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The Case Against Group-Differentiated Animal Rights*

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The Case Against Group-Differentiated Animal Rights* Cosmozoopolis: The Case Against Group-Differentiated Animal Rights* ALASDAIR COCHRANE University of Sheffield Abstract This paper claims that relational position and group-based distinctions are less important in determining the rights of animals than Zoopolis concludes. In particular, it argues that the theory of animal rights developed in Zoopolis is vulnerable to some of the critiques that are made against theories which differentiate the rights of humans on the basis of group-based distinctions. For example, in the human context, group-differentiated theories of rights have been criticised on a number of important grounds: for failing to extend to non-associates rights that ought to be so extended; for granting too much weight to the rights of associates over non-associates; for wrongly treating groups as homogenous entities; and for also assuming that these groups necessarily have value as they exist presently. This paper outlines how modi- fied versions of these critiques can be levelled at the theory of animal rights defended in Zoopolis. Keywords: animals, animal rights, universal rights, group-differentiated rights, relational position, cosmopolitanism, capacities, interests. 1. INTRODUCTION In their fascinating and thought-provoking new book, Zoopolis, Sue Donald- son and Will Kymlicka aim to construct a distinctively political theory of ani- mal rights. Zoopolis seeks to employ familiar concepts from political theory and practice in order to “supplement” and “extend” so-called “traditional theories” of animal rights (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011: 50). It argues that * For writing such a thoughtful, imaginative and progressive book on behalf of animals, special thanks to Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka. I would also like to thank all of the editors and reviewers at LEAP for their extensive and helpful feedback —with particular thanks owed to Paula Casal. Finally, thanks to all of the following people who helped me shape the paper after extensive discussion of Zoopolis: Garrett Brown, Steve Cooke, Robert Garner, John Hadley, Oscar Horta, Siobhan O’Sullivan and Krithika Srinavasan. LEAP, 1 (2013) 128 Alasdair Cochrane while traditional theories have provided a plausible basis for attributing uni- versal moral rights to sentient animals based on their intrinsic character- istics, they have failed to capture the variety of duties we have to animals stemming from the very different types of relationships we have with them (6). The book aims to remedy this fault through employing a theory of group- differentiated animal rights that takes animals’ relational position seriously. Zoopolis employs three concepts from political theory and practice to help determine what is owed to different groups of animals. “Citizenship” should be granted to all domesticated animals on the basis that they are full members of mixed human-animal communities, participating in the coop- erative project of political life. “Sovereignty”, by contrast, should be granted to those wild animals who live apart from humans, on the basis that they are competent to run their own affairs, and seem not to desire intervention. Finally, “denizenship” should be granted to those “liminal” animals who are wild but live in the midst of human settlements (such as crows or mice), on the basis that they reside within our societies, but lack the reciprocal capaci- ties necessary to be regarded as joint co-operators (Ch. 1). Developing a theory of animal rights that is subtle, nuanced and attuned to the differences between animals is certainly commendable. Moreover, a theory which is alive to the political importance of animal rights is an ex- tremely welcome contribution to animal ethics. It is important, however, not to overstate the novelty of a “political approach” to the question of what is owed to animals. Previous discussions of animal rights have also been po- litical: they have employed political concepts and have offered prescriptions that the state ought to enforce coercively. The novelty of Zoopolis resides not so much in connecting animal ethics to political theory, but connecting it to a particular position in political theory: a position which grants consider- able weight to group membership and relational position when determin- ing an individual’s proper entitlements. Traditional theories of animal rights as espoused by such thinkers as Tom Regan and Peter Singer, on the other hand, have very much been cosmopolitan in character: sceptical about the moral relevance of group-based distinctions, and instead focused on the equal universal entitlements derived from the interests and capacities of in- dividuals (Singer 1995; Regan 2004). When evaluating the theory of Zoopolis, then, the question is not whether a political theory of animal rights makes sense. Rather, the appropriate question is whether a political theory which gives such important weight to the relational and group-based distinctions of animals makes sense. This paper claims that relational position and group-based distinctions are less important in determining the rights of animals than Donaldson and Kymlicka conclude. In particular, it claims that their theory is vulnerable to some of the critiques that are made against theories which differentiate the LEAP, 1 (2013) Cosmozoopolis: The Case Against Group-Differentiated Animal... ��12� rights of humans on the basis of group-based distinctions. For example, in the human context, group-differentiated theories of rights —such as that proposed by Kymlicka himself— have been criticised on a number of im- portant grounds: for failing to extend to non-associates rights that ought to be so extended; for granting too much weight to the rights of associates over non-associates; and for both wrongly treating groups as homogenous enti- ties, and for also assuming that these groups necessarily have value as they exist presently.1 The following three sections of this paper outline how modi- fied versions of these critiques can be levelled at the theory of animal rights defended in Zoopolis. In each of them, the paper argues that while the rela- tional position and group membership of animals can be of relevance in de- termining their rights, it is not of primary importance. Instead, and in keep- ing with more cosmopolitan traditions of political thought, the paper argues that it is the capacities of individual animals, and the interests that flow from those capacities, that is the most crucial factor in delineating their rights. The paper concludes by briefly exploring how a traditional theory of animal rights grounded in cosmopolitan political thought can still be attuned to the different types of duties we have towards animals. 2. DENYING WILD ANIMALS THEIR JUST ENTITLEMENTS Zoopolis recognises that all sentient animals possess certain universal moral rights, but argues that animals have further group-based rights on the basis of their different relational positions. Such a theory follows a familiar line of thinking in political theory. For example, David Miller famously proposes a theory of global justice which endorses the protection of minimal univer- sal human rights for all, with further and more extensive rights and duties granted to individuals via their association within a nation-state (Miller 2007). One potential problem faced by such theories, however, is that they can favour denying “outsider” groups —like foreigners— their just entitle- ments by being too minimalist about the universal rights that are recognised (see e. g. Wenar 2008). Crucially, I believe that the theory of animal rights de- fended in Zoopolis faces this problem. In particular, I am not convinced that the citizenship rights that Donaldson and Kymlicka grant to domesticated animals should not also be extended to all wild animals. Donaldson and Kymlicka argue that citizenship contains three core ele- ments, each of which entails a general right of citizenship that ought to ap- 1. For Kymlicka’s own theory of group-differentiated rights for humans, see Kymlicka (1995). For examples of critiques of theories of group-differentiated rights, see Wenar (2008: 401-411), Kukathas (1992: 105-139), Waldron (1995: 93-119), Barry (2001), and Brown (2009: Ch. 4). LEAP, 130 Alasdair Cochrane ply to domesticated animals, but not to wild animals: the right to political concern, the right to political agency, and the right to residency (101). In their discussion of the practical implications of their theory, they also dis- cuss further rights that are exclusive to domesticated animals, such as the right to be protected from predation (133-134). I want to claim that each of these rights can and ought to be granted to all sentient animals, including those in the wild. Let us start then with the first general right of citizenship that Donaldson and Kymlicka identify: the right to political concern. This right means that domesticated animals —like other citizens— are entitled to have their inter- ests included in the public good (101). In other words, it means that lawmak- ers must consider the well-being of these creatures when formulating and implementing policies. However, it is unclear why this right is something that ought to be exclusive to domesticated animals. For one, Donaldson and Kymlicka themselves acknowledge that the interests of wild animals count for something —this, after all, is the basis on which they assign universal rights to them (Ch. 2). Moreover, it is also evident that the actions of human political communities affect those interests in profound ways. For example,
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