32 CHAPTER 1 • A NIMA L RIGHTS overcome, for them, the habits and forces behind stage, adoption, that requires both our passion and Non-human 1 their system.atic oppression. All great m ovements, it our discipline, our hearts and our heads. The fate of right not to b is written, go through three stages: ridicule, discus­ animals is in our hands. God grant we are equal to call this "th1 sion, adoption. It is the realization of this third the task. although it is" animal liberati1 some sentient : NOTE I will arg; animal rights J 1. Tom Regan, The Case for A11i111al Rights (Berkeley: position entail University of California Press, 1983). person cannot non-hun1an a STUDY QUESTIONS I would exter include all senl 1. How is Regan's position on animal rights dif­ 3. Does Regan allow for expe1imentation on ani­ of having ex1 ferent from Singer's? Explain. mals? If we have to test a dangerous vaccine, pleasure or sat 3 on whom should we test it? tration. How 2. What are Regan's reasons for granting animals rights of most equal moral rights? strength to th non-hun1an ar stances which rights of perso 5 ling realities ~ animals for rea ing of persons mal rights" pc to a wider ra1 A Critique of Regan's Animal Rights Theory animal rights p I will beg MARY ANNE WARREN the strong ani problems with quences of tho I think are un The author ef ma11y articles and books in moral philosophy, Mary A11 11 e Warren (1946- case for the wt 2010) taught philosophy at San Francisco State Un iversity. Warren reco 11 str11cts Regan's argument for anil/'l al rights and criticizes it for depe11di 11g on the obscure notion of inherent value. She then argues that all ra tional human beings are equally part ef the moral community since we can reason with each other about our behavior, whereas we cannot so reason with an a1 1imal. She puts forth a "weak animal rights theory," Regan's argu1 which asserts that we ought not to be cruel to animals or kill them witl1011tgood reason. First, he argue not only senti Tom Regan has produced what is perhaps the de­ way inferior to our own. In The Case for Animal as well. These finitive defense of the view that the basic moral Rights, he argues that all normal ma1ru11als over a memory, belie tights of at least some non-human animals are in no year of age have the same basic moral rights. 1 intentional act degree of se capacities are s From Between the Species, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 163-73 (1986). Edited for length. Reprinted by perm ission of Mary Ann e Warren. not only alive •· MARY ANNE WARREN• A CRITIQUE OF REGAN'S ANIMAL RIGHTS THEORY 33 passion and Non-human mammals have essentially the same psychological identity over time and an existence . The fate of right not to be harmed or killed as we do. I shall which can go better or worse for them. Thus, they are equal to call this " the strong animal rights position," can be ham1ed or benefitted. These are plausible although it is weaker than the claims made by some claims, and well defended. One of the strongest animal liberationists in that it ascribes rights to only parts of the book is the rebuttal of philosophers, some sentient animals.2 such as R. G. Frey, who object to the application I will argue that Regan's case for the strong of such mentalistic terms to creatures that do not animal rights position is unpersuasive and that this use a human-style language.5 The second and third position entails consequences which a reasonable stages of the argument are more problematic. person cannot accept. I do not deny that some In the second stage, Regan argues that subjects­ non-human animals have moral rights; indeed, of-a-hfe have inherent value. His concept of I would extend the scope of the rights claim to inherent value grows out of his opposition to utili­ include all sentient animals, that is, all those capable ta1ianism. Utilita1ian moral theo1y, he says, treats tion on ani­ of having expe1iences, including experiences of individuals as "mere receptacles" for morally signif­ s vaccme, pleasure or satisfaction and pain, suffering, or frus­ icant valu e, in that ham1 to one individual may be tration.3 However, I do not think that the moral justified by the production of a greater net benefit rights of most non-human animals are identical in to other individuals. In opposition to this, he holds strength to those of persons. 4 The rights of most that subjects-of-a-life have a value independent non-human animals may be overridden in circum­ of both the value they may place upon their lives stances which would not justify overriding the or experi ences and the value others may place rights of persons. There are, for instance, compel­ upon them. ling realities which sometimes require that we kill Inherent value, Regan argues, does not come animals for reasons which could not justify the kill­ in degrees. To hold that some individuals have p ing of persons. I will call this view "the weak ani­ more inherent val ue than others is to adopt a mal tights" position, even though it ascribes rights "perfectionist" the01y, i.e., one which assigns dif­ to a wider range of animals than does the strong ferent moral worth to individuals according to how animal rights position. well they are thought to exemplify some virtue(s), I will begin by summarizing Regan's case for such as intelligence or moral autonomy. Perfec­ the strong animal rights position and noting two tionist theories have been used, at least since the problems with it. Next, I will explore some conse­ time of Aristotle, to rationalize such injustices as quences of the strong animal rights position which slave1y and male domination, as well as the unre­ I think are unacceptable. Finally, I will outline the strained exploitation of animals. Regan argues that case for the weak animal rights position. if we reject these injustices, then we must also reject pe1fectionism and conclude that all subjects­ of-a-life have equal inherent value. Moral agents REGAN'S CASE have no more inherent value than moral patients, i.e., subjects-of-a-life who are not morally respon­ Regan's argument moves through three stages. sible for their actions. First, he argues that normal, mature mammals are In the third phase of the argument, Regan uses not only sentient but have other mental capacities the thesis of equal inherent value to derive strong e for Animal as well. These include the capacities for emotion, moral 1ights for all subjects-of-a-life. This thesis mals over a memory, belief, desire, the use of general concepts, underlies the Respect Principle, which forbids us to 1 oral rights. intentional action, a sense of the future, and some treat beings who have inherent value as mere degree of self-awareness. Creatures with such receptacles, i.e., mere means to the production of capacities are said to be subjects-of-a-life. They are the greatest overall good. This principle, in turn, not only alive in the biological sense but have a underlies the Harm P1inciple, which says that we 34 CHAPTER 1 •ANIMAL RIGHTS have a direct prirna facie duty not to harm beings else places upon its experiences, then why does the wherever W( who have inherent value. Together, these princi­ fact that it has certain sorts of experiences constitute sion is impla ples give rise to moral rights. Rights are defined as evidence that it has inherent value? If the reason is It woul valid claims, claims to certain goods and against cer­ that subjects-of-a-life have an existence which can sharp line b tain beings, i.e., moral agents. Moral rights generate go better or worse for them, then why isn't the all other Ii\ duties not only to refrain from inflicting ham1 upon appropriate conclusion that all sentient beings have magpies, par beings with inherent value but also to come to inherent value, since they would all seem to meet tally sophist1 their aid when they are threatened by other moral that condition? Sentient but mentally unsophisti­ equally stro1 agents. Rights are not absolute but may be overrid­ cated beings may have a less extensive range of pos­ subject-of-a­ den in certain circumstances. Just what these cir­ sible satisfactions and frustrations, but why should it advocating t cumstances are we will consider later. But first, follow that they have-or may have-no inherent only that nc let's look at some difficulties in the theory as thus value at all? while other far presented. In the absence of a positive account of inherent there must value, it is also difficult to grasp the connection there are nc between being inherently valuable a11'd having moral should web THE MYSTERY OF INHERENT VALUE rights. Intuitively, it seems that value is one thing, creatures th and rights are another. It does not seem incoherent that are notr Inherent value is a key concept in Regan's theory. to say that some things (e.g., mountains, rivers, red­ comes in de It is the bridge between the plausible claim that all wood trees) are inherently valuable and yet are not little self-a"' normal, mature mammals-human or otherwise­ the sorts of things which can have moral rights. Nor anticipate th are subjects-of-a-life and the more debatable claim does it seem incoherent to ascribe inherent value to and some al that they all have basic moral rights of the same some things which are not individuals, e.g., plant or Should strength. But it is a highly obscure concept, and its animal species, though it may well be incoherent to ians, and n obscurity makes it ill-suited to play this crucial role. ascribe moral rights to such things. yes-or-no a Inherent value is defined almost entirely in In short, the concept of inherent value seems hand, some negative terms. It is not dependent upon the value to create at least as many problems as it solves. If in­ without the which either the inherently valuable individual or herent value is based on some natural property, beliefs, desi1 anyone else may place upon that individual's life or then why not try to identify that property and other hand, experiences. It is not (necessarily) a function of sen­ explain its moral significance, without appealing to self-awarene tience or any other mental capacity, because, inherent value? And if it is not based on any natural of future e Regan says, some entities which are not sentient property, then why should we believe in it? That it sophisticatio (e.g., trees, rivers, or rocks) may, nevertheless, have may enable us to avoid some of the problems faced how much i inherent value (p. 246). It cannot attach to any­ by the utilitarian is not a sufficient reason, if it cre­ It is sti thing other than an individual; species, ecosystems, ates other problems which are just as serious. about insect: and the like cannot have inherent value. animals whi These are some of the things which inherent whose mine value is not. But what is it? Unfortunately, we are IS THERE A SHARP LINE'? alien to us t' not told. Inherent value appears as a mysterious tures are pro non-natural property which we must take on faith. Perhaps the most serious problems are those that they can fee Regan says that it is a postulate that subjects-of-a-life a1ise when we try to apply the strong animal rights ical structun have inherent value, a postulate justified by the fact position to animals other than non11al, mature pain impuls1 that it avoids certain absurdities which he thinks mammals. Regan's theory requires us to divide all ment is inc follow from a purely utilitarian theory (p. 247). But living things into two categories: those which have might proc1 why is the postulate that subjects-of.a-life have inher­ the same inherent value and the same basic moral When injur, ent value? If the inherent value of a being is com­ rights that we do, and those which have no inher­ pain. On e' pletely independent of the value that it or anyone ent value and presumably no moral rights. But that highly • MARY ANNE WARREN• A CRITIQUE OF REGAN'S ANIMAL RIGHTS THEORY 35

~ n why does the wherever we try to draw the line, such a sharp divi­ systems would not have developed a capacity for lences constitute sion is implausible. pain (and pleasure), since such a capacity has 1 If the reason is It would surely be arbitrary to draw such a obvious survival value. It must, however, be admit­ ence which can sharp line between nonnal, mature marnnuls and ted that we do not know whether spiders can feel µ why isn't the all other living things. Some birds (e .g., crows, pain (or something very like it), let alone whether 1ent beings have magpies, parrots, mynahs) appear to be just as men­ they have emotions, memories, beliefs, desires, self­ IJ seem to meet tally sophisticated as most marnn1als and thus are awareness, or a sense of the future. :ally unsophisti­ equally strong candidates for inclusion under the Even more mysterious are the mental capacities ve range of pos­ subject-of-a-life criterion. Regan is not in fact (if any) of mobile microfauna. The brisk and effi­ it why should it advocating that we draw the line here. His claim is cient way that paramecia move about in their inces­ ·e-no inherent only that nom1al, mature nurnn1als are clear cases, sant search for food might indicate some kind of while other cases are less clear. Yet, on his theory, sentience, in spite of their lack of eyes, ears, brains, rnnt of inherent there must be such a sharp line somewhere, since and other organs associated with sentience in more the connection there are no degrees of inherent value. But why complex organisms. It is conceivable-though not 1d having moral should we believe that there is a sharp line between very probable-that they, too, are subjects-of-a-life. ie is one thing, creatures that are subjects-of-a-life and creatures The existence of a few unclear cases need not eem incoherent that are not? Isn't it more likely that "subjecthood" pose a serious problem for a moral theory, but in ains, rivers, red­ comes in degrees, that some creatures have only a this case, the unclear cases constitute most of those and yet are not little self-awareness, and only a little capacity to with which an adequate theory of animal rights oral rights. Nor anticipate the future, while some have a little more, would need to deal. The subject-of-a-life criterion 1herent value to and some a good deal more? can provide us with little or no moral guidance in ls, e.g., plant or Should we, for instance, regard fish, amphib­ our interactions with the vast majority of animals. 1e incoherent to ians, and reptiles as subjects-of-a-life? A simple That might be acceptable if it could be supple­ yes-or-no answer seems inadequate. On the one mented with additional principles which would :nt value seems hand, some of their behavior is difficult to explain provide such guidance. However, the radical dual­ >it solves. If in- without the assumption that they have sensations, ism of the theory precludes supplementing it in this 1tural property, beliefs, desires, emotions, and memories; on the way. We are forced to say that either a spider has t property and other hand, they do not seem to exhibit very much the same right to life as you and I do, or it has no ut appealing to self-awareness or very much conscious anticipation right to life whatever-and that only the gods 1 on any natural of future events. Do they have enough mental know which of these alternatives is tme. ve in it? That it sophistication to count as subjects-of-a-life? Exactly Regan's suggestion for dealing with such problems faced how much is enough? unclear cases is to apply the "benefit of the doubt" eason, if it cre- It is still more unclear what we should say principle. That is, when dealing with beings that senous. about insects, spiders, octopi, and other invertebrate may or may not be subjects-of-a-life, we should act animals which have brains and sensory organs but as if they are. 6 But if we try to apply this principle whose minds (if they have minds) are even more to the entire range of doubtful cases, we will find NE? alien to us than those of fish or reptiles. Such crea­ ourselves with moral obligations which we cannot tures are probably sentient. Some people doubt that possibly fulfill. In many climates, it is virtually are those that they can feel pain, since they lack certain neurolog­ impossible to live without swatting mosquitoes and g animal rights ical stmctures which are cmcial to the processing of extemunating cockroaches, and not all of us can d onnal, mature pain impulses in vertebrate animals. But this argu- afford to hire someone to sweep the path before we JS to divide all ment is inconclusive, since their nervous systems walk, in order to make sure that we do not step on ise which have might process pain in ways different from ours. ants. Thus, we are still faced with the daunting task ne basic moral When injured, they sometimes act as if they are in of drawing a sharp line somewhere on the contin­ ave no inher­ pain. On evolutionary grounds, it seems unlikely uum of life forms-this time, a line demarcating the ral rights. But that highly mobile creatures with complex sensory limits of the benefit of the doubt principle. 36 CHAPTER 1 •ANIMAL RIGHTS

The weak animal rights theory provides a more the moral equality of other persons is the price we of reasoned a: plausible way of dealing with this range of cases, in must each pay for their recognition of our moral fectionist the that it allows the rights of animals of different kinds equality. Without this mutual recognition of moral There is no to vary in strength .... equality, human society> can exist only in a state of moral equalir chronic and bitter conflict. The war between the we don't reg; sexes will persist so long as there is sexism and male since it is ped domination; racial conflict will never be eliminated WHY ARE ANIMAL RIGHTS WEAKER well enough so long as there are racist laws and practices. But, to respect the b; THAN HUMAN RIGHTS? the extent that we achieve a mutual recognition of and that is ern equality, we can hope to live together, perhaps as But wha How can we justify regarding the rights of persons peacefully as wolves, achieving (in part) through rational? lt is as generally stronger than those of sentient beings explicit moral principles what they do not seem to capacities sue which are not persons? There are a plethora of bad need explicit moral principles to achieve. the possessio justifications, based on religious premises or false or Why not extend this recognition of moral nearly everyo unprovable claims about the differences between equality to other creatures, even though they can­ tally incomp human and non-human nature. But there is one not do the same for us? The answer is that we though they difference which has a clear moral relevance: peo­ cannot. Because we cannot reason with most non­ capacities. Bu ple are at least sometimes capable of being moved human animals, we cannot always solve the prob­ there are po' to action or inaction by the force of reasoned argu­ lems which they may cause without harming for protectin ment. Rationality rests upon other mental capaci­ them-although we are always obligated to try. which are al ties, notably those which Regan cites as criteria for We cannot negotiate a treaty with the feral cats and animals. In£ being a subject-of-a-life. We share these capacities foxes, requiring them to stop preying on endan­ human condi with many other animals. But it is not just because gered native species in return for suitable conces­ enced or are we are subjects-of-a-life that we are both able and sions on our part. also protect 1: morally compelled to recognize one another as If rats invade our houses ... we cannot because we c beings with equal basic moral rights. It is also reason with them, hoping to persuade for animals ir because we are able to "listen to reason" in order them of the injustice they do us. We can in the case to settle our conflicts and cooperate in shared proj­ only attempt to get rid of them. 7 them as havi ects. This capacity, unlike the others, may require tionship to u something like a human language. Aristotle was not wrong in claiming that the sake but also Why is rationality morally relevant? It does not capacity to alter one's behavior on the basis of rea­ done to ther make us "better" than other animals or more soned argument is relevant to the full moral status are irrelevant "perfect." It does not even automatically make us which he accorded to free men. Of course, he was But in ordin; more intelligent. (Bad reasoning reduces our effec­ wrong in his other premise, that women and slaves moral rights tive intelligence rather than increasing it.) But it by their nature cannot reason well enough to func­ not i;ghts. Tl is morally relevant insofar as it provides greater pos­ tion as autonomous moral agents. Had that premise to infunts a1 sibilities for cooperation and for the nonviolent been true, so would his conclusion that women proves that r: resolution of problems. It also makes us more dan­ and slaves are not quite the moral equals of free moral tights : gerous than non-rational beings can ever be. men. In the case of most non-human animals, the Because we are potentially more dangerous and less corresponding premise is true. If, on the other predictable than wolves, we need an articulated sys­ hand, there are animals with whom we can (learn tem of morality to regulate our conduct. Any to) reason, then we are obligated to do this and to WHYS human morality, to be workable in the long run, regard them as our moral equals. must recognize the equal moral status of all persons, Thus, to distinguish between the rights of per­ whether through the postulate of equal basic moral sons and those of most other animals on the grounds If, as I have : rights or in some other way. The recognition of that only people can alter their behavior on the basis animals as o ; .

MARY ANNE WARREN• A CRITIQUE OF REGAN'S ANIMAL RIGHTS THEORY 37 is the price we of reasoned argument does not con1111it us to a per­ still ascribe rights to them? Everyone agrees that 1 of our moral fectionist theory of the so1t Aiistotle endorsed. animals are entitled to some protection against nition of moral There is no excuse for refusing to recognize the human abuse, but why speak of animal rights if we ily in a state of moral equality of some people on the grounds that are not prepared to accept most animals as our 1r between the we don't regard them as quite as rational as we are, moral equals? The weak animal tights position may ~xism and male since it is petfectly clear that most people can reason seem an unstable compromise between the bold r be eliminated well enough to detem1ine how to act so as to claim that animals have the same basic moral rights ·actices. But, to respect the basic rights of others (if they choose to), that we do and the more common view that ani­ recognition of and that is enough for moral equality. mals have no rights at all. her, perhaps as But what about people who are clearly not It is probably impossible to either prove or dis­ part) through rational? It is often argued that sophisticated mental prove the thesis that animals have moral rights by :lo not seem to capacities such as rationality cannot be essential for producing an analysis of the concept of a moral eve. the possession of equal basic moral rights, since tight and checking to see if some or all animals sat­ tion of moral nearly everyone agrees that human infants and men­ isfy the conditions for having tights. The concept 1Ugh they can­ tally incompetent persons have such tights, even of a moral right is complex, and it is not clear ver is that we though they may lack those sophisticated mental which of its strands are essential. Paradigm rights rith most non­ capacities. But this argument is inconclusive, because holders, i.e., mature and mentally competent per­ olve the prob­ there are powe1ful practical and emotional reasons sons, are both rational and morally autonomous hout harming for protecting non-rational human beings, reasons beings and sentient subjects-of-a-life. Opponents of ligated to try. which arc absent in the case of most non-human animal rights claim that rationality and moral e feral cats and animals. Infancy and mental incompetence are autonomy are essential for the possession of rights, .ng on endan- human conditions which all of us either have expeti­ while defenders of animal rights claim that they are 1itable conces- enced or are likely to expetience at some time. We not. The ordinary concept of a moral tight is prob­ also protect babies and mentally incompetent people ably not precise enough to enable us to determine :an not because we care for them. We don't nom1ally care who is right on purely definitional grounds. suade for animals in the same way, and when we do-e.g., [f logical analysis will not answer the question We can in the case of much-loved pets-we may regard of whether animals have moral rights, practical them as having special rights by virtue of their rela­ considerations may, nevertheless, incline us to say tionship to us. We protect them not only for their that they do. The most plausible alternative to the 1111ing that the sake but also for our own, lest we be hurt by harm view that animals have moral rights is that, while ~e basis of rea- done to them. Regan holds that such "side-effects" they do not have rights, we are, nevertheless, obli­ 1ll moral status are irrelevant to moral rights, and perhaps they are. gated not to be cruel to them. Regan argues per­ course, he was But in ordinary usage, there is no sharp line between suasively that the injunction to avoid being cruel to tnen and slaves moral rights and those moral protections which are animals is inadequate to express our obligations iough to func- not tights. The extension of strong moral protections towards animals, because it focuses on the mental 1d that premise to infants and the mentally impaired in no way states of those who cause animal suffering, rather i that women proves that non-human animals have the same basic than on the harm done to the animals themselves equals of free moral tights as people. (p. 158). Cruelty is inflicting pain or suffering and 1n animals, the either taking pleasure in that pain or suffering or on the other being more or less indifferent to it. Thus, to express we can (learn the demand for the decent treatment of animals in do this and to WHY SPEAK OF "ANIMAL RIGHTS" terms of the rejection of cruelty is to invite the too ATAU? easy response that those who subject animals to suf­ · rights of per­ fering are not being cruel because they regret the )n the grounds If, as I have argued, reality precludes our treating all suffering they cause but sincerely believe that what or on the basis animals as our moral equals, then why should we they do is justified. The injunction to avoid cruelty 38 CHAPTER 1 •ANIMAL RIGHTS is also inadequate in that it does not preclude mountains, nvers, or species, are at least logically the wea~ animals l the killing of animals-for any reason, however possible candidates for moral rights. This fact, to­ persons. trivial-so long as it is done relatively painlessly. gether with the need to end current abuses of ani­ The inadequacy of the anti-cruelty view pro­ mals-e.g., in scientific research . . . -provides a 5. See R. C A11i111als ( vides one practical reason for speaking of animal plausible case for speaking of animal rights. rights. Another practical reason is that this is an age in which nearly all significant moral claims tend to be expressed in terms of rights. Thus, the denial CONCLUSION that animals have rights, however carefully quali­ 1. Exami111 I have argued that Regan's case for ascribing strong fied, is likely to be taken to mean that we may do tion. W moral rights to all nonnal, mature manunals is whatever we like to them, provided that we do not is her er violate any human rights. In such a context, speak­ unpersuasive because (1) it rests upon the obscure ing of the rights of animals may be the only way to concept of inherent value, which is defined only in 2. What is persuade many people to take setiously protests negative terms, and (2) it seems to preclude any beings n against the abuse of animals. plausible answer to questions about the moral status Why not extend this line of argument and of the vast majotity of sentient animals .... speak of the rights of trees, mountains, oceans, or The weak animal rights theory asserts that anything else which we may wish to see protected (1) any creature whose natural mode of.life includes from destruction? Some environmentalists have not the pursuit of certain satisfactions has the right not hesitated to speak in this way, and, given the to be forced to exist without the opportunity to importance of protecting such elements of the natu­ pursue those satisfactions; (2) that any creature ral world, they cannot be blamed for using this rhe­ which is capable of pain, suffering, or frustration torical device. But, I would argue that moral rights has the tight that such experiences not be deliber­ can meaningfully be ascribed only to entities which ately inflicted upon it without some compelling have some capacity for sentience. This is because reason; and (3) that no sentient being should be moral rights are protections designed to protect killed without good reason. However, moral rights tights holders from hamis or to provide them with are not an all-or-nothing affair. The strength of the benefits which matter to them. Only beings capable reasons required to override the rights of a non­ of sentience can be hanned or benefitted in ways human organism varies, depending upon-among which matter to them, for only such beings can like other things-the probability that it is sentient and or dislike what happens to them or prefer some con­ (if it is clearly sentient) its probable degree of men­ ditions to others. Thus, sentient animals, unlike tal sophistication ....

NOTES

1. Tom Regan, 771.e Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: disposition. Dispositions do not disappear whenever University of California Press, 1983). All page they are not currently manifested. Thus, sleeping or references are to this edition. temporarily unconscious persons or non-human 2. For instance, Peter Singer, although he does not animals are still sentient in the relevant sense (i.e., like to speak of rights, includes all sentient beings still capable of sentience), so long as they still have under the protection of his basic utilitarian principle the neurological mechanisms necessary for the of equal respect for like interests. (Animal Liberation occurrence of experiences. (New York: Avon Books, 1975), p. 3.) 4. It is possible, perhaps probable that some non­ 3. The capacity for sentience, like all of the mental human animals-such as cetaceans and anthropoid capacities mentioned in what follows, is a apes-should be regarded as persons. If so, then ,. MARY ANNE WARREN• A CRITIQUE OF REGAN ' S ANIMAL RIGHTS THEORY 39 least logically the weak animal rights position holds that these 6. See, for instance, p. 319, where Regan appeals to This fact, to­ animals have the same basic moral rights as human the benefit of the doubt principle when dealing persons. abuses of ani­ with infanticide and late-tenn abortion. -provides a 5. See R. G. Frey, Interests and Rig/its: T/1e Case Agai11st 7. Bonnie Steinbock, "Speciesism and the Id ea of ;hts. A11i11ials (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980). Equali ty," Philosop/1y 53 (1978), p. 253.

STUDY QUESTIONS

1. Examine Warren's critique of Regan's posi­ animals? Do you agree with Warren's cribing strong tion. What is her main criticism? How strong arguments? mammals is is her criticism? n the obscure 3. What is the weak animal rights position? efined only in 2. What is the basis for granting human What is Warren's argument for it? preclude any beings moral rights that we do not grant e moral status s.... y asserts that )flife includes the right not pportunity to any creature or frustration ot be deliber­ te compelling ng should be r, moral rights trength of the hts of a non- 1pon-among is sentient and egree of men-

!pear whenever ~us, sleeping or 10n-human nt sense (i.e., they still have .ry for th e some non- .nd anthropoid ;. If so, then