Animal Ethics and the Political
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This is a repository copy of Animal Ethics and the Political. White Rose Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/103896/ Version: Accepted Version Article: Cochrane, A. orcid.org/0000-0002-3112-7210, Garner, R. and O'Sullivan, S. (2016) Animal Ethics and the Political. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy. ISSN 1369-8230 https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2016.1194583 This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy on 09/06/2016, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/13698230.2016.1194583. Reuse Unless indicated otherwise, fulltext items are protected by copyright with all rights reserved. The copyright exception in section 29 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 allows the making of a single copy solely for the purpose of non-commercial research or private study within the limits of fair dealing. 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[email protected] https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ Alasdair Cochrane, Robert Garner and Siobhan O’Sullivan Animal Ethics and the Political (forthcoming in Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy) Some of the most important recent contributions to normative debates concerning our obligations to nonhuman animals appear to be somehow ‘political’.i Certainly, many of those contributions have come from those working in the field of political, rather than moral, philosophy. Furthermore, many of them also explicitly employ political language, concepts and ideas when making their prescriptions. For example, Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka (2011) have offered a model of animal rights centred around citizenship, sovereignty and denizenship. Martha Nussbaum (2006) has critiqued Rawlsian models of justice for excluding animals, and has argued that her capabilities approach provides an appropriate framework to outline our political relations with animals. Furthermore, Robert Garner (2013) has recently developed a theory of justice for animals that attempts to avoid idealistic utopian theorising and which is instead grounded in non-ideal theory. Still other theories have asked how ideas and debates familiar within political philosophy - including the scope of the liberal state (Smith 2012, Flanders 2014), the value of equality (O’Sullivan 2011), human rights (Cochrane 2013a), cosmopolitanism (Cooke 2014), global justice (Horta 2013), property rights (Hadley 2015), associative duties (Valentini 2014) and democratic representation (Driessen 2014, Garner forthcoming) - shape our obligations to nonhuman animals. In light of these contributions, some thinkers have claimed that we are witnessing a ‘political turn’ in animal ethics (Milligan 2015a, 2015b, Wissenburg and Scholsberg 2014, Wykoff 2014, Donaldson and Kymlicka forthcoming, Garner and O’Sullivan forthcoming, Woodhall and Garmendia da Trindade forthcoming). But do these various contributions represent a real and meaningful shift in emphasis from previous work in animal ethics? In order for them to comprise a genuine ‘political turn’, we propose that two things would need to be shown. First, 1 it would need to be demonstrated that the combined body of work has some unifying thread. That is to say, the contributions should possess common features of some sort, such as shared assumptions, normative commitments, methods or approaches. This is not to say that the contributions and their normative prescriptions cannot differ in important and substantial ways; it is simply to point out that for them to comprise a cohesive ‘turn’ in animal ethics, rather than simply amount to a collection of new but quite disparate theories, they must have some shared political feature or set of features which unite them. Second, for these contributions to mark a political turn, they would also have to be shown to be distinctive in some politically salient way from what we might call ‘traditional animal ethics’; a field which is most famously exemplified by the work of Peter Singer (1990) and Tom Regan (2004). At first blush, it might seem obvious that the theories and contributions referred to above do represent something that is both unified and distinctive. After all, as noted, they all employ political language and concepts in making their normative claims about our obligations to animals. However, if the use of political language and concepts was all that were required to make a contribution to animal ethics ‘political’, then we could safely say that animal ethics has been political since its inception. Donaldson and Kymlicka (forthcoming) have argued that animal ethicists have theorised the, ‘…moral rights of animals without drawing upon the categories and concepts of political theory’. But the truth is that the use of political categories and concepts has in fact been pervasive in the literature. To take just one obvious example: many argue quite reasonably that the very notion of ‘rights’ is political, since rights imply entitlements that can be coercively enforced by the state as a matter of justice (Nozick 1980, pp. 499-503, Steiner 2005, p. 460). And of course the concept of rights is an established feature of traditional theories of animal ethics: it is most obviously central in Regan’s The Case for Animal Rights (2004), but it is also evident in Singer’s utilitarian animal manifesto, Animal Liberation, in which he describes rights as a, ‘convenient political shorthand’ (1990, p. 8). Given the widespread use of political language in the animal ethics literature, of which we will provide more 2 examples below, we argue that if these more recent political contributions to the field are to be regarded as unified and distinctive, a more specific and substantive essential feature needs to be identified. This paper, then, is devoted to exploring whether any such unifying and distinctive feature exists. We take as our starting point certain characteristics discussed by Tony Milligan, which he describes as ‘overlapping commitments’ of the political turn (2015a, p. 155, 2015b, p. 7).ii Three of the commitments Milligan identifies can be dispensed with relatively quickly on the basis that they straightforwardly fail to meet the conditions of being unifying and distinctive. They comprise: a focus on the tension between the treatment of animals and liberal values; a commitment to interest-based rights; and consideration of animal interests as part of the common good. A focus on the tension between liberal values and the treatment of animals is not unifying, and is barely discussed in key recent political texts, such as Zoopolis (2011). That feature is also not particularly distinctive, with Tom Regan devoting an entire section of The Case for Animal Rights to the issue of how our obligations to animals, and in particular our duty to be vegetarian, conflict with the human interest in liberty (2004, pp. 331-334, see also Clark 1987). A commitment to interest-based rights is also not unifying, with only a few recent political texts explicitly invoking them (Cochrane 2012). Furthermore, nor is such a commitment distinctive since the use of interest-based rights has an extremely long history in animal ethics (Feinberg 1974). Finally, consideration of animal interests as part of the common good cannot be regarded as unifying.iii In fact, it is only explicitly referred to in one recent work, Donaldson and Kymlicka’s Zoopolis, and even in that theory, the only animals whose interests count as part of that common good are domesticated animals (p. 101). As such, this paper focuses on the remaining and best candidates for comprising the essential feature of the political turn. Those candidates are: a focus on relations and positive duties; the offering of feasible and pragmatic prescriptions; and the avoidance of first principles 3 (Milligan 2015a, p. 155, Milligan 2015b, p. 7). We find that none of these candidates comprise a ‘unifying thread’ of the political turn, and are in fact contested by key theorists working in the field. We also find that none of these features is particularly distinctive, and each has in fact been prevalent in a number of works within traditional animal ethics. Indeed, on this basis we argue that traditional animal ethics should be regarded as more political than some proponents of the ‘turn’ have suggested (for example, Donaldson and Kymlicka forthcoming). However, in the final substantive section of the paper, we identify one key focus of these recent political contributions which both unifies them, and which makes them important and original additions to the normative debate relating to human-animal relations. That focus is on justice. While other theorists (Wykoff 2014) – including Milligan (2015a, 2015b) - have also claimed that these theories offer something novel by their focus on justice, we argue that they have not accurately captured what that focus amounts to. For the crucial unifying and distinctive feature of these contributions – and what can properly be said to mark them out as