'Ali clan, Jabiri decided to support Nasur in his challenge to Kinj. Several incidents took place within the Bani 'Ali, and, on 30 May 1938, the Bayt Fadl and the Bayt Abu Shalha came to blows. Kinj accused the governor of having masterminded the incident and threatened to respond brutally85. Although the governor and the local National Bloc did their best to prevent it, the Alawi realignment under Kinj's leadership continued86. On 9 June, a meeting was held in Latakia to which more than thirty Alawi leaders attended, representing all Alawi clans except the Khayyatin, while Amin al-Raslan and Muhammad Bey Junayd attempted to bring about a reconciliation between Ibrahim al-Kinj and Jabir al-'Abbas, which the governor and the local National Bloc did their best to prevent87. The situation in Alexandretta and Jazira started to negatively influence the mood among the nationalists in the Province of Latakia. French intelligence even picked up rumours that the governor and the local National Bloc were organising armed militias in order to plunge the Syrian littoral into a civil war. The dispatch of a Senegalese battalion temporarily restored order88. After his failure to challenge Ibrahim al-Kinj's leadership, governor Jabiri turned his attention towards Sulayman al-Murshid. On 26 June 1938, heavy fighting broke out in Jawbat Burghal between partisans of Sulayman al-Murshid and his lieutenant Hasan al-'Abud. 'Abud rebelled against his master to obtain more influence at a time he perceived him as weakened. Accusations of the Mahaliba and the Bayt Shilf clans that Murshid had handed them over to the Sunni government of Damascus had already weakened his position. 'Abud, who had been at odds with his master several times before (see section 4.2), it was rumoured, acted at the instigation of Ibrahim al-Kinj. As the most fantastic rumours, for example over the deaths of Sulayman al-Murshid and Muhammad al-Khartabil, spread over the Alawi Mountain, the partisans of both sides started to mobilise89. Ibrahim al-Kinj prepared the Bani 'Ali to march against Murshid, while the Sunnis of Sahyun promised their support to Murshid. The mobilisation was stopped by the intervention of Captain Blondel, the Special Services Officer from Latakia, while governor Jabiri in vain had tried to prevent Sulayman al-Murshid from leaving Latakia to go to Jawbat Burghal to restore order. In Jawbat Burghal, Murshid soon restored order, and 'Abud sought refuge with the Nawasira90.

CADN 497· Bulletin d'information de Latakia (23/9/1938) sur l'insécurité dans la province alaouite CADN 1956 Bulletin hebdomadaire (22-29/5/1938), (30/5-5/6/1938) CADN 1956 Bulletin hebdomadaire (22-29/5/1938) CADN 1956. Bulletin hebdomadaire (30/5-5/6/1938), (6-12/6/1938) CADN 1956. Bulletin hebdomadaire (30/5-5/6/1938), (6-12/6/1938) (13-19/6/1938). Al-Ayvam (16/6/1938). AlifBa' (30/6/1938) The French information on this affair has to be treated with great caution, as it was gathered and reported by Captain Blondel, later promoted to Inspector of the Special Services. The next chapter will demonstrate that Captain Blondel, who had recently arrived from the tumultuous Jazira, throughout the late 1930s and early 1940s Nationalist politics in the Province of Latakia, 1936-1939 141

The governor's actions enraged Sulayman al-Murshid, who on 29 June, in the presence of governor Jabiri and a French official, explained his position. He claimed that the governor and the nationalists had misled him and had stimulated the armament of his clan to form a counterweight against Ibrahim al-Kinj. Murshid considered that his refusal to demand complete unity and the suppression of administrative and financial autonomy of the Province of Latakia had infuriated the governor, who in revenge had pushed Hasan al-'Abud into rebellion. During the meeting, he threatened the governor and his supporters:

"I demand from you, the French, your neutrality, because in ten days I will crush all Syrians under my boots, and if the Syrian government sends five thousand gendarmes to the mountains, you will see what I will do to them"91.

Munir and Shawkat al-'Abbas also blamed the governor for the situation. They complained of 'Sunni ostracism' in the Province of Latakia, although they remained sympathetic towards the Syrian government. Munir al-'Abbas, in a conversation with a French official, declared that he feared that if the situation would not change soon, the Alawis would turn away from Syria and seek Turkish support92. Ironically, 'Abud's challenge led to the reaffirmation of Murshid's authority. As a French intelligence report stated:

"Quelques mécontents qui se seraient certainement joints aux révoltés si le mouvement n'avait pas dépassé le cadre de la tribu, se sont, devant les dangers extérieurs, regroupés autour de leur chef'91.

Even more ironie, the incident led to the reconciliation of Murshid and Kinj, as they considered the governor to be responsible for the incident. The leader of the Khayyatin confederation, Jabir al-'Abbas, fearing a marginal role in case of the realignment's success, joined the realignment through the person of his son, Shawkat al-'Abbas, the future governor of the Province of Latakia, while, at the same time, he instructed his other son. Munir al-'Abbas, member of

had secretly attempted, for his personal ends, to build up a clientele of Alawi clan leaders, among them Sulayman al-Murshid. In the context of this affair, it must be kept in mind that it was Captain Blondel who accused governor Jabiri of trying to capitalise on the affair. The episode fits the narrative of a Syrian governor embarking on a policy of divide and rule, a narrative that French intelligence carefully developed, the episode also fits the alternative narrative of a French official building up a clientele for personal ends The available data are inconclusive. Perhaps both narratives are correct CADN 978: Cahour à Martel (3/7/1938) sur l'incident de Jawbat Burghal (3/7/1938), annexe Déclarations de Sulayman al-Murshid, le mercredi 29 juin 1938. CADN 1956 Bulletin hebdomadaire (27/6-3/7/1938) CADN 497: Note sur la visite de Munir & Shawkat al-'Abbas, et Muhammad Bey Junayd (3/6/1938) Bulletin d'information de Latakia (12/6/1938). CADN 978: Cahour à Martel (3/7/1938) 93 CADN 1956 Bulletin hebdomadaire (27/6-3/7/1938). 142 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 parliament and future nationalist cabinet minister, to maintain relations with the nationalists94. Soon other leaders followed. On 5 July 1938, Ibrahim al-Kinj, Shawkat al-'Abbas, Muhammad Bey Junayd, and Sulayman al-Murshid solemnly swore, in the presence often other chiefs, to act united in the defence of Alawi people. A few days later, they formed an executive committee, consisting of Ibrahim al-Kinj, Munir al-'Abbas, Sulayman al-Murshid, Muhammad al-Junayd, Amin al-Raslan, sheikh 'Ali Muhammad Kamil, and sheikh 'Ali Shihab, to represent what they termed the Alawi interests95. The realignment of the principal Alawi clans was a fact. On 18 July, the committee went to Beirut to present itself to the High Commissioner96. To save face, governor Jabiri presented himself as the author of the realignment. During a meeting in Latakia, he promised the nomination of an Alawi as a cabinet minister, and he offered the control of the Department of the Interior, Inspection of Public Instruction, Inspection of the Public Works, one position district governor, and seven positions of mudirs to Alawi officials97. Under pressure from the local nationalists, he withdrew his promises the next day. Simultaneously, Jabiri put pressure on Murshid to break with Kinj and 'Abbas by threatening him with judicial action for the murder of one of his former lieutenants and ex-member of the Representative Council, Muhammad al-Khartabil, who was shot, dismembered, and burnt during the incidents at Jawbat Burghal. Murshid, on his part, was not to be intimidated and threatened to resist with force any attempts to arrest him98. Jabiri also attempted to break the realignment by removing its basis, the Kalbiyya, from the influence of Kinj. As a French intelligence report remarked,

"Un certain nombre de personnages apparemment ralliés à la cause nouvelle, constituent entre les mains du gouverneur un élément de renseignement et de dissociation qu'il ne manque pas à utiliser"99.

The governor, capitalising on the continuing tensions between Murshid and 'Abud, attempted to break the realignment, by spreading rumours that Kinj and sheikh Kamil had promised to protect the Kalbiyya and the Nawasira, where 'Abud had sought refuge, in the case of an attack by Murshid. The governor ordered Muhammad Hasan Isbir, member of parliament, to conclude an

CADN 497: Martel à Affaires étrangères (18/7/1938) sur le regroupemenl des alaouites. CADN 978. Cahour à Martel (3/7/1938) CADN 1956: Bulletin hebdomadaire (28/3-3/4/1938), (30/5-5/6/1938), (13-19/6/1938), (20- 26/6/1938), (27/6-3/7/1938) CADN 1956: Bulletin hebdomadaire (4-10/7/1938). CADN 497 Martel à Affaires étrangères (18/7/1938) CADN 1956: Bulletin hebdomadaire (11-17/7/1938) The newspaper AlifBa ' (28/7/1938) dedicates four lines on page 4 to the visit of the delegation. AhJBa (9/7/1938), (12/8/1938) CADN 497: Martel à Affaires étrangères (18/7/1938). CADN 1956: Bulletin hebdomadaire (27/6-3/7/1938), (4- 10/7/1938). CADN 1956 Bulletin hebdomadaire (27/6-3/7/1938) Nationalist politics in the Province ofLatakia, 1936-1939 143 agreement between the Nawasira, Kalbiyya, Qarahila, and Bani 'Ali to attack Jawbat Burghal after the harvests. Isbir, however, joined the realignment. Jabiri then, again in vain, attempted to enlist the support of 'Aziz Bey Hawash and the Matawira. After several meetings, a temporary conciliation between 'Abud and Murshid materialised, and later sheikh Salih al-'Ali rallied to the realignment100. After the departure of Jamil Mardam for Paris to negotiate the ratification of the Franco-Syrian treaty by the French parliament, governor Jabiri seemed to lose all restraint. During a meeting of members of the Nawasira, Kalbiyya, Bayt Abu Shalha, and Bayt Shilf in Latakia on 28 July, he called upon them to create incidents in Kinj's zone of influence in order to weaken his authority. Indeed, on 31 July, armed men from the Bayt Abu Shalha carried out a small raid'01. Jabiri also continued with his efforts to bring the Kalbiyya chiefs of the north under his influence, who supposedly with the help of the Sunnis of Haffa and Akrad districts, and the nationalists ofLatakia, could function as an opposition to the Alawi realignment. The governor told a correspondent of a Syrian newspaper that he had decided to employ six hundred members of the Kalbiyya clan and Sunnis from Sahyun as gendarmes'02. In addition, Jabiri staged several incidents in Wadi al-'Uyun in the south in order to bring the Matawira under his control, and to bring about an alliance between the Matawira and the Kalbiyya. The principal leader of the Matawira, 'Aziz Bey Hawash, already had been neutralised as he had been appointed governor of Hawran the previous year, while its principal religious chief, Mansur al-'Isa, had been bound to him by the nomination of his son to the position of mudir of Wadi al-'Uyun. The incidents in Wadi al-'Uyun enabled the governor to send units of gendarmerie in order to indirectly intimidate Ibrahim al-Kinj and Sulayman al-Murshid, while at the same time he hoped to distance the Matawira from the Alawi realignment. The incidents also enabled him to accuse the French of having pushed the Alawis to demand autonomy and the Jesuits of having supplied them with weapons'01. After his manoeuvrings in the Kalbiyya and Matawira confederations had led to nothing, governor Jabiri decided on a direct confrontation with Sulayman al-Murshid and, after that, with Ibrahim al-Kinj. With force, he tried to prevent a meeting between Murshid and Nuri al-Hajji, one of the Sunni leaders of the district of Haffa. Jabiri sent three platoons of gendarmerie and threatened Murshid with all sorts of harassment, such as the looting of Murshid's property by Bedouin, if he would not tum away from the French and the Alawi realignment. Murshid was not to be intimidated, called for civil disobedience, and prepared for war. Jabiri, on his part, continued his attempt to realign the Kalbiyya clan through the

CADN497 Lalakia à Beirut (21/7/1938) CADN 1956 Bulletin hebdomadaire (11-17/7/1938), (18-24/7/1938) CADN 1956 Bulletin hebdomadaire (25-31/7/1938) MAE 535 Revue de la presse libanaise et synenne (5-11/12/1938) CADN 1956. Bulletin hebdomadaire (1-7/8/1938), (15-21/8/1938), (22-28/8/1938) Alif Bar (25/8/1938), (6/9/1938) 144 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 intermediary of Muhammad Hasan Isbir, Muhammad Bey Junayd, and Hasan al-'Abud. Despite his apparent conciliation with Murshid after the incidents of Jawbat Burghal, 'Abud continued to intrigue against his master under the protection of the Nawasira. The Nawasira, however, after the financial support promised by the governor for the sustenance of 'Abud's partisans did not materialise, no longer wanted to feed them and forced them to return to Jawbat Burghal. Initially, Murshid chased 'Abud and his followers from Jawbat Burghal, but soon granted them pardon, when 'Abud begged for the return of his property104. A few days later, the governor provoked an incident in Jabla, by sending a tax collector with an armed escort of forty gendarmes, a situation reminiscent of Ottoman times. The governor's plan failed, as Kinj's men and the Bayt Abu Shalha in a concerted effort forced them to back off. After that, the governor attempted to create a new conflict between Ibrahim al-Kinj and the Bayt Abu Shalha by promising the position of mudir of the district of Bani 'Ali to 'Ali Salim Dirgham, a friend of Bahjat al-Nasur of the Abu Shalha. Kinj considered this a provocation and threatened with violence, after which the governor promised to withdraw Dirgham's candidature on the condition that Kinj, together with Sulayman al-Murshid and Jabir al-'Abbas, would come to Latakia. All three refused105. In September 1938, the French sent military units to the region. They feared that the expected failure of the negotiations in Paris over the ratification of the Franco-Syrian treaty would trigger violence in the Province of Latakia. French intelligence had picked up rumours of a plan of the local nationalists to assassinate high-ranking French officials in Latakia. Another report indicated the governor and the local nationalists had developed a detailed battle plan to turn the province into chaos. The dispatch of French troops for the time being calmed down the situation106. Still, the governor did not give up, and in October 1938, members of the Bayt Abu Shalha under the leadership of 'Ali Salim Dirgham attacked a village belonging to Kinj. This time, French army units intervened and arrested the attackers'07. In November 1938, Bahjat al- Nasur and Ibrahim al-Kinj conciliated after mediation by members of the Alawi realignment108. It did not take long before the governor made his next move, this time against Sulayman al- Murshid. In August, he had already nominated Khayri Khayr Bey, the son of Saqr Khayr Bey, an enemy of Murshid, to the position of district governor of Haffa, Murshid's home district109. Jabiri's intentions were clear, as he suggested to the new district governor to group around him

CADN 1956 Bulletin hebdomadaire (29/8-4/9/1938), (5-11/9/1938), (12-19/9/1938), (19/9-2/10/1938) CADN 1956 Bulletin hebdomadaire (5-11/9/1938) CADN 497: Martel à Affaires étrangères (20/9/1938), (5/10/1938). Information de Latakia (22/9/1938), (26/9/1938). CADN 1956: Bulletin hebdomadaire (12-19/9/1938). CADN 1956: Bulletin hebdomadaire (10-16/10/1938). Al-Avyam (23/10/1938). CADN 1956: Bulletin hebdomadaire (7-13/11/1938) CADN 1956: Bulletin hebdomadaire (22-28/8/1938). AlifBa (24/8/1938). Nationalist politics in the Province of Latakia, 1936-1939 145 the Qarahila, Nawasira, and the Sunni community of the Sahyun. This bloc, he considered, would then enable him to pose an ultimatum to Murshid, and, if need be, to destroy him by force"0. Murshid declared he would no longer pay his taxes until Khayr Bey was sacked1". Jabiri did not play his cards very well. First, he sent out units of the gendarmerie to confiscate harvests, livestock, and fiimiture in order to stimulate the retrieval of taxes. He also did this in villages belonging to the Kalbiyya, who thought they were in a privileged position as the governor sought their support. In addition, the Qarahila, the clan of Janim Khadur, member of parliament for Jabla district, for its part was angry that it had not received any official positions for its support to the Syrian government. In short, the dissatisfaction of the Kalbiyya with respect to Jabiri's policies led some of them, such as As'ad Muhanna of the Nawasira, to attend a meeting of the leaders of the Alawi realignment on 30 September in the house of Yusuf al-Hamid"2. The meeting of 30 September 1938 gave rise to a conflict between Ibrahim al-Kinj and Yusuf al-Hamid, as the latter was not invited to come to Beirut to present the decisions reached at that meeting to the High Commissioner. In addition, when a Beirut newspaper published the petition, his signature did not appear. Hamid accused Ibrahim al-Kinj of attempting to take over absolute power over the Haddadin confederation. On 21 October, Hamid's signature appeared on two petitions demanding the implementation of the Franco-Syrian treaty. Nevertheless, he continued to support the realignment"1. During a meeting in the house of Yusuf al-Hamid on 28 October, governor Jabiri made the unexpected move of delivering a written statement to his 'honourable brothers' ('I wish that each of you know that I am a brother to you') in which he made an appeal to their 'ancient Arab history, to their Arab and Islamic pride'. He stated that the followers of the caliphate of 'Ali Ibn Abi Talib, who had always carried the banner of pure Arabism, should not let themselves be carried away by an 'irritation of the moment' that had pushed them to exaggeration. He asked them to do their duty for the nation and the people, and declared himself ready to discuss their grievances and demands as long as they did not conflict with the national interest. The most interesting part of the letter is governor Jabiri's insistence on considering the Alawis his brothers in Islam and Arabism. This notion was not merely an attempt to befriend to the Alawi leadership, but it expressed a trend, current in the Alawi community, which sought recognition for the Alawis as an Islamic community (see also section 3.3)'M. The Alawi leaders were not

u CADN 497 [nformalion de Lalakia (22/9/1938). 111 CADN 1956: Bulletin hebdomadaire (17-23/10/1938). 112 CADN 1956: Bulletin hebdomadaire (19/9-2/10/1938) 111 CADN 497: Note pour M Kieffer (18/10/1938) CADN 1956 Bulletin hebdomadaire (10-16/10/1938), (24- 30/10/1938) It appears that governor Jabiri already in August 1938 succeeded in obtaining a statement ofseveral Alawi sheikhs that the Sunnis and Alawis were brothers in the same religion. His principal supporter on this issue was 'Abd al- Karim al-Khayyir, member of an influential family of religious sheikhs from Qardaha and an ardent nationalist 146 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 impressed; they simply concluded that the governor recognised them as the official representatives of the Alawi population, and their demands as legitimate"5.

4.4 Land disputes

As his attempt to divide the Alawi realignment had failed, the governor changed tactics and focused on a series of long drawn-out conflicts over the ownership of land, disputed by Alawis, Sunnis, Christians, and Ismailis. In this way, governor Jabiri created an atmosphere of anarchy that would haunt the Alawi region for a long period after he had departed. To discuss these conflicts, we have to go back in time and leave the chronological narrative followed so far.

4.4.1 The Ba'amra dispute In 1933, Muhammad Ibrahim, an Ismaili notable from Misyaf and a notorious usurer, during a public sale obtained the village of Ba'amra, belonging until then to the Alawi religious sheikh Sulayman al-'Ali of the Matawira confederation. This acquisition led to widespread discontent among the Alawi peasants who remained loyal to their original master, especially since their new master was an Ismaili. In October 1935, the peasants collectively abandoned the village, forcing Muhammad Ibrahim to look for new cultivators. He decided to invite around thirty Ismaili families from Salamiyya to replace the Alawi peasants. When the families arrived on 9 December 1935, Alawis from the surrounding villages attacked them, killing one person and injuring four others. The Ismailis subsequently returned to Salamiyya"6. In 1937, the Syrian governor Mazhar Pasha al-Raslan at the request of Muhammad Ibrahim asked peasants of the Rashawina clan of Muhammad Bey Junayd to move to Ba'amra, much to the dissatisfaction of the original peasants. Throughout 1937 and 1938, numerous incidents took place. In September 1938, governor Ihsan al-Jabiri promised the French to mediate in the conflict through Amin al-Raslan, who maintained good relations with both the Matawira of Sulayman al-'Ali and the Rashawina of Muhammad Junayd, his brother-in-law. Secretly, through the intermediary of the district governor of Safita, he prevented Raslan from

(see section 3 2) During Ihe wedding of the son of the supreme religious sheikh of the Haddadin, Ahmad al- Habib, Khayyir obtained the signatures of a number of religious leaders for his statement. Those who signed the statement primarily belonged to the Khayyatin confederation, while those refusing to sign belonged to the Haddadin confederation. The following sheikhs signed the statement: sheikh 'Isa al-Khayyir (Khayyatin of Qardaha), sheikh Sahh Nasir (Khayyatin of Jabla), sheikh Muhammad al-Ahmad (Khayyatin of Misyaf), sheikh 'Ah Hamdan (Khayyatin of Tartus), sheikh 'Ah 'Abd al-Hamid (Bashangha of Jabla). CADN 1936: Bulletin hebdomadaire (8-14/8/1938) CADN 1956: Bulletin hebdomadaire (24-30/10/1938), annexe: lettre du gouverneur (28/10/1938). CADN 978 Meyrier à Affaires étrangères (3/12/1938) sur les incidents en pays alaouite CADN 1877 Bulletin hebdomadaire (14/12/1935), (21/12/1935) Nationalist politics in the Province ofLatakia, 1936-1939 147 accomplishing his task. Moreover, he ordered the gendarmerie to prevent the Rashawina from leaving the village"7. In the summer of 1938, tensions rose considerably because of the manoeuvring of Ihsan al-Jabiri, and, on 30 October, Muhammad Ibrahim was assassinated, while in the company of Muhammad Junayd and Amin al-Raslan. An explosive situation developed as angry Ismailis attacked Alawi villages, which in turn led to the mobilisation of the Matawira to retaliate. French intelligence officers restored order, as Jabiri appeared powerless to do so. The Ismailis generally accepted that the assassination of Ibrahim was not related to the Ba'amra affair, but was the result of a rivalry between Ibrahim and another clan of Ismailis of Misyaf'8. Governor Jabiri ordered the court of Latakia to conduct a full inquiry in the affair. Sheikh Sulayman al- 'Ali was suspended as justice of the peace of Tallkalakh, and warrants for the arrest of several Matawira leaders were issued. The Matawira then mobilised a thousand armed men and let it be known they would use violence unless the charges against their leaders were dropped. After the governor visited sheikh Salih al-'Ali, a few days after the assassination, the Rashawina and Matawira were on to the plan to bring them into conflict with the Ismailis, and closed ranks. The French considered the affair to be part of Jabiri's policy of division aimed to plunge the Province of Latakia into chaos: first, by antagonising the Matawira and Rashawina clans; second, by antagonising the Alawis against the Ismailis. In addition, the attack of a powerful Alawi clan on a small minority constituted a great means of propaganda to discredit the Alawi leadership"9. Despite his failure to antagonise the Rashawina and Matawira, governor Jabiri could not withdraw the charges against the Matawira leadership without losing face. Moreover, Sulayman al-Murshid had declared that he could not accept the charges against the Matawira leadership, as he considered them as false as the charges made against himself after the incidents of Jawbat Burghal in June 1938, and sought the support of Ibrahim al-Kinj. To find a way out, the French Delegate in Latakia, Pierre Bart, demanded that governor Jabiri should publicly state that the murder of Muhammad Ibrahim, a notorious usurer, had nothing to do with politics or religion. Meyrier, the Delegate General of High Commissioner de Martel, subsequently put pressure on the Minister of the Interior, Sa'dallah Bey al-Jabiri, to order his brother, governor Ihsan al-Jabiri, to cooperate with Bart. Governor Jabiri had no choice but to comply. Sa'dallah Bey argued that he could not pass over the affair without antagonising the Ismailis, and proposed that the Matawira notables, charged with the murder, should report themselves at the court of

117 CADN 978 Meyrier à Affaires étrangères (3/12/1938). CADN 1956 Bulletin hebdomadaire (12-19/9/1938), (19/9-2/10/1938). 118 CADN 497 Information de Lalakia (7/11/1938) sur le meurtre de Muhammad Ibrahim. CADN 978: Meyrier à Affaires étrangères (3/12/1938) CADN 1956 Bulletin hebdomadaire (19/9-2/10/1938), (3-9/10/1938), (10- 16/10/1938), (31/10-6/11/1938). AUfBa'(26/7/1938), (12/8/1938) 119 CADN 497· Information de Latakia (7/11/1938). CADN 978 Meyrier à Affaires étrangères (3/12/1938) CADN 1956: Bulletin hebdomadaire (31/10-6/11/1938). MAE-SDN 596: Affaires étrangères à Société des Nations (25/5/1939) sur une pétition ismaélite. 148 The A lawis of Syria, 1918-1946

Latakia, where they would immediately be acquitted of all charges. In this way, the affair was closed120.

4.4.2 The Khandaq dispute Khandaq, a village situated on the Orontes River in the Ghab district, in the late 1930s became the centre of a dispute between Sulayman al-Murshid, the Christian 'Abd al-Karim Rustum, and the nationalists of Hama. The roots of the Khandaq affair go back to the early 1920s. Mendenhall (1991: 148-151) describes the origins of the conflict. He argues that before the French arrived in the region, the Ghab district had been a refuge for bandits and outlaws because of its inhospitable nature, and had remained outside the orbit of landowners of the neighbouring towns of Horns and Hama. With the advent of the mandate, the security provided by the French presence allowed Alawi peasants to further exploit the region. Mendenhall argues that these successes stimulated the Sunni and Christian landowners to appropriate more land, through legal and illegal means, especially as the French cadastral services made an effort to register landownership. The attempts to appropriate land led to disputes between these local notable families, which Mendenhall describes as Sunni and Christian landowners from Hama and its neighbouring villages and towns, and Alawi chiefs from the eastern slopes of the Alawi Mountain121. It was in these conditions that 'Abd al-Karim Rustum, a Greek-Orthodox notable from the village of Sqaylabiyya, succeeded in obtaining the ownership, together with two rival Alawi chiefs, over plots of land surrounding the village of Khandaq, that was divided in a western and an eastern part by the Orontes River. Rustum, capitalising on their rivalry, succeeded in sidelining his co-owners with the aim of gaining full control of the lands. Alawis of the 'Amamira clan, who worked the land, refused to give up their claims to the land. Rustum, on his part, employed Alawis recruited from the Jalqiyya clan, dependent on the Rashawina of Muhammad Bey Junayd, to form a counterweight to the 'Amamira. The situation remained deadlocked for a long time as judicial proceedings continued, and occasionally skirmishes occurred. The affair came to the fore again in 1938, when governor Jabiri pressured the Latakia court to rule in favour of Rustum122.

CADN 497. Meyner à Affaires étrangères (10/12/1938), (14/12/1938) Information de Latakia (17/12/1938) sur le meurtre de Muhammad Ibrahim. CADN 499. Ostrorog à Meyner (7/12/1938). CADN 978: Rapport Meyrier à Affaires étrangères (3/12/1938). Murshid à Kinj (7/12/1938). CADN 1956: Bulletin hebdomadaire (7-13/11/1938). See also CADN 499 Malartre à Puaux (11/4/1940) sur la réclamation de 'Abd al-Karim Rustum For a description of the region and its inhabitants, see CADN 974. Bourgeois à Directeur du Service des Renseignements (21/9/1926). In 1926, the living conditions in the region were so bad that Bourgeois warned that a revolt could be imminent CADN 499: Blondel à Chef des Services Spéciaux du Levant (26/11/1939). Malartre à Puaux (11/4/1940). Rapport Blondel (2/6/1939) sur les incidents survenus dans la région de Khandaq au cours des journées des 27-28- 29 mai 1939. CADN 1913. Bulletin hebdomadaire (7/11/1936). Nationalist politics in the Province of Latakia, 1936-1939 149

In May 1939, 'Abd al-Karim Rustum decided to grant the lease of the eastern part of Khandaq to fetch in the hay to an Aleppine merchant. The then leader of the 'Amamira, 'Isa [Slettine] (unidentified French transcription), a lieutenant of Sulayman al-Murshid, demanded that the money for the lease should be paid to him, rather than to Rustum, and threatened to prohibit the collection of hay. As the Aleppine merchant bought off this threat, the case seemed closed. However, the blackmail had led to agitation among the Jalqiyya and, on 27 May 1939, culminated in the assassination of several 'Amamira, among them 'Isa [Slettine]. The next day, Sulayman al-Murshid sent a force of four hundred armed men, commanded by Hasan al-'Abud, to the area to intimidate the Jalqiyya. The French rushed in gendarmerie units and Gardes Mobiles from Jabla and Latakia to restore order, but both groups came to blows and several villages on the eastern bank of the Orontes River were looted and burnt, putting thousands of people to flight. In the Alawi Mountain, the intervention of the French authorities prevented the mobilisation of the Nawasira and Qarahila, who feared an attack by the 'Amamira12'. The French held Muhammad Bey Junayd responsible for the incidents, who in his turn claimed he had acted on the orders of Rustum and the nationalists of Hama (Rustum stood under the influence of the Greek-Orthodox bishop of Hama, who had strong nationalist sympathies)124. Junayd swore his loyalty to the French, but protested against their passive attitude concerning the actions of Sulayman al-Murshid, against which only he himself was prepared to act. The French answered him that

"les autres grands chefs alaouites, et en particulier, Ibrahim al-Kinj et Jabir al-'Abbas, ne pouvaient pas approuver tout ce que faisait Sulayman al-Murshid, mais que, pour le bien de la cause générale, ils savaient fermer les yeux et s'entendre avec Sulayman Effendi".

They advised him

"de montrer par son attitude à Kinj et 'Abbas qu'il marchait avec eux: que l'union entre les chefs alaouites était indispensable dans les circonstances actuelles et, qu'au surplus, cette union était le seul moyen de normaliser une situation qui, du fait de Murshid, était souvent irreguliere" 12\

Indeed, as the French admitted in a confidential report, throughout 1938 and 1939, the local mandatory authorities did nothing to curb Sulayman al-Murshid's influence in the region or put an end to his exactions. The gendarmerie even received orders not to conduct operations

CADN 499 Rapport Blondel (2/6/1939) Bart à Damas (19/6/1939). CADN499 Rapport Blondel (2/6/1939) Bart à Damas (19/6/1939). CADN 497: Note sur Muhammad Bey Junayd (13/6/1939) 150 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 in the Ghab area. Murshid's partisans profited by looting and pillaging in the region with impunity. The French report even admitted to "l'impossibilité où nous estimions être d'obliger Sulayman al-Murshid au respect des lois"126. In the end, the French concluded, the only means to solve the problem was to use the Orontes River as the border between the lands of the two parties, but the formation of a commission of experts to decide on this issue was postponed time after time127. Interesting is the remark of the Assistant Delegate of Homs and Hama in a report to the Delegate in Damascus (see chapter 5):

"Je crois toutefois que pour calmer quelques inquiétudes, sans fondements, il serait préférable que le capitaine Blondel ne fit point partie de la commission d'expertise et de limitation"128.

At the time the French left Syria, the affair still had not been settled.

4.4.3 The Stamu dispute

The Stamu affair was a dispute over the ownership of land around the village of Stamu, in the district of Haffa. Two parties contested the ownership of the land: on the one hand, the Sunnis Haqqi and Sami Shuraytih from Latakia, the owners of the village proper; on the other hand, Sulayman al-'Isa, an Alawi notable belonging to the clan of Sulayman al-Murshid'29. The affair had a long history, but it was only in October 1936 that the French reported that the conflict threatened to degenerate into violent conflict130. In September 1938, the situation grew tense as governor Ihsan al-Jabiri intervened in the conflict and prohibited the cultivation of the contested lands until a definitive solution would be reached. In November, under the pretext that skirmishes had occurred on the contested lands between partisans of the Shuraytih brothers and Sulayman al-'Isa, the governor ordered the installation in Stamu of a gendarmerie unit. Under the protection of this unit, peasants of the Shuraytih brothers started to work on the contested lands, which Sulayman al-'Isa and Sulayman al-Murshid considered as a provocation. Early December 1938, after a rumour got out that the Shuraytih brothers had ordered Murshid's assassination (see section 4.5), Sulayman al-'Isa's

CADN 499 Homs/Hama à Puaux (22/7/1940) sur le différend Murshid-Rustum. CADN 499: Blondel à Chef des Services Spéciaux (26/11/1939) sur l'arbitrage linge affaire Ghab. Homs/Hama à Damas (22/12/1939) Homs/Hama à Puaux (6/2/1940). Malartre à Puaux (5/6/1940). Hama à chef du Cabinet militaire (3/8/1940) Puaux à Malartre (11/10/1940) CADN 499: Homs/Hama à Damas (22/12/1939). CADN 499 Bart à Puaux (12/4/1939) sur le différend Shuraylih-Murshid CADN 1913 Bulletin hebdomadaire (7/11/1936). Nationalist politics in the Province ofLatakia, 1936-1939 151 partisans occupied Stamu and chased away the gendarmerie and the peasants belonging to the Shuraytih brothers131. In December 1938, governor Jabiri installed a commission to investigate the incidents and to propose a solution, without any result. Murshid demanded a favourable settlement for his followers, while the Shuraytih brothers refused any compromise132. Instead, they sent petitions to the High Commissioner, complaining of'a category of ignorant people from the Mountain', who were allowed to carry arms with impunity and attacked every 'partisan of the Franco-Syrian treaty'. The Shuraytih brothers accused the French authorities in general and the officers of the Special Services from Latakia and Haffa, Blondel and Gave, in particular, of protecting the culprits, led by Sulayman al-Murshid1". On 4 March 1939, the Shuraytih brothers placed the case before the court of Latakia, accusing Sulayman al-Murshid and Sulayman al-'Isa of pillaging some 15,000 Syrian pounds worth of goods and livestock. Although the court decided in favour of the Shuraytih brothers, the case was far from over, as the Alawis accused them of having 'bought' the magistrates. Whatever the truth and the exact circumstances, the process did have political connotations as the Shuraytih brothers argued that "since the French [who had taken over control in early 1939] are now charged with security questions, we will see if they execute the warrants of arrest [for Murshid's partisans] issued by the court"'34. The affair would drag on throughout the 1940s. Although the disputes over land were long drawn-out conflicts that had started long before the Syrian government took over authority in the Province of Latakia and, on some occasions, would last even after the French had left Syria, they contributed to the French decision to take over power in the Province ofLatakia, early in 1939.

4.5 The French take over

In the beginning of 1939, the situation in the Province of Latakia had deteriorated to such an extent that the French took over control in matters of security, while the outbreak of World War II allowed them to place the entire Levant under direct military administration. On 1 July 1939, the coastal region regained its former autonomous status. The deteriorating situation was not the only reason for the French to take over control in the Province ofLatakia. As the situation threatened to degenerate into a civil war, more and more Alawis turned to Turkey for support. The French military, still responsible for the security

CADN 499· Bart à Meyner (3/12/1938). Bulletin hebdomadaire (28/11-4/12/1938) Information de Latakia (6/12/1938) sur l'attentat contre Sulayman al-Murshid. Bart à Puaux (12/4/1939). CADN 497: Meyner à Affaires étrangères (14/12/1938). CADN 499: Bart à Puaux (12/4/1939) CADN 1956: Bulletin hebdomadaire (12-19/12/1938). Al-Ayyam (8/12/1938). CADN 499- Plainte de Sami & Haqqi Shuraytih (19/1/1939) CADN 499 Bart à Puaux (12/4/1939) Information de Latakia (18/3/1939) 152 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 in the region, considered the situation unacceptable, especially with war in Europe looming. General Caillault was especially worried about Turkish propaganda, to which the divided Alawi population, and perhaps even the Sunnis of Tripoli, became increasingly susceptible.

"Il me parait y avoir incompatibilité entre la situation politique créée dans le muhafaza de Latakia par les méthodes de gouvernement syriennes, et les nécessités d'ordre militaire résultant pour la France des traités et accords annexes conclu avec la Syrie et le Liban. [...] [Tout notre établissement] militaire au Liban se trouverait ainsi menacé, sinon définitivement compromis, si nous n'opposons pas, au Nord de Latakia et dans la montagne alaouite, au démantèlement de notre premier ligne de défense".

Caillault did not consider military intervention an option, as it would not put an end to the Turkish propaganda. Instead, he called for "une action politique appropriée"135. The High Commissioner was ordered to closely monitor events, and, if the situation would further deteriorate, 'to act appropriately': to take control of the security forces136. In the beginning of December 1938, the already tense situation in the Province of Latakia took a tum for the worse when a conspiracy to assassinate Sulayman al-Murshid leaked out. Numerous incidents and raids occurred in the Alawi region, and Murshid even took hostage a group of some thirty gendarmes sent to arrest him. Rumours that Murshid wanted to kidnap or even assassinate the governor led to a further deterioration of the situation, while in January 1939, the rumour that Murshid planned to attack and pillage Latakia caused great anxiety137. The news of the adjournment of the ratification of the Franco-Syrian treaty led to strong agitation among the Sunnis and nationalists of the province, who considered the demands of the Alawi realignment to be the principal cause. According to French sources, they prepared for 'extreme action'138. The autonomists, sensing the tide was turning into their favour, demanded increased autonomy from Syria, which in practice would amount to the complete separation of the Alawi region from Syria. For the time being, the intrigues continued139.

CADN 978 Caillault à Martel (3/12/1938). CADN 497 Mcyrier à Diplomatie (6/12/1938). Diplomatie à Meyrier (7/12/1938) Meyrier à Affaires étrangères (10/12/1938) Guerre à Diplomatie (9/12/1938) CADN 499 Ostrorog à Meyrier (7/12/1938) CADN 978 Caillault à Martel (3/12/1938) Al-Ayyam (4/1/1939), (8/1/1939) CADN 497 Meyrier à Diplomatie (3/12/1938), (4/12/1938), (5/12/1938) CADN 499: Bart à Meyrier (3/12/1938) Information de Latakia (6/12/1938) CADN 978: Meyrier à Affaires étrangères (2/12/1938) sur les incidents en pays alaouite. CADN 1956 Bulletin hebdomadaire d'information (28/11-4/12/1938), (5-11/12/1938), (12- 19/12/1938), (19-25/12/1938). MAE 535. Revue de la presse libanaise et syrienne (28/11-4/12/1938), (5- 11/12/1938), (12-18/12/1938), (19-25/12/1938). Al-Av\am (2/12/1938), (5/12/1938), (6/12/1938), (2/1/1939), (4/1/1939), (22/1/1939) CADN 497 Revendications alaouites (1/1939) Puaux à Beirut (20/1/1939). Information de Latakia (21/1/1939), (25/1/1939) Information de Tartus (26/1/1939) Mahmud 'Abd al-Razzaq à Puaux (26/1/1939) Petition de Nationalist politics in the Province ofLatakia, 1936-1939 153

In January 1939, Gabriel Puaux was appointed as the successor of count Damien de Martel. During an introductory visit around Syria, the new High Commissioner concluded that governor Jabiri's position was no longer tenable. During a luncheon, offered to him at the home of Jabir al-'Abbas, and to which also Ibrahim al-Kinj and Sulayman al-Murshid were invited, the latter reportedly arrived with a bodyguard of some 1,500 armed men. Back in Damascus, Puaux set Prime Minister Jamil Mardam Bey an ultimatum: if Jabiri would not resign, the French would intervene and take over control in Latakia province140. On 18 February 1939, Puaux by decree placed the gendarmerie and police forces under the direct authority of his Delegate in Latakia, Pierre Bart141. Jabiri was virtually powerless and resigned; on 30 March, Shawkat al- 'Abbas was appointed interim-governor of the Latakia province142. On 31 December, the Representative Council (the former Administrative Council) elected him as governor143. As will be demonstrated in the next chapter, the granting of executive power to an Alawi governor would have far-reaching consequences.

4.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have discussed the temporary incorporation of the Alawi region into the Syrian state following the conclusion of the Franco-Syrian treaty of 9 September 1936. As the expansion of the political arena offered them new possibilities, many autonomists sought a rapprochement with the Syrian state and the Syrian nationalists. A case in point is Muhammad Sulayman al-Ahmad of the Numaylatiyya clan, one of the principal protagonists of Alawi autonomy and opponents of Sunni dominance, who in January 1937 suddenly announced his candidacy as member of parliament for the National Bloc list. Only Ibrahim al-Kinj and a few former unionist leaders such as sheikh 'Ali Muhammad Kamil and Nawfal Ilyas (member of the National Bloc), who were disappointed that they had not been awarded for their efforts to establish Syrian unity, opposed the incorporation. These sudden and contradictory changes of loyalty demonstrate the pragmatism of segmentary Alawi politics. They also strengthen my argument that the Alawi discourses of loyalty towards the French, of autonomy, of unionism were nothing more than the power effects of the dominant Syrian nationalist and French patriotic discourses, and that political agency lay elsewhere.

Ibrahim al-Kinj (27/1/1939) sur le congrès de Tartus Bart à Puaux (11/2/1939). Blondel à Bart (21/3/1939) Bart à Puaux (29/3/1939) CADN 497: Puaux à Affaires étrangères (11/2/1939) sur son voyage aux Alaouites Al-A\\am (9/2/1939), (10/2/1939) CADN 497: Arrêté 22/LR (18/2/1939). The French had been threatening with intervention since early January. ΛΙ- Ayyam (8/1/1939) CADN 497: Arrêté 54/LR (30/3/1939). Al-Ayyam (13/3/1939), (2/4/1939), (10/4/1939) AliJ Ba' (10/3/1939), (11/3/1939). AhfBa (31/12/1939) 154 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946

For the Syrian government, in its efforts to facilitate the transition from French to Syrian rule in the Alawi region, much hinged on the outcome of the parliamentary elections Months of efforts on the part of the government and the governor to get the former autonomist leaders elected as members of the Syrian parliament were thwarted by the Latakia branch of the National Bloc Campaigning for Syrian unity provided them with influence in the local political constellation, while achieving it reduced them to marginal players in the Syrian political context As it did with the division between the Aleppo and Damascus branches of the National Bloc, regionalism played an important role in the activities of the Latakia branch These elections also demonstrated that the lesser chiefs of the Alawi clans profited most from the ascendancy of the Syrian government With their newly acquired influence, they challenged the dominant clan leaders In addition to the internal rivalries, rivalries between Alawi clans came to the fore as a result of the policy of divide and rule of the Syrian governor At the point that civil war was imminent, the principal clan leaders suddenly closed ranks and set up a commission to mediate in conflicts between and within other clans Together, they called for an end to Syrian rule and called for the return of autonomy under French protection This sudden reconciliation may be explained partly with the help of the segmentary model, which prescribes mediation to prevent conflicts from escalating and threatening the entire segmentary system The fact that the Syrian state had manifested itself in the Alawi perception as an 'ethmcised state' by filling the provincial bureaucracy with Sunni and officials and excluding Alawis from it may also have contributed to the realignment Faced with its failure to incorporate the Alawi region and French pressures resulting from the imminent World War II, the Syrian government could but accept the detachment of the Alawi region from Syria in 1939 5

Incorporation into Syria

1939 - 1946

On 1 July 1939, the Province of Latakia regained large autonomy in the fields of administration, finance, and the judiciary, although it remained under the sovereignty of the Syrian state Shortly after the outbreak of World War II in September 1939, the French placed the Territoire autonome alaouite under military administration In order not to hamper the French war effort, the different communities promised a moratorium on politics for the remainder of the war This moratorium did not stop political intrigues During the initial stages of military administration and, from June 1940, under Vichy French rule, French authority seriously declined because of corruption on the part of a number of French officials, who used their authority to further their personal interests From the late 1930s onwards, these officials built up a local political clientele that offered bribes in return for political privileges, permits, and protection The cutting down of forests, the natural wealth of the Alawi region, reached alarming proportions, while the cultivation and trafficking of hashish prospered Although the establishment of Free French and British control after the invasion of June 1941 largely ended the corruption, the political intrigues multiplied, as politics in the Autonomous Alawi Territory became part of political fencing between the Free French and the British Under British pressure, the French, in January 1942, decided once again to attach the Autonomous Alawi Territory to the Syrian state as the Province of the Alawi Mountain (muhafazat al-jabal al-'alawi), and place it under the sovereignty of the Syrian government In contrast to the period of 1936-1939, this time the Syrian government, with British support, succeeded in establishing its authority One by one, the Syrian government succeeded in breaking the power of the leading Alawi clans In late 1943, only Sulayman al-Murshid, with the help of the French authorities, continued to resist the Syrian government In late 1946, after the French and British had left the region, Syrian military forces entered the region and arrested Murshid, who, on 16 December 1946, was publicly executed on the Martyrs' Square in Damascus 156 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946

Unfortunately, as has been discussed in the 'Assessment of the Sources', only very little information exists on the Alawi community for the period of 1939-1946. Many of the French archival sources have either been destroyed or are still classified, while British intelligence showed little interest in the Alawi community as its focus was on military security. The heavily censored Syrian press hardly reported on events in the Alawi region. Consequently, large gaps in the information, especially for the years 1939-1941 and 1944-1946, hinder a detailed analysis of political life in the Alawi region. Nevertheless, this chapter will sketch the main lines. Section 5.1 discusses the decline of French authority because of corruption, and, after July 1941, the presence of the British. In this period. Captain Blondel, the head of French intelligence in the Alawi region, secretly played out the principal Alawi clan leaders against each other to further his personal interests. Section 5.2 discusses the consequences of the Anglo- Free French invasion of June and July 1941, and particularly of the French policy that allowed the 'Abbas and Kinj families, and Sulayman al-Murshid to establish a virtual dictatorship in the Autonomous Alawi Territory. This triumvirate filled the bureaucracy with its own supporters and used the rivalry between the British, the Free French, and the Syrian government to establish its dominance. Moreover, the Anglo-Free French invasion seriously upset the balance of power in the Alawi region. As the British military presence dwarfed the French presence, most of the Alawi clans no longer recognised the French as the masters of the region. The Syrian government profited from the situation by gradually developing its authority over the coastal region, and eliminating its opponents. Section 5.3 discusses two incidents concerning Sulayman al-Murshid, which occasioned major rows between the French and the British authorities in 1942 and 1944. The British representative in the Levant, Major General Spears, used a number of incidents concerning Sulayman al-Murshid to attack the Free French, who subsequently increased their support for Murshid. Section 5.4 discusses the final episode of the mandate over the Levant, during which the Syrian government succeeded in eliminating its last opponent in the coastal region, Sulayman al-Murshid.

5.1 Decline of French authority: corruption

This section discusses the decline of French authority because of corruption. With the outbreak of World War II, a military Assistant Delegate, Lieutenant Colonel Malartre, replaced the civil Assistant Delegate in Latakia, Pierre Bart. Before leaving Syria for France, Bart, on his third tour of duty in Syria since 1918, wrote an assessment of the political situation in the Autonomous Alawi Territory for his successor and the High Commissioner. He warned of the dangers of the circulation of large amounts of arms among the population. He also warned that the political dominance of the Alawis, which had become manifest with the appointment of Shawkat al-'Abbas as governor on 31 December 1939, could lead to a polarisation between Incorporation into Syria, 1939-1946 157

Alawis on the one hand and Sunnis and Christians on the other'. Although Bart stated the obvious, his successor did not heed his warnings. Before Malartre left for Latakia, High Commissioner Puaux extensively briefed Malartre and drew his attention to the activities of Captain Blondel, the head of the French intelligence services in Latakia, and Sulayman al-Murshid. Malartre, in a report made after a first tour of the region, reassured the High Commissioner.

"Je dois dire que le Capitaine Blondel jouit ici de l'estime générale. Il me paraît avoir une vue très claire des véritables intérêts de ce pays. La tranquillité qui y règne est son oeuvre. C'est un travailleur acharné - un homme calme, loyal et modeste. [...] La politique du Capitaine Blondel qui a consisté à faire de Murshid un vrai paysan et à l'inciter à travailler dans le calme [...], me paraît avoir porté tous ses fruits".

Malartre dismissed the danger of the armament of Murshid's clan, and claimed that Murshid, when asked, would hand over his weapons peaceflilly. Concerning the administrative services, he lashed out to Benoist of the Financial Service.

"En bref, j'ai trouvé ici, pour ce qui concerne le fonctionnement des Services, une sorte de dictature exercée depuis longtemps déjà par M. Benoist soit comme Directeur des Finances ou comme Contrôleur des dépenses engagées; un Administrateur Supérieur [Shawkat al-'Abbas] neutralisé par cette dictature, et pour le reste, léthargie ou anarchie".

As a solution, Malartre demanded Benoist's removal. As will become clear, Malartre probably wanted Benoist out of the way for quite different reasons2. In October 1940, prominent nationalists from the Autonomous Alawi Territory wrote a letter directly to High Commissioner Puaux, in which they complained that certain French officials, in particular Captain Blondel, had built up a personal clientele. They accused these officials of arming their clients and giving them preferential treatment in issuing all sorts of permits. Moreover, they accused them of allowing their clients to illegally cut down trees and cultivate hashish, of intimidation, and of obstructing any protests against their arbitrary administration. The nationalist leaders 'Abd al-Qadir Shuraytih and 'Abd al-Wahid Harun, for example, had been placed under house arrest for no obvious reasons. Furthermore, they accused the French authorities of being prejudiced in the litigation over lands, the most notorious cases being the Stamu and the Khandaq affairs3. The complaints were repeated a few months later by

CADN 500: Bart à Puaux (6/12/1939). CADN 500. Malartre à Puaux (3/1/1940) Shawkat al-'Abbas à Malartre (4/1/1940) CADN 499: Lettre à Puaux (9/10/1940). 158 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946

'Aziz Bey Hawash, the leader of the Matawira clan, in a letter to Puaux's successor as High Commissioner, General Dentz". Malartre brushed aside these complaints. Already in January 1940, he had called unjustified the complaints made against Captain Blondel. In a personal and confidential report to the High Commissioner, Malartre explained that these accusations could not be taken seriously as they were made by 'extremist anti-French nationalists' belonging to the entourage of'Abd al-Qadir Shuraytih and 'Abd al-Wahid Harun:

"Ce serait une erreur grave de les considérer comme mandataires qualifiés de la communauté musulmane. [...] Leur appétit de pouvoir - pour les profits qu'ils en ont eus naguère, et leurs sentiments anti-mandataires - s'affichent au grand jour. Sur une population de près de 400.000 âmes, nous comptons 70 à 80.000 sunnites dans ce Territoire. Les nationalistes n'ont guère qu'un ou deux milliers d'adhérents".

Instead, he chose to blame his predecessors for the situation, as he did in January 1940, in particular Pierre Bart, whose action he called "inutile de qualifier". Concerning the principal objects of the nationalists' complaints, Captain Blondel and governor 'Abbas, he reported:

"L'administrateur est ulcéré des attaques dont il est l'objet. Probe, intelligent et travailleur - les actes de son administration, dont je suis personnellement informé, sont inattaquables. Et je ne dis rien du Capitaine Blondel: la malveillance à son égard est le fait d'imaginations déréglées. Toutes les accusations possibles ont été portées contre lui. Les calomnies actuelles ne sont donc que des reprises de thèmes anciens. Dix mois de collaboration quotidienne ne m'ont pas fait varier sur le jugement d'intelligence, de courage, et d'honnêteté qui j'ai porté naguère sur lui"5.

High Commissioner Puaux, of course, was in no position to contradict his Assistant Delegate's opinion based on the complaints of'extremist anti-French nationalists'. In December 1940, the new High Commissioner representing the Vichy government, General Dentz, appointed Colonel Jourdan, an experienced colonial administrator, as his Assistant Delegate in Latakia, where the tensions between Sunnis and Alawis and among Alawis were rising6. The appointment of Colonel Jourdan took the lid off a cesspool of corruption and intrigues. Jourdan largely confirmed the accusations of 'extremist anti-French nationalists' against Captain Blondel and other French officers, such as Colonel Gérardin, the commander of the gendarmerie. He did not accuse his predecessor Malartre of corruption, as his report focused primarily on Blondel, but, reading between the lines, it becomes clear that Malartre had to be

CADN 500 Petition of'Aziz Bey Hawash (4/2/1941 ) CADN500 Malartre à Puaux (2/10/1940) CADN 500 Dentz a Diplomatie (10/12/1940) Incorporation into Syria, 1939-1946 159 either a very weak, incompetent and ignorant officer who was easily fooled, or that he was corrupt. Unfortunately, the declassified French archives do not provide conclusive information on the affair. Concerning Captain Blondel, head of the military intelligence services, the available material suggests that Jourdan ordered the civil Sûreté Générale to secretly monitor him for a month. The reports give a glimpse on the modus operandi of Blondel and other French officers, and, as such, on life in the Alawi region during the second half of 1939 and 19407. The reports established by the Sûreté Générale describe several meetings held between Blondel, his interpreter Khalil al-Hubayshi, governor Shawkat al-'Abbas and several leaders of the Kalbiyya confederation, like Muhammad Bey Junayd, Saqr Khayr Bey, and 'Ali al-Asad, just after the appointment but before the arrival of Colonel Jourdan.

"Le but de ces réunions serait d'éviter que le Colonel Jourdan soit mis au courant de tout ce qui se passe dans la région et de tromper sa bonne foi".

In order to secure the support of some Alawi notables, among them Muhammad Bey Junayd, Munir al-'Abbas, 'Ali Muhammad Kamil, and Saqr Khayr Bey, and receive money from them, Blondel during one of these meetings offered them permits for the chopping down of trees8. In addition, the reports suggest that Captain Blondel attempted to create a bloc of Alawi leaders against Ibrahim al-Kinj, consisting of Sulayman al-Murshid, the 'Abbas family, and the principal chiefs of the Kalbiyya confederation. Although this information cannot be confirmed due to a lack of sources, Ibrahim al-Kinj's and Captain Blondel's names turned up in the reports in connection with the assassination of Amin al-Raslan in October 1940, which may explain their animosity9. Moreover, it appears that Captain Blondel used Ibrahim al-Kinj to harm the reputation of Colonel Jourdan. When Kinj stood candidate for the presidency of the Representative Council in January 1941, Blondel gathered a group of Kinj's opponents, and ordered them to visit Colonel Jourdan in Latakia to accuse Kinj of attempting to settle his election to the presidency in advance. The reports imply that Blondel, through this manoeuvre, intended to discredit Colonel Jourdan, who based on this misinformation might take an unfortunate decision that would damage his reputation. It is clear that Blondel wanted Jourdan out of the way, as the report indicates:

"Le Capitaine Blondel ne semble pas admettre l'autorité du Colonel Jourdan qui lui a enlevé toutes initiatives dont il jouissait du temps des autres délégués"10.

7 CADN 500: Extraits d'information des bulletins de la Sûreté Générale de Latakia (12/2/1941) sur le Capitaine Blondel 8 CADN 500· Bulletin de la Sûreté Générale de Latakia (7/1 /l 941 ). 9 CADN 499: Information de Latakia (11/12/1940). CADN 500 Bulletin de la Sûreté Générale de Latakia (25/1/1941) 10 CADN 500: Bulletin de la Sûreté Générale de Latakia (7/1/1941). 160 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946

Next, Blondel and governor 'Abbas spread the rumour that Ibrahim al-Kinj had ordered the assassination of Sulayman al-Murshid". Subsequently, Blondel went to Murshid to convince him of the plot, showing him three rifles he had 'confiscated' from the 'assassins', one of the rifles being Kinj's personal rifle. The Maronite lawyer Nawfal Ilyas, who was on good relations with both Murshid and Kinj, revealed the plot to them and defused the potentially explosive situation. Blondel, who was informed of Ilyas' intervention, according to a French report, threatened to kill him, and subsequently compiled a report for Colonel Jourdan in which he accused Ilyas of working for the English and the Italians12. The reports further state that, in early January 1941, Blondel received the message that he was to be fired because he had reached the Special Services' maximum age of 48. Shawkat al-'Abbas and Khalil al-Hubayshi advised Blondel to take action against Director of the Interior 'Ali al-Kinj, Ibrahim's brother, in order to take over his office in case he would be forced to return to civilian life. To achieve this, Blondel suddenly accused 'Ali al-Kinj of supporting the National Bloc, and of illegally trading rice and sugar. Moreover, he again attempted to antagonise the Kinj family and Sulayman al-Murshid by accusing 'Ali al-Kinj of paying the Shuraytih family to continue its judicial proceedings in the Stamu dispute (section 4.4.3), and of encouraging a faction of the Mahaliba clan dependent on Sulayman al-Murshid to assassinate its chief. The report continues that Blondel's ambitions to take over 'Ali al-Kinj's position may have contributed to the conflict between Ibrahim al-Kinj and Captain Blondel13. In addition, Blondel, with the help of the 'Abbas family and Muhammad Bey Junayd, organised several campaigns of petitions demanding General Dentz, the new High Commissioner, to maintain him in office. He even organised a delegation to be sent to Beirut, consisting of Muhammad Bey Junayd, Sulayman al-Murshid, sheikh 'Ali Muhammad Kamil, Saqr Khayr Bey, and Munir al- 'Abbas. Shawkat al-'Abbas even threatened with resignation, if Blondel was to be removed. Nevertheless, Blondel was transferred to a post in Beirut. A few days after his departure, Sulayman al-Murshid and Ibrahim al-Kinj allied themselves and decided to work for the 'Alawi cause' in cooperation with the French14. Beirut was not far away from Latakia, and Blondel's influence could be felt there for some time. On 25 January, after an unspecified phone call from Beirut, Munir al-'Abbas, Sulayman al-Murshid, Muhammad Bey Junayd, Saqr Khayr Bey, sheikh 'Ali Muhammad Kamil, and sheikh Ahmad Dib al-Khayyir collectively retired from the Representative Council15. From Beirut, Blondel continued to diminish the influence of the Kinj family to the benefit of the

Tensions had risen between Sulayman al-Murshid and Ibrahim al-Kmj in December 1940, as Kinj had refused Murshid to marry a woman belonging lo his clan. CADN 500 Information de Lalakia (23/12/1940) 12 CADN 500: Bulletin de la Sûreté Générale de Latakia (7/1/1941). 13 CADN 500: Bulletin de la Sûreté Générale de Lalakia (8/1/1941) 14 CADN 500 Bulletin de la Sûrelé Générale de Latakia (8/1/1941), (9/1/1941), (10/1/1941), (11/1/1941) " CADN 500 Bulletin de la Sûreté Générale de Latakia (10/1/1941), (11/1/1941), (14/1/1941), (15/1/1941), (25/1/1941), (25/1/1941), (25/1/1941) Incorporation into Syria, 1939-1946 161

'Abbas family and Sulayman al-Murshid'6. To settle the affair, Jourdan called for the immediate removal of Captain Blondel from Beirut, and for the dismissal of Colonel Gérardin, commander of the gendarmerie, and Khalil al-Hubayshi, Blondel's interpreter'7. A few days later, Jourdan sent a note of instruction to all his subordinates in which he ordered them to conserve 'a totally impartial' attitude in order to settle "les hostilités entre le clan Kinj et le clan opposé" and to consider their zones of action as 'regions of France"8. Clearly, discipline, weakened since the outbreak of World War II, had to be restored. Unfortunately, no sources are available for the period leading up to the Anglo-Free French invasion.

5.2 The Alawi triumvirate

In June 1941, Operation Exporter, the Anglo-Free French invasion of the Levant, started. In July, British and Free French forces were in control of the entire region. Shawkat al-'Abbas, Sulayman al-Murshid, Ibrahim al-Kinj and his brother 'Ali, profited from the ensuing Anglo- Free French rivalry to fill the bureaucracy and administrative services with their own supporters. The Syrian government, on its part, profited from the misrule of the provincial government and Anglo-French rivalry to develop its control over the coastal region, which in January 1942 was reattached to the Syrian state as the Province of Jabal Alawi. By the summer of 1943, Sulayman al-Murshid was the only remaining Alawi leader capable of opposing the Syrian government. A series of reports, drafted in August 1941 by Colonel Jourdan for his successor as Assistant Delegate, General Mondar, sum up the political situation in the Autonomous Alawi Territory after the Anglo-Free French invasion. It appears that governor 'Abbas, after the removal of Captain Blondel in January 1941, had followed a policy of divide and rule, which allowed him, in his capacity of governor, to act as arbiter. He defended his growing independence and subsequent political influence by appointing a number of political stooges in the local administration, known for their anti-French sentiments, and by attempting to discredit Colonel Jourdan19. During a visit of generals De Gaulle and Catroux in August 1941, 'Abbas

CADN 2409: Rapport Jourdan sur la situation créée aux Alaouites résultant de l'attitude adoptée par l'administrateur supérieur du territoire, Shawkat al-'Abbas (20/8/1941) CADN 500: Note de la Délégation de Latakia (16/4/1941). CADN 500: Note de service (8/4/1941). Governor 'Abbas appointed a number of political stooges in the local administration, known for their anti-French sentiments, like 'Abdallah al-'Abdallah and Yusuf Taqla, both members of the 'Abbas' Khayyatin confederation, and Adib al-Jabur, a Greek-Orthodox lawyer from Safita, the fief of the 'Abbas family 'Abdallah al-'Abdallah, member of the Khayyatin of Banyas, came into prominence in the late 1930s because of his unionist sympathies and actions. He came into contact with the nationalists during his study at the faculty of law in Damascus, a stronghold of nationalism. In 1937, he was nominated secretary at the Ministry of the Interior in Damascus, where he was responsible for press and propaganda. In this capacity, he served as a liaison between the unionist leaders in the Alawi region and the Syrian government In 1938, in addition, he acted as one of the prominent members of the Syrian Popular Party. Towards the beginning of 1939, together with two other members of the Khayyatin, Ahmad al-Khayr and 'Uthman Zaydan, and with the support of 'Abd al-Qadir Shuraylih and 'Abd al-Wahid 162 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 published a declaration in which he accused Colonel Jourdan of incompetence with the obvious aim of discrediting him before his superiors. In this campaign against Jourdan, 'Abbas, who enjoyed the quiet support of Sulayman al-Murshid, received the support of Ibrahim al-Kinj, who had clumsily been refused an audience with generals De Gaulle and Catroux, while an audience of a Sunni delegation went ahead as planned. This led to accusations on the part of Ibrahim al- Kinj that Colonel Jourdan conducted an 'exclusively Sunni policy', and he joined governor 'Abbas in his opposition to Jourdan, who, on his part, accused governor 'Abbas, "un personnage d'une duplicité extraordinaire", to be the principal agent of anti-French action in the Autonomous Alawi Territory. With regard to the British, whom the French greatly distrusted, Jourdan commented:

"En effet, la France est attaquée par l'ensemble des agents étrangers dont les plus nocifs ont été jusqu'en juin à la solde de l'Allemagne ou de l'Italie. Avec un cynisme déconcertant, ils ont réussi à entrer en relations [...] avec les services britanniques et ils affichent actuellement avec insolence leurs sentiments anti-français en se réfugiant derrière la protection anglaise".

Jourdan specifically pointed to the role of Nawfal Ilyas, a Maronite lawyer, whom he called

"l'agent le plus actif de l'influence britannique dans le Territoire [...] qui inspire ostensiblement tous les actes tendant à détruire l'influence française".

On several occasions, Nawfal Ilyas arranged meetings between British officials and long-time French allies such as governor 'Abbas, Ibrahim al-Kinj, 'Aziz Bey Hawash, and Sulayman al- Murshid20. Jourdan warned his successor to carefully watch British agents like Ilyas, and advised

Harun, he actively campaigned againsl the French, which led to his arrest. In April 1939, he left for Iraq where the British expelled him for his support of the Rashid 'Ali coup. Back in Latakia, governor 'Abbas appointed him as head of the Drogmanat, the department of interpreters and translators In 1944, he died because of an illness. CADN 2409: Compte-rendu au sujet des menées anti-françaises dans le Territoire autonome alaouite (10/8/1941). Renseignement concernant 'Abdallah al-'Abdallah (1941) Al-Ayyam (12/3/1944). Yusuf Taqla (Khayyatin of Tartus) was the leader of the Alawi-Muslim Youth Association that during the late 1930s actively campaigned for Syrian unity with a special status for the Alawi region, while he had also been a member of the Syrian Popular Party. In the 1940s, he worked for the Italians as a member of the armistice committee. CADN 2409: Compte- rendu au sujet des menées anti-françaises dans le Territoire autonome alaouite (I0/8/I94I). After the defeat of metropolitan France, Nawfal Ilyas worked for the Italian armistice commission in Beirut. In Lebanon, he offered his services to the acting British consul in Tripoli, the Greek-Orthodox merchant Georges 'Arida In November 1940, Ilyas attended a meeting with Ibrahim al-Kinj, Georges 'Anda, and a member of the Maronite Sa'adah family of Latakia, to discuss the monopolisation of cotton trade in the coastal region. During this meeting, 'Arida promised them considerable commissions, if they would attempt to artificially lower the price of cotton, which would be to the benefit of his trading company. CADN 499 Rapport Malartre (12/11/1940). According to Jourdan, on 7 August 1941, it was Ilyas who arranged a meeting between Ibrahim al-Kinj, 'Aziz Bey Hawash, Georges 'Arida, and Colonel King, the commander of the British forces in the Autonomous Alawi Territory, followed by a meeting at King's office in Latakia the next day, which also governor 'Abbas and Sulayman al-Murshid's son attended. Jourdan clearly was not happy with these meetings between British officials and long-lime French allies such as Kinj and Murshid. Incorporation into Syria, 1939-1946 163

"l'arrestation par la Sûreté Générale de tous ces individus et leur mise en surveillance très étroite en un lieu très éloigné du Territoire alaouite"21.

In August 1941, the visit of generals De Gaulle and Catroux to Latakia also provided the population with an opportunity to present a series of letters of protest. The protests focused on the nepotism and corruption of the 'Abbas, Kinj and Murshid families, the trafficking of drugs, the contraband in tobacco, the unfair distribution of grain and wheat, and the illegal exploitation of the forests; illegal acts from which many of the signatories of the petitions had profited themselves until recently under the protection of Captain Blondel. The names under the petitions clearly suggest that the political situation in the Alawi region had changed. The petitioners included many notables of the Kalbiyya and Matawira confederations who had earlier on profited from Captain Blondel's protection, such as Muhammad Bey Junayd of the Rashawina and As'ad Muhanna of the Nawasira. Ironically, even the nationalist leader 'Abd al- Qadir Shuraytih called for French assistance to combat what he called 'the regime of feudalism and administrative anarchy'22. On 24 August 1941, General Catroux convoked governor Shawkat al-'Abbas and Director of the Interior 'Ali al-Kinj to Beirut, dismissed them from office, and placed their principal advisor, Nawfal llyas, under arrest. Catroux appointed Salami Bey Kamil Pasha al- Masri, an Alawi from Cilicia, as interim-governor. Three days later, these mutations were followed by the replacement of Colonel Jourdan as Assistant Delegate by General Mondar21. The instructions he received from Catroux were clear: political and territorial unity for Syria, financial and administrative decentralization for the Alawi region24. The events in Damascus of September 1941 had serious repercussions for the Autonomous Alawi Territory, and are indicative of the interrelatedness of Syrian and Alawi politics that had developed over the years. On 19 September, the appointment of the pro-French sheikh Taj al-Din al-Hasani as President of the Syrian Republic and the appointment of Hasan al-Hakim of the Shahbandarist party (a Pan-Arab party opposed to the National Bloc) as Prime Minister led to strong protests from the Latakia branch of the National Bloc, while the Latakian Shahbandarist party under the leadership of Majid al-Safiya supported the appointments. More

CADN 2409: Compte-rendu sur les menées antifrançaises dans le Territoire autonome alaouite (10/8/1941) Compte-rendu sur l'action politique des autontés militaires britanniques en Territoire alaouite (10/8/1941). Rapport Jourdan sur la situation créée aux Alaouites résultant de l'attitude adoptée par l'Administrateur Supérieur du Territoire, Shawkat al-'Abbas (20/8/1941).

The principal signatories ο Γ the petitions, to be found in CADN 791 & CADN 2409 and dated August 1941, included Muhammad Bey Junayd (Kalbiyya), Saqr Khayr Bey & Khayn Saqr Khayr Bey (Kalbiyya), 'Ah al- As'ad Isma'il (Kalbiyya), Ghazi Isma'il (Nawasira), As'ad Muhanna (Nawasira), Muhammad Amin al-Raslan (Rasalina), sheikh Mansur al-'lsa (Matawira), sheikh 'Ah Muhammad Kamil (Numaylatiyya), Bahjat Nasur (Abu Shalha), and several lesser notables of the Kalbiyya confederation See section 2.1.2. General Mondar is the alias of Captain Magrin-Vemerey who during the revolt of Salih al-'Ali had commanded the post of Babana. 24 CADN 791 Catroux à Mondar (10/9/1941). CADN 2409: Bulletin d'information (28/8/1941). 164 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 important for the Alawis was the appointment of Munir al-'Abbas as Minister of Public Works. This nomination, in addition to the proclamation of Syrian independence on 27 September, led to great anxiety among the Alawi and Christian communities of the coastal region, who interpreted 'Abbas' appointment as a de facto incorporation of the Alawi region into the Syrian republic and the end of autonomy. For the time being, they remained expectant, as they realised that General Catroux's proclamation of independence, made under British pressure, was not unconditional: the Free French wanted a treaty regulating future Franco-Syrian relations in exchange for independence25. General Mondar on 13 October reinstated Shawkat al-'Abbas and 'Ali al-Kinj in office, probably following a request of Syrian Prime Minister Taj al-Din al-Hasani, who had been put under pressure by his cabinet minister, Munir al-'Abbas, Shawkat's brother26. The return to office of Shawkat al-'Abbas and 'Ali al-Kinj shortly after the proclamation of independence seriously alarmed the Christian community and part of the Alawi leadership. The triumvirate of 'Abbas, Kinj, and Murshid dominated the civil services, which they had filled with their supporters, and to counter this, the Christians called for the recruitment of officials outside of the Autonomous Alawi Territory. In addition, the Christians were angered by a decree of the Syrian government that established the Friday as the weekly day off instead of the habitual Sunday27. Christian opposition was especially strong within the Greek-Orthodox community of Latakia, led by the Sa'adah family. Wadi' Sa'adah, a long-time autonomist, even declared that he would rather come to an agreement with the nationalists than with the Alawis, and sought contact with 'Abd al-Wahid and As'ad Harun. To remedy the situation, the governor and representatives of the Greek-Orthodox community decided to meet in Latakia to find a solution. On 30 December 1941, a day before the meeting, a futile and rather ridiculous incident took place during a dancing party in the Casino Hotel, organised by the Greek-Orthodox community, which would make conciliation impossible for the time being28. The incident developed as follows. After a visit to governor 'Abbas, where they had some drinks, 'Ali al-Kinj and Colonel Tomb, the commander of the gendarmerie, went to the dancing party in the Casino Hotel to have some more drinks. Tomb then offered a cigarette to Kinj, who, a little drunk and somewhat irritated as he had just quit smoking, swept the cigarette case aside. Unfortunately, in some bizarre twist, the cigarette case landed on the chest of Odette Sa'adah, daughter of Wadi' Sa'adah, and from there jumped onto the bottom of another daughter

Khoury 1987, 595. CADN 791: Baddur à Catroux (3/10/1941) CADN 796 Information de Beirut (24/9/1941) CADN 2022: Bulletin d'information (26/9/1941). FO 684/14: Diary of the political officer in Damascus (2/10/1941) CADB2022 Bulletin d'information (17/10/1941). CADN 791 Note sur la situation aux Alaouites (5/10/1941). CADN 2022 Renseignements de Latakia (26/12/1941) sur l'opinion générale des principales communautés sur la probabilité du rattachement du Territoire Alaouite à la Syrie CADN 791 Compte-rendu Mondar sur les incidents survenus à Latakia du 28 au 31 décembre et de l'agitation politique qui en est la conséquence (6/1/1942) CADN 2022: Bulletin d'information (1-8/1/1942). Incorporation into Syria, 1939-1946 165 of Wadi' Sa'adah. An angry crowd, which considered the incident a deliberate insult of the Greek-Orthodox community, surrounded Kinj, who, although trying to apologise, had to flee the hotel, showered with abuse like 'savage filthy peasant'. When he arrived at his car, an angry mob surrounded it. Suddenly several loud bangs were heard, and the Christians believed that Kinj had drawn his gun and opened fire on them. In reality, the bangs were backfires in the exhaust of Kinj's car. The next day, petitions were drawn up and the Sa'adah family went to General Mondar to protest against the insults. The incident also gained a political dimension as Odette Sa'adah claimed:

"C'est cet odieux Shawkat qui a tout manigancé. Il faut supprimer ce gouvernement d'indignes, de paysans, de sauvages".

On the 12 January 1942, General Catroux by decree promulgated the new Organic Law for the 'Province of the Alawi Mountain' {muhafazat al-jabal al-'alawi), which stated that the Alawi province constituted an integral part of the Syrian state and was bound to the Syrian constitution, although it would continue to enjoy a special administrative and financial regime29. With the cosmetic revision of the existing Organic Law for the Autonomous Alawi Territory, dating back to 1 July 1939, the French wanted to adapt

"au principe de l'unité de l'Etat de Syrie le Statut du Territoire de Latakia sans provoquer la désaffection d'une population dont l'attachement nous a été utile et peut encore nous servir"30.

For the French, the new Organic Law had to meet two basic requirements: a legitimisation for continued French presence in the region, and related to it, the formal recognition of France as 'la protectrice des minorités'31. Since 1918, the phrase 'protection of the minorities' had changed from a euphemism for divide and rule to a veil for the French need of Alawi support. In a short but revealing note, entitled "Bases de notre politique" (1941), the Free French stated their policy towards the Alawis:

"Garantir dans une fédération syrienne une autonomie raisonnable (financière et administrative) du Gouvernement des Alaouites. Ce territoire comprend une importante minorité sunnite très agressive, une masse alaouite peu évoluée, qui nous est attachée, mais dont les différents chefs ont tendance à se disputer entre eux. L'union des alaouites s'est faite par nos soins, contre les sunnites, en 1938 et 1939, et sous l'égide

29 CADN 791 Arrêté 23/FL (12/1/1942) portant la promulgation du règlement organique de la Province de Jabal Alawi. FO 371/31471: Weekly political review (14/1/1942), (21/1/1942). AI-Ayyam (22/1/1942), (23/1/1942) CADN 791 Note de la Délégation Générale de la France Libre sur la situation aux Alaouites (5/10/1941) 11 CADN 791 : Rapport Mondar sur le futur Statut des Alaouites (18/11/1941). 166 The Alaxvis of Syria, 1918-1946

de la famille 'Abbas qui avait fait alliance avec Sulayman al-Murshid et Ibrahim al- Kinj, de moindre importance que les 'Abbas, mais de tout temps fidele a la France Cette union doit être maintenue à tout prix, c'est la base de tout"32

To achieve this, the French were prepared to turn a blind eye on the excesses committed by this Alawi triumvirate In August 1942, the French General Mondar confirmed this policy of support to the triumvirate 'Abbas-Kinj-Murshid, "à la condition posée par l'opposition que la Delegation arbitrerait les différends avec le gouvernement"33 The Spears Mission certainly approved of this decision

"This triumvirate is too powerful for opposition, and our policy has been to support them and to try and make them personal friends If this policy is continued, we should not be endangered by enemy intrigue or insecurity in the Alawi hills"34

In April 1942, dissension began to rise within the Alawi triumvirate, and small disturbances occurred throughout the Alawi region, which brought Murshid into conflict with governor 'Abbas and 'Ah al-Kinj35 As a British report analyses

"Although the ostensible reason for the road blocks and robberies was hunger, they undoubtedly had political implications and consequences It is widely suggested that they were engineered by persons wishing to bring discredit on the present administration by creating a state of insecurity The incidents are also being used by certain sections of the Muslim and Christian communities in an endeavour to influence the British to take action against Sulayman al-Murshid, whose people were involved An unfortunate result of the incidents has been a more or less open quarrel between the governor and the (local) minister of the interior on the one side ['All al-Kinj], and Sulayman al-Murshid on the other The political officer has obtained from the latter a definite promise that there will be no fiirther disturbances, but an effort to patch up relations between him and the governor were less successful Ancient tribal rivalries as well as personal jealousies are at the bottom of the dispute"36

The opposition to the triumvirate, consisting of an alliance of Alawi leaders and the Muslim and Christian communities, seized the opportunity to mount a campaign against Shawkat al-'Abbas

32 CADN 791 Bases de notre politique ( 1941 )

33 CADN 791 Mondar a Collet (18/7/1942) Schema de la situation politique aux Alaouites (21/8/1942) M FO 892/140 Spears to Cairo (26/3/1942) 35 CADN 2022 Bulletin d'information (30/4/1942) 36 FO 371/31471 Weekly polilical summary (24/4/1942) Incorporation into Syria, 1939-1946 167 and 'Ali al-Kinj, whom they accused of favouritism in handling the distribution of the desperately needed wheat and grain. Moreover, they attacked 'Ali al-Kinj's administration of the municipality of Latakia, which he had taken over pending the arrival of a new president of the municipality, as scandalous, while they accused his son-in-law, 'Ali Najib, the district governor of Haffa, to exercise a veritable reign of terror. The exasperation among the Sunnis and Christians reached such an extent that they demanded direct control by the French, while others threatened with civil disobedience against the provincial government17. Soon the opposition found a more subtle and effective way to get 'Ali al-Kinj out of the way. They knew a debate was due in the Administrative Council (former Representative Council) about the maintenance of'Ali al-Kinj's office of Director of the Interior, for which no fimds were reserved in the budget but which still existed. The opposition simply hoped that the Administrative Council would suppress Kinj's office, and so eliminate his influence. The French, on their part, hoped that the opposition in the Administrative Council would vote 'Ali al-Kinj out of office, while leaving the presidency of the council for Ibrahim al-Kinj. They did not want to eliminate 'Ali al-Kinj themselves, as they feared this would unite the Kinj and 'Abbas families against them, as happened during the tenure of Assistant Delegate Jourdan18. Governor 'Abbas, on his part, aware of the opposition to 'Ali al-Kinj, seized the opportunity to attempt to place the Kinj family under his influence, or, in case of failure, to remove it from power. General Mondar, on the basis of information which probably derived from Sulayman al-Murshid, reported that, since his appointment as governor in 1939, Shawkat al-'Abbas had tried to destroy the power of the Kinj family; on the one hand, by distancing Ibrahim and 'Ali al-Kinj from the French, on the other hand, by dressing Alawi 'public opinion' against them. Mondar cited as examples the governor's manoeuvres in the Representative Council in 1939, aimed to block Ibrahim al-Kinj's election as president of the council, and his alliance with Captain Blondel in 1940-1941 against Kinj (see section 5.1). General Mondar even held Shawkat al-'Abbas responsible for creating the then current opposition of Alawis, Christians, and Sunnis against the Kinj family39. Governor 'Abbas, in an apparent effort to protect 'Ali al-Kinj, delayed the scheduled reunion of the Administrative Council that was to decide over the suppression of 'Ali al-Kinj's office, and went to Damascus to arrange the nomination of four deputies loyal to the Kinj family, as replacement for four deceased members of the Administrative Council, among them sheikh 'Ali Muhammad Kamil"0 and the

CADN 791: Compte-rendu d'information (28/3/1942). Catroux à Collet (24/6/1942). Mondar à Collet (18/7/1942) Noie au sujet de la situation aux Alaouites (14/10/1942). CADN 2022: Bulletin d'information (25/5- 9/6/1942), (7/10/1942), (12/10/1942). Compte-rendu d'information (20/5-5/6/1942). CADN 791 Compte-rendu d'information (28/3/1942). CADN 2022: Bulletin d'information (30/4/1942). CADN 791: Compte-rendu sur la dissolution du Conseil Administratif du Jabal Alaouite (10/7/1942). Mondar à Collet (18/7/1942) After the death of 'Ah Muhammad Kamil, Muhammad Sulayman al-Ahmad returned from exile in Iraq (where he had fled in 1939) in order to lake over control over the Numaylatiyya. Together with Muhammad Bey Junayd, he hoped to realign the Kalbiyya confederation CADN 2022: Bulletin d'information (31/10/1942), (21/11/1942) 168 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 assassinated Amin al-Raslan. In this way, governor 'Abbas wanted to create a majority in the Administrative Council to vote for the continuation of 'Ali al-Kinj's office and to ensure Ibrahim al-Kinj's election as president of the council. However, Mondar claimed, governor 'Abbas hoped that the opposition to his government and especially to 'Ali al-Kinj would grow to such an extent that either the French authorities or the Syrian government would prevent the nomination of the four new deputies loyal to the Kinj family, and thus prevent the continuation of 'Ali al-Kinj's office and Ibrahim al-Kinj's presidency of the council. In this way, either the French or the Syrians would be responsible for the fall of the Kinj family from institutional power, from which 'Abbas could profit. Mondar, indeed, considered control of the Kinj family over the Administrative Council as unacceptable, as it would take away from the triumvirate's opposition its only legal means of opposition, and threats of civil disobedience had already been made41. The French authorities and the Syrian government, however, decided to play along with governor 'Abbas and allowed the appointment of the four candidates he had nominated. In addition, they put pressure on the other members of the Administrative Council to support Ibrahim al-Kinj in his election to the presidency of the Council. On 3 November 1942, the Administrative Council met and decided to continue 'Ali al-Kinj's office, while it elected Ibrahim al-Kinj as its president42. Subsequently, the agitation against 'Ali al-Kinj continued throughout December 1942, and in an effort to save his brother's deteriorating position, Ibrahim al-Kinj resigned as president of the Administrative Council, in the hope that the French and the Syrians would beg him to stay on, which would enable him to pose conditions concerning the position of his brother43. The French and Syrian authorities, however, did not beg him to return, and, not long after, 'Ali al-Kinj was dismissed and his office suppressed44. The power relations in the Alawi region had changed dramatically, as the build-up to the parliamentary elections that were due for July 1943 suggests. Ibrahim al-Kinj and 'Aziz Bey Hawash, who throughout the mandate period had been the champions of Alawi autonomy, on several occasions visited the National Bloc leader, Shukri al-Quwwatli, in Damascus, who obtained for them the votes of the nationalists in the coastal region. In the Administrative Council, both deputies obstructed the normal course of events with the aim to obtain concessions in return for their cooperation. The result, however, was a confrontation between Ibrahim al-Kinj and the Administrative Council, which in protest elected Muhammad Bey Junayd as its new president, a position that Ibrahim al-Kinj until his resignation had held for thirteen years45. In

CADN 791 : Compte-rendu sur la dissolution du Conseil Administratif du Djebel Alaouile (10/7/1942) Mondar à Collet (18/7/1942). CADN 2022 Bulletin d'information (30/4/1942), (25/5-9/6/1942), (21/6-4/7/1942) 42 CADN 2022: Bulletin d'information (7/11/1942), (14/11/1942). 43 CADN 2022: Bulletin d'information (19/12/1942), (28/12/1942). 44 CADN 791 Arrêté 34 (13/3/1943). 45 See al-Avyam (5/5/1943) Incorporation into Syria, 1939-1946 169 protest against his non-election as president, Ibrahim al-Kinj decided to present his own list for the coming parliamentary elections that consisted primarily of nationalists such as the Sunni 'Ali Harun and the Alawi Ibrahim al-'Uthman (of the Alawi-Muslim Youth Association), and former autonomists such as his brother 'Ali al-Kinj, 'Aziz Bey Hawash, Yusuf al-Hamid, and the Maronite Sadiq Ilyas46. In the build-up to the elections also, the Syrian Prime Minister, 'Ata Bey al-Ayubi, in May 1943 sought French approval to remove governor Shawkat al-'Abbas from office, and to replace him by a governor appointed by the Syrian government. The French refused as they considered that such a manoeuvre would antagonise the Alawi community. In their efforts to protect the governor, they even went so far as to arrest 'Aziz Bey Hawash, who had gone to Damascus to protest against governor 'Abbas, on the suspicion of 'anti-Allied activities'. The continuing agitation against the governor forced the French to change their position, and, as a compromise, they advised the Syrian government to send Shawkat al-'Abbas on temporary leave until the conclusion of the elections47. In the beginning of June 1943, the Syrian government sent Bahij Bey al-Khatib to the Alawi province to study, in Khatib's words, the compatibility of the laws and regulations in Latakia Province with those in Damascus, as the Province of Latakia had to become like other Syrian provinces. Indeed, a month later, al-Ayyam reported that some laws specific to Alawi province had been annulled in favour of the Syrian regulations. According to British and French intelligence, the real reason for his visit was to study "the means of removing him [the governor] without causing the opposition to gain too much from his downfall"48. Bahij al-Khatib's actions remain unclear, but, towards the end of June, governor 'Abbas considered his position untenable and offered his resignation. He was replaced by a Syrian governor, the Sunni emir Mustafa al- Shihabi49. Within a period of four months, Shawkat al-'Abbas, Ibrahim al-Kinj and 'Ali al-Kinj, who had dominated Alawi politics since 1939, had been removed from power. Moreover, in the elections, Ibrahim al-Kinj was beaten in his home district of Jabla by his long-time rival, Bahjat al-Nasur. Sulayman al-Murshid, the newly elected member of parliament for the district of Haffa, was the only remaining Alawi chief who could effectively challenge the Syrian government50.

CADN 791 Des Essars à Collet (30/4/1943) Al-Ayyam (16/4/1943), (21/7/1943). CADN 791 Note pour le Délégué-Général (4/5/1943). FO 684/14: Diary of the political officer in Damascus (29/5/1943), (5/6/1943). CADN 791 Note pour l'ambassadeur (1/6/1943), (12/6/1943) FO 684/14: Diary of the political officer in Damascus (5/6/1943). Al-Ayvam (18/6/1943), (18/7/1943), (20/7/1943), (1/3/1944), (9/4/1944), (10/5/1944) FO 684/14. Diary of the political officer in Damascus (26/6/1943). Among those elected: Sulayman al-Murshid, Muhammad Bey Junayd, Muhammad Sulayman al-Ahmad, Ah Harun, and Bahjat Nasur, Kinj opponent within the Bani Ali. 170 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946

5.3 Sulayman al-Murshid This section discusses two incidents concerning Sulayman al-Murshid, which occasioned major rows between the French and the British authorities in 1942 and 1944. The British representative in the Levant, Major General Spears, used a number of incidents concerning Sulayman al- Murshid to attack the Free French. Both incidents revolved around the question of the illegal appropriation of lands by Murshid, but gained political dimensions. In 1942, Major General Spears used a conflict over a piece of land involving Sulayman al-Murshid as a pretext to campaign against the Free French movement, which he detested so much (see section 1.3.3 and the section on 'British archival sources'). In this, he acted in spite of directives from the Foreign Office. The situation was further complicated as his principal French adversary in this case, General Mondar, in spite of instructions from his superior General Catroux, stimulated the formation of a separatist movement in the Alawi province under the leadership of Sulayman al- Murshid (Fournie & Riccioli 1996: 228). Spears' attack on Mondar, however, prevented Catroux from removing him, as this would be seen as the Free French giving in to British pressure. Moreover, the Free French leader, General de Gaulle, hearing of Spears' attacks on Murshid, decided to receive Sulayman al-Murshid as his guest of honour during a visit to Latakia to spite the British, and especially his enemy Spears. Ultimately, the affair was settled. The conflict in 1944 between the British and the Free French followed a similar pattern, as again the British wanted to confront the Free French, using a conflict over land involving Sulayman al- Murshid as a pretext. This time, however, Spears decided not to confront the Free French directly, but to use the intermediary of the Syrian government. As in the case of 1942, the incident gained a political dimension as some French officers, under the protection of officers further up the Free French hierarchy, disobeyed their direct superiors, and used Murshid to organise a separatist movement to prevent the Syrian government from establishing control in the Alawi province. The first conflict started, when, on 15 August 1942, followers of Sulayman al-Murshid arrived in the village of Bab Janna to cut down trees in order to build a new house for their leader on land that Murshid claimed to have bought. According to British intelligence, the situation escalated as the villagers attacked Murshid's men, after which Murshid sent a large party of his armed partisans and a detachment of the gendarmerie from Slunfa to loot Bab Janna. Those who had resisted his men were brought before him and beaten with sticks under the eyes of the gendarmes, who did not intervene. Officers of the French intelligence services, who arrived on the scene shortly afterwards, restored order. The next day, General Mondar visited Bab Janna, where, according to British intelligence, he told the population that they should obey Murshid51. Hearing of the incident, Spears sent his political officer in Latakia, Captain Evans- Pritchard, to Bab Janna to investigate the affair, where, according to the French, he threatened

FO 226/238 Purvis lo GSI (21/8/1942) Incorporation into Syria, 1939-1946 171

Murshid with arrest In a report to the Spears Mission, Evans-Pritchard argued that the Bab Janna incident was part of a series of disorders that threatened military and civil security, against which the British army was legitimised to act Moreover, he bluntly held the French responsible for the incidents and accused them of encouraging Murshid's actions

"The French give him every support and refuse justice to his victims They support him for political reasons, regarding him as their representative and political ally in the Alawi territory British interests are compromised The people of the territory look to us for protection and justice and we are directly involved morally in the issue If Murshid is not checked at once, further incidents are likely to occur and our prestige in the territory is ruined As General Mondar lends him every support, it is necessary to remove the General"52

Whatever the truth about the precise course of events, it is clear that the British, or more particularly the Spears Mission, wanted to capitalise on the affair It may well be that the reports established by the Spears Mission and sent to the Foreign Office and the Minister of State's Office in Cairo have been 'coloured' to induce London to take action against the Free French Already in April 1942, Spears reported on the Free French that

"Their obstructiveness in the vitally important Alawi territory on the Turkish border has assumed dangerous proportions [ ] The majority of the population regard Free French control as even more irksome than that of Vichy since it combines the same faults with greater inefficiency"53

Spears singled out two reasons for the French to build up Murshid The official French reason to support Murshid, Spears argued, was that Murshid was to form the axis of a guerrilla army in the case of a German invasion54 Spears considered the real motive of the French to be something else

"They regard Murshid as an invaluable tool with which to create troubles in the Alawi territory when they can no longer maintain their hold on Syria proper, thus ostensibly justifying them in imposing a 'special regime' in this coastal territory and maintaining thereby a stranglehold on the hinterland"

Spears blamed General Mondar for the situation

52 FO 226/23 8 Note by Evans-Pntchard ( 19/8/1942) 53 FO 371/31471 Spears to Foreign Office (8/4/1942) 54 FO 371/31472 Weekly political summary (14/5/1942) 172 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946

"Although Mondar is at the bottom of all this, and his removal would eventually prick Murshid's bubble, I regard it as hopeless for either you or myself to demand his removal as a political demarche. [...] Now, with De Gaulle on the spot and in even worse than his normal form, a request on the political side for Monclar's removal would certainly be rejected in the most provocative manner possible".

As Murshid would be one of the guests at De Gaulle's passage in Latakia in late August 1942, the British asked the French not to receive him55. To spite his enemy Spears, General de Gaulle did not only receive Murshid, but treated him as his guest of honour and granted him a private audience. Evans-Pritchard reported to Spears that British action had to be taken immediately to save British prestige56, after which Spears reported to the Foreign Office that

"Direct British military action is the one argument against which De Gaulle is powerless short of deciding on the major political breach; and this case, the main facts of which (including Monclar's impossible behaviour) are known to many local Frenchmen, would be a poor one on which to base so drastic a step"57.

To Spears' disappointment, the Foreign Office was not inclined to decide on a confrontation course, and ordered him to stop with his intrigues and focus on the security of the British troops in the region58. Despite these direct Foreign Office directives, Spears continued to steer towards direct military action and convince the Foreign Office of the necessity of a confrontation with the Free French:

"My proposal was that the question should be taken up by Army Commander, not by the Minister of State or myself on the political side; and that Army Commander should base his action on military security grounds - which are in fact the true grounds"59.

When Murshid accused British troops under the command of Evans-Pritchard of having raided his house, the affair developed into a flill-blown political row. Evans-Pritchard dismissed the accusation, insinuating:

"It is possible that a raid took place and that it was made by other than British troops. It is also possible that a raid was staged with the intention of discrediting British troops.

FO 226/238: Prodrome Beirut to Minslate 269 & Foreign Office (19/8/1942). FÜ 226/238 Evans-Pritchard to Spears Mission Beirut (23/8/1942). FO 226/238: Prodrome Beirut to Minstate 269 & Foreign Office (19/8/1942) FO 226/238: Foreign Office to British Legation Beirut (24/8/1942) FO 226/238: Prodrome Beirut to Foreign Office 440 & Mmstate Cairo 283 (25/8/1942). Incorporation into Syria, 1939-1946 173

There can be no doubt that Murshid and the Delegate would like to see British troops in the area discredited and that neither is above staging a raid"60.

General Catroux subsequently demanded the removal of Evans-Pntchard, and placed his frill weight behind Sulayman al-Murshid In a letter to the British army commander, General Holmes, Catroux explained his position concerning Murshid In addition, the letter also sheds some light on French thinking on the Alawis

"Il n'y a donc pas eu, en la circonstance, acte de terrorisme de la part de Murshid et j'ajoute qu'il est excessif de donner ce qualificatif à la façon dont ce chef indigène agit à l'égard des populations II est arrivé certainement et il arrive à Murshid de commettre des abus, et du point de vue de nos conceptions occidentales du droit ces abus sont condamnables et l'administration, tant française que syrienne, s'emploie a les limiter Ces agissements n'ont point cependant sur les populations les effets que l'on en pourrait redouter dans d'autres pays Ainsi que vous le savez, les alaouites sont arriérés Ils vivent sous le régime féodal et ils s'y soumettent C'est pourquoi l'autorité de Murshid n'est pas discutée, ceci d'autant plus qu'elle s'appuie sur le caractère religieux que de nombreux alaouites reconnaissent à ce chef Cet état de choses commande notre attitude à l'égard de Murshid. Il est obéi, il est craint, il possède de nombreux partisans et il a des armes Ce serait une erreur politique grave de notre part de nous l'aliéner et d'en faire un ennemi, en prenant position contre lui dans ses différends avec les paysans et surtout en adoptant à son égard des mesures de rigueur Je ne puis, pour ma part, consentir à cette politique car j'en prévois les conséquences qui seraient immanquablement dangereuses pour la sécurité du territoire et des troupes En me plaçant sur le terrain réaliste des nécessités de la guerre, je n'hésite pas à faire un choix entre Murshid qui est une force, et quelques villageois qui ne peuvent rien pour ou contre nous. J'ajoute que Murshid est fidèle à la France et que par voie de conséquence il sera fidèle à son alliée la Grande Bretagne, s'il a le sentiment que ses agents ne menacent pas sa situation"61

From this quote, it becomes clear that France, which in 1918 legitimised its policies in the Levant by portraying itself as the 'mère de la liberté' with an eternal mission to protect the weak, had finally shed its romantic discourse and entered the phase of Realpolitik To end the affair and in an effort to patch up Anglo-French relations, the British decided to use Captain Evans-Pritchard as a scapegoat The court set up by General Holmes to investigate Evans-Pntchard found that he had exceeded his competence as established in the

60 FO 226/238 Evans-Pnlthard to Spears Mission Beirut (28/8/1942) 61 FO 226/238 Catroux to Holmes (26/8/1942) 174 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 instructions of the Spears Mission. The court, however, considered that Evans-Pritchard had acted under direct instructions from Spears, and, according to Yaffe & Rabinovich (1990: 178), "took a light view of the matter". Nevertheless, General Holmes seemed fed up with Evans- Pritchard and Spears, and asked the Foreign Office for Evans-Pritchard's removal. Shortly after Evans-Pritchard left, General Mondar too was replaced. Fournie & Riccioli (1996: 228) argue that Catroux, who had always favoured Syrian unity, fired Mondar, who had fallen in the grip of Alawi separatism, because he executed a policy that squarely contradicted his superior's policy62. Sulayman al-Murshid, who was asked by governor 'Abbas to visit the Syrian president, received a 'severe dressing down'61. The British political officer in Damascus, Gilbert MacKereth, who was very critical of Spears, brought the affair back to its essence:

"The question of the Alawis is centred round the misappropriation of certain lands by Sulayman al-Murshid and the question of whether or not he should give them up and whether or not he should pay for having used them"64.

In 1944, a new dispute between the British and the Free French would arise over Sulayman al-Murshid. At the basis of the conflict, again, were plots of land, which, the Syrian government considered, Murshid had illegally appropriated. Moreover, the Syrian government suspected Sulayman al-Murshid, under French protection, of organising a separatist movement. The British, in the person of Major General Spears, as with the Bab Janna incident, wanted to use the possible threat of Murshid against military security as a pretext for a confrontation with the Free French. As the events in Lebanon in December 1943, the arrest of the Lebanese cabinet and the subsequent British intervention, had shown that the British would never allow the French to use military force (see section 1.3.3), the Syrian government felt confident that the time had come to confront Sulayman al-Murshid in earnest. First, however, the Syrian government would have to convince the Syrian parliament of Murshid's illegitimate actions in the Alawi province in order to revoke Murshid's parliamentary immunity, which he still enjoyed as member of parliament for the district of Haffa. In addition, since the Syrian government did not have sufficient gendarmerie forces to stage a direct action against Murshid, it needed British support. According to a British report, the Syrian Prime Minister, Sa'dallah al-Jabiri, was

"particularly desirous of avoiding any situation in which the French would be called upon to intervene [...] since he did not want to encourage the implication that the French were still in physical control".

See also FO 226/238: Beirut to Cairo (29/9/1942) FÜ 226/238 Note of the political officer in Damascus (3/9/1942) FO 684/14: Diary of the political officer in Damascus (12/9/1942) FO 684/14 Diary of the political officer in Damascus (5/9/1942) Incorporation into Syria, 1939-1946 175

The British felt, however, that British military action was out of the question as they still recognised the French territorial command, against whose authority they were legitimised to act only in the case of threats against military security The British therefore proposed to arm the Syrian gendarmene, on the condition that the Syrian government would present a report about Murshid's misdeeds, armament, and "the desirability of liquidating him" Confronted with such a report, Murshid would either have to comply with any demands the Syrian government should make, or he would ignore these demands, in which case there would be a pretext for the Syrian government to intervene with indirect British support The Syrian Prime Minister, however, insisted on direct British military involvement, as he feared that Murshid would call the bluffa Before undertaking any action against Murshid, the Syrian government wanted the British army to disarm the Alawi population, something the political officer in Latakia, Ditchbum, dismissed outright "Heaven help us if in wartime we raise this hornet's nest" In a compromise, it was decided that the Syrian gendarmerie was to arrest Murshid in Jawbat Burghal at the time British forces were manoeuvring in the area, while in Damascus a dossier would be ready on the basis of which the parliament could revoke his immunity This time, however, the British backed out, as they feared that the Syrian government would leave the final elimination of Murshid to them and considered it "vitally important to avoid making this a Franco-British issue"66 In other words, the efforts of the Syrians to deny the French any influence and of the British not to upset French nominal control made Murshid, for the moment, immune to any action against him A member of the British Legation in Beirut summed up the problem

"The position is that we want to get Murshid liquidated, but consider that the Syrians should do this"67

Ditchbum recognised the difficulties the Syrian government faced, as it not only had to deal with Murshid, but also needed to win over the sympathy of the Alawis In addition, he warned that Murshid, with the support of Captain Boussiquet, the head of the French intelligence services in Latakia, was forming a separatist movement by capitalising on the alienation from the Syrian government caused by governor Shihabi, who had allowed the Sunnis "to throw their weight around too much" Ditchbum concluded

"There is something in the air as Murshid has made a point of contacting Alawi leaders - men he has had no personal contact with in years - to urge them to unite This is what happened in 1936-1938 and resulted in the French forming the Republic of Latakia"68

65 FO 226/255 Note of the British Legation (8/1/1944) 66 FO 226/255 Ditchbum to Lascelles (27/1/1944) 67 FO 226/255 Lascelles to Brenan (31/1/1944) 68 FO 226/255 Ditchbum to Lascelles (8/2/1944) 176 The A lawis of Syria, 1918-1946

It appears that Ditchbum's information might have come from French reports "of which sight was unofficially obtained" and which stated that

"Alawi chiefs are attempting to unite so that eventually they may be powerful enough to take decisions with regard to Syrian policy"69

Some French officials were not at all unsympathetic to the removal of Murshid After a discussion between Lascelles of the British Legation in Beirut and the French Assistant Delegate in Latakia, Des Essars, it appears that they shared the same views about Murshid70 In a conversation with Ditchbum, which focused on Captain Boussiquet and his interpreter Khahl al- Hubayshi, who had also been Captain Blondel's interpreter, Des Essars moreover told him that it was impossible to curb Boussiquet's influence, as, in vain, he had already appointed three assistants "to keep him in check"71 In other words, if this information is correct, it appears that Colonel des Essars, under whose authority Captain Boussiquet operated, could not dismiss him, which in tum suggests that Boussiquet enjoyed the protection of someone higher up in the French hierarchy This suggestion is strengthened by a conversation, later that year, between a British official and Colonel Gaussot, Des Essar's successor as Assistant Delegate in Latakia, who argued that

"Young Bureau Politique officers like Boussiquet could not forget the power they had wielded in the past and that such men, who were also supported by a few high-ups among senior French officers out here and in North Africa [the Free French headquartered in Algiers at that time], had but one aim and that was to work against Syrian independence"72

In March 1944, the Syrian government came up with a new plan to eliminate Murshid Prime Minister Jabin proposed to summon Murshid to Damascus where he would retain him, after which a judicial commission would be sent to the Alawi province to prepare a case against Murshid concerning land transfers, even transfers which had already been sanctioned by the cadastral office The Syrian parliament would then force Murshid to abide by any findings of the commission, and if need be to revoke his immunity In anticipation of a trial, Prime Minister Jabin ordered the removal of all incumbent judges in the Alawi province and their replacement with Syrian judges However, Prime Minister Jabin wanted to have British troops stationed or

FO 226/255 Note on Alawi affairs (11/2/1944) FO 226/255 Note Lascelles (9/2/1944) FO 226/255 Ditchbum to Lascelles (8/2/1944), (1/3/1944) FO 226/255 Extract from a conversation between Army Commander and Colonel Gaussot (26/6/1944) Incorporation into Syria, 1939-1946 177 manoeuvring in the area around Jawbat Burghal in case of trouble73. However, a few days later Jabiri changed his mind, as he feared that he would meet opposition in parliament and that the appointment of such a commission would set a precedent, which "might end in a general clamour for such commissions to be sent to each locality"74. In June 1944, the Murshid affair came to a head as, in Jawbat Burghal, Murshid's partisans staged anti-govemment demonstrations. According to British intelligence, the French used the demonstrations, which had begun just after a visit of French officers to the village, as a pretext to arrest some of Murshid's opponents within his clan, such as Hasan al-'Abud. Strikingly, the arrests were made during the absence of the French Assistant Delegate in Latakia and without his approval. Governor Shihabi furiously demanded the release of 'Abud and sent a gendarmerie unit to Jawbat Burghal to put down a new anti-Syrian demonstration, but Murshid's partisans forced the gendarmerie to back off. The British concluded:

"The present situation at Jawbat Burghal is a threat to security and must be scotched. The root source of all trouble is Murshid. [...] Recent French actions indicate he is working under cover of their support to flout Syrian authority"75.

The British informed the Syrian government that they were prepared to send Murshid into exile, as the Syrian law prohibited the exile of a Syrian citizen. For the Syrian government too, a limit had been reached. At the request of Prime Minister Jabiri, the Lebanese police arrested Murshid during a visit to Beirut, and sent him to Damascus where he was placed under house arrest. Murshid in vain looked to the British for support, claiming that Jabiri had told him that "he must nowpayforl938"76. After the arrest of Sulayman al-Murshid, the British demanded the removal of Captain Boussiquet and his interpreter Khalil al-Hubayshi from the Alawi province, as they considered them to be partly responsible for the troubles concerning Murshid77. Instead of removing Boussiquet and Hubayshi, the French Delegate General Beynet stationed a battalion of Senegalese soldiers near Haffa to stop the arrests of Murshid's partisans by the Syrian gendarmerie, which, according to Beynet, operated under the protection of British troops. In a report to the Quai d'Orsay, a furious Beynet made it clear that the deployment of the battalion was directly aimed against the Syrian government:

FO 226/255: Brenan to Lascelles(7/2/l 944). Brenan to Lascelles & Dilchbum (28/2/1944), (6/3/1944) 74 FO 226/255: Brenan to Lascelles (11/3/1944). 75 FO 226/255: Ditchbum to Spears Mission (16/6/1944) Damascus to Beirut (19/6/1944) on the Jawbat Burghal incidents. 76 FO 226/255 Damascus to Beirut (18/6/1944), (19/6/1944) Consul-general Beirut to British Legation Beirut (23/6/1944) MacKerelh to Ditchbum (27/6/1844), (19/7/1944). Report from Latakia (8/7/1944) 77 FO 226/255 Latakia to Beirut (17/8/1944) 178 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946

"Sa'dallah al-Jabiri s'imagine imiter tantôt Mussolini, tantôt Hitler, mais c'est dans les mille et une nuits qu'il trouve réellement son inspiration"78.

The British, on the other hand, regarded Beynet's move as a deliberate attempt to support Murshid, and to further divide the Alawi clans79. The Syrian government profited from the discord between the British and the French to purge the civil service and the judiciary in the Alawi province, and appoint officials from Damascus as replacements of Alawi officials. Moreover, the Syrian government confiscated the land they considered Sulayman al-Murshid had appropriated illegally, and returned it to its previous owners80. Within the Alawi community itself, an opposition movement against the dominant 'Abbas, Kinj, Hawash, and Murshid families started, as several chiefs and sheikhs of secondary importance under the leadership of the religious sheikh Mansur al-'Isa, Hawash's rival for the leadership over the Matawira confederation, decided to ask the French authorities and the Syrian government for support in their efforts. They proposed to place the leadership over the Alawi community in the hands of sheikh Salami Kamil Pasha al-Masri, an Alawi from Cilicia who in August 1941 had held the position of interim-governor of the Autonomous Alawi Territory during the arrest of Shawkat al-'Abbas. The plans, however, did not materialise81. The Murshid affair ended in October 1944, when the newly appointed Syrian cabinet released him, as it considered Murshid's arrest and forced residence as infringements of the constitution82. The British Legation in Beirut, now led by Gilbert MacKereth, a critic of Spears, did not object to the release of Murshid. In a memorandum for the Foreign Office, he concluded:

"We possibly spend too much time and too little thought in seeking to suppress elements who appear to be at variance with the local governments. Murshid is, notwithstanding his dubious activity, an example, for not by the greatest stretch of imagination could this man have hindered the war effort or damaged British interests except in so far as it may have been thought to be a British interest to belittle the French in the Levant"83.

CADN 791 : Beynet à Massigli (8/8/1944). FO 226/255: Lalakia lo Beirut (23/7/1944). CADN 791: Information spéciale de la Sûreté aux Armes (22/8/1944) sur la situation au Jabal Alawi. Beynet à Affaires étrangères (12/9/1944) CADN 791: Beynet à Affaires étrangères (12/9/1944) FO 226/255: Latakia to Beirut (18/10/1944), (19/10/1944) FO 226/255 Memorandum MacKereth on Sulayman al-Murshid (7/10/1944). Incorporation into Syria, 1939-1946 179

5.4 Independence and unity This section discusses the final episode of the French mandate over the Levant, which in April 1946 ended with the evacuation of the last French and British troops. During this period, Sulayman al-Murshid, despite the events described in the previous chapter, continued his intrigues and rebellious stand towards the Syrian government, which accused the French of supporting him. In the summer of 1946, after the evacuation of the last foreign troops, the Syrian government decided on a final showdown with Murshid, and sent the Syrian army into the Alawi Mountain to arrest him. On 16 December 1946, he was publicly executed in Damascus. Unfortunately, only very little information is available in the French and British archives concerning this period, which makes analysis difficult. On 9 February 1945, an insurrection broke out near the village of Fakhura (district of Haffa), in which some two thousand fighters loyal to Sulayman al-Murshid, including deserters of the Troupes Spéciales, participated. No information is available on the causes of the revolt and its aftermath, although it is clear that the Syrian government accused the French, in the person of Captain Boussiquet, of having incited Sulayman al-Murshid to revolt84. Towards May 1945, with unrest all over Syria, new incidents occurred in the Alawi province, where an atmosphere of insecurity reigned, and bazaars and schools closed down. On 11 June, a French convoy was attacked near Jisr al-Shughur. The French accused the British of having masterminded the attacks with the aim of creating a pretext to intervene and eliminate the French from the region85. In this atmosphere, the Syrian government on 15 June 1945 appointed Mazhar Pasha al-Raslan, the former governor of the Province of Latakia in 1937, as the new governor of the Alawi province. A few days later, the Syrian government attempted to bring an Alawi battalion of the Troupes Spéciales under its control86. In early July, five French soldiers were lynched and some twenty civilians died in skirmishes that erupted after a French military truck accidentally ran over a girl in Latakia87. French intelligence estimated that the Alawis would revolt against their incorporation into Syria, and that the Troupes Spéciales would desert at the moment they would be handed over to the Syrian government88. The French, rather optimistically, considered that the Alawis were still sympathetic to the French presence, but that British and Syrian threats prevented them from showing it89. A report states that, during a meeting in Jabla on 6 July, all the important

CADN 798: Ministre des Affaires étrangères syrien à Beynet (12/2/1945) CADN 1173 Francom Beirut à Diplofrance, Gaulcab, EEMG (14/6/1945) See the correspondence between the French Assistant Delegate in Latakia to Delegate General Beynet and the Delegate of Damascus, Oliva-Rogct, dated 21-25 May 1945 CADN 1173 Information de Latakia (15/6/1945) Latakia à Paris/Londres (18/6/1945) CADN 1173 Francom à Diplomatie (6/7/1945). Auf Ba1 (13/7/1945), (18/7/1945), (22/7/1945) CADN 1173 Note de renseignements (8/7/1945) CADN 1173· Information sur la situation aux Alaouites (26/6/1945) 180 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946

Alawi chiefs with the exception of Bahjat al-Nasur issued a statement, proclaiming the independence of the Alawi Mountains under the protection of France, and calling for an immediate end to the payment of taxes to the Syrian government and the refusal to enter military service. The report continues that, when governor Raslan ordered Sulayman al-Murshid to come to Latakia to explain the situation, Murshid was said to have answered him that "he was not a subject of the governor, and that if he had anything to say to him, he should come and visit him"90. In September, sixty gendarmes, sent to Jawbat Burghal to arrest Murshid, were disarmed and taken prisoner. A similar situation occurred near 'Ayn al-Kurum. As negotiations to settle the affair peacefully failed, the Syrian government backed down, after which Murshid started to levy taxes from his followers and build up his armed forces91. In January 1946, armed bands started operating in the district of Misyaf and along the Tripoli-Latakia road. Muhammad Bey Junayd, who had allied himself completely to the Syrian government, used the situation to arrest rival notables within the Kalbiyya clan. According to the Syrian government, the bands used rifles, which, they considered, could only have been obtained from the French with the aim of creating unrest and discrediting the Syrian government. On 11 January 1946, it almost came to a confrontation between a French army unit and Syrian forces, when the latter prevented a French convoy from passing the border from Lebanon into the Alawi province92. In 1946, the Syrian government initiated a campaign to eliminate the last remnants of French control from the Alawi province, and place it under its direct control through a policy of assimilation. Captain Boussiquet reported:

"Les oeuvres françaises, dont l'action est pratiquement anéantie, continuent cependant à servir de cible à la vindicte du muhafiz et des journaux, tous extrémistes. [...] L'action sournoise des Britanniques est pour une bonne part responsable de cet état de choses".

As a result of this, the French provocatively started showing the French flag over their army barracks in Latakia with elaborate ceremonies. In January, an incident occurred when French soldiers stopped the traffic and forced the passing people to salute the French flag; two Syrian soldiers who refused were arrested. Moreover, the Syrian government unilaterally abolished the financial and administrative autonomy of the Alawi province, which had been granted by General Catroux in 1941. In addition, the Syrian government proposed a rearrangement of the administrative districts of the coastal region with the aim of limiting the numerical dominance of the Alawi population. For example, the predominantly Sunni district of Jisr al-Shughur was to be annexed to Latakia, the predominantly Alawi district of Misyaf to Hama, and the Alawi-

CADN 1173: Note de renseignemcnls (28/7/1945) Information de Latakia (14/9/1945), (23/9/1945), (28/9/1945), (30/11/1945) FO 371/52857: Weekly political summary (18/12/1945). CADN 791 Information du Capitaine Boussiquet sur la situation aux Alaouites (16/1/1946). FO 371/52857: Weekly political summary (10/1/1946), (15/1/1946), (5/2/1946). Incorporation into Syria, 1939-1946 181

Christian district of Tallkalakh to Horns. In these new districts, the Alawis would then constitute a minority. On 7 April 1946, the last French and British forces evacuated the Alawi region91. With the foreign troops out of the way, the Syrian government could pursue its policy of Syrianisation that had started with the abolition of the financial and administrative autonomy of the Alawi region. Syrian action was needed, as the most important Alawi chiefs showed themselves favourably inclined towards a Greater Syrian Hashemite monarchy that was propagated from Transjordan (a similar trend could be discerned in the Jabal Druze). Instability within and opposition to the government in Damascus, in the spring of 1946, prevented the Syrian authorities from taking decisive action against Murshid, their principal remaining antagonist in the Alawi region. Instead, the President and the Prime Minister agreed to an amnesty for Murshid, the exact conditions of which are not known94. On the occasion of the evacuation of the last foreign troops from Syria, a number of Alawi personalities, including representatives of the 'Abbas, Kinj and Hawash families, but with the exception of Sulayman al-Murshid, Muhammad Bey Junayd, and Muhammad Sulayman al- Ahmad, presented a violently worded protest to the Syrian government and the foreign consulates. They accused the Syrian government of aiming at the dismemberment of the Alawi province and allowing representatives of the central government to exercise uncontrolled authority in the area95. In the summer of 1946, the Syrian government decided to confront Sulayman al- Murshid and also Ibrahim al-Kinj in earnest, after Murshid attacked a gendarmerie post to free one of his partisans. The government appointed a new governor, 'Adii al-'Azma, and sealed off the Alawi province for all foreign consuls. In August, Syrian gendarmes arrested the sons of Ibrahim al-Kinj, after they had used violence to settle a dispute with their peasants. British intelligence reported that in September 1946, after the Syrian intelligence services intercepted a message from King 'Abdallah of Transjordan to Murshid, heavy fighting broke out in Jawbat Burghal and the district of Tallkalakh. The Syrian government sent several thousands of soldiers and gendarmes into the region, and succeeded in arresting Murshid. When the Syrian forces entered his stronghold, it was found empty except for Murshid himself and the corpse of one of his wives, whom Murshid stated he had shot as she had been the cause of all the trouble and had consistently urged him to resist the government. According to the French, the action against

CADN 791: Note du Capitaine Boussiquet sur la situation politique aux Alaouites (21/1/1946). FÜ 371/52857 Weekly political summary (22/1/1946), (29/1/1946), (19/3/1946) CADN 791- Beynet à Bidault (1/4/1946) sur la situation politique en Syrie et au Liban FO 371/52857· Weekly political summary (5/2/1946), (12/2/1946), (26/2/1946), (5/3/1946), (2/4/1946) FO 371/52857 Weekly political summary (30/4/1946) CADN 791: Beynet à Affaires étrangères (14/5/1946). For the (French translation of the) seven-page memorandum dated II April 1946, see CADN 791 The principal signatories included Munir al-'Abbas (member of parliament for Safita), Ibrahim al-Kinj, Khayn Saqr Khayr Bey, 'Aziz Bey Hawash, Nun al-Hajji (Sunni leader from Haffa district), sheikh Ibrahim Salih (member of parliament for Banyas district), Sa'id Darwish (member of parliament for Tallkalakh), the three Sunni lawyers Majid al- Safiya, Muhammad al-Fadl, 'Abdallah Mahmudi, two Sunni religious leaders, the shanfs Zayn 'Abidin and Fadl 182 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946

Murshid formed the culmination of the Syrian plan to eliminate the influence of the Kinj, 'Abbas, and Murshid families96. In November 1946, Sulayman al-Murshid was brought to trial in Latakia. On 14 November, the press solemnly announced that

"the President of the Juridical Council has decided to set Saturday, 23 November 1946, eight o'clock in the morning, as the time and place for the start of the trial of the crimes ascribed to Sulayman al-Murshid and his companions"97.

The trial of Ibrahim al-Kinj's two sons, who had been charged with resisting the gendarmerie, was brought before a court around the same time, but hardly attracted any media attention98. It appears that Ibrahim al-Kinj himself had lost so much of his former influence that the Syrians did not even bother to arrest him anymore. Murshid's trial, on the other hand, received a very large coverage in the Syrian press; the newspapers al-Ayyam and AlifBa ' together devoted some thirty articles to the trial, with almost verbatim accounts of parts of testimonies and cross- examinations, from mid-November onwards to the end of December 1946. In addition, in 1947, a booklet was published in Damascus, "Sulayman al-Murshid, al-rabb al-muzayyif', which elaborately describes Murshid's trial. A day before the trial, Hamdi Babil, an editor of al-Ayyam, received permission to visit Murshid and the other defendants, including four of his children, in the prison of Latakia. His article depicts Murshid as pale faced and crying. In the interview, Murshid stated not to have had any contact with foreign powers for at least nine months, and that he had loyally served the government and the parliament, as he was devoted to Syrian independence. He denied responsibility for the fighting in Jawbat Burghal and put the blame on one of his wives, Umm Fatih, whom, he said, he had killed to prevent more casualties. Concerning his trial, Murshid claimed that he trusted his judges, as they were judges of the Syrian republic, while in the past he had distrusted them, and that after he was released from prison, he would settle himself outside the Alawi region99. The trial against Sulayman al-Murshid lasted for nearly a month. In total fifty-six defendants were brought before the court. Murshid and his four sons were defended by Yusuf Taqla and Ibrahim 'Uthman, former leaders of the Alawi-Muslim Youth Association, who had been appointed by the court, as Murshid argued that he did not have the money to pay the fees for a lawyer himself. The examining magistrate read out the accusations against him: conspiracy

CADN 791 Noie sur la situation aux Alaouites (14/9/1946), (23/9/1946), (2/10/1946) FO 371/52858: Weekly political summary, (11/6/1946), (23/7/1946), (10/9/1946), (5/10/1946). AhJBa-iWX 1/1946). Al-Ayyam (16/11/1946). 99 Al-Avyam (24/11/1946), Incorporation into Syria, 1939-1946 183 with a foreign power against the Syrian state, the establishment of the Government of the Ghasani-Haydari Alawi people, the unlawful appropriation of land, the installation of a judiciary outside the Syrian judicial order, the conclusion of forced marriages, the murder of several gendarmes, the murder of Umm Fatih, and several smaller incidents that had occurred over the years. More than forty witnesses, including his own supporters and sons, admitted and sometimes accused Murshid of having accepted weapons from the French, having participated in meetings that the French had convened in his house, and having led and participated in skirmishes against Syrian forces100. Sulayman al-Murshid himself was heard and cross-examined too. Questioned on his assumed enormous wealth, Murshid claimed that he had inherited most of his lands, and that most of his fortune stemmed from trade, the exploitation of his lands, and his position of clan leader. On his resistance to the Syrian government in 1937 and 1938, he claimed that he had worked together with the nationalists, but that the French, through the intermediary of Ibrahim al-Kinj, had succeeded in convincing him that the Syrians were against him (which would corroborate the story that Captain Blondel was behind the confrontation between Murshid and governor Jabiri). He argued that the French exploited him by pitting him against the nationalists, and told the court that the French supplied him with rifles. Murshid denied the responsibility for the formation of a private militia, the issuing of laws, and the collection of taxes; instead, he accused his former confidants Nazir Khayr Bey, Sulayman al-'Isa, and sheikh Darwish to have exploited his name to do so. Nevertheless, he admitted to having a small group of 150 partisans that were distinguished by a sun on their chest, to the collection of some taxes, and the institution of a judiciary for the settling of minor problems. He also admitted he had raised the French flag over his house during the war, but that he had done so together with the British and Syrian flags. Finally, he told the court that he was a nationalist, and that he held to the position of administrative and financial decentralization, as for example Shawkat al-'Abbas had done. He claimed he was not worried about the gallows and his possible execution; however, he wanted to completely refute the accusation that he had acted against Syrian independence, not a single time since he contacted the National Bloc in 1934. In this claim, he received the unexpected support of the former governors of Latakia province, Mazhar Pasha al-Raslan and Ihsan al-Jabiri101. Murshid complained to the court about having been tortured in jail, after which the president told the director of the prison that he did not want rough treatment for anybody. According to French sources too, Murshid was severely tortured during his detention in Damascus in order to force him to admit to his relations with the French, especially General Mondar and Captain Boussiquet. Murshid also complained that, during the trial, his testimony had been distorted in the version written down by the examining judge102.

Al-Ayyam (24/11/1946), (27/11/1946), (28/11/1946), (29/11/1946). Ali/Ba(26/l 1/1946), (1/12/1946). Al-Ayyam (27/11/1946) AlifBa'(26/11/1946), (27/11/1946). CADN 791. Beirut à Pans (29/10/1946). Al-Avyam (27/11/1946), (28/11/1946). 184 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946

Finally, on 11 December 1946, the president of the court found Murshid guilty as charged, and sentenced him and a few accomplices to death by hanging, while sentencing others, including some his sons, to long prison sentences and hard labour. After the final session of the court, Sulayman al-Murshid was transferred to Damascus, where, on 16 December 1946, he was executed on Martyrs' Square.

5.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have discussed the final years of the French presence in the Levant and the growing ascendancy of the Syrian government in the Alawi region. As has been mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, a detailed analysis of this period was difficult due to a lack of quality and quantity of the available sources. The beginning of the end for the Alawis was the granting of executive power to an Alawi governor, Shawkat al-'Abbas, in December 1939. In the following years, governor 'Abbas together with the Kinj family and Sulayman al-Murshid, succeeded in monopolising the offices of state and the bureaucracy. Major General Spears already in March 1942 remarked that the coalition of the 'Abbas and Kinj families, and Sulayman al-Murshid, was "too powerful for opposition" (see section 5.2). The Alawi triumvirate was able to dominate the other Alawi clans, which, together with the Sunnis and the Christians, looked to the Syrian government for support. The granting of executive power to Alawi clan leaders broke the principle of balanced opposition on which the segmentary Alawi society rested, and, together with the ascendancy of the Syrian government and the decline of French power, contributed to its disintegration. In 1946, the Syrian government liquidated its final Alawi opponent, Sulayman al-Murshid. Conclusion

In the preceding chapters, a narrative account of the political development of the Alawi community under French mandate rule (1918-1946) has been given, and the role this development played in the complex process that led to the formation of the Syrian state has been analysed It has become clear that the definition of nationalism as a particular form of cultural compromise in which people relate their individual long-term interests and aims to one another, based on their internalised cultures, fits the Alawi case well I have argued that the Alawis' internalised culture, in particular their segmentary organisation based on the principles of balanced opposition and mediation, throughout the mandate period remained the basis for the definition of their long-term interests According to this argument, the segmentary organisation of the Alawi community determined the political direction of individual Alawi clan leaders, and the advent of French rule and later the Synan nationalists provided an environment in which Alawi segmentary politics could flourish It has also become clear that, in a seeming contrast, the enormous increase in state power associated with the advent of French rule weakened the segmentary character of the Alawi community that was geared to operate in the (near-) absence of state power In addition, the Alawi leadership, by becoming increasingly dependent on the French and the Syrian nationalists and by operating in an expanding political arena, became subject to forces it was ultimately unable to control

The 'Alawi revolt' and the 'isabat movement

In early 1919, fighting broke out in the Alawi region because of a conflict between Ismailis and Alawis, which has come to be portrayed by Syrian nationalist historiography as the Alawi revolt of sheikh Salih al-'Ali, the first Arab nationalist popular revolt against the French This image of the revolt has been repeated also in scholarly publications (for example Khoury 1987, Mendenhall 1991, Moosa 1988) I have argued that the image of an Alawi popular revolt against French occupation cannot be maintained, but rather that the initial stages of the fighting followed the logic of segmentary organisation, particularly its modes of conflict management, and that afterwards other dynamics came into play, which I have related to the harakat al- 'isabat, the movement of rural mobilisations as analysed by Meouchy (1989, 2002, 2004) 186 The Alawis of Syria, 19Ì 8-1946

In my analysis, the revolt, which was sparked off by the Ismaili refusal to pay blood money for the death of an Alawi boy, had local origins that lay in lingering disputes between Alawis and Ismailis over land and cattle. After a failed attempt at mediation by two Alawi chiefs, Alawi fighters attacked the Ismailis in order to obtain satisfaction. Local political intrigues by for example the Maronite district governor of Banyas and French mismanagement of the situation led to an atmosphere of insecurity, which, together with a miserable economic situation, caused the fighting to spread and escalate. There is no evidence that anti-French or nationalist motives played a role. Rather, the fact that the Alawis wanted the conflict to remain an internal affair in line with their own mode of conflict management, which relied heavily on an element of collective responsibility, strengthens the argument that the events followed the logic of segmentary organisation. For the French, however, intervention was imperative for establishing their control, while non-intervention would have been tantamount to defeat and a considerable loss of prestige. Their focus on the armed band of sheikh Salih al-'Ali, and their ill- fated expeditions against him, provided the sheikh with a charisma and authority that far exceeded his influence as a second-rank petty chief and religious sheikh. The sheikh, simply to save his life against French attempts to liquidate him, had to continue his resistance. The other clans, however, when faced with the reality of a strong French influence in the region, accepted French rule. When the French finally decided, with the help of the British, to settle the conflict peacefully in August 1919, other dynamics had come into play. In a way similar to other rural mobilisations in the Levant in that period (the harakat al- 'isabat), the Sharifian government in Damascus and the Kemalist forces in Turkey had taken the sheikh under their patronage and offered him their support, as they had done with numerous other armed bands that had come into being through a combination of local factors, déstabilisation due to the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the creation of international borders, and the establishment of centralising states. Moreover, the number of Alawi 'isabat began to increase in this period, as the French policy to promote the participation of the larger Alawi clans in local administration brought the smaller Alawi clans located mainly in the jabal into dissidence. For them, the French presence manifested itself as relative loss of influence towards the larger clans; they had nothing to gain with the French ascendancy and nothing to lose by accepting Sharifian and Kemalist support. This mechanism of balanced opposition remained operative throughout the French mandate period.

The birth of Alawi particularism

For the Alawis, the expansion of state power associated with the advent of French rule in the Levant constituted a considerable political break with their recent Ottoman past. While in the late-Ottoman period the Alawis had been a marginalised people in a remote comer of the Ottoman Empire, with the advent of French rule they found themselves the dominant people in a Conclusion 187 circumscribed polity that carried their name This polity, moreover, was of great importance to both the French and the nationalist movements that aspired to establish a viable independent Syrian state Within this constellation of forces, the Alawis, or more precisely its lay and religious leadership, considered that they had a common interest to defend, and they adopted the discourse of Alawi particularism to express that common interest The adoption of this discourse was the power effect of the then dominant discourses of Arab nationalism and French patriotism, which forced the Alawis to express themselves in the generally accepted forms of collective representations in order not to be marginalised in the political debate The French policy to promote the participation of the larger Alawi clans in the administration of their own autonomous polity took, up a trend that has largely been obscured in approaches that focused on Syrian nationalist historiography about the Alawi revolt This trend was the rise of the cultural compromise of Alawi particularism and the pohticisation of Alawi identity Until the advent of French rule, the central authorities had largely ignored the wishes and needs of the Alawi clans that lived in the coastal mountains, and the Alawis were rather inward oriented Moreover, the lack of a proper road network and lines of communication ensured that political life developed in parochial settings The complete security offered by the French presence, the establishment of administrative and bureaucratic institutions, the geographical integration of the Alawi region and population through the establishment of a proper infrastructure offered opportunities for the Alawi clan leaders to further their common interests In the 1920s, many Alawi leaders began to play an important role in the administrative and bureaucratic institutions the French had set up, which added a new level of communal politics to the existing level of clan politics The institutionahsation of politics stimulated Alawi clan leaders to participate in the administration of the political entity the French had created for them Moreover, the French presence, more than the Ottoman state did, brought them benefits in the form of official positions, money, infrastructure, education, healthcare, protection, sowing seeds, and so on Under these circumstances, individual Alawi clan leaders had a stake in the maintenance of the autonomy of the Alawi region from which they profited, and, associated with that, of courting the French The common interest of the Alawi leaders that developed under these particular circumstances formed the nucleus for a developing feeling of Alawi community This common Alawi interest was further strengthened by the participation of the autonomous Alawi entity in the short-lived Syrian Federation (1922-1924), which from the Alawi viewpoint may be termed an 'ethmcised state', because of the dominance of the States of Damascus and Aleppo that excluded the State of the Alawis from the political decision-making process and which diverted the Federation's resources to their own use This participation in the Syrian Federation and the Alawis' experience of nationalist exclusion further contributed to the pohticisation of Alawi identity, which, because of the power effects of the then dominant discourses of Syrian nationalism and French patriotism, expressed itself in the cultural compromise and discourse of Alawi particularism 188 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946

Challenges to Alawi particularism During the mandate period, developments within and outside of the Alawi community produced disagreement among the Alawi leadership on the question what exactly constituted the Alawis' common interest, while an increasing number of Alawis considered that they had a say in its formulation. The disagreement focused on the question of Syrian unity, and, associated with that, on the question of Alawi identity. Although the Alawi leadership used a discourse that focused on common Alawi interests, the Alawi community before all else was a loosely structured group of clans, which all considered their individual interests to be the common Alawi interest. The Alawis were not merely the passive instruments of the French policy of divide and rule, but active participants in the struggle that culminated in the formation of the Syrian state. In this connection, it has become clear that there was a strong correlation between developments within the Alawi clan structure and the positions taken by those clans on the questions of Syrian unity and Alawi identity. This is precisely the kind of impact one would expect of a state on a segmentary society. In 1930, after a period of relative quiet, discussions started in the Alawi region on the question of Syrian unity and on Alawi identity. In addition, new players made their entry into the political arena. Alawi politics had been dominated by clan leaders and religious sheikhs, who from 1930 onwards slowly began to lose their grip on the Alawi population. Concerning the challenges with which the cultural compromise of Alawi particularism was faced from 1930 onwards, I concluded that these can be explained from the interplay between transformations within the Alawi clan structure and the changing relationship between the French mandate authorities and the Syrian nationalist movements following the Great Revolt of 1925-1927. Franco-Syrian negotiations over a ftiture Syrian state made it clear to the Alawi leadership that a unified Syrian state of which the Alawi region would be part was no longer a remote possibility. The 1930 elections for the Representative Council formed a catalyst for these developments. In the context of the changing relations between the French and the Syrian nationalists, external assets in the form of support from the Syrian nationalists became a serious option for those clan leaders losing ground in the balance of power between the clans. These leaders sought a rapprochement with the Syrian nationalists within the Alawi region and in the Syrian interior to restore their former positions. They no longer considered their long-term interests represented by the existing cultural compromise of Alawi particularism, and began promoting the incorporation of the Alawi region into Syria, which in their eyes should have a decentralised character and respect the autonomous status of the Alawi region. In addition, new players emerged on the political stage such as the horizontally organised cross-sectarian organisations such as the Alawi-Muslim Youth Association, which considered that Alawi rights and interests would be best cared for within the context of an independent Syrian state. Although these organisations were closely related to certain clans and its principal members even related to certain clan leaders, their rise was indicative of the growing number of people willing and able to participate Conclusion 189 in the different cultural compromises current in the Alawi region, which were no longer the exclusive domains of the clan leaders. The rise of these new political organisations and the growing number of politically conscious Alawis must be explained from the rise of state power, which gradually weakened the ties of dependency between the clan leaders and their clients. I have argued that the establishment of administrative and judicial institutions, complete security, a healthcare system, schools, a cadastre, infrastructure, and the Troupes Spéciales, gradually diminished the dependency of the people on their clan leaders and patrons. These same developments also enhanced the physical and social mobility of part of the population, and caused an increased migration of Alawi peasants to the predominantly Sunni coastal towns and villages. The physical boundaries that had separated rural Alawis and urban Sunnis were further blurred by the deployment of the Troupes Spéciales in these coastal towns and villages. Several sectarian incidents occurred that included the newly arrived migrants and the Troupes Spéciales. The different political currents within the Alawi region used these incidents to stake political claims. One of these incidents, the 'rubber ball' incident of January 1933, led to the mobilisation of the Alawi population at large. Not a single other event during the French mandate period triggered such a mobilisation of Alawi primordial feelings, which may be an indication of the low level of political consciousness of the Alawi population and of the disinterest for questions of Alawi autonomy or unity with Syria, independence or a French mandate.

Incorporation into the Syrian state

Throughout the mandate period, the political arena in which the Alawi leadership operated gradually expanded, while the leadership adapted its role to fit the arena. From clan leaders in parochial settings, they developed into Alawi leaders in the setting of the Alawi political entity. Yet, they failed to adopt a new role when they entered the Syrian national arena. They remained Alawi clan leaders and acted accordingly. Simultaneously, the Alawi clan leaders grew increasingly dependent on French and Syrian nationalist support to maintain their position within the Alawi clan structure. Ultimately, the breakdown of the principle of balanced opposition caused a rift within the Alawi community, which, together with the decline of French power following the outbreak of World War II and the growing ascendancy of the Syrian state, signalled the end of Alawi autonomy. After the conclusion of the Franco-Syrian treaty in September 1936, many clan leaders who initially opposed the incorporation of the Government of Latakia into the Syrian state quickly cast aside their objections and sought a rapprochement with the Syrian nationalists. Given the fact that segmentary politics formed the primary political agency among the Alawi clan leaders, this is not at all strange. As the expansion of the political arena offered them new possibilities, many clan leaders sought a rapprochement with the Syrian state and the Syrian nationalists. These sudden and contradictory changes of loyalty demonstrate the pragmatism of 190 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 segmentary Alawi politics. These changes also strengthen my argument that the Alawi discourses of loyalty towards the French, of autonomy, of unionism were nothing more than the power effects of the dominant Syrian nationalist and French patriotic discourses, and that political agency lay elsewhere. For the Syrian government, in its efforts to facilitate the transition from French to Syrian rule in the Alawi region, much hinged on the outcome of the parliamentary elections of 1937. Months of efforts on the part of the government and the governor to get the former autonomist leaders elected as members of the Syrian parliament were thwarted by the Latakia branch of the National Bloc. Campaigning for Syrian unity provided them with influence in the local political constellation, while achieving it reduced them to marginal players in the Syrian political context. These elections also demonstrated that the lesser chiefs of the Alawi clans profited most from the ascendancy of the Syrian government. With their newly acquired influence, they began challenging the dominant clan leaders, and on some occasions, these challenges expressed themselves in terms of particularism versus nationalism. As a rule, one of the rivalling parties, usually the challenging party, proclaimed itself nationalist in order to seek nationalist support. A well documented case is the conflict between Bahjat al-Nasur of the Bayt Abu Shalha, who with the support of the Latakia branch of the National Bloc and the Syrian governor challenged Ibrahim al-Kinj of the Bayt Fadl over the leadership of the Bani 'Ali clan, of which they were both part. The same pattern can be discerned outside of the Alawi community, for example within the Ismaili community of Qadmus, where the challengers of the incumbent leadership claimed themselves to be nationalists. In addition to the internal rivalries, rivalries between Alawi clans came to the fore as a result of the policy of divide and rule of the Syrian governor, and the possibilities this offered for the Alawi clans to reposition themselves in the Alawi political constellation. In the summer of 1938, the number of divisions and conflicts within and between clans had reached such a dramatic level that a civil war was imminent. At this point, the leading Alawi clans closed ranks and set up a commission to mediate in conflicts between other clans. Together, they called for an end to Syrian rule and called for the return of autonomy under French protection. This sudden reconciliation may be explained partly with the help of the segmentary model, which prescribes mediation to prevent conflicts from escalating and threatening the entire segmentary system. Another factor that contributed to the realignment of the principal Alawi clans may be that the Syrian state filled the provincial bureaucracy with Sunni officials and excluded Alawis from it, or at least this was how the Alawis perceived the situation. As the Syrian Federation had done in the early 1920s, the Syrian state manifested itself to the Alawis as an 'ethnicised state'. Faced with its failure to incorporate the Alawi region and French pressures resulting from the imminent World War II, the Syrian government could but accept the detachment of the Alawi region from Syria in 1939. Concerning the French pressures, it must be noted that no substantiation could be found for the Syrian claim that the French during the years 1937 and 1938 actively sought to frustrate Syrian efforts, although the non-ratification of the Franco-Syrian treaty certainly not strengthened the Syrian position. Conclusion 191

Word War II caused the final decline of French influence in the Levant, and contributed to the growing ascendancy of the Syrian government in the Alawi region. The beginning of the end for the Alawis was the granting of executive power to an Alawi governor, Shawkat al- 'Abbas, in December 1939. In the following years, the breakdown of order during Vichy rule and the Anglo-French rivalry after the invasion of June 1941 allowed a group of Alawi leaders to abuse the bureaucracy and administrative services to further their own interests. The abuse and resulting alienation grew to such an extent that Alawis, Sunnis, and Christians alike began looking towards the Syrian government for a solution. The granting of executive power to Alawi clan leaders broke the principle of balanced opposition on which the segmentary Alawi society rested, and, together with the ascendancy of the Syrian government and the decline of French power, contributed to its disintegration. By 1946, the lack of cohesion among the Alawi clans had allowed the Syrian government to liquidate its opponents among the Alawi leadership. The history of the political development of the Alawi community during the French mandate period demonstrates the importance of studying local community structures and the interplay of these structures with their surroundings in understanding the development of nationalism and the formation of states. Beyond the conclusions about the development of Alawi particularism during the French mandate period, my main conclusion is that it is necessary to look beyond Arab nationalism and recognise other forms of historical agency that together determine its dynamics. The account this study provides is by necessity a history of the political leadership of the Alawis. What is missing in this narrative is the history of the Alawi masses. Their voice would not be heard until the 1960s.

Appendix 1 Reference list for the principal Alawi clans and clan leaders

Confederation Clans Principal leaders

Khayyatin Bayt al-Khayyat Jabir al-'Abbas, Munir al-'Abbas, Shawkat al-'Abbas 'Amamira (see Murshidiyya-Ghasasina) Saramita Ahmad Dib al-Khayyir Makhalisa Ali Zaydan Rashawi Faqawira 'Abdiyya Halabiyya

Haddadin Bayt al-Haddad Ahmad al-Hamid (d. 1929), Yusuf al-Hamid, Muhammad Isma'il Rakawina Mahaliba Saqr Darwish (see Murshidiyya-Ghasasina) Bani 'Ali Ibrahim al-Kinj (Bayt Fadl), Bahjat al-Nasur (Bayt Abu Shalha) Bayt Yashut Bashaliwa Jadid Mahmud 'Atariyya Shamasina Banawi

Matawira Matawira Isma'il al-Hawash, 'Aziz al-Hawash, Mansur al-'lsa Basharigha Salih al-'Ali Numaylatiyya 'AN Muhammad Kamil (d. 1942), Muhammad Sulayman al-Ahmad 'Arajina Jawahira Sawarima

Kalbiyya Darawisa 'Ali Baddur (see Murshidiyya-Ghasasina) Bayt Shilf Kalbiyya Saqr Khayr Bey, Khayri Khayr Bey, Nadim Isma'il Nawasira Tamir Sudan, As'ad Muhanna Qarahila Hasan Khadur, Janim Khadur Jalqiyya Rashawina Isma'il al-Junayd, Muhammad al-Junayd Jurud Rasalina Amin Milhim al-Raslan (d. 1940)

Murshidiyya- 'Amamira Sulayman al-Murshid (d. 1946), H. 'Abud, M. Khartabil (d.1936) Ghasasina Mahaliba Saqr Darwish Darawisa 'Ali Baddur 194 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946

Appendix 2 Alawi deputies to the Syrian Federal Councils and Alawi Representative Councils

FC1922 FC1923 RC1923 RC1926 RC1930 RC1935 RC1939Ι Alawis i I ^ I Jabir & Munir al-'Abbas XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX Ahmad & Yusuf al-Hamid XXX XXX XXX ζ XXX Isma'il & 'Aziz al-Hawash XXX XXX Ibrahim al-Kinj XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX Isma'il & Muhammad al-Junayd XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX Amin Milhim al-Raslan XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX Shihab Nasir XXX XXX Mansur al-'lsa XXX XXX Jadid Mahmud XXX Saqr Khayr Bey XXX XXX XXX XXX "All Muhammad Kamil XXX XXX M.S. al-Ahmad XXX XXX XXX Muhammad al-Khartabil XXX Ahmad Dib al-Khayyir XXX XXX Sulayman al-Murshid XXX Sunnis Abd al-Wahid Harun XXX Mahmud Abd al-Razzaq XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX Maj al-Din Azhari XXX XXX XXX XXX 'Abd al-Qadir Tahuf XXX 'Abd al-Qadir Shuraytih XXX XXX Muhammad al-Muhammad XXX 'Abd al-Ghani Isrib XXX Greek-Orthodox Ishaq Nasri XXX XXX Nicolas & Gabriel Bashur XXX XXX XXX XXX Wadi' Sa'adah XXX XXX XXX llyas 'Ubayd XXX XXX Maronites ^ Sadiq llyas XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX Ismailis Tamir 'Ali xxflj Hasan Hajj Ibrahim XXX Muhyi al-Din al-Ahmad XXX XXX XXX Appendices 195

Appendix 3 Petition congress of Tartus (25/2/1936)

CADN 410 Traduction de la mazbata adressée à Son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires étrangères et a Son Excellence le Haut-commissaire (25/2/1936)

Nous, chefs des tribus alaouites, les membres du Conseil représentatif, les chefs religieux, les notables et lajeunesse, avons l'honneur d'exposer ce qui suit Après examen de la situation politique à la lumière de la raison et de la logique avons décidé ce qui suit 1. Maintien de notre complète indépendance sous l'égide du gouvernement mandataire français, seule formule garantissant la sauvegarde de nos intérêts et le respect de nos traditions et de nos coutumes Nous sommes prêts à tout sacrifier à cette fin 2 Insistons pour l'obtention de nos droits aux fonctions et de tous les avantages du gouvernement, le relèvement de la situation des cultivateurs et la réduction des impôts dans la mesure du possible. 3 Rétablissement du nom de "l'Etat des Alaouites" 4 Interdiction du prosélytisme Nous vous prions de bien vouloir prendre note de ces revendications et nous sommes convaincus que Votre Excellence voudra bien les prendre en grande considération, les revendications sociales d'un peuple ami et dévoué et d'agréer l'assurance de notre considération distinguée

The petition is followed by 144 signatures of'chefs de tribu', 'chefs religieux', and 'notables'

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Samenvatting

Dit proefschrift beschrijft en analyseert de politieke ontwikkeling van de alawitische gemeenschap tijdens de Franse mandaatperiode (1918-1946), en de rol die deze gemeenschap speelde in het complexe proces dat leidde tot de formatie van de Syrische staat die onafhankelijk werd in 1946. Na de Eerste Wereldoorlog ontving Frankrijk van de Volkenbond het mandaat om die gebieden van het Osmaanse Rijk die het had bezet tot twee democratische onafhankelijke staten te vormen, Syrië en Libanon, waarna de Fransen het gebied zou moeten verlaten. De eindigheid van het mandaat met zijn centrale doelstelling van zelfbeschikking stond in schril contrast met Frankrijk's intenties om Syrië en Libanon tot koloniën te maken. Om te voorkomen dat Syrië en Libanon zich tot zelfstandige democratische staten zouden ontwikkelen voerden de Fransen een beleid van verdeel en heers, dat zij legitimeerden door te wijzen op het zelfbeschikkingsrecht van de diverse etnische en religieuze gemeenschappen die Syrië en Libanon telden. Binnen de grenzen van het mandaatgebied Syrië eisten de alawieten een hoge mate van autonomie voor het gebied waarin zij de meerderheid vormden, het kustgebergte ten noorden van Libanon. De Syrische nationalisten echter beschouwden dat kustgebied als een integraal en noodzakelijk onderdeel van de toekomstige Syrische staat. Zij beschouwden het alawitische particularisme als een Franse creatie omdat het ontstaan ervan samenviel met het begin van de Franse heerschappij. Deze opvatting is echter onjuist. In dit proefschrift toon ik aan dat de alawieten niet slechts de instrumenten waren van de Franse politiek van verdeel en heers, maar dat zij een eigen specifieke vorm van politiek kenden, de segmentaire politiek. Deze vorm van politiek bestond al tijdens de Osmaanse periode en zijn centrale politieke mechanismen, de principes van de 'gebalanceerde oppositie' en 'bemiddeling', veranderden niet toen de Fransen in 1918 de macht van de Osmanen overnamen. De concepten van de 'gebalanceerde oppositie' en 'bemiddeling' staan beschreven in het segmentaire model, dat beoogt te verklaren hoe een samenleving in de afwezigheid van een centrale autoriteit zoals een staat de orde kan bewaren. Het segmentaire model veronderstelt een ideaaltypische samenleving, waarin gelijke 'segmenten' (clans in het geval de van de alawieten) in een relatie van gebalanceerde oppositie met elkaar staan. Ieder segment is even sterk als een ander segment, en iedere groep van segmenten vindt een even sterke groep van segmenten tegenover zich. Elk segment is collectief verantwoordelijk voor de misstappen van zijn individuele leden; de sociale controle is daarom sterk. Deze collectieve verantwoordelijkheid en sociale controle zijn er in beginsel op gericht om conflicten te voorkomen, aangezien een 206 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 conflict tussen partijen van gelijke sterkte oneindig lang zal duren. Andersom zal elk segment collectief opkomen voor de belangen van een benadeeld lid door bloedgeld te eisen van de tegenpartij. In het geval dat deze partij weigert te betalen ontstaat er een vete waarbij de benadeelde partij geweld zal gebruiken om genoegdoening te krijgen. Om te voorkomen dat dergelijke vetes uit de hand lopen is 'bemiddeling' vereist. Segmentaire samenlevingen kennen een scheiding en evenwicht tussen wereldlijke en religieuze autoriteiten. De wereldlijke autoriteiten zijn verantwoordelijk voor de uitoefening van geweld, terwijl de religieuze autoriteiten door middel van bemiddeling zorg dragen voor een minimum aan bloedvergieten. Een bepaald niveau van geweld blijft echter nodig voor het voortbestaan van het systeem. In werkelijkheid bestaat een dergelijke ideaaltypische samenleving niet, aangezien geen enkel segment gelijk is aan een ander. Het is echter juist deze ongelijkheid van segmenten die het segmentaire model een dynamisch en exploratief karakter geeft door het identificeren van de factoren die deze ongelijkheid veroorzaken zoals demografische, sociale en economische ontwikkelingen, veranderingen in leiderschap, en de groeiende impact van de staat. In deze zin betekent het concept van de gebalanceerde oppositie dan ook niet dat ieder segment gelijk is aan een ander, maar dat geen enkel segment in staat is een ander te domineren. Gedurende de mandaatperiode zochten de alawitische clans ook actief naar een dergelijke balans. Bijvoorbeeld, een segment kan zijn gebrek aan mankracht compenseren door externe relaties aan te gaan, of zijn gebrek aan economische middelen compenseren met effectief leiderschap of een politieke alliantie. Dit constante streven naar een machtsbalans, en daarmee samenhangend het principe van bemiddeling, is cruciaal voor het begrijpen van de alawitische politiek tijdens de mandaatperiode. Het proces van staatsvorming in Syrië heeft de etnische variant van politieke modernisering gevolgd, zoals deze gedefinieerd is door Wimmer (2002). Ik heb nationalisme gedefinieerd als een bepaalde vorm van een cultureel compromis, waarbinnen mensen, op basis van hun geïnternaliseerde cultuur (hun segmentaire organisatie in het geval van de alawieten), hun individuele lange-termijn-belangen en doelstellingen aan elkaar relateren. Voor de alawieten betekende de uitbreiding van de staatsmacht, geassocieerd met de opkomst van de Franse heerschappij, een aanzienlijke breuk met het recente Osmaanse verleden. Van een gemarginaliseerd volk in een afgelegen hoek van het Osmaanse Rijk veranderden de alawieten in het dominante volk van een begrensde politieke entiteit die zelfs hun naam droeg. Deze entiteit was bovendien van groot belang voor zowel de Fransen als de Syrische nationalisten. Tot de opkomst van de Franse heerschappij negeerden de centrale autoriteiten grotendeels de wensen en noden van de alawitische clans, terwijl het ontbreken van een fatsoenlijke infrastructuur en communicatiemiddelen ervoor zorgden dat de horizon van het alawitische politieke leven beperkt bleef. De institutionalisering van de politiek door de Fransen stimuleerde de alawitische clanleiders om deel te nemen aan het bestuur van hun regio. Bovendien had de Franse aanwezigheid allerlei voordelen in de vorm van officiële posities, geld, infrastructuur, onderwijs, gezondheidszorg, bescherming en zaaigoed. Onder deze omstandigheden hadden individuele alawitische clan leiders belang bij het voortbestaan van de autonomie van het alawitische gebied. Samenvatting / Summary 207

Om dit gemeenschappelijke belang te kunnen uiten en verdedigen, namen de clanleiders het discours aan van het alawitische particularisme Het 'power effect' zoals gedefinieerd door Wimmer van de dominante discoursen van het Arabische nationalisme en het Franse patriottisme dwong de alawieten zich te uiten in algemeen geaccepteerde vormen van collectieve representaties om te voorkomen dat zij gemarginaliseerd zouden raken in het politieke debat De opkomst van het alawitische particularisme en de politisering van de alawitische identiteit voegde een nieuw niveau toe aan het niveau van de segmentaire politiek Het gemeenschappelijke alawitische belang werd verder verstrekt door de gedwongen participatie van de alawieten in de Syrische Federatie (1922-1924), waarbinnen de dominante staten van Damascus en Aleppo de alawieten uitsloten van alle politieke besluitvorming en economische ontwikkeling Deze situatie van nationalistische uitsluiting door een 'ethmcised state', zoals gedefinieerd door Wimmer, leidde tot een verdere politisering van de alawitische identiteit Gedurende de mandaatperiode zorgden ontwikkelingen binnen en buiten de alawitische gemeenschap ervoor dat er binnen het alawitische leiderschap onenigheid ontstond over de vraag wat precies dat gemeenschappelijke alawitische belang nu eigenlijk was, terwijl een toenemend aantal alawieten vond dat zij daarover mee mocht praten De onenigheid richtte zich op de kwestie van de Syrische eenheid en, daarmee samenhangend, de alawitische identiteit Al gebruikte het alawitische leiderschap een discours dat zich richtte op de belangen van de alawieten als gemeenschap, de alawitische gemeenschap bestond in de eerste plaats nog steeds uit een los gestructureerde groep van alawitische clans die allemaal hun eigen individuele belangen beschouwden als het gemeenschappelijke belang In dit proefschrift heb ik aangetoond dat er een duidelijke correlatie bestaat tussen ontwikkelingen binnen de alawitische clanstructuur en de posities ingenomen door de verschillende clans over de vraagstukken van Syrische eenheid en alawitische identiteit Tegelijkertijd betraden nieuwe spelers de politieke arena zoals de horizontaal georganiseerde, maar religieus-pluralistische bewegingen, die vonden dat de alawitische rechten en belangen het best verdedigd konden worden in de context van een onafhankelijke Syrische staat Ook al waren deze bewegingen nauw gerelateerd aan bepaalde clans of notabele families, hun opkomst was indicatief voor het groeiende aantal mensen dat bereid en in staat was om deel te nemen aan de formulering van de verschillende culturele compromissen binnen het alawitische gebied De transformatie van het culturele compromis van het alawitische particularisme vanaf de jaren '30 hangt ook nauw samen met de veranderende verhouding tussen de Franse autoriteiten en de nationalistische bewegingen na de Grote Opstand van 1925-1927 Na de Grote Opstand en de daarop volgende periode van 'eervolle samenwerking' (1927-1936) tussen de Fransen en de nationalisten was de incorporatie van de alawitische regio in de Syrische staat plotseling een reële mogelijkheid De verkiezingen voor de alawitische Representatieve Raad in 1930 vormden een katalysator voor deze ontwikkelingen In de context van de veranderende relatie tussen de Fransen en de nationalisten werd exteme steun in de vorm van steun van de Syrische nationalisten een serieuze optie voor die alawitische clanleiders die aan invloed hadden ingeboet binnen de alawitische machtsbalans Deze leiders zagen hun lange-termijn-belangen niet langer vertegenwoordigd in het culturele compromis van 208 The Alawis of Syria, 1918-1946 het alawitische particularisme, en begonnen te pleiten voor de incorporatie van de alawitische regio in de Syrische staat. De invloed van de staat binnen de alawitische samenleving groeide langzaam door de instelling van bestuurlijke en juridische instituties, complete veiligheid, gezondheidszorg, scholen, een kadaster, infrastructuur, en een inheems leger (de Troupes Spéciales). Al deze zaken verzwakten langzaam maar zeker de relatie van afhankelijkheid tussen de clanleiders, notabele families en hun cliënten. Deze zelfde ontwikkelingen vergrootten ook de fysieke en sociale mobiliteit van delen van de bevolking en veroorzaakten een grote migratie van alawitische boeren naar de voornamelijk soennitische dorpen aan de kust. De fysieke grens die er tot op dat moment bestaan had tussen de alawieten en de urbane soennieten vervaagde verder door de aanwezigheid van de Troupes Spéciales in die dorpen. Verschillende sektarische incidenten vonden plaats, die op hun beurt weer leidden tot politieke discussies over etnische en religieuze identiteit. Een van deze incidenten, het 'rubberen bal' incident van januari 1933, leidde tot een grootschalige mobilisatie van de alawitische bevolking. Geen enkele andere gebeurtenis tijdens de mandaatperiode heeft een dergelijke mobilisatie veroorzaakt, wat een indicatie mag zijn van het lage niveau van politiek bewustzijn van de alawitische bevolking en haar complete desinteresse voor de vraagstukken van autonomie of eenheid, mandaat of onafhankelijkheid. Na de ondertekening van het Frans-Syrische verdrag in september 1936 verzetten aanvankelijk vele clanleiders zich tegen de incorporatie van de alawitische regio in de Syrische staat. Al snel zetten ze hun bezwaren opzij en zochten ze toenadering tot de Syrische nationalisten om de nieuwe mogelijkheden te benutten die de uitbreiding van de politieke arena hen bracht. Deze plotselinge en tegengestelde loyaliteiten tonen het pragmatisme aan van de segmentaire alawitische politiek en versterken ook het idee dat het discours van het alawitische particularisme grotendeels het 'power effect' was van de dominante Syrische nationalistische en Franse patriottische discoursen. Gedurende de mandaatperiode breidde de politieke arena waarbinnen het alawitische leiderschap opereerde zich langzaam uit, terwijl dat leiderschap zijn rol aanpaste aan de arena. Van clanleiders in lokale settings ontwikkelden ze zich tot alawitische leiders in de context van de alawitische politieke entiteit. Zij namen echter geen nieuwe rol aan toen ze de Syrische nationale arena binnen stapten, maar bleven alawitische clanleiders en handelden als zodanig. Tegelijkertijd werden de clanleiders in toenemende mate afhankelijk van Franse en nationalistische steun om hun positie binnen de alawitische clanstructuur te behouden. Voor de Syrische regering, in haar pogingen de transitie van Franse naar Syrische heerschappij te vergemakkelijken, hing veel af van de uitkomst van de parlementsverkiezingen van 1937. Maanden van noeste arbeid van de regering en de Syrische gouverneur om de belangrijkste alawitische leiders te neutraliseren door hen in het Syrische parlement gekozen te krijgen, werden gedwarsboomd door de Syrische nationalisten uit Latakia. Het streven naar Syrische eenheid verschafte hun grote invloed; het bereiken van eenheid reduceerde hen echter tot marginale spelers in het Syrische politieke spel. Al snel groeide het Syrische beleid in de alawitische provincie uit tot een beleid van verdeel en heers. In de zomer van 1938 waren de Samenvatting / Summary 209 spanningen binnen en tussen de alawitische clans en tussen de diverse gemeenschappen zo hoog opgelopen dat er een burgeroorlog dreigde. Juist op dat ogenblik sloten de belangrijkste alawitische clans de rangen en zetten zij een commissie op om conflicten tussen andere clans te beslechten. Bovendien eisten ze het einde van de Syrische heerschappij en Franse bescherming. Deze plotselinge verzoening kan deels verklaard worden vanuit het segmentaire model dat bemiddeling voorschrijft in het geval dat een conflict dusdanig uit de hand dreigt te lopen dat het voortbestaan van de gemeenschap bedreigd wordt. Een andere factor die bijgedragen heeft aan deze hergroepering is het feit dat de Syrische staat zich in de ogen van de alawieten ontpopte als een 'ethnicised state', zoals de Syrische Federatie dat in 1922-1924 gedaan had. In 1939 namen de Fransen de macht opnieuw over. De Tweede Wereldoorlog luidde de ondergang in van de Franse aanwezigheid in de Levant en droeg bij aan de toenemende macht van de Syrische regering. Het begin van het einde van de alawitische autonomie begon met het toekennen van uitvoerende macht aan een alawitische gouverneur in december 1939. De ineenstorting van het Franse gezag na de nederlaag tegen Duitsland en de invasie door Engelse en Vrije Franse troepen in 1941 aan de ene kant en het wanbeleid van de alawitische gouverneur en zijn medestanders aan de andere kant veroorzaakten een sterke vervreemding onder de bevolking. Velen wendden zich tot de Syrische regering voor een oplossing. Het toekennen van uitvoerende macht aan een alawiet brak bovendien het principe van gebalanceerde oppositie waarop de alawitische samenleving rustte, en droeg bij aan haar disintegratie. In 1946 leidde het gebrek aan cohesie ertoe dat de Syrische regering de macht kon grijpen en haar laatste opponenten binnen de alawitische gemeenschap kon liquideren om zo de politieke incorporatie van de alawitische gemeenschap in de Syrische staat te voltooien.

Curriculum vitae

1975 Geboren te Eindhoven

1987-1993 Gymnasium, Hertog-Jancollege te Valkenswaard

1993-1994 Propedeuse Culturele Antropologie, Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen

1993-1998 Doctoraal Midden-Oosten Studies, Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen cum laude

1999-2000 MPhil programme, International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modem World, Leiden

2000-2004 Assistent-in-opleiding/junioronderzoeker, vakgroep Talen en Culturen van het Midden-Oosten, Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen