A Turkish Perspective on

Ercan Çitlioğlu Acknowledgments

I would like to present my thanks and gratitutes to Assoc. Prof. Dr. Umut Koldaş, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mustafa Çıraklı, Dr. Nazlı Kansu and Ayşe Okşan Okur for their assistance and contributions. Ercan Çitlioğlu 26.09.2020

This publication reflects the views of the author only

Table of contents

Introduction ...... 1 The HTS ...... 3 An Overview ...... 10 The Impact of the “Oil Card” ...... 14 The Third Perspective ...... 16 ...... 19 ’s Discontent ...... 20 – UAE – Gulf States ...... 22 US (Delta Crescent Energy LLC) – PYD Energy Deal ...... 27 a) Turkish, Russian And Iranian Reactions to the Delta Crescent-PYD Deal ...... 29 The Russian Federation ...... 35 a)Bilateral Agreements between the RF and Syria ...... 38 Russia- Dispute over the PYD/YPG ...... 42 The ...... 50 People’s Republic of China ...... 52 ...... 52 Israeli foreign policy towards the Assad regime in the future of Syria .. 54 Israeli relations with the Kurdish forces in Syria ...... 58 Israeli concerns about Iran and its proxies ...... 60 Israeli-American Relations in the context of the Syrian Crisis ...... 63 Israeli Relations with the Russian Federation in the context of the Syrian Crisis ...... 65 Israel and the Saudi Arabia ...... 66 The Instrumental Role of the Sunni Religious Groups for Israeli Security Interests in Syria ...... 68 Israeli Turkish Relations ...... 70 Conclusion ...... 72 The Chain of Errors ...... 75 a)The Second Error ...... 76 b)The Third Error ...... 76 and the Soviet Counterinsurgency Doctrine ...... 78 Underestimating the Armed Opposition ...... 81 Training of the Opposition Groups by the US and Turkey ...... 83 The Situation in / an overview ...... 85 The Breaking Point in Idlib: Balioun ...... 87 Memorandum on Stabilization of the Situation in the Idlib De- Escalation Zone ...... 90 Who Won What with the Additional Protocol? ...... 92 Turkish Antiterror Operations in Syria ...... 96 Efforts to Merge the PYD with the KUC ...... 97 a)YPG-FSA-KNC ...... 102 PYD’s Policies ...... 106 a)Kurdification of the Syrian Schools ...... 111 Idlib ...... 114 Turkey’s Dilemma ...... 117 Opposition Groups in northern Idlib ...... 120 Observation Outposts ...... 124 Turkey-Russia Discord ...... 127 Conclusion ...... 133 Appendix ...... 137

Introduction

The war is not over, but the overall military victory of the Assad forces in the Syrian conflict — securing the control of the two-thirds of the country by the Summer of 2020 — has meant a shift of attention on part of the regime onto areas controlled by the SDF/PYD and the resurfacing of a number of issues that had been temporarily taken off the agenda for various reasons.

Diverging aims, visions and priorities of the key actors to the Syrian conflict (Russia, Turkey, Iran and the US) is making it increasingly difficult to find a common ground and the ongoing disagreements and rivalries over the post-conflict reconstruction of the country is indicative of new difficulties and disagreements.

The Syrian regime’s priority seems to be a quick military resolution to Idlib which has emerged as the final stronghold of the armed opposition and jihadist groups and to then use that victory and boosted morale to move into areas controlled by the SDF/PYD with backing from Iran and Russia.

While the east of the controlled by the SDF/PYD has political significance with relation to the territorial integrity of the country, it also carries significant economic potential for the future viability of Syria in holding arable land, water and oil reserves. Seen in this context, the deal between the Delta Crescent Energy and the PYD which has extended the US-PYD relations from military collaboration onto oil exploitation can be regarded both as a pre- emptive move against a potential military operation by the Syrian regime in the region and a strategic shift toward reaching a political settlement with the SDF. .

Russian and Iranian priorities, on the other hand, entail the elimination of the jihadist Salafist and Sunni armed groups located in Idlib, and consolidate their presence and permanence in Syria while taking active part in shaping the reconstruction of the country in line with their interests.

For the US, the main objective is to maintain the control of the areas with important water and oil reserves adjacent to the Iraqi border in the east and southeast through the PYD and to ensure that the SDF which is described by the Washington as “partner” plays a key role in the future of Syria together with the KNC including autonomy. The US involvement in Syria — both directly and through the PYD — is also considered an important deterrence against possible Iranian aggression toward Israel via Syria.

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The HTS

Turkey on the other hand has revised its engagement with Syria in relation to the overthrowing of the Assad regime, adopting instead a more pragmatic and cautious discourse in line with the existing circumstances and developments, hence prioritizing efforts to stop a potential refugee wave from Idlib and to effectively curtail PYD’s actions toward setting up a Kurdish state. More specifically, ’s priority in stopping a potential refugee wave is based on a non-violent solution to Idlib and to mitigate the HTS (Hayat Tahrir al Sham) which controls large parts of the area.

It is important to note however that, while there is an apparent consensus regarding Syria’s territorial integrity and countering PYD’s secessionist moves in this context — reflected in statements agreed following the Astana and Sochi Summits — the same cannot be said with relation to tackling a potential refugee wave a large scale operation in Idlib undertaken by the Syrian army (and supported by Russia and Iran) would trigger.

Bearing in mind also that the UN Security Council considers Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaida, HTS, Turkistan Islamic Party and various other groups as terrorists, further echoed in the Astana and Sochi Agreements, a potential military operation in Idlib also carries the potential to create further disagreements between Turkey, Russia and Iran, guarantors to the de-escalation zones.

Yet, for Turkey, which was successful so far in delaying a military solution to Idlib that is set to result in significant casualties and a large refugee wave toward the Turkish border, time is running out and its room for maneuver is gradually narrowing.

Another sticking point is that the SNA () consisting of moderate opposition groups brought together by Turkey is also considered a terrorist organization by Russia and Syria. This is complicated further by the fact that the groups under the SNA, manned mostly with Syrian trained and armed by Turkey,

are not only an integral part of Ankara’s policy of national security A Turkish Perspective on Future Syria's Perspective Turkish A

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against the armed wind of the PYD, the YPG but also an important aspect of Turkish engagement in .

Turkey’s relations with the HTS, the latter’s efforts to portray a more moderate position and distance itself from the radical jihadist fractions in order to remove its name from the UNSC’s terrorist list, together with US backing toward such repositioning without a “green light” from Russia is yet another important (and increasingly critical) link in the chain of problems regarding Idlib.

In this regard, the priority of the talks — regarding the integration of the HTS which has recuperated after recent admissions to boast 30,000 militants into the moderate opposition groups, and Turkey’s fulfilment of its obligations under various agreements toward fighting terrorist groups — is for the HTS to convince various fractions that are unwilling to compromise using force if necessary and to join other groups supported by Turkey under a single umbrella.

It is understood that a positive outcome from these talks that have been going for some time with some progress would preempt the likely Russian move during a military operation in Idlib to use the ‘terrorist card’ with reference to the UNSC decisions and the Astana and Sochi agreements in justifying its support for the Syrian regime.

In this context, a meeting held in July 2020 at the Bab-al Hawa Border Crossing, the issue of the setting up of a new military council and an operational headquarters for the Al-Fateh al Mubin, set up by the

HTS, National Front for Liberation and Jaysh al-Izza was discussed and prior to that meeting, the HTS took the first step toward mitigation by arresting the leadership of the Rouse the Believers group set up by the Guardians of Religion (Hurras ad-Din), Ansar al-Din Front, Ansar al-, al-Jihad and al-Ansar

In addition, the HTS released some of the opinion-leaders whom it initially arrested for defection on conditions of loyalty and serving the organization, hence consolidating its influence and control in the region.

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Against Turkish efforts toward mitigating the HTS to reach a peaceful deal in Idlib (bar the radical jihadist groups), the Syrian army has retaliated by targeting the Jabal al-Zawiya (Zawiya Mountain – northwest of Ma'arrat al-Nu'man), Al-Ghab plain (south of Idlib), Jisr al-Shughur (Jisr al-Shughur bridge), giving a clear message that is not willing to be bypassed regarding the future of Idlib.

During the Euphrates (Peace) Shield Operation conducted by the (TAF) in the days that followed the martyring of 33 TAF personnel on 27 February 2020, the 5th Corps of the Syrian Army suffered heavy losses and a significant portion of its armored vehicles, tanks and artillery batteries were destroyed.

Yet to avoid further losses in Idlib, Russia has provided the Syrian regime with new air defense systems, armored vehicles, heavy artillery batteries and missile/rocket systems. Scores of Shia and militants killed during the operation have also been replaced with Iranian, Afghan and Lebanese fighters though recent reports suggest that significant numbers of these numbers have been diagnosed with the novel coronavirus.

The most important prerequisite for Turkish success on the Idlib “chess board” is for Russia to recognize the efforts toward reconstructing and possibly dissolving the HTS and to not classify the new formation as terrorist.

In this context, there appears to be three significant obstacles to the

dissolution of the HTS and the creation of a new coalition. The first obstacle relates to how the US support for such reconstruction and the subsequent end to the designation of the HTS as terrorist, will be received by Russia and Iran. The second obstacle is the extent to which groups within and around the HTS will approve such reconstruction. The final obstacle is what the Russians, but also the HTS will ask in return from Turkey and whether Ankara will agree to them.

When the US Ambassador and Syria Special Representative James

Jeffrey was asked during a press conference held on 5 February 2020 A Turkish Perspective on Future Syria's Perspective Turkish A

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in Washington, his thoughts on a solution for Idlib and whether he considered it a permanent enclave for rebels in relation to Syrian territorial integrity, he gave the following response which carefully distanced the HTS from other jihadist groups:

We do, but so does the UN, yet that did not stop the UN from calling for a nationwide ceasefire, and by the nature of the ceasefire, that you are acknowledging that part of the country will not under the control of the government in the regime in Damascus. So, we have no problem with the legal and diplomatic justification of our position. In terms of HTS, the HTS has not - we have not seen them planning or carrying out international terrorism attacks. We have seen them focusing on basically maintaining their position in Idlib. The Russians claim that they constantly launch attacks on the Russians. While HTS did not accept or was not part of the Sochi ceasefire agreement from 2018, we have only intermittent and not very strong or significant military actions on their part against the Russians. The Russians use this as an excuse. Basically, they’re on the defensive, they’re just sitting there, and the Russians claim that they’re being attacked or the Syrians are being attacked in order to launch these massive attacks against the civilians.1

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s statement dated 18 January 2019 appears to confirm Ambassador Jeffrey’s suggestion that Moscow uses the HTS as an excuse to conduct attacks against the civilians together with the Syrian army: “it also worries us in Idlib, contrary to the agreements on creating the demilitarized zone there, Jabhat al-Nusra dominates and violates the demilitarized zone. About 70 percent of this territory is already occupied by terrorists, they are trying to attack the Syrian army’s positions, settlements and they are trying to threaten our military base in Hmeymim.”

While Lavrov’s statement omits it, the Turkistan Islamic Party and not the HTS or the Jabhat al-Nusra that is responsible from the frequent attacks against the Hmeymim base, often with drones, causing slight damage and injuries.

1 US Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Ambassador James Jeffrey On the Situation in

Syria” Special Briefing, February 5, 2020 A Turkish Perspective on Future Syria's Perspective Turkish A

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At the same time however, it is important to recall too that even though Ambassador Jeffrey in his press conference on 5 February insisted that the HTS is “on the defensive, they’re just sitting there” the group conducted attacks in July 2019 against the Nour al-Din al- Zenki and Faylaq al-Sham (or the ), with the attacks resulting in a huge defeat for the Nour al-Din that subsequently led to losing of territories under its control, its dissolution and nearly half of its fighters defecting to Ahrar al-Sham and other groups.

For its part, Faylaq al-Sham also lost its influence and when the group’s fighters moved onto Turkish-controlled areas following the but were excluded by other groups moved onto the area from regions included in the Operation Euphrates Shield.

Hence, while it is true that the HTS is clearly avoiding attacking Russian targets as Ambassador Jeffrey claims, the group has nonetheless continued attacking rival groups and consolidating its existing influence in the region.

There was an early indication that Jeffrey and his government did not consider the HTS (though defiant of the 2018 Sochi ceasefire) a terrorist organization and that the group would be considered to be “on the defensive” at a video conference on 30 January 2020.

Only 5 days before his announcement on 5 February, Jeffrey claimed that: “We recognize that there are terrorists in Idlib. There’s also a very large group, the al-Nusra or Hayat Tahrir al-Sham group,

HTS, that is an al-Qaida offshoot. It is considered a terrorist organization, but it is primarily focused on fighting the Assad regime. It itself claims - we haven’t accepted yet, but they do claim to be patriotic opposition fighters, not terrorists. We have not seen them generate, for example, international threats.”

Another statement which reasserts Ambassador Jeffrey’s views regarding the HTS was released on 13 August 2020 quoting the US Centcom Commander General Frank McKenzie in which he claimed: “conditions are as bad or worse, we should all be concerned about

that” also adding a caveat that “as young people grow up, we’re A Turkish Perspective on Future Syria's Perspective Turkish A

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going to see them again unless we can turn them in a way to make them productive members of society. We can either deal with the problem now or deal with it exponentially worse a few years down the road.”2

While Jeffrey’s statements regarding the HTS described as an offshoot of the al-Qaeda but not a terrorist organization that is on the “defensive” (thus, not a threat) have allowed room for future collaboration and is largely compatible with the recent Turkish views and efforts toward the group’s legitimation, they contrast starkly with Syria and Russia’s determination to “eliminate” all terrorist groups, echoed frequently by Kremlin spokesmen.

The HTS on the other hand has refrained from any hostile actions toward TAF personnel in Idlib since it needs Turkish support to avoid being a terrorist target and for protection. More remarkably perhaps, the HTS has agreed to cooperate with TAF’s decision to set up checkpoints and bases in the Turkish-controlled areas, allowed safe passage for the Turkish logistical support convoys and facilitated the Turkish army’s acquisition of new areas for temporary bases that are located within the territories it controls.

In this regard, the HTS has been keen to convince Turkey and the US that it could work with Ankara on the field as the largest and most- organized group that controls large parts of Idlib, and that it is not an extension of the al-Qaida and its jihadist ideology.

To that end, the HTS leader Abu Mohammad al-Golani has carefully distanced his organization from the radical jihadist groups to demonstrate his willingness to work with Turkey and other Western powers despite fierce accusations and sharp criticism.

In that respect, Hurras ad-Din (Guardians of Religion), Ansar al-Din, Ansar al-Tawhid and Ansar al-Islam fiercely opposed al-Golani’s efforts to reconcile with Turkey and the leader of the Hurras ad-Din Abu Humam al-Shami released a statement warning Syrians not to

2 “Islamic State making a resurgence in western Syria-top US commander”, AP,

13.08.2020 A Turkish Perspective on Future Syria's Perspective Turkish A

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trust Russia or Turkey. A key figure in the HTS, Commander Abu Malek al-Tali3, also defected the group together with the Head of its Shura Council Bassam Sohyoni after coming out against the recent policies adopted by the group though al-Tani was convinced to return back after three days.

At a meeting in February 2020, another HTS hardliner Abu al-Fath Yahya al-Farghali, described the Turkish army as an “indifel force” claiming later in a statement in March 2020 that the Operation Euphrates Shield was an “invasion”. al-Farghali added that: “HTS would fight any occupation because we don’t expend our blood to replace one occupier with another.”4

It is believed that such disagreements between the moderate (pragmatic) factions of the HTS consisting mainly Syrians and the hardliner factions dominated by foreign fighters will lead to the setting up of new groups apart from the Rouse the Believers Operations Room or other forms of coalitions.

At the same time, Uighur, Uzbek and Chechen fighters from Turkistan Islamic Party and other groups in Idlib consider Turkey the only safe haven during a final battle with Russia and Syria and have therefore kept themselves away from the al-Qaida’s inspired groups and remnants.

The ways in which al-Golani’s efforts toward dissolving the HTS to join the moderate opposition under a different name by neutralizing

hardline fractions and perhaps more importantly, the options that are available to curtail Russian and to such restructuring of the HTS under Turkish control is dealt with in detail in the subsequent section on Idlib.

3 Abu Malek al-Talli was the commander of al-Nusra Front’s Kalamen group. When he was arrested by the HTS, al-Talli was commanding to the Mukatilin al-Ansar, one of the founding members of Fesbütu Joint Military Operation Center.

4 “Are there any partners for Turkey among radicals in Idlib?”, BBC, April 15.2020 A Turkish Perspective on Future Syria's Perspective Turkish A

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An Overview

In order to deliberate on the future direction of the that has been raging for nearly a decade, one must take into account a number of historical factors that have shaped the country’s not so distant past.

The events that culminated in the so-called “” described here as the Arab uprisings are usually analyzed through 3 distinct perspectives.

These distinct perspectives, however, tend to offer different and often competing explanations to what took place in Syria and the primary actors of the Syrian conflict together with the other, tertiary state actors have taken conflicting stances in opposing camps.

The competing claims of the actors, their opposing interests and the ensuing bitter rivalry is the main stumbling block toward reaching a deal in Syria and the “wars within wars” with a constantly changing configuration in this context has sustained the conflict over the last decade.

In this regard, an analysis which investigates how a conflict that started as a local uprising – or one that was conceived as such – turned into a multi-actor, hybrid and an asymmetric proxy war will be of much assistance toward predicting the future that awaits Syria.

The first perspective that attempts to explain the factors that led to the Arab Uprisings in General and the uprisings that triggered the conflict in Syria tends to explain it with reference to internal dynamics. As such the events that took place in Tunisia, and Libya provided a blueprint if not an inspiration for the Syrian people that had been

subject to ethnic (Arab-Kurdish-Druse-Assyrian) and sectarian A Turkish Perspective on Future Syria's Perspective Turkish A

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(Nusayri, Sunni, Christian) discrimination5 under an authoritarian regime.

Though accurate and fair at first sight, a key weakness of this perspective and perhaps its fallacy is that it treats the diverse Syrian communities as a homogenous society sharing a common sentiment and resentment toward the regime.

While it is true that large segments of the population have mobilized in order to provide manpower and take active part in battle in order to force Assad to resign, there are large numbers of Syrians from different non-Assyrian ethnic and religious backgrounds that nonetheless support his regime.6 Indeed, the fact that the ruling elite, bureaucracy, the military, intelligence community, the business elite from Sunni background together with large numbers of Christian , Assyrians and Druse continue to support the Assad regime means it is misleading if not a biased suggestion to assume that the “Syrian people” as a unified, homogenous force are behind the opposition against the regime.

That said, while non-Assyrian groups support Assad or at least remain neutral not as a choice but out of fear, or to protect their interests, this should not detract from the fact that the Syrian situation cannot be considered homogenous.

Those who subscribe to this view which fails to take into account the key socio-political features of Syria including its distinct identities

based on ethnic, religious and clan belongings, the complex economic interests, the influence of Ba’athist ideology on the governing structures, as well as the bitter rivalries within the much-fragmented opposition, either out of naivety, or by choice to use it as a pretext for maintaining and consolidating their interests in Syria suggest that there is a majority against the Assad regime.

5 The Nusayri minority are a privileged class which has traditionally controlled political power in Syria. Numerically larger Sunni communities have, in turn, been treated as minority. Similarly, have been denied fundamental rights including the right to political participation, property rights and freedom of travel. 6 “Syria’s Business Elite, Between Political Alignment and Hedging Their Bets”,

Samer Abdoud, SWP Reports, 22 August 2013 A Turkish Perspective on Future Syria's Perspective Turkish A

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In a rather sharp contrast, the second perspective considers the Syrian conflict as a project financed and guided by regional and global actors, above all the US and Israel (followed by Russia and Iran) as part of a grand strategy to redesign the country for their own national interests.

While the “imperial design” perspective too appears rather consistent and convincing at the onset, it is far from carrying the analytical depth to provide a comprehensive account of the Syrian conflict. The weakness of this perspective that tries to explain the conflict with reference to “a ploy against the by the imperial powers” is the fact that it ignores the masses and the groups that are ready to “buy” this project while the authoritarian features of the regime provides the necessary excuse for putting into action such a ploy.

A key argument that is put forward by the “imperial design” perspective is that Syria is singled out as anti-democratic in a region in which many other countries governed by repressive, theocratic and autocratic regimes, including Bahrein, Saudi Arabia and Egypt in which Morsi was removed by a military coup. This argument is also supported by events that took place in Egypt following the coup led by General Sisi. The coup was backed politically but also financially by the autocratic monarchies of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the and it was welcomed by the US, Israel, and the rest of the Western world.

While the reason behind such help and sympathy toward Sisi in Egypt is the loyalty of Morsi toward the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimīn)7, the anti-Muslim Brotherhood sentiment of Ba’ath8 in

7 Al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn: Founded in Egypt by Islamic scholar Hassan al-Banna in 1928, Ikhwan (or the Muslim Brotherhood) spread far beyond Egypt, to become the largest, and the most influential Islamic movement of the Arab world, today representing some of the largest oppositional organizations in numerous Arab countries. The uprising of 1982 which it led was crushed violently by the Hafez al-Assad resulting the in the death of thousands of armed insurgents and civilians. The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria (Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimun fi Suriya) was founded in the mid-1940s by Mustafa al-Siba'i and Al-Mubarak al- Tayyib, who were friends and colleagues of the founder of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan al-Banna. For many years, the leader of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood was Ali Sadreddine Al-Bayanouni, who lives as a political refugee in . His current successor is Muhammad Walid. The Muslim Brotherhood was considered the main opposition group in Syria to the Assad regime but with very

little public support. From 2012 onwards it was once again considered by some as A Turkish Perspective on Future Syria's Perspective Turkish A

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Syria which has been a strong supporter of Assad and the ideology of pan-Arabism raises an important question: What is the reason behind the support of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Russia toward in Libya against the Prime Minister of the Government of National Accord of Libya Fayez al-Sarraj while the same countries except Russia want the removal of Assad9 in Syria who is anti-Ikhwan and relatively secular?

Another suggestion made by the proponents of the “imperial design” perspective is that the uprisings started in places that were particularly conductive due to their certain characteristics.

The southwestern city of in which the protests began, for instance, was known as an anti-regime stronghold populated almost exclusively by Sunni’s, among them the grandchildren and the descendants of Sayyidis (people accepted as descendants of the İslamic prophet Muhammed, or belonging to Ahl al Bayt). The second location in which the protests began is the coastal city of considered a trading center which connects the country to the Mediterranean and the rest of the world. The third location is where the largest refineries are to be found, which in turn supply a large part of the country’s energy needs. For the proponents of the “imperial design” perspective, all three locations were chosen specifically to trigger a sectarian conflict and an economic downfall one of most important actors in the opposition (en.wikipedia-org/wiki/Muslim Brotherhood-of-Syria). After the 1963 coup brought the secularist, pan-Arabist Ba'ath Party to power, it was banned. The Brotherhood played a major role in the mainly Sunni-based resistance movement that opposed the secular Ba'ath Party. This conflict developed into an armed struggle in the late 1970s that climaxed in the

Hama uprising of 1982, when thousands were killed by the military. While it is difficult to assess the Brotherhood’s real weight, it does not enjoy the same level of public support that its counterpart in Egypt does. (SWP-Petra Becker, “Syrian Muslim Brotherhood Still a Crucial actor”) 8 Ba’ath Party: Espousing Arab nationalism, the Party was founded in1940 by Michel Aflaq (of Christian background) and Salah al-Din al-Bitar.In 1947 it held its first congress with the joining of Zaki al-Arsuzi. Secularism and socialism also appear as the key tenets of the Pan Arabist ideology promoted by the Ba’ath. (www.ntvmsbnc.com/id/25301312) 9 The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood has resurrected itself to become the dominant group in the fragmented uprising against President Bashar al-Assad. Assad who applauded fall of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood claimed that: “Arab identity is back on the right track, It is returning after the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood and after these political trends that use religions for their narrow interests have been revealed. The Muslim Brotherhood and those who are like them take advantage of religion

and use it as a mask”. (Liz Sly, , 12 May 2012) A Turkish Perspective on Future Syria's Perspective Turkish A

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and that the start of the uprising in these localities cannot be explained as pure coincidence.

It is also important to recount at this point the general outlook of Syria in the first days of the uprising.

The start of the uprisings in Daraa, Latakia and Baniyas coincides with a period marked by a significant increase in food prices as a result of long period of droughts, energy shortages, widespread discontent in the countryside linked to the Syrian government’s decision to stop paying oil subsidies for the farmers and a growing disgruntlement among the elite and the educated middle-classes toward the repressive policies of the regime.

The Impact of the “Oil Card”

This period also coincides with the negotiations between Qatar and Syria to import gas from the South Pars gas field10 to through the Mediterranean via two different pipeline projects. The first project would bypass Iran to transfer gas into Europe through the Saudi Arabia--Turkey route and the second project would bypass Saudi Arabia using the --Syria route.

It is the second project that Syria approves and enters negotiations. In the same period, it opens a call for bids for gas exploration contracts with a deadline for October 2011 following the discovery of three offshore locations with potentially rich gas reserves off the coast of İskenderun Gulf. Yet the projects are then suspended because of the street revolts that had begun earlier that year.

10 The ownership of the field shared between Qatar and Iran with the latter estimated

to hold 14tn cubic meter in place. A Turkish Perspective on Future Syria's Perspective Turkish A

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Iran - Iraq - Syria Gas Pipeline

http://www.21yyte.org/tr/arastirma/enerji-ve-enerji-guvenligi-arastirmalari- merkezi/2013/08/02/7139/

Qatar – Saudi Arabia - Syria Gas Pipeline

http://www.sabah.com.tr/Ekonomi/2009/08/19/

Another project that is not realized during this time involves the transfer of Iranian gas through Iraq-Syria into the Mediterranean formalized in an agreement between the three countries in July 2011,

four months into the uprisings. A Turkish Perspective on Future Syria's Perspective Turkish A

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The fact that the countries that opposed this agreement the most included Israel which is planning to sell its gas from the Leviathan and Tamar fields, the de-facto Greek Cypriot controlled Republic of Cyprus (RoC) with similar plans to exploit its own Aphrodite, and the countries which have signed an agreement with the RoC including Italy (ENI), Norway (Noble), France (Total) and the US (Texaco) is yet another strong argument voiced by those circles subscribing to the “imperial design” perspective.11

While it is noteworthy that the Syrian uprising occurred at such time coinciding with the plans of Iran and Qatar to sell gas into Europe through the Mediterranean (Syria) and should not be entirely disregarded from an analytical point of view, it is nonetheless rather superficial and conspiratorial to assume that it is the sole reason which accounts for the conflict and the ensuing civil war.

The third perspective in a rather similar fashion to the previous “imperial design” view also emphasizes the foreign powers’ “meddling” in the Syrian affairs. From this perspective, “popular demands in Syria for a more democratic, inclusive, and participatory regime are led and guided by external actors in line with their own interests of increasing their own power, consolidate their influence in the region”.

The Third Perspective

While this perspective comes close to offering an accurate account of the conflict by drawing on the stronger arguments suggested by the previous perspectives, it still does not adequately take into account the fact that Syria represents a playground for multiple actors not only regional but also local, competing with one another for power and influence.

11 It is important to note too that the Qatari Emirate, the closest ally of Turkey in the

region, is also a signatory to that deal. A Turkish Perspective on Future Syria's Perspective Turkish A

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In fact, it should have been rather clear and indeed predictable from the lessons in Yugoslavia and Iraq that a chaos and disintegration would ensue following the weakening of the central, authoritarian structure which had thus far controlled and managed the complex dynamics of a multi-ethnic and multi-faith country in which governance is based on ethnic and sectarian differences.

In this regard, the exogenous state and non-state actors have complicated the rather predictable chaos further through a power struggle, played out in Syria to sustain inherent interests and influence rendering a national conflict first into a regional one and soon after, a global one.

As a result of the direct and indirect meddling of external actors in the conflict, what started as dissent and the ensuing clashes that took place between the regime supporters and the opposition was gradually spilled over beyond its original confines to include radical religious and jihadist groups that shared no concern regarding the democratization of Syria.

In this context, the groups that first came together on an ethnic and sectarian basis and later split for various reasons (interests, rivalry, power struggle, selling services, engagement, rent-seeking behavior) formed new alliances sometimes on a daily basis, transforming the conflict from a bipolar one into a conflict characterized by an asymmetric ground.

However, if more attention would be paid to the historic context, and in particular the French policy (1918)12 toward Arab nationalism with

12 Following the French occupation of Syria in 1918, an autonomous state named Jabal Druze was created on 24 October 1922 for the Druze population of Sothern Syria. When Jabal Druze was incorporated into the state of Syria in 1936, some Druzes took on Syrian citizenship and stayed while others migrated to Lebanon. It is estimated that around 400,000 Druzes continue to live in Syria today. On 31 August 1920, the State of , located to the south of Sandjak Alexenderatta and north of Greater Lebanon was created to incorporate a majority of Nusayris. Initially it was an autonomous territory under French rule known as the "Alawite Territories". It became part of the Syrian Federation in 1922 but left the federation again in 1924 and became the "State of Alawites". On 22 September 1930, it was renamed the

"Independent Government of Latakia. In 1936, both Jabal Druze and the Alawite A Turkish Perspective on Future Syria's Perspective Turkish A

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the latter being seen as a potential platform for independence from the French colonial rule and toward the minorities (to stop one ethnic or religious fraction acquiring too much power), the revival of separatist and nationalist sentiment with the weakening of the authoritarian and repressive regime, that had thus far kept such secessionist feelings in the “deep freeze”, could have been predicted.

Indeed, while it is unlikely that such predictions were not made based on historical cases of Yugoslavia, Iraq, and to some extent Yemen and Afghanistan, not learning lessons from these cases to avoid a similar outcome raises the question of whether the ultimate aim was indeed to break up Syria from the onset.

Moreover, the sheer hypocrisy of the statements made by the same actors which destroyed the territorial integrity of Syria for the foreseeable future, adds further explanatory power to this suggestion made above.

Regardless of which of the three perspectives, briefly outlined above, is taken on the Syrian conflict, it is clear that none of the exogenous state and non-state actors that are directly or indirectly involved in the Syrian conflict, are in Syria out of a genuine concern for the democratic demands of the Syrian people.

In fact, the interest from and the ensuing actions taken by such state actors, and above all the US, the Russian Federation, Iran, France, Israel, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, People’s

Republic of China and international organizations such as the EU and NATO, do not reflect the tragic destruction, loss of civilian life, human rights violations, torture, excessive and unequal use of force, the repressive character of the regime or the local demands for democratization.

It is important at this point to provide a caveat for Turkey’s role in the Syrian conflict. While placed under threat and risk itself in terms of its

State were incorporated into the State of Syria. In 1939 the Nusayris regained their independence before being incorporated into the newly proclaimed Syrian Republic

in 1944. (Wikipedia) A Turkish Perspective on Future Syria's Perspective Turkish A

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national security from the terrorist group the YPG (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel) situated toward its northern border, Turkey has taken a humanitarian stance on Syria by admitting nearly 4 million seeking protection from the war, which makes the country qualitatively different from the other exogenous actors listed above.

While Turkey does support and indeed lead several opposition groups in organizational terms against the Assad regime that is Syria’s legitimate government under the UN, this should not be detract from the fact that it is nonetheless a rather distinct external actor as explicated above.

Iran

For Tehran, the end of the Assad regime and by extension the exclusion of the Nusayris from power would amount to the collapse of geopolitical strategy based on the so-called “Shiite Crescent” toward the Bagdad-Damascus-Lebanon (Hezbollah) axis, a scenario that would ultimately mean Iran losing an important if not the only ally in the Arab World. Another fact that renders Syria critical from an Iranian perspective is the geographical proximity of the country to Israel and which maintains the logistical support Tehran provides for Hezbollah through this strategic corridor.

Indeed, it would not be wrong to suggest that Iran perceives the Syrian conflict as its own conflict. Iran’s increasing support toward the Regime and the mobilization of Hezbollah in Syria, the Revolutionary Guards, the Quds Force and other militant groups13 to engage directly in the clashes, together with logistical support including advanced weapons systems and strategic defense planning offered by combat advisors are clear indicators of the critical importance of Syria from an Iranian perspective.

13 A number of Iran-backed militias, including the Mukhtar Al Thaqfi Brigade, Iranian 65th. Brigade “Green Helmet Unit”, Naksha Forces, Al Quds Force, Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps are scattered around Syria, fighting in support of the regime. Diverse groups from Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan,

Bahrein, and Yemen are also fighting alongside Syrian military units. (Appendix 1) A Turkish Perspective on Future Syria's Perspective Turkish A

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Another key indicator which underlines the strategic relationship between Syria and Iran is the narrative chosen by the Iranian Supreme leader Al Khamenei in a speech delivered in September 2011 in which explicit support was expressed for the Assad Regime. According to magazine, by February 2012 Syria that had been weakened by embargoes received 9bn USD as well as petrol from Tehran. When taken into account that over 2,000 soldiers from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards have been killed in Syria since January 2013, including several high ranking captains and general (Commander Hossein Hamadani, 7 October, ; Brigadier General Mohsen Ghajarian, 3 February 2016; Brigadier General Mohammad Jamali-Paqaleh; November 2013)14 the extent of Iranian support for the Assad regime in Syria that had been the closest ally of the country since the İslamic revolution can be better appreciated.

Russia’s Discontent

Russia and Iran, the two key actors that support the Syrian regime politically, economically and in technical and logistic terms, are not in perfect harmony over Syria.

More specifically, Iranian efforts toward consolidating its military presence in Syria and political clout by playing the Shia card over the Alawi-dominated regime are seen by Russia as undermining its own dominant position in the country a highly-priced position that the latter is not willing to share with anyone.

Another Russian unease in relation to Iran is the latter’s confrontation with Israel via its proxies, especially Hezbollah, which for Russia provides a pretext for Israeli involvement in Syria, which in turn cements US permanence in the country. In other words, Tahran’s penchant for proxy activities against Israel in Syria offering a pretext for intervention are considered to be damaging long-term Russian plans regarding Syria.

14 Iranian Involvement in the Syrian Civil War-Wikipedia, 1/26/2018 A Turkish Perspective on Future Syria's Perspective Turkish A

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Indeed, Russian silence over Israeli air raids in Syria targeting Hezbollah and other military targets is understood to be an extension of this unease regarding Tehran. The Russian-Iranian friction over Israel is dealt with in detail in the subsequent section on Israel.

Various developments reported by the Russian media in recent months also gives the impression that Moscow is sending Tehran an implicit message of discontent. This is seen in the response of Hezbollah leader Hasan Nasrallah to an article published on the Federal News Agency owned by Yevgeny Prizorkin, a Russian oligarch with close ties to Putin who also owns the (and by extension the Wagner forces in Libya) which called for “Iranian forces exploiting Syria to agitate Israel and the US forces” to leave. In his response, which was broadcast by the Radio Iran on 14 May, Nasrallah insisted that there was no power struggle between Russia and Iran over Syria.15 A BBC Analysis which was published on 30 October 2015, titled “Syria crisis: Where Key countries stand” also made public the true motive behind Iranian interest in Syria by stating that “Mr. Assad is Iran’s closest Arab ally and Syria is the main transit point for Iranian weapons shipments to the Lebanese Shia Islamist movement, Hezbollah.”16

While localized fighting amidst the overall military victory of the regime, another bone of contention and source of rivalry between Russia and Iran is over who will get the better piece of the cake within post-war reconstruction of Syria.

Russia’s post-war priorities include the strengthening of the central

government, defense and security sector reform, securing deals for lucrative investment projects to cover war costs while Iran is more concerned with maintaining and increasing its political clout in Syria through proxy militant groups and influence over the local populations. More concretely, Moscow is keen to upgrade its naval facility in together with the , and to secure its oil and gas exploration contracts while Iran is focused on modernizing the Latakian port, construction of power plants and other mobile communications projects.

15 Selahaddin E. Çakırgil, https://www.star.com.tr, 18.05.2020, erişim tarihi:14.08.2020 16 “Syria crisis: Where key countries stand, 30 october 2015, BBC,

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23849587 A Turkish Perspective on Future Syria's Perspective Turkish A

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In this regard, the Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yury Borisov announced that Syria and his country signed a series of bilateral agreements regarding bilateral cooperation in a number of sectors including energy, construction and agriculture envisaging 40 new investment projects, among them the rebuilding of hydroelectric stations and deep-sea oil exploration (September 2020) Borislov also announced that a new trade deal would be signed between the two countries in December 2020.

Yet, considering their own economic woes in the context of ongoing embargoes, neither Russia nor Iran is in a position to finance the post- war reconstruction of Syria directly. For that reason, it should not be surprising that in relation to the post-war reconstruction and foreign investment, both countries are keen to find partners elsewhere using their influence in the region.

Saudi Arabia – UAE – Gulf States

For the Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait and others, these countries have so far interpreted the events largely through a sectarian perspective (Shiite – Salafi), aimed at weakening and ultimately ending Tehran’s growing influence both domestically (among the Shiite population) and in the region (other proxies) through Syria.

From the Gulf states’ perspective moreover, when compared to the potential, desired outcome of the conflict which involves the exclusion

of the Nusayris and the Ba’ath from power thus the limiting of the Iranian influence and the Shiite Crescent when Tehran loses its only ally, the human cost of the destruction of the “Shiite Crescent” and the ensuing tragedy appears insignificant.

In fact, for the Gulf states which follow a foreign policy largely shaped by their patron, the US and a more authoritarian domestic rule than Damascus, such a foreign and hostile conception as the “democratization of Syria” appears a complete anathema.

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Besides, following the fallout with Turkey in 2013 over the coup in Egypt, the Gulf states, and above all, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have taken a rather different approach toward Syria, beyond their concern for sectarian influence and their fears regarding Iran.

In this context, following the fallout over Ankara’s support for Morsi in Egypt, Turkey’s involvement in the Astana peace process with Iran and Russia was an important factor which ended Ankara-Riyadh partnership in Syria.

In a similar vein, it is important to note too that Ankara’s support for Qatar during the Qatar-Gulf crisis in June 2017, the completion at the same time of a Turkish military base in the country and the fast-tract deployment of Turkish troops, the subsequent expansion of that military base and more recently Turkish support toward the Sarraj government in Libya (financed by Qatar) known for his close links with the Muslim Brotherhood have further increased the enmity in Saudi Arabia and the UAE toward Turkey.

TAF Base in Qatar

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TAF Base in Qatar

The shift in US foreign policy toward the Middle East soon under the US President Trump, involving the improvement of relations with Saudi Arabia and an active role in the peaceful containment of Iran in the region meant a more prominent regional role for Riyadh.

The ousting of Crown Prince Muhammed bin Nayif and his replacement with Muhammed Bin Selman known for his close relations with Abu Dhabi and an equally distanced approach toward Ankara, continued the trend of worsening relations between Ankara and Riyadh and the recent killing of the Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in a rogue operation carried inside the Consulate (2 October 2018) have significantly increased the tensions that mark

the bilateral relations today.

In parallel to these developments, both Mohammed bin Selman (MBS) and the UAE Crown Prince Muhammed bin Zayed (MBZ) initiated an anti-Turkish campaign first in the Middle East in Syria, and later in Libya, Somalia in North Africa and now in the Eastern Mediterranean, turning Syria into a central hub both for reducing Ankara’s influence in the country and organizing activities that threaten the latter’s national security.

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While Turkey was trying to stop the PYD/YPG from gaining political power via the power vacuum left behind, both Saudi Arabia and the UAE developed their relations with these groups by providing financial assistance and military support.

In this vein, Saudi and BAE officials held several high-level meetings in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi with senior representatives from the PYD/YPG. In October 2017 for instance, Thamer al-Sabhan, the Minister of State for Gulf Affairs together with the US Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition Brett McGurk held a coordination meeting with the PYD/YPG in (Syria), and in December 2019 the UAE invited Ferhat Abdi Şahin, better known by his nom de guerre Mazlum Kobani sought by with a red notice on Turkey’s behalf, to Abu Dhabi for a meeting.

Such meetings do show that Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are both playing the PYD/YPG card to pressurize Ankara and have both radically altered their initial positions regarding Syria.

In fact, the statement by the Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir in June 2016, claiming that “Turkey would pay a heavy price for altering its policy toward Syria” is an important indication of such policy on the part of the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

Finally, clear opposition from the Crown Prince bin Selman and the UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Anwar Gargash toward Turkey’s military operations in the region ( Operation Olive Branch,

Operation Peace Spring, Spring Shield) on the grounds of “threatening Arab national security”, and statements describing Turkey together with Iran and other groups in the region as being part of a “triangle of evil” has been the last nail on the coffin for their bilateral relations with Turkey.

On the other hand, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have both recently initiated a process of normalization with Syria and the Assad Regime (of which Turkey is a key opponent), which has paved the way for restoring diplomatic relations including the reopening of the UAE and Bahrein

Embassies in Damascus. A Turkish Perspective on Future Syria's Perspective Turkish A

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In this vein, reports suggesting that the UAE offered the regime in Damascus 3bn USD in return for the violation of the ceasefire in Idlib following Turkey’s Spring Shield Operation though unconfirmed, deserve more attention especially when considered together with the recent developments in Libya and the UAE’s sending of two F-16s to Crete (Greece) as part of its Eastern Mediterranean policy.

Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Çavuşoğlu once stated without mentioning any name some of the countries donated radical groups financially and created commotion in Afrin and Idlib whenever Turrkey launched military operations in these regions.

Indeed, while the frequent violations of the ceasefire by the Syrian army in Idlib in recent days can be explained by other and perhaps more important factors17, the activities of the UAE and Saudi Arabia involving the PYD in Idlib should not be ignored.

When taken into account together with the financial support provided by Kuwait for the radical religious groups amounting to nearly 200m USD (intercepted by Turkey in the field) it becomes clear that the Idlib province will continue to present a key ground for multiple actors in the battle for defending their own interests and putting into practice their own plans. For example, in April and May 2017, Kuwait is estimated to have sent 130m USD (collected from zakat, or the obligatory alms) to Jabhat al-Nusra.

Saudi Arabia too, upon calls from the US, sent technical teams to modernize the oil fields in Deir ez-Zor and in Rmelan (Rumeylan) controlled by the YPG. At the same time, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia both sent representatives to Raqqa and respectively to offer assistance yet with no success when the Arab local population rejected such offers.

17 These include disagreements between Russia and Turkey over Manbij and (but also over Sirte in Libya), unfulfilled Turkish promises regarding the M4 highway, Turkish-US rapprochement but also Assad’s goal to achieve a military

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Following US plans to legitimize the PYD/YPG with Saudi Arabian financial backing, Riyadh has pledged to give USD 520 ml over three years, with the first payment of USD 200ml already being made to the group by the Kingdom.

Within the framework of US efforts to counter Iran in the post-war period by increasing Saudi influence moreover, work is underway to set up a 10.000 strong “oilfield guard force” which will consist of the members of the Arab tribes from Al-Hasakah and Deir ez-Zor loyal to the SDF/PYD.

US (Delta Crescent Energy LLC) – PYD Energy Deal

A clear indication of the US determination not to share Syrian oil with anyone but the PYD it effectively controls was manifest in May 2019 though not adequate attention was paid to this development which was treated at the time as a reflection of the wider power rivalry.

During that time, the Russian Wagner Group commanded around 3,000 with a majority of them operating in Latakia, near the Syrian 5th Corps (Around 2,500 Wagner Group mercenaries were later deployed to Libya to fight alongside Haftar’s forces). When significant numbers of mercenaries were redeployed to Deir ez-Zor and near the oil fields in Spring 2019, they were targeted by US fighter planes. While the attacks inflicted heavy losses on Wagner mercenaries, the response from Moscow was rather muted. It is understood that Moscow deliberately avoided displaying a strong reaction to the attacks in order not to reveal the presence of the Wagner forces in Syria and their connection to Kremlin but agreed instead with the US to set up various deconfliction mechanisms (such as joint control mechanism of Syrian air space) to avoid similar incidents in the future. Attacks against Wagner forces were nonetheless a clear message from the US to Russia to stay away from the oil fields.

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The same message was delivered at a press conference on 5 February 2020 by the US Ambassador and the Special Representative for Syria Engagement James Jeffrey which is worthy of quoting at length:

We’ve seen many of these things. Now actually looked at a map of where they’re happening. Most of them are happening right on the edge where there is a road that everybody usus, and then there’s also an airbase of ours.

The vast majority of these incidents occur there, and so to some degree, they represent the Russians traying to move into far northwest where they do have the town-the city of , where there are Russian and Syrian forces….so the Russians have legitimate needs to move their forces into that area, but we have deconfliction agreements and we find them violating them to one or another degree in there […]

Now more serious is we have seen a number – a limited number of occasions, but we have seen them-were they have tried to come deep into area where we and SDF are patrolling, well inside the lines that we have sketched, not right along the borders. Those are the ones that worry me […] we call upon the Russians to adhere fully to the deconfliction agreements we’ve made with them.18

In addition to these, and within the framework of US plans to bring the Syrian Kurd and Arabs together (with the Saudi financing) in an alliance of mutual interests, the coalition forces have begun to return back to military bases, including the Lafarge base near Jalabiya and the Jazira base near Raqqa and work has also begun on the rebuilding a military base in the south of Ayn al-Arab, or Kobani.

Considering these developments and also the work undertaken by the Saudi experts in Rmelan (upon US request) to upgrade the capacity of the oil fields, the deal between the US-based Delta Crescent Energy LLC and the PYD, which also envisages the building of two mobile oil refineries in the region should have been no surprise.

When taken together, President Trump’s statements suggesting that the revenues from Syrian oil would be used to finance US expenditure in the country and that the US troops were stationed to protect these oil fields, Pentagon spokesperson Jonathan Hoffman’s statement that

18 U.S. Ministry of Foreign Affairs; “Ambassador James Jeffrey On the Situation in

Syria”, February 5,2020, Washington, D.C. A Turkish Perspective on Future Syria's Perspective Turkish A

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the revenues from the oil fields protected by the US troops in Syria would be given to the SDF as well as the US Secretary Pompeo’s suggestion that US troops would be stationed in Syria to protect the oil fields from ISIS, also help clarify the big picture regarding US involvement in Syria.

a) Turkish, Russian And Iranian Reactions to the Delta Crescent-PYD Deal

The deal between the US and the PYD (or rather the deal between a state and a terrorist group) represents perhaps a first-of-its-kind in terms of terrorist financing and has attracted strong condemnation from Turkey, Russia and Iran, guarantor states of the Astana Process. Indeed, as the Astana agreement stipulated:

[Guarantor states] rejected in this regard all attempts to create new realities on the ground under the pretext of combating terrorism, including illegitimate self-rule initiatives, and expressed their determination to stand against separatist agendas aimed at undermining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria as well as threatening the national security of neighboring countries. (Article 3)

Discussed the situation in the North-east of Syria, emphasized that security and stability in this region can only be achieved on the basis of preservation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country and agreed to coordinate their efforts to this end. Expressed their opposition to illegal seizure and transfer of oil revenues that should be belonged to the Syrian Arab Republic. (Article 4)19

While the three countries have fulfilled their commitments, which were detailed in the agreements, it is unlikely that the US will backtrack from the move that seems long time in the making.

In this regard, it is important to recall that the deal which includes the modernization, exploitation and the monetarization of the oil fields under PYD control, was revealed only when the Republican Senator

19 Joint Statement by the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the President of the Russian Federation and the President of the Republic of Turkey, Video Tele-

Conference (VTC), 1 July 2020. A Turkish Perspective on Future Syria's Perspective Turkish A

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Lindsey Graham pressed the US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo at a meeting of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. At that meeting, when Pompeo was asked by Graham — who initially spoke to SDF so called General Commander Mazloum Abdi regarding a deal signed with a US company to —whether the administration was supportive of it, he responded affirmatively, adding that "The deal took a little longer ... than we had hoped, and now we're in implementation."

The deal was swiftly condemned by Turkey in a statement released on 3 August, remarking that "We deeply regret the US support to this step, disregarding international law, violating territorial integrity, unity and sovereignty of Syria, as well as being considered within the scope of financing terrorism. This act, which cannot be justified by any legitimate motive, is utterly unacceptable". Turkey’s statement is also remarkable for emphasizing the link with terrorism which was omitted in the statements released by Russia and Iran.

For its part, the Russian Foreign Ministry released a strongly worded statement on 7 August 2020, criticizing the US move. The statement did not refer to the PYD but described the deal to be between the “self-proclaimed Kurdish administration” and the Delta Crescent, envisaging the building of two mobile refineries in the region. US Secretary of State Michael Pompeo’s exchange with the Republican Senator Lindsey Graham at the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, confirming the deal and Pompeo’s admission that “it took longer than expected” together with his claim that the deal would help those living in northeast Syria was also quoted in the statement.

More remarkably perhaps, the Russian statement suggested that the

Delta Crescent was given certain privileges by the US Treasury to by- pass the embargoes placed on Syria, arguing that:

This amounts to systematic violations of international legal standards and international humanitarian law by Washington, its commitments as an occupying power.20 Moreover, the US administration has again demonstrated its obvious disdain for the UN Charter and Security Council and General Assembly resolutions in favor of strict respect for Syria’s sovereignty,

20 This definition should be noted as an official reflection of Russian views for the

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independence, unity and territorial integrity as a UN member. The United States is illegally occupying territories in the northeast and South of Syria. Moreover, it is taking part in robbing and illegally trading in the country’s natural resources that are the asset of all Syrians. And this is the being done against the backdrop of yet another toughening of unilateral sanctions adopted in circumvention of the UN Security Council [...] it should be noted that the oil products produced in the northeastern regions of the country and this profits from smuggling them are not benefiting all the residents in that part of northeastern Syria. The media and analytical centers regularly publish information on civil protests in northeastern Syria against the illegal US presence and arbitrary rule of Kurdish authorities that do not care about the wellbeing of civilians. The US policy of artificially strengthening the Kurds at the expense of other ethnic and religious groups in northeastern Syria provokes domestic tensions and creates serious threats to regional security and stability. We are seriously concerned, and we regret these arbitrary and illegal actions, as well as the absence of a proper reaction from the international community.

Reference to “civil protests in northern Syria against the illegal US presence and arbitrary rule of Kurdish authorities” in the statement of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is indicative of the developments that will follow in the coming days and should thus be noted by the relevant actors in the field. More specifically, the mobilization of the Arab population already disgruntled by the PYD’s Kurdification policies on the heels of the recent US-PYD-deal carries the potential to enter the agenda in the very near future.

Tehran too, in a statement released by the Foreign Ministry spokesperson Abbas Mousavi, strongly condemned the deal, remarking that: “The signing of the agreement by the US, as an occupier force that is illegally present on the Syrian oil, lacks any legal validity and amounts to another step taken by that country (the US) in plundering Syria’s natural resources.” In a statement to Russian Sputnik News Agency, the deputy director general of the National Energy Security Fund, Alexei Grivach has also argued that with the deal the US was “preparing the ground for taking its share of the oil revenues in Syria; in this way, while supporting those forces under its control, Washington wants to monetize the oil reserves in the country”.

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In a statement published by the official SANA News Agency, the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, also said that it condemned “in the strongest terms” the agreement signed between the SDF and a U.S. oil company to steal the Syrian oil, affirming that it considered it “null and void”.21

It is worthy to note that both the Russian and Syrian foreign ministries described the US presence in Syria as illegal/occupation and that they considered the actions of the latter with regards to the oil fields as “plundering”.

In a recent briefing regarding the oil deal between the Delta Crescent and the PYD, held at the Brussels Media Hub via telephone, the US Special Representative for Syria Engagement, James Jeffrey was further pressed by a journalist on Turkish responses. When asked “a short follow-up regarding the deal between and Delta Crescent Energy” and to elaborate on talks between Turkey and Washington, Jeffrey said:

In terms of the contract or whatever it was between Delta Crescent and the autonomous administration, this is an issue that the United States, other than issuing because we’re asked to issue and we’ve had every reason to not have a problem-necessary waivers from U.S. sanctions because the activity does not benefit the Assad regime, which is the purpose of waivers. This is a private operation to further the development of the oil fields in the northwest. We don’t see this is a change in ownership of these fields or anything else. The fields have been operating by the autonomous administration for many years now they took them back from ISIS……..We have been supporting their economy

with stabilization funding from us and other coalition members

for years, many hundreds of millions dollars. It’s not a surprise to see them do well economically as long as they’re continuing to maintain stability and continue to fight against the ISIS.22

21 Sputnik, Amur Gadjiev, 03.08.2020, Deutsche Welle, 03.08.2020, Bilal Güler, Dünya, 05.08.2020 22 https://www.state.gov./briefing-with-ambassador-james-jeffrey-u-s-special- representative-for-syria-engagement-and-special-envoy-to-the -global-coalition-

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At the same briefing, when asked about his thoughts on Kurdish autonomy by the Lebanese journalist Monalisa Freiha from Annahar newspaper, Jeffrey responded:

It is an additional economic activity among the many economic activities that the people of the northeast, several million of them with- that they’ve been operating these oil fields since 2015. In some cases, they’ve been managing the overall economy of the northeast, of which the oil is one minor component.

It is clear from Jeffrey’s statements which omit Turkish and Syrian reactions to the deal, that Washington is keen to soften the strong condemnation it has attracted with the move. Indeed, his remarks regarding the oil fields, that “we don’t see this is a change in ownership of these fields” is an obvious message of calm to Syria, Russia, Iran, and Turkey amidst strong condemnation.

In the same vein, Jeffrey’s repeated references to the economic aspects of the deal and his implicit claim that the deal had no political significance can be read as a separate message to Ankara.

While some have claimed that the situation regarding the oil fields is nothing new (and that these fields were being operated by the PYD since 2015), these claims are far from convincing. Given that the US has replaced its technical assistance to the PYD, provided indirectly via Saudi Arabia, with a direct involvement in the form of a commitment to build two mobile refineries, the situation regarding US relations with the PYD has taken a different turn.

It is difficult to ignore, even though the most senior US official would like to state otherwise, that the US-PYD deal carries significant political repercussions. Besides, the reference in Jeffrey’s statements to the “millions of dollars” spent on the PYD (implicitly named) by the US and its coalition partners can be considered a clear message to Ankara that regarding the terrorist organization, the US is not acting alone.

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It is also equally difficult to assume that Jeffrey who chooses to refer to the “Kurdish autonomous authority” as opposed to the PYD is unaware of the remarks made by the US Special Forces Commander, General Raymond Thomas in October 2015 that remains in the archives. In his speech delivered at the Annual Security Forum organized by the Aspen Institute in Colorado, General Thomas would claim that:

They formally called themselves the YPG, who the Turks would say equated the PKK, you’re dealing with a terrorist enemy of mine. How can you do that to an ally? So, we literally played back to them: you’ve got to change your brand. What do you want to call yourself beside the YPG? With about a day’s notice, they declared that they were the Syrian Democratic Forces. I thought it was a stroke of brilliance to put democracy in there somewhere. But it gave them a little bit of credibility. They wanted a seat at the table and because they had been branded as PKK they could never get to the table. So while we paired with them militarily, McGurk was able to keep them in the conversation and allowed them the necessary legitimacy to be good partners for us.23

Regardless of the name under which represents itself, whether the PYD, armed-wing YDG, the SDF or the “Kurdish autonomous authority”, the organization which the US has chosen as an ally and partner, and tried to legitimize with a deal signed for by the Delta Crescent Energy LLC, is — as General Raymond himself has admitted back in October 2015 — in effect, the PKK.

Although most attention has focused on the engagement of main actors including Russia, the US, Iran and Turkey, various Gulf countries — above all Saudi Arabia, but also Kuwait and Bahrain — have also intervened in the conflict. While the main drivers of the initial Gulf engagement have been the strategic rivalry with Iran but also sectarian calculations, these countries have recently increased their involvement on an anti-Turkish impulse.

23 AA, 25, January 2018 A Turkish Perspective on Future Syria's Perspective Turkish A

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The Russian Federation

While Russia is the main actor which, through its involvement, changed the balance of power in Syria in favor of Assad, the clear lack of understanding of Russian positions and Moscow’s interests in Syria, particularly within a historical context, represents the first and the worst error committed by the West, and the US in particular, in a long chain of errors in developing a good understanding of the conflict.

Yet, it should have been very clear from the outset that Russia would not be willing to lose Syria, a country which is the largest regional customer for Russian weapons, an ally in which large numbers of military professionals and advisors worked in the 1970s (nearly 4,000) and above all, a key asset for Russian geopolitical and geostrategic interests as a regional playing field as well as a stepping-stone toward becoming once again, a global power.24

While it was (and still is) crucial to take stock of the long history and the extent of Russia-Syria bilateral relations which dates back to the relations between the Syrian Arab Republic and the USSR, in order to better understand the current scope of Russian policy toward the country, the fact that this was not foreseen, or worst, that it was foreseen but ignored for self-interests, is the main factor which led to the globalization of the ongoing chaos and conflict.

Various disagreements between Russia and Syria during the 25

Gorbachev era notwithstanding it is important to remember that the

24 “[...] Putin has made expansion of Russian sea power a pillar of his third presidential term. “I would like to reiterate again that the development of a powerful, effective navy is one of Russia’s chief priorities.” He stated on January 10, at the inauguration of Russia’s first new class of submarines since 1991. Assad’s fall would mean losing Russia’s only military base outside the former —a naval resupply center in Syria’s port of Tartus.” “Russia’s many interests in Syria”, The Washington Institute of Near East Policy Center, January 24, 2013. 25 The rise of Mikhail Gorbachev as the next Soviet Premier in November 1985 (after Konstantin Chernenko) marked a radical departure its Syrian-Soviet relations. Gorbachev openly denounced Hafez al-Assad for his adventurism in Lebanon and called for a significant reduction in economic and military aid. He also perceived Syria’s obsession with fighting Israel as a liability. Gorbachev frustration with Syria

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relations between the two countries began in 1955 under the USSR. Indeed, when placed into a historical context, the military and political cooperation that has reached its peak it is futile to question whether the Russian presence in Syria (and by extension the Eastern Mediterranean) is permanent. This permanence was registered with the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1980. What is being witnessed now is the transformation and dramatic strengthening of Russian presence.

From the earlier days of the Soviet Union onwards, Syria has always enjoyed a rather privileged position in the geopolitical calculations of the Kremlin. Today, it is not possible to find a comparable case which receives the same extent of Russian political or military support than Syria.

Jalil Al-Marhoun further explains the reasons behind Russia’s recent interests in Syria:

[...] it is necessary to point out the geopolitical environment of the Black Sea has changed fundamentally since Romania and Bulgaria became considered members of NATO and and Georgia gained independence. Furthermore, NATO countries are now betting on the possibility that their troops will gain access to the Azov and Black Seas, is now subject to Ukrainian control which represents a sharp conflict between Russia and the West. Within the same context, the United States signed an agreement with Romania (December 6, 2005), allowing the US to deploy 1.500 soldiers to American Naval Bases in the Back Sea. In short, the Black Sea has become a spot of Atlantic influence where Russia’s historical standing has

been damaged. Today’s Russia has lost all its former Soviet military bases, including those in Cuba and Vietnam. The Syrian base in Tartus is the only exception, which helps explain why Syria is so significant when considering Russian geopolitics. This explains why Russia

Syria dropped off dramatically. The number of Soviet advisors in Syria was also reduced to 1.800 from 4.000 in 1986. Finally, the Soviets began demanding that Syria pay for arms with cash. Assad made a brief visit to Moscow in May 1985 restated Syria’s plea for a stronger Soviet military commitment. However, the Soviet leadership reprimanded him for Syria’s hostility toward the PLO and Iraq and reminded him that the Syria was not its only Middle East ally. In May 1986, Gorbachev renewed Soviet promises to supply Syria with military equipment and excoriated Israeli and American pressure on Syria.

( https://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/2009/02/28/the-Syria-soviet-alliance/) A Turkish Perspective on Future Syria's Perspective Turkish A

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has been pursuing the Mediterranean and Syria in its new foreign policy.26

This perspective which links the historic Russian quest for “warm water ports” to the latest developments in the Black Sea and the Southeastern Europe also sheds light onto Russia’s expansionist plans in Syria (Tartus/Hmeymim) and more recently in Libya (Al Jufra / Sirte) that go beyond the Eastern Mediterranean into becoming a permanent feature in North Africa and the Mediterranean

Anna Borshchevskaya from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy also takes a similar view:

[...] since 2000, Putin has sought to restore Russia as a Great Power, shaping its policy as an anti-American zero- sum game in order to position the country as a counterweight to the West in the Middle East. Syria is Russia’s most important foothold in the region and a key to Putin’s calculus. Syria’s location-bordering the Mediterranean, Israel, Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan and Iraq-makes it too important to lose.27

Drawing from Borshchevkaya’s argument, Carlo Jose Vincente Caro also explains Russia’s interest with reference to historical ties:

[…] There have been many objections to what is denominated as the Russian interference in Syria, more specifically in the Syrian Armed Conflict. Most of the

objections coming from these analysts concentrate on one sided arguments and therefore ignore the historical relationship that Moscow has had with the Damascus… They paint an ingenious yet delusional picture of a foreign intruder coming of nowhere to the aid of an internal despot, while ignoring the fact that the relations of cooperation between Syria and Russia were established literally as the former gained independence from the French and thereby became a modern nation-state.

26 Abdul Jalil Al Marhoun, “The Story of Syrian-Russian Relations”, Middle East Monitor, March 29.2014

27 Anna Borshchevskaya. The Washington Institute, January 24, 2013 A Turkish Perspective on Future Syria's Perspective Turkish A

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A thorough analysis of the bilateral relations from a historical perspective, together with the bilateral agreements between the two countries would therefore suggest and indeed predict that for various reasons (though all serving a common purpose) Russia would be willing to directly intervene in Syria. A potential proposition here is whether the US, as a counter-strategy based on the assumption that nothing would stop Kremlin from intervening in Syria, allowed Syria to descend into chaos thus paving the way for the effective/ de facto partition of the country.

Indeed, as it will be discussed further below, the autonomous region that is supported by the US (despite clear Turkish opposition) and the more recent deal between the PYD and the (KNC) brokered by Washington and France all point out to a PYD/YPG plan to set up an entity similar to the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq (KRGI) in northeast Syria.

a) Bilateral Agreements between the RF and Syria

Along the long trajectory of Russia-Syria relations, four key events and dates stand out. The first date is 1945 as Vincente Caro underlines in his article:

[….] when Syria became independent it asked for the withdrawal of foreign troops from its territories, something which was not simple and even caused a few skirmishes. Yet the Soviet Union supported Syria’s request, where interests coincided with them; to preserve

the security of their borders. In their note of the 1st of July 1945 and the course of debates in the UN Security Council, the USSR insisted of the need to resolve this question, thereby giving legitimacy and weight to the Syrian requests. This posture was important since it was the first political action of scope from the USSR in the Arab world since the Second World War.

The second event took place in 1955 when Syria, along with Egypt, was invited to Moscow to sign a “Treaty of Amity” by the infamous

Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov. This was shortly followed by A Turkish Perspective on Future Syria's Perspective Turkish A

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Premier Khrushchev sending 200m USD in military aid to Syria between 1955 and 1960.

The third event is the “Peace and Security Pact” signed between Moscow and Damascus in 1972 with the aim of increasing the defense capacity of Syria after Air Force Commander Hafez al-Assad took control of the country through a military coup.28

The fourth and the most important date is November 8, 1980.

On this date, the governments of the Soviet Union and the Syrian Arab Republic signed the “Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation” in Moscow. The treaty expressly stated that “In the occurrence of situations jeopardizing peace of security for either party, the two parties would promptly contact each other to coordinate positions and cooperate to eliminate threats so that peace can be restored.”

The treaty was originally designed to remain in force “for a period of 20 years from the date of its enactment”. The document would then remain in force “for an additional five years until one contracting party notified the other party in writing about its intention to terminate the treaty and the agreement remains in force to this day.”

With regards to Syrian-Soviet relations, the visit of the then Syrian Prime Minister Yusuf Zuayyin to Moscow in April 1966 should also

be noted. During Zuayyin’s visit, both nations wowed their strong opposition to imperialism and shortly after, an accord would be reached for the formation of Syrian political, technical, and military cadres in the USSR. By 1990, over 40.000 Syrian citizens were educated and trained in the USSR. Many of them would later occupy key government posts and within the ranks of the . Indeed, as Carlo Vincente Caro notes “[…] of the eight

28 Hafez Assad made his first visit as the new head of the state to Moscow on 1-3 February 1971. The visit was a clear demonstration of the importance the Syrian government attributed to its relations with the Soviets. Indeed, Syria had already been enjoying close military and economic relations with the Soviet Union for 15

years prior to that. “European Researcher”, 2012, Vol. (35), No:11-3. A Turkish Perspective on Future Syria's Perspective Turkish A

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members that made the general direction of the Baath Party prior to 2011 half of them spoke Russian fluently.”

Even today, many prominent figures in the Air and Air Defense Forces have a background and training in the USSR in key places as Simferopol () and Frunze Military Academies (Bishkek). In this respect, it can be said that the Syrian and Russian relations have a long history but also that deep institutional relations were also formed and developed in almost all aspects of life and governance between the two countries over the last 75 years.29

Moreover, on 23 August 2017 the two countries extended the “Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation” that was initially signed in 1980 for another 49+25 years which will allow Russia under international law to maintain its presence in Syria until 2091.

The particulars of the treaty concerning Russia’s presence, influence, power and future projections are striking and can be briefly outlined as follows:

 Russia is allowed to bring in and out any kind of weaponry, ammunition, devices and materials to provide security for the facility staff, crew and their families throughout the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic without any duties or levies,

 Russia can renovate the base (Tartus) at will, including underwater construction, and build offshore platforms,

 Syria agrees not to make any objections related to the

military activities of the base, (Tartus) which will also be beyond Damascus jurisdiction,

29 “Moscow has considered the Assads in Syria its closest ally in the Arab world for more than forty years. During the Cold War, many Russians moved to Syria and, in turn, many Syrians from elite classes studied at top Russian institutions including the Moscow State University and the People’s Friendship University. Intermarriages also took place in both countries. At the time when the Syrian uprising began in March 2011, an estimated 100.000 Russian citizens lived in the country. From 2007 to 2010, Russian arm sales to Syria amounted to USD 4.7bn, doubling from the previous quarter (Anna Borschchevskaya, The Washington Institute for Near East

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 Russia can deploy temporary mobile outposts beyond the base, as long as they coordinate them with the Syrians.30

In addition to the extension, Russian President Putin also signed a new law ratifying the deal with the Syrian Government allowing Russia to keep its air base in Syria for another 50 years. The deal, which was signed in Damascus in January 2017, sets out the terms under Russia can use its Hmeymim air base in Latakia Province which it has used to carry out air strikes against forces opposing President Bashar al- Assad. The Hmeymim air base has been at the heart of Moscow’s military foray since it intervened in the conflict in the September 2015, helping turn the tide in favor of Assad.31

In the context of Russia’s expansionist plans toward becoming a global power, and the steps it has taken in that direction under Putin’s leadership on a pan-Slavic impulse in the Black Sea in Crimea (Sevastopol), in the Mediterranean in Syria (Latakia-Tartus- Hmeymim) and more recently in Libya (Sirte and Al Jufra), it would not be wrong to suggest that Syria’s importance will continue to increase for Kremlin’s policies toward the Mediterranean-the Middle East and North Africa.

30 How Russia is Turning Syria into a Major Naval Base for Nuclear Warships (and Israel is Worried) The National Interest Blog, 8.24.2017

31 1 July 2017; of India A Turkish Perspective on Future Syria's Perspective Turkish A

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Russia-Turkey Dispute over the PYD/YPG

Though both are guarantor states to the Astana process together with Iran and signatories to the agreements signed in Astana and Sochi, Turkey and Russia have significant disagreements over several key issues both on the field and regarding the future of Syria.

A key disagreement between Turkey and Russia (but also Iran) is Ankara’s insistence on the removal of Assad from power while Tahran and Kremlin have remained key allies of the regime. Despite the fact that the incumbent regime in Syria is recognized by the UN, Turkey has refrained from any contact with the Syrian government (bar the low-level dialogue among intelligence operatives), justifying its presence in the country with reference to the Astana agreements and Article 51 of the UN Charter relating to self-defense instead.

Russia and Iran can both claim stronger reasons for their involvement in the Syrian conflict when compared with Turkey. Russia’s involvement is based on its bilateral agreements with the country while Iran says its presence is legitimate because it came at the request of the Syrian government and contributed to Syria's efforts in the fight against terrorism.

Although both Astana and Sochi agreements to which Turkey is a signatory refers to the “Syrian Arab Republic”. Turkey also refrains from using the official name of the state when referring to Syria, describing it as the “regime” instead.

A reflection of the Turkish non-recognition of the Assad government as the legitimate authority in Syria, this approach also points to another disagreement with Russia and Iran, though one that all parties avoid voicing, that is regarding the status of the PYD/YPG.

For reasons explained earlier, Russia does not consider the PYD a terrorist organization. In fact, Kremlin diverges significantly from

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contact with the organization, offering training, but also shelter in Tell Rifaat and Manbij following the retreat of US forces from these areas.

Indeed, in a statement given to the Rudaw TV in Erbil (northern Iraq) on behalf of the SDF, Mazloum Abdi announced that he met with the Head of Russian Forces in Syria, General Alexander Chaiko and that the Russians agreed to increase their support:

We received today the of Commander of the Russian forces in Syria, Major General Alexander Chaiko to discuss common issues among them the violations of Turkey of the 23rd October agreement, in particular the assassination of three Kurdish female activists in Kobani, it has been agreed to raise the level of coordination and joint work. And we have directed thanks to his responsiveness in working to confront the challenges.” SDF spokesperson Kino Gabriel who spoke at the same slot with Abdi also claimed that they were working together with Russia and the US “to deter Turkish attacks on Rojava,

that Turkish actions infringed the agreements made with US and Russia and that they were in dialogue with the regime in Damascus.

In a statement released in August 2019, ’s Special Envoy for Syria, Alexander Lavrentyev further claimed that the SDF had pursued a policy aimed at preserving Syria’s territorial integrity and that it was supportive of the talks between Damascus and the Kurds, confirming that Russia’s stance toward the Kurdish rights was

different than other countries’.32 Lavrentyev’s reference to “other states” can be seen as an indirect diplomatic message to Ankara. Indeed, taken together with the statement of the Kurdish National Council’s (ENKS) Head of Foreign Relations Bureau Kamiran Haco that they had met with the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov in Moscow to discuss the work of the Syrian Constitutional Committee and “developments in the northeastern areas of the country”, it can be seen that the traditional Russian foreign policy of “talking to all sides “as in Libya is in place regarding the .33

32 Orsam, Center for Middle Eastern Studies, July 29-August 04. 2019

33 Orsam, Center for Middle Eastern Studies, July 29-August 04. 2019 A Turkish Perspective on Future Syria's Perspective Turkish A

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Another statement which confirms direct dialogue between the Russian forces and the PYD was released by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights on 20 March 2017. In their statement, the Organization also confirmed suspicions regarding Russian support for the YPG, remarking that:

The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights obtained information from several reliable sources in Afrin area which is located in the Northwestern countryside of Aleppo; that tens of Russian soldiers have entered the area with vehicles and machines and positioned in the countryside of the city, and in the details documented by the Syrian Observatory; about 100 members of the Russian special forces have entered with vehicles and armored vehicles to Afrin province, within the agreement between Russian forces and Kurdish forces (YPG) [...] they prepare for establishing a Russian military base, which in turn will do two main tasks, the first task is to prevent the contact between the Kurdish forces (should be read as YPG) and Turkish forces within the borders of Afrin and the Kurdish forces controlled areas, in addition to that that they will train the Kurdish forces.34

While Kremlin’s stance toward the Kurds in Syria is an understandable reflection of the traditional Russian policy in conflict settings to talk to all sides in order to minimize its loses and protect its exclusive interests regarding the winners, it nonetheless carries the potential in the Syrian context to cause a significant rift with Turkey.

Russia’s support for Haftar forces in Libya while maintaining dialogue at the same time with the official Sarraj government or its alignment with Iran to support the Assad regime while rejecting

Tehran’s efforts to target Israel using Iranian presence in Syria are also extensions of the same Russian policy.

Another disagreement between Turkey and Russia over Syria relates to the status of different opposition groups. Apart from the HTS, al- Nusra or the al-Qaida (recognized as terrorist groups by the UNSC), Russia also considers the Syrian National Army (or the past ) backed by Turkey as a terrorist organization.

34 “The Russian Military Base in Afrin aims to train Kurdish Forces and prevent

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The eventual eradication of radical and jihadist groups in Idlib in line with the Astana and Sochi agreements, the issue of the Turkish- backed SNA (that has been put on the deep-freeze) will inevitably dominate the agendas and it is not difficult to suggest that it will represent another significant disagreement between the parties.

In this regard, Russia (together with Syria) will have an important say on the involvement and status of the Turkish-backed “moderate opposition” in the post-war reconstruction of Syria, following the introduction of a new constitution and the holding of fresh elections once the fighting is over.

It is likely that Russia will use the involvement of the groups under the SNA in the post-conflict reconstruction process as a bargaining chip and allow such involvement together with the setting up of a buffer-zone under Syrian and Russian control, in return for Turkish withdrawal from the territories which it controls.

Moreover, the current modus operandi between Turkey and Russia, which allows other disagreements over Libya, Crimea, Ukraine and in the Black Sea to deepen and exacerbate the existing rifts in Syria, and both sides’ insistence to tackle these issues independently of one another raises important concerns for the future viability of the relationship.

More specifically, the compartmentalization approach, i.e. Isolation of agreement from areas of disagreement which has so far allowed a

wide range of issues to be kept separate from cooperation in Syria, including Turkish rapprochement with the US in Libya toward a settlement, the alignment of Turkish and US interests regarding the dissolution/reconstruction of the HTS, Turkish “U-turn” regarding the deployment of the S-400 missile system following US Congress pressure through the sanctions act (CAATSA), Turkish efforts to strengthen military cooperation with the Ukraine but also its denial, in the same vein, to deny recognizing the annexation of Crime, and other disagreements does not appear sustainable any longer.

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A close inspection of the recent developments taking place in PYD- controlled northeast and southeast of Syria reveals that plans to set up an Iraqi-style autonomous Kurdish region have gathered pace. In this regard, the meeting between the-then Director of the CIA, Michael Pompeo, the Director of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Sergey Naryshkin and the Director of the Russian of the Russian Federation (FSB) Alexander Bartnikov in Washington (the two officials are barred from entering the US in the context of US sanctions on Russia) to discuss the issue of Syrian Kurds (PYD and the KUK) and the subsequent meeting on 25 February 2018 in which Vladimir Putin’s adviser on the Middle East, Vitaly Naumkin35 got together with Pompeo at a special event organized by the Georgetown University to discuss the future of Syria all point to a rather special dialogue between the US and Russia on Syria.

Considering also that Russia and the US have similar views regarding limiting the depth of the buffer zone set up by Turkey in the north of Syria, their opposition to the extension of the Turkish-controlled military zone through the merging of the pockets (acquired following Turkish incursions) to cover the whole Turkish-Syrian border, their unfaltering support for the PYD despite strong Turkish objections — directly in the case of the US and implicitly by the Kremlin by protecting the YPG in Tell Rifaat and Manbij, offering training and holding high-level talks — the reality in Syria does not appear to correlate with what is being observed on the ground.

When considered together, the widespread international rejection (by the US and Russia above all) to classify the PYD as terrorist, growing

Western sympathy toward the latter in the context of the fight against the ISIS, the brokering of the talks between the PYD and the ENKS by France and the US, the financial strengthening of the PYD through oil deals and enabling the latter to play an important role in the wider Syrian economy, efforts to cut off its organic ties to the PKK, the group’s increased dialogue with the Syrian regime (but also the Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem’s remarks that the “federal option” could be discussed) the emerging prospects of a limited and cultural

35 Prof Dr Vitaly Naumkin is the President of RAS Institute for Oriental Studies, President of Moscow International Centre for Strategic and Political Studies and a

distinguished member of the Russian Academy. A Turkish Perspective on Future Syria's Perspective Turkish A

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autonomy for the Syrian Kurds under the SDF banner, backed by Russia and the US can hardly be surprising.

In this respect, the visit of the PYD/YPG-led SDC (Syrian Democratic Council) delegation to Russia in August 2020 to conduct high-level talks and the signing of a joint memorandum with the pro-Russian Popular Front for Change and Liberation is a clear indication of Russian readiness to allow the PYD an active role in the future of Syria.

Indeed, the deal struck in Moscow between the SDC and the Popular Front now allows the PYD to take part in the Geneva talks (albeit indirectly) that it had long wished for.

Reacting to the move which constitutes the next phase of the efforts to merge the PYD with the ENKS the Turkish Foreign Ministry expressed Ankara’s concerns in a strongly worded statement released on 31 August 2020, as follows:

Combating terrorism in all forms and manifestations, and standing against separatist agendas aimed at undermining the territorial integrity of Syria as well as threatening the national security of neighboring countries constitute common commitments enshrined in the joint statements of the high- level Astana-format meetings held to date. As a matter of fact, the Astana guarantors reaffirmed, most recently at their meeting held in Geneva on 25 August 2020, their joint objection against separatist agendas of illegitimate entities. We expect the Russian Federation to act in conformity with

Astana spirit and the commitments undertaken at the Astana- format meetings, and to refrain from taking steps that would serve the agendas of the entities affiliated with the PKK/YPG terrorist organization.

While Ankara also referred to the Articles 3 and 4 of the Astana Agreement and demanded that Russia acts in the spirit of these commitments, the chances of Moscow backing down from its current course remain rather slim.

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Recent reports suggesting that the US has warned the PYD not to use PKK symbols and flags in areas adjacent to the Turkish border also suggest that Russia and the US share similar views regarding the PYD though with varying degrees.

In addition to these developments, Nechirvan Barzani’s slamming of the PKK as the head of the Kurdish region in Iraq during an official visit to meet Turkish President Erdoğan on 4 September and Masoud Barzani’s remarks that the PKK had become a serious headache for the whole of Kurdistan is an indication which supports the US position to legitimize the PYD by delinking it from the PKK

It should also be noted that the Turkish-Russian rapprochement that came hard on the heels of Washington’s uncompromising and often threatening stance regarding the PYD/YPG, the FETO (Fethullah Terrorist Organization) but also the S-400/Patriot with the F-35’s deliviries appears to have waned especially in the context of the ongoing conflicts in Syria and Libya.

The US, for its part, is also keen to deepen the Russia-Turkey rift over Syria in Idlib, which was recently evidenced in the remarks of the US Special Representative James Jeffrey at a press conference on 17 August. When Jeffrey was asked by a journalist from the DW Turkish Service his thoughts regarding President Trump’s expectation of Turkey having dialogue with the Syrian Democratic Forces and whether he discussed the issue with the Turkish side on finding common ground”, he responded that:

[…] There have been allegations on both sides of violations of it-attacks here, attacks there. But generally speaking, in the context of Syria, we’re happy with that. Turkey has a whole series of threats to its South. The PKK is one very important one, Daesh is another, Iranian, Syrian, and Russian forces together are a third. And we have very close communications with the Turks at every level on the situation in Syria in general, and we very strongly support, as you know, their position in Idlib and in the situation in the northeast, and we’ll continue these talks.

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Jeffrey’s response is rather ironic in that while acknowledging threats to Turkish security from the South in the form of the PKK, it wholly omits the fact that the PYD is in fact an offshoot of the latter. Perhaps more remarkable however is the explicit support for Turkish position in Idlib and the classification of Iran, Syria, and Russia as threats to Turkish security,

As underlined earlier, the apparent convergence of Turkish and American interests over the dissolution/reconstruction of the HTS is likely to attract a strong reaction from Russia, thus making it harder to reach a settlement in Idlib that would be satisfactory to Turkey.

In this sense, Jeffrey’s statement regarding Turkish position in Idlib but also its framing of Russia as a threat is likely to complicate the situation further.

That said, a caveat is needed here. Despite these disagreements, a complete breakdown of Turkey-Russia relations remains a distant possibility not least because of the interdependence that exists between the two countries especially in the field of energy. Russia’s strategic investments in Turkey in the nuclear energy sector as well as the intergovernmental gas pipeline agreements are important barriers to a major dislocation.

Nonetheless, recent disagreements over Syria (the 2015 downing of the Russian Sukhoi Su-24, assassination of the Russian Ambassador to Turkey, Balioun airstrikes which killed 33 Turkish soldiers, and so

on) that have so far been resolved (or postponed) with the eleventh hour interventions of Putin or Erdoğan will always carry the potential, however small, to flare up and create a multiplier effect in impacting the bilateral relationship.

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The United States

Under President Trump, the US has closed most of its bases in the country (except for Jalabiya and al-Tanf, etc.) though it still maintains air support to these through the airports it has built in the east of the Euphrates. Regarding its relations with Turkey too, Washington has been using delaying tactics, and yet to fulfil its promises to Ankara.

Statements of the them US Central Command Commander General Joseph Votel that "the President made this decision without consulting me, I felt like I was punched in the gut when I heard it" and the then White House Security Advisor, John Bolton, before his visit to Israel (January 7, 2018) that "[the US] will not withdraw from Syria without a promise to protect the Kurdish fighters (read YPG)", were clear indications of the subsequent US policy in Syria.

While President Trump bowed to Pentagon pressure to maintain US presence in Syria despite his previous position that he would be getting his country out of the “ridiculous endless war”, his following announcement in the form of a tweet confirmed his determination to protect the PYD/YPG: “As I have stated strongly before, and just to reiterate, if Turkey does anything that I, in my great and unmatched wisdom, consider to be off limits, I will totally destroy and obliterate the Economy of Turkey (I’ve done before!). They must, with Europe and others, watch over.”

While Turkish Presidential Spokesperson Ambassador Ibrahim Kalın responded to Trump’s tweet by reasserting that "Syrian Kurds are a fatal error in keeping with the PKK. We will protect Kurds and Syrians against all terrorist organizations. Terrorists cannot be your allies", Trump has maintained its stance on the issue. Adding insult to injury, Trump later told the Turkish President Erdogan in an extraordinarily inept letter that a “great deal” was possible if he negotiated with the head of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, Mazloum Abdi, whom Turkey issued an Interpol “red notice” and considers a “terrorist” for his ties to the Kurdish PKK militants in

Turkey. A Turkish Perspective on Future Syria's Perspective Turkish A

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US State Department spokesman Robert Palladino’s statement, moreover, following Mike Pompeo’s meeting with his Turkish counterpart Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu in Washington, that “Minister Pompeo expressed his support for the ongoing negotiations regarding northeast Syria. At the same time, he warned about the potential devastating consequences of the unilateral military action by Turkey” — at a time when the US support for the PYD/YPG despite clear Turkish objections had stoked up bilateral tensions — reaffirmed that the US would maintain its position.

The fact however that the US and Turkey are on the opposing lines of the battle in Syria should have been clear when the US failed to comply with the deal that was reached between the two counties in June 2018 regarding the gradual withdrawal of the PYD/YPG from Manbij. According to Turkish reports, in the first phase of the process, the TAF would begin patrolling the surrounding areas independently. The second phase would include the joint patrolling and the final phase would involve the withdrawal of YPG members from the city toward the east of the Euphrates.

The first phase was completed rather smoothly but when the process entered its second phase, the initial foot-dragging by the US could only be overcome after the targeting of YPG positions by the TAF with artillery fire.

As for the entry of TAF into Manbij, Colonel Sean Ryan, spokesman for Operation Inherent Resolve based in Iraq, remarked in a statement to Pentagon reporters via teleconference that; "I can tell you that

Turkish soldiers will not go into Manbij.” When asked whether the

PYD would withdraw from Manbij, Ryan suggested that “there’s never a hundred percent assurances for anything in war time.”

Indeed, this also holds true for another instance of deliberate US deceptiveness when the US practically handed over its base in Manbij to Russia even though it had promised Ankara that the latter would be given the control of the area.

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While the overall US foreign policy toward Syria is delineated in detail throughout this report, the abovementioned illustrations of the strained relationship between Washington and Ankara over Syria serve useful in better contextualizing and understanding the role these actors play in the Syrian conflict.

People’s Republic of China

It is understood that China is keen to take an active role in the post- war reconstruction of Syria and has based its policy around two key goals. The first goal, if successful in developing good relations with Damascus, is to stop the jihadist Uighur fighters who have been seeking refuge amongst the ranks of the Turkistan Islamic Party returning back to China and their eventual elimination — a goal that Russia also sympathizes with. China’s second goal is to develop a robust economic relationship with Syria during its post-war reconstruction. This is clearly indicated by the hosting of the “First Trade Fair on Syrian Reconstruction Projects” in Beijing and China’s pledge to invest USD 2 billion to establish industrial parks in the country.

Israel

The Syrian crisis presents an enigmatic state of affairs for the Israeli security. More specifically, the post-2011 period has posed a significant dilemma for the Israeli policy makers and security establishment by offering a set of serious opportunities to destabilize and ultimately overthrow the hostile Assad regime, whist at the same time carrying the risk of unleashing the anti-Israeli radical groups operating inside and outside Syria that were previously contained and to a large extent controlled under the Syrian regime.

Israeli foreign and security policies towards Syria within the context

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“manageable dividedness” in the country from the very early stages of the crisis. In the absence of a trusted and durable partner in Syria, senior policymakers in Syria assumed that it was such dividedness that would best serve the Israeli interests and security priorities. However, with the current developments that have taken place in the region from mid-2016 onwards, the management of the dividedness in Syria has become more complicated and difficult for the Israeli decision- makers.

The aforementioned changes in the region can be characterized as follows:

- Assad regime regaining strength with the support of Russia and Iran

- Continuing struggle among the state and the non-state actors aimed at expanding domestic spheres of influence

- Enduring proxy wars among the regional and international actors aimed at expanding regional spheres of influence

- Spillover of the clashes in Syria into Israel and increased response from Israel to these clashes

- Significant advancement of the pro-Assad forces with the support of Russia and Iran, leading to the emergence of a new status quo

In order to elaborate further on the abovementioned changes in line with the changing and enduring security priorities of Israel, it is

important to reflect on the changes and continuities in the main tenets of the Israeli foreign and security policies. The various changes and continuities in the main concerns of Israeli foreign and security policy in Syria in the last years can be summarized as follows:

1. Manipulating the dividedness in line with Israeli security interests to the largest extent possible

2. Containing the ‘axis of evil’ composed of the Assad regime, Iran, and Hezbollah

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3. Increased pressure over the Palestinians and the consolidation of military control over Gaza Strip and other Palestinian territories through exploiting the existing situation in Syria

4. Consolidating ties with the United States in the defense industry

5. Pursuing a limited war against Iran (aimed at preventing Iran’s military fortifications through preemptive strikes and limited warfare)

6. Building new alliances in the region to counterbalance Iran and the Assad regime

Israeli foreign policy towards the Assad regime in the future of Syria

As the Assad regime regained strength with the support of Iran and Russia, some segments of the Israeli military establishment have reiterated Israel’s need to take a position before it would be too late. These segments of the security establishment including Amos Yadlin, the former IDF Military Intelligence Directorate, have asserted that taking a stance against the Assad regime is both a moral imperative and a strategic necessity. According to Yadlin, an assertive, moral, proactive and creative policy against the radical axis (Iran-Assad Regime and Hezbollah), revolving around the ousting of the pro- Iranian Assad regime, is the path Israel must follow.36 In fact, the Assad regime became once again an ardent enemy of Israel following a period when the former was perceived as a balancing stone of the manageable divisiveness in Syria. Israel policy makers and security officials are concerned with the possibility of Assad’s return to the balance of power game in the country as one of the key players. They would rather prefer it remains as a weak and passive observer. Some security officials have thus openly urged that certain measures should immediately be taken to contain Assad’s regime and weaken the radical axis. These measures should include both moral and strategic parameters.

36Amos Yadlin, “Israel's Need to Take a Stand against the Assad Regime: A Moral Imperative and Strategic Necessity”, INSS Insight No. 823, May 22, 2016, http://www.inss.org.il/publication/israels-need-to-take-a-stand-against-the-assad-

regime-a-moral-imperative-and-strategic-necessity/ A Turkish Perspective on Future Syria's Perspective Turkish A

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On the moral side, suggestions regarding the measures to be taken by Israel include:

 Launching a clear political, legal, and diplomatic process against the crimes committed by the Assad regime with reference to its role in the mass murders and the use of chemical weapons;

 Establishing a ‘moral axis’ against the ‘radical devil axis’ by re-approaching the moderate Sunni-Muslim countries such as Turkey and the Arab-Muslim countries —such members of the Gulf Cooperation Council like Jordan and Egypt in particular — under the auspices of the United States;

 Strengthening moderate opposition groups and increasing their ability to fight against the Assad regime, while ensuring their integration into the ‘moral axis’;

 Conveying the ethical message to Syrian regime through limited use of military force, strikes and targeted attacks when the clearly stated red lines of the ‘moral axis’ are violated by the forces of the ‘radical axis’;

 Consolidating Israel’s moral position against the Assad regime by supplying humanitarian aid to the war-torn Syrian opposition forces in order to sustain their fight against the Assad’s regime;

 Using all diplomatic channels in order to mobilize the

international society against the Assad regime;

 Seeking international and regional backing to stabilize the situation in the southern part of Syria across the border. Encouraging regional and international actors to take part in the stabilization efforts in the South will serve into hands of Israel in two ways. Firstly, it will help with the promotion of the Israeli public image as a humanitarian aid provider (to refugees, besieged populations, and the wounded) among the regional and local actors. Secondly, it will create a common

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reconcile. In fact, this would also have strategic consequences for Israeli security as evaluated further below.

From a strategic perspective, suggestions regarding the measures to be taken by Israel include:

 Using limited military force and waging a low intensity war of attrition against the Syrian army without entering a comprehensive air campaign and/or clashing with the Russian military forces;

 Supplying opposition groups fighting the Assad regime with intelligence, weapons and other assistance;

 Stabilizing the situation in the South across the border in order to stop Iran and the Assad regime acquiring the direct control of these territories. Repopulating the border and the Syrian hinterland with populations affiliated with the opposition groups would also help creating a natural strategic depth for Israeli defense.

 Increasing efforts towards convincing Russia to replace the existing Assad regime with a new regime in the long run that would lean more towards Russia and less towards Iran.

 Supporting all measures to be taken against Iran and its proxies by any local, national, regional, and international actor at any level in order to contain and counterbalance Iranian activities toward increasing its sphere of influence at the expense of

Israeli security.

 Seeking regional, and if needed, clandestine alliances with regional powers in the Sunni Muslim world (most importantly Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Turkey, Jordan and Egypt) in order to counter-balance the common enemies in the radical devil axis (Iran, Hezbollah and the Assad regime)

The main dilemma which would face Israel while trying to implement such a multilayered and multifaceted strategy would be to convince

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security priorities. Indeed, the conditions on the ground have changed significantly in the past five years. As the Assad regime regained its ability to control certain segments of the country, the picture has become more difficult and complicated for the Israeli security establishment and policy makers. Until very recently, the manageable divisiveness of the country seemed to serve into the hands of Israel where the domestic actors were mainly concerned with the power struggle in Syria. Thus, Israel did not directly confront Assad’s regime because the regime was perceived as one of the useful actors, which served to sustain this functional divisiveness. As the Assad regime regained power with the support of Iran and Russia however, the dividedness has become less manageable for Israel in the last years.

Yet, it was not only the Assad regime’s ability to gain back its power and control over the significant portions of Syria which made the divisiveness less manageable. At the initial stages of Syrian crisis, Israel preferred the survival of a weak Assad regime until a more workable alternative was available for securing the Israeli security interests. However, in time Assad regime has become an unmanageable component of the matrix of power in the country due to its increasing functionality for the anti-Israeli axis. In this respect, the real concern of the Israeli security establishment is not so much the offensive and defensive capabilities of Syrian regime but its functional role within the Iranian led axis against Israel. This is also reflected in the statements of National Infrastructure, Energy and Water Minister Yuval Steinitz following the 12-member security cabinet meeting about possible steps following an Iranian drone intrusion, downing an Israeli F-16 warplane in February 2018. Underlining the similarities between Syria and Lebanon as well as the Hezbollah and the Syrian army from the Israeli perspective, Steinitz said

Today there is no difference between Syria and Lebanon, and the Syrian army and Hezbollah are two arms doing Iran’s bidding. Assad and Hezbollah are the same, and if there will be an attack against us, we will not be obligated to act only against the source of the attack, we will reserve the right to choose the right front […] the Assad regime is the weak link in the Iranian-Shi’a axis, and I think Assad should think very well whether he wants to turn Syria into a forward base for

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because he himself, his regime, his government and his army can be hurt in that situation.37

As reflected in the statements of Steinitz, Israel perceives the Syrian regime as a sub-contractor of Iran. Steinitz also stated that Israel would act against Assad if Iran crosses the red lines that Israel has established. Listing the red lines of Israel as “turning Syria into a ‘forward’ military base for the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps, including intelligence, naval and air-force bases” and “enabling Iran to upgrade Hezbollah’s missile capabilities by turning those missiles into precision weapons that would constitute a much greater threat to Israel than they currently are”38 Steinitz warned Syrian regime not to cross these lines by embedding itself to the Iranian security objectives.

Israeli relations with the Kurdish forces in Syria

While Israel has successfully established a collaborative framework with the Kurds in northern Iraq, the Syrian Kurds have usually stayed outside of this framework. In Syria too, the conflict has generated common Israeli and Kurdish interests around the struggle against the jihadist forces, the desire to re-establish stability and Kurdish autonomy in Syria, and hope for the country’s reconstruction in line with Israeli and Kurdish security priorities. Nevertheless, Israel’s physical distance from the Kurds, cautious attitude of the Kurds towards Israel, and the swift changes in the balance of power considerations among the local, regional and international actors have all made it more complicated and challenging to develop a Kurdish-

Israeli cooperation and coordination in the context of the Syrian conflict39.

37 Post, “Steinitz: Assad in danger if he allows Iran to attack Israel from Syria”, February 13, 2018 http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Steinitz-Assad-in- danger-if-he-allows-Iran-to-attack-Israel-from-Syria-542453 38 Ibid. 39 Udi Dekel, Nir Boms, and Ofir Winter, “Syria’s New Map and New Actors: Challenges and Opportunities for Israel”, Memorandum No 156, August 2016, The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), Tel Aviv, Israel, http://www.inss.org.il/wp-

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Considering its taciturn relations with some of the key regional and international game-makers such as Russia, the Syrian regime, Iran and Turkey, Israel is in need of consolidating its goal-oriented alliances with the sub-national and local actors to contain the further expansion of its enemies’ spheres of influence. Within this context, Syrian Kurds are likely to cooperate with Israel in line with their expectation that Israel will help them gain security, autonomy, and closer ties with the United States. Such cooperation may, in turn, provide Israel with an ally against Iran, the Assad regime and the Islamist groups. Cooperating with the Kurds however, may also lead further alienation of Israel in the region. In fact, such cooperation may further deteriorate the relations with Turkey, Iraq and Iran which are strictly against the autonomy of the Syrian Kurds40.

The relationship between the Kurds and Israel will be based on pragmatic/strategic concerns of both sides rather than mutual trust. In fact, the failure of the Iraqi Kurds to establish their autonomous and independent state while relying on Israeli support has sent an important message to the Syrian Kurds not to be certain of the decisiveness of Israeli support while designing their own future in Syria and elsewhere. Both sides, however, have common security interests and concerns when it comes to containing Iran, the Assad regime and even Russia partly.

In economic terms, natural resources found in the Kurdish controlled areas such as oil can contribute to Israel’s mid-term energy supplies with the materialization of pipeline projects that would connect these areas with Israel via Jordan. In strategic terms, it is no secret that there are numerous American military bases in Syria’s northeastern Kurdish

controlled areas. These bases may also serve the Israeli security interests in the region in controlling both Iraq and the Iranian proxies in coordination with its strategical ally, the US. In military terms, Israel did not actively and openly support the Kurdish groups as its strategic ally US did. However, following the reports regarding the Syrian regime’s increased efforts to convince the Kurds by claiming the regime is open to negotiations on autonomy in the post-conflict

40 Lazar Berman, “Is a free Kurdistan, and a new Israeli ally, upon us?”, The Times of Israel, 10 August 2013, http://www.timesofisrael.com/is-a-free-kurdistan-and-a-

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Syria41, Israel may get involved more in providing the Syrian Kurds with additional military42 and intelligence assistance in coordination with the United States. In political terms, Israel for its security purposes, would prefer a politically divided Syria rather than a unified authoritarian Syria under Russia/Iran backed Assad regime. Therefore, the presence of autonomous Kurdish regions in a divided Syria across the ethno-religious lines would serve the security interests of Israel in the region better. Although the Israeli policy makers did not openly express their support for political autonomy for the Syrian Kurds (as they did in the case of Iraqi Kurds), an autonomous Kurdish authority — unless it aligns itself with the Russia-backed Assad regime — indeed seems to be one of the preferable entities that may serve Israeli future security interests in the region. All such prospects however, remain strictly dependent on the future of the balance of power architecture between the Kurds, Russia, United States, Turkey, the Sunni groups, Iran and its proxies, and other actors in the Syrian chaotic mélange.

Israeli concerns about Iran and its proxies

Israel and Iran have been engaged in a de facto war in Syria and a proxy war in Lebanon. In light of the recent developments, one may argue that the chief concern of Israel regarding Iran is to stop the existing Iranian presence close to the Israeli-Syrian border from developing into a second line of active confrontation in addition to the Hezbollah line in South Lebanon43.

Hezbollah has advanced its defensive and offensive capabilities

against Israel thanks to its involvement in Syria. Under the guidance of the Iranian Islamic Revolution Guards Corp (IRGC), its combat cadres acquired more experience in advancing their fire-and-maneuver tactics; and increasing their capabilities in utilizing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance data to design and implement more

41 Haaretz, “Assad Regime Open to Possibility of Autonomy for Syrian Kurds, Report Says”, 27 September, 2017, https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east- news/syria/assad-regime-open-to-autonomy-for-syrian-kurds-report-says-1.5453820 42 Rachel Avraham, “Israel should Arm the Kurds” Jerusalem Post, 27 November 2017, http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Israel-should-arm-the-Kurds-515340 43 , “Israel Is Going to War in Syria to Fight Iran”, Foreign Policy, 28 September 2017, http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/09/28/israel-is-going-to-war-in-

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complex offensive operations. Hezbollah has also instrumentalized its presence in Syria in order to consolidate its military and strategic position against Israel with the support of Iran and Russia. In fact, Hezbollah’s concentration on Syria did not necessarily led to the negligence of the Israel front. As the reports reveals

Many of its top fighters, especially the ATM teams and the rocket units, have stayed in Lebanon. Since early December 2016, plain-clothed Hezbollah units have been conducting a thorough, but low-key, survey of the Lebanon-Israel border, taking extensive measurements of adjacent terrain, including slope gradients, and photographing Israel's own new defenses on the other side of the fence […] The survey, which is part operational planning and part psychological needling of IDF troops watching from the other side of the fence, underlines that Hezbollah’s anti-Israel activities have not slowed despite its involvement in Syria.44

Aware of the increasing capabilities of Hezbollah, Israeli security establishment intensified its military measures against the possible threat of cross-border penetrations by strengthening its fortifications in the northern borders in late 2016.

Regarding direct confrontation with Iran, the main threat perceptions of the Israeli defense establishment derives mainly from a) Iranian forces deployed in Syria, b) Iranian appropriation of Syrian defense assets, c) Shi’ization of Syria through the transfer of population and Shiite indoctrination and d) Iran’s use of Syria to advance terrorist activities45. Among these concerns, newly set-up and/or appropriated military bases seem to be one of the most alarming for the Israeli military and political echelon. Although the Iranian official statements

claim otherwise, Israeli, and international media reports have asserted that there are numerous Iranian military bases in Syria46. These bases are believed to serve the consolidation of Iranian military entrenchment in Syria against Israel within the framework of a new

44 Nicholas Blanford, “Hizbullah’s Expanded Role in Syria Threatens Israel,” 2017, Jane’s Defense, IHS,Markit http://www.janes.com/images/assets/885/68885/Hizbullahs_expanded_role_in_Syria _threatens_Israel.pdf 45 website, “IDF Perspective: Iran in Syria”, https://www.idf.il/en/minisites/facts-and-figures/iran-in-syria/idf-perspective-iran- in-syrian/ 46 Time of Israel, “Iran has 10 military bases in Syria, two near Israel border — analyst”, 19 February 2018, https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-has-10-military-

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military strategy designed and implemented by Major General Qasem Soleimani in time he was the commander of the Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. It is believed by the Israeli security officials and policy makers that Iranian Revolutionary Guards have been cultivating an extensive and smart anti-Israeli defense network in Syria and trying to keep its details secret from Russia’s and the Assad regime47. According to Israeli Defense Forces, direct involvement of the Iranian forces entails two separate contingents that begun arriving in Syria from the early 2016 onwards48. The first one consists of exclusively Iranian forces, based on the ground forces of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps. The second is a minor cluster of divisions from the regular Iranian army, Artesh. Within the aforementioned framework, the military bases serve both as a logistical site, used in order to supply logistical support to Iranian proxies and as fundamental constituents of an integrated/combined logistical support system among the Iranian forces settled in Iran.

The main apparatuses of the Iranian strategy seem to lean on using the military bases (such as Tiyas-T4 airbase) to coordinate anti-Israeli military/logistical activities (i.e. fortifying local entrenchment of the Iranian forces); proxies such as Hezbollah, to organize attacks and fight in line with the security priorities of Iran; intelligence and surveillance personnel to plan and implement intelligence gathering and coordination activities; high-rank army officials and military advisors to coordinate the strategy and to exert pressure on the Assad regime to allow Iran assuming control of strategic outposts close to Israel.

The growing military entrenchment of Iran which gained impetus

from 2015 in Syria, has increased the incidents involving Israeli direct military engagement with the Iranian forces. In fact, the Israeli armed forces did not hesitate to engage with the Iranian military positions in Syria manifested in the bombing of a big military facility at , near the town of Hama in September 2017; bombing of a base which was being built by Iran for the Shi'ite militias in Al-Kiswah, near Damascus in early December 2017; and the downing of an Iranian

47 Amos Harel, “Revenge by Iran Could Push Israel to Terminate Tehran's Presence in Syria”, Haaretz, 11 April 2018, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium- iran-israel-revenge-eliminate-tehran-s-presence-in-syria-1.5991846 48 IDF website, “Iranian Forces Deployed in Syria”, https://www.idf.il/en/minisites/facts-and-figures/iran-in-syria/iranian-forces-

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drone and bombing the drone’s command center as well as other Iranian targets in February 2018. One of the most recent Israeli attacks which hit the Tiyas airbase, known as T4, near the city of and resulted in reportedly killing of 14 people including members of Iranian Revolutionary Guards and military advisors has further shown Israel’s determination to engage with Iran directly when (and if) it is necessary.

As stated earlier above, Israel’s response to Iran and Hezbollah has taken the forms of direct and indirect strategic engagements. In terms of direct engagements, Israel has recently launched many strategically targeted military strikes against both Iran and Hezbollah in order to thwart their paramilitary infrastructural fortification in the region. These strikes included targeted political assassinations as well as air strikes against weapon convoys and infrastructure. Within this context of a policy of selective disruptions to the systematic transfer of weaponry against Hezbollah49, Israel put into effect more than one hundred air strikes targeting militants, weapon convoys, infrastructure and military installations of this group as well as of Iran in Syria50 .

Israeli-American Relations in the context of the Syrian Crisis

The United States will be the only strategic ally within the context of Syrian crisis with whom Israel will continue to coordinate its foreign policy strategies, regardless of the recent pre-assumptions and debates on the strategic drifts, negative trends, concerns and divergences on a number of key points including strategic priorities and values51. Notwithstanding such differences, military and defense ties remain

endurable and compartmentalized away from the disagreements at the political level. However, in certain areas (i.e. its relations with Russia) Israel will need to set a balanced relationship between its strategic alliance with the US and its pragmatic security needs and

49 Yaakov Lappin, The Low-Profile War Between Israel and Hezbollah, Mideast Security and Policy Studies No. 138 , BESA, Ramat Gan, 2017, p.15, https://besacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/MSPS138.pdf 50 Jerusalem Post, “After years of alleged Israeli strikes in Syria will luck run out”, 9 January 2018, http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/After-years-of-alleged- Israeli-strikes-in-Syria-will-luck-run-out-533270 51 Eran Etzion, “The Next Administration and Recalibrating U.S.-Israeli Ties”, MEI Policy Focus 2016-9, April 2016, https://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/publications/PF9_Etzion_USIsraelRecalibrat

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interests in Syria. In other words, towards Syria, Israel will not simply pursue a subordinate foreign policy to the US priorities and actions in the region. On the contrary, Israel’s strategy will be based on strengthening the strategic alliance with the United States, while managing its relations with international, regional and local actors in order to achieve its main objectives of containing Iran, controlling the radical groups and managing the chaotic mélange of security interests in Syria for securing Israeli boundaries.

Lacking a military presence in Syria, Israel’s strategic interests rely on its close military coordination with the United States in the region. Notwithstanding the increasing opposition against the American presence in the region from Turkey, Russia, Iran and the Assad regime, the US administration reiterated its intention to maintain its military bases in the region. In fact, military actions taken by the United States in the region against the Iranian and Russian backed Assad regime throughout February 2018, indicate that American intention to consolidate its presence in the Kurdish controlled areas is not merely limited with its foreign policy discourse related to the region but is also prevalent in the very practice of its security policies in Syria. In fact, following the confrontation with Turkey, Russia, Iran and Assad regime over its plans to form a 30.000 strong YPG-Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units and SDF Syrian Democratic Forces border guard, the United States did not hesitate to clash with the pro- regime, Iranian-trained militias and Russian mercenaries in Deir ez- Zor province in February 7, 201852.

Israel shares common security interests with the US on a) containing Iran; b) minimizing the Russian military and political sphere of

influence and Moscow’s protection of the Assad regime; c) promoting a weak Assad regime; d) maintaining control over the activities of the Sunni militant groups (and stopping them from becoming a threat) while instrumentalizing them in line with own security priorities; and e) consolidating Israel’s political and military control over . Although these commonalities play an important role in the coherence of the strategic partnership between these two countries, differences in prioritizing these interests create certain disappointments during the designing of a common strategy, as well as its coordination and implementation.

52 Paul Iddon “How long will the United States stay in Rojava?”, 18 February 2018,

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Israeli Relations with the Russian Federation in the context of the Syrian Crisis

Russia is not in a position to unambiguously take sides in the confrontation between Israel and Iran in Syria. It desires to maintain the balance in the country without harming its relations with either of them. Within the context of the Syrian civil/proxy wars, Russian priorities seem to be a) keeping the balance in Syria under Russian supervision b) maintaining its dominant position c) not allowing Iran and its proxies to challenge Russian superiority d) stopping unpredictable and (i.e. unmanageable) new players such as Israel to enter the already crowded Syrian theater of war53.

In line with the priorities listed above, Russia has not openly taken sides in the Israeli-Iran clashes notwithstanding its strategic partnership with Iran and the Assad regime. This is because Moscow does not want Iran to expand its sphere of influence in the country at the expense of Russian dominance. Therefore, it maintains its cautious silence and low-profile reactionary stance against the Israeli preemptive attacks to Iranian posts and proxies in Syria to limit Iranian expansion in Syria. However, Russia does not want substantial involvement of an US-backed Israel into the Syrian powder keg either. In effect, such a development, which may untangle Russia’s dominant role in Syria, is as undesirable as the overpowering expansion of Iranian sphere of influence in the country.

Israel has been dissatisfied with the Russian Federation’s stance and response to Israel especially regarding presence of Iran and its proxies

in Syria. Israel is also not happy with Russian full-fledged involvement in Syria. In fact, Russia’s involvement in Syria imposes various security dilemmas and complications for Israel. Israeli concerns over Russian involvement derive from a) Russian protectorate of Assad regime which is also supported by Israel’s primary regional rivals - namely Iran and its proxies or “Shiite axis of evil”- b) Ease of access of the Russian arms to Hezbollah and other proxies of Iran c) Operational limitations exerted by Russian presence in Syria to probable Israeli military operations in the country d)

53 Emil Avdaliani, “Russia and the Israeli-Syrian-Iranian Confrontation”, BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 742, February 15, 2018,

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Potential for direct conflict with Russia due to this country’s substantial military deployment in Syria54.

Therefore, Israel is in a position to develop a functioning mechanism of direct communication with Russia in order to figure the possible ways to coordinate joint efforts towards preventing the expansion of the Iranian sphere of influence in Syria. As the uncontrollable expansion of the Iranian sphere of influence through Iran-Iraq-Syria- Lebanon axis is not desired by either Israel or Russia, Israel will seek to convince Russia to tolerate Israel’s direct or indirect engagement against Iran and its proxies in the region. It would otherwise be very difficult for Israel to prevent the worst-case scenario (direct military confrontation with Russian forces) from happening. In this respect, Israel should keep all the channels of communication and de- escalation open in order to convince Russia that any measure that will be taken within the framework of Israel’s proactive defense strategy will not target Russia and its national security interests in the region.

Israel and the Saudi Arabia

Israeli-Saudi Arabian relations have recently grown from a “second track ties”55 into a strategic alliance under the supervision of the United States following the recent domestic and regional developments. Domestically, Saudi Arabia went through a regime restructuration with the succession of Muhammad bin Salman and the transfer of power from the old guard to the new King in the country56.

54 Larry Hanauer, “Israel’s Interests and Options in Syria”, Perspectives, Rand Corporation, 2016, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE185/RAND_PE 185.pdf 55 Aaron David Miller, “In Saudi Delegation’s Visit to Jerusalem, Signs of Broader Change,” Wall Street Journal, July 26, 2016. 56 Paul Aarts & Carolien Roelants, “The perils of the transfer of power in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia”, Contemporary Arab Affairs, Vol.9, No.4, 2016, pp.596- 606 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/17550912.2016.1238110?needAccess

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King Salman did not hesitate to express that “there are a lot of interests Saudi Arabia shares with Israel”57. In fact, there have been important bilateral steps taken towards deepening the ties between these two countries before and after King Salman came to power. These steps included opening of the Saudi airspace to Israeli flights, exchanging letters to coordinate a range of regional issues including Iran58 during Salman’s visit to in March 2018, Israel’s offer to provide support to Saudi Arabia during the Qatar crisis of 2017, Israel’s silent support for the US-Saudi arms deals, exchange of visits by `unofficial` representatives of the two countries to promote the intelligence sharing and cooperation in other fields.

Senior Israeli officials also acknowledged openly that Israel has worked actively to improve relations with Saudi Arabia. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu mentioned in his public remarks secret contacts with Arab states (though without mentioning any names) claiming that collaboration takes place `in various ways and different levels`. Israeli Energy Minister Yuval Steinitz, on the other hand, admitted having clandestine contacts with Saudi officials59. Israeli Transportation and Intelligence Minister Yisrael Katz also confirmed that Israel and the Saudis share a litany of interests by stating “Mutual economic, intelligence and security interests have formed, and I hope that this will be accompanied by political peace. It’s not contradictory, but rather a complementary process,”60. For his part, the Israeli military Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Gadi Eizenkot, told the Saudi- owned newspaper Elaph that Israel was ready to share “intelligence information” with Saudi Arabia, by adding their countries had a common interest in standing up to Iran61.

57 Haaretz, “Saudi Crown Prince: We Share Common Interests With Israel, but There Must Be Peace With Palestinians“, 3 April 2018, https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/saudi-prince-israelis-have-the-right-to- have-their-own-land-1.5974278 58 Middle East Monitor, “Report: Saudi Arabia, Israel exchanged letters on Iran, deal of the century”, 9 March 2018, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20180309- report-saudi-arabia-israel-exchanged-letters-on-iran-deal-of-the-century/ 59 Reuters, “Israeli minister calls on Saudi Arabia to lead regional peace efforts”, 19 November 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-saudi/israeli-minister- reveals-covert-contacts-with-saudi-arabia-idUSKBN1DJ0S1 60 Ynet News, “Israeli minister calls on Saudi Arabia to lead regional peace efforts”, 13 December 2017 https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-5056494,00.html 61 Jerusalem Post, “IDF Chief Of Staff: Israel Willing To Share Intelligence with Saudis”, 16 November 2017, http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/IDF-

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Israeli and Saudi Arabian interests seem to converge especially in preventing Iran from building a regional hegemony and expanding its spheres of influence in the Middle East. The United States also share common concerns with these two countries regarding the rising influence of Iran in the region. Therefore, it is possible to predict that Israeli-Saudi Arabian cooperation against Iran will further enhance in the near future under United States` coordination. The cooperation will be deepened in the fields of security consulting, armament, intelligence sharing, military training, sales of weapons as well as advanced systems and technologies, diplomatic cooperation in delegitimizing the expansionist activities of Iran and its proxies in the international and regional platforms,

Within this context, the two countries will continue to coordinate their contacts within the framework of a `tacit security regime` which — unlike liberal institutional variants that attempt to privilege the promotion of collective norms — remains configured around threat perceptions to be countered and strategic interests to be realized. Such a security regime between Israel and Saudi Arabia (and other Gulf countries) reflects a turning point for Israel in redefining the political and strategic demarcation of its relations not only with Saudi Arabia but also with the other countries in the region.62

The Instrumental Role of the Sunni Religious Groups for Israeli Security Interests in Syria

Israel sees the Sunni groups as instruments in counterbalancing the Assad regime. The Islamic state and the Sunni groups have not been

one of the prior strategic concerns of Israel from the very beginning of the civil war in Syria. In fact, as the Islamic state and the other Sunni radical groups will be contained by the continuous efforts of Russia, the US and other members of the international society regardless of Israeli involvement, Israel will not be in a position to spend its energy to take measures against them. For that reason, as long as they do not exert a direct threat to Israel’s security, al Nusra, other Sunni groups

62 Clive Jones & Yoel Guzansky, “Israel’s relations with the Gulf states: Toward the emergence of a tacit security regime?”, Contemporary Security Policy, 2017, Vol. 38, No. 3, 398-419, https://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080%2F13523260.20

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and even the ISIS in Syria is considered functional in obstructing Iran’s expedition for regional hegemony63.

In fact, Israel’s support to these groups dates back to the early stages of Syrian civil war in the form of support supplied by Israeli army that was not merely limited to humanitarian aid that was provided within the context of “Operation Good Neighborliness”64. Although Israel does not accept its support to these groups in its official statements, as Hadar puts it

Evidently, non-official Israeli support of rebel groups extent beyond a mere humanitarian assistance. Non-Israeli sources also point to an on-going supply of funds (used to pay for fighters’ salaries and ammunition) food, fuel, and medical provisions to Syrian rebels near the Israeli border and deeper on Syrian soil as early as 2013. The creation of a special army unit to oversee the aid operation was reported by . This suggests that unlike its’ official position, Israel is very much involved in the Syrian war.65

From the Israeli point of view, Sunni groups including Al-Nusra and Islamic State may be instrumentalized to serve strategic interests by:

- disallowing Assad regime to regain control of the country;

- counterbalancing Iran and its proxy Shiite groups in Syria and Iraq;

- keeping Hezbollah and other anti-Israeli groups busy with domestic power struggles;

- Stopping Russia from expanding its sphere of influence in Syria at the expense of Israel’s strategic priorities.

63 Efraim Inbar, “The Destruction of Islamic State is a Strategic Mistake”, BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 353, August 2, 2016, https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/destruction-islamic-state-strategic- mistake/ 64 Amos Harel, “Israel's Aiding of Neighboring Syrians Isnt Altruistic, but Still Commendable”, Haaretz, July 20, 2017, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/israel- s-aiding-of-syrians-isnt-altruistic-but-commendable-1.5431797 65 Maya Hadar, “The War in Syria: An Israeli Perspective”, IFK Monitor International October 2017, Vienna Defense Academy, https://www.truppendienst.com/fileadmin/user_upload/Einzelbeitraege/2016/Syrien/

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To serve these goals, Israel has developed and instrumentalized pragmatic, operational ties and cooperation with the local Sunni rebel groups. This assistance includes treating the wounded fighters and civilians, as well as providing humanitarian aid and financial support. According to certain reports, “there has also probably been assistance in the field of intelligence, though no evidence has yet emerged of direct provision of weapons or direct engagement of Israeli forces on the rebels’ behalf.”66

Israeli Turkish Relations

Israeli relations with Turkey have suffered from negative trends, tense diplomatic relations and minimized military ties since the Mavi Marmara flotilla crisis of 2010. The reconciliatory moves of the Israeli government concerning the compensations for the victims of the Mavi Marmara incident were initially interpreted as signs of a new rapprochement between the two countries. These efforts have been followed by certain diplomatic steps and high-level exchange of official visits towards re-institutionalizing the mutual confidence and strategic cooperation.

Notwithstanding the positive impact of the diplomatic moves, the ongoing energy talks and increasing trade volume between the countries on bilateral relations, political strains and clash of values have thwarted the development of a functional strategic cooperation which could have been designed and implemented in terms of pragmatic priorities concerning the regional issues. In fact, similar concerns, and common threat perceptions of the two countries regarding the Syrian conflict could have triggered a pragmatic rapprochement between Israel and Turkey. The relations became normalized in 2016 with the mutual implementation of the provisions of the normalization agreement and the return of the ambassadors. After a year of normalization, Turkish Israeli relations suffered again from mutual distrust in the political sphere. In 2017, the Turkish- Israeli relations were further strained following the US president Donald Trump’s designation of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.

66 Jonathan Spyer, “Israel Is Going to War in Syria to Fight Iran”, Foreign Policy, 28.09.2017, http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/09/28/israel-is-going-to-war-in-syria-to-

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Turkey`s critical stance over Israel’s policies with regard to the ongoing clashes between the Palestinians and the Israeli security forces in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and elsewhere exacerbated the strained relations. Turkish attempts to assume a leading role in opposing the US decision to designate Jerusalem as the capital of Israel was not welcomed by the Israeli policy makers and the security establishment there. Nevertheless, even with the repeated exchanges of critical and clashing rhetoric regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Turkey remains one of Israel’s trustworthy partners among the Muslim countries in economic terms if not politically.

From the very beginning of the Syrian crisis, both countries shared similar concerns such as 1) perceiving Assad regime as a threat and a destabilizing factor for Syria and the region, 2) being cautious about Iranian support to Assad regime 3) being alarmed about emergence and rise of a Shiite axis (Hezbollah, Iran and Assad regime) beginning from Iran and reaching to Mediterranean in their neighborhood 4) having military ties with US and US-led coalitions notwithstanding the recent strategic rifts and 5) perceiving the Sunni opposition groups in Syria as instrumental elements against the Assad regime

The two countries have also had different stances on various issues from the very early stages of the crisis including: 1. The relations with the Syrian Kurds and their status in the future of Syria 2. Methods in dealing with Iran and its proxies such as the Hezbollah and (i.e. diplomacy versus the use of force) 3. Coordination and wider relations with the United States 4. Relations with Russia 5. The nature and the content of relations with the Sunni Muslim groups. Apart from these basic differences in their positioning toward various actors

of the Syrian crisis, a crucial challenge that further deepened the divergences between Israel and Turkey has been lack of mutual trust.

Against this backdrop, the future of Turkish-Israeli relations is likely to be determined by various convergences and differences regarding individual threat perceptions and security priorities. In fact, since shared interests do not necessarily designate harmonious or even a similar understanding of the strategic environment, Israel and Turkey will be faced with the challenge of working out how to harmonize their security policies in order to achieve shared interests. This will

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the political rhetoric while designing and implementing policies in order to achieve common objectives in Syria.

A cooperation against the YPG and PYD: It does not seem likely unless Israel or Turkey change their position significantly. The PYD and the YPG are seen as the conjuncture-bound allies of Israel with a potential to become a long-term ally in the future depending on their positioning against the Assad regime as well as their service to the foreign policy objectives of Israel. Therefore, unless Turkey would devise an offer attractive enough to entice the Israeli policymakers which is unlikely, the best scenario for the Turkish side is to convince Israel not to support these groups in their attacks toward Turkey or the Turkish forces by providing on spot information, etc.

From Israel’s point of view, pragmatic elasticity will remain to be a determining feature of its foreign and security policy in its relations with Turkey. Without insisting on the value-based long-term partnerships, Israel will try to coopt Turkey as well as others within the framework of a goal-oriented and short-term pragmatic alliance in order to achieve its foreign policy and security objectives. In this respect, it is quite likely that Israel will continue to seek goal-oriented, strategic alliances with the regional actors such as Turkey, in order to contain various threats and manage the crisis in Syria and to secure support for its pro-active defense strategy. However, it will not be willing to transform such functional, pragmatic, and short-term alliances into long-term strategic partnership unless the relationship between the two countries evolves into a relationship of mutual trust.

Conclusion

Therefore, Israel is likely to maintain its current cautious stance of “proactive self-defense.”67, in which she can interchangeably use coercive diplomacy and pre-emptive strikes. In case of the failure of the diplomatic activities with local, regional and international actors, senior Israeli policy makers and the military establishment in Israel

67 Larry Hanauer, “Israel's Interests and Options in Syria”, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE185/RAND_PE

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appears ready to opt for the selective, preemptive and/or proactive limited military operations to deter any aggression. To serve this goal, Israel is likely to instrumentalize the low-intensity controlled warfare and preemptive strikes as means of deterrence against Iran, the Assad regime and any other state or non-state actor that would challenge its national and regional security68.

Israel stands out as the country that benefitted the most from the civil war in Syria, entering its 9th year. Following Tel Aviv’s successful back-door diplomacy — under the watchful eyes of President Trump and Gerald Kushner — with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Jordan now bearing fruit in terms of the recent decision of Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates to officially recognize Israel, Iran and Syria have been largely alienated in their tough stance against Tel Aviv, with further ramifications for the current balance of power in the Middle East.

To begin with, the developing of a fully-fledged relationship between Israel and the UAE is set to further complicate Iran's military use of the Syrian geography against Israel (also objected by Russia), together with a range of implications for the future of Syria-Iran relations.

In view of the Gulf states’ financial muscle and the extent of the investment Syrian post-war reconstruction will require, Damascus may also be forced to reconsider its choices in the region when the war is finally over.

From the onset of the war, Israel followed a rather cautious policy regarding the Syrian conflict and chose to engage in indirect and covert activities instead of direct engagement, but by responding promptly and harshly to the threats and attacks posed by Iran-led Hezbollah and the Syrian army, it nonetheless showed that it was determined to protect its national security.

In this regard, it can be said that the ever-consuming civil war which has weakened the Syrian army has provided a significant respite for

68 Zeev Maoz, Evaluating Israel's Strategy of Low-Intensity Warfare, 1949–2006,

Security Studies, (2007), Vol16, No.3, pp. 319-349. A Turkish Perspective on Future Syria's Perspective Turkish A

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Israel, which has traditionally viewed Syria as one of its most-bitter enemies in the region in view of the latter’s tough stance against Tel Aviv. It is understood that Israel thus prefers the current state of affairs in the conflict and would rather have a militarily and economically weakened Damascus than a chaos or indeed a takeover by the rebel forces.

This also explains why Israel is content with its limited containment policy — involving air strikes and missile attacks, and only to reinforce its red lines — instead of an all-out conflagration aimed at destroying the defense capabilities of Syria,

Moreover, Israel’s favorable view of the fact that a large area in the east of the Euphrates is now controlled by the PYD/YPG and its eager reception of the progress the latter has made toward securing autonomy, constitutes another added value for Tel Aviv's future plans.

Reports circulating on open sources that other Gulf countries are preparing to follow on the UAE and Bahrain’s footsteps to recognize Israel also suggest that the latter may soon strengthen its political hand further by acquiring a strong card which can be used to re-admit Syria to the Arab Union.

Recent developments that may result in Syria and Iran gradually reducing their influence in Lebanon, and the growing sphere of influence Tel Aviv started to form against Iran's “Shia axis”, also carry the potential to have negative repercussions for Syria.

While its covert relationship with some rebel groups in Syria allows Tel Aviv comfortable room of maneuver in the field, the latter also enjoys the comfort of having the power to deter any would-be threats.

With ability to shape the course of events without directly intervening in the civil war to not jeopardize its security and national interests,

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Syria. Given the circumstances, the status quo appears to be the most preferred option for Isreal.

The Chain of Errors

The US and Turkey, together with the rest of the Western countries shared the common prediction and indeed expectation that the uprisings which began in Daraa, Latakia and Baniyas and later spread to the rest of the country, would result in the overthrowing of the Assad regime in a short period of not months but weeks.

For example, the former Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu in a speech he delivered in 2012 claimed that Assad would not “see the end of the year” and that his regime would end “not within months but within weeks”. Later on, in 2018, Davutoglu would express the same views that he was looking forward to seeing his “brothers” in Damascus very soon and that “the end is near”. Yet, in the 8 years that Davutoglu first claimed victory against Assad, the regime in Syria consolidated its power and Assad retained its seat at the helm.

In any case, the nine years that passed since a domestic conflict that was first transformed into a regional than a global one through the involvement and at times, active engagement of multiple actors with an ever growing uncertainty both in terms of its costs and outcomes suggests a serious chain of errors and inaccurate assessments regarding various dynamics of this increasingly intractable conflict.

The first error in the long chain of errors is indeed the fact that the extent of neither Russia’s nor Iran’s direct engagement in the Syrian crisis was predicted; or that despite reaching such predictions, the expected alignment of these actors’ engagement with other interests meant that it was deemed insignificant.

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a) The Second Error

The second error is the mistaken expectation that Syria would be a repeat of Iraq in the sense that the key features of the Syrian army and its intelligence community, including their position, capabilities, networks, ideology, place within the existing system, loyalty toward the regime, were not adequately assessed in earlier calculations.

b) The Third Error

The third error is related to the fact that the role and impact of the demographic dynamics, the socio-economic balance as well as the socio-political and socio-cultural features of Syria were not sufficiently accounted for.

The ineffectiveness and the relative neutrality of the armed forces in Tunisia and in Egypt during the uprisings, and the absence of a disciplined military in Libya (which relies heavily on militias) all led to the false expectation that under the same scenario the Syrian army would quickly split or change sides.

Indeed, the general assumption was that the Syrian army, lacking the necessary deterrent against Israel, lacking a strong command and control structure, lacking strong capabilities in operational terms (numerically strong but limited in fire power to tanks, and armored combat vehicles and warplanes), with questionable morals and

motivation, would fail to suppress a countrywide uprising and quickly switch loyalties.

An important source of this assumption was that soldiers from Sunni background (representing the majority as a reflection of the country’s demography) would refrain from fighting against the opposition Sunnis and switch sides. While this came to be true to some extent at the beginning, the defects were not significant as expected, neither in terms of numbers nor in terms of the rankings of the defectors. In fact, the number of defectors and the absentees has been limited to only ten

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Moreover, while the number of defector and absentee soldiers and officers, those joining the opposition in particular, was a cause of concern as well as a source of disappointment for the regime, the impact of these defections both on the operational power of the army and on the control and command systems has been minimal.

A key factor which resulted in this outcome was the low number officers from Sunni background, the limited deployment of those who were of Sunni origin to critical locations and the limited advancement of Sunni soldiers to higher ranks with the Syrian army — an approach inspired in its entirety by the Soviet (Red) Army. In the USSR too, officers from non-Slavic backgrounds — if not members of the Communist Party — would only be promoted to the rank of a captain. They would be required to further prove their loyalty to the regime in order to be promoted to the rank of a political officer or zampolit.69

Indeed, the key forces which were deployed by the regime against the armed opposition groups were the , the 4th Armored division and the 5th Corps which were made up of Nusayris and other minorities in their entirety. 14th Airborne Division, 15th Special Forces division and the majority of the officers of the 1st and 3rd Armored Division were also of Nusayri and other minority backgrounds.70

Another key reason which explains the low levels of defection and why the Syrian army did not disintegrate is the privileged position of the armed forces in Syria, their education and ideology. It is obvious that the calculations and analyses before and during the uprising did

not adequately take into account the fact that the Syrian army which followed from the 1970s onwards the Russian military doctrine (significant numbers of officers and staff officers were trained in the USSR and later the Russian Federation in addition to thousands of Russian military advisors and defense specialists deployed in Syria) would not only guard the country but the regime itself.

69 The deployment of Azeri officers on intelligence missions to Turkey during the Soviet Union era is a good example of this rite of passage. 70 Joseph Holiday, “The Assad Regime: From Counterinsurgency to Civil War,

Powerpoint presentation”, July 2013, Institute for the Study of War, slide 2. A Turkish Perspective on Future Syria's Perspective Turkish A

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Syrian Army and the Soviet Counterinsurgency Doctrine

The failure on the part of the analysts to predict that Syrian army would follow the same strategies to neutralize dissent prescribed by the Russian military doctrine — based on the principle that threats against the regime are to be considered a threat to the nation — represents the final error in the chain of errors regarding responses to the Syrian conflict.

Indeed, when the tactics used by the Syrian officers and generals — trained under the Russian Military Doctrine which assumes excessive force as a given to suppress an uprising with very little regard for destruction or loss of civilian life — are considered, their similarity to the tactics used by the Russians in Grozny (Chechnya) are striking.

The doctrine which further prescribes the total blockade of the areas controlled by the dissidents, and a heavy bombardment of those areas from land and air without any concern for destruction and civilian casualties, to crush and destroy the uprising has already been put into practice in many different residential areas, among them Aleppo and .

Perhaps the worst among all the wrong predictions regarding the response of the Syrian army toward the uprisings has been the expectations regarding the and the Air Defense Force. Nearly all of the officers and the war pilots within these operational units are Nusayris. It seems that the effects of Hafez al- 71

Assad’s personality both as the Commander of the Syrian Air Force and a war hero on the morale of the members of this unit — ensuring that they perceived themselves as the guardians of the regime — were not taken into account. Indeed, the fact that the lowest number of

71 Born in into the Alawi sect, Assad became an officer in the air force. He joined the Ba'ath Party in the 1950s and became part of a group of nationalist officers who organized the successful coup of 1963. He was appointed commander of the air force, and in 1965 moved up to the leadership of the Ba'ath Party. In the internal struggles of the party, he became a leader of the military faction, which he supported in the 1966 coup. He was rewarded with the appointment of Minister of Defense, though he came to oppose the doctrinaire rigidity of President Jadid. He took power in a coup in 1969 and consolidated his power in another coup in 1971. In 1971 Assad established the People's Council, by which he was elected President

(confirmed in a plebiscite the following month). www.oxfordreference.com A Turkish Perspective on Future Syria's Perspective Turkish A

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defectors, when compared to the rest of the Syrian army, were from the Air Force should not be treated as a coincidence.

On the other hand, it is also true that the torture of Syrian soldiers and officers at the hands of jihadist and other radical groups (ISIS, Al Qaida etc.) and videos of mass killings gradually transformed the perceptions within the ranks of the Syrian army from that of protecting the regime into protecting themselves and their families.

As a result, the number of defectors from the Syrian army which maintained a strong sense of belonging — together with a feeling of existential (in)security — toward the regime, remained low to the extent that it had no significant impact on operational capabilities .

Another wrong assessment regarding the response of the Syrian army toward the uprisings is based on the insufficient evaluation of its intelligence community, their reach, positioning within the system and overall influence. Apart from the umbrella organization Al Mukhabarat, each force within the Syrian army but also various ministries maintain their own intelligence services which operate under a mechanism that ensures each of them oversees the other. If such features of the Syrian intelligence services including their improved operational capabilities (mainly through Lebanon), capability to carry out operations in Europe and a raison d’etre to monitor and prevent anti-regime activities, had been taken into account then it would have been possible to predict that they would have a strong reflex, together with the Syrian army, to protect the regime.

In this part, the report will evaluate the third stage in the chain of errors.

The Syrian regime has been successful in managing perceptions and turning the growing concern and fear in the West following the spread of increasingly violent clashes and the appearance of violent extremist and jihadist groups (ISIS in particular) to its own favor.

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In fact, by constantly hammering the message that the uprising was led by terrorists, and that the violent acts were committed by extremist groups from outside Syria to render it a permanent feature of social reality, the regime spokespeople went beyond transforming the concerns of the Western nations regarding violent extremists into significant gains for the regime.

Through this, they were also able to appeal to various minorities including the Druzes, , Assyrians, and other Christian groups on the grounds of fear and suspicion against ISIS to successfully consolidate their support for the regime.

Christian minorities in particular kept their distance from the uprising that saw large numbers from Syria’s majority Sunni population taking part. The common feeling among the Christian minorities has been that they had achieved relative security under minority Nusayri control (12%), and that a new regime dominated by Sunni/Salafi segments would not be able to offer them the same level of protection. More specifically, various groups which took part in the pro-regime coalition together with Nusayris feared that if the regime were toppled, they would face a genocide at the hands of Sunni opposition and violent extremists. Indeed, the torture and mass killings of many dissidents by the violent extremists and jihadists went on to show that such fears were in fact legitimate.

The Sunni elite too — which had enjoyed relative economic power within the existing system — gradually switched from a neutral stance toward distancing themselves from the opposition and eventually

aligning with the regime as jihadists and violent extremists became more active in the uprising.72

In a similar vein, the rumors that Bashar al Assad and the high- ranking members of the Ba’ath would share the same fate as the likes of Mubarak and later Morsi in Egypt and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali (what happened to Saddam and his family in Iraq or Gaddafi and his family and close allies in Libya were rather different) did not result in the intended effect of causing fear. Instead, such rumors further

72 Samer Abdoud, Syria’s Business Elite, Between Political Alignment and Hedging

Their Bets, SWP Report 22, August 2013. A Turkish Perspective on Future Syria's Perspective Turkish A

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consolidated the regime’s power by leading to an even closer alignment of the political elite, the army, and the business elite with the Assad regime.

The final error in the long chain of errors which has sustained the conflict over the last nine years is the rather unrealistic and perhaps arrogant expectations regarding the performance and the operational skills of the armed opposition groups.

Underestimating the Armed Opposition

Despite their numerical superiority, the Sunni Arabs in Syria do not possess the capacity and skill to attain such superiority in terms of an ultimate military victory. With their numbers predicted to be around 100,000-150,000 at the onset of the conflict, the armed opposition groups not only suffered from lack of communication and disunity, they also prioritized the defense of their own residential areas. Fearing that their families would be killed by the militias of the Syrian government () should they abandon their own residential areas, the opposition groups by remaining “local” in effect obstructed efforts to display unity and to lead the battle through the forming of operational “centers of gravity”. Moreover, with the number of non- permanent, non-clustered fighters deployed away from their own residential areas estimated at only 40,000, the opposition groups were not able to perform as expected.

A further reason which explains why the expectations were not met

can be found in the leadership ranks of the opposition groups and the fact that these groups have been led by sectarian strongmen and religious figures with no combat training and at best officers defecting the Syrian army. Marked with significant differences in training, practice and aims, these groups have failed to act on a common ground and the differences between them were soon transformed into feuds, rivalries, cleavages and disorder which brought about a serious handicap.

Some opposition leaders only fought in their own areas and did not

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clashing interests have meant that violent extremist and jihadist groups (such as Jabhat al-Nusra, Al- Qaeda in Iraq, ISIS, Tahrir al- Sham and the Turkistan İslamic Party) with strong combat experiences from as diverse as Afghanistan, Iraq, Chechnya, Bosnia, Yemen, Somalia, Palestine, Pakistan, Lebanon, Turkic Republics and China, and a strong culture of commitment, were able to take center stage and with the support of some external state actors using these jihadist groups for their own purposes, the conflict took on a new dimension.

A persistent difficulty in developing a good understanding of the current situation but also in elaborating on the future directions of the Syrian conflict is the contingency, uncertainty and rivalry that dominates the relations not only between the regime and the opposition groups but also the relationship the opposition groups have with one another.

The presence of around 20,000 Nusayris (Alawites) living under the control of the opposition groups around al-Fu’ah and , in the north of Idlib city is a case in point. Despite being under siege and hosting the 2,000 strong al Quds force, the towns of al-Fu’ah and Kafriya which received weekly or fortnightly air drop supplies, the armed opposition groups did not try to attack these towns or block the air drops. Besides, C-130 Hercules aircraft were used for these air drops. Considering that the Syrian Air Forces did not have any C-130 Hercules in their fleet, the air drops were facilitated by the aircraft belonging to the Iranian Air Forces in a cunning attempt to allow Tehran the “moral superiority” in helping the besieged Nusayris with whom they shared the same sect.

In 2018, when Aleppo was taken back from the opposition, the Nusayris were evacuated from those areas and the HTS was allowed to resettle in al-Fu’ah and Kafriya. More remarkably perhaps, the Sunni groups under the HTS refrained from any acts of violence against their opponents, the Iranian-controlled al-Quds

Another example which demonstrates the self-interested nature of the relations between various opposition groups is the rebels in Aleppo

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from Turkey to reach areas controlled by the PYD (after a certain cut) thus not blocking the local population’s access to the much-needed goods and equipment. More strikingly, it is also known that the Nour al-Din al Zenki group which has close ties to the US which also receives military support from the latter have been selling arms sent by Washington to their opponents, the al-Nusra.

While it is possible to extend this list, the examples chosen here should suffice to show the interdependence and overlapping interests that exists between the rival and warring groups that have shaped the overall contingent and fragile context in Syria

Training of the Opposition Groups by the US and Turkey

At this point of the conflict, a new program titled ‘Train and Equip’ was initiated by Turkey and the US to discipline and avoid the further fragmentation of the “moderate” opposition groups by providing them training and logistical support. On 19 February 2013, the then US Ambassador to Turkey, John Bass and the Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs Feridun Sinirlioğlu signed the deal ratifying the new program which envisaged the training of 1000-1500 selected opposition fighters by American and Turkish specialists in three-month periods for an entire year. The same program was also adopted in Jordan and Saudi Arabia envisaging the training of around 3,000-3,500 fighters within a year.

The first group which was trained in Turkey under Colonel Nadim

Hasan consisting of 18 fighters of mainly background, were ambushed in Al-Malikiyah, near and all but 3 fighters were killed. The second group (54 fighters) were forced by Al-Nusra in Ma’arrat al-Nu’man to surrender their weapons, vehicles, and equipment in return for their lives.

Such field incidents, the capturing of advanced weapons such as the TOW by Al-Nusra as well as the problems in reaching the target number of participants all led to a certain disgruntlement on the part of the US. Indeed, the then US President Barack Obama during a press

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“unsuccessful”, stating that he was the first person to “admit that it did not work as expected”. This was an early indication that US would not put its weight behind the Kurds. In the following days, the then US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, in a press conference held with his British counterpart Michael Fallon declared that the ‘Train and Equip’ program would be transformed to “focus on working together with competent Kurdish and other forces”, pointing though not naming the PYD. With the decision of the US to choose PYD as their new ally in the fight against the Assad regime, the ‘Train and Equip’ program was discontinued in 2015 (09 October 2015, New York Times).

This was confirmed by the new US President, Donald Trump that he would order the CIA to terminate all training and arming programs toward the Syrian opposition bar the support provided to the SDF (PYD/YPG).

Following the decision of the US to choose the PYD as its new ally, Pentagon quickly followed suit, thus leaving Turkey on its own. For its part, Turkey continued to train, provide logistical support and offer guidance in organizational matters for the selected armed opposition groups and later brought them together under the Free Syrian Army (later to be renamed the Syrian National Army) to end the apparent disunity among them, attaining a good degree of success to that end under given circumstances.

While the US decision to pull out of the ‘Train and Equip’ program (which enjoyed an estimated budget of USD 500ml) is usually

explained with reference to the programmer’s operational failure, it is understood that the real reason was resistance from Turkey to include fighters from Kurdish background onto the program, fearing that the latter could have links to the PYD. Indeed, the emphasis on “competent Kurds” in both President Obama’s and Secretary Carter’s statements does suggest that there was prior planning with regards to identifying potential allies.

It is also important to note too that unwillingness on the part of the US to provide the opposition with advanced weapons systems (anti-

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hands was a significant handicap for the opposition in the field. Yet the Javelin anti-tank missiles — requested by Turkey and denied by the US Congress — were provided to the PYD/YPG and the TOW anti-tank missiles, registered to the Saudi inventory, were given to the Salafi groups.

On the other hand, the consequences of the aforementioned errors were only worsened by the fact that not adequate attention was paid to the psychological/ideational aspect of warfare in the sense that while the conflict was conceived by the regime as a war of necessity/survival, the opposition lacked such a unifying idea, often bickering around competing interests thus sustaining a psychological disparity against the regime.

On the psychological effects of the Syrian conflict, it can also be suggested that while military advancements have now been replaced by diplomatic initiatives (in Astana, Sochi and Geneva) more attention needs to be paid and indeed, careful planning is required to tackle the post-conflict traumas once and if the dust settles. Bearing in mind that peacekeeping is almost always harder than peacemaking or peace enforcement, not paying adequate attention to the post conflict traumas will potentially carry the past errors into the future.

The Situation in Idlib / an overview

Terrorism, radicalization and irregular movements that emerged as a result of the clashes in Syria, which have entered its ninth year as of

July 2020, continue to pose a security threat not only for Turkey, but for the entire region and beyond. Indeed, Turkey ranks first among the neighboring countries who has been affected from the crisis in Syria the most.

Since the beginning of the crisis, Turkey stood by the Syrian people and provided secure living conditions by opening up its borders to over 4 million Syrian refugees escaping the clashes.73

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The town of Idlib, where some of the most fierce fighting took place, remains the last opposition stronghold largely controlled by both radical and moderate armed groups such as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, Hurras al-Din, Turkistan Islamic Party, Ahrar al-Sham and the National Syrian Army (Turkish-backed rebel alliance) and is important for Turkey’s national security for its close proximity to the Turkish borders and for being affected directly by the instabilities in the region.

For these reasons, an “Idlib De-Confliction Zone” was established as part of the “De-Escalation Agreement” announced at the sixth round of Astana negotiations held on 14-15 September 2017. Later, Turkey held separate meetings with the Russian Federation in order to protect the civilians by preventing a humanitarian crisis, to support political solution process and to eliminate security risks that may stem from Idlib, culminating in the “Memorandum on Stabilization of the Situation in Idlib” signed during the Sochi Summit on 17 September 2018. As one of the guarantor states to the Sochi Memorandum, Turkey continues to exercise its responsibilities for maintaining the ceasefire in Idlib.

However, the ceasefire violations committed by the Assad regime often put the peace and stability conditions in the region in a difficult position. In 2019, because of the frequent ceasefire violations and forward operations with the Russian support, more than one million civilians, most of them from the South of Idlib, had to migrate to the North of Idlib and areas close to the Turkish border.

As of February 2020, almost 800.000 civilians who left their homes as a result of continued attacks by the Regime forces, took shelter around Idlib close to the Turkish border, and in other areas close to where the Operation Euphrates Shield (OES) and the Operation Olive Branch (OOB) were launched. Because of these developments in the past two years, nearly 2 million civilians have started living in areas next to the Turkish border and under extremely poor living conditions.

In addition, during the January-February 2020 period, almost 250 civilians died and more than 500 were wounded, including children, in

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Most of the civilian casualties were incurred as a direct result of the use of barrel bombs and blockbusters by the Syrian air force targeting civilian residential areas, camp sites and public buildings such as hospitals, schools, etc. Destruction of civilian infrastructure, including camps, water resources, electric supply, roads, communication facilities, etc. and the disruption of the humanitarian aid, all indicate that the Regime is pushing civilians to migrate and the opposition to surrender by applying “total destruction and devastation of settlements” as prescribed by the Soviet Army’s Counterinsurgency Doctrine - which was applied in a brutal fashion by the Soviet Army in Chechnya.

The Breaking Point in Idlib: Balioun

Despite several meetings held between the Russian and the Turkish delegations on the developments in Idlib in February 2020, the Regime’s attacks targeting the civilians continued. In an attack within the Idlib De-Escalation Zone (on the road between al-Bara and Balioun, 3 miles North of in southern Idlib) on 27 February 2020 carried out by two Russian Sukhoi SU-34 and two Syrian Sukhoi SU -22 against the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) units (mechanized infantry battalion comprised of around 400 soldiers that had arrived to Idlib 24 hours before the attack), the Regime forces killed 33 TAF personnel and wounded 52. After the attack, Turkey launched Operation Peace Shield (OPS) under the right to self-defense of the 51st Article of the UN Charter, causing intensive damage to the units of 4th Armored Division and considerable number of casualties.

While Russia initially denied any involvement in the attacks, the Russian Defense Ministry later claimed that Turkey did not provide the coordinates regarding the location of its units. When Turkish Ministry of Defense responded by the particulars of the communication with the Russians regarding the detailed coordinates, this was followed by a rather accusatory suggestion from Kremlin that “Turkish soldiers should not have been there” – though one that also admitted responsibility for the attacks.

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The detailed assessment of the attacks show that the TAF convoy after the first attack sought defensive fighting position in the nearby buildings which were later bombed with bunker-buster munition and the casualties were mainly from the personnel who were trapped under the rubble. Despite establishing communication with the Russian forces in Syria, the attack continued for 5 hours and another TAF convoy — deployed there to aid the previous convoy — was also targeted. Perhaps more worryingly, Turkish request to open the air space for the transport of casualties and the injured was denied by the Russians and the injured personnel were taken 70km away to the town of Reyhanlı, in Turkey over land (through the Bab al-Hawa Border Crossing).

At the emergency meeting of the UNSC on 28 February 2020 on the attack, the Turkish Permanent Representative to the UN Feridun Sinirlioğlu underlined the key particulars of the attack which showed that the Russian role in the attacks was beyond any doubt: “[...] that the precise location of the convoy was coordinated with the Russian military authorities in writing, [...] that the attack continued for 5 hours despite calls [...] that the traces from the radar show the Russian and Syrian crafts were flying on a mission configuration [that] the ambulances and ambulance staff were also targeted.”

It is important to note that the attack in Balioun is not the first incident between the Russian and the Turkish forces. On 9 February 2017, a building in which a Turkish TOW team was stationed near Al Bab was targeted by Russian jets causing the death of 3 soldiers and the wounding of 11. The attack was initiated when the Turkish TOW

team responded to the firing of a Syrian tank which targeted a group of frontline FSA soldiers from Aleppo. Following the hitting of the tank by the Turkish TOW team, a Russian SU-34 upon a call from the Syrian army hit the building in which the TOW team was stationed. Following the incident, the Russians apologies from Turkey, claiming the attack was an accident.

On 18 August 2019, another Turkish convoy heading to Morek Turkish observation post was shot by Russian jets. While the attack did not directly target the TAF units (firing around the convoy instead), the vehicle which was manned by the FSA fighters escorting

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Russian forces were careful in not directly targeting the Turkish soldiers in Morek, it was in Balioun that they did. Indeed, on 4 May, when the Turkish observation post in Zawiya (No.10) was targeted by the Syrian artillery, the Russian forces opened the air space to allow the evacuation of the two wounded soldier but denied doing so in Balioun despite heavy losses. And a week before the attack in Balioun, on 20 February 2020 near the Russian forces deliberately shot an M60 Sabre tank belonging to the TAF, killing 2 soldiers. Let alone apologizing, the Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that the tank was shot for providing fire support for the rebels, thus assuming direct responsibility.

The attack in Balioun was in fact foretold in an unreported development which took place immediately before. On 27 February shortly after 1300 hours, an attack was reported in which Russian and Syrian planes were targeted with MANPADs (Man-portable air- defense systems) over 15 rounds causing damage to a Russian plane as it maneuvered to avoid being hit. In a statement from the Russian side, Turkey was blamed for the attack.

While it is not known with any certainty whether the statement which further raised tensions between the two sides after the attack in Zawiya aimed at creating a pretext, it is important to take into account that before the Baloun attack, on 25-26 February, the SNA (backed by Turkish firepower) led a counterattack in Al-Nayrab and Saraqib, taking control of Al-Nayrab and setting several blockades along the M5 before it advanced onto Saraqib located at the strategic juncture between the M4 and the M5 motorways.

In this context, the airstrikes over Baloun are considered to be linked to Russia’s discontent with Turkey’s recapturing of Saraqib, connecting the M4 and the M5. Indeed, in the following days, Saraqib was recaptured several times from the Syrian Army and by the end, it was the Russian military police took control of the city, effectively ending further advances.

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Memorandum on Stabilization of the Situation in the Idlib De- Escalation Zone

Following the incidents in Baloun, a meeting between the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his counterpart, Vladimir Putin in Moscow on 05 March 2020 which aimed at stopping the regime attacks in Idlib and ending the humanitarian crisis in the region. At that meeting, the two sides signed the “Memorandum on the Stabilization of the Situation in the Idlib De-Escalation Zone”.74 The Additional Protocol stipulated that the “ceasefire” (though the protocol refers to “cease all military actions” instead of using the word of “ceasefire”)75 would enter into effect 06 March 2020, establishing a security corridor of six kilometers in the north and south of M4 Highway and creating a joint Turkish and Russian patrol along M4 Highway between Trumba (2 km to the west from Saraqib) and Ain al-Havr. By August 2020, 26 joint patrol missions were carried out.

The Additional Protocol further highlighted that there could be no military solution to the Syrian conflict and that it could only be resolved through a UN facilitated process in line with the UNSCR 2254. The Protocol also renewed calls that the Regime stops its attacks in Idlib area and committed the sides to work together to prevent the deterioration of the humanitarian crisis, to ensure the protection of civilians to be also provided with humanitarian aid, to stop the further displacement of civilians and ensuring safe and voluntary return of the internally displaced people to their original places of residence.76

74 05 March 2020, Memorandum on the stabilization of the Situation in the Idlib De- Escalation Zone. 75 While criticized by some observers, the text’s choice of words, referring to the “ceasing of all military actions” as opposed to a “ceasefire” can be considered a more formal but also a wider arrangement which halts military build-ups, fortifications and repositioning of forces. 76 According to Prof. Abdulkadir Çelik, the President of the Political Psychology Association based at Ankara University, forced migration is the involuntary or coerced movement of a person or people away from their home or home region. This movement may have been caused by a variety of factors including natural disasters, economic reasons, violence, and other man-made/political circumstances. The sense of “belonging” among forced migrants, or displaced people depend on context-specific circumstances but various studies have shown that well-established diasporas such as the Armenian diaspora or the Ahiska (Meskhetian) have maintained a strong sense of belonging and identity while integrating into their respective host societies.

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The following two points, stated in the Protocol and cited here in full, also deserve attention:

(i)“Reaffirming their (the two parties of the protocol) determination to combat all forms of terrorism, and to eliminate all terrorist groups in Syria as designated by the UNSC, while agreeing that targeting of civilians and civilian infrastructure cannot be justified under any pretext”; and

(ii) “Reaffirming the strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Syria Arab Republic.”

With regards to the first point, while it is important that the Protocol affirms Russia’s and Turkey’s determination to “combat and eliminate all forms of terrorism”, it is likely that the existing disagreements between the two sides regarding which groups are to be considered terrorist will raise concerns over the viability of the agreement.

While Russia, and Syria — though not a signatory to the deal — regards all groups under the National Syrian Army as “terrorists”, for Turkey the terrorists are the “sectarian militias and radicals from outside Syria”. Since the Protocol refers to the definition adopted by the UNSC, groups such as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, Hurras al-Din and Turkistan Islamic Party belong to that category that would need to be eliminated.

In addition to significant disagreements over which groups constitute the terrorists, other key concerns are also to be found in various documents and agreements signed by the two sides previously, including the Memorandum of Understanding signed in Sochi on 22 October 2019, the 12-point ‘Joint Declaration’ issued following the summit between Turkey, Russia and Iran, the ‘Memorandum on the Creation of De-Escalation Zones in the Syria Arab Republic’ signed on 4 May 2017 (also referred to in the ‘Additional Protocol’ signed on 5 March 2020) as well as the “Memorandum on Stabilization of the Situation in the Idlib De-Escalation Area” signed on 17 September 2018. 77 More specifically, certain Turkish obligations under these

77 05 March 2020 Additional Protocol: “The Republic of Turkey and the Russian

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agreements which Russia claims were unfulfilled was later used as a pretext by the latter as a pretext to launch its operation (together with the Syrian regime) in Idlib.

Who Won What with the Additional Protocol?

The strong wording regarding the commitment of the two sides “to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Syria Arab Republic” does not reflect the realities on the ground and raises important questions regarding the ways in which the two sides will put these principles into practice.

More specifically, while large areas including those adjacent to the Iraqi border near Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor and in the northeast of the country (constituting 30 percent of the country’s total land area) are controlled by the PYD/YPG backed by US bases and explicitly US support, with further plans for its future governance on some form of autonomy from the Syrian regime, it remains unclear in the Turkey- Russia agreements how the territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic would be protected and by whom.

Besides, bearing in mind that Russia’s presence in Syria is based on bilateral treaties that exist with that country which also provide the legal ground for its bases, it should not come as a surprise that further escalation of the disagreements between Russia and Turkey over Libya (Al-Jufra, Sirte) and Syria (Idlib, Manbij, Tell Rifaat) results in demands for a Turkish withdrawal from those areas which it controls.

While the second article of the ‘Additional Protocol’ — signed on 5 March 2020 in Moscow with immediate effect — envisaged a security corridor of six kilometers in the north and south of M4 Highway within 7 days, it did not stipulate any measures regarding the M5 Highway.

Arab Republic (hereinafter referred to as the Parties. Recalling the Memorandum on the Creation of De-Escalation Areas in the Syrian Arab Republic as of May 4, 2017 and the Memorandum on Stabilization in the Idlib De-Escalation Area as of September 17, 2018.”

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It is important to recall nonetheless that the responsibility for opening up the M4 and M5 Highways for traffic and trade was given to Turkey and not fulfilling that responsibility was among the reasons why Russia, together with Syria, initiated the operation in Idlib.

The main reason why no additional measures were included in the ‘Additional Protocol’ regarding the North-Southbound M5 Highway is that it would later come under the full control of the Syrian army following an operational advance.

For Turkey, the main stumbling block toward establishing the security corridor that was foreseen in the Additional Protocol is the presence of groups belonging to Hay’at Tahrir el-Sham, Hurras al-Din and the Turkistan İslamic Party and their refusal to leave the areas along the M4 starting from Saraqib to West (Latakia) including the towns of Ayn al-Bayda, Jisr al-Shughur,Muhambal, Arihah and Sermin. Indeed, these groups have occasionally attempted to frustrate the joint patrol missions along the M4 by setting up roadblocks, hand made explosives and attacking the convoys, including Russian vehicles which took part in the 17th and 26th patrol mission.

The attack which was carried against the Turkish-Russian joint patrol in June resulting in extensive damage to two Russian vehicles is not an isolated incidence. In fact, the joint patrol missions have been fraught with difficulties and only on 22 July the patrol mission was completed along the whole of the M4 motorway as the Moscow Agreement had stipulated, though this was also interrupted by mortar fire along the route and attacks on Russian vehicles by light weapons.

Nonetheless, with the deal reached on 6 March 2020, Turkey was able to gain much-needed time by stopping a new influx of refugees toward its borders. And with around 60 temporary stations it was able to acquire to the north and northwest of the M4 highway, Turkey then established a secure zone to give permanency to the presence of its forces in the area for some time.

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checkpoints. Especially after the intensive bombing raids of Balioun, Turkish observation posts and checkpoints were fortified and strengthened with heavy weaponry. Following the air raid which caused 33 casualties, temporary stations and checkpoints have been repositioned in order to avoid similar heavy losses.

The ‘Additional Protocol’ also bore important dividends for Russia and Damascus in terms of territory. While in May 2019, the size of the areas (in Idlib and its periphery) controlled by the opposition was estimated at 6,000km2, through several advancements in 2019 and in 2020, the regime in Damascus was able to gain back the control of around 2,900km2 thus the control of the M5 Highway. With the entering into force of the ‘Additional Protocol’ the regime was then able to acquire the control of another 300km2 to the south of the M4 Highway without any resistance, which altogether amounts to the effective control of the half of Idlib.

For Russia, the ‘Additional Protocol’ ensured the protection of the bases in Khmeimim and Hama against drone attacks from the opposition and the Turkistan Islamic Party in particular.78 Though rather small in size (around 600-800 strong) the Turkistan Islamic Party represents the most radical fraction of the opposition that Russia but also China (because of the Uighur fighters) that wants to eliminate the most. While Russian planes conducted over a hundred sorties into

78 The Turkistan Islamic Party has become notorious for targeting the Hmeymim base in a series of drone attacks. The combatants have developed cunning tactics to launch these attacks in groups of 20, whereby each combatant operates an individual drone simultaneously from a 10km using a notebook to strike the same target. TIP’s attack on 27 December 2017 was followed by a subsequent attack on 31 December which killed two Russian soldiers as well as causing significant damage to the infrastructure. This was swiftly followed by another attack a week later, on 7 January 2018. As Tylor Rogoway has described, “weaponized drones are especially attractive for this type of warfare because they can be built in large quantities clandestinely in an urban environment and they are a standoff weapon that allows the user to have a high chance of survivability after their employment. They also put high value targets that are well defended against a ground infiltration within a single operator’s reach. Russia’s main base in Syria is clearly the juiciest of almost all targets imaginable for such hostile actors. If these factors are indeed at play, these attacks are likely to become even more frequent as time goes on.”; “Russia’s Air Base In Syria Seems To Be Under Regular Attack Now”, 6 January 2018. The Jihadist group is also known for its private snipers who carry out ‘hits’ in exchange for money.

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this group located in Jisr al-Shughur, the difficult terrain (rough and mountainous) meant very little success.

In that respect, the ceasefire decision taken in the meeting was reflected over the region and some people have started to return to their original place of residence. Should the peace prevail in the region it is expected that nearly two million Syrians living along the Turkish border would return to the residential areas in and around Idlib.

A permanent ceasefire in Idlib is important in terms of curbing civilian losses by ending the Regime’s forward operations, curbing the irregular migration movements, and tackling radicalization. However, the effective implementation of the agreement and its viability depends on the actions of the Syrian Regime and their allies.

Moreover, the political process and the valuable efforts of the Syrian Constitutional Committee should also be supported for the ultimate resolution of the Syrian crisis. The ceasefire reached in Idlib in this sense presents an important opportunity to trigger the political mechanisms and create the necessary momentum. In that respect, the US and the EU countries should put more diplomatic pressure on the Regime and its supporters, particularly the Russian Federation, in order to reach an understanding that there is no alternative to political settlement — a point which was also underlined in the Sochi and Astana agreements repeatedly by the parties. Support from the international committee to the ceasefire agreement is important too in terms of strengthening its dissuasive effect on the Regime and its supporters.

And in the event that the Regime, in its unrelenting quest for military victory continues with its attacks against Idlib and the conflict in Idlib is resolved through military means, this is likely to lead to initiate new and long-lasting conflicts in the region, by further radicalizing the opposition in Syria and initiating the creation of new jihadist structures resembling DAESH/Al Qaida. Such a situation also carries the potential to create a long-lasting wave of terrorism, thus further instability in the region, which would in turn, fuel irregular migration

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In that respect, it would not be wrong to suggest that Turkey has assumed great responsibility in Idlib on behalf of the international community. Against the existing and future security risks created by the Regime’s attacks in Idlib, Turkey had used its influence to maintain the status quo which was further stabilized with the ‘Additional Protocol’ to the Sochi Agreement which came into effect on 5 March 2020, to prevent civilian losses, and to distinguish the moderate opposition from terrorist in taking into consideration the security concerns of all sides.

Turkish Antiterror Operations in Syria

Republic of Turkey resolutely maintains its struggle against terrorism originating from Syria, which constitutes threat to national and international security. Turkey conducted three operations so far against terrorist organizations ISIS and PKK-PYD-YPG to eliminate threats to its border security and to create a peace environment for the safe return of the Syrian refugees to their homeland.

Firstly, an area of 2015 km2, mainly Jarablus, was cleared from ISIS and the threats of other terrorist organizations to the territorial integrity of Syria were eliminated with the “Operation Euphrates Shield (OES)” conducted in August 2016. After the operation, a Syrian Task Force was set up to rebuild the infrastructure in the region, normalize daily life and ensure the safe return of civilians displaced by the YPG.

Local administrative bodies — constituting entirely from local people who have no affiliation with terrorist organizations — were established to provide essential services including security, public order, education, health, justice, etc. Turkey provides technical support to these bodies.

Operation Olive Branch (OOB) was conducted in January 2018 in Afrin to stop the harassing fires and infiltration attempts of the terrorist groups into Turkish territories. In this respect, predetermined positions, tunnels, and training camps used by the PKK/PYD (together

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Turkey, as in the case of the OES, provided support to ensure minimal disruption to key public services including security, justice, electricity and water supply, education, transportation, and communication.

In the context of Turkish efforts to bring normalcy into the region, local administrative bodies and councils were set up in Afrin, Cindires, Bulbul, Mabatli, Sheran, Sheikh Hadid. Afrin’s judicial bodies and the local police force were also reconstructed. By 2018, around 200.000 Syrians returned to their homes, their safety ensured by the OES and OOB.

Finally, with the Operation Peace Spring (OPS) which was launched in October 2019, Turkey-backed Syrian National Army units cleared an area with a total size of 4.160 km2 which included the towns of Tal Abyad and Resulayn.

Terrorist strongholds have been declining as a result of Turkish operations, which have all been conducted with the prior knowledge of the UNSC, EU and NATO. Nonetheless the ongoing terrorist attacks conducted by the PKK-PYD-YPG and with the tactical help of the Syrian regime continues to pose a significant challenge to the long-term goal of peace and stability the civilian populations in Syria long for.

Efforts to Merge the PYD with the KUC

Reports relating to increased efforts on the part of the US and France to bring together the PYD with the Kurdish groups supporting Barzani with significant progress being made toward creating an entity similar to the IKRG all point to a critical juncture for the future direction of the Syrian conflict.

The direct talks between the Kurdish National Unity Parties (PYNK) — which consists of 25 parties close to the PYD — and the Kurdish National Alliance in Syria (HNKS) close to Mesut Barzani took place

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Deputy Special Envoy for the International Alliance, William Robak and Mazloum Abdi introducing himself as the Commander in Chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

The news were reported by the Al Monitor as follows:

Rival Kurdish parties in northeastern Syria have begun US-sponsored reconciliation talks after repeated delays in the past [...] The initiative is seemingly designed to include all the Kurdish parties in the PYD- ruled autonomous administration in northeast Syria, paving the way for the autonomous administration to join the UN-sponsored negotiations in Geneva to end the Syrian conflict.

The deal that was reached on 16 June 2020 was announced at a press conference in which the Special Envoy Roebuck commended “both sides [PYNK-HNKS] for the hard work they’ve done to reach the progress reached so far [...] on the basis of the Duhok Agreement”, also commending the role of Mesut Barzani, Nechirvan Barzani and Mazloum (PYD) in bringing the sides together that would “form a strong basis for the Syrian Kurds”.

The ‘Duhok Agreement’ which was referred to in Roebuck’s statement was sponsored by Mesut Barzani and signed on 22 October 2014 in Duhok (Northern Iraq). The negotiations were held between the PYD (represented by the then co-chairman of the Party), and its key ally Movement for a Democratic Society (or TEV-DEM, Tevgera Civaka Demokratik) and the HNKS close to the KDP (Iraq). Governance, power-sharing, security and defense were among the issues that were discussed during the negotiations which lasted nine days, and the end of which the groups agreed to set up a 30-member power-sharing council to run the Kurdish-controlled areas in Syria. More importantly perhaps, the agreement also confirmed YPG, or the so-called ‘People’s Protection Units’ as the only military entity in Rojava.

In this context, the reference in William Roebuck’s statement regarding the deal between the PYNK and the HNKS to the Duhok agreement should be read as an outcome of the efforts toward legitimizing the PYD/YPG and legalizing Washington’s collaboration

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These developments were also discussed by Turkish President Erdogan, Russian President Putin and their Iranian counterpart, Rouhani during a teleconference on 1 July 2020, the conclusions of which were noted in a joint statement.

Such strong wording as Rejected in this regard all attempts to create new realities on the ground under the pretext of combating terrorism, including illegitimate self-rule initiatives, and expressed their determination to stand against separatist agendas aimed at undermining the sovereignty and territorian integrity of Syria as well as threatening the national security of neighboring countries] should be read as a diplomatic response to statements issued by the PYNK and HNKS, claiming [to attend to the third round of Geneva talks].

Indeed, the part which emphasizes that [Emphasized their strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic as well as the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. Highlighted that these principles should be universally respected and that no actions, no matter by whom they were undertaken should undermine them] is a particularly strong warning for all actors, and above all the US, France but also the KRG, that are behind the efforts to unite and mobilize the rival Kurdish groups in northeastern Syria for autonomy.

Yet despite such a clear declaration penned onto the agreements signed by Turkey, Russia and Iran reflecting their shared stance, the deal reached between PYD and People’s Will Party in Moscow under the initiative of Russia (August 2020), paving the way for indirect

participation of the latter in the Geneva talks is an unfortunate event for the Turkish-Russian relations.

A further warning to the US for allowing the PYD to exploit Syrian oil resources and revenues is expressed in the following sentence: “Expressed their opposition to the illegal seizure and transfer of oil revenues that should belong to the Syrian Arab Republic.”

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But the US administration has nonetheless facilitated the signing of the deal between the Delta Crescent Energy LCC and the PYD in a hegemonic fashion and in total disregard of international law.

The shift in US policy from fighting terrorism onto fighting for oil profits in terms of financing a terrorist organization through an oil deal will create a significant handicap for the global fight against terrorism and present a blueprint for other countries using terrorist groups as their proxies.

Lack of Western response to the US move, that is set to raise serious concerns over its policy in Syria of combatting terrorism and alleviating human suffering is a sheer hypocrisy which also shows that countries who are victims of terrorism can easily be abandoned in their battle to fend for themselves.

US efforts to delink the PKK from the PYD as part of its legitimation strategy can also be considered a deliberate act to drive a wedge between the two organizations that will mark the end of Syrian unity, integrity and sovereignty. Reports pointing to a growing dispute between Qandil and Syria is a clear indication that the groundwork for this has already begun.

When taken into account that Russia and Iran are also concerned (though for other reasons) with such US actions toward establishing a permanent presence in Syria including its collaboration with the PYD and support for efforts toward Kurdish unification and setting up a

Kurdish entity similar to the one in Iraq (KRG), it is also possible to point to another potential crisis point other than Idlib. Yet while Turkey, Russia and Iran all oppose the US-brokered agreement between the PYNK and the HNKS with regards to Kurdish autonomy, no strong consensus exists among these actors regarding Idlib.

In fact, while Russian opposition to Kurdish autonomy, and the deal between the PYNK and the HNKS for that matter, was clear from the joint declaration issued on 1 July 2020 following the Summit with Turkey and Iran, Russia continues to allow the PYD/YPG forces to

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Agreement signed with Russia in the context of the Peace Spring Operation stating otherwise, that “all YPG personnel to leave Manbij and Tell Rifaat with their weapons”. More worryingly for Turkey, while these areas are monitored and controlled by the Russian military police, the YPG continues to subject the Turkish forces harassing fire and infiltrating operations from these locations. To add insult to injury, Moscow does not consider the PYD or the PKK for that matter, as a terrorist group, and has allowed these groups to open political representations across Russia.

It is also important to note too that while Russia is against the PYNK- HNKS deal since it is designed to provide the US with strategic advantage in Syria and northern Iraq (Kurdistan region), it nonetheless maintains communication with the PYD to stop the latter being drawn even closer into the US orbit. A case in point is the news item published on Rudaw considered the mouthpiece of the KDP on 20 March 2017, titled “YPG receiving training from Russia in Afrin, says spokesman”. The report attests that the YPG is in direct contact with Russia and receives military training from Moscow and is quoted here at length:

Kurdish forces in Syria have announced their direct relations with Russia, saying they are receiving training from Russian forces. Russian forces are present in the western-most Kurdish canton of Afrin as a result of an agreement between our forces and the Russian army, Redur Xelil, spokeperson for the People’s Protection Units (YPG), announced in a published statement on Monday. “The agreement was based in the framework of cooperation in the fight against terrorism and on the military training of our fighters by the Russian army. We have direct relations with Russia. Xelil described

the cooperation as a positive and good step in fight against

terrorism in Syria and noted that YPG forces are working with many forces.

Indeed, it can be recalled that during Turkey’s operation into Afrin, it was the Russian forces who helped evacuate the PYD forces through a secure corridor from Afrin town center into Tell Rifaat, and later offered protection there by the Russian military personnel.

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a) YPG-FSA-KNC

In this context, it is important to briefly recap the clashes between the PYD and the FSA (Free Syrian Army) but also the KNC and recount the gradual rise of the PYD to become the sole representative of the Syrian Kurds.

From a chronological perspective, the first clash between the PYD/FSA and the KNC took place on 30 September 2012 when an FSA suicide bomber killed 4 and wounded 15 in Qamishli.

On 25 October 2012, groups from the FSA forced Kurdish residents of Aleppo from the Al-Ashrafiya and Sheikh Maqsud districts to flee their homes. This was followed by the shelling of Al-Ashrafiya by the government forces, causing significant Kurdish casualties. The FSA was blamed by the Kurds for the casualties and the rebels were asked to leave Ashrafiya. In the ensuing clashes between the Kurdish groups and the FSA, in which crowds chanted pro-PKK slogans, 10 people died and 20 were injured. This was followed by the armed wing of the PYD, the YPG attacking FSA units on 27 October in which there were 22 casualties and over 100 injured.

The resistance displayed by the PYD against the FSA during the clashes in Ashrafiyah and its determination to protect the Kurdish people through armed struggle resulted in heavy losses (in terms of prestige and support) for the other Kurdish factions of the KNC. The coming to light of the close relations some of these parties established

with the was also instrumental in the rise of the PYD following the clashes in Ashrafiyah and the creation of the cantons.

While there was a brief period of ‘unspoken truce’ between the two sides which started in January 2013 following clashes between the FSA and the ISIS (but also other extremist, jihadist groups), this was over by May 2014 when small-scale clashes erupted once again in Afrin, Ras al-Ayn, Al Darbasiyah, and in Tirbesipi (Qahtaniyah). In

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Hasakah-Darbasiyah route and following the violent clashes which started on 16 July, it took control of the entire Ras al-Ayn.

With such territorial gains, the further weakening of the other Kurdish fractions belonging to the HNKS, and the switching sides of some of the fractions, the PYD’s political authority and influence continued to grow in the post-Ashrafiyah period.

In 2012, some of the senior members of the HNKS, including party leaders and other senior officials, who attended the meeting of the Kurdish Supreme Committee — an initiative led by the KRG in Iraq – were arrested upon their return from Erbil, followed by the arrest of another 74 members of the Syrian KDP on 18 May 2012 when travelling back to Syria from Iraq. With the growing tensions between the PYD-KRG, and on the face of growing hostility from the PYD, the KRG in Iraq closed the Semalka border crossing.

The YPG retaliated in the following days by conducting mass-arrests in the town of , a HNKS stronghold; the ensuing clashes killed 7 people and injured hundreds. While these incidents increased the already-intense rivalry between the PYD and the HNKS, the PYD — by successfully exploiting the divisions and rivalries of the other Kurdish parties — emerged as the umbrella political organization for the Syrian Kurds.

Following the clashes on 27 June 2013 in Amuda, almost all Kurdish parties, above all the Syrian KDP and the Freedom Party, dropped

their anti-PYD appeals and accepted (though rather grudgingly) the political leadership of the PYD. The PYD too, during this time, refrained from using its armed wing the YPG against the rival Kurdish parties and used its military power instead to fight threats against the Syrian Kurds thus increasing its support and sympathy among the Kurdish population. It is also possible to suggest that the PYD also benefitted from a careful analysis of the orientalist features of the Kurdish culture, and in particular the traditionally privileged position of power, in consolidating its power.

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In fact, while increasing its support among the rival Kurdish groups, the PYD also found support among other minorities including the , Assyrians, and the Druzes who feared the presence and future actions of the local extremist and jihadist groups. Its decision to later include representatives from these minority groups in the councils set up for the autonomous cantons was to help it gain more public sympathy both in Syria and in the West.

The statement made by , the then co-chairman of the PYD during a visit to France is a case in point: “There are three sorts of Arabs among us: there are those with whom we have always lived and who we have fought alongside. We defend the brotherhood between these peoples. There are those who do not belong, Arabs who came from outside, other countries or the region, the jihadists who have burned our homes, and decapitated Kurds. Finally, there are the Arabs who were moved to Kurdistan by force by (former Syrian president) Hafez al-Assad... to Arabize the region, they are victims... and we advocate a peaceful solution for these populations: those who can return to their hometowns should do so and the others can live in peace with the Kurds.”

In the days which followed Salih’s statement — aimed at emphasizing the secular nature of the PYD but also uniting Kurds and Arabs together on the grounds of a common victimhood — on 21 January 2014 to be more precise, the Party proclaimed “democratic autonomy” in Jazire, appointing Ekrem Haso of Kurdish background as is leader and Elizabeth Gawrie and Hussein Taza as the deputy prime ministers. The appointment of Elizabeth Gawrie and Hussein Taza Al Azam, from Assyrian and Arab backrounds respectively, was

another message by the PYD to the world that it would not discriminate on the grounds of ethnicity, religion, or sectarian identity.

It is important to note however that the proclamation of autonomy in Jazire created a significant backlash among the anti-PYD Kurdish groups and following strong criticism the HNKS responded by attending the meeting of the Syrian National Council in Istanbul. The meeting which established the Syrian Interim Government (in exile in Turkey) also appointed a Kurd known for his anti-PYD views as its Minister for Economy and Natural Resources.

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Such anti-PYD sentiment was also echoed in the columns of Salah Badr al-Din (influential among the Syrian Kurds) and Mohammed Ismail, a senior leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party–Syria (KDP-S) published in the London-based al-Hayat newspaper owned by the Saudi Prince Khalid bin Sultan.

In one particularly fiery column, Al Din claimed that he was against autonomy and that in fact virtually all the other Kurdish parties did not agree with the setting up of an autonomous government. This view, Al Din claimed, was also supported by the majority of moderate Kurds, Arabs and Christians which represented the majority of the Syrian population. Al Din further argued that PYD’s views and decisions were dictated through force and that such actions put them in the same category as the likes of ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra.

For his part, Mohammed Ismail criticized the repressive policies of the PYD while emphasizing that the KDP-S continued to see Barzani as their leader and the KDP as the political umbrella for the Kurdish movement.

The blockade of Kobane by ISIS and the heavy casualties incurred on the YPG side, followed by the decision of Barzani in November 2014 to send 155-strong peshmerga (together with 32 vehicles) to join the battle through the Khabur gate with the blessing of Turkey led to a certain thawing of relations between the PYD and the KDP (Barzani). The decision of the IKBY to help the PYD in Kobane was also conceived as a move that would, together with the Duhok Agreement signed in October 2014, strengthen Barzani’s influence among the

Syrian Kurds as a “savior”.

In the end, with the coming into force of the Dohuk Agreement recognizing the YPG as the sole armed entity and the IKBY effectively supporting the YPG in Kobane, the PYD not only obtained the political representation of the Syrian Kurds as a whole, it also put an end to the occasional bickering with the IKBY and the KDP.

When considered together with the gradual exclusion of the

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and the wider Kurdification policies toward the region, the significance of the Kurdish unification under the PYD/YPG roof can hardly be overestimated.

The progress being made in US-led efforts (also actively supported by France) to bring the Syrian Kurds together with the local Arab population is a clear manifestation of the extent to which external factors can radically change political alliances and power dynamics, leading to greater uncertainty.

PYD’s Kurdification Policies

Following a brief account of how the PYD successfully overcame its disagreements with the other rival Kurdish parties and groups — either through the use of force or exploiting the internal divisions that existed among them — this section of the study deals with various Kurdification policies the PYD has implemented in the territories under its control. Such policies of demographic manipulation to create a Kurdish majority, forced migrations, the destruction of official title deeds, unlawful manipulation of the civil registry data and so on, share a striking resemblance to the former policies of Hafez al-Assad in the region against the Kurds. While the Kurdification policies of the PYD are a far cry from its earlier appeals to the equal treatment of all ethnic groups and peaceful co-existence, they also provide important clues regarding its future plans for the region.

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It is clear that the PYD — backed both politically and militarily by the US — is increasingly leaning towards ethnic cleansing in such areas as Raqqa with an Arab majority and where Arabic is the most spoken language.

To this end, local village names in those areas populated by Arab majorities have been changed from Arabic to Kurdish, to eradicate the historical and cultural impact of the Arabic language on the landscape in an attempt to Kurdify the region with a distinct Arabic character.

The villages between Amude and Quamishli

Apart from the replacing of place names, the PYD changed the medium of instruction in schools under its control from Arabic to Kurdish despite Arabic being the official language of the Syrian Arab Republic which constitutes a clear violation of the right to education in mother-tongue.

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Indeed, it can be seen from the visuals published by the French Le Parisien newspaper as part of a story titled “Les Kurdes de Syria”, that many Arabic place names have been replaced with Kurdish ones.

During a news report by the Kurd Street News aired in October 2016, the name of the village al-Sahajara (meaning “tree” in Arabic) near al- Hasakah was replaced with Çoldara (meaning “woodland in Kurdish)

(2016 ,األكراد يستعيدون)

Again, the name of the Ayn al-Arab district (Arab Spring in English) soon after it came under the PYD control following the defeat of the regime forces in 2012 was renamed Kobani.

(2014 ,كوباين) A Turkish Perspective on Future Syria's Perspective Turkish A

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Other examples of such name changes include (“white hill” in English) replaced with “Gire Spi” and the Ras al-Ayn, populated by Arabs, Kurds, Chechen, and Christians, with “Sere Kaniye”. It is important to note too that out of the 271 villages in the Ras al-Ayn district, 106 of them are populated by Arab majorities.79

(2014 ,كوباين)

( ve 2011) ,عبودي وردي

79 Bozbuğa, R. “Suriye Kürtleri: Suriye’nin kuzeyinde etnik yapı ve Kürt nüfusu”, 21. Yüzyıl Türkiye Enstitüsü, 05 Ocak 2015. (Syrian Kurds: Etnicity Structure and

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(Rojava in Kurdish and Arabic, 2016)

(Rojava in Kurdish and Arabic, 2016)

Kurdification of the Syrian Schools

It is also understood that in addition to changing geographical names, the PYD is also working on a new syllabus following the changing of the medium of instruction in public schools from Arabic to Kurdish to deny the children of Arab background the right to education in their mother-tongue and to learn about their own culture.80

80 Kajjo, S. , “Syrian Kurdish learns their mother tongue freely”,

08 August 2016. A Turkish Perspective on Future Syria's Perspective Turkish A

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(Abed, 2017)

Abed, 2017)

As part of these changes, the PYD has already replaced the Arabic curriculum which is followed by the Syrian Ministry of Education with a Kurdish curriculum in 75% of the local schools with the new curriculum that includes topics such as “Kurdish History”, “Kurdish language”, “Mazdeism” each supported with ideologically biased and customized textbooks.81

81 Abed, s. Voices from Al Hasaka: Part II (Illegally enforcing the Kurdish

curriculum) The Rabbit Hole, 20 April 2017. A Turkish Perspective on Future Syria's Perspective Turkish A

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It is also noted that the new Kurdish curriculum is in direct violation of the official education policy of the Syrian government and that hundreds of schools have been shut down by the PYD as a result of the dispute regarding the adoption of the new curriculum. More alarmingly, recent reports suggest that schools that have been reopened by the PYD have been staffed by PYD sympathizers lacking qualifications and the necessary professional skills.82

It is disappointing that while such practices of ethnic cleansing adopted by the PYD since 2012 — including arbitrary changes to geographical names and the forceful removal of Arabic from the daily vernacular by replacing the medium of instruction with Kurdish — constitute ethnic discrimination thus serious human rights violations, they have received very little attention and almost no condemnation from the international community.

By the same token, the Western states have also failed to respond to the deal between the US-based Delta Crescent and the PYD, which has meant legitimizing a terrorist group but also siding with a secessionist movement.

The political subjugation of its Kurdish rivals but also the systemic discrimination, ethnic cultural cleansing, forced migration and the totalitarian oppression of the Arab populations living in the territories under its control all underline the fact that the PYD is not a secular and democratic organization as some circles would suggest.

The apparent “immunity” the PYD enjoys in practicing its oppressive policies that constitute clear human rights violations owing to patronage provided by Washington (and the Pentagon in particular) confirms the rather brutal reality that ethical considerations and principles can be suspended at a whim when interests are at stake.

82 Darwish, S. M, “The Kurdish School Curriculum in Syria: A step towards self-

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Idlib

Apart from the US organized and approved deal between Delta Crescent Energy LLC and the PYD and its possible repercussions, the situation in Idlib is on top of the list of issues that will play a key role in the future direction of the conflict in Syria.

With a range of actors already situated in the province — including but not limited to the armed jihadist groups, Turkish-affiliated moderate opposition groups, Syrian armed forces (5th Corps and the 4th Armored Division) Russian military police (including members of the Russian Special Forces), Turkish military personnel (based in the temporary facilities, observation outposts and checkpoints), Iranian Hezbollah militias and ISIS militants — the situation in Idlib now resembles a powder keg in the long running Syrian conflict.

When taken together with the rivalry and power-struggle that exist amongst the rebel groups, the diverging and contingent interests of their patrons, but also the worsening humanitarian situation (with displaced Syrians from Eastern Ghouta, rural areas of Damascus, Daraa, Hama and Aleppo moving into the area in their thousands) presenting fertile ground for manipulation by a myriad of secret service operators, the situation in Idlib has deteriorated faster than anticipated.

While more than half of the displaced Syrians — fleeing not only from the jihadist groups but also from regime offensives — have been

resettled in the camps and empty buildings in the Eastern of Reyhanlı (in the southern districts of Atmeh, Al-Etarip and in particular), as well as in Turkish-controlled Afrin and Azaz, large numbers of them nonetheless remain scattered around the region, living in make-shift tents around olive groves and along the disused rail lines, not least because of the inadequate living conditions in the refugee camps.

The situation is exacerbated further by Russian air raids, which are aimed at strengthening the Syrian army’s position but also to force the

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fragility of the situation is also demonstrated by Russia’s recent targeting in July 2020 of the Turkish-controlled “Peace Spring” operation areas.

The Syrian regime appears keen for another military victory (following the recent recapturing of the M5 highway and other key areas) to consolidate its political position in the country, and wants a clean sweep in Idlib, described as the last stronghold of the rebel forces. For its part, Russia wants to control the entire M4 highway (which it patrols together with Turkey) to stop the drone attacks against its Khmeimim base, launched by the Turkistan Islamic Party. To that end, Russia’s immediate priorities also include the elimination of Turkistan Islamic Party based in Jisr al-Shughur and the Hurras al- Din (Guardians of Religion) active in the surrounding areas of the M4 highway.

So far, Russian gains toward the elimination of these two groups (Turkistan Islamic Party and the Hurras al-Din) have been negligible. While the Syrian 5th Corps, trained and equipped and advised by the Russian Special Forces guidance, has the overall responsibility of the Jisr al-Shughur province (including the Kurdish mountains) and the al-Ghab plains, the unit — which is also known as the “Tiger Corps” — has been unable to make significant headway. The difficult and mountainous terrain around the Jisr al-Shughur (a critical location for the entire region that lies between Latakia and the Turkmen mountains) appears to be the main reason why the 5th Corps but also the Russian jets (delivering over more than 200 sorties) have been unable to eliminate the rebel forces located in this area.

The Turkistan Islamic Party, also known in Syria as the “Afghanis”, is one of the most extremist rebel groups in Syria. The group which calls itself the Mujahideen is also known for training child recruits (as young as 7) and have used children to perform violent attack include suicide bombings. Unconfirmed reports further suggest that the group — notorious for its snipers who frequently act as private hitmen for the highest bidder — is in contact with the Circassian group (known as “Shishani”) based in Idlib city.

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On the other hand, the 5th Corps consists mainly of Syrian officers but also includes (as an extension of the key organizational feature of the Syrian army) Syrian and Iranian militias, Hezbollah fighters and personnel from the shady Russian private security firm, the Wagner group. The elite 4th Armored Division of the Syrian army led by Maher Assad (brother of Bashar al-Assad) which accompanied the 5th Corps in the south of Idlib was also transferred to Aleppo and was given the task to advance toward the central areas of Idlib from the east-west direction but it was unable to make key advances and eventually retreated to Aleppo, having lost the control of the locations it initially captured. The struggle between the Fourth Armored Division and the Fifth Corps over the operation, but also over the spoils of war can also be noted as a further handicap in the taking over of Idlib by the Syrian regime.

For its part, Iran also supports the regime efforts toward the elimination of the Salafist groups located in Idlib and in the north of Aleppo as part of a wider goal to see all anti-Iranian groups eliminated, to then be able to consolidate its influence in the country. In this context, small scale fighting continues between the Iranian- backed Shia militias and the ex-HTS militants who now fight for the control of the access points which link Aleppo with Afrin.

Another group of around 4,000 militants — affiliated with the rebel groups who defected from the HTS — who moved to the south of the M4 motorway following a call for jihad, have suffered heavy losses following the bombarding of the areas by Russian and Syrian jets, and retreated in significant numbers to the west of Aleppo.

In this regard, the Russian counterinsurgency doctrine, discussed in detail earlier has played a key part in creating the current military situation in Idlib. Similarly, various rebel groups (scattered in Aleppo, Daraa, Eastern Ghouta, Homs and Hama) have been cornered in Idlib largely thanks to Russian air bombardments.

Despite the overall destruction and human suffering it would cause, the Russian army’s decision to use Grozny-style “carpet bombing” in Syria (as opposed to “salami slicing” that was used by the US in

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the rebel population into a rapidly shrinking area between the Idlib city and the Turkish border, thus serving a dual-goal of eradicating the rebels and pressuring Turkey with a new influx of refugees.

In this regard, it is important to also underline that while there have been several ceasefires which followed the international condemnation over the significant loss to civilian life following Russian and regime attacks, these have been short-lived (72 hours) and in all instances, Russia and the Syrian regime resumed their operations with further advances.

Turkey’s Refugee Dilemma

With unconfirmed reports that the Idlib city already hosts more than one million displaced Syrians (many of whom having fled from the south and the southeast) and with at least 3.5 million of them living in the countryside, the massive refugee wave a final regime offensive (backed by Russia and Iran) in Idlib would trigger, is among the major Turkish concerns regarding Syria which has to be shared by the majority of the western countries, international community and the UN.

According to a report published by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in January 2020, more than 312,000 people fled from their homes in the period 1-31 December 2019 alone, mainly from the southern , moving further north, away from the hostilities. The figures published

by the OCHA further suggest that from 1 December 2019 to 2 February 2020, some 586,000 people fled from their homes in southwest Syria as a result of ongoing hostilities. Most studies also underline that women and children are disproportionately affected by the hostilities with an estimated 80 percent of those who were recently displaced being women and children. One NGO estimates that as many as 200,000 children and their families had been forced to flee their homes in northern Syria. Overall, by the UN’s own admission, the refugee crisis has reached a horrifying new level.

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Considering the fact that Turkey continues to host the largest number of Syrian refugees worldwide, (3.643.870 in August 2019) and bears high expenses on refugee care (housing, employment, education and health) and refugee-related social/demographic issues (Turkish city of with a total population of around 142.000, is home to 116.000 Syrian refugees), the country’s worries relating to a new wave of refugees are not ungrounded.

Constituting a 4.4% addition to Turkey’s population of 82 million citizens as of 2018, the Syrian refugees have an average household size of five to 6 (5.8) distributed to 620,000 households. It is further estimated that with the current number of births among Syrian refugees per day at 465, and the total number of births since the start of their flight to Turkish territory at 500,000, the size of the Syrian refugees in Turkey is expected to increase to 4,2 million in the next five years (unregistered Syrian refugees are not part of this estimate). Considering also that newborn Syrian children are not granted citizenship by the Syrian government, rendering them stateless, this “lost generation” is set to cause additional problems in the future.

Turkey is also worried about the growing anti-refugee sentiment at home. Though initially welcomed on humanitarian grounds, the presence of the nearly four million displaced Syrians has stoked up anger and backlash amongst the Turkish public with a further potential for anti-refugee violence. While the Turkish government initially said that it was prepared to host 100,000 refugees and that they would be placed into designated camps (the-then Turkish Prime Minister claimed that the 100,000 mark was Turkey’s “red line”), this was later abandoned in favor of a much-contested open door policy.

The controversy around the precise number of refugees in Istanbul is reflective of the war of numbers that have ensued in Turkey regarding the Syrian refugees. Home for the largest number of Syrian refugees, Istanbul was estimated to host around 547.943 Syrians in 2019 (3,64 percent of the city’s population). Yet, according to unofficial reports, a further 300,000 Syrians (registered elsewhere in Turkey) live in Istanbul, putting the final figure at one million (5,6 percent). Opinion polls also show that a rising tide of anti-Syrian xenophobia is now sweeping through Turkey's cities.

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The anti-refugee sentiment is based on a perception of threat to “way of living” and the Syrian presence is also being blamed for many of Turkey’s social troubles including distorting the labor market (driving the wages down), hence causing unemployment.

While situation in Turkey is different to what led to the surge of the far right movements in Europe — threatening democracy in many EU member states including Austria, the Netherlands, Hungary, Denmark and France — anti-refugee sentiment is still evident in rather benign and banal forms, including over the filling of the low-skilled and temporary positions in agriculture and construction with the unqualified Syrian refugees.

It is also noteworthy that while in Europe those parties that are on the far right of the political spectrum have benefitted from popular anti- refugee sentiments, in the Turkish case the social-democratic parties have been the main protagonists of such positions.

Yet it should be noted that despite the growing anti-refugee sentiment and the fact that high intensity fighting in most parts of Syria is over, many Syrians have managed to create a new life in Turkey. And with a generation of children growing up with increasingly distant — or nonexistent — personal memories of Syria, it is difficult to expect large numbers of them returning. And for that reason, a new wave of refugees which would only add to the existing problems mentioned earlier, would pose a burden that would be too heavy for Turkey to bear, economically, socially but also politically.

Moreover, with growing numbers of people in Turkey now convinced — within a much-polarized political landscape — that the refugee crisis is a result of bad policy, the controversy that surrounds the presence of the displaced is likely remain a hot- button topic and may even have domestic political repercussions, that may exacerbate the existing problems further.

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Opposition Groups in northern Idlib

Another threat related to Syrian regime’s sweeping of the opposition groups to the north — toward the Turkish border — also deserves close attention.

The pending danger from a Turkish perspective in this regard relates to the fact once the final offensive “liberates” Idlib from the jihadist groups and other terrorists, they will be flushed toward the Turkish border together with their families. Under such a scenario, it is not difficult to foresee the chaos that will render it near impossible to conduct screening to identify terrorist fighters and Turkey will face with a Peshawar-like situation along its border. Such a situation would not only pose a significant risk to Turkey but would also threaten European security as terrorists disguised as refugees would head toward the continent.

For these reasons, Turkey has been against the idea of a final regime offensive in Idlib and has supported instead a peaceful resolution (or at least one that involves minimal fighting) involving the rebranding of the HTS and its internal transformation as a moderate group, independent of al-Qaeda’s chain of command.

Under present circumstances, Turkey seems to have secured the extra time it needs as Russia — following the deal struck between Ankara and Kremlin in Moscow on 5 March 2020 to allow the opposition remain in the Idlib city, 7 km north of the M4 highway and for

Russian and Turkish troops to jointly patrol the highway — has postponed its plans for a final offensive in Idlib.

That said, it is also unlikely that Russia which has thus far preferred to use air strikes to force the retreat of the rebels, will engage in a guerrilla battle in sizeable Idlib with a dense population since this would require Kremlin to launch a lengthy grounds operation, risking significant casualties.

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For its part, the Syrian regime too is likely to follow a cautious strategy toward Idlib in view of the estimates that around 50,000 jihadist fighters (including the HTS) is currently located in Idlib.83 Limited too in terms of its capabilities to launch a final offensive in terms of logistical and personnel requirements, the Syrian regime is likely to adopt a bitesize approach which will, in turn allow Turkey the opportunity to pursue a peaceful resettlement by focusing on the rebranding and the internal reconstruction of the HTS, the largest and the strongest of the rebel groups in the region.

That said, even if Russia and Syria would decide to strike a deal with the HTS, it still seems inevitable that the two countries will sooner or later engage in some form of battle in Idlib with the splinter jihadist groups such as the Hurras al-Din and the Turkistan Islamic Party that have fiercely opposed the rebranding and the internal reconstruction of the HTS along more moderate lines.

Indeed, Turkey also appears to be preparing for this eventuality. In this context, the setting up of temporary stations, checkpoints along critical junctures and observation posts (around 60, though some open sources give a higher estimate of around 60-66) can be considered the setting up of an unofficial “buffer zone” to protect the Turkish border from an eventual spillover from the fighting that is set to take place between the Syrian regime (backed by Russia) against the jihadist groups, above all the Hurras al-Din (Guardians of Religion) and the Turkistan Islamic Party.

83 As mentioned previously, the jihadist fighters tend to move around with their families and in this sense, in addition to 50,000 fighters, the total number of the jihadist population is likely to be over 300,000. Other jihadist groups who fought alongside Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan or with Baghdadi in Idlib — together

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TAF Observation Outposts and Temporary Stations (May 2020)

More specifically, a closer look on preparations around the temporary stations and checkpoints reveals that the aim is to stem the advances of the Syrian forces further west or north beyond the areas around the M5 highway that it already controls. It is also clear that with temporary stations in Maar Hitat, Qminas, , Ma’arat al-

Na’asan, and observation posts in the far north of Idlib (in Salva and Takleh) Turkey is establishing a “safe zone” to stem a refugee wave toward its borders. Turkey has also completed the necessary reinforcements against potential air and land offenses and dropped the number of troops it stationed in the temporary posts to a company level instead of battalion to avoid extensive casualties.

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In an article published on Al-Monitor titled “What a Russian-Turkish compromise on Idlib may look like”, Russian analyst and a non- resident expert of the prestigious Russian International Affairs Council, Kirill Semenov has suggested that Russia has proposed Turkey the control of a strip in the Idlib de-escalation zone, 15 kilometers (9 miles) wide, along the Syrian-Turkish border, where could be located. Considering however that the Turkish troops are currently positioned 20-35 kilometers from the border and that such a retreat under Russian plans would allow the Syrian army to continue its northward and westward advancement, it is unlikely that Turkey will agree.

Observation Outposts

Another Turkish concern regarding Idlib relates to the status of its military observation posts (set up in accordance with the Astana agreements), 7 of which now remain in areas that have been captured during regime advances.

TAF Observation Outposts – Before February 2020

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TAF Observation Outposts – After February 2020

It is also important to note that Turkey has refortified these observation posts during and after its Peace Shield Operation and the Syrian regime has so far refrained from obstructing the weekly and fortnightly logistical support provided to these posts. In this regard, it

can be suggested that the Peace Shield Operation in response to the

Balioun attack has been an effective deterrent which —together with Russian pressure over the Syrian regime — has, to a large extent, stopped the regime attacks and harassment targeting the Turkish observation posts.

Occasional skirmishes do continue however, as reported by the Turkish Ministry of Defense on 16 September 2020 that the 7th observation post in Tell Touqan (set up on 9 February 2018) came under attack by civilian groups upon directions by the Syrian regime. The same report also notes that observation posts which are encircled

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groups though these were later forced to leave these areas thanks to Turkey’s precautionary measures.

For Turkey, these attacks and initiatives are considered a form of posturing regarding its position over Idlib. In other words, at a time when Ankara’s attention is focused on the developments regarding the energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean and the disputes which have emerged in this context with Cyprus, Greece, France, Egypt, the EU, but also the US, such small-scale attacks are not considered to be aimed at military results but to remind Turkey of its obligations under the Astana Agreement (4 May 2017), and with reference to the Article 5 of the Russia-Iran-Turkey joint statement (1 July 2020) in particular.

In this regard, trying to pressurize Turkey regarding its obligations under the Astana agreement can be placed in the wider context of Syrian unease over progress in Turkish efforts to rebrand the HTS along moderate lines to reach a peaceful resolution in Idlib, thus an attempt to torpedo these efforts and bypass the HTS.

It is important to note that the Syrian position is also supported by Russia which itself resorted to the same tactics earlier. With that in mind, and considering that there is no YPG or HTS presence in the areas where the targeted observation posts are, it is possible to suggest that these attacks were carried out by the regime-affiliated militias with Russian knowledge and consent. Bearing in mind also the fact that the observation posts that are located within the regime-controlled territories are only 10-40km apart from another and a simultaneous attack on them requires military planning and preparation. Lacking

such capabilities in terms of coordination, communication, and repositioning, it is highly probable that they were carried out with the behind-the-scene guidance of the Syrian regime.

In theory, Turkish inability to send air support to its southernmost observation posts (located in the regime-controlled territories and beyond the reach of long-range rocket and artillery systems) without Russian consent is a serious handicap for Ankara and should be a cause for concern. As reiterated earlier however, it is unlikely that the Syrian regime will risk a direct, large-scale attack which would have

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would trigger from Turkey but also in terms of the overall balance of power in the conflict.

Besides, these observation posts have now been reinforced and fortified with artillery and rocket batteries, tanks, and armored combat vehicles to defend themselves against such threats.

Turkey-Russia Discord

An important stumbling block for Turkey, regarding Idlib but also the overall Syrian conflict is the disagreements which have emerged with Russia.

Such diverging views and disagreements were manifest in the statements of both sides responding to the killing of 7 Turkish soldiers together with a civilian by the Syrian army’s artillery fire in Saraqib on 3 February 2019.

Following the attacks, the Kremlin released a statement on 14 February 2019 (which came after a phone call between President Erdogan and his Russian counterpart), emphasizing the concern of the two leaders regarding the recent aggravation in the Idlib de-escalation zone, adding also that the recent spike in terrorist attacks in the region was causing significant casualties.

Yet, for his part, President Erdogan did not mince his words in a subsequent statement on his flight back from Senegal on 29 January 2019 regarding the attacks and the wider dispute between Ankara and Kremlin over who is a terrorist and who is not: “Russia tells us they fight against terrorism. Who are terrorists? The people fighting to defend their own lands? If you ask them, they will tell you that the 4 million Syrians in Turkey are terrorists. These people have fled their country because of Assad”.

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list), it is clear that for Erdogan, “the people who defend their own lands” is the Turkish-affiliated groups including the SNA. This situation, i.e. diametrically opposing Turkish position over the HTS and Kremlin’s stance regarding the Syrian National Army (SNA) considered by Kremlin as terrorists, represents a dangerous rift that both sides have refrained from tacking so far.

In order to get to the bottom of the Idlib-related disputes between Russia and Turkey, a brief assessment of the “Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Republic” signed between Russia, Iran and Turkey in Astana on 4 May 2017, and the “Memorandum on Stabilization of the Situation in the Idlib De- escalation Area” signed between the Kremlin and Ankara in Sochi on 17 September 2018 is needed.

Article 2 of the 4 May Memorandum excludes those groups who oppose the ceasefire by stating that: “within the lines of the de- escalation areas: hostilities between the conflicting parties (the government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the armed opposition groups that have joined and will join the ceasefire regime) with the use of any kinds of weapons, including aerial assets, shall be ceased”. Article 5 of the same text also excludes those groups who are included in the UNSC terror list: “The guarantors shall: [...] take all necessary measures to continue the fight against DAESH/ISIL, Nusra Front and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaeda or DAESH/ISIL as designated by the UN Security Council within and outside the de-escalation areas.”

In this sense, the Astana Agreement prescribes the guarantors to continue fighting those groups (within and outside the de-escalation areas), who do not recognize the ceasefire and those who are included in the UNSC designated terrorist groups.

It is also for this reason that Kremlin responds to accusations over Syria ceasefire violations by claiming that these groups are not party to the agreed ceasefire.

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Regarding the bilateral Russia-Turkey memorandum of 17 September (Sochi Agreement) moreover, both Russia and Turkey blame each other for violating the ceasefire.

The Sochi agreement which refers to the trilateral Astana deal (4 May 2017) envisaging “stabilizing the situation in the Idlib de-escalation area as soon as possible” includes the following:

2. The Russian Federation will take all necessary measures to ensure that military operations and attacks on Idlib will be avoided and existing status quo will be maintained.

3. A demilitarized zone, 15-20 kms. deep in the de-escalation area will be established.

4. All radical terrorist groups will be removed from the demilitarized zone by October 15.

5. All tanks, MLRS, artillery and mortars belonging to conflicting parties will be withdrawn from demilitarized zone by October 10.2018.

6. With a view to ensuring free movement of residents and goods and restoring trade and economic relations, transit traffics on the routes M4 (Aleppo-Latakia) and M5 (Aleppo-Hama) will be restored by the end of 2018.

7. The two sides reiterated their determination to combat terrorism in Syria in all forms and manifestations.

Yet, despite the clear commitment Russia has pledged to “take all necessary measures to ensure that military operations and attacks on Idlib will be avoided and existing status quo will be

maintained” (Article 2), the ongoing violations of ceasefire committed by the Syrian army, but also the direct involvement of the in aiding regime advances toward the north of Idlib suggest that Russia is in violation of the relevant article.

For their part, Kremlin heavyweights including Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Kremlin Spokesperson and Special Envoy Alexander Lavrentyev with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Maria Zaharova have responded to

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the agreement does not suspend the fight against terrorism and refer to Article 5 of the said text.

But rather paradoxically perhaps, the conflicting views between Russia and Turkey over the status of various armed opposition groups are each individually supported by the Sochi and Astana accords. In this regard, the fact that Article 5 of the Astana Agreement (referred also in the Sochi accord) and the ambiguous commitments to “fighting terrorism” and “maintaining the status quo” penned into the Sochi accord would conflict with each other in practice was not taken into account, is among the main reasons which have caused the existing disagreements between Russia and Turkey regarding the situation in Idlib.

It is nonetheless remarkable that Russia has accused the HTS of provoking the attacks. According to the Sochi accord, Ankara's obligation was to separate moderate opposition militants from terrorists and neutralize the HTS. The group which was left out of the Sochi accord attacked the Turkish-backed National Liberation Front groups in January 2019 and took control of large parts of Idlib, thus making it impossible to set up a 15-20km deep safe zone in the ceasefire areas.

To expand its influence, the HTS then attacked the CIA-affiliated Jabhat al-Sham and the Nour al-Din al-Zenki Movement (also affiliated with the CIA). Following these attacks, Jabhat al-Sham retreated toward Afrin (areas included in the Operation “Olive Branch”) and dissolved itself while a significant fraction of the Nour

al-Din al-Zenki Movement joined the Ahrar al-Sham when they were refused entry into the “Euphrates Shield” operation area.

Along with a strong presence in the Idlib city, the HTS’s consolidated superiority in the countryside subsequently ruled out Ankara’s fulfilling of its Sochi pledge to “remove all radical terrorist groups from the demilitarized zone by October 15” and the withdrawal of heavy weaponry from the demilitarized zone by October 10 2018”. When the latter faced further challenges in meeting the October deadline regarding the restoring of transit traffics on the routes

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The M4 and M5 highways which link Aleppo to Latakia and Hama and represent the key supply lines, and they are also crucial for the Russian objective of linking and protecting its bases. When the highways were not opened to traffic, for which Turkey was responsible, this gave the Russians the perfect excuse to back the regime offensive in Idlib, in which the latter retook Saraqib, located at the intersection of the M4 and the M5.

But the harsh statements from Kremlin (and from the Foreign Minister Lavrov and Lavrentyev in particular), despite Putin’s intervention that Turkey was “doing its best”, were an early indication that the Syrian regime had secured Russian backing to initiate a large-scale operation.

In this context, it should not be surprising if Russia would resort once again to the same tactic by referring to the latest Summit decisions between Turkey, Russia, and Iran on 1 July 2020 “to continue cooperation in order to ultimately eliminate all terrorist groups” since the Article 5 of the Summit decisions state that: “[the Guarantors] reaffirmed the determination to continue cooperation in order to ultimately eliminate DAESH/ISIL, Al- Nusra Front and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaeda or DAESH/ISIL, and other terrorist groups, as designated by the UN Security Council”.84

In other words, because Russia has pointed in particular to HTS’s inclusion in the UN Security Council’s sanctions list, as its main reason for backing repeated regime offensives in Idlib, it may be tempted to push in that direction once again by insisting on the HTS’s

removal from the demilitarized zone — and using Turkish non- compliance as a pretext for another attack or as leverage.

As discussed earlier in the preceding sections of the report, Turkey nonetheless appears to have increased military control in Idlib, and the military coordination that comes with it, which gives Ankara more say over the rebel groups, including HTS, and allows it to pursue the rebranding of the HTS along moderate lines. Indeed, Turkish priority

84 As noted earlier, when the UNSC “terrorist list” was revised to include the HTS (as the predecessor of al-Nusra), Turkey followed suit in August 2018 by

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now appears to be in that direction; to set conditions for the HTS’s transformation into a moderate political actor.

At the same time, the HTS for its part, also appears convinced that an all-out battle would come at a high cost and might endanger its future survival. It has thus increased security cooperation with Turkey despite strong challenge from internal critics in forging links with Ankara or pursuing the Turkish-backed transformation.

In this context, various opposition groups have posted comments on social media to suggest that the Bab al-Hawa border crossing — controlled by the HTS — would be linked with the M5 and placed under Russian/Syrian joint control in return for Moscow’s “green light” to extend the “Peace Spring” operation area toward Ayn al- Arab/Kobane. It is possible that such reports and comments are part of HTS’s plan to lay the groundwork, since the Turkish Armed Forces have started using the alternative Kafr Lusin border crossing more frequently to reinforce their positions.

But when taken together with other reports on the social media that the group is demanding from the control of another border crossing and partial responsibility over the distribution of foreign aid in return for Bab al-Hawa, it is suggested that the HTS is looking to strengthen its hand against dissenters by creating a perception that it is driving a difficult bargain with Turkey.

Nonetheless, it is important to underline that the reconstruction of the

HTS along moderate lines does not only depend on Turkey or the current HTS leadership and other actors including Russia, Israel, Syria, Iran, the US but also Saudi Arabia and the UAE (despite their wading influence) are likely to intervene to protect — and extend — their own interests.

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Conclusion

It goes without saying that Russia holds the key in Idlib in relation to reaching a settlement that Turkey favors.

While a costly battle for the province — set to weaken the Russian but also Syrian presence — does not appear to be Moscow’s priority, it is nonetheless likely that the latter will, sooner or later, play the “Astana card” regarding Turkish pledges.

In addition, while the two countries have so far managed to avoid a cliff-edge in the relations by compartmentalizing disagreements that exist on multiple issues but it seems that the resolution to the Idlib conflict is likely to depend on other developments outside Syria.

The situation in Libya is relevant here. As it is well-known, Turkey and Russia stand on opposing sides of the battle line in Libya. Turkey appeared as a “game changer” in Libya with a robust support for the GNA and a strong military presence in Trablus, al-Watiya and Misrata. Russia on the other hand has backed the Hafter forces by sending Wagner militias and war planes (via Syria), with a long-term interest in acquiring bases in al- Jufra and Sirte. In this sense, it is likely that the trade-offs in Libya will also have implications for the negotiations regarding the situation in Idlib.

Recent Russian involvement in August-September 2020 in the energy-

related developments in the Eastern Mediterranean and around Cyprus, are also indicative of a complex game of chess. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s remarks during a visit to the island, backing Greek-Cypriot arguments regarding the Turkish military presence on the island as the guarantor power, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yury Borisov’s statement regarding plans for joint oil exploration with Syria, and Russian live-fire naval exercises in the Eastern Mediterranean all point to Moscow’s desire to grow stronger and enter the energy bonanza in the region.

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For all these reasons, the last rebel stronghold of Idlib — following Russian move to include the PYD in the Geneva talks, albeit indirectly — has emerged as a crucial stress test for the bilateral ties between Moscow and Ankara. While a peaceful settlement in Idlib via the HTS (supported by Turkey) would not solve all the problems that exist between Russia, Iran, Turkey and the US, it would nonetheless provide some respite and allow diplomacy to develop initiatives and opportunities in bridging key divergences.

Yet, recent steps taken by the US, France but also Russia in Syria and the new dynamics these have set, still carry the potential to further deteriorate the situation for Turkey which now appears to be running short of time.

Under present circumstances, as displayed in a rather dramatic fashion by the US military commander Myles B. Caggins — during an award ceremony organized by the YPG in which he cried as he made his farewell speech in which he said he was extremely sad that he would no longer be able to support the terrorist group — it is clear that the US (together with Russia) has given its blessing for a Kurdish puppet state in Syria under a new federal system.

In this regard, the Syrian conflict is likely to soon move into its next phase in which the reconstruction of the country — in economic, political, judicial, technical and commercial terms — will be the focus of attention and perhaps the new battlefield in the wider context of the struggle for power in the region.

In this new battlefield, Russia and Iran is expected to emerge with a geo-economic superiority based on existing agreements and bilateral ties with the Syrian regime together with China in terms of the latter’s economic power and technological capabilities.

For its part, the US is expected to focus its attention on consolidating its permanence in the west of the country via the PYD and taking an active role in the reconstruction of the areas controlled by the latter.

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Yet, despite its geographical proximity to Syria, Turkish aspirations to take an active part in the post-conflict reconstruction of the country are likely to be opposed by Russia, Iran but also the US in view of Ankara’s current stance on the Assad regime but also its rightful objections regarding the PYD’s goal of achieving territorial autonomy and its strong ties with the PKK. 85

In this regard, the future viability of the Turkish foreign policy toward Syria, and the ways in which it can be altered — without jeopardizing its national security — to reflect the changing dynamics once the dust begins the settle and normalization follows (with the eventual settling of the dispute in Idlib, the drafting of the new constitution, and holding of fresh elections) is an important line of inquiry that requires further attention.

The history of international relations provides ample evidence of pragmatic alterations in foreign policy in line with national interests. Indeed, while a major transformation usually takes time, it is by no means a taboo. As Lord Palmerston put it more succinctly: “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.” Palmerston’s message of “no friends or permanent enemies” continues to ring true today.

For Turkey, the main sticking point regarding the post-conflict reconstruction of Syria is the legalization of the PYD the offshot of PKK to become a state actor (de facto) or take part in the governance of Syria under a federal regime (de jure). Concerned by both

prospects, Turkey has been working on the parameters of a detailed action plan to counteract each scenario as part of its national security calculations.

Indeed, recent developments especially since 2016, have shown that the PYD has made significant progress — with backing from Russia, the US, France but also the UAE and Saudi Arabia — toward territorial autonomy or sharing power under a new federal system of

85 That said, the enormous reconstruction needs of the country and Turkey’s construction potential demonstrated in Iraq, may nonetheless tempt the Russian

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government (as a “fallback” option). Under these circumstances, Turkey’s plans to counteract such prospects have taken on even greater significance.

Another issue, from a Turkish perspective, relates to the future status of the armed opposition groups that it trained and brought together under the Syrian National Army (the Free Syrian Army). In this regard, the stance of the Assad regime (or its future extension) toward these groups will depend on a political deal which will ensure their safety and security.

In a similar vein, a third issue concerns the areas that remain under Turkish control. Regardless of how long it takes, Turkey — which has consistently pledged to respect Syria’s unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity — will have to withdraw from these areas once normalization begins. Ankara will thus be keen to secure clear commitments that once it pulls back from the areas adjacent to the Turkish border that it controlled following subsequent military operations (“Euphrates Shield”, “Olive Branch”, “Peace Spring” and “Peace Shield”), including Afrin, Azaz, Tell Abiad and Al Bab, the PYD will not be allowed to return to these areas to threaten Turkish national security. In view of the ongoing Kurdification efforts led by the YPG in areas it controls, discussed in detail earlier this issue will remain a highly sensitive issue for Turkey.

Last but not least, the safe return of at least some of the displaced Syrians that have been generously hosted by Turkey so far — free from fear of regime retaliation — and their peaceful integration into

the Syrian society as full and equal citizens, remain key priorities for

Turkey.

It is clear that the complex post-conflict setting which will emerge with the winding down of the military conflict will usher in a new phase of multinational political conflagration which may well place Turkey in a more difficult situation. To face that, Turkey will need a strong and enduring alliance that will support its rightful arguments based on national security.

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Appedix

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REPUBLIC OF TURKEY MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Relations between Turkey–Syria

TURKEY’S APPROACH TO THE CONFLICT IN SYRIA The events that erupted in Syria in March 2011 have transformed into a major conflict, closely affecting regional security and stability, particularly in Syria.

The conflict in Syria has claimed the lives of a great number of innocent people, caused millions of Syrians to be displaced to various regions within their country or to other countries including Turkey. Turkey has been facing serious political, security and humanitarian challenges and responsibilities caused by the conflict.

Since the outset, the basic parameters of Turkey’s policy with regard to the developments in Syria have been the preservation of the territorial integrity and unity of Syria, ending the bloodshed and the peaceful conclusion of the political transition process that would address the legitimate demands of the Syrian people.

FIGHTING AGAINST TERRORISM EMANATING FROM SYRIA The regime’s policies that led Syria to an ever-deepening crisis have triggered regional instability and have added a new dimension to regional threats. As a result, DEASH and other extremist groups found fertile ground in the region. The menace posed by DEASH to regional and international peace and security required effective global counter measures, leading to the creation of the Global Coalition Against DEASH.

Fighting against DEASH is a national security priority for Turkey. As an active member of the Global Coalition since its inception, Turkey has contributed to its Operation “Inherent Resolve”.

Turkey also carried out three important counter terrorism operations on the Syrian territories neighboring its border on the basis of international law, in accordance with its right to self-defense as outlined in Article 51 of the UN Charter and the relevant Security Council resolutions on counter terrorism.

Operation Euphrates Shield In order to eradicate DEASH presence from the Syrian territories it borders, Turkey

launched "Operation Euphrates Shield" (OES) on 24 August 2016.

The Free Syrian Army, supported by the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), have established control over an area of 2,015 km2 and neutralized 2,647 DEASH fighters. As a result of the success of the OES, DEASH started to lose ground and lost its territorial control in Syria by the end of March 2019 due to subsequent operations conducted by the Global Coalition.

Operation Olive Branch The threat posed by the PKK/YPG terrorist elements located in Afrin in the northwest of Syria to the lives and properties of the local population as well as to our citizens living in the bordering Turkish provinces escalated due to harassment fires

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The presence of DEASH elements in Afrin and the risk of their possible attacks to Turkey as well as their infiltration into Europe constituted another reason for Turkey to take action. Against this backdrop, the TAF and the Free Syrian Army supported by the TAF launched Operation Olive Branch (OOB) on 20 January 2018.

The objectives of the OOB were to ensure our border security, to neutralize terrorists in Afrin and to liberate the local population from the oppression and tyranny of terrorists.

Control was established in Afrin as of 18 March 2018. In less than two months, an area of approximately 2,000 km² was cleared from PKK/YPG and DEASH elements. Approximately 4,600 terrorists have been neutralized since the start of the operation.

As in the OES area, Turkey focused on ensuring security and stability with the participation of the local population in areas freed from terror with the OOB. More than 371,000 Syrians have been able to return to the said operation areas thanks to stabilization efforts in areas such as de-mining, public order, local governance and return of IDPs.

Operation Peace Spring In order to eliminate the PKK/YPG threat to its national security, Turkey held talks with the U.S. on the establishment of a safe zone in the Syrian territories neighboring Turkish border between February and September 2019.

During the talks, Turkey has conveyed its fundamental expectations regarding the safe zone for effectively addressing its national security concerns. We have emphasized our right to self-defense in the face of terror threat emanating from Syria and our determination to combat PKK/YPG terrorist elements. Turkey repeatedly stressed the fallacy of combating DEASH and undertaking stabilization efforts by engaging with another terrorist organization, PKK/YPG.

A preliminary understanding on the safe zone was reached during the talks between the military authorities of the two countries on 5-7 August 2019. Subsequently, a Turkish-U.S. Joint Operations Center commenced its activities on 12 August 2019, followed by joint air reconnaissance missions and ground patrols. However, the commitments undertaken by the U.S. have not been fulfilled.

In light of the ongoing PKK/YPG threat and the inability of the U.S. to effectively

address our legitimate security concerns, the TAF and the Syrian National Army supported by the TAF launched "Operation Peace Spring" (OPS) on 9 October 2019.

The objectives of the OPS were to eliminate the terror threat to our national security, contribute to the preservation of Syria's territorial integrity and unity, liberate the local population from the oppression and tyranny of the terrorists and lay the ground for the dignified, safe and voluntary returns of displaced Syrians.

The legitimate representatives of the Syrian people, the National Coalition and the Interim Government, along with tribal leaders as well as representatives of minorities including the Christian communities expressed support to the operation.

With the commencement of the OPS, baseless allegations were directed against Turkey. These include that the OPS would lead to a humanitarian crisis, weaken the fight against DEASH, disrupt the political process and change the demographic

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Turkey’s efforts to combat terrorism, the OPS paved the way for the return of Syrians displaced by PKK/YPG, disrupted the separatist agenda of PKK/YPG and thus contributed to the advancement of the political process. The U.S. accepted the legitimacy of the OPS and the new status-quo on the ground with the Joint Statement made on 17 October 2019 during the visit of Vice President Mike Pence to Ankara. A Memorandum of Understanding was concluded with the Russian Federation on the removal of terrorist elements from the Syrian territories neighboring the Turkish border and from Manbij and Tal Rifat, as a result of the meeting between President Erdoğan President Vladimir Putin in Sochi on 22 October 2019. The Russian Federation has also acknowledged our legitimate security concerns, the legitimacy of the OPS conducted to address them and the established status-quo on the ground.

Turkey has been conveying to the U.S. and the Russian Federation that it reserves the right to self-defense against threats and attacks conducted contrary to those agreements by terrorist elements.

EFFORTS TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT Actively involved in all international initiatives to find a peaceful solution to the conflict, Turkey is exerting efforts to accelerate the political process in order to prevent further escalation and the spread of violence to neighboring countries. Turkey has prepared the ground for the Vienna talks and participated in the meetings organized with the participation of the International Syria Support Group member states and like-minded countries.

Geneva Process On 18 December 2015, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution that for the first time envisaged a timetable for the political process. Based on the Geneva Communiqué of 2012 that defines the framework of political transition in Syria, the UN Security Council Resolution No. 2254 envisions the gathering of opposition and regime representatives in Geneva under the auspices of the UN. The agenda of this "Geneva Process" was determined in accordance with the roadmap set out in the UN Security Council Resolution No. 2254: (i) Transitional governing body, (ii) Constitution, (iii) Elections and (iv) Counter Terrorism (subsequently added by the regime’s demand). As a result of the intense diplomacy by Turkey, delegations composed of the representatives of the Syrian opposition, Syrian Negotiation Commission (the then called High Negotiations Committee established in Riyadh in December 2015) began to participate in indirect negotiations conducted under UN mediation in Geneva in January 2016.

However, as the regime continued its intense attacks and refused to discuss political transition, the Geneva talks ceased after the ninth round on 25-26 January 2018.

Astana Platform Eastern Aleppo, which was besieged by the regime in July 2016, was completely subjugated in December 2016 as a result of continuous attacks. Ceasefire was established in Aleppo as a result of intense talks between Turkey and the RF, which allowed the safe evacuation of 45,000 civilians in December 2016. As a result of the agreement signed by Turkey and the RF on 30 December 2016, the ceasefire in Aleppo was extended to the whole country.

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regularly being organized at capital of Kazakhstan, Nur-Sultan (previously called Astana) since January 2017 with the participation of Turkey, the RF as well as Iran.

In addition to the regular meetings, the three Astana guarantor states held five Summits (Sochi, 22 November 2017; Ankara, 4 April 2018; Tehran, 7 September 2018; Sochi, 14 February 2019; Ankara, 16 September 2019), and six Foreign Ministers’ meetings (Astana, 16 March 2018; Moscow, 28 April 2018; New York, 26 September 2018; Geneva, 18 December 2018; New York, 25 September 2019; Geneva, 29 September 2019).

The Astana platform, which plays a significant role in the establishment of de- escalation areas, the launch of the Constitutional Committee and the adoption of confidence building measures between the Syrian parties, remains the only international initiative that made a concrete contribution to end the conflict in Syria.

IDLIB DE-ESCALATION AREA Idlib, one of the four de-escalation areas designated at the 4th Astana Meeting held on 4-5 May 2017, remains as the last one after the regime took control of Eastern Ghouta, Northern Homs and Daraa-Qunaitra in 2018. President Erdoğan and the President of the RF met in Sochi on 17 September 2018 to discuss the situation in the Idlib De-Escalation Area. As a result, the "Memorandum on Stabilization of the Situation in the Idlib De-escalation Area" was signed between two countries. Iran, the third Astana guarantor, later announced its support to the Memorandum. Maintaining compliance with the Memorandum is critical to prevent escalation on the ground, a wave of irregular migration and humanitarian crisis as well as for the sustainability of the political process.

Regime elements have increased their attacks on Idlib since May 2019 under the pretext of combating terrorism. Turkey emphasizes to the regime’s guarantors its deep concern regarding the regime's targeting of civilians and civilian infrastructure, as well as the risks those pose to Turkey. Turkey’s expectation is the establishment of calm on the ground by fully implementing all agreements on Idlib, first and foremost the Memorandum of 17 September 2018.

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITTEE At the Syrian National Dialogue Congress held on 30 January 2018 in Sochi/RF with the joint efforts of the Astana guarantors, a call was made to establish a “Constitutional Committee" consisting of 150 members.

The Secretary-General of the UN announced the establishment of the Committee on

23 September 2019, after agreement was reached on its members and rules of procedure. The inaugural session of the Committee was held on 30 October 2019 in Geneva. Turkey continues to support the work of Constitutional Committee, a milestone in accelerating the political process, in order to pave the way for a genuine and comprehensive political change that will address the root causes of the conflict in Syria.

Turkey wants to see that this process would result in the peaceful establishment of a free and democratic system in line with the legitimate aspirations and expectations of the Syrian people, where all Syrians', without any ethnic, religious and sectarian discrimination, fundamental rights and freedoms are under constitutional guarantee on the basis of equality.

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SYRIAN OPPOSITION Turkey also supported the efforts for the emergence of an effective and inclusive Syrian opposition, which will take responsibility on the transition process in line with the legitimate demands of the people.

Within this framework, the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces was designated as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people at the meeting of the Friends of the Syria Group held in Marrakech in December 2012. The National Coalition is based in Istanbul. Turkey also lent support to The Riyadh Meeting of 8-10 December 2015, in which the Syrian Negotiation Commission (the then called High Negotiations Committee) was established.

In line with the understanding that the main element of democracy is pluralism and that pluralism requires the existence of effective opposition, Turkey’s engagement with the Syrian opposition groups are carried out without any political, ethnic, religious or sectarian interests and without any discrimination. The Syrian people will determine the solution to the conflict and the future of Syria. Turkey continues to support the Syrian people in this process.

Syrian Turkmens have a special position within the context of Turkey's support to the Syrian people. Being one of the principal founders of Syria and at the forefront of resistance against oppression, Turkmens will continue to enjoy Turkey’s support in order to have their rightful place in the future of Syria.

(http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey%E2%80%93syria.en.mfa)

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