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In Defense of an Animal's Right to Life

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In Defense of an Animal's Right to Life IN DEFENSE OF AN ANIMAL’S RIGHT TO LIFE Aaron Simmons A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate College of Bowling Green State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY May 2006 Committee: R.G. Frey, Advisor Juan Bouzat Graduate Faculty Representative Tom Regan David Sobel ii ABSTRACT Dr. R.G. Frey, Advisor In this dissertation, my primary aim is to defend the idea that animals have a basic moral right to life, such that we have a strong duty to refrain from killing them. More specifically, I argue that animals’ right to life is equal in strength to humans’ right to life, such that our duty not to kill animals is just as strong as our duty not to kill humans. An implication of this right is that we are required to cease killing animals for food, material, and purposes of scientific experimentation. I approach my thesis by examining two main objections to the view that animals have an equal right to life. The first objection contends that animals do not have a right to life because they do not have an interest to live. According to this objection, animals have no interest to live either (1) because having interests requires having desires and animals cannot have desires, or (2) because even if animals can have desires and interests, they do not have specifically an interest to live. In response, I argue, first, that many animals are in fact capable of having desires. Second, I argue that many animals do have specifically an interest to live. The second objection contends that animals do not have an equal right to life because life has less value for animals than humans. According to this objection, life has greater value for humans than animals because human life is richer than animal life, and this is the case because only humans possess traits such as autonomy, personhood, or rational agency. In response to this objection, I concede that it is plausible to think that life typically has greater value for humans than animals. However, I argue that having an equal right to life does not require that life has equal value for a being but rather just that iii the value of life for a being meets a certain threshold. I aim to show that the value of life for many animals meets this threshold. iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank the members of my dissertation committee for their assistance in my production of this dissertation. At the outset of this project, my advisor R.G. Frey expressed to me his belief that it is best to have as your advisor someone who disagrees with your conclusion, since such an advisor is likely to challenge you to defend your views more thoroughly. Although at times it can be frustrating to work with an advisor who, more often than not, does not see eye to eye with you, I believe that my dissertation is considerably stronger for having worked with Dr. Frey. In our meetings, he consistently challenged me to address various important issues and arguments that I otherwise may have missed or glossed over. As a result, my arguments became more sophisticated and stronger. I was fortunate to be able to rely on Dr. Frey’s expertise in the area of animal ethics, and I thank him as well for his support of my work despite the fact that we hold opposing viewpoints on the moral standing of animals. Additionally, I would like to thank the other members of my committee: Tom Regan, Dave Sobel, and Juan Bouzat. I am grateful for having been able to work with Dr. Regan, whose seminal book The Case for Animal Rights (along with Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation) originally inspired my interest in the philosophy of animal ethics back when I was just a junior in high school. Dr. Regan provided me with extensive comments on the rough drafts of my chapters, which helped me improve my arguments. Moreover, he offered me words of encouragement and support as a fellow defender of the rights of animals, which I appreciated. I thank Dr. Sobel as well for his extensive comments on my rough drafts, and also for his very positive and encouraging words of support after reading my work and before my dissertation defense as well. v Finally, I’d like to thank my parents for always being supportive of my beliefs and my academic pursuits. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................. 1 1. Clarifying the Right to Life................................................................................. 2 2. Life vs. Suffering ................................................................................................ 5 3. Main Argument & Basic Assumptions............................................................... 7 4. The Merits of this Project ................................................................................. 11 5. Chapter Outline................................................................................................. 13 CHAPTER 1. FEINBERG, ANIMALS, AND THE RIGHT TO LIFE..................... 17 1. Feinberg & the Interests Criterion .................................................................... 18 2. Feinberg on Animals & the Right to Life ......................................................... 25 3. Problems with Feinberg’s Argument................................................................ 29 4. Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 40 CHAPTER 2. ANIMALS, INTERESTS, AND DESIRES: IN DEFENSE OF ANIMAL DESIRES........................................................................................................ 43 1. Interests & Desires............................................................................................ 44 2. Desires & Animals............................................................................................ 46 3. Animals & Propositional Attitudes................................................................... 61 4. Animal Behavior & the Scope of Desires......................................................... 86 5. Drawing the Line .............................................................................................. 88 6. Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 90 CHAPTER 3. ANIMALS, THE VALUE OF LIFE, AND THE RIGHT TO LIFE: IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS’ RIGHT TO LIFE ....................................................... 92 1. An Interest to Live ............................................................................................ 93 2. The Comparative Value of Life ...................................................................... 108 vii 3. The Value of Life and the Right to Life ......................................................... 118 4. Applying the Right to Life.............................................................................. 130 5. Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 142 CHAPTER 4. ANIMALS, THE RIGHT TO LIFE, AND THE ARGUMENT FROM MARGINAL CASES: A REFUTATION OF ATTEMPTS TO OVERCOME THE AMC............................................................................................................................... 143 1. Preliminary Remarks on the AMC ................................................................. 144 2. Membership to the Human Species ................................................................ 146 3. Potential Persons & Former Persons............................................................... 150 4. Personal Relationships of Care ....................................................................... 153 5. Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 156 CHAPTER 5. REGAN, ANIMAL RIGHTS, AND THE INTERESTS CRITERION ......................................................................................................................................... 158 1. Regan’s View.................................................................................................. 159 2. A Defense of the Interests Criterion ............................................................... 165 3. Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 176 CHAPTER 6. A CRITIQUE OF WARREN’S WEAK ANIMAL RIGHTS VIEW ......................................................................................................................................... 178 1. Warren’s View................................................................................................ 178 2. Criticism of Warren’s View............................................................................ 184 3. Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 191 CHAPTER 7. ANIMALS, PREDATORS, THE RIGHT TO LIFE, AND THE DUTY TO SAVE LIVES.............................................................................................. 193 1. The Predator Objection................................................................................... 194 2. An Inadequate Response to the Predator Objection ....................................... 197 3. How to Reply to the Predator Objection......................................................... 200 viii 4. Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 208 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................
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