MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES Fall 2015 MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM FALL OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES 2015 Learning from Sykes-Picot The collapse of Picot” has become the short hand for specula- Marina Ottaway, central author- tion about a possible reconfiguration of the Middle East Fellow, Woodrow Wilson International ity in both Syria states of the Levant. Center for Scholars and Iraq, coupled Very little of the Sykes-Picot agreement with the rise of was implemented, and the borders that were a growing num- eventually established bear almost no resem- ber of non-state blance to the lines drawn—in exquisite impe- actors, has given rial fashion—by the two diplomats whose rise to much specu- main concern was to decide how Britain lation about the future of the Levant and and France would divide among themselves the end of at least some of the states formed the Arab parts of the Ottoman Empire. after World War I. The first of a long series Paradoxically, it is the failure of the agreement of agreements that defined the post-Ottoman that makes it relevant to understanding the Levant was one reached by a British and a forces currently threatening the disintegration French diplomat, Mark Sykes and Francois of Levant states and possibly reconfiguring the Georges-Picot, in 1916. The “end of Sykes- region. If Britain and France had succeeded 1 MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES Fall 2015 About the Middle East Program Director The Middle East Program was launched in February 1998 in light of Henri J. Barkey increased U.S. engagement in the region and the profound changes sweep- ing across many Middle Eastern states. In addition to spotlighting day-to-day Associate issues, the Program concentrates on long-term economic, social, and political developments, as well as relations with the United States. Kendra Heideman The Middle East Program draws on domestic and foreign regional experts Assistant for its meetings, conferences, and occasional papers. Conferences and meet- Julia Craig Romano ings assess the policy implications of all aspects of developments within the region and individual states; the Middle East’s role in the international arena; American interests in the region; the threat of terrorism; arms proliferation; and Special thanks strategic threats to and from the regional states. Special thanks to Kendra Heideman and Julia Craig The Program pays special attention to the role of women, youth, civil society Romano for coordinating and institutions, Islam, and democratic and autocratic tendencies. In addition, the Middle East Program hosts meetings on cultural issues, including contempo- editing this publication; the rary art and literature in the region. Design staff for designing the Occasional Paper Series; and • Current Affairs: The Middle East Program emphasizes analysis of current Michael Darden for taking the issues and their implications for long-term developments in the region, includ- photograph. ing: the events surrounding the uprisings of 2011 in the Middle East and its effect on economic, political, and social life in countries in the region; the increased use of social media; the role of youth; Palestinian-Israeli diplomacy; Iran’s political and nuclear ambitions; the drawdown of American troops in Afghanistan and Iraq and their effect on the region; human rights violations; globalization; economic and political partnerships; and U.S. foreign policy in the region. • Gender Issues: The Middle East Program devotes considerable attention to the role of women in advancing civil society and to the attitudes of govern- ments and the clerical community toward women’s rights in the family and society at large. The Program examines employment patterns, education, legal rights, and political participation of women in the region. The Program also has a keen interest in exploring women’s increasing roles in conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction activities. • Islam, Democracy and Civil Society: The Middle East Program monitors the growing demand of people in the region for the transition to democratization, political participation, accountable government, the rule of law, and adher- ence by their governments to international conventions, human rights, and women’s rights. It continues to examine the role of Islamic movements and the role of Islamic parties in shaping political and social developments and the variety of factors that favor or obstruct the expansion of civil society. The opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not reflect those of the Woodrow Wilson Center. 2 in shaping the Levant as they liked, the agreement they had awarded themselves. They succeeded in could be dismissed as the product of a bygone colo- drawing the borders of the new countries, but they nial era with little relevance to the present. But they had limited capacity to shape the states contained were not. The actions of Arab and Turkish nation- within those borders. alists, the demands of minorities, the ambitions of Going into the war, France and Britain were con- politicians, the collapse of czarist Russia, and the vinced that the Arab parts of the Ottoman Empire bankruptcy of Britain and France in aftermaths of were not ready for self-government and would the war shaped a Levant quite different from the one not be ready for a long time—statesmen in both the two diplomats had envisaged. countries were in total agreement on that point. And that is the relevance of Sykes-Picot to the The issue they wanted to settle was not whether present. The United States, Russia, and to some these areas would be under foreign supervision, extent the European Union—the new international because that was a foregone conclusion, but which powers who have replaced Britain and France in areas would be supervised by France and which by trying to shape the region—have their own ideas of Britain. The Sykes-Picot Agreement provided the how the region should evolve and have invested lives answer. Britain would get complete control over an and treasure to realize their goals. Turkey, Iran, and area of “Mesopotamia” starting north of Baghdad Saudi Arabia—the major regional powers—have and extending through Basra all the way down the their own plans for the future of the region. But east coast of the Arabian Peninsula. France would once again it is the ever changing array of local, get complete control over an area extending along state, and non-state actors that will shape the final the Mediterranean coast from Haifa to southern outcome. Turkey and inland to a part of Anatolia. Britain and France could do what they wanted: putting The Actors Sykes and Picot these areas under direct administration by colonial officials or indirect control through local rulers of Forgot their own choosing. In addition, France and Britain also awarded themselves their respective zones of Several factors explain why, once the dust settled influence, where they would set up independent over the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Sykes- Arab states, or a confederation of states, under their Picot Agreement had become largely irrelevant: supervision. Finally, an area comprising roughly the upsurge of nationalism in the region; the rise today’s Israel and the West Bank, would be declared of modern Turkey; the Bolshevik revolution that an international zone controlled jointly by Britain, turned Russia from an ally into an enemy of France France, and Russia. The Arabian Peninsula, with the and Britain, to be contained rather than awarded exception of the east coast claimed by Britain, would territory; and the bankruptcy of the two major be left under Arab control. The text of the agree- colonial powers—France and Britain—in the wake ment and British-French correspondence around it of the war, which kept them from devoting to the show clearly that the main concern of both France region resources commensurate with their original and Britain was to protect their interests against the aspirations. Ultimately, France and Britain could other—there is much discussion about access to not realize their goals, despite their superior power ports and the impositions of tariffs, none about the and the League of Nations mandates over the Levant interests of the local population. 3 MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES Fall 2015 In negotiating the agreement, Britain and France French zone of Influence, but it was the British, had ignored not only the issue of the rights of the not the French, that entered Damascus and expelled Arabs whose territories they were disposing of, but the Turks. The British also expelled the Turks from also their probable reaction. Convinced that Arabs Palestine and remained there, although Palestine were not ready to govern themselves, the colonial was supposed to be put under international admin- powers also seemed to believe that they would istration. Furthermore, U.S. intervention toward remain passive. Instead, the high-handed approach the end of the conflict changed the dynamics of of the European pow- peace negotiations, and ers stirred nationalist the formation of the reactions through the “Diplomats had simply League of Nations meant region, where cur- that the Arab territories rents of Arab nation- assumed, for the first but not Britain and France had alism had been evi- viewed essentially as dent for a long time. for the last time, that state- colonies or protector- With the weakening building was possible...” ates to remain under of the Ottoman grip, their control indefinitely nationalists gained became instead League prominence in Cairo, of Nations mandates. Damascus, and Baghdad, among others. The British The mandates, on the other hand, were temporary themselves contributed to stirring up Arab national- and carried the obligation for the mandatory pow- ism by dangling in front of Hussein, the Sharif of ers to prepare the countries under their care for Mecca, the vision of an independent Arab state under independence.