MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES Fall 2015

MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM Fall OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES 2015

Learning from Sykes-Picot

The collapse of Picot” has become the short hand for specula- Marina Ottaway, central author- tion about a possible reconfiguration of the Middle East Fellow, Woodrow Wilson International ity in both states of the . Center for Scholars and Iraq, coupled Very little of the Sykes-Picot agreement with the rise of was implemented, and the borders that were a growing num- eventually established bear almost no resem- ber of non-state blance to the lines drawn—in exquisite impe- actors, has given rial fashion—by the two diplomats whose rise to much specu- main concern was to decide how Britain lation about the future of the Levant and and would divide among themselves the end of at least some of the states formed the Arab parts of the . after . The first of a long series Paradoxically, it is the failure of the agreement of agreements that defined the post-Ottoman that makes it relevant to understanding the Levant was one reached by a British and a forces currently threatening the disintegration French diplomat, Mark Sykes and Francois of Levant states and possibly reconfiguring the Georges-Picot, in 1916. The “end of Sykes- region. If Britain and France had succeeded

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About the Middle East Program

Director The Middle East Program was launched in February 1998 in light of Henri J. Barkey increased U.S. engagement in the region and the profound changes sweep- ing across many Middle Eastern states. In addition to spotlighting day-to-day Associate issues, the Program concentrates on long-term economic, social, and political developments, as well as relations with the United States. Kendra Heideman The Middle East Program draws on domestic and foreign regional experts Assistant for its meetings, conferences, and occasional papers. Conferences and meet- Julia Craig Romano ings assess the policy implications of all aspects of developments within the region and individual states; the Middle East’s role in the international arena; American interests in the region; the threat of terrorism; arms proliferation; and Special thanks strategic threats to and from the regional states. Special thanks to Kendra Heideman and Julia Craig The Program pays special attention to the role of women, youth, civil society Romano for coordinating and institutions, Islam, and democratic and autocratic tendencies. In addition, the Middle East Program hosts meetings on cultural issues, including contempo- editing this publication; the rary art and literature in the region. Design staff for designing the Occasional Paper Series; and • Current Affairs: The Middle East Program emphasizes analysis of current Michael Darden for taking the issues and their implications for long-term developments in the region, includ- photograph. ing: the events surrounding the uprisings of 2011 in the Middle East and its effect on economic, political, and social life in countries in the region; the increased use of social media; the role of youth; Palestinian-Israeli diplomacy; Iran’s political and nuclear ambitions; the drawdown of American troops in Afghanistan and Iraq and their effect on the region; human rights violations; globalization; economic and political partnerships; and U.S. foreign policy in the region. • Gender Issues: The Middle East Program devotes considerable attention to the role of women in advancing civil society and to the attitudes of govern- ments and the clerical community toward women’s rights in the family and society at large. The Program examines employment patterns, education, legal rights, and political participation of women in the region. The Program also has a keen interest in exploring women’s increasing roles in conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction activities. • Islam, Democracy and Civil Society: The Middle East Program monitors the growing demand of people in the region for the transition to democratization, political participation, accountable government, the rule of law, and adher- ence by their governments to international conventions, human rights, and women’s rights. It continues to examine the role of Islamic movements and the role of Islamic parties in shaping political and social developments and the variety of factors that favor or obstruct the expansion of civil society.

The opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not reflect those of the Woodrow Wilson Center.

2 in shaping the Levant as they liked, the agreement they had awarded themselves. They succeeded in could be dismissed as the product of a bygone colo- drawing the borders of the new countries, but they nial era with little relevance to the present. But they had limited capacity to shape the states contained were not. The actions of Arab and Turkish nation- within those borders. alists, the demands of minorities, the ambitions of Going into the war, France and Britain were con- politicians, the collapse of czarist Russia, and the vinced that the Arab parts of the Ottoman Empire bankruptcy of Britain and France in aftermaths of were not ready for self-government and would the war shaped a Levant quite different from the one not be ready for a long time—statesmen in both the two diplomats had envisaged. countries were in total agreement on that point. And that is the relevance of Sykes-Picot to the The issue they wanted to settle was not whether present. The United States, Russia, and to some these areas would be under foreign supervision, extent the European Union—the new international because that was a foregone conclusion, but which powers who have replaced Britain and France in areas would be supervised by France and which by trying to shape the region—have their own ideas of Britain. The Sykes-Picot Agreement provided the how the region should evolve and have invested lives answer. Britain would get complete control over an and treasure to realize their goals. Turkey, Iran, and area of “Mesopotamia” starting north of Baghdad Saudi Arabia—the major regional powers—have and extending through Basra all the way down the their own plans for the future of the region. But east coast of the Arabian Peninsula. France would once again it is the ever changing array of local, get complete control over an area extending along state, and non-state actors that will shape the final the Mediterranean coast from Haifa to southern outcome. Turkey and inland to a part of Anatolia. Britain and France could do what they wanted: putting The Actors Sykes and Picot these areas under direct administration by colonial officials or indirect control through local rulers of Forgot their own choosing. In addition, France and Britain also awarded themselves their respective zones of Several factors explain why, once the dust settled influence, where they would set up independent over the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Sykes- Arab states, or a confederation of states, under their Picot Agreement had become largely irrelevant: supervision. Finally, an area comprising roughly the upsurge of nationalism in the region; the rise today’s Israel and the West Bank, would be declared of modern Turkey; the Bolshevik revolution that an international zone controlled jointly by Britain, turned Russia from an ally into an enemy of France France, and Russia. The Arabian Peninsula, with the and Britain, to be contained rather than awarded exception of the east coast claimed by Britain, would territory; and the bankruptcy of the two major be left under Arab control. The text of the agree- colonial powers—France and Britain—in the wake ment and British-French correspondence around it of the war, which kept them from devoting to the show clearly that the main concern of both France region resources commensurate with their original and Britain was to protect their interests against the aspirations. Ultimately, France and Britain could other—there is much discussion about access to not realize their goals, despite their superior power ports and the impositions of tariffs, none about the and the mandates over the Levant interests of the local population.

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In negotiating the agreement, Britain and France French zone of Influence, but it was the British, had ignored not only the issue of the rights of the not the French, that entered and expelled Arabs whose territories they were disposing of, but the Turks. The British also expelled the Turks from also their probable reaction. Convinced that Arabs Palestine and remained there, although Palestine were not ready to govern themselves, the colonial was supposed to be put under international admin- powers also seemed to believe that they would istration. Furthermore, U.S. intervention toward remain passive. Instead, the high-handed approach the end of the conflict changed the dynamics of of the European pow- peace negotiations, and ers stirred nationalist the formation of the reactions through the “Diplomats had simply League of Nations meant region, where cur- that the Arab territories rents of Arab nation- assumed, for the first but not Britain and France had alism had been evi- viewed essentially as dent for a long time. for the last time, that state- colonies or protector- With the weakening building was possible...” ates to remain under of the Ottoman grip, their control indefinitely nationalists gained became instead League prominence in Cairo, of Nations mandates. Damascus, and Baghdad, among others. The British The mandates, on the other hand, were temporary themselves contributed to stirring up Arab national- and carried the obligation for the mandatory pow- ism by dangling in front of Hussein, the Sharif of ers to prepare the countries under their care for Mecca, the vision of an independent Arab state under independence. The difficult economic situation his rule when they were trying to enlist his support both Britain and France faced at the end of the war, against the Ottomans and stir the Arab Revolt. furthermore, made them unwilling to invest much Finally, the issuing by Britain of the November in the new territories. Both countries were under 1917 Balfour Declaration, which declared support pressure to demobilize the troops and return men for the establishment of a Jewish home in Palestine, to civilian life and to reduce the cost of controlling encouraged the Zionist movement and inevitably and administering the new territories. Britain under an Arab nationalist reaction. Additionally, after the the leadership of Secretary of State for the Colonies defeat of the Ottomans, Turkish nationalists under Winston Churchill pioneered in Mesopotamia the the leadership of Kemal Ataturk fought fiercely idea of reducing the number of ground troops by against attempts to dismantle the Turkish core of the relying on the air force for control—a tantalizing Ottoman Empire and formed a new strong Turkish antecedent to current U.S. policy in Iraq. state that had not been part of the Sykes-Picot plan. In conclusion, when the Ottomans surrendered Local actors, in other words, had no intention of in October 1918, Sykes-Picot could no longer pro- remaining passive and allowing Britain and France vide an answer for the future of the Arab territories. to design a post-Ottoman Levant as they saw fit. Instead, it took until 1925, repeated rounds of The outcome of the war also made Sykes-Picot negotiations and several treaties for the map of the impossible to implement in the original form. Syria, Levant to take the familiar shape commonly identi- including Damascus, was supposed to fall in the fied with the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Little survived

4 of the Sykes Picot Agreement: Syria, including the long history of wars, migrations, invasions, and what is today Lebanon, remained in a French zone religious schisms in the Levant guaranteed that no of influence but as a League of Nations mandate state would have a homogeneous population, no and with boundaries that bore little similarity to matter how borders were drawn. France and Britain those envisaged by the two diplomats in 1916. had no experience with state-building overseas— Similarly, Mesopotamia stayed in the British zone colonization was about control, pacification, and but as a mandate that did not include the east coast low-cost administration, not about state-building. of the Arabian Peninsula but included the former Diplomats had simply assumed, for the first but not Ottoman province of Mosul that Sykes and Picot for the last time, that state-building was possible, had given to France. Everything else was different: and that Britain and France, being states, would Palestine had not become an international zone but have the capacity to build states elsewhere and in a a British mandate, which included Transjordan but few decades. In reality, the states remained hollow, not the much larger zone of influence, extending both under the mandates and after they became well into the Arabian Peninsula, designed by the independent. Whether the failure to consolidate two diplomats. And while an Arab state had indeed the states was due to poor management or lack of arisen in the Arabian Peninsula, as envisaged in the good will by the mandatory states, or whether it was original agreement, it was not the one centered on due to the intrinsic difficulty, if not impossibility, the Hejaz that Britain had dangled in front of Sharif of state-building by outsiders is an issue I will not Hussein’s eyes but one dominated by Ibn Saud, discuss here. who had brought much of the peninsula under his The British encountered serious challenges with control starting from the Najd. Turkey had lost its mandates in Mesopotamia and Palestine. In the empire, but it had successfully fought against Mesopotamia, they installed Faisal, one of Sharif dismemberment of its core and had become an inde- Hussein’s sons, as king, hoping he would prove loyal pendent, fiercely nationalistic, and secular republic. and compliant in return, but this was not the case. And Egypt, from where Britain had plotted the war (Interestingly, he had proven a difficult leader to in the Levant and directed military operations, had manage in Syria, which the British had controlled also become independent, although the Suez Canal briefly before being forced to turn it over to the zone was still controlled by Britain and France. French, who quickly got rid of Faisal.) The British were also facing nationalists who wanted indepen- The Mandates and the dence, not subordination to a mandate, in the cities and with a rebellion in the old Mosul province of the Failure of State-building Ottoman Empire, where Kurds had been agitating for a state of their own since the fall of the Ottoman The mandates system imposed upon France and Empire. The British had enough power to repress Britain the responsibility to run restless territories the opposition and retain control, but did not have cobbled together in international negotiations into the time or capacity to build a functioning politi- states ready for self-government. The new countries cal system, institutions, and a common identity. In had new and artificial borders and diverse popula- 1932, when the British mandate came to an end, tions, although that was inevitable—all borders are the hollowness of the new state became evident. The artificial, be they settled by war or negotiations; and monarchy the British had hoped would bind the

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country together was controlled by a foreign dynasty When Saddam Hussein was removed by American and commanded little loyalty, particularly after Faisal intervention in 2003, the full extent of the hollow- died in 1933 and his young son succeeded him. The ness became apparent again. strongest institution the British had bequeathed was The situation in the Mandate of Palestine was the military, and in 1936, amidst general unrest, it even more problematic. The British task of building seized power and continued doing this repeatedly. a state embracing the diverse population groups col- By 1941, the country, by then called Iraq, had expe- lided with the Zionist project to make Palestine not rienced five military coups d’état. The installation just the vague “national home for Jews” supported in 1941 of an anti-British, pro-Nazi government by the Balfour Declaration, but a state in which Jews that tried to hinder the movement of British troops would be the majority. Britain was caught between out of their bases in Iraq conflicting Jewish and led to a short Anglo- Arab nationalisms. Faced Iraqi war and to a new “In reality, the [new] with the determination period of British occu- states remained hollow, of the Zionists and the pation that lasted until flood of new Jewish 1947. At that point, the both under the man- immigrants on one side, history of unrest, revolts, dates and after they and a revolt by Arabs and military coups d’état became independent.” beginning in 1936, the resumed, becoming British toyed with the even more complicated idea of forming a small because Iraq was by this Jewish state in Palestine, time caught in the Cold War and U.S. efforts to enraging Arabs without satisfying Zionists, who build anti-Soviet alliances with neighboring coun- wanted much more. Eventually, the partition was tries. The mandatory powers’ task of building a state adopted and recommended by the United Nations ready for self-government had been replaced by the in 1947 and it satisfied neither side, with the prob- United States and British efforts to keep that state in lem continuing to this day. Again, the mandate left the Western camp. In 1958, Abd al-Karim Qasim behind an enormous problem, though it should be seized power, abolished the monarchy, took Iraq recognized that Britain had been handed an intrac- out of the Baghdad Pact, discussed the possibility table situation. of joining the with Egypt Transjordan, formally part of the mandate of and Syria, and threatened to nationalize oil, raising Palestine, was administered separately. A smaller alarm in Washington and London. Inevitably, when and, at that time, less complex country, it settled Qasim was ousted in a coup in 1963, the CIA was down more easily under another of Hussein’s sons, accused of complicity. Certainly, Washington was Abdallah. The British recognized the virtual inde- relieved, but the situation did not improve for Iraq, pendence of the territory in 1928, although the which remained in turmoil under a series of mostly formal mandate was not terminated until 1948. In military governments of short duration until the rise many ways, it was the most successful of the British to power of Saddam Hussein in 1979. Instability mandates. ceased because a strong, authoritarian regime used The outcome of the French Mandate in Syria, repression to make up for the hollowness of the state. which officially started in 1923, was the emergence of

6 not one but two deeply troubled states, today’s Syria a further attempt to remedy fragmentation, the and Lebanon. Despite the Sykes-Picot Agreement, proclaimed the Independent Government it was Britain that first administered Syria after cap- of , which only joined the Syrian Republic turing it from the Ottomans in 1918. The British in 1936, when the State of Jebel also joined. installed Faisal as leader of Syria, in recognition of Neither the original decentralization nor the later the contribution of the Arab Revolt to the defeat of unitary model helped the French maintain order the Ottoman Empire and of past promises to Faisal’s in Syria. During World War II, lost father Hussein. From the outset, Syria was in revolt. control of Syria to a new British occupation, with Faisal wanted a truly independent Syrian state that the support of the Free French, creating yet another included Palestine and Transjordan, and so did the upheaval. Syria became formally independent in Syrian nationalists who were well represented in the 1943, although French troops remained for another parliament elected in 1919. But negotiations at the three years. Paris Peace Conference led to an agreement that Not surprisingly, given this history, Syria France would control Syria, as envisaged by Sykes- remained extremely unstable after the mandate Picot. In 1920 France took over the administration ended. Between 1946 and 1956, the country expe- of the territory, just as Faisal and the nationalists rienced several coups d’état and went through 20 declared the independence of a Kingdom of Syria. cabinets and four different constitutions. In 1958, The French reacted by forcing Faisal to abdi- following another coup, Syria joined Egypt in form- cate, putting an end to the Kingdom of Syria after ing the United Arab Republic, but the troubled only four months. They also tried to bring the union came to an end with yet another coup d’état unruly country under control by dividing it into six three years later. The cycle of military coups contin- separate mini-states: Damascus, , the state of ued until 1970, when Hafez al-Assad rose to power, Alawites, Jebel Druze, the Sanjak of Alexandretta also in a coup, and finally stabilized the country (which became part of Turkey in 1939), and Greater under his rule and that of the Ba’ath Party. For 30 Lebanon. The latter was the only state to survive years Syria experienced stability, with repression in long term, becoming the Lebanese Republic under a police state being its cost. At his death in 2000, French supervision in 1926 and finally a fully inde- Hafez even managed to transfer power to his son pendent state when the French mandate terminated Bashar, and stability continued until the uprisings in 1943. The division of Syria into mini-states did that shook the Arab world in 2011 affected Syria as not stabilize Syria. The Sunni population in general well, leading the country into war and bringing it to opposed decentralization, while other states wanted the verge of state collapse. more autonomy than the French were willing to grant them. France succeeded in bringing together A New Power Vacuum Aleppo, Damascus, and the state of Alawites in a until 1924. At that point, the Despite their hollowness, the Levant states survived, country exploded in an anti-French uprising in as indeed most states survive in the contemporary which disparate population groups participated. It world where military conquest of weaker states by took two years and much brutality for the French to stronger ones is no longer the norm. In part, they pacify the country, but they could not unite it. When survived because international borders were frozen the French set up the Syrian Republic in 1930, in

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in place by the Great Powers, particularly during (I am excluding here the Israeli-Palestinian issue, the Cold War. With wars of conquest no longer which is quite different from the problems of other part of normal relations among countries, new states states). The most important explicit, vocal demands are destabilizing of the status quo, likely to produce for the formation of new states have come from conflict, and in general a nuisance other states prefer Iraqi Kurds, who have been in revolt against the to avoid. With rare Iraqi state since Mosul was exceptions, only those “With wars of conquest first included in the man- directly demanding it no longer part of normal date of Mesopotamia. But favor the formation of even the Kurdish leadership new states while the relations among countries, is careful to state that, while international system is new states are destabi- independence is the ulti- hostile to it. mate goal, it cannot be real- Furthermore, even lizing of the status quo, ized under current condi- hollow states eventu- likely to produce conflict, tions. This does not prevent ally develop an iden- and in general a nui- Iraqi Kurdistan from trying tity over time. By to build state institutions, now, several genera- sance other states prefer to including its own military, tions have been born avoid.” and from laying the founda- as or Iraqis, tions for financial indepen- and many never ques- dence through oil exports. tioned that identity. Also, webs of vested interests Nevertheless, discussions about the end of Sykes- develop around any state, indeed any organization, Picot are not idle talk. Syria and Iraq are no longer aiding its persistence. Somebody always benefits functioning as states. The issue is no longer whether from the existence of a state—from politicians who they will fall apart, because that has already hap- secure positions of power to businessmen who pened, but whether they can be put back together prosper beyond protective barriers, to civil servants as they were. Both countries have lost a large part who draw steady salaries. And at least a part of the of their territory to the Islamic State of Iraq and the population comes to identify as citizens of that state, Levant (ISIL), which has an explicit state-building not necessarily by an enthusiastic choice, but at least project transcending the established borders. The by inertia. new state, or “caliphate” as the leaders would have it, Finally, there are patterns of governance that help appears to have gained some acceptance, or at least hollow states to survive. In Iraq and Syria, the major passive quiescence, among Syrian and Iraqi Sunnis. mechanism for state survival has been the authori- The writ of Baghdad no longer runs in Kurdistan, tarianism of regimes. Lebanon, a state so hollow as to and in much of Nineveh, Salahuddin, and Anbar be practically a fiction, experienced a nasty civil war provinces. Even in Shi’a regions, Baghdad shares but finally survived by letting the state dwindle even authority and influence with Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, more, with power residing in the hands of confes- more broadly the religious establishment in Najaf, sional communities and their foreign backers. and the Shi’a militias, most of which are controlled As a result, there has been limited demand for by Iran. These militias may well be more power- the reconfiguration of the Levant states until recently ful at present than the national Iraqi military. The

8 Iraqi state still exists because it has internationally they could mobilize are much greater than those of recognized borders and because oil revenue flows to domestic players. The way in which international Baghdad, but it is more hollow than ever. players deal with the Levant is influenced by many Damascus now controls only about one-third of considerations including some that have little to do Syrian territory, in the west. ISIL has established its with the situation on the ground. The United States Islamic state centered on Raqqa and extending to has become somewhat more assertive in its policy a large part of Iraq. Syrian Kurds have established toward Syria since Russia decided to intervene there. semi-autonomous “cantons” along the Turkish bor- The resources the United States is devoting to Syria der; they argue they are not aiming for an indepen- are a fraction of what it could theoretically mobilize, dent state but for bottom-up, popular government but are already greater than they were before Putin of the cantons. But they are also busy trying to started flexing his muscles. Like France and Britain consolidate what started as separate cantons in a in 1918, the United States and Russia are dealing continuous strip of territory along the Turkish bor- with Syria with an eye on each other. And so are der, much to the chagrin of Ankara. Another part of Iran and Saudi Arabia, while Turkey’s desire to see the country, the extremely contentious area around the end of the Assad regime is tempered by its deter- Aleppo, is being disputed among the al-Qaeda mination to contain the successes of Syrian Kurds, aligned Jabhat al-Nusra, so-called moderate groups for fear such successes would strengthen the Kurdish supported to some degree by the United States and opposition in Turkey. By contrast, local actors are GCC countries, ISIL, and government forces and usually much more single minded and bring all their the militias aligned with them. The intervention of resources to bear on their goals. ISIL has only one Russia in October 2015 injected more complications goal at this point—to build an Islamic state—and in this corner of Syria in an attempt to bring it back whatever resources it can mobilize are devoted to under government control, consolidating the part of that goal. Syria that Damascus still controls. This is an obvious lesson, but it is regularly ignored. Current diplomatic efforts to negotiate an Sykes-Picot Redux end to the Syrian conflict are a case in point. The first international attempt to settle the present Syrian conflict was a June 30, 2012 meeting in Geneva of As in the aftermath of World War I, there is a power the Syria Action Group, in which representatives vacuum in the Levant and as a rush by international, of the United Nations, the League of Arab States, regional, and local players to fill it in the way that China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the best suits their interests—or at least in theory, their United States, Kuwait, and Qatar (because of their principles. While the outcome is impossible to pre- roles within the League of Arab States), and the dict at this point, two lessons derived from what can European Union met to devise a solution to the be broadly defined as the broader Sykes-Picot experi- crisis in Syria. Participants issued a communique ence will affect what happens.Those lessons can also spelling out principles and guidelines for the Syrian help analysts focus on the most important issues. transition and outlining steps all parties needed to The first lesson is that international and regional take. Syrians were not present at the meeting. The players have limited capacity to impose solutions, communique declared that the Syrian people ought although the military and diplomatic resources to determine the future of the country, but also

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went on to preempt possible choices by declaring controversial. The UN Secretary-General invited their commitment to, among others, the unity of Iran, causing vehement protest from the opposition Syria, democratic principles, and the full inclusion and a condition by the United States that Iran must of women—obvious principles for participants in first fully accept the Geneva communique, and Iran such gathering, but did not participate. The not what many conference did not achieve Syrian organiza- anything. Like many of tions involved in “...international post-World War I meet- the conflict would and regional players ings, the Geneva meeting have chosen or were have limited capac- was driven above all by likely to accept. In the politics and require- January 2014, with ity to impose solutions, ments of outsiders. So was the Geneva com- although the military a meeting held on October munique having had 30, 2015 in Vienna, which no impact on events and diplomatic resources broadened further the list in Syria and the war they could mobilize are of participants by includ- still raging, a confer- much greater than those ing Iran and Iraq, but still ence, which became did not get the buy-in from known as Geneva II, of domestic players.” the moderate Syrian oppo- was convoked under sition and excluded the the auspices of the groups that controlled ter- UN after Russia and the United States had com- ritory. There are no easy solutions to this problem. mitted to bring “all Syrian parties” to the table with The international community cannot fail to react to a view to implementing the Geneva communique. the situation in Syria. It is unthinkable at this point Syrian parties proved difficult to corral. The to ask ISIL to participate in international peace nego- Syrian government agreed to participate in order tiations. As a result, however, whatever decisions are to pursue “the Syrian people’s demands, first and reached by meetings such as those in Geneva or foremost eliminating terrorism,” a term applied to Vienna will be as irrelevant to what happens in the all opposition. The opposition groups recognized Levant as the original Sykes-Picot Agreement was to by the international community, and thus invited, the Arab territories of the Ottoman Empire. split on whether or not to attend, but the Kurds, The second lesson to be derived from Sykes-Picot who were not invited separately from other groups, is that any solution devised by the international com- demanded to be given their own voice. The Islamic munity in negotiations or imposed on the ground by State and al-Qaeda aligned Jabhat al-Nusra, both local actors has to pass the test of implementation. of which controlled substantial territory were obvi- Can new borders—such as those imposed by ISIL ously not invited, but that meant main players were conquest in Syria and Iraq, or those of a new Alawite not involved. International participation was also entity some think might be revived—enclose a func-

10 tioning state rather than hollow territory? There is ments and support, or become self-perpetuating much but vague discussion about what a post-Sykes- and self-sustaining? Outside support could certainly Picot Levant might look like: a division of Iraq into become a factor, but it is sobering to remember the three states, as in the Biden-Gelb plan of 2006; an fragility of the states left behind by the mandatory independent Iraqi Kurdistan, possibly in a loose states, armed with superior power and the author- confederation with Sunni and Shi’a states; a rump ity of the League of Nations. And there are equally under the control of Bashar al-Assad in sobering contemporary examples outside the Levant: Syria; Sunni states in both Syria and Iraq, replacing in 1995, the Dayton Agreement put an end to war the Islamic state; and autonomous Kurdish cantons and slaughter in Bosnia, in an excellent example of consolidated in northern Syria. All these ideas have what international intervention and good diplomatic been advocated by some or other groups at some work can accomplish. Twenty years later, it is still point. open to question whether the Bosnian state will ever The real question is not whether any of these be more than a hollow shell. solutions would be desirable, but whether any of These and other questions are not idle specula- them could become real on the ground. Does the tion. Iraq and Syria, never strong states for all the fact that an Independent Republic of Latakia defied authoritarian of their leaders, have become fiction. French efforts to absorb it into Syria for six years They could survive as fiction, the way the Lebanese mean that it could be replicated? Would an indepen- state managed to survive as fiction after the end of dent Iraqi Kurdistan survive with hostile neighbors the civil war; or they could break up. As after World on all sides? Would there be sufficient economic and War I, outsiders will come up with proposals and even political resources to make Kurdish cantons in agreements, but they will not determine the final Syria more than an ephemeral phenomenon? And outcome. Prescribing solutions is largely a pointless what would determine whether such entities would exercise. Understanding what the outcome of differ- remain hollow, kept alive by international agree- ent solutions might be would be useful to all sides.

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