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The American and Japanese Navies As Hypothetical

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The American and Japanese Navies As Hypothetical BIG STICK AI\70 SHORT SWORD: THE AMERICAN AND JAPANESE NAVIES AS HYPOTHETICAL ENEMIES DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Carlos R. Rivera, B.A., M.A ***** The Ohio State University 1995 Dissertation Committee : Approved by J.F. Guilmartin, Jr. a <—- J.R. Bartholomew A v \(,/i ( I ^ Adviser^ P.L. Hahn Dep^tm^t of History ÜMI Number: 9534057 Copyright 1995 by Rivera, Carlos Rafael All rights reserved. DMI Microform 9534057 Copyright 1995, by UMI Company. All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. UMI 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, MI 48103 Copyright by Carlos R. Rivera 1995 To my Father, Carlos Rivera DeJesus Sargeant First Class (ret.) U.S. Army Who taught me that honor, duty, and courage are so much more than political expediency 11 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I express my most sincere and grateful appreciation for the professional contributions I received. For John F. Guilmartin, Jr., I very much want to recognize the patient guidance and support I received during the last few years. Grateful thanks go to the other members of my committee, James R. Bartholomew and Peter L. Hahn, and Frederick J. Milford. Other persons who have been most helpful include Otsubo Sumiko and Sendai Kenzo, both of The Ohio State University, Yamamoto Masahiro, University of Alabama, and Sebastian Dobson, Tokyo. I want to recognize the Ohio State University Main Library, especially, Ms. Maureen Donovan for help with Japanese texts, and the staff of the Inter-Library Loan office for their valued assistance. In Washington DC, the staff at. the National Archives, primarily, Richard von Doenhoff, and at the Library of Congress Manuscript Division, demonstrated again and. again their first rate status as professionals. In Newport RI, Dr. Evelyn Cherpak, Archivist, U.S. Naval War College, has graciously endured my unending queries for too many years. I also wish to recognize and thank the following persons for their most important contributions to my work, Mark R. iii Peattie (Hoover Institution) and David C. Evans, (University of Richmond), especially for generously sharing their work with me, William R. Braisted (University of Texas), James R. Reckner (Texas Tech University) , and Hirama Yoichi, (Maritime Self Defense Force, Tokyo), for their valued contributions. A number of authorities also proved to be great fonts of critique and wisdom. To Paolo E. Coletta and Holger H. Herwig, I extend my appreciation. Edward S. Miller patiently answered many of my questions while Asada Sadao's keen comments surely helped my work. Finally, but not least, I want to credit my family. For too many years they have labored with me to finish this work. Though I can never thank them enough, I want to try to do so here. To Heidi and Jack, please accept my lament at losing the many hours we might have shared. To my wonderful wife, Evelyn, I reserve my most appreciative comments. Your love, support, and patience are worth more than a king's ransom. Thank you very much. IV VITA April 16, 1956 ................ Born - El Paso, Texas 1977 .......................... A.A., Columbus College, Columbus, Georgia 1978 .......................... B.A., Columbus College 1980-1985 .................... U.S. Navy- 1988 .......................... M.A., Portland State University, Oregon 1990-1991 .................... Fellow, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio 1991-1995 .................... Graduate Assistant, The Ohio State University FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: History Studies in Military/Naval History, J.F. Guilmartin, Jr. V TABLE OF CONTENTS DEDICATION ...................................... ü ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................... iii VITA .............................................. V LIST OF FIGURES ...................................... viii CHAPTER PAGE I . INTRODUCTION ............................... 1 The Development of the Hypothetical Enemy 1 Historiography .......................... 2 6 Significance and Interest ............ 36 Questions ............................ 46 II. THE AMERICAN NAVY: THE HAWAII QUESTION . 49 Introduction .......................... 49 The Hawaii Controversy in 1897 62 III. THE JAPANESE NAVY: COMING OF AGE, 1890-1900 . 86 Introduction .......................... 86 Akiyama Saneyuki: Japan's Première Naval Planner .............................. 94 Akiyama Early Career, 1890-1900 ........ 99 IV. THE AMERICAN NAVY: FROM MANILA TO PORT ARTHUR, 1898-1904 .................................. 118 The Philippines, the United States, and Japan ................................ 118 Preparing for the Hypothetical Enemy . 12 5 Roosevelt's Navy, 1901-1904 ............ 138 V. THE JAPANESE NAVY: BECOMING A FIRST-CLASS FORCE, 1900-1905 152 Introduction .......................... 152 Preparing the Japanese Navy for War . 157 vi VI. THE AMERICAN NAVY: FROM PORT ARTHUR TO CRISIS, 1904-1907 174 Introduction ............................ 174 The U.S. Navy View of the Russo-Japanese W a r .......................................179 The Emergence of the American Naval Strategic Elite ........................ 195 VII. THE JAPANESE NAVY: FROM TSUSHIMA TO CRISIS, 1905-1907 213 Introduction ............................ 213 The Japanese Navy and Imperial Defense, 1906-1907 218 Planning for the Hypothetical Enemy, 1906-1907 224 VIII. THE AMERICAN NAVY: FROM CRISIS TO GLOBAL WAR, 1906-1914 242 Planning for the Hypothetical Enemy . 242 The War Scare of 1906 250 Another War Scare and the "Great White Fleet," 1907-1909 258 The Strategic Elite between 1907 and 1 9 1 4 .......................................269 Global Conflict, 1 9 1 4 .....................289 IX. THE JAPANESE NAVY: PREPARING FOR THE ENEMY, 1907-1914 291 The War Scare of 1906-1907 .............. 291 The Japanese Navy and the U.S. Navy's World C r u i s e ............................ 304 The Road to Global C o n f l i c t .............. 310 X. FINALE: HYPOTHETICAL ENEMIES ............... 315 The World War, 1914-1916 315 Conclusion .............................. 338 LIST OF REFERENCES..................................... 345 V I 1 LIST OF FIGURES FIGURES PAGES 1. USN AND IJN ORDER OF BATTLE, 1893 ............ 54 2. USN AND IJN ORDER OF BATTLE, 1897 ............ 78 3. FOUR NATION FLEET COMPARISONS, 1907 ......... 143 4. SUBIC BAY NAVAL RESERVATION........... 187 5. PORT ARTHUR NAVAL B A S E ..................... 188 6. IJN CAPITAL SHIPS, 1905-1916 234 7. USN CAPITAL SHIPS, 1905-1916 262 8. SITE OF DECISIVE BATTLE, 1906-1914 303 9. SITES FOR A DECISIVE BATTLE, 1915-1916.... 324 10. USN CAPITAL SHIPS TO 1 9 1 5 ............. 336 11. 1916 NAVAL PROGRAM AND RATIOS, 1906-1916 . 337 Vlll CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION The Development of the Hypothetical Eneiry [T]here remains the question as to why [the American and Japanese naval planners] came to similar conclusions.'^ — Edwards. Miller, naval historian, 1993 [T] he Japanese [N]avy's studies on strategy tallied exactly with their American counterparts. Strategic planning in any nation, even that bearing on the most secret aspects of national defense, should lead to identical conclusions if based on the same premises and reliable data.^ — Admiral Kate Kanji, Chief of the Imperial Japanese Naval Staff, 1930 The fiftieth anniversary of World War II, and the associated American-Japanese conflict, has produced an avalanche of studies. The topics range from Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima and Nagasaki and at times reflect upon events between the Washington Naval Disarmament Conference (1921- 1922) and the outbreak of conflict in 1941. Most, though, minimize any number of developments before the Washington Conference that are germane to World War II. ^ Miller letter to Rivera, 3 June 1993. Miller wrote War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1922 (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute P, 1991) . ^ Quoted in Asada Sadao, "From Washington to London: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the Politics of Naval Limitation, 1921-1930, " Diplomacy and Statecraft: Special Issue on the Washington Conference, 1921-1922 4 (November 1993) -.150. Hereafter, Japanese names follow the convention of surname first, given name second. 2 This study focuses primarily upon American naval officers who, long before 1922, influenced the long-range strategies for war with Japan. For the most part, the officers were junior subordinates between 1897 and 1907 and removed from the national level of planning.^ While the materials available lend themselves to a thorough examination of those American naval officers, “ this study will also explore, in a limited way, the role of their Imperial Japanese Navy counterparts.^ This study's title requires explanation. It illustrates the origins and practices of American and Japanese naval planning. The oft quoted remark, "Speak softly and carry a big stick," served as a metaphor illustrating American naval strategy.® The big stick represented normally the American battle fleet, composed of capital ships, a widely recognized ^ Herein, the term "planner" refers to those officers contributing to the formulation of war plans, including naval attachés, intelligence officers, war college staffers, and those attached to dedicated planning organizations. "[To] be ready when war breaks, the first essential is a plan for preparation of sufficient material and personnel and preparation of plans for the conduct of the war. These two parts are considered "War Plans," Bradley A. Fiske, The N a w
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