JAPAN AND THE TRANS-SIBERIAN RAILROAD, 1885-1905 A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN H IS T O R Y MAY 1974 By Robert Britton Valliant Dissertation Committee: John A. White, Chairman John J. Stephan Harry Lamley Robert K. Sakai Larry Heien We certify that we have read this dissertation and that in our opinion it is satisfactory in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History. DISSERTATION COMMITTEE C hairm an INTRODUCTION Railroads are generally built for economic reasons and that is the way they are studied, but some railroads have another aspect that is equally, if not more, important. I propose to examine the strategic consequences of just one railroad, the Trans-Siberian. In doing so, I have considered the Chinese Eastern Railroad, as the branch through Manchuria was called, as a part of the Trans-Siberian since for all practical purposes it was a Russian national railway. The focus here is on Japan and on how the Japanese viewed the railroad, and how they reacted to it. The Trans-Siberian railroad was one of those grand rail­ road schemes of the 19th century. Others with which an eco­ nomic, but not a strategic, comparison may be made are the United States' Trans-continental and the Canadian Pacific. All three bridged continents; opened land for settlement, expanded trade and provided other economic stimuli, but neither of the North American railroads evoked the same strategic response the Russian railroad did. Even though Russia reached the coast, she remained hemmed in. All her ports froze during the winter, and the Japanese archipelago cut her off from the Pacific. In addition neither the United States nor Canada faced a threat from any other power on their western frontier, but Russia thought she did in the combination of China and Great Britain. The only other major area of strategic railroads in the world was in the Middle East. There it was a question of the Russian threat to India and the British response. The solution was an ideal one. Both Persia and Afghanistan became a buffer zone, and no railroads were built in either country. Such a solution was not possible in Korea because the Japanese regarded it as their first line of defense, and they would never be content to leave it sunk in backwardness and too weak to defend itself. Set against this background, the Trans-Siberian need not be seen as an isolated event. Its purpose was, first of all, strategic. The government in St. Petersburg and officials responsible for the Far East were particularly anxious to avoid a repetition of the events of 1854 when the British had attacked their relatively undefended eastern flank with impunity. At the same time they were worried about the Chinese settlement of Manchuria, seeing in it a future threat that might deprive them of an outlet to the sea. Without an all-weather means of transport, it took months to move troops across Siberia, and any Russian shipping that traveled via the Indian Ocean would be prey to the British. In fact the Russian squadron based at Vladivostok wintered in Japan. There was another reason for the railroad that will not be discussed here: the development of Siberia both as an outlet for the over-populated central provinces and for the natural resources. Once the government began to build the railroad between the V Urals and Vladivostok, the next steps followed in logical succes­ sion. First it was a short cut across Manchuria in order to avoid the difficult and costly construction that would be required should the route follow the Amur River as originally planned. Then it was the acquisition of an ice-free port. The line across Manchuria offered two possibilities: either to some Korean port or to the Liaotung peninsula. The choice became a matter of dispute within the Russian government, but the Foreign Minister had his way and the latter alternative was chosen. The suc­ ceeding step was the consolidation of Russian interests in Man­ churia to protect the railroads. In effect this meant shutting out other countries. Something the Japanese were not prepared to accep t. The Japanese response to the Russian railroad may be divided into three broad tendencies. One group of men which saw it as a threat may be called the "defensists. " As the name implies they were interested in preparing Japan's defenses for what they considered to be the logical culmination of a new con­ centration of Russian power in the Far East: the partition of China. More important still, Korea, Japan's first line of defense, offered many ice-free ports, and these men did not expect Russia to pass up the opportunity to acquire a year-round outlet and predominant influence in that backward kingdom. Not only did they argue for increased army and navy spending, but they also vi supported those interested in building a railroad in Korea. The second group of men, which might be called the "economists," was more interested in taking advantage of the Russian railroad than it was concerned with any vague threat. This group saw a chance to expand Japanese exports to Siberia, Russia and Europe and to make Japan the central way station on an east-west trade route. Therefore as positive measures, members of this group supported language schools, advocated construction of railroads in Japan to ports on the Japan Sea, proposed that more ports for trade with Russia be opened, were active in organizing associations and trade firms to do business with Russia, and established shipping lines between Japan and Siberia. The one important point on which they agreed with the "defensists" was the necessity for Japanese railroads in Korea. The "economists" saw such lines, when connected with the Chinese Eastern Railroad and the Chinese railroad in Manchuria, as an important means of attracting through traffic to Japan. The third group of men was small and uninfluential, but had their idea prevailed a war might have been avoided or at least postponed. They proposed that Russia be given a free hand in Manchuria and that Japan, while protecting the independence of Korea, turn her attention to the south. This proposal turned up again just before the beginning of the Second World War, and then it was decided to move south. The railroad then offers one facet of international relations. As Russia moved into the Far East Japan developed her own expansionist momentum, and the two states moved toward collision. The first part of this study discusses the early argu­ ments for a railroad and conditions in the Russian Far East. Once construction was begun, and not without opposition, some in St. Petersburg began to consider the possibilities which China would offer. In the Japanese response to the railroad, one may follow the "defensist"-"economist" argument easily. The second part of the study poses the question of conflict or peaceful co-existence. The construction of the Chinese Eastern Railroad made the arguments of the Japanese "defensists" more acute, and Korea became the center of attention as Japan attempted to build a railroad between Seoul and Pusan. However trade was expanding, and the public in Japan by no means saw a war as inevitable. Still, the trade never reached the expected volume. The reasons for this and for the continued deterioration of political relations are explored. The final part describes the descent to war. As political relations worsened the Japanese government took a hand in the construction of the Seoul-Pusan railroad. At the same time it worked to obtain the concession for the Seoul-Uiju line and to deny it to the Russians. In Manchuria the condition of the CER became a matter of concern to both sides since its carrying v i i i capacity would decide the victor in case of war. In pursuing this topic, one notices that relatively few books on Russia's relations with the Far East stand out, and of these fewer still deal with Japan in any knowledgeable way. For the period under study here, although the Japanese Gaiko bunsho (Diplomatic documents) has been available for almost 20 years, little use has been made of it. John A . White used it for his study of the diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War as did Ian Nish in his monograph on the Anglo-Japanese alliance. However the former is concerned chiefly with the period immediately pre­ ceding the war, and the latter is interested in Russia only peripherally, although he does have an article on the role of Korea in Russo-Japanese relations. There are books on the formation of Japanese foreign policy during the war and studies of Japanese-Korean relations based on Japanese documents, but almost nothing concerning Russia, and even these deal primarily with the diplomatic aspects of relations and ignore, for the most part, economic and cultural features. Works based on Russian sources are more common, but then the basic Russian materials have been known for years. B. B. Glinskii, B. A. Romanov and the various articles in Krasnyi arkhiv remain about the only official documentation. These and a few others were all available to Andrew Malozemoff for his almost unsurpassed survey of Russian relations with Asia ix from 1881 to 1904. Even Soviet scholars have difficulty gaining admission to the archives. Perhaps the most notable works in the past 20 years are those of A . L. Narochnitskii who covers the period 1860-1895 and who made excellent use of the archives; a small article by V.