The Imperial Japanese Army

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The Imperial Japanese Army The Imperial Japanese Army The change from Western Europe in the first two modules fort in knowing that many a Marine and Army veteran of to the Pacific for module 3 required a unique shift in the that campaign felt much the same way. Last Hundred Yards’ model. The Pacific module incorpo- So, how should you play the Japanese to maximize the rates adjustments to better reflect the strengths and limita- impact of their unique characteristics? The Japanese player tions of Japanese tactical doctrine, weapon systems, and its should play aggressive and be willing take losses. They are soldiers’ behavior in combat. at their best in the assault especially in combination with The individual Japanese soldier was physically hardy, envelopment. The Japanese strength is fighting in the strong and because of good training was “at home” in the jungle and/or Night. They should avoid attacking in open jungle and excelled in the use of camouflage. Stealth, infil- terrain due the American’s superior firepower. If forced to tration, and deception were noted characteristics. They attack in open terrain during the day, the Japanese should were relentless when on the attack and when in prepared concentrate their force using terrain and MFAs (including defenses, usually tenacious unto death. smoke) to hinder the enemy’s LOS, enabling their infantry to close with the enemy. The Japanese should advance/in- When it came to weapons production, the Imperial Japa- filtrate as rapidly as possible toward their objectives in nese Army’s requirements often came in second to the order to get past/behind the American forces. This will needs of the Imperial Japanese Navy. The Army was an typically pressure the Americans to give up their forward infantry-heavy organization that lacked much in the way of positions to fall back and avoid being cut off. the modern heavy weaponry other armies enjoyed. Their antitank capabilities were extremely limited; artillery was Also, the Japanese tanks are inferior to Allied armor and, if often lacking and sometimes restricted to small, outmoded used aggressively, their losses will pile up quickly which pieces; and its armored forces included obsolescent tanks will contribute to an early CDL loss. They are best used that were greatly inferior to their opponents’ armor. To supporting the infantry with fire support and in assaults. help compensate for the lack of heavy weapons, the Impe- The Japanese should avoid directly engaging Allied rial Japanese Army worked hard to develop large numbers AFVs/AT guns with their tanks, if possible, and instead use of what were probably the best light infantrymen in the the infantry to either destroy or flush out Allied AFVs and world at the time. Their creed stressed relentless offensive AT guns from their positions. action seeking a quick decision and emphasizing spiritual 1 Robert Cashner – What Made the Dreaded Type 89 factors including zealous dedication and fighting spirit. Knee Mortar So Damaging (warfarehistorynet- Night attacks were a true specialty, and their weaponry work.com) October 2010 Warfare History Network. reflected their light and fast doctrine. To offset their Additional Resources frequent lack of artillery, the Japanese augmented their Douglas Ford – Dismantling the “Lesser Men” and firepower through the extensive use of mortars, the best “Supermen” myth: US Intelligence on the Imperial Japa- and most cost-effective substitute for industry-intensive nese Army after the fall of the Philippines, Winter 1942 heavier artillery. And few were as feared, or as effective, as to Spring 1943. 2009. the Type 89 “Knee Mortar,” or grenade discharger.1 US War Department – “Excerpts from the Handbook on These unique characteristics of the Imperial Japanese Japanese Military Forces” TM E 30-480, 15 September Army are incorporated into the LHY series rules to best 1944. https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Japan/IJA/H- model Japanese unit behavior during the Solomon Islands B/HB-7.html. campaign. The enhanced ability of the Japanese to maneu- ver on their enemy, and maintain contact despite casualties, leads to a nail-biting experience for players of the Ameri- can forces, especially at Night. Players can take cold com- © 2021 GMT Games LLC • P.O. Box 1308, Hanford, CA 93232 • www.GMTGames.com.
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