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WASHINGTON IRVING CHAMBERS: INNOVATION, PROFESSIONALIZATION, AND THE NEW , 1872-1919

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctorof Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

Stephen Kenneth Stein, B.A., M.A.

*****

The Ohio State University 1999

Dissertation Committee: Approved by Dr. Allan R. Millett, Adviser Dr.JolinF.OuUmart» ^ Dr. William R. Childs Adviser Department of History UMI Number: 9S41439

UMI Microform 9941439 Copyright 1999, by UMI Company. All rights reserved.

This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, Code.

UMI 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, MI 48103 Copyright by Stephen Kenneth Stein 1999 ABSTRACT

The career of Irving Chambers spans a unique and formative period in the development of the . He entered the Naval Academy in the doldrum years of obsolete, often rotting ships, and left the Navy after it had a developed a large, world-class fleet of modem and was preparing to build its first aircraft carriers. This was a critical period in the formation of a professional identity for naval officers who adopted a professional identity at the same time that changing technology forced a complete transformation of the fleet. The officers who embraced new technology were often the same ones who redefined themselves as professionals. The synergy between professionalization and technological innovation accelerated the process that washed away the old Navy and left a new one in its place. Chambers' career demonstrates the process of institutional socialization by naval officers during this period of constant flux and change, and shows an struggling to master new technologies while simultaneously using his mastery of technology to further his career and improve the Navy. Chambers was one of the first officers assigned to the new Office of Naval Intelligence and one of the members of the 's first permanent faculty. He designed torpedoes and several including a prototype Dreadnoughtstyle . At the close of his career, he founded the Navy's air arm. Working with Glenn Curtiss, Chambers guided a coalition of aviation enthusiasts and pioneers, popularized aviation and convinced the Navy of its importance. Chambers helped bring about the two most momentous transformations the U. S. Navy has undergone in its history. In the first of these. Chambers iielped like-minded officers convince Congress and Ihe public of the need to adopt a new built around a fleet of battleships. In the second. Chambers laid the groundwork for naval aviation and the eventual dethronement of the battleship by the .

lU To Carolyn

IV ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to express my sincere appreciation to Dr. Allan R. Millett for his encouragement, insight and guidance through this project Thanks also go to the other members of my advisory committee. Dr. John F. Guilmartin and Dr. William R. Childs, for their comments and suggestions. The assistance of Kathleen McDonough at the Manuscript Division of the , Rebecca Livingston at the National Archives, Gregory Plunges at the Northeast Regional Branch of the National Archives,

Evelyn Cherpak at the Naval War College Library, and Beverly Lyall at the Nimitz Library at the U. S. Naval Academy are ail gratefully acknowledged. Without the unstinting support of my wife, Carolyn, completion of this project would have been impossible. VITA

August 6, 1964...... Bom - , 1988 B.A., University of Colorado 1992...... M.A., University of Colorado

HELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: History Studies in American, Ancient, and Military History

VI TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS...... iv

VITA...... ^ INTRODUCTION...... 1 CHAPTER PAGE 1. THE NAVAL ACADEMY...... 21 Chambers ...... 26 Hazing at the Academy ...... 33 Summer Cruises...... 41 Graduation ...... 43 2. EARLY CRUISES...... 47 Gallivanting Around ...... 49 Duty on the Pensacola ...... 51 The Portsmouth ...... 55 The Paris Exposition of 1878 ...... 61 The M arion ...... 62 Ordnance and Innovation ...... 64 The Rescue of the T rinity...... 67 IntelUgence Officer ...... 69 New lYospects...... 70 3. THE GREELY RELIEF EXPEDITION...... 73 The Greely Expedition ...... 74 The Relief Expedition ...... 77 The Voyage Home...... 87 Conclusion ...... 91

4. THE NICARAGUAN SURVEY...... 95 The Surveying Expedition ...... 101 The Canal Issue in the 1880s and 1890s ...... 108 Conclusion ...... 111

Vll 5. THE OFHCE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE...... 113 Invention ...... 119 Spokesman for Reform ...... 121 The Office of Naval Intelligence at its Peak ...... 129 Torpedoes ...... 130 New Ships...... 131 Conclusion...... 135 6. THE NAVY YARD...... 138 Chambers at the Yard ...... 141 The ABCs and the Maine ...... 144 Tracy, Ramsay, and the Spoils System ...... 149 Ramsay’s Aide ...... 157 Conclusion ...... 159 7. THE PETREL AND ...... 162 The ...... 162 The Petrel...... 165 A tlanta ...... 170

8. THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE ...... 177 ...... 181 The 1892 Session ...... 187 Torpedoes ...... 190 Chambers on Strategy ...... 194 The Bureaucrats Strike Back...... 195 Conclusion ...... 202

9. THE 1890S...... 205 Bureau of Ordnance Inspector ...... 207 The Minneapolis...... 210 The Armor Factory Board ...... 219 The Station ...... 223 Conclusion ...... 228

10. POLICING AN EMPIRE...... 231 The Texas ...... 231 To the ...... 236 The Philippines ...... 238 The Campaign...... 242 Conclusion ...... 244

V lll 11. TORPEDOES, , AND THE BOARD...... 245 Back to the Torpedo Station ...... 245 ...... 248 The Ali-Big-Gun Battleship...... 250 The General Board Responds ...... 253 Chambers' Work for the General Board ...... 260 Conclusion ...... 263 12. THE AND THE BUREAU OF ORDNANCE...... 266 The ...... 266 Chambers in the Dominican Republic ...... 271 Intervention in ...... 277 The and the Ordnance Tests ...... 278 The Bureau of Ordnance ...... 279 Conclusion ...... 282 13. THE BEGINNINGS OF NAVAL AVIATION...... 283 The State of Naval Aviation ...... 285 The Officer in Charge of Naval Aviation ...... 287 The Hrst Appropriation of Funds ...... 293 The First Planes ...... 296 Aviation Safety ...... 298 Progress at the End of 1911...... 301

14. BUILDING NAVAL AVIATION...... 303 Chambers’ Thoughts on Aviation ...... 309 A National Aeronautic Lab: The Woodward Commission 311 Problems at the end of the Y ear ...... 314 1913: A New Administration ...... 316 The Billingsley Crash...... 321 Plucked ...... 322 Conclusion ...... 326 15. RETIRED...... 328 The Chambers Board ...... 329 Matt Bristol...... 332 Reinstatement ...... 333 Aviation in 1914...... 335 Dwindling into Obscurity...... 337 Retirement ...... 340

CONCLUSION...... 344 BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 355

IX INTRODUCTION

The career of Washington Irving Chambers ( 1876-1919) spans a unique and formative period in the development of the United States Navy. He entered the Naval

Academy in the doldrum years of obsolete, often rotting ships, and left the Navy after it had a developed a large, world-class fleet of modem, style battleships and was preparing to build its first aircraft carriers. The challenges facing the Navy during these years were hardly limited to growth. Officers struggled to create and adapt to new technologies, new management techniques, new administrative structures, new missions, and a new vision for the future. These transformations mirrored those of the American people as they adapted to a new industrialized, urbanized, and increasingly bureaucratized society during the Progressive Era. This was a critical period in the formation of a professional identity for a host of new occupations that ranged from social workers to engineers. Naval officers were swept up in these changes, and between the Civil War and World War 1 created a professional identity for themselves. The officer corps professionalized at the same time that changing technology forced a complete transformation of the fleet In general, the officers who embraced what new technology had to offer were the same ones that sought to redefine themselves as professionals. The two processes were virtually inseparable. The synergy between professionalization and technological innovation accelerated the process that washed away the old Navy and left a new one in its place. Chambers was a central figure in this process. His career demonstrates the process of

1 institutional socialization by naval officers during this period of constant flux and change, and shows an officer struggling to master new technologies while simultaneously using his mastery of technology to further his career and improve the Navy. In the end. Chambers proved unable to control the forces he had helped unleash, and was forcibly retired (“plucked”) before reaching the rank of .

Professionalization Scholars have offered a number of definitions as to what makes an occupation a profession. Wilbert Moore’s list of six defining attributes of a profession is perhaps the most widely-known.' These definitions have evolved over time to suit the many different occupations that increasingly sought professional status. Virtually all scholars agree that status as a profession requires: 1) a dynamic body of theoretical knowledge that requires lifelong learning and is constantly challenged, debated, and refined by the members of the profession; 2) a full-time commitment to serving society’s needs, frequently in morally ambiguous areas; and 3) a corporate identity on the part of the members of the profession who police themselves in terms of ethics and conduct and have an internal system of honors and recognition.^ This is essentially the framework used in studies of

'Moore’s 6 characteristics are that the profession is: 1) a full time occupation serving the communities needs; 2) a life-long calling by people who identify themselves by their job; 3) that it is organized by a code of conduct and professional ethics; 4) that it requires formal, theoretical education in an esoteric, but socially useful body of knowledge, and that this body of knowledge that continues to grow; 5) that it has a service orientation to a client and community in which public benefit outweighs personal gain; and 6) that in deference to its specialized knowledge, the community grants the occupation a great deal of autonomy. See Wilbert E. Moore, 77ie Professions: Rules and Roles (New Yoric Russell Sage Foundation, 1970). For more on the development of this framework see: Morris L. Cogan, ‘Toward a Definition of a Profession,” Harvard Educational Review 23 (Winter 1953); Ernest Greenwood, “Attributes of a Professioa,” Social Work 2 (July 1957); William J. Goode, ‘lEncroachment, Charlatanism, and the Emerging Profession: Psychology, Sociology, and Medicine,” American Sociological Review 25 (December 1960); Howmd S. Becker, ‘The Nature of a Profession,” 'mEducation for the Professions: The Sixty-First Year Book o f the National Society for the Study o f Education, ed. Nelson B. Henry, Part m (Chicago: Univenity of Chicago Press, 1962); Bernard Barber. "Some Problems in the Sociology of Professions.” in Vie Professions in , ed. Kenneth S. Lynn and the editors of Daedalus (: Houghtcm VCfflin. 1965); Edgar H. Schein, Professional Education: Some New Directions (New York: McGiaw Hill. 1972); and Amos Perlmutter. The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers (New Haven: Press. 1977). 2 the professinnaiization of the by Allan R. Millett and later by William B. Skelton and other scholars.^ The term professionalism actually encompasses two different processes. The first is the process of transformation in which an occupation becomes a profession, and new institutions are formed to create and maintain the corporateness, and the ethical and educational standards of a profession. The second process is that in which prospective members of the profession adopt the values, social outlook, and core behaviors of that profession."* Both of these are important for any study of a profession, as those indoctrinated eventually become the indoctrinators, passing on their values to new members and shaping the course of their profession as it adapts to a changing world. Within the debate on professionalism there is a separate debate on whether military officers merit consideration as professionals. El ting Mori son has argued that naval officers are “with one reservation, a profession.” That reservation is that members of a military organization must follow the orders of their superiors and function as a cohesive unit Military professionals must sacrifice some of the independence their civilian counterparts enjoy for the good of the service and the needs of military discipline.^ This reservation, of course, is true of all professionals who enter public service. The important difference is that while doctors and lawyers may enter private practice, military professionals may not In his landmark study on naval officers, Peter Karsten accepted naval ofllcers as members of a profession on par with doctors and lawyers, having undergone the same ’Allan R. M illett The Générai: Robert L. Bullard and Officership in the United States Army 1881-1925 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975); William B. Skelton, The American Profession o f Arms: The Army Officer Corps, 1784-1861 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas. 1992). M llett further refined his definition of professionalism in Military Professionalism and Officership in America (Columbus, OH The Mershon Center of The Ohio State University, 1977). For the Marine Corps see Jack Shulminson, ‘\Clitary Aofessimialism: The Case of the U. S. Marine Corps, 1880-1918” Jourrui/ of Military History 60 (April 1996). 231-242. Tor more on this important distinction, see Bengt Abtahamssoit Military Professionalism and Political Power (Beverly Hills- Sage Publications, 1972). ’Elting E. Marisaa,Admiral Sims and the Modem American Navy (Boston: Houghton \fifflin Company, 1942), 463-4. 3 transfoimation as these two old professions did in the late nineteenth century. What made the members of the burgeoning naval profession unique was the much greater cohesion and narrower range of social, ethnic and economic backgrounds among its members.

This, in part, produced a “remarkably stable pattern of thought and behavior” among what Karsten termed the Naval Aristocracy, the line officers of the Navy.* Mori son is hardly alone in pointing to the importance of autonomy for professional identity. Wilbert Moore and Eliot Freidson both identify autonomy as the single most important attribute of a profession.^ Arthur Larson also emphasizes the importance of autonomy. He agrees with Morison’s caveat, but reaches the opposite conclusion. Professions, he insists, must control their own affairs. They must have autonomy. The military meets most characteristics of a profession, but not autonomy. The rank structures of military organizations, their subordination to civil authorities, and the lack of an individual client relationship enjoyed by the medical and legal professions, limit the autonomy of military officers. Larson sees military officership as a semi- profession, occupying a middle ground between occupations and professions along with nursing and public school teaching.® The problem with Larson’s objection is that other professions also work for the state or have corporate clients: university professors, for instance, or any of the growing number of engineers, accountants, and other professionals required to staff the Federal bureaucracy as it grew through the twentieth centiuy. All gave up varying degrees of their autonomy to their government client’ Also, no profession enjoys complete autonomy. This should be obvious from the number of malpractice lawsuits filed in the *Peter Karsten, The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden Age o fAnnapolis and the Emergence o f Modem American Navalism (New York: Free Press, 1972), xiv-v. Wilbert E. Moore, The Professions: Rides and Roles (New Vork: Russell Sage Foundation, 1970), 16; and Eliot Freidson, of Medicine: A Sociology o fApplied Knowledge (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1972), 82. “Arthur Larson, ‘Military Professionalism and Qvil Control: A Comparative Analysis of Two Interpretations,” yourno/ of Political and Mlitary Sociology 2 (Spring 1974), 66-7. ’For the problems of engineers as they prt^essitmalized see, Monte Calvert, The Mechanical Engineer in America, 1830-1910 (, 1967). 4 United States. Autonomy must be seen as a relative, rather than an absolute, characteristic of a profession. The question then, is do naval officers enjoy enough autonomy to be considered professionals, despite the hierarchical nature of their service and their restriction to serving one client (the government) exclusively? While it is my opinion that they do, a final resolution to this debate is not essential for an exploration of professionalization in the post-Civil War Navy. It is not so important as to whether naval officers attained the coveted status of professional, but that many of these officers saw the creation of a professional identity as the solution for all their problems, be they pay, promotion, autonomy from civil authority, the direction of strategic planning, or personal pride. The large literature on professions identifies three old occupations—doctors, lawyers, and the clergy—as the first to achieve professional status. In the late 19th century, two of these professions sought to redefine themselves for a modem, technical society. Both the American Bar Association and the American Medical Association established strict licensing requirements for their members. Later they also mandated professional education for their members, which replaced the previous system of apprenticeship and on the job training.'® In the late 19th century many new occupations worked to make the same transition from occupation to profession, and implemented similar reforms. The Navy, for instance, in 1845 replaced its midshipman system in which prospective officers learned their duties on board an operating (essentially an apprenticeship) with formal education at the Naval Academy, but further progress in professionalization did not occur until after the Civil War. The inspiration for professionalization in the Army was the bloodletting of the Civil War. Officers such as pushed the Army to redefine itself and its mission to the preparation for and the study of war. For the Navy, it was the chaos. "’For more on the history of the three old professicms in the United States see Samuel Haber, The Quest for Authority and Honor in the American Professions, 1750-1900(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). 5 confusion, and sense of loss following the Civil War that brought a cry for reform. Despite the ’s victory, many officers felt humiliated by the successes of the Alabatna and other Confederate commerce raiders. Likewise, the Navy seemed to have had trouble bringing sea power to bear against the rebellious states. After the war naval officers sought to process their experiences and redefine their role and the role of the Navy. Like their counterparts in civilian life, they sought to rationalize and harmonize life within the Navy, to make it more efficient, and prepare it for “the coming century, when America would assume far-reaching world responsibilities.”" In the next few decades reform-minded naval officers created a host of institutions that first laid the groundwork for professionalization and later embodied it The first of these was the U. S. Naval Institute (1874), which provided a forum for professional discussion and debate outside the hierarchy of military rank. It was followed by a number of practical schools such as the Newport Torpedo School ( 1880), the Office of Naval Intelligence (1882) and the Naval War College (1884). Most important in achieving professional autonomy was the succession of advisory bodies that gradually evolved into a much more powerful institutional presence that gave naval officers a greater voice within government and over the direction of their service. This process began with the Naval Advisory Boards of the 1880s, and was followed by the Policy Board in 1890, the General Board in 1900 and eventually the creation of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations in 1915. The model for many of these reforms was the Royal Navy, though American officers also consciously emulated the new managerial techniques of American corporations, adopting ideas and techniques of the private sector to suit the needs of the growing Navy. Many officers were temporarily detached to work in, and learn from, private industry. Several officers were trained in the new science of efficiency by Frederick Taylor himself." * Peter Karsten, “Armed Progressives ” in Karsten (ed.). The Military in America From the Colonial Era to the Present (New York: The Free Press. 1980), 236. " Karsten, “Armed Progressives,” 230-246. 6 Professionalization was a long and complicated process. Reforms would not benefit all ofïicers. Many attempts at reform met with severe opposition within and from outside the Navy. Line officers saw themselves as professionals above the mere engineers and managers of the bureaus, and sought to wrest control of their service from the hands of civilian authority on one hand, and its own technical bureaus on tlie other. They saw themselves as a separate and distinct profession within the Navy, separate from other professionals within the larger naval profession such as engineers, naval constructors, paymasters, surgeons, and chaplains.'^ Young officers also fought for merit-based promotion (promotion by selection) as opposed to the old system based on seniority and the occasional intervention of civilian authorities. Most reforms were not the result of sudden, radical change, but rather slow adaptation and the gradual promotion of their adherents into positions of authority.

Innovation Before the 19th century, naval technology changed slowly, and had in fact remained relatively unchanged for over two centuries. American sailors from the would have been equally competent to sail the ships of the American Revolution or even those of Francis Drake or Ferdinand Magellan. This changed after the War of 1812. In the 19th and early 20th centuries a series of technological advances transformed the of the world. Bernard Brodie cites five technological revolutions that marked a total transformation in sea power the steam warship, the iron-hulled warship, armor and great ordnance, the , and naval aircrafL Focusing more on the later half of the 19th century, Arthur Marder cited a similar list: steam power, the screw propeller, shell gun, and steel-hulled ships.The sail-powered, wooden fleets of the world became obsolete. Yet even as they became obsolete, so too did their successors as the pace of ' Y-or a study on the fight for professional lecognitirm and treatment by military chaplains in this period, see Richard M. Budd, “Serving Two Masters: The Prrfessionalization and Bureaucratization of the American Mlitary Chaplaincy, 1860-1920,’' PhD. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1994. 7 technological innovation accelerated into the twentieth century. Ships became faster, and more efficient engines and fuels extended their cruising range. Their armored surfaces were progressively thickened and strengthened, only to be overcome by progressively larger ordnance.*'* Had the process of innovation advanced in this simple linear fashion, the lives of naval officers would have been much easier. Instead, the path of progress was a complicated, twisting route with many dead-ends. In the United States, the dynamite-gim Vesuvius and the ram Kathadin were both failures; the first because it depended too much on an unproven technology, the second because it drew the wrong lessons from recent wars and tried to turn back the clock two thousand years. This was a challenging time for the officers and shipbuilders who lived through it They faced great difficulties in determining which new technologies would prove useful, and which would prove to be wasted efforts; which new warship designs would rule the waves, and which would rust into obsolescence. While the U. S. Navy was clearly a late adopter of new technology after the Civil War, many officers pressed for more rapid technological advance. Whether Williams S. Sims and his penchant for continuous-aim fire, Bradley Fiske and his many optical and electric devices, or a dozen other officers, all were united by a common affinity for technology and progress. They pushed for innovation and progress despite the many technical, bureaucratic, and personal obstacles placed in their paths. Elting Morison has identified three stages in which the service responded to calls for innovation. In the first stage, the would-be innovator was simply ignored. His reports went uruead. Letters were filed and forgottetL In the second stage, a determined innovator such as Sims responded to this silence by stepping up his arguments, and popularizing his line of reasoning as widely as possible. This forced his opponents to recognize his '‘Bernard Brodie, Power in the Machine Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press,1941], 10; Arthur J. Marder, The Anatomy o f British Sea FowerÇSew Yoric Alfred A. Knopf, 1940). See also Stanley Sandler, The Emergence of the Modem (Newark, 1979). 8 arguments and confront them with reasoning of their own and counter-arguments. If the innovator still refused to back down, he was confronted with the third and final stage of opposition: personal attacks on his service loyalty, professional assault, and ad hominem arguments.**

Sims responded to this opposition by going directly to President Roosevelt, but he represents an exceptional case. Most officers tried to work within the system to slowly bring others around to their line of thinking. It was a slow process that drove several of them to leave the service, and employ their technological skills in the more appreciative civilian sector. Park Benjamin (class of 1863) resigned from the Navy in 1869 and used his knowledge of technology to become editor of the magazine Scientific American. Edward Very (class of 1867) left to join the Hotchkiss Company in France. Ensign Frank Sprague (class of 1878) left to build trolley car systems, capitalizing on many of Fiske’s electrical inventions that the Navy ignored. He introduced the first electric street railway in Richmond, , in 1888, and later became famous as one of Thomas Edison’s most important assistants. Albert A. Michelson (class of 1873) became the first to measure the speed of light while assigned to the Naval Observatory, but left the Navy shortly thereafter due to its disinterest in such “impractical” work.*" Those who remained in the Navy placed the needs of the service or professional pride as naval officers above personal financial gain.

*MonsoD,Mm. Machines, and Modern Times (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1966), 29-31. See also Vincent Davis, The Politics o f Innovation: Patterns in Navy Cases (Denver University of Denver, 1967) whose study on the post-WWn Navy largely confirms Morison’s pattern of innovation and institutional response. William McBride has offered a more nuanced appraisal, borrowing from the work of Thomas Kulm. He argues that new technologies were adopted by the Navy as long as they fit into existing strategic paradigms. See Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970); William M. McBride, "Challenging a Strategic Paradigm: Aviation and the US Navy Special Policy Board of 1924,” Journal of Strategic Studies 14 (1991): 72-89; and William Michael McBride, ‘The Rise and Fall of a Strategic Technology; the American Battleship from Santiago Bay to Pearl Harbor, 1898-1941” (Ph. D. dissertation, John Hopkins University, 1989). "Paolo E. Coletta, Admiral Bradley A. fiske and the American Navy (Lawrence; Regents Press of Kansas, 1979), 3-4; Coletta, ‘The ‘Nerves’ of the New Navy, ”7%c American Neptune (April 1978); and Coletta, French Esnor Chadwick: Scholarly Warrior (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1980), 17; Karsten, The Naval Aristocracy, 286-300; Seager, Mahan, 120. 9 Over roughly the same period, the U. S. Army underwent an equally painful period of innovation and adaptation. Norman Cary cites four problems that hindered the adoption of motor vehicles by the Army after the Spanish-American Wan 1) reluctance of soldiers to adopt the new equipment; 2) bureaucratic in-righting within the Army; 3) lack of funding; and 4) Congressional intervention in the Army's automotive program.'^ David Armstrong also cites lack of funding as the key factor in hampering the Army’s modernization of weapoiuy and organization, though he notes numerous instances of bureaucratic resistance as well, and emphasizes the role of a handful of officers in pushing innovation.** In both services technological innovation proved a painstakingly slow process with many false starts and wrong turns, often hindered by low budgets and bureaucratic inertia.

The Fusion of Professionalism and Iimovation The exigencies of the Civil War had forced the Navy to adopt a host of new technologies and technological devices at breakneck speed with little long term planning.*’ After the war the Navy needed time to acclimate to this new technology, but the pace of technological irmovation accelerated. Technological innovation and the professionalization of the naval officer corps occurred simultaneously, complementing one another, and at times fusing, becoming indistinguishable from one another. Modem warships or new technical devices were simultaneously proof of the Navy’s mastery of the new technology and reafrirmations of the professional status of naval ofricers. These

' Nonnan Cary, ‘The Use of Motor Vehicles in the United States Army, 1899-1939” (Ph.D. dissertation. University of , 1980). **David A. Armstrong, Bullets and Bureaucrats: The Machine Gun and the United States Army, 1861- 1916 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982). '^The standard account of the Navy’s first decade after the Civil War is Lance C. Buhl, 'The Smooth Water Navy; American Naval Policy and Politics, 1865-1876” (Ph.D. diss.. Harvard, 1968). See also by the same author ‘Mariners and Machines: Resistance to Technological Change in the American Navy, 1865-1869” yonrno/ o fAmerican History 61 (1974), 703-27; and Stanley Sandler, ‘‘A Navy in Decay: Some Strategic Technological Results of Disarmament, 1865-69 in the U. S. Navy,” Military Affairs 35 (Dccemberl971): 138-42. 10 were the product of many officers working together, officers who frequently placed the needs of the service ahead of their careers. Historians have approached the careers of these naval officers from a variety of directions. At the extremes, they have been portrayed as either selfless martyrs who sacrificed everything to help the Navy, or as scheming, self-interested, and ambitious social-climbers who cared only about their own career advancement and used the issues of technological innovation and naval modernization to further their careers. An example of the martyr approach is Elting Morison who is unstinting in his praise for the irmovative naval officers of this period. They were “the very few within the Navy who possessed both intelligence and the courage and drive to challenge complacency.” These officers “endured the opposition of politicians, the apathy of the public and the antagonism of brother officers.” They “risked position and reputation to gain their ends.” They “at all times sustained themselves on hopes deferred. Peter Karsten is an example of the opposite approach. He argues that many officers, and virtually all of the younger officers, saw an expanded Navy as the path to promotion and job security. They used this period of new missions, managerial and technological streamlining, professionalization, and growth to further their own ends. They seized on the concepts of professionalization and innovation because they were in tune with events in the civilian sector. They perceived these as the best arguments to evoke a positive response from Congress. Genuine interest in improving the fighting quality of the Navy came second to career advancement" Karsten’s ‘ideal type’ naval officer pursued “violence, glory, and adventure” in his career. He was racist, classist, narrow-minded, and looked down on civilians. He was eager for action and adventure, and hoped to make a name for himself. While these officers looked down on businessmen and their pursuit of profit, they simultaneously admired their new managerial techniques.

“ Morison, 5/>7ir. 530. ■'Karsten, “Armed Progressives,” 229. 11 embracing many of them.“ Robert O’Connell makes a similar point He argues that naval innovators like Sims, Fiske, and Chambers took advantage of the convergence of the forces of naval tradition, technology, and progressivism, linked their careers to them, and then rode this tide to higher rank. Both Karsten and O’Connell see a cycle in which reformers challenged their rigid superiors and used a reform platform to expand their opportunities for promotion. As they rose, these officers in turn became rigid and set in their ways. With seniority and higher rank came a decline in career anxieties, and with it a decline in irmovation.” The narrow portrait of naval officers presented by Karsten and adopted by O’Cormell inevitably led other historians to look for exceptions. Most prolific of these has been Paolo Coletta whose three biographies of important naval reformers challenge Karsten’s assessment French Esnor Chadwick, Bradley Fiske, and Bowman Hendry McCalla pushed for iimovation within the Navy. They met significant and sometimes fierce opposition, and their careers suffered because of their efforts at reform. For all three of these officers, innovation and reform were lifelong callings, not merely the means to achieve higher rank. Jon Sumida and David Rosenberg are also critical of O’ Cormell’s portrayal of the Navy and its officers. They emphasize the chaos and confusion in the world’s navies of these years, and offer a more complicated and nuanced approach. Naval leaders throughout the world were overwhelmed by technical, personnel, economic, administrative, and financial problems that were greater in scale and complexity than had ever been faced before. They grappled with these forces as best they could, and met with frequent reverses." Kermeth Hamburger makes a similar point in his critique of the U. S. "Karsten, The Naval Aristocracy, especially chapters 6-8. ^’Karsten, “Armed Progressives,” 245; Robert L. O’Connell, Sacred Vessels: the Cult o f the Battleship and Rise o f the U. S. Navy (Boulder, CO; Westview Press, 1991), 13. ^ o n Tetsuro Sumida and David Alan Rosenberg, ‘Machines, Men, Manufacturing, Management, and Money: The Study of Navies as Complex Organizations and the Transfoimation of Twentieth Century 12 military's inability to adjust to technological change.^ Susan Douglas has offered a more perceptive appraisal. She argues that the transition from the old to the new Navy “was initially cosmetic.” Hardware modernization proceeded gradually, but “changes in naval administration, organization, and tactics lagged behind.'^ Just as certain officers clung to the halyards of the old navy, so too did some of them cling to the traditions of the old sailing navy. Often the old guard was able to channel innovation to less threatening areas. Sims took his demands to

President Roosevelt, but this was an exception. Most ofTicers operated within the bounds established by tradition and military discipline. Morison is far too praiseworthy of Sims, who was his father-in-law, and ignores or glosses over a number of his failings.” Kars ten and O’Connell, however, are too condemnatory—especially as regards the rigidity of officers as they rose through the ranks. The careers of Sims, Fiske, and especially Chambers clearly refute Karsten’s claim that innovators became conservative as their careers advanced. These and other officers remained actively involved in innovation even after reaching high rank. It would perhaps be more accurate to argue that many innovators were abrasive individuals. They were willing to bend rules and occasionally work outside the system to advance their causes. They made enemies on the way up, and eventually these enemies gathered to oppose the innovator, slowing or even halting his efforts to implement change. It is also important to note that while the efforts of some officers to reform the Navy did diminish as they rose in rank, these officers frequently recruited Junior officers

Naval History” in John B Hattendoif, Doing Naval History: Essays Toward Improvement (Newport Naval War College Press, 1995), 34-5. ^Kenneth Earl Hamburger. ‘The Technology, Doctrine, and Politics of U. S. Coastal Defense, 1880-1945: A Case Study of U. S. Defense Planning.” PhD. dissertation, Duke University, 1986. ^Susan Douglas, ‘The Navy Adopts the Radio, 1899-1919,” 121 in Merritt Roe Smith (ed.). Military Enterprise and Technological Change: Perspectives on the American Experience (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985). ^William McBride points out a number of these and argues that Sims was frequently in over his head on technical matters. William Vfichael McBride, The Rise and Fall of a Strategic Technology: the American Battleship from Santiago Bay to Pearl Harbor, 1898-1941” (Ph. D. Diss., John Hopkins University, 1989). 13 to their mission, cultivating them, and encouraging them to continue the struggle. It was, at least in part, with this in mind that Stephen 3. Luce selected Alfred Thayer Mahan lo lead the Naval War College, and perhaps why Mahan later chose Washington Chambers as one of the College’s first resident instructors. Mahan convinced the reluctant Chambers of the importance of the College during a series of letters in 1892. Chambers became one of the College’s first resident instructors and became so ardent in its defense that he later risked court martial. Mahan had to appeal directly to Secretary of the Navy Herbert to save his willful subordinate.®

The striving for professional status among naval officers became inextricably linked to their efforts to master new technology. Their ability to understand and master these new technologies, in fact, helped prove them worthy of the status of professional. So too did the new missions of the Navy. It became essential to portray military leadership and strategy as a science (as Mahan and Luce frequently did), or at least as a learned system. This further fueled the drive for naval expansion. The old navy, engaged in policing the seas, and trained for single-ship actions, had little need for strategy. A new, larger Navy did.

In this dissertation I will explore the process and relationship of professional socialization and technological innovation in the new Navy, focusing on the experiences of one officer, Washington Irving Chambers. I will look at professionalization at both the personal and institutional levels (as described by Abrahamsson) and emphasize the three key categories of expertise, social responsibility, and corporateness. I will focus on Chambers’ relations with his fellow officers, and the growing number of civilians both employed by the Navy and those overseeing naval developments from various political posts. During his career. Chambers both affected change in the Navy, and was deeply

®Robeit Seager II and Doris D. Maguire (eds.). Letters and papers o f Alfred Thayer htahan (Annapolis, Naval Instimte Press, 1975), letter Mahan to Chambers July 27,1892; letters to Ellen Evans Mahan DecemberlS, 1893, Jan 5,1894, and Feb 9,1894; and Seaga, Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Man and His Letters (Annapolis; Naval Institute Press, 1977), 244-5. 14 affected by the changes that swept it during its transition from old to new. Chambers was at various times in his career both helped and hurt by the changes and internal struggles that accompanied the development of the new Navy. He pushed for reform throughout his career, and yet was eventually pushed out of the service by those who thought him insufficiently interested in reform.

The Career of Washington Irving Chambers When Chambers entered the Naval Academy in 1872, officer ranks were overcrowded due to the influx during the Civil War, making promotion a painfully slow process. The once proud fleet of the Civil War languished, declining from a fleet of over 700 ships, some of them the most modem ships in the world, to fewer than 100 obsolete vessels.^’ Foreign officers joked about the living museum the U. S. Navy had become. Many young officers left the service. Others bore these indignities quietly. A few, like Chambers, worked to change things. Chambers was one of the “Young Turks” of the post-Civil War—a group of naval officers that fought for a variety of reforms and technical innovations. Like many of these officers he graduated from the Naval Academy in the midst of the Navy’s doldrums. Congress had authorized the last new ships in 1874 (a collection of obsolete wooden, steam sloops) and seemed unlikely to do anything to arrest the decline of the U. S. Navy relative to the fleets of other nations. It would not authorize further construction until 1882, and did not fund this construction until the following year. Chambers graduated from the Naval Academy in 1876. He began his naval career with classic operations of the old Navy and its mission to police the seas and further American trade. He sailed with the Greely Relief Expedition to rescue stranded Arctic explorers. Afterward his ship helped police the Caribbean. Even in the early years of his career, he showed himself more an officer of the new rather than the old Navy. ^Cdetta, McCcdlaA. 15 Lieutenant Raymond Perry Rodgers, one of the founders of the new Office of Naval Intelligence and scion of a famous naval family, befriended Chambers and brought him into contact with other progressive naval officers.^ While in Latin American waters ( 1882-83), Ensign Chambers reported on events for the Office of Naval Intelligence and was included in the expedition to the Isthmus of Darien, specifically to write confidential reports to Secretary of the Navy Chandler?' When Rodgers became head of the ONI in 1885 he brought Chambers on to his staff. The creation of the Naval Advisory Board and the growing interest in rebuilding the Navy gave Chambers an opportunity to demonstrate his skills. He submitted a design for a new cruiser to the board that was later published in the Proceedings of the U. S. Naval Institute. It was the first of many designs he would submit, and the first of many articles he would write.” A later article won him first place in the Naval Institute’s annual essay contest This recognition led to his appointment to the ONI’s special mission to accompany the Nicaraguan Canal Surveying team in 1884.” This, in turn, brought Chambers to the attention of retired, though still influential. Admiral Daniel Ammen who spent many years lobbying successive administrations to build a Nicaraguan canal. An isthmian canal was integral for Ammen’s vision of an enlarged fleet policing an American in the Caribbean. Very early in his career. Chambers broadcast his vision for a new Navy, a vision shared by many of his fellow officers of a large capital ship fleet operating from a network of overseas bases that would eventually be offered to the public by Alfred Thayer Mahan.” Chambers desperately wanted to help his service and restore it to a place ^Chambers Personal Journal 1876, in Washington Irving Chambers Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Box 42. Jeffery Dorwart, The Office o f Naval Intelligence: The Birth o fAmerica’s First Intelligence Agency /865-79/S (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1979). 17-18; Karsten, Naval Aristocracy. 323. ^^ashington I. Chambers, “A Modified , with a New Method for Mounting and Working the Guns,” USNIP 7 (1881), 43746. ^^Dorwart, The Office o f Naval Intelligence,ll-l. **Much of this he presented in his second article published in the Proceedings. 'The Best Method for Reconstruction and Increase of the Navy,” USNIP 11 (1885), 3-83. 16 of esteem in the nation. During his career he designed torpedoes and their guidance systems, a , and eventually a prototype Dreadnought-sty\e battleship. He pushed for legislation for modem battleships, frequent tactical exercises that stressed concentrated fire power, the acquisition of coaling stations, the early adoption of fuel oil to replace , transports and supply ships to support long-range operations, and government subsidies for the merchant marine. Eventually he commanded one of the Navy’s new battleships, the . He is most remembered for the last years of his career when he worked to develop the Navy’s air arm. Admiral and other members of the General Board specifically requested Chambers for this task as they knew of “no one better equipped for analyzing and judging these matters than you [Chambers].’^® Alex Roland has concluded that in the early years there was “no clear dividing line between civilian and military aviation.”^* This was certainly the case in the Navy. In 1910, a newly formed civilian organization, the United States Aeronautic Reserve requested the Navy to designate an officer as a consultant The Navy appointed Washington Chambers to whom “naval aviation was to owe more than to any one other man in its earliest years.”” Historians Archibald Turnbull and Clifford Lord credit him with two key accomplishments; “ 1 ) awakemng the general interest of the Navy in flying; 2) constantly stimulating research into the science of aerodynamics.”®* Chambers and Glenn Curtiss guided a coalition of aviation enthusiasts and pioneers that popularized aviation. In 1910 they arranged the first take-off from, and a few months later the first landing of an airplane on to a ship. Chambers also worked on developing an autopilot system, radio communication, and other important details of ^’Swift to Chambers, November 24,1909, Chambers Papers, Box 3. ^Alex Roland, ‘The Impact of War Upon Aeronautical Âogress: The Experience of the NACA,” in Alfred E. Hurley and Robert C. Ehrfaart (eds.) Air Power and Warfare (US Air Force Academy Military History Symposium 1978: Washington, D C., 1979). ’ Robert G. A üâod ., Makers o f Naval Policy 1798-1947 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press. 1980), 361. Archibald Turnbull and Clifford Lord, History o f United States Naval Aviation (Yale University Press, 1949), 9. 17 flight, as well as a catapult to launch planes from ships. Just as he had eariier used his talents as a writer to push for innovation, he returned to writing after 1910 and published a series of articles popularizing naval aviation.^’

Chambers remained in this position until 1913 when he was prematurely retired at the age of fifty-seven. Chambers had earlier passed up chances for sea duty that would probably have led to his promotion to admiral. Instead, he continued his work on aviation. Lacking the necessary time at sea for promotion, he was forcibly retired. Still, the Navy needed his expertise. For the next six years he served as assistant to Captain Mark Bristol, the man who replaced him. Chambers remained technically on active duty, but received only his retired pay. He remained in this position until after , helping create the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics in 1915, but slowly dwindling into obscurity, as his Richardson wrote, “a victim of his devotion to naval aviation.”” Chambers actively participated in four of the five technological revolutions cited by Brodie, designing new ships and pioneering in aviation. Even in the fifth revolution, submarines. Chambers had some influence through his work on torpedoes and particaption in the sea trials of several of the Navy’s first submarines. In fact, as early as 1893, while still preaching the need for a fleet of battleships, he had explored the possibility that future might “rest with the submarine.”** Chambers worked on the two great revolutions of in the 20th century that extended the scope of naval conflict above and below the surface of the ocean. He was an active participant in the process of technological iimovation that transformed the ships of the Navy and the simultaneous process of professionalization that transformed its officer

^^ashington I. Chambers, “Aviation and Aeroplanes,” USNIP 37 (March 1911), 162-208; “Aviation Today, and the Necessity for a National Aerodynamic Laboratory,” USNIP 39 (December 1912), 329-36; ‘Naval Aviation,” Scientific American 105 (July 8,1911), 26-7. ■"Richardson, Tlistory of Naval Aviation,” 85-7; Quoted in Coletta, Bellinger, 73. ■“cited in Ronald Spector, Professors o f War: The Naval War College and the Development o f the Naval Profession (Newport Naval War College Press, 1977), 148. 18 corps. This dissertation is more than a study of an individual reformer. The career of Washington Chambers provides a window into the process of technological innovation within the U. S. Navy and the process of adaptation to new technology during which the Navy developed new operational capabilities.^ Chambers helped bring about the two most momentous transformations the U. S. Navy has undergone in its history. In the first of these. Chambers helped like-minded officers convince Congress and the public of the need to adopt a new naval strategy built around a fleet of battleships. In the second. Chambers laid the groundwork for naval aviation and the eventual dethronement of the battleship by the aircraft carrier. Chambers was more than a publicist for these changes. He helped design several of the ships of the new Navy, worked to perfect the new technologies it needed, and worked to create a new strategy that would guide their conduct in war. Technological innovation was just part of a larger movement among naval officers to professionalize their service. Here too Chambers left his mark. In fact. Chambers embodied the new professionalism in each of the three key categories of expertise, corporateness, and social responsibility. He was an active participant in the new educational institutions of the new, professional Navy including the U. S. Naval Institute, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Newport Torpedo School, and the Naval War College. Throughout his career, he kept abreast of the latest scientific developments, and worked to educate not only himself, but his fellow officers as well. As an instructor at the Naval War College and in his writings. Chambers helped redefine the role of the Navy in society and change its strategy and guiding principles. He also saw the military

'^For more on how tecbnoiogicai iimovation leads to new doctrine and operational capabilities, see Williamson Munay & Allan R. VGllett, Military Innovation in the (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Barry R. Posen, The Sources o f Military Doctrine ([Hbacai Cornell University Press. 1984); and Stephen Peter Rosen. Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modem Military (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1991). Rosen categorizes iimovation into three types: 1) operational behavior in peacetime; 2) operational behavior in wartime; and 3) technological. 19 as an instrument of social reform and worked to wean those under his command from alcohol and other vices.

The Navy did not institute these transformations in a vacuum. Much of the impetus for these reforms came from outside the Navy, They were part of the sweeping changes of the Progressive Era that transformed American society. So, while this is a study of technological iimovation and professionalization within the Navy, it is also a study of the effect of Progressivism on the Navy. Officers within the Navy such as Luce, Mahan, Fiske, Sims, and Chambers seized on concepts of science and technology popularized in the civilian sector. They believed that human conduct, and especially the conduct of war were guided by scientific principles. Likewise, they eagerly embraced technology and the attributes of a profession as the solutions to their problems. They were, as Peter Karsten has argued, “Armed Progressives.”

20 CHAPTER 1 THE NAVAL ACADEMY

While founded in 1845, by the 1870s the Naval Academy had still not settled into a routine. Issues of curriculum, discipline, and more remained disputed. The Civil War had further complicated matters. The forced relocation of the Academy to , and the necessity to rush midshipmen"® through during the war followed by its return to Annapolis at its conclusion had disrupted its routine. Changes in technology introduced during that war, especially the armored, steam-powered warship, forced naval officers to reexamine their profession, and the faculty of the Naval Academy its curriculum. While the United States had clearly emerged as one of the world leaders in modem ship design during that war, it lost its technological lead during the last few years of the 1860s and continued to fall behind during the 1870s as Congress slashed funding and naval officers squabbled over the direction to take into the future. The initial victors of this struggle were those who tolerated steam engines as a necessary evil and who possessed little faith in modem ordnance and armor. Not surprisingly, this group also saw little need for the kind of education offered by the Naval Academy, arguing that naval officers would better master the skills of their profession at sea than in classrooms on shore. They were opposed by a growing number of progressive, technology-minded officers who recognized that officers of the modem navy needed classroom education in engineering and science as well as practical experience at sea. The debate between the

designation for students at the Naval Academy changed repeatedly in these years. At first they were called acting midshipmen but this was changed in 1874 to cadets which included cadet-midshipmoi and cadet-engineets. It was later changed to naval cadets and then to midshipmen. For simplicity I have used the term midshipmen to describe all students at the Academy regardless of the date. 21 old, sailing navy conservatives and these rising progressives, interrupted by war, resumed with increasing fury in the post-war years, and greatly affected the Naval Academy of the 1870s.-”

Until 1925 the Naval Academy remained the sole source of officers for the United States Navy. Candidates competed fiercely for admission. Roughly a third failed the difficult entrance exam that emphasized math, geography, and giummar. Of those admitted, more than half the members of each entering class resigned or were dismissed within their first two years of study. At the Academy, midshipmen were kept under constant scrutiny, ranked relative to one another in each subject of study, and carefully monitored for any misconduct Class tank at graduation established the new officer’s standing in the long line for promotion, following him throughout his career. Despite the efforts of reformers, promotion in the 19th century remained based strictly on seniority. So long as an officer’s health held out, he could expect to be promoted to captain and possibly Admiral, though the later would probably be just before his mandatory retirement for old age. The handful of officers that graduated the Academy in these years saw themselves as an elite, hand-picked group. Because of the small classes of this decade these officers knew each other very well, perhaps, as one later wrote, “even better than brothers.”-*® Friendships begun at the Academy often lasted a lifetime. So too, did rivalries. The curriculum of the Academy stagnated through the 1860s changing little as midshipmen were rushed through for war. Peace brought only a call for a return to normalcy. The only major change inaugurated by the new Superintendent, Admiral David

■”Paik Benjamin, The United Slates Naval Academy: Being the Yarn o f the American Midshipman (New Yoik: GP. Putnam’s Sons, 1900), 254; on the Academy see also John Crane and James F. Kieley, The United States Naval Academy: The First Hundred Years (New York: McGraw Jfili, 1945); Edward C. Marshall, History o f the United States Naval Academy (New York: Van Nostrand, 1862); W.D. Puleston, Annapolis: Gangway to the QuarterdeckQ^ew York, 1942); James Russell Solcy, Historical Sketches o f the United States Naval Academy,QNaslûnpOD: GPO, 1876); Jack Sweetman, The U. S. Naval Academy: An Illustrated History (AnnapoUs: Naval Institute Press, 1979). **Frederick Sawyer, Sons o f (Aimapolis: U. S. Naval Institute, 1946), 17. 22 Dixon Porter, was the introduction of athletic programs. A science and engineering curriculum inadequate at the war’s outset changed little. Classes emphasized memorization and rote learning. Innovative solutions to problems were more likely to be punished than rewarded. This began to change at the close of the decade when a number of reform-minded officers were assigned to the Academy, eventually forming perhaps the best faculty it had ever enjoyed. Park Benjamin, a contemporary observer and 1863 graduate of the Academy, echoes this, arguing that in these years the “direct management of the Academy had passed into the hands of one of the most brilliant groups of young

officers which had ever been assembled under the auspices of the Navy.”^ At various times in this period this group included Admiral C. R. P. Rodgers, who became the Eighth superintendent of the Academy in 1874, and future admirals Robley D. Evans, Schley, William T. Sampson, and Henry C. Taylor. Other members of this distinguished faculty included Bowman H. McCalla, T.B.M. Mason, and James Russell Soley, to name just a few of the better known. The early arrivals of this group had to work quietly for reform. Porter’s successor. Admiral John L. Worden, despite having commanded the Monitor in its famous battle with the Virginia, was a conservative who would rather have had the midshipmen learn

their cralt through practical expenence at sea than at a “landsman’s school. He had considerable support in his position from the Board of Visitors, a group of senior officers who made armual and inspections of the Academy, and who in 1871 had decried the Academy for condemning its students to “irksome studies and minute rules of conduct” They recommended that instead the midshipmen be sent to sea for a year before embarking on classroom éducation."® The reformers blocked these efforts and quietly modernized classroom practice. In 1874 when Worden was in turn succeeded by Admiral

■’^Dorothy Livingston, Master o f Light: a Biography o f Albert A. Micheison (New Yoik; Scribners, 1973), 28-35; Benjamin, The United States Naval Academy, 263-4. ^^S'KeetsDsoL, Naval Academy, 102. ■“Benjamin, The United States Naval Academy, 278 23 C.R.P. Rodgers, they could act more decisively. Rodgers, in fact, energized the faculty and brought about major reforms. His speech at a British naval gathering, while better expressing his ideal for the Academy than its reality, certainly shows the progressive direction in which he tried to push it The “midshipmen while at plastic age, between fifteen and twenty, have been taught how to study; and have acquired a habit of analysis and investigation which serves them well in after-life. Should they have ambition they may go on with a degree of intelligence and with a success from which the men of my time have been debarred by the imperfection of their eariy training.”^’ These officers updated the curriculum, adding several new technical and science courses and worked to move teaching from rote memorization to a hands on, participatory approach despite opposition from their conservative seniors. After 1874 they formed new departments, such as the Department of Mechanics and Applied Mathematics, and reshuffled several others in an effort to improve the engineering and science curriculum and introduce new technology into the Academy’s classrooms. Rodgers introduced elective courses in mathematics, mechanics, physics, and chemistry, though full integration into curriculum was resisted by the conservative Board of Visitors who made their will felt through bureaucratic and political chaiuiels. William Sampson chaired the Chemistry and Physics Department from 1869- 1871 and again following a tour at sea from 1874-79. He introduced modem equipment and technology and helped make sure the midshipmen would at least be aware of recent developments even though they would serve on obsolete ships. became head of Department of Modem Languages at the Academy in October 1872. He inaugurated major pedagogical changes, introducing new teaching styles and new textbooks. He single-handedly reversed a curriculum that had previously emphasized the rigid rote learning of phrases and grammatical rules that focused on reading and translation and instead made sure the midshipmen leamed practical conversational '^Quoted in Benjamin, The United States Naval Academy, 287. 24 language skills that would help them communicate with the officers of the many foreign navies they would encounter in their careers." T. B. M. Mason would later form the Office of Naval Intelligence with the strong support of Admiral Rodgers and become its first director. Henry Taylor proved instrumental in the foundation of the Naval War College and later the General Board. J. R. Soley, later the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, headed the Department of English Studies, History, and Law from 1873 to 1882, and went on to teach at the Naval War College. In addition to his own writing, he helped find a publisher for Alfred Thayer

Mahan’s Influence of Sea Power Upon History, and in fact got him started as a writer by convincing him to write the third volume of a trilogy on the Civil War. Many of these officers also took younger officers and even midshipmen under their wings and helped guide their careers.

Much like progressives in civilian life these officers believed in technological progress, scientific methodology and its applicability to a wide array of problems. At times the similarities were quite striking. While urban progressives cleaned up city water supplies and hunted down other sources of disease, Rodgers and his officers tracked the cause of repeated malaria outbreaks at the Academy to the poor location and bad drainage of the new hospital. Rodgers ordered it closed in 1876." Despite the efforts of these officers, the Academy curriculum remained notably deficient in several areas. There was not a good course in ordnance at the Academy until the mid-1880s, simply because there was no modem ordnance with which to work. Marksmanship was instead encouraged at the pistol and rifle galleries constructed in the 1870s. For larger ordnance the midshipmen had only the smoothbore, muzzle-loading carmon of the aging sXoap Santee. These were old and obsolete even by the standards of the U. S. Navy. Despite the gradual increase in the number of engineering courses offered "Richard West, Admirals o f American Empire; Winfield Scott Schley, Forty-Five Years Under the Flag (New York. 1904). ‘‘“Departments” USNIP 61 (October 1935): 141+40. 25 to line officers, the emphasis remained on the old seamanship of sail and rigging as laid out in Stephen B. I j x c € s Seamanship, the textbook of choice in the years between the Civil War and the Spanish-A mencan War. Courses on naval tactics actually emphasized signalling, memorizing Myer’s Signal Code, rather than squadron evolutions. A relic of the struggle to adopt the was the ambiguous position of engineers in the Navy. They formed their own corps, with its own separate rank structure and its own course through the Academy, that until 1874 took only two years to complete. Their curriculum emphasized steam engineering and other practical and technical areas. Regular midshipmen received no instruction in steam engineering until their final year of study. Yet engineers could never rise to command a ship, this being reserved for line officers. The conflict between line officers and staff officers, especially the engineers over control of their service and recognition raged throughout the late 19th and early 20th centuries, further complicating the adoption of new technologies.

Midshipman Chambers Washington Irving Chambers was bom on April 4, 1856, in the small town of Kingston, in Ulster County, New York, a few north of Poughkeepsie. Few records of his childhood remain. He maintained a close relationship with his parents, especially his mother who he credited for “all the good and manly impulses of my youth. Kingston has a long history, being first settled by the Dutch in the early 17th century and burned by the British during the Revolutionary War. It incorporated as a city in 1872, but remains small to this day. Chambers, who preferred to be called Irving rather than Washington, spent his entire childhood there. He first applied to the Naval Academy for the 1870 school year, but was unable to win his Congressman’s appointment This went to “young Jones,” a better connected, and presumably younger friend of his. Jones, though, found the Academy rough going and left for Law School before ^^Chambeis Journal, 1876-79, Chambers Pzq)ers, Box 42. 26 completing his first year. This cleared the way for Chambers who the following year did receive the appointment from his Congressional District, the 13th. Athletic, he easily passed the physical exam, and he passed the entrance examination on his first try. He was appointed midshipman on June 9, 1871. Despite his undesired wait of one year. Chambers was still a year younger than the average member of his entering class. He had just turned 15, and was one of the youngest members of his class, just one year past the minimum age of 14.®

Chambers was unusual in other ways as well. His father, Jacob, was a shoemaker— an occupation rarely found in the Academy’s register of midshipmen. Only one in seven academy appointees in the 19th century were the sons of artisans or small shopkeepers. Most, in fact more than half, came from professional or upper class families that included bankers, lawyers, physicians, and manufacturers. These midshipmen had usually enjoyed considerable educational advantages including private schools and not uncommonly special tutors who helped them cram for the entrance exams. Peter Karsten argues that those from working-class occupations like brickmakers, cabinetmakers, or shoemakers in the case of Chambers’ father probably represented the better off of their trade. This may well be true of Chambers’ family as he was clearly adequately prepared for the Academy

and his letters from friends and family indicate a middle class, though hardly prosperous, background. Certainly they could afford a good education for their only son.® Chambers entered the Academy one year after Congress had acted to trim the bloated naval officer corps. Not surprisingly, the brunt of its efforts fell on those with the

least political influence, the Academy midshipmen. Instead of graduating the Academy as ensigns, they would have to serve a tour of duty at sea for an indeterminate period before their commissioning as ensigns on a space available basis. In 1873 Congress finalized the sea tour at two years and made commissioning automatic on its satisfactory completion.

^Chambers Journal, 1876-79, Chambers Papers, Box 42; Beryamm, Naval Academy, 300. ^ a v a l Academy, Register of Cadets; Karsten, Naval Aristocracy. 7-16. 27 This mollified the midshipmen somewhat, but none appreciated the extra two years at low pay they had to serve before becoming ensigns, nor the addition of two years to what was already a painfully slow promotion process.

Life at the Academy was strictly regimented, designed to mold a diverse collection of young men into largely interchangeable naval officers. As William F. Fullam later complained, the “individuality and independence [of midshipmen] are constantly discouraged.”^ Instruction included not just the skills needed for careers as naval officers, but also on preparing the midshipmen for high society. They were expected to behave as “gentlemen” and were always addressed as mister, the term “boys” being reserved for the academy’s black servants. They were expected to learn to dance and attend a regular series of balls and dances. Fencing, at which Chambers excelled, was still taught though few expected to grab cutlasses and lead boarding parties onto enemy ships. The midshipmen were assigned two to a room. Each made his own bed and alternated as superintendent of the room, the one responsible for sweeping the floor and keeping the room neat, though the Academy’s black servants supplemented their efforts. Daily and irregular inspections of their rooms scrutinized their housekeeping efforts, and made sure of their work. Life at the Academy was regimented by bugles calls which began with reveille at 6:00 a. m. (6:30 in winter), and ended with lights out at 10:00 p. m. The morning was divided into two hour classroom periods followed by another one in the aftemoon. The midshipmen marched in and out of the dining hall in strict order, each section eating at a separate table under its captain. When not in class or at drill, they were expected to spend their time studying in their rooms. Their only free period was between 9:30 to 10:00 in the evening when they were free to roam the halls and visit friends. Weekends were not an exception to their regimented life as all midshipmen were required

^^illiam F. Fullam, *The System of Naval Training and Discipline Requited to Promote Efficiency and Attract Americans,” USNIP 16 (1890), 481. 28 to attend the Sunday morning church service unless arrangements made through their parents to attend church in Annapolis. They received leave to visit home in September but Christmas and other holidays were celebrated at the Academy.

The meats were far from exciting, consisting of an exceedingly repetitive selection of breads, potatoes, seasonal vegetables, beef and pork, and occasionally fish. This encouraged the midshipmen to eat well while off the grounds. Many of them also climbed the fruit trees surrounding the Superintendent’s house and stole his fruit They spent much of their scant pay in town, and it went quickly. Expenses for uniforms, mess, laundry and such were all deducted from their $500 annual pay, consuming more than half of it^

The academic year was divided into two terms with comprehensive exams at the end of each, and a short break around January 30. After the summer exam the midshipmen of the newly formed first and third classes went on a practice cruise timed to arrive back in mid-September. Those of the second class were given a leave of absence for the entire summer, while the graduating class left for home to await their orders to sea.

Most new midshipmen arrived in the fall, but some, like Chambers, chose to arrive in June. The early arrivals were quartered on the Santee, an aging sloop permanently anchored at the Academy. On board they received an early start on learning to sleep in hammocks and other aspects of shipboard life including knotting and splicing and learning to climb the masts and rigging. Once the rest of their class arrived in the fall, there were settled into dormitories with them. The Academy course was far from easy, and Chambers had to work hard his first year to keep up with his older and better educated classmates. Years end found his grades deficient, that is below the minimum requirement, in both math and composition, nor were his scores in other subjects much to be proud of. Because of his academic ^Chambers Journal, 1876-79; Menu, 1871, Chambers Papers, Box 42; Beqamin, Naval Acadenrv, 294. 29 deficiencies he was not ranked in his class, and could have been dismissed. Deficiency in any area could lead to recommendation of dismissal, but those with slight deficiencies were sometimes just turned back into the next class to repeat the year and improve their grades. Chambers apparently managed to convince the faculty of his ability to improve his academic performance. He was turned back into the incoming fourth class to repeat the year. This practice became increasingly common as many midshipmen had problems adjusting to the Academy their first year. It became regular procedure in 1875.^ Chambers seems to have formed his closest friendships at the Academy among his similarly deficient classmates, including fellow New Yorker James H. Sears, William Brawnersreuther, and Charles Gove who were all held back either that year or the next At least part of Chambers’ academic difficulties stemmed from his growing pursuit of recreational activities. His discipline record was excellent for his first year, in stark contrast to that of his friends Sears and Gove, but the following year and those after, he was increasingly cited for “skylarking,” visiting after hours, and assorted pranks such as “mimicking the reveille bugle at 1:15 a. m.,” organizing late night swimming parties, “not sharing his intentions concerning liberty,” and absconding with a mast and sail from the Amphitrite. He frequently covered for his friends when in charge of his dormitory floor, granting them permission to visit after hours—something he as a midshipman did not have the authority to do. In his second year he also began experimenting with two new vices: drinking and smoking. Again these were almost definitely picked up from Sears, Brawnersreuther, and Gove, who had been cited for smoking in their rooms and smuggling in alcohol their first year. Like much of late 19th century society, the Academy faculty condemned the use of while simultaneously condoning its use. Admiral Worden, for instance, allowed members of the first class to use tobacco, but other midshipmen received a severe tongue-lashing for using it Worden became famous for his fire and brimstone lectures against the vile weed, all delivered while chewing it ^Solcy, Historical Sketches o f the United States Naval Academy. 112-3. 30 He never managed to stamp out its use, nor did his successors.^ As a student. Chambers excelled in French and fencing, but tended to falter in technical subjects, having especial difficulty with math. A talented gymnast and the best fencer in his class, he repeatedly demonstrated his skills at the gymnastics exhibitions held several times each year at the Academy. His forced repetition of his first year helped him catch up academically. At the end of the 1872-73 school year he did well on his exams and ranked at 22nd out of the 105 members of the new third class. He was ranked well ahead of his more fun-loving friends like Brawnersreuther, Coffman, and Gove, but behind several others of his growing circle of friends including George C. Foulk, Henry T. Mayo, and Templin M. Potts. In individual subjects Chambers ranked 21 in Math, 33 in grammar, 76 in history and composition, 14 in french, 52 in geography and had collected 112 demerits, roughly average for his class. Some had amassed more than 200 and a few over 300. Only one midshipman, Charles C. Rogers, ranked second in the class, had amassed none.^ In theory, midshipmen who amassed more than 301 demerits in a year were dismissed, but numerous exceptions were made. Punishments with demerits were the most common, and usually ranged from one to ten for an offense. Punishments could also include extra instruction, extra drill and even confinement to the unofficial prison ship, the Santee. As one midshipman wrote his father “a moderate lot of demerits don’t do the least harm, but show that you are not quite subdued. As a general thing, you will find that those who run a whole year without them are the outcasts of the institution, who are spiritless and friendless.... Too many demerits however show a rash harebrained youth.”“ Chambers at times veered close to this category, but he never seems to have

Conduct Roles for 1871-72 and 1873-74, Naval Academy Archives; Benjamin, The United Stales Naval Academy, 794',Army and Navy Journal. January 1,1876. ^Chambers Notebook, March 14, 1874, Chambers Papers Box 42; Letter Tom [no last name] to Chambers February 17, 1875, Chambers Pliers, Box 5; Naval Academy Register, 1871-72 & 1872-73; Gymnastic Exhibition Announcements, Chambers Phpeis, Box 5. ‘^Albert Caldwell to father. Quoted in Karsten, Naval Aristocracy. 37. 31 crossed the line. Instead his occasional antics made him popular with his fellow midshipmen.

The following year Chambers class’ faced the difficult semiannual exams, and as was typical, just over half failed. Chambers ranked 40 out of the 48 survivors who entered the following year as the second class, having just skated by, and well behind most of his friends. Even Brawnersreuther (22) and Gove (24) passed him, and Sears now ranked fourth in the class, having given up his wild ways. Among the few midshipmen behind Chambers were the two Japanese midshipmen, Koroku Katz and Giro Kunitomo. Faced with language difficulties and ignored by most of the midshipmen, they ranked 45 and 46 respectively and struggled in most subjects. Chambers ranked 34 in seamanship,

37 in ordnance, 8 in mechanical drawing, 37 in math, 51 in chemistry, 59 in history, 51 in rhetoric, 17 in french, 11 in drawing, 1 in fencing and had amassed 182 demerits. The shock of his poor showing again spurred Chambers to study. Once again he pulled out of the bottom ranks of his class. At the end of the year he ranked 39th, just short of the merit list (top 38). His cumulative grades show his continued problems in technical subjects with little hint of his future as a designer of both torpedoes and warships: 66.73 out of 99 in seamanship, 20.17 out of 24 in naval tactics, 10.18 out of 24 in ship building, 15 out of 45 in gunnery, 16.89 out of 30 in infantry tactics, 8.61 out of 9 in French, 13.42 out of 45 in astronomy, 18.49 out of 45 in electricity, 72 out of 120 in math, 23.78 out of 30 in composition, 27.62 out of 30 in drawing, and 108.96 out of 120 in conduct*’

Little happened to break the routine of the Academy during Chambers’ years there. A serious fire broke out in the engineering building and the midshipmen helped put it out In 1873 the midshipmen marched in Ulysses S. Granf s second inauguration. They had heard a rumor that despite the poor weather, the West Point cadets would march

Annual Register of the U. S. Naval Academy for the years 1871-72 through 1875-76 (Washington: GPO. 1872-1876). 32 without their overcoats. The midshipmen decided to do the same. Word of this spread to the West Pointers who now really did decide to march without their overcoats. So the cadet and midshipman battalions both marched through the pouring rain in only their dress uniforms. Roughly half became ill. Worden was infuriated by this, but none of the attending officers had interfered. It had become a matter of honor for the midshipmen. Grant visited the Academy twice during Chambers five years there, and on January 10, 1873 a special ball was held for him. Admiral Porter, and Commodore Daniel Ammen. The midshipmen attended and the party lasted well after midnight Chambers enjoyed these events. He was good dancer and letters to friends indicate he made considerable efforts to impress the opposite sex. His repeated citations for “skylarking” at dances indicate that this sometimes exceeded the bounds of propriety

Hazing at the Academv The Naval Academy remains known for hazing to this day, but it took several decades for that peculiar institution to take hold there. Most historians argue that the practice was introduced into the Academy during the Civil War through contact with West Point cadets among whom hazing had been long established. There is, though, at least one well-documented case from 1859. In that year midshipmen tarred and feathered midshipman Henry D. Foote, who had among other things stolen from them, was frequently drunk, and known for abusing the female slaves who worked at the Academy. Regardless of how or when it was introduced, by 1870 it had become regular and increasingly “brutal, senseless, and physical.” Neither should its psychological element be ignored. Midshipmen who violated the norms of conduct, such as Alfred Thayer Mahan who during his last year reported a classmate for talking in the ranks, were placed

"^Journal of the Officer of the Day, January 10,1873; Chamber Journal 1873-1876; Letter Tom [no last name] to Chambers February 17.1875 , Chambers Papers, Box 5; Conduct Roles, 1873-1876, Naval Academy Ardnves. 33 in “Coventry,” that is shunned by the other midshipmen." Hazing was primarily carried out by the third class against the newly arrived fourth (or plebe) class, and consisted of a range of quick indignities. Victims were usually targeted just prior to the sounding of study call, or in the half hour before lights out “A plebe might be compelled to eat soap or drink ink; he might be thrown through a transom; shaved with a blunt instrument; ordered to make a face, to stand on his head or to climb his wardrobe . . . to recite ‘Mary has a little lamb’ over and over again” He might be tossed into the Severn River or “made into a sandwich,” that is laid between two or more mattresses upon which several third classmen walked.’** This, however, is a rather mild portrait of an institution that increasingly got of hand in the 1870s. Hazing victims sometimes resisted and fistfights and other violence became common. On at least one occasion a knife was drawn. Sometimes these fights were organized and even refereed by the midshipmen, as in the famous fight between midshipmen Bradley Fiske and future Nobel physicist Albert Micheison, but more often not. The faculty expected midshipmen to guard their honor, even to the point of violence, and rarely interfered in this process. Hebes who turned to the faculty for help became targets for more serious hazing. As fourth classman William Green wrote in 1873: “There is no use in appealing to the officers, as the whole class will go for you then.” Those officers that opposed the institution seemed powerless to stop it.“ In 1870 a harassed fourth classman turned on his tormenter, fighting back furiously. Both hazer and hazed called for help from their fellow classmates and the ensuing brawl eventually involved most of the members of both classes. The fourth classmen, not surprisingly, defeated the outnumbered third class, bringing an end to hazing for that year. Yet once they became third classmen themselves, they resumed the "Karsten, Naval Aristocracy, 39; Seager.Mahan, 119. "Jack Sweetman. The U. S. Naval Academy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press. 1979), 104. "chambers’ classmate Albert B. Crittenden drew a knife and attacked another cadet. Journal of the Officer of the Day, U. S. Naval Academy, February 13-15, 1872; William Green to Hunt Priddy, October 1.1873, quoted in Karsten, Naval Aristocracy, 40. Green later resigned because of the hazing. 34 practice. In the fail of 1871 several members of Chambers' entering class were, in Park Benjamin’s words, “roughly handled.” Their treatment was, in fact, so bad, that it provoked criticism from both military and civilian authorities including the Board of Visitors.

Under increasing pressure from civilian authorities and the parents of the abused midshipmen. Admiral Worden launched a full investigation. He expelled five of the perpetrators immediately and six more a month later following investigations, and then finally two more; all for having “committed gross inhumanities upon members of the junior class.” Numerous others received lesser punishments. As Park Benjamin observed, official condemnation seemed only to fuel the practice and more incidents followed.

Despite his warnings, Worden foimd that hazing continued to be carried out “under circumstances of great cruelty.” Worden had previously faced outraged letters from the parents of the hazed; now they poured in from the parents of the hazers, complaining that their sons had been dismissed for mere youthful pranks. Worden, though, refused to back

down, and none of the thirteen sentences was reversed.** Benjamin’s assertion that the worst hazed became the worst hazers was perhaps true, and Chambers may well have been one of the midshipmen “roughly handled” during

his first year. Certainly several members of Chambers’ class became active hazers. Chambers himself was cited the following year for “hearing or encouraging the hazing of fourth classmen.”*^ Either from conscience or due to his anomalous position of repeating his first year, making him a member of the fourth class, but not a plebe. Chambers did not directly haze anyone. Vet in 1874 he became involved in the most serious hazing incident

in the Academy’s history. On Sunday, February 8, Chambers’ fellow member of the third class Augustus C.

Almy entered the room of fourth classman Thomas G. Harkness and attempted to haze

**Worden to E. J. Horton, Hazing File, Naval Academy Archives; Benjamin, Naval Academy, 287-290. * Naval Academy Conduct Role 1872-73. 35 him. Haiimess refuse to acceded to whatever petty indignities Almy had in mind. Almy became belligerent and in the words of the investigating board “wantonly insulted and unlawfully ordered and threatened” Harkness. Harkness stood by his guns and “refused to obey his order or yield to his threats, regarding them, as they were, ungentlemanly insults, and culpable abuses of authority.” Frustrated, Almy left in search of reinforcements, but was met with disinterest If he could not handle a fourth classman, that was his problem. He spent much of the next day convincing classmates to support him, claiming that Harkness had insulted them and cast aspersions on their honor and the honor of their class. That night nineteen of them including Chamber^ returned with Almy to confront Harkness in his room. They turned off the lights, closed the blinds, and then proceeded to beat Harkness to the ground. Almy, and possibly others, repeatedly kicked him once he was down. Hearing the approach of Lieutenant Conunander Coffin, who had heard the noise and come to investigate, they ran, scattering in all directions, leaving Harkness a bloody heap on the floor.*’ The event was already far larger than any previously reported, but it did not end there. While Coffin failed to catch any of the midshipmen that night, he could identify several of the twenty perpetrators. Apprehension and punishment of the others was certain. The remainder of the third class, thirty-three in all, gathered in a secret meeting two days later on February 11. Faced with the dismissal of nearly half of what remained of their class, they decided to act With only one dissenting vote, that of Clifford J. Bousch, they adopted a resolution claiming that the guilty twenty had acted with the approval of the whole class to uphold its honor. As the act was motivated by honor, they demanded to share in any punishment meted out to the perpetrators, and sent their signed petition to Worden. This was, of course, gross insubordination and a direct challenge to

‘’The other 18 were: W.G. Cutler, GJ). Donnelly, H.W. Ford, G.C. Foulk, H.C. Geuring, EC. Goss, A.L Hall, Mcholas J.LT. Halpine, W.G. Ham mon, Richard Henderson, C.W. Horton, S.B. Mallory, R.T. VfiUigan, C.F. Pond, TM . Potts, A.W. Rollins, F Jl. Sherman, and W .L Vamum. "‘Report of Board on Order of 31 March, 1874, Hazing Hie, Naval Academy Archives. 36 the authority of the Academy faculty and Worden. Worden was incensed by the petition and saw it as an effort to hide the guilty. The entire class would have to be punished. He launched an immediate investigation that quickly unearthed the guilty. Almy was expelled, but he was the only one. Harkness had repeatedly asked for leniency for his attackers. In exchange, the third class promised to end all hazing. Possibly Worden had been swayed by Harkness’ plea. More likely, he simply could not dismiss that many midshipmen, and the nineteen all seemed equally guilty. None would testify against another. All received ten demerits for “making or aiding and abetting a pusillanimous attack on a member of the fourth class,” and were severely punished. Starting April 1, Chambers and the other perpetrators were confined to the Academy limits and subjected daily to double drills. At night they were confined to the Santee. Instead of the normal summer vacation as members of the new second class, they were sent on a practice cruise. They remained confined to the Academy after the cruise, receiving no leave to return home in September. The rest of the third class, received what they asked for, sharing in the punishment of the nineteen. They were also confined to the Academy, and denied their summer vacations, but without the requirement of double drill.™ It was this incident that finally forced Congress to intervene directly. On June 23, 1874, Congress passed a law that made every form of hazing, no matter how trivial, illegal and a court martial offense. The accused would be tried by board of three officers. Their recommendation for dismissal, if approved by the Superintendent, was final.

Further, any students so dismissed could not be readmitted. Almy, who was readmitted in October 1874 seems to have been one of the few exceptions as his offense took place before the law’s passage. Congress had taken itself out of the process, and political pressure could no longer save the guilty.’* ^Conduct Role, 1874; Journal of the Officer of the Day, April 1 ,1874, Naval Academy Archives; Report of Board on Order of 31 March. 1874, Hazing File, Naval Academy Archives. Almy eventually graduated in 1880. 37 Admiral Rodgers, who took over as Superintendent shortly this incident, rigorously applied the new hazing laws, determined to stamp out the practice. He forced six midshipmen to resign rather than face courts martial that year. But hazing continued and the midshipmen strictly refused to testify against one another. In September 1875, there was another serious outbreak of hazing on the return of third class from their practice cruise, and another midshipman was court martialed and dismissed.^ Yet by the 1880s the situation had apparently calmed down, and certainly no longer provoked mention in the press. (Class of 1885), for example, claimed that in his day there was little brutality to it The worst case he witnessed was that of a midshipman who was held upside down while water was poured down the legs of his pants.^

Several explanations for the severe hazing of these years have been offered. Park Benjamin claims that hazing at the Academy was confined to minor pranks until the appointment of the first black midshipman and a tough, street-smart New Yorker in 1872. These two social outcasts were made roommates and hazed severely. Peter Karsten argues that disruptions in the Academy such as its relocation or its massive expansion early in 20th century led to increases in hazing as midshipmen sought to preserve the character of their institution. He also attributes them to the growing pains of the new navy.

Both Benjamin and Karsten are certainly correct that social class or race difference brought severe hazing, but not always. There are, for instance, no records of any hazing incidents visited upon the several Japanese midshipmen of these years. Apparently as they posed no threat to the establishment (they would be returning to ), there was no need to target them. The level of hazing certainly varied from plebe to plebe. One might be made to stand on his head for only a few minutes while another would be kept at it for a considerably longer period despite having repeatedly fainted. For ^Benjamin, The United States Naval Academy, 301 ; Army <& Navy Journal, October 2,1875. Robert E Coontz, From the to the Sea (: Dorrance & Co, 1930), 65. ’“Karsten, Naval Aristocracy, 38. 38 some it was a simple right of passage, for others it was calculated brutality designed to force them to resign. Growth of the Navy simply fails as an explanation. If it were the cause, hazing would have increased in the 1880s and 1890s rather than decreased. The treatment of the first black midshipmen in the Academy’s history shows hazing at its worst All three were appointed by ’s reconstruction government The first James H. Conyers, arrived on September 21,1872. Alonzo C. McClennan arrived the following year, and the last Henry E Baker, Jr. came in 1874. While Park Benjamin claims the black midshipmen were “neither coddled nor oppressed,” a succession of serious incidents indicates otherwise.” All, in fact were ostracized and faced particularly brutal hazing. Conyers was attacked by members of his own, entering class as well as the third class. He was assaulted by Robert Diggs, and Gerard Claude refused to fence with him. Both were dismissed despite the explanation offered by the Claude’s father that “his son was raised a Southerner, and not on social equality with a negro.” The succession of assaults on Conyers probably provoked Worden’s October 22, 1872 General Order against hazing, but it failed to prevent further incidents. In May Conyers and George D. Donnelley were both suspended for fighting and sent to the Santee, though Conyers was quickly released. The next month eight more midshipmen were confined to the Santee for abusing Conyers.” When McClennan arrived, he and Conyers were assigned to room together despite being of different classes. They tried to look out for one another, but were obviously outnumbered. Conyers resigned on Nov 11,1873, leaving McClennan alone and in an increasingly dangerous situation. He was transferred aboard the Santee for his own safety, but this proved futile. One night someone cut the rope of his hammock, dropping him on his head and knocking him unconscious. Depressed, isolated, and fearful he resigned. Two Academy instructors helped him gain admission to Wesleyan Academy 'benjamin. The United States Naval Academy, 293 tfoumal of the Officer of the Day, 1872-74, Naval Academy Archives; A/iew York Times, February 27, 1875,6. 39 where he completed his undergraduate education. Baker apparently arrived forewarned and instead of waiting for the hazing to begin he went on the offensive. He was involved in an escalating series of confrontations and fights and was eventually dismissed in

November 1875, as were several midshipmen who had harassed him. It would be sixty years until the next black midshipmen arrived at the Academy.^ There is no question that the three black midshipmen faced a particularly brutal form of hazing, but hazing, even brutal hazing predates their arrival. Certainly it had much to do with the midshipmen's notions of themselves as officers and gentlemen. Many Southerners, like Claude, foimd it beneath their dignity as gentlemen to associate with blacks, and virtually all the assaults on the black midshipmen were by Southerners. In contrast, Almy’s initial attempt at hazing Harkness was routine and ignored by his classmates, until Almy told them their honor was at stake. Harkness, despite his treatment, insisted on testifying on behalf of his attackers, except for Almy. The guilty nineteen also testified against Almy, but not against each other. Having lied to them, Almy had broken their code and was no longer entitled to their protection. The rest of the third class, including such model midshipmen as C. G. Rogers, insisted on standing by their classmates because the honor of all was at stake. Just as in their rainy march before President Grant, their honor bound them together in a questionable act While Worden and later Rodgers could decry hazing, one of its results was exactly what the Academy faculty sought to create—a small group of officers motivated by honor who saw themselves as a 'band of brothers’ and stood by each regardless of the consequences.

' McClennan went on to the University of South Carolina and then to Howard University to study medicine and had a successful medical career. See Willard B. Gatewood, Jr. “Alonzo Clifton McClennan: Bladt V&dshipman from South Carolina VSTi-lA" South Carolina Historical Magazine, in Naval Academy Archives. Black Cadets file; New York Times. November 8,1875; Worden to Board of Investigation, October 28, 1874, Naval Academy Archives, Hazing file; R.L. Held, ‘The Black Midshipman at the U. S. Naval Academy,” USNIP 100 (April 19738):28-30. 40 Summer Cruises

Despite being a land-based school the midshipmen received extensive training in handling sailing vessels. They practiced throughout the year on board the sloop Dale and each summer the midshipmen were assigned to one of old sailing warships at the

Academy for practical experience at sea. Each summer Chambers was assigned to the frigateConstellation, an aging veteran of the War of 1812. On board the midshipmen trained extensively in all the complexities of sailing these old ships. While not required to wash down the , the third classmen did virtually everything else on board. They

learned to man the rigging, handle sail, make simple repairs, to man a lead, respond to emergencies like fire or man overboard, and many other tasks. Morning classes were followed by practical drills in the afternoon. They also had to get used to the many unpleasant aspects of life onboard ship.

Those who had not already experienced them, had to get used to sleeping in hammocks. Many became seasick. Fresh water was carefully rationed and passed out under guard to the crew. They bathed in salt water, sharing nine washbasins between sixty or more of them. While few had held the food at the Academy in high regard, it was far preferable to the hard tack and dried fruit served onboard ship.™ Shortly before leaving for the summer cruise as members of the second class. Chambers and his punished classmates steamed out of the harbor on the Monitor Lehigh and practiced firing at targets. This was their only practice with even remotely modem ordnance. Their training during that cruise and that of the following year as members of the first class emphasized navigation, target practice, and other more sophisticated skills. On the cruise as first classmen each midshipman had duty in turn as captain of the top, officer of the forecastle, and midshipman of the quarter deck. Each also had to take the deck under sail. This was their final preparation to take their place as deck officers on

^Coontz, From the Mississippi to the Sea, 63; Coletta, Admiral Bradley Fiske and the American Navy, 5; Chambers’ practice logbooks, 1872 & 1873, U. S.S. Constellation, Chambers Papers, Box 41. 41 regular vessels of the Navy.'^ On the cruises the practice ships travelled up and down the eastern seaboard, never far from the coast, stopping at various naval yards, installations, and manufacturing centers. The midshipmen thus learned not just ship handling, but also ship construction, maintenance, and repair. They became familiar with what passed for new technology in the U. S. Navy at the naval yards, as there was nothing even remotely modem on the obsolete ships they sailed. In 1874 and then again on his final cruise. Chamber’s class visited the Torpedo Station at Newport There they listened to detailed lectures on chemistry, electricity, and the manufacture of dynamite. They were shown the Alarm, the United States’ only and various types of torpedoes. The first class men were even allowed to fire a few. Chambers was fascinated by the torpedoes and took detailed notes on their design and operation. This was apparently the origin of his lasting interest in torpedoes and torpedo guidance.” The midshipmen crewed their ship alongside its small group of experienced sailors. The sailors’ pay was quite low by the standards of the day and the benefits few, so the Navy attracted few recruits with a deep commitment to the service. This combined with the vast social gulf that separated the officers from the common sailors led to exceptionally harsh treatment of the enlisted ranks by their officers. While Congress had outlawed flogging, offieers continued to contrive new punishments for their unruly sailors, punishments for which the midshipmen would be responsible once they became officers. At any given time at least one of the Constellation’s crew was being punished. This usually meant being confined on bread and water, though sometimes the sailor was confined in irons. The most common charges were insubordination or refusing to obey orders, though fights among crew members were regular occurrences, especially as many

^Journal of the Officer of the Day, U. S. Naval Academy, May 20,1875; Coontz. From the Mississippi to the Sea, 74. “ chambers Notebook, 1876, Chambers Papers, Box 42; Chambers Practice Logbook, 1874, Chambers Papers, Box 41. 42 returned from leave drunk. Numerous sailors deserted from the Constellation on these cruises. Its proximit>' to the shore and frequent stops made this easy. Some deserters returned weeks later, having merely ‘overstayed’ their leave, but most were gone for good, and at least one died trying to swim for shore.*' During the 1870s and 1880s the ships of the U. S. Navy became involved in a series of embarrassing collisions. These excited frequent and derogatory comment in the press, such as editorial that called for an end to “the disastrous experiment of sending our men-of-war to sea, where they are at all times in danger of being sunk by coal and fishing smacks.”*^ Chambers experienced his first collision during his 1873 summer cruise when a small collided with the Constellation while both ships were leaving New York harbor. Damage was slight to both ships. Chambers blamed the civilian for causing the collision as did the Constellation’s captain. A. P. Cook. It was not uncommon for civilian vessels to bump warships and then file suit for damages. Conversely, the U. S. Navy was hardly at the peak of its efficiency. Its ships were clearly responsible for a number of these collisions, and it would hardly be surprising for an aging crewed primarily by inexperienced midshipmen to have caused another.

Graduation Chambers entered his final year with average grades but very popular among his classmates. He and Sears were made cadet-ensigns, and Foulk was appointed cadet lieutenant commander. The position actually most coveted by first classmen was membership on the hop committee which arranged the regular dances at the Academy and the final celebrations of graduation or ‘June Week,’ when, in the words of one midshipman, Annapolis was in “fiesta and large numbers of young girls arrive to gladden

"chambers’ practice logbooks, 1872 & 1873, U. S.S. Constellation, Chambers Papers, Bo.\ 41. York Times.OcVoba 3,1884. 43 the midshipmen after their year of hard study.” It was during this week that the Board of Visitors made its annual inspection and the academy treated them and numerous other dignitaries and visitors to drills and exhibitions all capped by one grand ball after the graduation ceremonies. The members of the hop committee were all elected by their fellow midshipmen from the first class. In 1876 they chose Chambers and several of his circle of friends including Foulk, Mayo, Potts, and Sears. Chambers entered the year ranked 24th in his class, but dropped to 28th over its course, probably due to the great dedication with which he pursued his duties on the hop committee.^

Chambers graduated from the Naval Academy on June 20, 1876,28th in his class of 42. Chambers and 12 others of these had been admitted in 1871, taking five years to complete the course. The rest had done it in four. Only 29 of the 69 who entered with Chambers in 1871 graduated. Most of his friends graduated well ahead of him. Gearing, Foulk, Pbtts, and Sears all graduated in the top ten. Brawnersrcuther who had struggled throughout the program, graduated last in the class. Again Chambers managed to rack up a fair number of demerits. His total of 153 was just imder that of Charles Pond’s 165, the highest of their class. Following their graduation they were sent home to await their orders to sea. Between the faculty at the Academy and the many officers he met on his practice cruises Chambers had made a number of connections that would help him later in his career. These included reformers Lieutenant Caspar H. Goodrich, and Lieutenant Commander French Esnor Chadwick, who he had met on the Constellation and also the Constellation’s 1875 captain. Commander Silas Terry, whom Chambers later served as Intelligence Officer. Terry’s Navigation Officer that year was Lieutenant Raymond P. Rodgers who would become one of the first officers assigned to the Office of Naval

Coontz. From the Mississippi to the Sea, 73; Hop Announcements, Chambers Papers, Box 5; Chambers Notebook 1875-1876, Chambers Papers, Box 42; Stirling, 8. The other members of the hop committee were D. R. Case. A. E. Jardine, Walter McLean, R. T. Mulligan, J. T. Newton, R. C Ray, C. G. Rodgers, and B. S.TappaiL 44 Intelligence and would later bring Chambers into that organization. Chambers also managed to impress both Sampson and Schley and would serv e under both of them later in his career. These connections proved invaluable for Chambers in aiding his f^eer as he lacked the political connections of many of his friends; connections that despite protestations to the contrary, officers in these years routinely used to further their careers. At least two of his friends made use of theirs at the Academy to avoid dismissal. While

Congress had at least officially removed itself from the process, the same could not be said of the Executive Branch. Potts was nearly tossed out in April 1876 over issues of conduct, but Secretary of the Navy Robeson intervened, and simply delayed his graduation until September as punishment. After testing seriously deficient,

Brawnersreuther resigned but then changed his mind and Robeson had him re-admitted and re-tested. He again did poorly, but due to Robeson’s intervention he was simply turned back into the next class as Chambers had been. A few years later he was again found deficient on annual examination and was again saved by Robeson.** Chambers and his classmates graduated in the year of their nation into a Navy that had as little room for them as it had for modem ships. An 1876 world survey of naval powers failed to even mention the United States though the 15 nations it did describe included Turkey, , and , countries clearly economically and technologically behind the United States. The centennial exhibition that opened that year in Philadelphia showcased the scientific progress and technological achievements of the United States as compared to that of other nations. Of particular interest to the midshipmen was the huge, breech-loading cannon at its entrance and the enormous 1400 horse power Corliss steam engine that powered many of the exhibits, which included mowers, reapers, Pullman sleeping cars, sewing machines, typewriters, looms, and numerous other devices. Those midshipmen not part of the more than ten million visitors

“ Robeson to CJU*. Rodgers April 19,1876, Potts file. Naval Academy Archives; Robeson to Brawnersreuther July 28, 1873 and July 31,1876, Brawnersreuther file. Naval Academy Archives. 45 had probably at least seen the models and other exhibits carried by the Tallapoosa to the exposition as it stopped at the Academy. Cleariy the United States was capable of producing modem ships, but none were being built It would be a decade before Chambers or any member of his class set foot on an even remotely modem ship. Instead they served on ships that increasingly became a source of amusement to officers of foreign navies.“

“ Stephen Howarth, To Shining Sea: A History o f the United States Navy. 1775-1994 (New Yoik: Random House, 1991), 216; Sean Dennis Cashman, America in the GuildedAge (New York: New York University Press, 1984), 10-11 ; Journal of the Officer of the Day, U. S. Naval Academy. June 6,1876. 46 CHAPTER 2 EARLY CRUISES

Chambers graduated the Naval Academy eager for adventure. Over the next few years he developed his skills as a sailor, impressing a succession of captains with his seamanship and bravery. During these years Chambers also developed an interest in new technology and ship design, tinkering with inventions and sketching ship plans whenever he had a chance. Despite a successful career at sea, it would be as an advocate of new technology that Chambers would leave his mark on the Navy. Chambers, like all recent graduates of the Academy, lobbied to get the best assignment he could and also worked to be assigned to the same ship as his friends. A good first assignment could bring one to the attention of influential superiors, leading to better assignments in the future. A bad one could doom one to obscurity. Graduates used whatever connections and political influence they had in arranging this crucial first posting. Chambers proved lucky in this regard. While his family was not particularly well-connected, that of his classmate and friend, Charles Gove, was. Through the influence of a friendly Senator, Gove arranged to be posted to the Pensacola, the flagship of Alexander Murray, commander of the South American Squadron. Gove also put in a good word for several of his friends, among them Chambers. Chambers, Gove and three of their classmates (Henry Gearing, Charles POnd, and De Witt Coffman) were ordered to the Pensacola on October 25,1876. They were to take passage on a Pacific mail steamer from New York to Panama where they would await the Pensacola’s

47 arrival.** Chambers received his orders, and they came as quite a surprise. He had expected a longer leave and more time to spend with his family, and had little time to gather his things. Fortunately, his mother had already done it, a considerable task, as Chambers brought 160 poimds of baggage with him. He left for New York the next day and stayed there with his cousin and her mother. He spent the 30th renewing a few old friendships and left New York the following day on the mail steamer Acapu/co along with his five classmates. The five midshipmen were joined by Lieutenant Raymond P.

Rodgers, the son of Admiral C. R. P. Rodgers, who had also been posted to the Pensacola. He acted as their chaperone on the voyage, keeping the recent graduates out of trouble and from offending the Acapulco's captain, a sailor of the old school who made sure the midshipmen knew he thought very little of their fancy education as compared to his years of experience at sea. The six naval officers shared three rooms, two per room. Chambers roomed with Rodgers at Rodgers’ request. Chambers had impressed Rodgers at the Aeademy, but it was apparently on this trip that they became friends.*^ The five midshipmen enjoyed the voyage and spent a great deal of time socializing with the other passengers, and competing for the favor of the few eligible ladies on board. Chambers met all the passengers, and spent a great deal of time watching them, recording his precise observations in his diary. He made particularly careful notes about a dentist who he watched fall prey to “the treacherous little god of love,” something he would soon do himself. Chambers spent several days amusing himself watching the dentist transform his outward appearance and mannerisms for his amorous pursuits.^ While hardly important in subject matter, his notes show the acute observation and attention to detail that would later make him useful to the Office of Naval Intelligence.

"‘Bureau of Navigadoa to Chambers, October 20,1876, Chambers Papers, Box 1; Chambers Journal 1876-79, Chambers Papers, Box 42. "^Chambers Journal 1876-79, Chambers Papers, Box 42. ""chambers Journal 1876-79. 48 Gallivanting Around Panama The Acapulco arrived in Aspinwall, Rmama, just over a week later on November

9. Rodgers and the midshipmen then crossed the Isthmus by train to Panama City where they were to await the arrival of the Pensacola. Chambers enjoyed travel, was fascinated by new places, and marveled at the lush, tropical scenery of the long ride. They arrived the following day and took rooms in the Grand Hotel for which they had to pay for out of their own pockets. It cost them almost a third of their monthly pay of just under $ 100. Rodgers again chose to room with Chambers. Chambers and his four friends sampled the delights of the town, “paying a great deal of attention to the ladies.” Chambers found time to court two of the local ladies, one of them quite seriously. His first love, Sarilla, broke off the relationship after only a short while, throwing Chambers into a deep depression. When the Boston Ice Company hosted a dance in Aspinwall, Chambers travelled back with his friends for it, but could not enjoy it as he still pined for Sarilla.” Nonetheless, Chambers recovered quickly and became enraptured with another young woman, whom he referred to in his journal only by the initial ‘V;’ his darling V as he referred to her time and again. He visited her frequently, met her parents and took pains to reassure her mother that his intentions were both serious and honorable. He promised V that he would always love her and would return for her. She, in turn, promised to wait for him. As he confessed to his journal: “I pray to God to make me worthy of the angelic being, to prevent my disappointing her, and to give me success in order that we may soon be happy.”^ He seems not, however, to have told his own parents about the seriousness of his intentions. Nor is there any indication that he thought of her once he left Panama for good. '"Chanibeis Journal 1876-79; Chambers to his parents, November 25, 1876, Chambers Papers, Box 5. ^Chambers Journal 1876-79. Several pages are tom out of this section of Chambers’ journal, so it is impossible to say more about this relationship. 49 Female companionship, however. sahsHed only part of the needs of the eager, young midshipmen. All were desperate for adventure and rather short on patience. They hired local guides and set off into the jungle, exploring the old mining district and, over the protests of their guides, even entered several abandoned mines. Rumors of bandits only excited their further explorations. Chambers enjoyed Panama’s mild winter climate and calm weather. The temperature usually remained between 75-85 degrees. Though as much as he enjoyed the climate, he was less than impressed with the local populace. “Spanish blood had demoralized the country and the natives, a mixture of Spanish, negro, and indian, are very indolentC ham bers’ early letters are filled with similar racial comments and comparisons based on his travels. He considered Colombians superior to Central Americans and Mexicans better than Colombians, though of course not on par with Anglo-Americans. He had clearly absorbed the racial prejudices of his day, but seems to have shed them as he grew older. Chambers was equally unimpressed with the soldiers of these nations. They were poorly equipped even by the standards of the United States and made little effort to maintain what equipment they had, a subject he discussed at length with Rodgers. The arrival of the Pensacola on November 23 brought only a brief pause to the midshipmen's explorations and adventures. Rodgers and the midshipmen quickly settled on board, the midshipmen sharing one cramped room. Each of the midshipmen stood watch for two days and then received three off, having only to be on board for quarters at 9:30 p. m. This left them plenty of time to visit their numerous “lady acquaintances,” and pursue other adventures. The arrival of four more of their classmates, including Brawnersreuther who had been delayed by academic difficulties, further crowded their cramped, shipboard quarters and encouraged the now nine midshipmen to spend as much time as possible on shore. The court martial and dismissal for drunkenness of a lieutenant

^'chambers to parents, January 13,1877, Chambers Papers, Box 5. 50 of the squadron seems not to have affected their own carousing/^ The primary mission of the United States Navy in those halcyon years was to show the flag and police the seas. Its ships were dispersed around the globe where they visited countless ports in support of U. S. commerce and diplomacy. Only rarely did they become involved in armed conflict, and when they did it was generally a punitive expedition on shore. The Pensacola made a regular circuit of visits at ports on its station and actually spent most of the time docked rather than at sea. This allowed Chambers, and the officers of the Pensacola, to have active social lives ashore. Naval officers received free passes on the Isthmian railroad, so Chambers and his friends continued to travel back to Aspinwall (contemporary Colon), as did many of the officers of the Pensacola, attending the dances and other social events there. Despite his professed love for his “darling V,” Chambers attended a number of dances there. At one hosted by the Boston Ice Company, he danced with a number of local ladies who spoke no English. Chambers, despite his recent practice, still had trouble with Spanish, and proved unable to extricate himself from a difficult situation when two of his dance partners felt slighted. He had to get Lieutenant Thomas Phelps who spoke Spanish fluently, to straighten things out On his return to Panama, he resolved to improve his Spanish and eventually became comfortable with the language.'’’

Duty on the Pensacola Captain commanded the 3000 ton screw sloop Pensacola, the flagship of the South American Squadron. Sixteen officers (nine of them midshipmen) served on board, and because the Pensacola was a flagship, 45 Marines, a 16 piece band and several servants completed the ship’s complement All the servants were Chinese, showing the growing trend in the Navy toward Asian servants in place of African- ’'^Gumbers to parents, December 26,1876, Chambers Papers, Box 5; USS Pensacola Log, 1876-1877, National Archives, Record Group 24. ’'^Chambers to parents January 13,1877, Chambers Papers, Box 5. 51 Americans following the Civil War. In addition to the roughly 200 members of the crew, whose numbers fluctuated wildly due to the vagaries of enlistment and desertion, the ship was also home to a menagerie of pets including dogs, cats, pig, parrots, and a monkey—most of which belonged tu Admiral Murray. The ship had been authorized in 1857, commissioned in 1861, and had a distinguished Civil War record. While hardly the oldest ship in the Navy, the Pensacola was certainly obsolete for naval warfare. She remained armed with a collection of Civil War-era smoothbore, muzzle-loading caimon and was only rarely able to steam at speeds greater than eight knots. More often Captain Irwin relied on the ship’s full set of sails to reach his destinations.^ Yet in the 1870s, Chambers could have done a lot worse, and he considered himself quite fortunate to get this posting. Even the most modem American ships were but quaint antiques compared to those of European navies. A few years later a classmate of his managed to get posted to the , the most modem ship in the Navy, and the first to be electrified. As he wrote to Chambers, he was not impressed. “I caimot tell you how disappointed I am in the Trenton. 1 had hoped to get at least on board a ship of war which might at least be not sneered at in the comparison of our ships with those of foreign navies—but alas!. . . So help me if I can respectably do it, I am not going to sea in a United States man of war until one is built fit to be called such.”^^ Chambers and his classmates would have a long wait The midshipmen’s duties in running the ship were quite light. Instead they were kept busy honing their skills for their eventual promotion exam to become ensigns. They had to prove themselves competent in navigation, recordkeeping, and other skills essential to running a warship. All brought with them a sextant or octant, a comparing watch, treatises on navigation and marine surveying, and a blank joumal in which to enter

^Chambers to parents, November 25,1876 and December 26,1876, Box 5; On the replacement of African American with Asian servants and mess attendents see Frederick S. Hanod, Manning the New Navy (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978), especially pages 54-65. ^George Fbulke to Chambers, December 28,1883, Chambers Papas, Box 5. 52 professional notes. While at sea they daily worked on improving their skills, computing all courses and distances run and completing other navigational exercises. Each of them determined the ship’s position at noon and reported to the captain to check his work.

Chambers always received excellent marks. They also kept up to date copies of the ship’s and his division’s watch, quarter and station bills, and stood junior deck watches. Irwin placed Chambers in charge of the 3rd division and the ship’s whale boaL**

The Pensacola remained in Panama City until late December and then sailed to Valparaiso, then to Punta Arenas, Costa E^ca and then back to Panama in February. The voyage proved as uneventful as any of Chambem’ practice cruises. The Pensacola left Panama again on April 4,1877, Chambers’ 21st birthday, following a grand, farewell ball. They again sailed north stopping at Punta Arenas, Costa Rica and several Mexican ports including San Bias and Acapulco. They recoaled at the U. S. coaling station in Pichilingue Bay—a grand name for a dilapidated shed and its one employee. The crew brought the coal to the ship in a lighter and then hauled it aboard in baskets—a difficult and slow process that covered the ship with coal dust. Chambers, always interested in efficiency, began studying the problem of recoaling, especially recoaling at sea, and would return to it periodically through his career. As Chambers commented at the time, the problem at Pichilingue Bay could have been solved by off-loading the coal from a hulk as the Navy did at its European coaling station, but the funds were simply not there. Throughout the 1870s and 1880s the Navy asked for more funding for coaling stations and was invariably turned down by a penurious Congress that questioned their need.^

As at the Academy, Chambers’ sense of humor continued to get him in trouble. In February, following the Pensacola’s retiun to Panama, he marched the band ashore in full military regalia to serenade the local American consul. While they carried no weapons, it was still an insult to Columbia’s sovereignty, and the offended local officials

^Chambers Journal. USS Pensacola, Chambers Papers, Box 42; Logbook, USS Pensacola, NARG 24. Chambers to parents, December 26,1876 and Apnil 12, 1877, Chambers Papers, Box 5. 53 demanded an apology. On hearing of the incident, Irwin required Chambers to apologize, though Chambers continued to think of it as a fine joke.** It would not be his last brush with local officials sensitive to the presence of Americans in their nations, and in fact, minor incidents between American naval officers and local officials were quite common. Later that month a sailor from the Pensacola, after over-indulging himself at one of the local taverns, became involved in a brawl. Chambers, who was nearby, rounded up several other sailors and broke up the fight They had just restrained the intoxicated man when the local police arrived. Not waiting to ask questions, the polices waded in with billy clubs attacking the intoxicated sailor and several of those restraining him. Chambers led their retreat out of the bar and managed to get everyone onboard the dinghy and back to the ship with only minor injuries. The police, without a suspect in custody, let the matter drop.” offered far more pleasures to the ship’s crew and officers, but also more run-ins with the local officials. The Pensacola arrived in Acapulco on May 1. When out of uniform, the crew was treated well, but there began an escalating series of incidents between local officials and the crew who went ashore in uniform. Chambers and his friends were harassed by the local sentry in front of the Customs House, but they had been treated well the day before by the same sentry when they were out of uniform. Other officers and members of the crew reported similar incidents. As the number of incidents rose. Captain Irwin decided to take action. He demanded the local officials apologize and fire a salute to the U. S. flag which, after some delay, they did This occasional harassment did not stop the crew from enjoying its frequent leaves on shore. Nor did the possibility that rebel forces might attack the city. Rather, Chambers and many of the ship’s other officers were eager to witness a battle. The paymaster’s clerk seemed particularly unable to resist the local entertainment and dipped ^Chambers to parents, December 26,1876, Chambers Papers, Bo\ 5. ’"chambers to Irwin. February 19,1877, Chambers Papers, Box 1 ““Chambers to parents, April 12,1877 and May 8,1877, Chambers Papers, Box 5. 54 into the ship's funds to satisfy his gambling debts. The unenviable task of straightening out the books fell to Chambers, who assisted the paymaster and later shared the blame for the austerity measures that followed as they were forced to make up for the “loan” by economizing on purchases of rations and stores."" Continuing its slow progress from port to port, the Pensacola stopped at Mazatlan and other Mexican ports, and eventually arrived in in September. In all. Chambers served on board Pensacola for ten months. Both Irwin and Lieutenant Commander George H. Wadleigh, the ship’s executive officer, commended him as

“zealous and capable.” Irwin recommended him as a good deck and drill officer” who was fully “proficient in navigation.” His “bearing as an officer and gentleman reflects credit on him and on the institution from which he graduated.”'”

The Portsmouth Chambers had clearly enjoyed his time on the Pensacola, but he was eager for new challenges and experiences. On September 1,1877, Chambers wrote Rear Admiral Daniel Ammen, the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, which was in charge of officer assigmnents, requesting a transfer to the Portsmouth. The Portsmouth was also in San Francisco and was outfitting for a voyage around Cape Horn. Chambers argued that participation in this cruise would be “beneficial and instructive to me from a professional point of view.” Ammen declined his request, but somehow Chambers and three of his friends, Gove, Brawnersreuther and Coffman, managed to arrange the transfer. Possibly they managed an exchange with midshipmen on the Portsmouth who wanted to stay home. Regardless, they received their new orders to the Portsmouth on September 20, and reported aboard on October 8 along with fellow midshipman and classmate

""chambers to parents, April 12,1877 and May 8,1877, Chambers Papers, Box 5. ""Journal of USS Pensacola, 1877, Chambers Papers, Box 42; Irwin to Secretary of the Navy Thompson, October 8,1877, Chambers Papers, Box 1. 55 Wildemar D. Rose."" It seems likely that Gove once again managed to put his political influence to good use and secure for himself and his friends a choice assignment Clearly the voyage aroimd the Cape was only part of their motivation, if it factored in at all. The Portsmouth was an aging, over-crowded third-rate sloop, but its final destination was France, famous for its social pleasures. It would be bringing the last of the American exhibits for the Paris Exposition, the latest in a series of technological extravaganzas in which the industrial nations competed to show their latest products. The operated out of Villefranche and many of its sailors and officers found their way from there to nearby Monte Carlo. Like the South American Squadron, the European Squadron spent much of its time in port and tended to cruise near its base to be close to supplies. Many American naval officers stationed there had brought their families with them. The social activities of the squadron’s officers excited frequent mention in the press and regular complaints from Congress. There is little doubt that the midshipmen would have heard of this, though even had they not, they certainly knew France had far more to offer them than ."” The Portsmouth, then under the command of Commander Norman H. Farquhar, was an old, full-rigged sloop, built before the age of steam and never modernized. Crowded, poorly lit and with little in the way of ventilation, it was a much less comfortable ship than the Pensacola. Caspar Goodrich, who had serv ed on her a few years before described her as “as stumpy and ugly a craft as can be imagined.” Yet thanks to an excellent underwater design, supposedly copied from a famous French privateer, she was quite fast, and “had little difficulty running down any ship not powered by steam.”‘“ What she would then do was questionable, as her entire armament down to the rifles in the arms locker was hopelessly obsolete.

""chambers to A m m en Septmnber 1,1877, A m m en to Chambers. Sqrtember 15, 1878, and Bureau of Navigation to Chambers, September 20,1877, Chambers Papers, Box 1. ""'.’ ’Uliam N. Still, American Sea Power in the Old World (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980), 49-50. ""Caspar Goodrich, Rope Yams From the Old Navy (NY: Naval Ifistory Society, 1931), 84. 56 Chambers and his friends joined the ship while she was fitting out for sea, and there was much to do. The eighty members of her crew received little help from the understaffed Mare Island Navy Yard gang and had to do virtually all the work themselves. In the words of his new captain, “Chambers had an opportunity to make himself very useful which he did.”‘“ The midshipmen stood their first watches while the ship was in port, an easy, but important step in accustoming themselves to the routine in preparation for becoming watch officers, that is one of the five or so officers on a ship judged competent to be in charge while the ship was underway. The officer of the watch was “a very important person, having full authority over all on board, subject only to the orders of the captain” and executive officer. “For the extent of his watch, he was the representative of the commanding officer. The watch officer “served as the eyes and ears of the commanding officer while at the same time protecting him from trivial and unnecessary harassment He trimmed the sails or changed the amount of sail carried to meet changing conditions of wind or weather,” and made other important decisions on running the ship during his watch. “Upon him depended the comfort and safety” of all onboard.""

The Portsmouth left San Francisco on Monday October 8, 1877, and sailed south, crossing the equator on November 12. This was the first crossing for Chambers and other midshipmen, as well as many of the crew, and the “pollywogs” endured the usual rituals, festivities, and visit from “King Neptune.” Continuing south, they crossed the cape and then sailed north along the coast of . Chambers enjoyed the long voyage under sail, and “always performed [his duties] cheerfully and intelligently.” The long trip, during which the ship never once docked, gave the midshipmen an excellent opportunity to hone their skills under the watchful eye of Lieutenant Clifford Gill, the ship’s navigation officer. Each day each of them calculated their position and took the readings.

""farquhar to Thompson, March 6,1878, Chambers P^>ers, Box 1. 107 Damon, Cummings, Admira/ Richard Wainwright (Washington: GPO, 1962), 20. 57 which Gill double checked. Chambers again received excellent marks. On the trip he “held the deck regularly in the day and navigated the ship finding the position daily.” Farquhar considered him “fully qualified to be navigator of any ship.”‘“

They arrived in New York on February 15, and began loading the exhibits for the exposition. Gove was detached for other duties, and roughly half the crew left as their enlistments were up. On March 7 Commander Frederick McNair took command of the Portsmouth from Farquhar. While eighteen new apprentices did join the ship, McNair was still seriously shorthanded and was forced to delay his departure until more men were recruited. The Portsmouth finally left New Yoric for Le Havre on March 14. She arrived on April 5 after an uneventful voyage on which Chambers and the other officers were all kept quite busy whipping the new crew into shape. There, Chambers’ classmate and long-time friend joined the ship. He had arrived earlier on the venerable Constitution, which had also transported exhibits for the exposition. In France the officers each received a month’s leave, departing the ship a few at a time and in rough order of seniority. Gill was one of the first to take his leave, followed by the other senior officers. The midshipmen, of course, left last. Chambers did not receive his leave till May 24. He spent it touring Fiance and actually did visit the exposition, spending several days there. While the officers could be depended upon to return at their leave’s expiration, the crew could not, and desertion became a serious problem. Some of the crew merely overstayed their leave, but once they were ten days late Commander McNair declared them deserters. By June this had become a serious problem as the number of deserters soared. Some were caught and returned by the local police, but many of those who deserted were gone for good. Meanwhile, the term of service expired for several members of the crew. Many of these chose to be discharged in France, waiving the right

'"‘Farquhar to Thompson, March 6,1878, Chambers Papers, Box 1; Log of USS Portsmouth, 1877-1878, Chambers Papers, Box 43. 58 to transport back to the United States, and reducing the crew even further. Experienced seamen had no trouble securing posts on any of the many merchant ships in port. There was little to do in port but work on the ship. With many ot the officers gone on any given day, the midshipmen stood about half the watches, and supeix ised what remained of the crew in painting the ship, drying the sails, repairing the masts and spars, tightening the ratlines, and assorted other tasks. While some of this work was obviously essential, as the months dragged on and the essential tasks were completed, the crew was kept at work simply to combat boredom and keep them out of trouble. Along with desertions, the number of disciplinary incidents also soared among the restless crew. Between these incidents and the almost weekly arrival of the police with another captured deserter, not a day went by without some member of the crew and often several confined. Aside from his leave and occasional short visits ashore or to the exposition, little happened to break Chambers' routine on board. On August 12, Chambers and a few of the other officers accepted an invitation to attend a British . Watching with their hosts from the yacht D/da, they were treated to a grand procession of the premier naval power of the world. Not only were the ships they saw far in advance of the Portsmouth, they were far in advance of any ships then in the U. S. Navy. Certainly this came as no surprise to Chambers, but seeing so many at once proved a humbling experience. Shortly following the review McNair turned over command of the Portsmouth to Commander Arent S. Crowninshield, a reformer who would serv e on the first Naval Advisory Board and who would figure prominently in Chambers’ later career.

The Paris Exposition of 1878 The Paris Exposition, which opened in May, was the latest in a series of technological expositions in the last decades of the 19th centuries at which the developed nations showcased their products in the hopes of furthering commerce. The U. S.

59 Congress was slow to authorize funds for an American delegation and exhibits, doubting its effect on commerce. Many congressmen argued businesses should pay their own way. Concerted lobbying and considerable pressure from the press, eventually convinced Congress to open its purse. In all the United States sent twenty railroad cars of goods including steam engines, mills, pumps, machine tools, gatling guns, Colt revolvers. Sharps and Remington rifles, torpedoes, and railroad machinery as well as a host of agricultural products and implements. While it boasted of the quality of American military inventions, the New York Times assured its readers that weapons research in the

United States was limited to defensive weapons such as “torpedoes to which the U. S. government had devoted a relatively good deal of attention as becomes a nation at peace

with all mankind and desirous of remaining so.”“” Despite not being invited to many of the balls and celebrations, and being snubbed at those to which they were, Americans received many awards from the expositions Judges. In fact, the United States received a higher proportion of awards for its number of exhibitors than any of the other nations. The quality of American mechanical devices was especially noted in the foreign press. The London Times for example, marveled at “the American inventive genius” that developed “more that is new and practical in mechanism than all combined.'"’The U. S. Naval Academy received a gold medal for the “best system of education in the United States.” A host of American inventors were inducted into the Legion of Honor, including Thomas Edison for the phonograph, Elisha Gray for the telephone, and Cyrus McCormick for his numerous agricultural inventions. So too was Lieutenant Benjamin H. Buckingham for his work as naval attaché to the U. S. exhibit, and as the one responsible for coordinating the transport of its many exhibits. He would later become the first U. S. naval attaché to France, working for the Office of Naval Intelligence. Chambers met him at the

“Afew York Times, Mardi 12, 1878,4. ‘‘“A/iw York Times, July 7, 1878, \ \ London\don Times,Times, August 22,1878. 60 exhibition, and the two spoke about new technology and naval advances at length, discussions they would return to in the 1880s when both were assigned to the newly formed Office of Naval Intelligence.'"

After a stay of almost six months, the Portsmouth finally left France and sailed for New York on November I. In the North Atlantic she entered a violent storm that quickly built to a hurricane that lasted from December 9-11. Chambers and the other midshipmen repeatedly led the crew up the masts to adjust the sails and make emergency repairs. During one of these efforts, lightening struck repeatedly about the ship. Blinded and disoriented Chambers was almost blown overboard. Fortunately, he managed to cling to the rigging as rescue would have been impossible during the storm. The battered ship arrived in New Y ork on December 20, whereupon a number of the crew deserted. Most of them probably would have done so anyway, but their recent experiences certainly encouraged them to find a safer line of work. Tht Portsmouth left New York for a few weeks later. On her arrival. Chambers was detached to proceed home and await orders.*"

Chambers’ commanding officers again thought well of him and sent in glowing reports on his fitness in anticipation of his promotion exam. McNair noted his excellent “deportment, attention to duty, and professional aptitude” as well as his “desire to improve himself.”"^ Crowninshield believed he would make an excellent and “efficient officer,” and “foimd him attentive and zealous in the performance of his duties.” Crowninshield, in fact, continued to support Chambers career in the future with recommendations for important posts and commands."** On March 3,1879, Chambers finally received his orders to report to Commodore

'"London Times, August 22,1878; New York Times. July 12, September 2, September 9, and October 22, 1878; Sweetman, Yovo/ Academy, 109; Chambers Journal 1876-1879; Jeffery Dorwart, The Office o f Naval Intelligence (Annapolis: Naval Instimte Press, 1979), 15-20. "^Chambers to Parents, Fdmiary 13,1878, Chambers Papers, Box 5; Logbook USS Portsmouth. "■^McNair to Thompson, August 21,1878, Chambers Prqiers, Box 1. "**CrowninsbieId to Thompson, December 21,1878, Chambers Papers, Box 1. 61 Foxhall Parker at Annapolis for his promotion exams. He passed easily and received his long-awaited commission as an Ensign on April 14. He received a month’s leave following which he was ordered to report to the Marion. All the graduates of the Naval Academy of the 1870s faced a long wait for promotion from ensign to lieutenant. The 1879 graduates for example, served seventeen years before becoming junior : six as cadet-midshipmen, one as midshipmen, and then nine as ensigns. Chambers was well aware of the long wait before him and it was, of course, the reason he, like many of his fellow junior officers, lobbied for promotion reform, that would clear out the dead wood of aging officers above them and allow promotion based on merit rather than seniority. As with his promotion to lieutenant, reform would be a long time coming."^

The Marion

Marion was an interesting ship that within its 1900 tons encapsulated most of the problems of the post-Civil War Navy. It was one of the famous ships ‘repaired’ during the Grant administration under the orders of Secretary of the Navy George Robeson. A thrifty Congress refused to authorize new ship construction for most of the decade of the 1870s, but it did fund repairs of existing ships. So, Robeson ordered ships repaired that should have been scrapped, and in fact spent more on repairs for many of them than new ships would have cost While not a good way to build a modem, efficient Navy, these repairs were an excellent place to hide corrupt dealings including generous supply and construction contracts and numerous jobs for the part)' faithful. As several people later testified to Congress, ships like the Mohican and Tennessee “had milhons of dollars expended upon them” and “were literally rebuilt in the navy-yards in order to give patronage to enable the Republican party to hold its own in doubtful districts.”"^ During the early 1870s Xhc Marion was rebuilt from on old sailing sloop. "^ugh Rodman, Yctrns o f a Kentucky Admiral (Indianapolis:Bobbs-Memll, 1928), 44; Karsten, ‘No Room fOT Young Turks,” USNIP 101 (March 1973), 37-50. ''^Congressional Record, 48th Congress, 2nd Session, 23 February 1885.2044. 62 Commissioned in 1875, she was an entirely new ship that shared hardly a timber or fitting with the original . When Chambers Joined her crew. Chief Engineer J. W. King, just completing his survey of the world’s navies, considered her, along with her sister-ships the Vandalia, Swatura, Quimebaug, Mohican, and Galena, to be “of the most value” in the Navy after the Trenton, the only reasonably modem cruiser in the fleet"’ The Marion was considerably faster than the Pensacola, able to exceed twelve knots for short periods, though it was armed with the usual collection of antiques that passed for ordnance in the U. S. Navy, in this case ancient 32-pounder cannon, several 9-inch Dahlgrens and an 11-inch pivot gim. All were muzzle-loaders Chambers quickly impressed \heMarion’s Captain, Commander F. M. Bunce, with his “personal gallantry,” attention to detail, and technical knowledge. Despite his increasing interest in new technology and innovation. Chambers worked to perfect his skills as a sailor, and was always quick to volunteer for dangerous duty. “During a gale at night the weather main topsail sheet and main lift parted. Ensign Chambers was one of the first aloft, leading the men in executing the order to reeve a hawser in place of the parted lift”"* Hazards other than stormy seas threatened the crew. Constant travel from port to port exposed crews to numerous diseases. The Marion left Valparaiso, , on February 6,1880, and all appeared normal, but by the time the ship had reached Montevideo, Uruguay on the 19th a dozen members of the crew were seriously ill including the ship’s doctor, Hosea Babin. Local officials ordered the Marion quarantined off Flores Island where the officers and crew waited for the epidemic to pass. Babin recovered, but others did not, including Lieutenant J. P. Wallis who died on February 23 and Cadet- midshipman Harvey Wike, who died a few days later. New cases were reported each day

'" j. W. King. The War-Ships and Navies o f the World, 1880 (Washington: GPO,I880; reprint, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1982), 394; Donald L. Canney, The Old Steam Navy: , Sloops, and Gunboats (Annqx>Iis: Naval Institute Press, 1990). '"‘Bunce to Whitney, December 12,1885,Chambers Papers, Box 1. 63 in February, but these were milder and most recovered, perhaps helped by the fresh vegetables sent from shore for the sick. At its peak, so many of the crew were ill that barely enough were left to stand regular watches.

By mid-March most of the crew had recovered, and on the 20th Bunce ordered the hatches sealed and fumigated the ship with sulphur. By the 29th the sickness was over and \hcMarion was free to sail, but other ships in the harbor had also become infected.

On the 31st, in response to signals from shore, Bimce brought the Marion up to steam and ran down a small boat that was trying to reach shore in violation of quarantine regulations. The Marion remained in port until mid-May. Bunce kept the crew busy with regular exercises and drills. They sailed on May 16 for Port Stanley in the Falkland Islands and then resumed their normal patrol, returning to Montevideo in July and spending August in Buenos Aires

Ordnance and Innovation

It was through seamanship more than anything else that an officer made his reputation in these years. Target practice, squadron evolutions, and other wartime skills counted for little. Many captains never fired their guns at all; the combination of peace, obsolete ordnance, and poorly trained crews made it seem pointless. As Caspar Goodrich later wrote: “While target practice was not neglected altogether, and a certain number of rounds had to be fired each quarter, officers made their own and their ships’ reputations by smartness at drills with sails and spars.”"’ Commander Bunce, at least made an effort at target practice, but after repeated efforts he determined that the Marion’s guns were completely inaccurate in all but the calmest of seas. In June 1879, he set Chambers to work on a solution. Chambers came up with number of improvements to the gun carriages, and he continued to refine his designs with Bimce’s encouragement While

Lieutenants Roswell D. Hitchcock, Edwin C. Pendleton, and J. R. Selfridge criticized "’Caspar Goodrich, Rope Yams From the Old Navy (NY: Naval History Society, 1931), 65-6. 64 Chamber’s initial design, arguing that it would fail under stress, they were sufficiently impressed with it to help him perfect it Eventually the four of them settled on a design and together sent a report to the Bureau of Ordnance on their work.'™ Chambers work on gun carriages led him to embrace an even greater challenge, designing first a turret and then an entire ship, which he named the Hiawatha. Like all line officers, he had taken only one course in naval architecture at the Naval Academy, but he studied on his own and followed foreign developments closely. Over the course of his career Chambers designed several warships. None of them was ever built That would have been quite unusual as they originated outside the Bureau of Construction. Still, Chambers’ efforts were widely distributed, provoking discussion and influencing later construction. In an age when turrets mounting one gun were still common and double turrets quite rare in the U. S. Navy, Chambers proposed placing three guns into a single turret They would be of mixed caliber (two 10” and one 15”) to keep the size of the turret small. That way it would fit on the small ships and monitors the United States preferred. He designed it to be easy to maintain and repair, and proposed mounting the guns further back in the turret than usual which would allow smaller gun ports. He redesigned the breeches of the guns to allow this, and to make reloading easier. Chambers’ turret would maximize firepower on the small ships of the U. S. Navy, but it was not without its problems, not the least of which is that the United States had no facilities to produce guns of that size. Chambers recommended those produced by Krupp, believing them superior to other foreign designs. His monitor design, \ht HiaM>atha, at 6000 tons was roughly comparable to the Miantonomah class monitors in size, but carried a much larger armament, and Chambers believed she would also be a more stable and seaworthy ship. In addition to two of his

'^Chambers Journal 1876-1879; Chambers to Bureau of Ordnance, June 10,1879 and June 24,1879, Chambers Papers, Box 1. 65 triple turrets (or dual 15” turrets if his design was not approved), it mounted a ram and would carry a mixture of torpedoes as wells as two 40’ torpedo boats which it would deploy before combat If built it would have been the ultimate development in coast defense vessels. Chambers was particularly interested in the employment of torpedoes offensively, but he also worried about defending against them. Ships of the time were particularly vulnerable to torpedoes, and much of Chambers’ defense of his design focused on his efforts to defend against torpedoes. The Hiawatha had a double hull with barrier of cork and compressed cotton in between which Chambers believed would absorb some of the force of torpedo detonations. In addition to the standard precautions of watertight doors, torpedo nets, and pumping equipment. Chambers suggested a series of inflatable rubber bags in many of the compartments below deck. These would be inflated by the engines prior to combat to fill the compartments and keep any water ouL‘^‘ Chambers described his ship in great detail, with long description and commentary on even minor systems. His repeated emphasis on its ventilation system and the number of air ducts can be taken as a commentary on the quality of air of the ships on which he had served. The one system for which Chambers made no recommendations was the engines, a subject on which he knew little. Instead he accepted those of the Miantonomah. as good, allowing a top speed of just under 14 knots, though he did increase the coal capacity to allow a cruising range of 3300 miles. The three-gun turrets and torpedoes gave Chambers’ design considerable striking power. The ram would of course be useless in combat, but at the time many officers in the major powers advocated them based on experience in the and the between Italy and Austria-Hungry. In the United States their leading advocate was Admiral Daniel Ammen. In fact the ship was likely to please the older, more conservative reformers like Ammen. It used existing technologies and tactical concepts and reflected the contemporary American emphasis on and '"'Chambeis. Notes on \bsHiowcaha^ Chambers Papers, Box 34. 66 coast defense. Chambers’ anti-torpedoes gimmickry aside, the design might have originated with Ammen, who also fancied himself a designer of warships. Chambers sent the turret design and the plans of \h&Hiawatha to Captain Montgomery Sicard, the Chief of Bureau of Ordnance and Guimery for his comments. Sicard was impressed and made copies of the plans for his files. At Chambers request, he sent them on to the Naval Advisory Board, then meeting to make recommendations on rebuilding the Navy, but it was not considering armored ships. Instead its priority lay with rebuilding the dilapidated cruising squadrons, and its recommendations would eventually lead to the construction of three new and a , the famous ABCDs, for which Congress authorized funds in 1883. Sicard also sent Chambers’ designs on to the Naval Institute, which eventually published them. Sicard commended the quality of Chambers’ submission and plans, and the two continued to correspond and discuss ship design and especially modem ordnance. Chambers continued to work on his design and kept Sicard apprised as to his progress, sending him several revised drawings.

He was excited by the prospects of reform and modernization and wanted to be part of the process.*^

The Rescue of the Trinity Despite his efforts at technological innovation and ship design. Chambers spent most of his time performing the same routine tasks as any shipboard officer of his day. The Marion was hardly a research test bed. Its missions were those of the old Navy—policing the seas and supporting the United States’ expanding commerce but reduced merchant marine. The Marion spent most of its time cruising the coast of South

America, sometimes even entering frigid Antarctic waters to aid American whaling ships. Chambers regularly stood watches and continued to hone his skills as a sailor and ‘P ic a rd to Chambers, November 9,1881, and Chambers to Sicard, June 27, 1882, Chambers Papers, Box 1 ; Washington I. Chambers, “A Modified Monitor, with a New Method for Mounting and Working the Guns,” USNIP 7 (1881), 437-46; Chambers to Sicard, Sqkember4,1881, Chambers Papers, Box 1. 67 navigator. Bunce, who was succeeded as Captain of the Marion on September 22, 1881 by Commander Silas W. Terry left with high praise for Chambers, stating that “he was remarkable for attention to his duties and skillful in their peiformance,” and that as an officer and a gentleman, “he was all that could be desired.”*^ Chambers, however, seems not to have been impressed with Bunce and the two later clashed. Chambers had first met his new commanding officer on his practice cruises at the Academy, and had great respect for him. Terry joined theA/ano/i in Montevideo and ordered her to set sail the next day for Buenos Aries. After years on station without a refit, though, Marion was in poor shape, and Terry was forced to turn back to make repairs. He found the ship’s bottom covered with barnacles and many of its fittings had all but rusted away—a situation that may explain Chambers’ soured opinion of Bunce. The repairs took more than a month, once again giving Chambers an opportunity to demonstrate his initiative and growing technical skills. Tht Marion’s first stop when it resumed its patrol was Maldonado, Uruguay, a small, resort town a short sail from Montevideo. There Terry received orders to search for the whaler Trinity which had not been heard from in eighteen months. Initial reports indicated the Trinity had been operating off Tiena del Fuego, but this proved in error. Fortunately Terry telegraphed back to double check his orders and determined that it was near Heard’s Island in the that the ship was believed lost. TheMarion had no charts of the area nor were any locally available. Resorting again to the telegraph Terry arranged for the charts to be delivered by to Capetown, South , where he would stop for supplies before entering the Indian Ocean. The passage to Capetown took twenty-eight days, and after taking on supplies they left on December 24. Terry managed to sail the 3000 miles to Heard’s Island in 18 days without once resorting to his engines. Lookouts located the survivors of the Trinity on Heard’s ‘^ u n c e to Whitney, December 12, 1885, Chambers P^>os, Box 1. 68 Island the night of January 12. The following morning Terry ordered the ship’s cutter and whaleboat ashore to retrieve the whalers who had been stranded there almost two years since October 17,1880. Chambers commanded one of the rescue parties. The entire operation was hampered by the heavy surf strewn with rocks and the freezing temperature. It took several hours to bring all survivors on board, the last arriving after night had fallen. Marion arrived back in Cape Town on February 20 and then sailed on to South America to resume its normal patrols. On the way Terry stopped to conduct another rescue mission, this time freeing the stranded British steamship Poonah, which was in danger of being dashed against the rocky shore of Table Bay by a rising storm.'"

Intelligence Officer

Reform-minded officers steadily gained strength over the years as the normal progression of promotion slowly moved them into positions of influence. In June of 1882 Commodore John Grimes Walker, the new Chief of the Bureau of Navigation and one of the leading reformers of the Navy, ordered all ships to appoint Intelligence officers, who would assist the newly created Office of Naval Intelligence in gathering data on foreign ships and bases. Bunce had ignored this order, as did many Captains, and appointed no one. Terry did. Perhaps aware of Chambers’ bent in this direction, he added intelligence gathering to his other duties. For the duration of his tour Chambers sent regular reports on to the ONI as did his friend and mentor Rodgers, who was also serving in Latin American waters. Chambers was a good choice as his work on ship designs kept him up to date on the latest developments. He maintained his interest in torpedoes, and in August of 1882 he sent the ONI a detailed report of a new Argentinian torpedo boat built by the Yarrow company in England. Chambers managed to get invited on board, and interviewed several

'^Chambers, "Rescue of the Trinity’s Crew,” USNIP 9 (1883), 121; Logbook, USS Marion, 1880, NARG 24. 69 of the employees of the builder who had sailed her from England. They gave him a complete tour, allowing him to compile an extremely complete report on the ship, including her fittings, machinery, engine, and armament His tour was so complete that he was able to draw up blueprints foi the ship. It was the third, and largest of Argentina’s torpedo boats and far in advance of anything in the U. S. Navy. It exceeded 21 knots on trials, performed well in heavy seas and had a cruising range of 1000 miles on coal though it also had sails. This was a significant intelligence coup and demonstrates the surprisingly easy access American Naval officers were often granted in the 1880s, a situation that changed in the following decade. Terry repeatedly commended Chambers for his wodc as an intelligence officer, and considered him “useful in the highest degree to the service.”*^

New Prospects As Chambers tour of duty neared its expiration, the Marion slowly worked its way up the coast, back to the United States. After an extended stay in she reached Portsmouth, New Hampshire, on December 13,1882. Chambers was detached and sent home to await orders a week later. As in the past. Chambers had no interest in leaving his next assignment to the vicissitudes of chance and bureaucratic politics, and his growing number of connections among reformers gave him an opportunity to influence his fate. His next assignment had to be on shore as the Bureau of Navigation required officers to alternate between sea and shore duty in order to guarantee sea experience for all of the Navy’s bloated officer corps. Several officers wrote to Chambers offering him choice assignments including Marshal Oliver, his drawing instructor at the Academy, who offered him a position on the faculty.^ '^Chambers to Walker, August 4,1882 and Walker to Chambers, October 16,1882, Chambers Papers, Box 1; Robert G. Angevine, ‘The Rise and Fall of the Office cd' Naval Intelligence,” Journal o f Military History 62 (April 1998): 291-312; Terry to Secretary of the Navy William Whitney, December 11, 1885, Chambers Papers. Box 1 ; Dorwart, Office o f Naval Intelligence, 17. '^Oliver to Chambers, May 5, 1882, Chambers Papers, Box I. 70 Two offers in particular excited Chambers interest. The first was from Montgomery Sicard, still the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, who repeatedly offered Chambers a posting there. The other was from Lieutenant Theodoras Mason, the head of the Office of Naval Intelligence, who had heard of him from Raymond Rodgers and had also read Chambers reports. He was eager to add him to his staff. Chambers remained interested in ordnance and wanted to pursue the latest developments in this now rapidly changing field, but was clearly tom between the two offers. He wrote to several friends asking their advice. Buckingham, his friend from the Paris Exposition, recommended that he accept Sicard’s offer as he could then work on the new guns being built at the . The appropriation of funds for the construction of the Navy’s first modem, steel warships, labeled the ABCDs by the press after the first letter in each ship’s name, had finally forced Congress to modernize ordnance manufacture in the

United States and fund a modem gun factory at the Washington Navy Yard. The problem with this, as Chambers well knew, was that the United States lagged far behind the

European powers in ordnance. As he wrote the following year, the “art of gun construction in this country, owing to our long neglect, is again almost in its infancy.” He thought the United States so far behind that “nothing less than a great effort on the part of the government will again enable our private gun-founders to compete. . . or our guns to become known for their excellence.”*^ He decided the best place to learn about modem ordnance would be the Office of Naval Intelligence and that is the assignment he chose. Mason considered this a major coup and congratulated himself on getting Chambers and his “excellent ideas,” and wrote him an exceptionally welcoming letter, saying: “When you come to Washington I shall be glad to see you and shall also be glad to receive any voluntary contributions which you may have from time to time for our work.” It would prove to be the perfect assignment for Chambers, and he would have much to contribute

'^Chambers, '"Reconstiuctioa and Increase of the Navy," USNIP 11 (1885), 41-42. 71 to the formative years of the ONI/

'b en jam in Buckingham to Chambers, February 2,1883 and April 1, 1883, Chambers Papers, Box 5; Sicard to Chambers, January 10,1883, Chamben ^ ^ r s . Box 1 ; Mason to Chambers, December 9,1882 and Fdmiary 9, 1883, Chambers pq)ers. Box 1. 72 CHAPTER 3 THE GREELY REUEF EXPEDITION

When Chambers arrived at the Office of Naval Intelligence, Mason was still in the process of organizing it and establishing a routine. Chambers helped get the filing system

in order and helped catalog the steadily increasing number of reports coming in from shipboard intelligence officers, industry contacts, and other sources. His assignment was only temporary. Sicard at the Bureau of Ordnance still wanted him and again offered to have Chambers assigned there. Mason approved the transfer on the condition, as he told Chambers, that after his assignment at the Bureau of Ordnance he would return to the Office of Naval Intelligence “with the increased experience which you will no doubt gain by a practical application of your excellent ideas.”'” As it turned out, neither Sicard nor Mason captured Chambers for the next year. Mason had earlier written Chambers telling him; “If you continue in the road which you are now travelling you will never have any trouble about duty. It has been my experience that men who apply themselves make themselves useful outside of their mere routine duties" and never have trouble getting good assignments. This turned out to be prophetic. Mason had to lose Chambers for much of the following year precisely because he was so desirable, and he did not lose him to Sicard. Chambers’ experience and high standing with a number of officers enabled him to gain easy admission to the Greely Relief Expedition to the Arctic, following which he was assigned to an expedition to survey a

new route for an isthmian canal through . It was not until after his completion of these two special assignments that he returned permanently to the Office of Naval '^lason to Chambers, February 9,1883. Chambers Papers, Box I. 73 Intelligence.*^

The Greelv Expedition

Among the traditional roles of the U. S. Navy, along with policing the seas, was exploration. Over the previous few decades, the Navy had launched several expeditions to the Arctic, though these met with limited success. Several ships were lost there, most recently the s\£ame.v Jeannette. Under Commander G. W. DeLong the Jeannette had left San Francisco in August 7,1879, passed through the Bering Strait and then began looking for approaches to the North Pole. The slow ship was caught and trapped by the advancing ice shortly after her arrival. The Jeannette was eventually crushed by the ice on June 12, 1881, after being trapped for twenty-one months. The crew split into the ship’s three small boats and rowed south. They became separated in the dense fog, and each group proceeded on its own. The crew of one boat became lost and was never seen again. The crew of the boat under DeLong died of starvation and exposure. Only the third boat under the ship’s Chief Engineer, George Melville, reached civilization. A Senate investigation later faulted the Navy for sending a ship clearly unable to withstand the rigors of the Arctic. TheJeannette had been a gift to the U. S. government from James Gordon Bennett, one of the many people fascinated by the mystenes of the arcuc. However inadequate, the Jeannette was far more suited to the arctic than any of the Navy’s other ships.*^* After the disastrous failure of Jeannette expedition, the Navy wisely decided to focus its attentions on safer parts of the world—a recognition that its limited budget, aging ships, and unevenly trained persotmel were simply not up to the rigors of Arctic ‘^Buckingham to Chambers, April I, 1883 and September 1,1883, Chambers Papers, Box 5; \lasoa to Chambers, January 9,1883, Chambers Papers, Box 1. '^*For more on the Jeannette Expedition see Edward EUshurg, Heü on Ice: The Saga o f the “Jeannette" (New York: Dodd Mead, 1938); Getnge Melville, In the Lena Delta (Boston: Houghton VfifHin, 1892); Raymond Lee Newcomb (ed.). Our Lost Explorers: The Narratives o f the “Jeannette" Arctic Expedition as Related by the Survivors and Last Journals o f Lieutenant De Long (Hartford and San Francisco; American Publishing and A.L. Bancroft, 188$). 74 exploration. For better or worse, the Army decided it would try its hand at this dangerous venture and soon received several opportunities to outdo the Navy. The United States was hardly alone in its interest in Arctic exploration. Many nations had launched expeditions, and experienced their own successes and failures in that inhospitable region. Karl Weyprecht, an Austro-Hungarian explorer, led the effort to win cooperation among the major exploring nations. He presided over three International Polar Conferences in 1879,1880, and 1881 to work out the details. After much wrangling, the governments of Austria-Hungary, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Norway, , and the United States agreed to cooperate in making various meteorological, astronomical, and magnetic observations as well as other studies from a ring of stations circling the North Pole. The stations would also send out teams to gather organic and mineral samples and explore their assigned areas. Because of the meteorological nature of the work and the Navy’s reluctance to risk more lives and ships, the United States’ program was placed under the Weather Bureau, part of the broad array of agencies directed by the Chief Signal Officer of the Army. The United States agreed to place and staff two of the network of planned polar observation stations: one at Point Barrow, , the other on Ellesmere Island, an isolated spot northwest of Greenland, bounding the northern segment of Lady Franklin Bay. The Point Barrow expedition, commanded by Lieutenant P. Hemy Ray, completed its mission and returned in good health, having manned their arctic post from September, 1881 to August, 1883. The Lady Franklin Bay expedition would not fair as well.*^^ General William B. Hazen, the head of the Signal Corps, chose Lieutenant Adolphus W. Greely, 5th Cavalry to lead the expedition of twenty soldiers and four officers to Lady Ranklin Bay. Greely was fresh off an outpost in the American West and had no arctic experience. His expedition left the United States on August 25,1881, on

"'John E. Caswell,^c/ic Frontiers: United States Explorations in the Far North (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956), 96-8. 75 board the whaler Proteus, amply supplied for their two year stay. Relief ships were to bring more supplies in the summers of both 1882 and 1883, and check that all was well with the explorers. Yet, Greely* s orders were quite specific. “If not visited in 1882, Lieutenant Greely will abandon station not later than September 1, 1883. and will retreat southward by boat, following closely the east coast of Griimell Land [an island west of Greenland], until the relieving vessel is met or Littleton Island is reached.”*” In the event

the relief ships could not reach Greely, they were to wait as long as possible in Smith Sound and then cache supplies for him on Littleton Island, and then withdraw southward ahead of the advancing ice pack. On the voyage north, Greely*s ship made an unexpectedly easy passage with little

difficulty from ice. This gave all involved a false sense of optimism for the future. In fact, only three of the many previous expeditions had made it this far north. The Proteus left Greely well established at his base of Fort Conger with three years of supplies. Fort Conger was specifically placed near a coal seam, so fuel would not be a problem. All

looked good for Greely and his men, but the 1882 resupply ship, the Neptune, failed to find a passage through the ice. Instead, her Captain cached supplies for Greely at several sites far south of Fort Conger and then returned home. The following year, the Army placed Lieutenant Edward A. Garlington in command of a more determined effort to get through to Greely. Garlington again hired the Proteus, the same well-built whaler that had delivered Greely to his frigid post, and was also accompanied by the U. S. S. Yantic. The Yantic was an old, wooden U. S. Navy steamer that had no business anywhere near the arctic, lacking both the speed and hull strength to survive the briefest encounter with the ice pack, let alone to attempt to force a passage through it She spent most of the voyage under sail due to mechanical difficulties. The Proteus, forced to proceed into dangerous waters alone, was trapped by a sudden advance of the ice in the Kane Sea and crushed. Its undisciplined crew fought '^*WinfieId Scott Sdiley and J.R. Soley, The Rescue o f Greely (NY : Scribner's. 1885), 23. 76 over the spoils as the ship went down, salvaging little. Most of the supplies for Greely were lost The civilian captain, Garlington, and Garlington’s naval advisor. Lieutenant J. C. Colwell, eventually managed to regain control of the crew. They cached what few supplies they managed to salvage, and rowed south across Melville Bay in the ships boats toward Upemivik where they were eventually rescued by the Yantic. The Yantic sailed home with both crews, while Greely on August 10,1883 , oblivious to what had occurred but obedient to his orders, gathered his force and began moving south, abandoning his well-supplied base for a dangerous journey on foot and in small boats through hundreds of miles of arctic wilderness.*”

The Relief Expedition Desperate to avert disaster and save the Greely part}'. Secretary of War Robert Todd Lincoln turned to the Navy for help, formally asking Secretary of the Navy Chandler for any assistance the Navy could furnish. President Arthur convened a joint Army-Navy board on December 17,1883 to work out the details of rescuing Greely’s expedition. It met from December 20 to January 22 without reaching a consensus. Its final report presented three options. Garlington wanted to lead another Army expedition to rescue Greely. Commander Bowman H. McCalla envisioned a solely Navy operation. The third option was a compromise between the two services—Navy ships carrying an Army relief party. President Arthur decided on an all-Navy rescue operation, though Congress did not authorize funds for the expedition until February 13. The House quickly approved the necessary funds, but the Senate stalled over approving an unlimited appropriation. As the Navy had no ships suited for arctic exploration, the Senators knew the expedition would be expensive and many considered it unlikely that any survivors would be foimd. Ships would have to be purchased

‘” Caswdl, Arctic Frontiers.l06S\ David G. Colwell, ‘The Navy and Greely: The Rescue of the 1881- 1884 Arctic Expedition,” USNIP 84 (January 1958): 71-79; Schley, Forrv-Five Years. 144-45. 77 overseas. The only ships in the world built for this work were the famous Dundee whalers, built in Scotland and made out of several different woods to balance strength and elasticity, and their bows heavily reinforced with iron to smash through ice. While the Senate wrangled over the final wording of the bill. Chandler approved the purchase of two Dundee whalers, the Thetis and Bear from civilian firms. The purchase was arranged by the Office of Naval Intelligence’s attaché in Britain, Lieutenant Commander French Esnor Chadwick. Eager to improve its relations with the United States, Britain donated Alert, a veteran of George Naies’ 1875 arctic expedition, then lying partially dismantled in a London dry dock. This gave the expedition three ships in all, and all designed for arctic service. Chandler chose Commander Winfield Scott Schley to lead the rescue expedition. Schley had most recently served on the Lighthouse Board under Commander , following a tour at sea in command of the screw steamer £j5e.r. He boasted a distinguished Civil War record and extensive duty with the Asian Squadron. He had served as Commander L. A. Kimberly’s adjutant during the successful 1871 assault on two Korean forts, and had a reputation for bold leadership and decisiveness. He was also a charter member of the United States Naval Institute and well acquainted with other reform-minded officers. Schley had followed the sad tale of the expedition in the newspapers and the failed attempts to rescue Greely and his men. He had even predicted to several friends that eventually “some naval officer will have to go up there and bring them back.” Schley had several conversations with Chandler before finally receiving his orders on February 18 to begin assembling his force. Schley believed the expedition to be a forlorn hope. Greely’s group was hardly the first to be stranded in the arctic. Between 1847 and 1879, 42 separate expeditions had searched for survivors of British explorer Sir John Franklin’s expedition. One actually scattered a stream of small message balloons in the arctic wind

78 hoping to get word to Franklin, possibly the first effort at naval aviation. All these expeditions returned empty-handed. The search for Greely looked to be much the same. Even if his party could be found, they would probably be found dead just as DeLong’s group had been. Despite his reser. ations, Schley agreed to accept the command as long as he could choose his officers, a process in which President Arthur may have participated.*^*

Schley selected his men carefully. All had to pass a rigorous medical screening and be volunteers, though the seamen and petty officers who went were required to

re-enlist as no one knew how long the expedition would last All of its 115 members received an extra $10 a month pay and a bonus of two month’s pay on successful return. In all Schley chose twenty-four officers for the expedition of whom eight had previous arctic experience.*** Many he knew personally, and he had probably met many of the

younger ones, such as Chambers, while directing the Modem Languages Department at the Naval Academy from 1873 to 1876. Schley commanded from Thetis, the most powerfully built and engined of the expedition’s three ships. Commander George Coffin commanded the Alert and Lieutenant William Emory commanded the Bear. Schley assigned each ship at least one officer with arctic experience. His own ship included Chief-Engineer Melville, who had survived the disastrous Jeannette expedition, and also the destruction of the Polaris under similar circumstances in 1871. Schley also assigned each ship an experienced civilian ice-master. Officers for the expedition began arriving in

New York in March. Most arrived in April. Schley himself arrived on April 1. Chambers received his orders on April 22 and arrived on the 25th when he was assigned to the '**William H. Goetzmann, New Lands, New Men: America and the Second Great Age of Discovery (NY : VUring, 1986), 433; David Wragg, V/ings Over the Sea (NY: Arco, 1979), 9; James M. Merril, The Greely Relief Expedition, 1884 USNIP 77 (September 1951), 971; Schley, forfy-f(ve Years, 148); New York Herald, August 5,1884,5. Albert Gleaves is incorrect when he states that Chambers was one of those with previous arctic experience. Gleaves probably confused him with Ensign Albert A. Ackoman who served on board the YarUic the previous year and on the Alert during the Greely Relief Expedition. Like Chambers, he was one of the Young Turks of the Navy pushing for reform. Albert Gleaves, The Life o f an American Sailor: Rear Admiral William Hemsley Emory (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1923), 51. 79 Thetis with Schley. The Senate finally approved the appropriation on February 13, thice weeks after the House version had passed. Wrangling over details, the unlimited funds of the appropriation, and the convictions of many senators that Greely’s part)' had already died had delayed its passage. The ongoing hearings on Jeannette disaster bolstered the pessimism of many senators. Senator Eugene Hale, long a champion of the Navy, managed to convince enough Senators of its importance to push it through. Also contentious was the issue of a reward to anyone helping rescue Greely or ascertain his whereabouts that many newspapers and public commentators demanded. Schley opposed issuing a reward. He believed it would lead unprepared vessels to rush into dangerous waters, getting in his way and possibly needing rescue themselves. Both Secretaries Chandler and Lincoln also opposed it, agreeing with Schley that it would only cause trouble. Pressure, however, continued. The New York Times demanded a $50,000 reward, and decried the “bureaucratic reverence for red tape and official routine,” that delayed the issuance of a reward and the departure of the rescue expedition. The same writer also wryly commented that the arctic whalers, the only ones likely to pursue the reward, could clearly take care of themselves—it was the Army and Navy that kept getting into trouble in arctic waters. Chandler finally acquiesced and issued a $25,000 reward to any civilians who either rescued Greely or ascertained his fate. This was a tidy sum for the average whaling crew, and many left port eariy in pursuit of iL*^^

Preparations for the expedition took a great deal of time. Chambers and the other officers were kept busy supervising work on the three ships, a process slowed by the throngs of reporters and the curious who observed their outfitting at the New York Navy Yard. Schley’s insistence on keeping crew complements to a minimum, in order to limit supply consumption and minimize the loss of life should things go wrong yet again in the arctic, meant plenty of work for everyone. All three ships needed extensive work. Both ‘^Schley and Soley, The Rescue o f Greelv, 155; New York Times, March 18,1884 and March 19.1884,4. 80 the Thetis and the Bear were crowded with fishing equipment and smelled badly. The agingAlert was no longer in the peak of condition and needed extensive repairs. Compartments were tom out to make room for supplies and the engines of all three ship» were completely overhauled. Their hulls were additionally strengthened according to suggestions made by Chief Constructor of the Navy Theodore Wilson. All were carefully stocked for a long expedition, as no one knew how long the search might take. Schley plarmed for everything, and fortunately had unlimited appropriations to pay for it He insisted on the best coal available (Welsh semi-bituminous) and had 2000 tons of it sent to St Johns, Newfoundland, to await his squadron. Schley and his officers also procured or cobbled together a variety of specialized equipment including new ice augers developed by the ever-inventive Bradley Rske, then a lieutenant with the Bureau of Ordnance, as well as 600 carefully designed explosive charges they planned to use to clear passages through the ice.“*They purchased copies of every book on the arctic they could find for each of the three ships which Chambers and the officers studied when they had time. Each ship also carried a variety of scientific instruments to carry out its own observations. Schley closely supervised the work and met with his officers every morning at 11 for a briefing. Chambers spent most of his time supervising the refitting of the Thetis, working closely with the commandant of the yard, and coordinating the work on all three ships. His organizational skills brought him recognition and a commendation from Schley.*^’ To hurry things along, Schley sent out the ships as they became ready. The Bear left first on

Thursday April 24. As the work neared completion on the Thetis, Schley transferred Chambers to the Alert to speed up its preparations on the 25th. He called him back to the Thetis]ust before it sailed, following a personal inspection by Chandler and other dignitaries. Chambers arrived just minutes before the ship sailed to rousing cheers from '^^illiam A. Kirkland to Bureau of Navigation, New York Branch of National Archives, RG 181, April 14,1884; Schley and Soley, 155. '^Schley to Chambers, Chambers P^wrs, Box I. 81 spectators on shore and on board dozens of ships and small boats in the harbor. In his haste, he forgot his cold weather clothing. In letters to friends Chambers confidently stated that he expected to enjoy his trip to the North Pole. Privately he worried about an expedition he increasingly saw as disorganized and its ships overcrowded. He presumably knew what he was getting into, as his Academy friend Mayo had served on the Yantic during its aborted rescue attempt the previous year.’"" Despite all the repairs, the Thetis’ en^ne shaft broke shortly after departure, and she spent a day under sail while Melville fixed it Lookouts spotted the first iceberg on

May 7, and then three more the following day. The Thetis arrived in S l John’s, Newfoundland, on May 9. Waiting there were the Bear and the Loch Garry, a British steamer leased for the expedition to carry coal for refueling. The U. S. Navy did not have a single vessel suitable for this task. The Loch Garry was an ordinary iron steamer of

1000 tons, entirely unsuited for travel through the arctic ice, though part of its civilian crew of eighteen had experience in the north. The ship’s commander. Captain Robert

Jones, an old, bewhiskered Scot with a weatherbeaten face was an experienced ice navigator. Schley was unable to get insurance for the ship, and he also worried that its civilian crew might have a change of heart and abandon his expedition. To prevent the later and ease coordination with the rest of the squadron, he sent aboard Chambers as supercargo along with two sailors, Carl Nilson and John B. Larson, to keep an eye on things. Captain Jones was subordinated to Chambers, and Chambers would keep a regular watch verifying the ship’s position every day, and helping guide it through the treacherous ice. He would rather have stayed on the Thetis and considered the assignment a “thankless billet”*'” The Thetis and Bear topped off with coal from the Loch Garry. This still left the

Loch Garry with 500 tons of coal to refuel the squadron as needed. Schley ordered Bear ''"chambers Journal 1884-1885, Chambers Papers, Box 42. ''“chambers Journal 1884-1885, Schley and Soley, 153-4; Schley, Report o f the Greely Relief Expedition, 27-28. 82 to press on northward while the Thetis remained in SL John’s to gather supplies and information. He intensively questioned the locals for information on weather conditions to the north and any rumors as to the whereabouts of Greely’s stranded party, but he learned little of use and nothing about Greely. While roimding up supplies. Chambers took the opportunity to procure a new set of cold weather clothing. The expedition also hired several sled dog teams.

The Thetis and Loch Garry left SL John’s at 6 a. m. on May 12, a few days behind the Bear, which maintained its lead. As soon as they cleared the harbor, they were engulfed in a thick fog. The Thetis led. The Loch Garry followed three cable lengths behind. The weather worsened through the day, turning to gale by afternoon. At 5 p. m. lookouts spotted floating blocks of ice, and both ships soon had to skirt the iceberg from which these had detached. The rough weather continued through the morning of May 22 when both ships arrived at the harbor ice of Godhavn. For the first time the crews had to anchor in ice and had some difficulty with this new task. Thereafter, Schley and Chambers required their respective crews to practice this, so that ice anchoring became a quick task, usually accomplished in about three minutes. A new gale packed the harbor with ice before they could leave, delaying them by a day and half. Schley again questioned the local populace, this time hearing of vague rumors indicating white men trapped on the ice, but he obtained no information that would help him locate them.'^^ The Thetis and Loch Garry left at 9 a. m. on the 24th, now bound for Upemivik. Off Hare Island, the Thetis was caught by the ice. The Loch Garry tried to pull her off, but the line snapped and she barely avoided being trapped herself, backing out of danger carefully. Both crews dispatched parties with ice augers and explosives to clear a path.'"° At the North Fiord they hit solid ice. The Thetis rammed in about 50 yards and stayed there for the nighL The Loch Garry remained safely away. The next morning a gale blew

“* ^ b o o k USS Thetis, 1884, NARG 24. York Herald. July 27, 1885,8. 83 up that threatened to drive the Loch Garry into the ice. Schley ordered her back to Godhavn to await a change in the wind, though Chambers signaled his willingness to remain. Meanwhile the Thetis pushed into the ice pack, a slow and dangerous process. The ice was now often ten feet thick and sometimes more than 20 feet thick. The explosives and torpedoes Schley had counted on to hasten his voyage proved ineffective. They only proved useful when ice closed around the ship and threatened to crush it Detonations on the ice then loosened it, keeping the pressure from building and crushing the ship, but not enough to allow the ship to continue its voyage.'** When the weather cleared, the Loch Garry resumed its northward journey, carefully picking its way through the clearing ice, and catching up with the Thetis on the 28th. By now Schley and Chambers had gained considerable experience in navigating these waters. As Schley later argued: “If a commander does not come to grief in the first week or ten days in the ice, he will have learned much that will help him to avoid ice dangers afterward.”'"*® Y et, both recognized that they still had much to learn, and received an opportunity to do so later that day when the Wolfdjo/l the Arctic, two of the many whalers in the area eager to share in the reward money, joined the Thetis and Loch Garry. Repeatedly during the expedition, Schley gathered the whaler captains and his officers on board one of the ships of his squadron so they could learn from their experience. At 8 a. m. the following morning the Arctic and Thetis smashed their way into the ice, the Wby following. The Loch Garry remained in the rear, advancing slowly and cautiously. Not very maneuverable and slower than the whalers, the Loch Garry had great difficulty keeping to the path cleared by the Thetis. Despite the best efforts of Chambers and Jones, the Wby frequently had to turn back and help extricate the Loch Garry. The passage that Schley described as “exciting and anxious” as he watched from the crow’s nest of the Thetis was considerably more so to those on board the ungainly

'^‘Logbook USS Thetis, 1884. NARG 24. ‘■“Schlcy, Forty-Five Tears. 150-151. 84 Loch Garry, which several times only narrowly avoided disaster. Schley spent twenty hours in the crow’s nest guiding his ship while his Navigator below, struggled to plot

their course on outdated charts that sometimes showed them considerably inland. All the ships of Schley’s growing armada arrived off Upemivik on the morning of the 29th. Whalers continued to trickle in, and now eight of them hovered about Schley’s squadron, eager to claim the reward. The Bear was also there, having arrived on the 27th. Emory had tried to press on but managed to travel only eighteen miles north of Upemivik before being blocked by the ice pack. He then tumed his ship back to await the Thetis at Upemivik. The Bear and Thetis set out that evening after recruiting some native guides and dog teams and recoaling from the Loch Garry. They left Chambers in the Loch Garry to await the arrival of the last ship of the expedition, the aging Aiert, the last to depart New York. Schley needed to press ahead and could not be delayed by having to escort the Loch Garry. The ice in Melville Bay was far too dangerous for the Loch Garry to proceed alone, though Chambers and Jones were again willing to make the attempt Even escorted by the Alert, there was a good chance of the Loch Garry foundering, so Schley also ordered Chambers to cache fifty tons of coal for the retum trip of his squadron. While separated. Chambers and Schley communicated intermittently through letters carried by passing whalers.'*” The Alert, under Commander Coffin, reached Upemivik on the 13th, two weeks after Schley had left The Alert, the largest of the ice-capable ships, carried on its deck disassembled sheds and building materials to establish a base camp that a prolonged search would require, and had stopped in Godhavn on June 5th to take on supplies and additional sled dogs. Schley had left orders for the Alert to convoy the Loch Garry north once conditions became favorable. While waiting for the weather to tum warm.

'^Schley and Soley, The Rescue o f Greely, 165-6; Schley, Forty-Five Years, 150-159. '^Logbook USS Thetis, 1884, NARG 24. 85 Chambers transferred coal from the Loch Garry to the Alert, stowing an extra quantity on her deck in case the Loch Garry failed to make it through. Both ships repeatedly exercised their crews in abandoning ship, underscoring the very real possibility that the ungainly LocA Garry and the worn out Alert put themselves at serious risk venturing further north. When he had time. Chambers sketched what he saw-mostly icebergs, though also the ships of the squadron and some natives. They left Upemivik on Jime 19 and soon encountered heavy ice that greatly slowed their passage north. At the Berry Islands all leads through the ice closed, and they anchored in the ice, awaiting an opportunity to renew their advance. Instead, on June 24 a heavy gale sprang up forcing them to cut a dock for the Loch Garry in the ice. It took two hours to cut through four feet of ice and dock both ships. The gale ceased the next day and both ships again worked their way north, passing Cape Shackleton and then the Duck

Islands where they were again stopped by solid ice. The Alert lacked the engine power to aggressively attack the ice as theBear and the Thetis did, and had to constantly double back to help the Loch Garry. Following the Alert as closely and quickly as she could, the Loch Garry was still frequently trapped by rapidly closing ice. The Alert would have to double back and free her. Chambers described the worst day of it in his journal. “We were ramming, pushing, and twisting our way through the ice, sometimes in the midst of it with no open water, sometimes in a narrow lane.. . . the Alert became stuck in the floe. Then the Loch Garry came to the rescue and entered on a ramming campaign with a view of gettingihe Alert out of her imprisonment,” but became stuck herself. They resorted to explosives and with a combination of ramming and blasting forced their way through to the Alert. They attached a hawser to the Alert and tried to pull her out, but it would not hold. They finally freed the Alert through a combination of ramming and blasting with explosives. The two ships managed to advance a paltry eight miles on the 26th and eight more on the 27th, but then slowed even more by thickening ice until they were finally

86 stopped and then trapped in the ice to await either better weather or rescue by the returning ships of the expedition. Still, the Alert and Loch Garry had made it farther north than Schley had expected.

While Chambers waited for the Alert and the two ships slowly clawed their way north, the Thetis and Bear completed the objective of the expedition. Moving through ice together taking turns leading, they helped extract one another when ice closed in. They spent several days and nights trapped in ice, and repeatedly came close to being trapped and crushed by rapidly closing ice, but managed to continue moving north. On June 21 they reached Littleton Island. Finding the supplies cached by the Neptune undisturbed, they knew Greely had to be further north. They pressed on the following day, discovering a cairn marking a deposit of Greely's records with a message that he and his party were on Cape Sabine. The last of these papers was dated October 21, 1883 and indicated Greely’s force had only 40 days of rations left Greely’s party had made camp near the wreck of \he Proteus, salvaging what they could. Lieutenant J. C. Colwell and a search party from the Bear found what remained of Greely’s party the following day, huddled in a collapsed tent, weak, and starving. Greely had shot one of his men for stealing food, and the survivors had clearly resorted to cannibalism in order to survive. Of the original party of twenty-seven, only Greely and six of his men had survived, one of whom died on the voyage home.*"*’

The Vovage Home

Returning south, Schley found the Alert and Loch Garry trapped in the ice on the afternoon of the 30th and broke them free. United for the first time, the four ships moved south, the Thetis leading, the Loch Garry second, and the other two ships following

'"“chambers Joutnal, 1884; Schley, o f the Greely Relief Ejqxdition, 72. '"*’Gieely’s account of the expedition skipped over the more gruesome details of their struggle to survive. Adolphus W. Greely, Three Years o fArctic Service: An Account o f the Lady Franklin Bay Expedition o f 1881-84 and the Attainment o f the Farthest North (New York Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1886). 87 behind ready to assist if necessary. All the ships had been seriously battered by the ice and weather and were leaking. At a conference on board the Thetis, Emory admitted he had five feet of water in the Bear’s hold. The ship was leaking so badly he questioned whether he could get her home.** The other three ships were not much better off. Instead of the ice pack, now niunerous ice bergs blocked their passage. Dense fog reduced their speed to only two knots and later to only one and half knots. The ships navigated between ice bergs almost blind, constantly sounding their whistles to avoid running in to each other. The Loch Garry was trapped in a floe on July 1 at 8 p. m. and had to freed by the fi^ar. Near the Duck Islands Hor Alert and Loch Garry were trapped again by rapidly closing ice. The Thetis and Bear had to double back and break them out. The squadron reached a large ice floe early the next morning and anchored to it, to rest their exhausted crews. The fog cleared at 4 p. m., and they resumed their course south, the Thetis and Bear now sharing the lead. They reached the Berry Islands on July 2 and entered the dangerous waters to their south, strewn with rocks and numerous hidden obstacles. The thick ice jammed in against the coast, forced the squadron to take a narrow passage through rock-strewn shallows. There, theBear hit a submerged rock and became stuck. It took two hours for the Alert and Thetis to pull her off. After clearing these dangerous waters, Schley sent the Alert and Loch Garry to Disko, while the Bear and Thetis left for Upemivik to take on supplies and return the dog teams and native guides, following which they would join them at Disko. The Loch

Garry and Alert arrived at Disko the next day. Both crews began repairs, further patching their damaged hulls. The Alert’s engines were now badly worn and barely functioning. Chambers and Coffin had their crews transfer the huts and building materials for the now-uimeeded base camp and other supplies to the Loch Garry, to lighten the load on the

Alert’s overstrained engines. The Thetis and Bear arrived in Disko on the 5th and recoaled from the Loch '“ Gleaves, Emory. 66. 88 Garry. Repairs on the Alert took four more days, so the squadron did not leave Godhavn until the 9th. Still, the Alert’s engines were barely functioning and she soon had to been taken in tow by the Loch Garry. Several times the steel towing line parted, forcing Chambers “to send her the end of a hemp hawser, and on two other occasions to obtain from her the end of our broken hawser, the ships meanwhile towing by the remaining hawser.” While it did not prove necessary. Chambers investigated the possibility of transferring coal from the Loch Garry to the Alert while underway. He was convinced “that, with the proper towing arrangement and without other facilities than those which could have been improvised on board, I could have transferred, without much difficulty, our whole cargo of coal, which was stowed in bags of 100 lbs. each.”‘®‘ On the 15th the squadron ran into a heavy gale, forcing the Loch Garry to drop the tow line to the Alert. The storm continued for several hours and was followed by heavy fog. Schley ordered the squadron to drop speed to only two knots, but \he Alert could not keep up and soon disappeared from sight The Thetis, Bear, and Loch Garry arrived in S t John’s on the 17th. The Alert straggled in the following day to find a celebration already in progress. The party moved to the Alert which had the most space for it There followed a grand reception the following day for local dignitaries, but none of the survivors of Greely's party were well enough to take part One of them had died during the voyage. Schley sent \heLoch Garry home on the 21st with Greely’s records, his preliminary report and three bags of mail from the squadron. They sailed through bad weather the entire way, arriving in New York harbor at 5 p. m. on the 26th, empty of coal and high in the water. The Loch Garry had been severely damaged by her arctic adventures and was leaking from numerous places. Sixteen of her plates were buckled and severely damaged. Six others had cracked under the strain. The main timbers all showed serious damage and cracking and several of the frame timbers were coming '^'chambers, 'Ttecooslmcdon and Increase of the Navy” Discussion, USNIP 11 (1885), 74. 89 apait*^-' If Chambers expected a great fanfare as the first of the relief expedition to return, he was disappointed. Th&Loch Garry passed the torpedo boat Alarm and the monitor Passaic without being recognized. When the Alarm ran aground a few minutes later. Chambers gleefully turned the Loch Garry about and offered to pull her off, signalling “we’ re in the relief squadron yet” The joke was apparently lost on the crew of the Alarm}^

The press, though, had been tipped off, and were waiting after \3n&Loch Garry had docked. Chambers had enjoyed his first command and the mixed crew had functioned well together. Still, the voyage had been arduous, and Chambers showed the strain. Several of the journalists interviewing him estimated his age as about “40 years old” rather than his actual age of 28. His face was seriously sunburned, his nose swollen and peeling. Still they described him as “tall and well built with a pleasant countenance.” When asked the usual cliché as to his happiness at arriving home, the exhausted Chambers snapped back, “We’re back and 1 can’t say 1’ m sorry for it” He quickly relaxed, though, and entertained the reporters with vivid descriptions of arctic beauty and danger. He complimented Schley’s leadership and praised the bravery of his crew and the other members of the expedition.'^ After seeing to \3a&Loch Garry, Chambers rushed north to rejoin the squadron at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, leaving behind a dog he had picked up somewhere in the Arctic and named Bear. The squadron had left S t Johns on the 26th, and made good time but deliberately waited to arrive in Portsmouth just before the planned welcoming ceremony by Acting-Rear Admiral Luce and the . Chambers rejoined the Thetis on August 1 on its arrival at Portsmouth. The following day, the officers of the expedition were received on board Luce’s flagship, the Tennessee, by '^-New York Herald, July 27,1885,8. 'Unknown newspaper clippings. Chambers Papers, Box 42. 'Unknown newspaper clippings. Chambers Papers, Box 42. 90 Luce, Chandler, and General Hazen. There followed three days of celebration and receptions with various dignitaries and the press. All of it was carefully staged by Chandler. The squadron sailed for New York on the 5th and arrived on the 8th. President Arthur personally welcomed them back at a reception that night. The ships were docked for repairs and their crews slowly dispersed to their previous assignments over the next month. Chambers returned to the Office of Naval Intelligence in October, but was soon off on another special assignment Schley was rewarded by his appointment as Chief of the Bureau of Equipment and Repair.

Conclusion

Throughout the months of the Greely Relief Expedition’s preparation and voyage, newspapers published a barrage of articles critical of the sad state of the Navy. After Greely’s return, tales of his adventures filled newspapers for weeks. Many of these were accompanied by editorials calling for a larger or at least more modem Navy. Much of this was carefully orchestrated by Chandler and other Navy officials including Chambers’ friends at the Office of Naval Intelligence, who deluged the press with statistics and data.‘“

The success of the relief expedition exonerated the Navy, but not the Army. Press coverage of the Army’s role in Greely’s expedition remained harsh. The press wanted a scapegoat for the Greely disaster and eventually settled on General Hazen, the man who had sent Greely north with such strange orders. Hazen’s efforts to blame Garlington and other subordinates while exonerating himself in the series of internal investigations and court martials that followed made him appear even more guilty.'^ Certainly the success of the relief expedition allowed the Navy to tamish the ‘“ Richard S. West, h.,Admirals o f American Empire (NY: Bobb-Merrill, 1948), 113. '^ la rit Russell Shulman, Æavo/wn and the Emergence o f American Sea Power (Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 1995), 32,52-4. The adventures of the relief expedition made repeatedly made the front pages of the major newspapers. '^New York Times. December 19,1884,4; December 20, 1884,4; Aprü 18,1885,4; April 20, 1885.4. 91 reputation of the Army,*^ but much more was at stake than bureaucratic infighting. The reform-minded Navy officers wanted more than just an increase in naval spending. The success of the Greely Relief Expedition wiped the taint of the failed Jeannette expedition from the Navy, displayed the talents of a new generation of officers, and offered proof not just of the Navy* s need for new ships, but also that its officers were ready and capable of commanding them and sailing them into the most dangerous waters of the planet It proved that naval officers, especially the younger generation were far from the drunks and misfits whose misadventures had been chronicled in the press through the 1870s. Chandler paraded the officers of the expedition before the press as examples of the officers who would lead the New Navy—brave, resourceful, and technically competent Officers who, as Schley proclaimed, could be “trusted in all emergencies to fulfill the expectation of our beloved people.’”**

Schley was very happy with Chambers’ performance. In fact Chambers was one of the few officers he singled out for special praise in his published report “I am glad to say that he [Chambers] was always most interested and efficient; his judgement and ability were most conspicuous, and to him and to his advice the safety of theLoc/i Garry was mainly due. He enjoyed my highest confidence for his officer-like management of delicate duties.”**" The following year when Chambers was up for promotion, Schley, then Chief of the Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting wrote the new Secretary of the Navy William C. Whitney, commending Chambers, stating that “it was due to his competency and professional skill that she [the Loch Garry] was conducted in safety through several hundreds of miles of ice. 1 regard Chambers as one of the most efficient and competent officers of the Navy.”***

*^*Vfaik Russdl Shulman in particular emphasizes this point Shulman, Mzva/ûm and the Emergence of American Sea Power (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 52-55. ‘"*Wiliam A. McGinley, Reception ofLt. A.W. Greely and His Comrades and o f the Arctic Relief Expedition at Portsmouth. NH on August 1 and 4,1884 (Washingtmi: GPO, 1884), 45. '*°SfMey, Report o f the Greely Relief Expedition, 73. “’‘Schley to Whitney, December 19,1885, Chambers Papers, Box 1. 92 Regardless of the success of Schley’s rescue, the whole affair showed the problems of military-run scientific missions. Science seemed to take a backseat to heroics and attempts at record-setting. The notes of the expedition and the samples it had gathered (recovered by later explorers) were of limited value. Many samples were improperly stored, and spoiled. Even before Greely set out for the arctic, civilian scientists were increasingly pushing the military out of primary research. For instance in 1879 the Interior Department took control of the United States Geological Survey from the Army. The year after the return of the Greely Relief Expedition, the Department of Agriculture assumed control of the Army meteorological program. The Navy was under similar pressure to turn its scientific research over to civilian agencies. The Army and Navy fought back against these bureaucratic interlopers, but increasingly both services reduced the priority of these missions as they concentrated on what their officers, like

Chambers, increasingly saw as their primary mission—the preparation for and the fighting of wars. The increasing professionalization of the officer corps decreased military participation in scientific research.'" This was, however, a slow process, and both services remained interested in exploration, or at least the favorable media attention it garnered. The Navy in particular maintained an interest in polar exploration. Aside from Chambers and Schley, there was one other person for whom the Greely Relief Expedition had particular importance, a man Chambers would soon meet Robert Edwin Peary, a Navy civil engineer, had closely followed Greely* s adventures and the voyage of the relief expedition. It proved his inspiration, and he became obsessed with Polar exploration. From 1885 he “single- mindedly planned a rendezvous with the top of the world.”'" On April 6,1909,

Commander Peary succeeded where so many others had failed in reaching the North Pole. "clarence G. Lasby, "Science and the Military” in David D. Van Tassel and \fichael G. Hall (eds.). Science and Society in the United States (Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press, 1966), 256-258. '"Goetzmann, New Lands, New Men, 445. 93 94 CHAPTER 4

THE NICARAGUAN SURVEY

The United States and the Isthmus of Panama The United States had a long interest in the Caribbean and the construction of a canal through the Isthmus of Panama. Over the years entrepreneurs and engineers had put forward many proposals for a canal over many different routes. Most authorities, though, agreed that Panama and Nicaragua offered the most practical routes for a canal. The debate over their relative advantages and disadvantages raged throughout the last decades of the nineteenth century. Both routes had much to recommend them, but both also presented engineers with considerable difficulties. Interest between the two waxed and waned through the last decades of the nineteenth century, influenced as much by the politics of the region as by engineering difficulties. In general, American commentators and policy-makers favored the Nicaraguan route, while Europeans preferred a route through Panama. Inability’ to settle on a location and design for a canal left the door open for a constant barrage of new proposals and crackpot schemes to link the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The most popular of these in the United States was the Eads ship railway. Rads argued against digging a canal at all. Instead he wanted to build a huge railroad across the isthmus. Ships would be hoisted out of the water at one coast, placed on flatbed cars, transported across the isthmus, and then hoisted back into the water to continue their voyage from the opposite coast This system had been used with canal boats, but never on the scale Eads suggested. Proposals for canal construction actually predate the Civil War. Navalists, such as

95 Navy Lieutenant Robert Shufeldt, envisioned an isthmian canal as the linchpin in a globe-spanning network of commercial and naval interests. It was not until after Civil War, though, that canal advocates began to gamer public support for their efforts. It was a very slow process, hindered by the success of the transcontinental railroad, which many thought would be a suHlcient commercial link between and east and west coasts. Shufeldf s vision was shared by Secretary of State Seward who on June 21,1867 acquired transit rights across Nicaragua and an agreement for the construction of a canal across the isthmus. As with his other acquisitive diplomatic efforts in Central America and the Caribbean, Seward had greatly outpaced public opinion and nothing came of it.'^ A growing number of naval officers came to champion canal construction in the 1870s. The most vocal of these was Admiral Daniel Ammen, who emerged as the leader of this group. He repeatedly pushed for expeditions to survey possible routes, and eventually convinced the Navy to send out several surveying expeditions.‘“ Shufeldt, who had returned to the Navy during the Civil War, led the first of these expeditions and surveyed a route across Tehuantepec, Mexico, in 1870-1. He continued to lobby for its acceptance in preference to the Nicaraguan route throughout the early 1870s, but eventually came to prefer the Nicaraguan route.‘“ Commander Thomas O. Selfridge led a large survey that investigated a number of the possible routes through Nicaragua in 1871-2,'®’ but the rainy season brought his operations to an early halt in July. In December 1872, Commander Edward P. Lull, aided by Chief Civil Engineer Aniceto G. Menocal returned to finish the work. The abundant "“Frederick C Drake, The Empire o f the Seas: A Biography o f Rear Admiral Robert Wilson Shufeldt, USN (: University of Press, 1984), 147-155; Jackson Crowell, ‘The United States and a Central American Canal, 1869-1877,” Hispanic-American Historical Review A9 (1969), 27-52. '^Ammen wrote many articles justifying canal construction including: ‘Inler-oceanic ship-canal Across the American Isthmus,” American Geographical Society Bulletin No. 3 (1878), 142-162; The American Inter-oceanic Ship Canal Question (Philadelphia: L R. Hamersly & Co.. 1880); and “Amoican Isthm ian Canal Routes,” Franklin Institute Journal 128, no. 6 (December 1889), -109-439. ‘“ Drake, The Empire o f the Seas, 35,135-141,151-152,396-97. Thomas O. Sdfridge, What Finer Tradition: The Memoirs o f Thomas O. Selfridge. Jr., Rear Admiral, C/SAffCcdumbia: University of South Carolina Press. 1987), 255; Survey o f the Darien Canal Routes, House .Vfiscellaneous Document 113,42d Congress, 3rd session. 96 waters of Lake Nicaragua would aid the construction and operation of any canal through Nicaragua, but Lull and Menocal had difficulty finding a route that avoided the unstable soil common to the area and also the nine active or potentially active nearby volcanoes. Menocal spent most of 1873 there and returned again in a privately financed expedition in 1874-5.'“

Lull continued to gather data on the possible routes and submitted his report to the Interoceanic Canal Commission in 1876. Both Lull and Menocal strongly favored a Nicaraguan route and won the Commission over. It unanimously decided that “the route known as the ‘Nicaragua route’ . . . possesses, both for the construction and maintenance of a canal, greater advantages, and offers fewer difficulties from engineering, commercial, and economic points of view, than any one of the routes.Most naval officers joined Menocal and Lull in supporting the Nicaraguan route. The United States was hardly alone in its interest in a canal. Various European companies and nations also initiated negotiations with the governments of Nicaragua and Columbia for canal concessions. The whole process was complicated by the unstable politics of the region and especially by the machinations of the dictator of , Jus to Rufino Barrios, who hoped to unite Central America under his rule. He repeatedly intrigued to gain foreign support for his expansionist dream, offering canal concessions in return.'™ In 1878 a group of French investors led by Ferdinand de Lesseps, the designer of the , received a concession from Columbia to build a canal through Panama. De Lesseps called a conference that met in Paris the following year under the auspices of the Geographic Society of France. Its avowed purpose was to discuss the possible routes

‘“ Gerstie Mack, The Land Divided: A History o f the and Other Isthmian Canal Projects (New Y(wk: Alfred A. Knopf. 1944), 210-11. '^Senate Executive Document 15,46th Congress, 1st Session, 1-2, quoted in Mack, 213; Lull’s final report is The Nicaragua Canal, Senate Executive Document 57,43rd Congress, 1st Session. Fred Rippy, “Justo Rufino Barrios and the Nicaraguan Caoaj,"Hispanic American Historical Review 13,190-197. 97 for a canal and their respective difficulties. De Lesseps real purpose was simply to gain international approval of his planned canal through Panama and to begin his fund-raising efforts. The Society invited all who were interested in canal construction to attend, and most of the developed nations sent delegations. At the conference the American delegation, led by Ammen and Menocal, obstinately argued for the Nicaraguan route. Not surprisingly, the votes went against them, and the conference issued a report in favor of a sea-level canal through Panama along de Lesseps’ proposed route. Immediately afterward, de Lesseps organized a construction company and left for Panama to begin work.

De Lesseps’ progress failed to discourage the Nicaraguan enthusiasts. After the Paris conference, Ammen retired from the Navy to pursue canal-building full-time, and incite American concern over the issue. Many Americans feared a European-built canal, believing it would become a base not Just for European commercial interests, but also renewed imperialism. As one member of Congress later warned, “what Europe digs with the spade she will maintain with the sword.” Shufeldt had warned against this risk in 1874, arguing that it should not be the policy of the United States to allow the construction of a canal that would “throw the commerce of the Pacific into the hands of England” or another European power‘d’ It was a sentiment echoed by many other naval officers. Ammen and several messmates, argued that even if de Lesseps’ did manage to build a canal—something that was far from certain—the United States would still have to build a canal of its own for security reasons and to prevent a French embargo of its commerce. Following the Paris Conference, even President Rutherford B. Hayes seemed convinced of the urgency of the situation. In a message to Congress he strongly objected to the construction of a

European-owned canal as a violation of the . He further argued that “the

'^'Representative Finerty, March 1,1884, Congressional Record, 48th Congress, 1st Session, 1534; Shufeldt to the editor of Use Nautical Gazette, 1874, quoted in Drake, 152. 98 policy of this country is a canal under American control. The United States cannot consent to the surrender of this control to any European power or to any combinations of European powers."'^ Most in Congress, however, did not share these concerns, though

Hayes’ speech did spur the American canal advocates to redouble their efforts. Late in 1879, Ammen and Menocal attracted a group of investors to their cause, including former General George B. McClellan, , and Levi P. Morton. Together they organized the Provisional Interoceanic Canal Society (PICS). Ammen and Menocal were its visionaries and driving leaders. They invited former President Grant to join, and he did. The shareholders elected Phelps the corporation’s president and placed him in charge of their fund-raising efforts. Meanwhile, Menocal returned to Nicaragua to gain its approval for construction. The Nicaraguan Congress confirmed an agreement with him on May 22,1880. Menocal brought back a 99 year concession to date from the opening of the canal. At the end of the 99 years, the canal would revert to Nicaraguan control. Menocal was allowed two years for surveys and an additional year for planning before he commenced work. If work did not begin within three years, Nicaragua would withdraw the concession and look for other takers.'^ On Menocal’s successful return, the PICS reorganized as the Maritime Canal Company of Nicaragua, and began fund-raising efforts in eamesL The new company also began aggressively lobbying for funds and support from Congress. On December 15, 1881, Senator John F. Miller of introduced a bill providing political and financial guarantees to the canal company. It was bounced in and out of several committees for the next two years. Ammen, Menocal, and their supporters lobbied for it furiously. In April 1883 Lieutenant John T. Sullivan submitted yet another lengthy report to the Senate describing the advantages of the Nicaraguan route, and glossing over its four major defects: great length, the necessity of locks, the lack of natural harbors, and ‘^Quoted in , The History o f the Monroe Doctrine, (Boston: Little Brown, 1963), 163. '^^enocal, Discussion upon inter-oceanic canal projects,” Amgncnn Society o f Civil Engineers Transactions 9 (November 1880): 429-446 99 the threat of volcanic devastation. Other naval officers weighed in as well. The bill finally failed by a narrow margin in a vote before the full Senate in 1884. Key to its defeat were the ongoing lobbying efforts of both de Lesseps, who did not want competition, and Eads who was still trying to raise funds to build his ship railway across Tehuantepec. Several Congressmen were also influenced by the restrictions of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty with Great Britain, which guaranteed the neutrality of any canal through the isthmus, requiring it to be open to all even in the event of war. Why, asked several Congressmen, build a canal if the United States would not be able to take advantage of it?*’"* The Maritime Canal Company’s other fund-raising efforts had also met with little success. By 1884 the company faced bankruptcy as the time limit on its concession approached. With the failure of Congressional support. Grant and McClellan exerted their influence to organize private financial backing under the direction of the Grant and Ward banking firm of which Grant was a partner. Unfortunately, that bank collapsed in 1884. Grant, who died a year later of throat cancer, was too ill to help, and the company’s

fund-raising efforts collapsed along with the aging general’s health. On September 30, 1884, the Maritime Canal Company lost its concession due to failure to begin construction. Still, the Maritime Canal Company had friends in high places. Chester A. Arthur" s administration, which strongly supported naval modernization, came to its rescue early in 1884. Secretary of State Frederick T. Frelinghuysen instructed the United States minister to Central America, Henry C. Hall, to negotiate a new canal treaty with Nicaragua. The two nations concluded an agreement after negotiations that lasted almost the entire year. The Nicaraguan Congress quickly ratified the agreement This agreement, the Frelinghuysen-Zavala Treaty, was much more favorable to Nicaragua than the one it

replaced. It gave Nicaragua joint ownership of the canal and one third of the profits. Barrios proved useful to the United States in these negotiations, though not as he ™Mack, The Land Divided, 214. 100 intended. The Nicaraguans proved more afraid of his ambitions than those of the United States and saw the canal as a guarantee of a U. S. presence in the region that would offset Barrios’ plans for expansion.*’® President Arthui sent a strong message to the Senate supporting the treaty, arguing that it would open up Asian markets to American industrial and agricultural products.*’* Rve days later Secretary of the Navy Chandler, who expected the ratification of the agreement, ordered Menocal to re-survey the eastern portion of the proposed route. Menocal had already re-surveyed the short western section of the route that would connect Lake Nicaragua to the Pacific in 1880. Chandler and Menocal hoped to improve on the route surveyed by Lull in 1872 and 1873 and reduce construction costs. The failure of private financing meant the government would have to pay for canal construction, and in dealing with the penurious Congress of the 1880s every dollar saved could make the difference between ratification and failure.

The Surveying Expedition The Navy assigned three officers to help Menocal: Civil Engineer Robert E. Peary, Ensign Washington Irving Chambers, and Passed Assistant Surgeon John F. Bransford. Bransford was there to ensure the health of the expedition in an exceptionally unhealthy part of the world. Menocal, Peary, and Chambers would carry out the work of the survey along with locally-hired labor. Peary was Menocal’s protege. Like many engineers in the Navy, he had not attended the Naval Academy. He instead graduated from a civilian engineering school. He passed the exam for a Navy civil engineer and was commissioned in October 1881. Menocal, who was then in charge of the Bureau of Y aids and Docks, was part of Peary" s examining board. Impressed by Peary’s performance, he made him his assistant The two *^^ppy, “Justo Rufino Banios and the Nicaraguan Canal,” 195-197. ' *James D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers o f the Presidents, 1789-1897 (Washington: GPO, 1899), 8: 257-258. 101 men worked well together, and Menocal continued to guide his career, arranging choice assigiunents for him. He would be the expedition’s pioneer and chief explorer.*^ Chambers’ appointment to the expedition seems a result of his intelligence work, knowledge of the area, fluency in Spanish, his excellent reputation following the Greely Relief Expedition, and his many coimections with reform-minded officers. In Chambers the expedition received not just an experienced explorer and a competent engineer, but a publicist as well. Chambers had already emerged as an ardent spokesman for reform and would win the Naval Institute’s Prize Essay contest the year the expedition sailed with an essay that pointed out the necessity of a canal. Menocal could be certain that Chambers would support him politically. Chandler himself may well have recommended Chambers.

They had met in the celebrations following the return of the Greely Relief Expedition and Chandler may have read some of his intelligence reports. Regardless, Chambers received confidential instructions from Chandler. During and after the immediately after the expedition Chambers sent separate reports back to him reporting on their progress and also on that of de Lesseps.’’* Chambers, Peary, and Menocal left New York on December 20, 1884, on board the mail steamer Colon. They traveled first to Aspinwall and then crossed the isthmus on the Panama Railroad Just as Chambers had on his way to his first assignment a dozen years before. A delay in transporting their supplies over the railroad gave them time to visit de Lesseps’ construction site, and they spent two days there inspecting his work. Over the previous few years several American naval officers had visited de Lesseps to monitor his progress—all part of the coordinated intelligence effort managed by the Office of Naval Intelligence. Chambers’ friend Raymond Rodgers had stopped by the previous year and reported that he expected de Lesseps’ to succeed. Most observers were not as optimistic. Shufeldt, who kept abreast of de Lesseps’ progress through a variety of ‘^William H. Hobbs, feary (NY: MacMillan, 1936). '^Chambers to Chandler, January 9,1885, Chandler Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division; Chambers Journal. 1884-1885, Chambers Papers. Box 42. 102 sources, expected him to (ail. So too did Chambers who reported back to Chandler that de Lesseps’ work was plagued with problems and going much slower than expected. Disease whittled away at the work force. Corruption was rampant with “large contracts given only to those who are in league with the Canal Officials to divide the spoils.” Workers dumped excavated soil wherever it was convenient, even if this meant later rains would wash it back into the cuts. Chambers estimated that de Lesseps had completed only five percent of the work on the canal. At that rate it would take him another eighteen years to finish. Lieutenant William W. Kimball made detailed survey of the Panama route later that year and came to similar conclusions. De Lesseps was in trouble. Clearly there was still time for the United States to complete a canal of its own first‘s From Panama the expedition then sailed north to Nicaragua on board the U. S. S. LacAwwamt,arriving in Corinto on January 7, 1885. From there they traveled inland and hired a private steamer to explore Lake Managua. They stopped in Managua to pay their respects to President Cardenas and other government officials. Cardenas assured them that he was eager for construction to begin and would help their expedition any way he could. They left after a visit of a few days, continuing on into the interior, and arriving at Grenada on January 13. There, they hired local guides and porters, and two cooks. Bransford, who had traveled separately, joined them there. Fifteen members in all, the group left Grenada traveling by steamer across Lake Nicaragua. For several days, an erupting volcano was cleariy visible on the horizon. After numerous delays, the expedition finally reached its jumping off point at the confluence of the Rio San Juan and the Sarapiqui River on January 22 and set up camp.'"' Menocal had planned that he and Peary would to do the bulk of the surveying while Chambers would be in charge of the camp and handle all the logistical details, but "^Kenneth Hagan, Amencon Gunboal Diplomacy and the Old Navy, 1877-1889 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1973), 156-157; Chambers to Chandler, October 15,1884, and Chandler to Chambers, December 15, 1884, Chandler Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division; ‘Reports of Naval Officers on Panam a Canal,” Senate Executive Document 123,48th Ccmgress, 1st Session. ""Chambers Journal, 1885, Chambers Papers, Box 42. 103 Menocal had overestimated his health and stamina. He soon began to have problems in the harsh climate. Chambers “with uniform kindness,” repeatedly offered to relive Menocal “of the hardest part of the work, by running either the transit or the level... over the most difficult part of the route.” At first Menocal refused, but the sheer quantity of the work as well as his increasing health problems and the numerous “painful indispositions” he later complained of, forced him to rely increasingly on Chambers. By the last month of the expedition, Menocal routinely remained in camp and coordinated the efforts of detached parties under Chambers and Peary. Chambers also took the expeditions many photographs, having learned about photography during his brief time at the Office of Naval Intelligence.**’

Several engineers had proposed building a dam at the junction of the San Juan and Sarapiqui Rivers to raise the level of the San Juan, essentially turning it into an extension of Lake Nicaragua This would considerably shorten the length of the proposed canal. Peary and Menocal explored the area testing the soil and seeking a site for the dam while Chambers paddled up the river in a canoe to survey it and check its depth. After three days of careful study they determined that constructing a dam there was unfeasible. This forced them to investigate the more difficult option—digging the canal through the San Francisco River valley.*” The following day the expedition packed up and hiked to the entrance of the valley near Greytown. There, they established their new camp, which they named Camp Chandler, on January 27 and commemorated the event with wine given them by President Cardenas. The area was almost untouched by people. Even rubber hunters had not entered the valley. The hilly terrain was covered throughout by dense jungle. The lower elevations were all swamp thickly inhabited by mosquitoes and snakes. The dense vegetation required continuous use of their machetes to open trails. It was impossible to Report o f the U. S. Nicaragua Surveying Party, 1885, Senate Executive Document 99,49th Congress, 1st session, 20. '^Report o f the U. S. Nicaragua Surveying Party, 1885, 1-14. 104 advance even a few feet without their use. It rained constantly, and the explorers were often up to their waists in water and mud as they stumbled forward over uncertain and shifting ground. Some of the vegetation they hacked their way through was highly toxic and splattered caustic fluids in all directions when cut. One worker was blinded in one eye, and skin irritations became common. Day after the day the expedition slowly worked its way up each of the San Francisco’s many tributaries. The work took much longer than expected, slowed, as Chambers wrote, by “many privations, hardships and copious rains.” Once they broke their only axe and had only their hatchets and machetes to clear the dense growth until it could be replaced.'” Their porters were quickly exhausted by the hard work, and injuries mounted as the survey dragged on. On February 4 one of their porters spotted a small boat passing by on the river. He demanded his pay from Menocal, and upon getting it ran off to catch the boat for a ride back to civilization. Two days later. Chambers shot and killed an enormous iguana that measured six feet from nose to tail. It provided a welcome break from their stale rations for those willing to try it Chambers continued to hunt to supplement their food supply for the rest of the expedition. It soon became obvious that Chambers was not the only hunter in the area. A jaguar trailed the party, and raided its food at nighL Chambers and Peary repeatedly tried to track the cat down, but it easily eluded them in the dense jungle."” When it became obvious that they would not finish the survey within their allotted time, Menocal traveled back to the nearest telegraph station and wired home for permission to remain in the field another month. Menocal took with him about half their force of local labor who had been worn out by the heavy woric of the expedition. After receiving the Navy’s affirmative reply, he arranged for additional provisions to be sent ^Chambers, ‘Notes on the Mcaiagua Ship Canal, as Relocated and Revised by the U. S. Surveying Expedition of 1855,” USNIP 11 (1885), 807-808; Menocal to Chambers, February 28,1885 and April 13, 1885, Chambers Papers, Box 1; John Edward Weems, Peary the Explorer and the Man (^osUm: Houghton Vfifllin, 1967), 50-55; Chambers Journal, February 11,1885. "‘^Chambers Journal, February 6-24,1885. 105 down the river, hired additional porters, and then hiked back to Camp Chandler. Chambers and Peary meanwhile continued the slow work of surv eying the valley, advancing only a few miles a day. The increasingly dense vegetation hampered their work, and they frequently had to climb trees to get their bearings. Menocal had considering bringing a balloon with the expedition, thinking it would allow them to take sightings from above the jungle’s canopy. Fortunately he discarded the idea as a balloon would not have long survived in the dense jungle. Chambers and, especially, Peary were frequently far from camp with little in the way of supplies. Often they bedded down with little more than palm leaves for shelter and rubber blankets for beds. Chambers repeatedly relocated their base camp as they advanced deeper into the valley, moving by foot and in canoes that could barely hold their 800 pounds of equipment In relocating the camp, “the heaviest part of the work fell mainly upon Mr. Chambers. This officer had not only the immediate supervision of the arduous work of overcoming the obstructions, but would, in his zeal, jump into the water when serious obstacles were met with, and by his own personal efforts assist in removing the logs blocking the way, or in lifting canoes bodily over them.” Chambers, who now spoke Spanish fluently, worked well with the hired men and continually inspired them to greater efforts “by word and personal exertions.” Unfortunately, Menocal frequently lost his temper with them, provoking several of them to demand their pay and quit As the expedition dragged on, Menocal again had to return to Grenada to hire fresh men.‘“ The expedition finally completed its work and started its journey home on April 26, retracing its steps back to Grenada and then Corinto. Amazingly not a single member of the party came down ill during their three months in the jungle. On the way back to the United States, they again stopped in Panama to check on de Lessep’s progress. This time they spent six days there, inspecting the work and sharing their experiences with some of

^'^Report o f the U. S. Nicaragua Surveying Party. 1885, Senate Executive Document 99,49th Congress. 1st session, 12,14-21; Chambers Journal, March 29,1885. 106 de Lessep’s workers. They arrived back in New York on June 2, and after a short leave, returned to their previous assignments. On July 17 Menocal summoned Peary and Chambers to his office at the Washington Navy Yard. There, they spent the next three

months preparing the maps and writing the final report of their expedition and their proposed canal route. This project also took longer than expected, but they managed to finish by October 15 when Chambers’ friend Rodgers, the new head of the Office of

Naval Intelligence, Insisted he had to have Chambers back. Between the Greely Relief Expedition and the Nicaraguan survey. Chambers had been gone for a year. The Office of Naval Intelligence, perennially short of good officers, needed him back.‘“ Menocal’s new route reduced the total length of a prospective canal by eleven and a half miles and reduced the amount of excavation required by more than 20 miles. It reduced the cost of a canal to Just under $50 million, a savings of almost $ 17 million. Their report concluded that a canal through Nicaragua was practicable, free from serious engineering difficulties, and “the most economical, convenient and safe route for interoceanic ship communication between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.”'** Menocal was effusive in his praise of both Chambers and Peary and their “untiring energy and perseverance.” He credited them with making the expedition a

success, in addition to “important services rendered in connection with the field work,” Chambers proved invaluable in the “onerous duties of executive in the camp organization.” Without him, the expedition might well have failed. Certainly Menocal would have been in the field much longer. Both Chambers and Peary continued to press

for reform and seek assignments that put them in the front rank of naval modernizers and technologically sophisticated officers.'**

"^Chambers, ‘Notes on the Nicaragua Ship Canal,” 809-814; R. P. Rodgers to Menocal, October 2,1885, Chambers Papers, Box 1. IK 7 Report o f the U. S. Nicaragua Surveying Party. 40. I» Report o f the U. S. Nicaragua Surveying Partv.40-\. 107 The Canal Issue in the 1880s and 1890s While the expedition had sweated through the Nicaraguan jungle. Congress had done nothing. It had yet even to approve the Freiinghuysen-Zavala Treaty. The departure of the expedition reinvigorated the canal advocates who again pressed Congress fut ratification of the treaty and fluids for canal building. In the Senate Thomas F. Bayard led Democrats in blocking its ratification. While the nominal issue was the abrogation of the

Clayton-Bulwer treaty, the failure of ratification had Just as much to do with the party politics of the 1880s. In the 1880s close elections and constant changes in control of the executive and legislative branches destroyed the possibility of compromise between the two parties who sought every advantage for the next election. This same inability of the two parties to work together had blocked funds for new warship construction in 1884 despite the fact that majorities in both parties favored rehabilitation of the Navy and new construction. Now it doomed the Frelinghuysen-Zavala Treaty. The incoming administration of Grover opposed the treaty, and Cleveland soon withdrew the unratified agreement from Senate consideration. In rejecting the treaty, Cleveland claimed that any future canal should be a “trust for mankind” to be “removed from the chance domination of a single power.” Calling on Washington's farewell address, he stated that its construction, ownership and defense were “beyond the scope of our national polity or present means.”**’ Menocal and his friends remained undaunted by this setback. Despite Cleveland’s speech, circumstances certainly pointed to an increasing interest by the United States in

the region. In April 1885 while Chambers, Menocal, and Peary were exploring Nicaragua, rebels in Panama attacked Colombian forces, shut down the isthmian railway, and seized several ships and other property belonging to Americans. Cleveland rushed American forces to the isthmus, and 750 American Marines and sailors occupied Panama City to protect it from the rebels. Clearly the United States had both an interest in the "^Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations o f the United States. 1885, v-vi. 108 region and the means to police it On Decembers, 1886, Ammen, Menocal, and several of their friends and supporters organized a second Provisional Canal Association and started the whole process over again. Menocal negotiated a new concession from Nicaragua with terms nearly identical to the original agreement The Nicaraguan Congress ratified it on April 23, 1887. In the United States the Provisional Canal Association launched yet another publicity campaign to gamer support Its proponents presented bills in both houses of Congress recognizing the incorporation of the company and wishing it success. Both passed easily in February of 1889 as this time the company asked for no financial support De Lessep’s company in the meantime had gone bankrupt and so no longer obstructed funding for an American-built canal. The collapse of de Lesseps’ firm presented American canal advocates both an opportunity to build the first canal, and a warning that the project would not be as easy as they expected. The Navy, now firmly wedded to the idea of a canal, sent yet another expedition to Nicaragua which confirmed

Menocal’s route as the best choice.’” Chambers, back at the Office of Naval Intelligence, remained involved in the canal project and repeatedly wrote to defend iL Like many naval officers. Chambers invested in the compiany. So too did Henry C. Taylor and Arent S. Crowninshield, two officers who would have a close relationship with Chambers over the next two decades and who repeatedly lobbied for Congressional funding of the canal.*” Chambers wrote many of the new company’s marketing pamphlets and briefing materials explaining the importance of a canal. He believed the canal was essential to further trade and to redress the mercantile imbalance between the United States and Great Britain. Eventually he believed it would lead to the commercial supremacy of the United

'” House Report 3035,51st Qxigress, 1st Session. '^'Thomas B. Atkins, The Interoceanic Canal Across Nicaragua and the Attitude Toward it o f the Government o f the United States (NY : New York Printing Co.. 1890); The hAcaragoa Canal Construction Company. Ai/iuo/ Report, 1890 and 1891, Chambers Papers, Box 30. 109 States from which “sea power would follow.” Without a canal. Chambers believed, or at least argued, the United States would split in two as commercial interests pulled the East and West Coasts apart.*” The canal, though, would be more than an economic boon to the United States. It would also become a center of culture and progress from which the United States would “develop” Nicaragua and aid the people of this “wonderful country” on their road to civilization. It was the duty of the United States, Chambers argued, “to demonstrate to the world that our free and liberal institutions are lasting.” It was an argument clearly influenced by the writings of Josiah Strong, whose best-selling book. Our Country, was one of the most popular of the decade of the 1880s and continued to sell well in the 1890s. In it. Strong called upon Americans, as the “chosen people,” to do their duty, to uplift the heathen multitudes into “the light of the highest Christian civilization.” To do this, the United States had only to offer these supposedly benighted people the twin benefits of a “pure spiritual Christianity” and the American ideal of “civil liberty.” For Chambers, the canal would become a lasting symbol of the emergence of the United States as a and its moral superiority over both decadent Europe and impoverished Latin America.*” Many other naval officers also campaigned in favor of the canal, including Commanders Chari es H. Stockton and Henry C. Taylor, both of whom Chambers would meet on the faculty of the Naval War College in 1893. Their writings on the canal both show agreement with Chambers. In arguments that echoed Chambers earlier points, both argued for the overriding commercial need for a canal, though they emphasized its military necessity more than Chambers. Taylor, much like Chambers, argued that opening a canal through Nicaragua would not only give the United States control of the

'^Chambers, "National Importance of a Canal,” Chambers Pqiers, Box 30. '^^Chambers, ‘National Importance of a Canal,” 3-9; Josiah Strong. Our Country: Its Possible Future and Its Present Crisis (New York, 1885), 29; Walter LaFeber, The New Empire (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1963). 70-79. no Pacific, but it would also become a base from which its warships could strike “rapid and effective blows in both oceans.” Both saw it as only the beginning of U. S. colonial expansion. Once built, the United States would need a larger navy and oversees bases to protect the canal, making the canal not just useful militarily buy also an excellent argument for naval expansion.'^

Building a canal, though, was no simple task. Menocal's new corporation organized itself and issued stock with a capitalization of $100 million. The board elected Hiram Hitchcock as its president and Menocal as the chief engineer who would oversee the construction of the canal. The actual construction of the canal would be by its subsidiary, the Nicaragua Canal Construction Company. It began construction on October 9,1889, but the work proceeded much slower than anticipated. The company rapidly found itself in financial difficulty and unable to raise more funds. Its last ditch efforts to issue more bonds failed in the panic of 1893 and the company collapsed. Despite repeated entreaties. Congress was never willing to offer the financial support the project clearly required. Chambers and his fellow canal-advocates would have to wait for a new century, a new, dynamic President, and the expansionist political climate following the Spanish-American War to make their dream a reality.

Conclusion Chambers returned to the Office of Naval Intelligence following the 1885 expedition with a growing circle of influential contacts including many higher-ranking officers. His woric on the canal and his later writings on its importance brought him to the attention of Alfred Thayer Mahan and other officers at the newly created Naval War College. Chambers, still a mere ensign, found himself routinely corresponding to senior officers, even the Secretary of the Navy. It must have been a heady experience. It would

''**Henry C. Taylor, *The Control of the ï^adlic,” Forum 3 (June 1887), 416; C. H. Stockton, “The Inter-Oceanic Canal,” USNIP 25 (December 1899): 153-177. Ill eventually lead him to overestimate his influence at these lofty heights.

112 CHAPTERS THE OFHCE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

The Office of Naval Intelligence owed its existence to the work of reformers both within and without the Navy. James Garfield came to the presidency in 1881 with a reform agenda and appointed a number of reformers to his cabinet One of them was Secretary of the Navy William H. Hunt, a prominent southern attorney and the father of a naval officer. Hunt proved an excellent choice. He was a dynamic and insightful leader and the first Secretary of the Navy in more than a decade to demand a navy cable of

“active and aggressive warfare in the ports and waters of an enemy.””* Unfortunately for the Navy, he held that office for only a year. In his short tenure. Hunt created the two institutions that would lead the drive for naval reform throughout the 1880s: The Naval Advisory Board and the Office of Naval Intelligence. In creating the Office of Naval Intelligence, Hunt was influenced by Commodore John Grimes Walker, the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation. Like Hunt, Walker had considerable business experience. He had worked for several railroads during the 1870s, and was about to be appointed treasurer of the Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Railroad when he resigned and returned to the Navy. A month later he was appointed the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, thanks in part to his influential brother-in-law. Senator William B. Allison of Iowa. Walker was an experienced manager with great respect for and experience in dealing with new technology. He was strongly influenced by the drive for efficiency then sweeping American business, and believed it essential to rationalize the

‘*^om as Hunt, The Life o f William Henry Hunt (Brattlebofo, Vt; E L Hildreth, 1922); Secretary of the Navy Annual Report (hereafter cited as SONAR), 1881,5. 113 Navy’s convoluted administrative structure and centralize its planning.'^ Walker expected the Office of Naval Intelligence to play a key role in llie reform and modernization of the Navy. It would be a centralized agency to collect and store information. It would systematize “the collection and classification of information for the use of the Department, in relation to the strength and resources of foreign navies.”'^ Meanwhile the Naval Advisory Board, benefiting from data from the Office of Naval Intelligence, would create plans for modem warships and supervise the construction of a modem fleet Walker appointed a number of promising officers to the Office of Naval Intelligence, and strongly supported the new agency. Without his support as Chief of the Bureau of Navigation it would probably have withered and died, a victim of bureaucratic neglect Even with the creation of the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Naval Advisory Board, there were few posts within the Navy at which officers could hone their scientific and technical skills. Walker appointed a number of naval officers to a variety of scientific agencies within the govemment such as the Smithsonian Institution and the Geological Service. There they could sharpen their skills while awaiting the modernization of the Navy and the creation of additional scientific and technical positions within iL Among these officers was Chambers’ friend C. P. Patterson, who found himself working for the Geological Service in the middle of New Mexico.*” Following Garfield’s assassination, Chester Arthur reshuffled the cabinet to reward his political supporters. He packed Hunt off as ambassador to Russia just a few weeks after he had established the Office of Naval Intelligence on March 23,1882. Hunt had yet to staff the agency or even appoint its head. Arthur replaced Hunt with William E. Chandler, a long-time Republican functionary. Chandler had been James G. Blaine’s floor manager at the 1880 Republican National Convention. He switched his support to ‘'^Robert G. Angevine, ‘The Rise and Fall of the Office of Naval Intelligence,” 297. "''s o n a r . 1882.107-8. *^C. P. Patterson to Chambers, June 28,1883 and August 18,1883, Chambers Papers, Box 5. 114 Garfield at the last minute, helping him and Arthur secure the nomination. While Garfield had chosen not to reward Chandler with an a cabinet post, Arthur was of a more traditional sentiment*” Chandler chose Lieutenant Theodoras Bailey Mason to lead the Office of Naval Intelligence. Mason had been a aid in the Grant administration, and briefly served as President Arthur’s naval aid. He was well-connected and a protege of Walker and Admiral C. R. P. Rodgers. He was also strongly influenced by the leading reformer of the Navy, Commodore Stephen B. Luce. Luce saw the Office of Naval Intelligence as the first step in the creation of a naval general staff, an institution whose importance had been impressed upon him by Colonel Emory Upton, who was then fighting for the creation of a general staff for the Army.“ ° With the help of his influential patrons. Mason convinced Chandler to make him the first Chief of Intelligence and to further clarify the structure and mission of Office of Naval Intelligence along the lines suggested by Luce. The Office of Naval Intelligence would not only gather the information necessary for the modernization of the Navy, but also the information needed to allow the Navy to plan strategy and draw up war plans against a variety of opponents. Preparation for war. Luce, Mason, and other reformers increasingly argued, should be primary mission of the Navy.“ ' The Office of Naval Intelligence made its home in the State, War, Navy building. Perennially crowded and understaffed, its officers did the best they could with the limited means at their disposal. Congress did not appropriate funds for the agency until the 1890s. Walker assigned Mason only three officers to help him in 1882. One of them was Chambers’ classmate Templin M. Potts, who like Chambers spoke French and Spanish

'” Hunt, The Life o f William Henry Hunt, 250-255; Paolo Coietta (ed.), American Secretaries o f the Navy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press: 1980), 389-391. ““Jeffery M. Dorwart, The Office o f Naval Intelligence (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1979), 16. “ 'These ideas and the mission of the ONI were further articulated by cme of the first officers assigned to assist Mason, Charles Curtis Rogers. Like his patrons, he called for the creation of a naval general staff. See C C. Rogers. “Naval Intelligence.” USNIP 9 (1883): 659-692. 115 and was skilled in drawing. The others were Lieutenants M. fisher Wright and A. G. Berry. Shortly thereafter. Walker ordered all warships to appoint intelligence officers, who would report to the Office of Naval Intelligence on foreign navies and events, though many captains resented the inference of Washington bureaucracy in their commands and ignored the order.^ The first task facing the new Office of Naval Intelligence was to develop a filing and cataloging system. Mason organized the office on functional lines. Different sections collected data of interest to the different bureaus of the Navy. This was the most efficient way to aid the individual bureaus’ efforts to modernize, but was far from the best system for creating a coherent strategic vision. Mason understood that if the Office of Naval Intelligence failed to prove its worth to the bureaus, its existence would not long outlive Walker’s tenure as Chief of the Bureau of Navigation. The Office of Naval Intelligence had to function effectively within the existing system while it worked to reform it“® Mason’s new staff gathered and recataloged all the existing intelligence data haphazardly collected since the Civil War, and then set about gathering new data. To do this they drew on Chambers, Rodgers and other shipboard intelligence officers as well as their only foreign attaché, French Esnor Chadwick, who was stationed in London. They studied, mapped, and later photographed foreign coasts, ports, and naval facilities. They compiled the routes and specifications of foreign merchant shipping as well as the specifications and stations of foreign warships. They “collected blueprints for a torpedo boat, a boiler, a dry dock, a magazine, a gun milling and drilling machine, and a rifling machine, ” along with numerous drawings of ships, ship machinery, guns and gun carriages, armor, turrets, and torpedoes, and “notes on experiments with armor, naval *®Wyinan H. Packard, A Century o f Naval Intelligence (^aaïâagLaa: ONI & NHC, 1996), 3. Records are poor for the early staff of the ONI. Many of its officers, such as Chambers, were listed as working for the Bureau of Navigation rather than the ONI. The two main historians of the agency, Dorwart and Packard, are in some disagreement as to which officos were assigned when. ^James Robert Green, ‘The Rrst Sixty Years of the Office of Naval Intelligence” (MA Thesis, The American University, 1963), 13; Dorwart, Office o f Naval Intelligence, 15; Packard, A Century o f Naval Intelligence, 158. 116 gunnery, submarine mines, and torpedoes.” They bought and translated foreign books and interviewed foreign naval officers. By September 1883 they had compiled a list of all the warships under construction in Europe and Latin American. As its organization cohered, the Office of Naval Intelligence began to publish a regular series of reports on important topics including its War Series and the General Information Series.These became well-respected by both American and foreign naval officers. Its first reports covered the operations of the French Navy in Tunis, the war on the pacific coast between Chile and Peru and Bolivia, and British operations in Egypt in 1882. It distributed the General Information Series to American naval officers throughout the world. This publication was far ahead of any comparable foreign naval document, and in fact was frequently bartered to foreign naval officers in exchange for data the Office of Naval Intelligence needed. It routinely covered technological exhibitions around the world and the naval operations and construction plans of many different countries. The Office of Naval Intelligence, protected by Walker, continued to grow. He assigned it three more officers in 1883 (Lieutenants William H. Driggs, Robert McLean, and Sidney Staunton) and then four more in 1884: Lieutenant William H. Beehler, and Ensigns Frank R. Heath, William L Rodgers and Chambers, though several of their predecessors departed.”^ Chambers proved an excellent organizer. He “arranged the forms for intelligence reports, arranged the files of drawings and plans, and mounted and arranged the growing collection of photographs.” He collected and organized data on foreign ports, and arranged the war maps. He drafted plans for numerous foreign warships, and prepared the original plates for the “Diagrams of Typical War Ships.” He translated a number of ^Angevine, The Rise and Fail of the Office of Naval Intelligence,” 299; Index to Register of the Office of Naval Intelligence, July 1882-December31,1885, NARG38; Packard, A Century o f Naval Intelligence, 40; P. T. Bowles, "Our New Cruisers,” USNIP 9 (1883); 627-631. Chadwick was first sent to study European developments in 1881 and became the Office of Naval Intelligence’s first naval attaché when he was assigned to London in 1882. ®*Niblack, History and Aims o f the Office o f Naval Intelligence (GPO, 1920); Green, 17-18; Packard, A Century o f Naval Intelligence, 5. 117 French publications, including the “Italian Reet,” which was published in the United Service Magazine. Among Chambers’ duties was also processing the deluge of letters from inventors eager to sell the products of their genius to the Navy. Chambers had to separate the cranks and crackpots from those inventors who actually showed promise.^ Chambers and John Baptiste Bemadou, who would join the staff early in 1885, set the tone at Office of Naval Intelligence for the rest of the decade. ‘They understood rapid technological change,” and proved adept at mastering the “details of new ship design, machinery, explosives, and ordnance.” Modernization could not occur rapidly enough for them, and they kept up with the pace of technological innovation while many fellow officers fell behind. They “displayed an unusual grasp of the relationship between sea power and national economic expansion and expressed the sentiments of those who welcomed a more vigorous foreign and naval policy.”” ’ As its staff grew, the Office of Naval Intelligence also increased the number of officers it assigned as foreign attachés. The next two were both friends of Chambers. His classmate, George T. Foulk, was ordered as naval attaché to in November 1883, though there is some question as to his exact title. He monitored the growing build-up of Russian, Japanese, and Chinese forces in the region and came increasingly to identify with the Koreans—a sentiment he took great pains to explain to Chambers. He became the United States chargé d’affaires in 1886 and continued to work to save Korea from foreign encroachment, though it cost him his career.”* In 1885 the Office of Naval Intelligence assigned Lieutenant Benjamin Buckingham, Chambers’ friend from the Paris Exposition, to be its attaché in Paris. From there he reported on events throughout the continent, supplementing the work of Edward

” *Register of Perscxiei of the ONI, NARG 38. ^Dorw art, Office o f Naval Intelligence, 22. ”“FouIk to Chambos, March 13,1886, Chambers papers. Box 5; Tyler Dennerr, 'Early American Polic} in Korea, 1883-1887: The Services of Lieutenant George T. Foulk," Political Science Quarterly 37 ( 1923): 82-103; Donald M. Bishop, "Sustaining Korean independence: American Military Xfissions to Korea, 1882-1896” (MA Thesis, The Ohio State University, 1974). 118 Very. Very, a successful inventor, had served on the first and second Naval Advisory Boards, but left the Navy to work for the Hotchkiss Company in France because the arms company had offered him a wider scope and better pay for his talents. From there he kept the Office of Naval Intelligence apprised of European naval developments and sent in drawings of both French and British equipment One of the reasons for Buckingham’s appointment was that Very was increasingly occupied by his job and had less and less time to collect information for the ONI.“”

Invention Chambers, too, remained interested in inventing. Encouraged by Mason, he continued his work on a number of projects in addition to his normal duties. Weapons systems, especially torpedoes, remained his primary interest He designed an anti-torpedo gun and sent it to Sicard at the Bureau of Ordnance. Sicard again complimented his work and thanked him for his “ingenious” design. He followed this with a 6-pound cannon designed for easy firing with a pistol grip and shoulder rest, and sent it off to Sicard as well.^‘® Chambers’ next project was a rocket-propelled torpedo designed to be fired from a naval gun. This would allow any ship to fire torpedoes without the need for torpedo tubes that currently manufactured torpedoes required. Chambers considered the Whitehead torpedo which many navies had adopted and was favored by the U. S. Navy for purchase, to be too complicated for normal use. His was a simpler design that he expected to considerably exceed the Whitehead in range. While the Whitehead was reasonably accurate between 300-500 yards. Chambers expected his design to strike targets at ranges exceeding 1000 yards.^"

Angevine, The Rise and Fail of the Office of Naval Intelligence,” 305; Dorwart, Office o f Naval Intelligence, 32-f; Packard, A Century of Naval Intelligence, 5. '"sicard to Chambers, July 3,1883, Chambers Papers, Box 1. '"chambers to the West Point Foundry Association, October 5,1883, Chambers Papers, Box 5. 119 Despite Sicard’s support of his efforts. Chambers felt ignored by the Navy’s bureaus. As he perfected his design he decided to offer it to a private firm rather than the Bureau of Ordnance where it “would be filed to gather dust” He wrote the West Point Foundry Association in October 1883 and offered them his design. While they were interested, they suggested that Chambers first get a patent for his torpedo as no one else had taken out a patent on a rocket-fired torpedo. Once he had a patent he should come talk to them in New York. Chambers eagerly agreed and offered them a host of his other designs including his 6-pound gun, assorted machine guns, and several gun caniages.^*^ Chambers knew not to put all his eggs in one basket A friend of his in the Argentinian Navy was working on a similar design, and he suspected others might be as well. He filed his patent application, but continued to offer his torpedo to private firms, including Hotchkiss, and also continued to try to get support from the Navy. He wrote to Chandler offering to give the Navy the rights to his torpedo if the Navy helped him patent it and reimbursed him for his estimated $500 of expenses in designing it. His patent application was delayed when his roommate, Charles C. Marsh, sat on his model. It was finally completed and accepted on March 3, 1884. The Patent Office then began its investigation. The Navy paid the $20 application fee for Chambers, but never reimbursed him for his expenses or showed any interest in developing his torpedo. Chambers himself had little time for his invention as he soon left for the Greely Relief Expedition and then the Nicaraguan survey Chambers also maintained his interest in ship design. His work at the Office of Naval Intelligence allowed him to keep up with the latest developments and to correspond with designers in Europe. He developed a network of contacts in the

‘''Chambers to the West Point Foundry Association, October 5,1883, and West Point Foundry Association to Chambers, October 10,1883, Chambers Ptg)ers, Box 5. ‘'^Chambers to Chandler, February 8,1884, Chambers Pqiers, Box 1 ; Chambers to Billy [no last name given], March 19,1884 and March 22,1884, Chambers Papers, Box 5; Chambers to Commissioner of Patents, February 29,1884 and Commissioner of Patents to Chambers, March 3,1884, Chambers Papers, Box 5. 120 shipbuilding industry that had the potential to help his own design efforts. One of his best sources was James Howden, who owned his own design firm in , Scotland. Howden sent him numerous ship plans and exacting descriptions of their machinery and its arrangement They developed an e.xcellent working relationship.^'"* It is sometimes hard to determine whether Chambers was contacting businesses to gather information for the Office of Naval Intelligence or for himself. Usually the two were not mutually exclusive. Information that would help Chambers with his inventions and ship designs would also help the Navy modernize.

Spokesman for Reform For a decade the United States Naval Institute had worked for reform, publishing articles on the latest naval developments in its Proceedings. In 1880 it inaugurated an essay contest with a cash prize for the best essay on a selected topic. For 1884 the topic was ‘The Reconstruction and Increase of the Navy,” and Chambers decided to enter. He sent in his effort on January 1, 1884. Much to his surprise he received notice in March that the three judge panel had selected his paper as the best entry. It certainly had not hurt his prospects that one of the judges was Admiral C. R. P. Rodgers, but the other two. Senator Joseph R Hawley and Dr. D. C. Gilman, the president of Johns Hopkins University, were completely unknown to him. Chambers received a gold medal and $100. He read his paper at the Naval Institute annual meting later that year following his return from the Greely Relief Expedition. In his wide-ranging essay. Chambers covered virtually every aspect of naval policy. He built on the work of previous prize essayists—all of them junior officers—who had proposed modernizing the Navy, expanding the merchant marine, and increasing the United States’ naval presence in its own hemisphere to vigorously enforce

' ‘"^James Howden to Chambers, Febmary 12,1884, Chambers Papers, Box 5. 121 the Monroe Doctrine/** Chambers offered a much bolder vision. Following in the tradition of Luce, Schufeldt and other naval officers, he argued that history showed the necessity of a strong navy for national prosperity. He assumed that international rivalry and arms races were normal. War was inevitable, “a necessary evil” that could not be avoided. The United States needed to rearm immediately. The peacetime Navy should foremost be a nucleus for wartime expansion and the preparation for war should become the primary mission of the Navy. Aside from preparation for war and the old missions of showing the flag and policing the seas. Chambers argued the Navy should adopt two new missions: 1) to observe and keep informed of the military progress of other nations, and 2) the enforcement of neutrality laws “to prevent other powers from doing it for us.” The former was an obvious justification of the mission of the Office of Naval Intelligence. The latter was a call for the vigorous enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine. Chambers argued that if the United States would not police the Caribbean, European powers would use the constant turmoil there as an excuse to intervene in the hemisphere. He expected the

United States to build an isthmian canal and wanted Europeans kept well away from iL

Chambers attacked the Navy’s bureau system and its system of administration in general. The convoluted and overlapping duties of the various bureaus kept many of them working at cross purposes, often putting more effort into winning bureaucratic battles than in rebuilding the fleet He recommended the creation of a naval general staff. It would be modeled on the German General Staff and incorporate the Office of Naval Intelligence as its key component The chief of the general staff would function as the Secretary of the Navy’s assistant, taking over many of the duties of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation in overseeing the disposition of personnel and ships. The general ^*See Charles Belknap, ‘The Naval Policy of the United States” [1880 Prize essay], USNIP 6 (1880). 375-391; Edward W. Very, ‘The Type of (I) Armored Vessel, (H) Cruiser, Best Suited to the Present Needs of the United States” [1881 Prize Essay], USNIP 7 (1881), 43-83; and J. D. J. Kelley. “Our Merchant Marine: The Causes of its Decline, and the Means to Be Taken for its Revival” [1882 Prize Essay]. USNIP 8 (1882). 3-47. 122 staff would collect and arrange naval information. It would guide strategy and war planning and study the “broad principles of naval warfare."*’* Like many of his fellow officers. Chambers openly admired the British Navy and saw it as the model the United States Navy should emulate. Nonetheless, he recognized that Britain was the only power that posed a credible threat to the United States in its own hemisphere. Not only was Britain by far the largest naval power in the world, but only Britain had the bases and infrastructure in the Americas to support a war against the United States. It would not be until the turn of the century that Germany and Japan began to figure prominently in defense planning and speculative exercises. With that in mind. Chambers used a potential war with Britain as his example in determining the needs of the U. S. Navy.

In this prospective war Chambers listed four missions for the U. S. Navy in order of importance: 1) preventing Britain from establishing an effective or bombarding coastal installations; 2) intercepting British convoys, troop transports, and supplies en route to North America; 3) the destruction of British commerce; 4) joint Army-Navy expeditions against Canada and other British colonies and bases.*’^ The first and third describe the existing policy of the United States—coast defence and commerce raiding; the second and fourth offered something rarely discussed following the Civil War—squadron level engagement of enemy forces. Chambers accepted that the United States would never be strong enough to challenge the bulk of the Royal Navy in a grand, open water battle like Trafalgar. Neither would it be able to blockade the British Isles, to lay siege “to the heart” of Britain “by offensive operations against the arteries leading to it," which he believed would be the most effective way to defeat Britain. Still, he was unwilling to surrender control of the seas and wanted the

United States to blockade Vancouver and the Sl Lawrence seaway. If one could not

''^Chambers, "Reconstruction and Increase,” 58. ' chambers. "Reconstruction and Increase,” 13. 123 blockade the mother country, its nearest and largest colonies would have to suffice/'* Even this limited effort was far beyond the U. S. Navy’s capabilities. It was a strategy for which it had neither the ships nor the infrastructure. Chambers addressed this in the heart of his paper, outlining a building program for a modem, yet politically acceptable, fleet While Chambers’ monitor design of two years prior was somewhat conservative, there was nothing conservative about the building program and ships he now proposed. Chambers believed in consistent technological progress and addressed it throughout his essay. In an argument very similar to the later debate on long range guns over quick-firing short range weapons following the in 1905, he argued that the increasing range of naval artilleiy would make ramming attacks impossible and increasingly limit the effectiveness of torpedoes in open water. Torpedo boats and especially rams would be destroyed by gunfire long before they entered the effective range of their weapons. He recommended that no rams be built and that armored ships dispense with ram bows. His recommendation emphasized armored ships, or ironclads, which were “^indispensable to raise a blockade.”^” Over the next decade he wanted the United States to build nine battleships, seven small and seven large ironclads, 38 gunboats and 20 torpedo boats. The battleships would be laid down at the rate of only one per year so that each would incorporate the latest technological developments. They would be armed comparably to the best foreign warships and would have a cruising range of 15,000 miles that would allow them to operate well outside the American hemisphere. In the event of war they would attack enemy convoys and blockade the enemy coast, engaging the enemy’s battle line if possible. The large ironclads, at 7000 tons and a 3000 cruising range, were actually closer to the small battleships or armored cruisers the United States would

'" ‘chambers, *Tleconstnictioa and Increase,” 12. '"chambers. ‘Tleconstruction and Increase,” 16, italics in original. 124 soon build: the Mz/neand the Texas. Chambers carefully used the neuti^al term ‘ironclad' in describing them to allow his readers to draw their own conclusions. Those who advocated battleships would see them as such, while those opposed to blue water expansion would hopefully perceive them as monitors. In his prospective war with Britain, these would support the battleships in operations against Canada.

The small ironclads and torpedo boats would defend the coast of the United States while the rest of the fleet, and whatever merchant ships could be converted, would attack enemy commerce. As Robert Seager points out, while the Navy officially maintained its policy of commerce raiding and coast defense, it “surrounded it with qualifications, and encouraged contradictory views to circulate.”^® Chambers was one of the most outspoken tolerated critics. He expected commerce raiding to do little more than distract enemy warships. Wars would be won by the clash of major warships.

In peacetime Chambers expected the battleships to be dispersed to the various squadrons as flagships as they had been in the past. Each would have a covey of gunboats assigned to it to allow it to project its power into shallow waters and up rivers. Individual gunboats would show the flag in less important regions. Essentially, Chambers argued that a modem fleet would be better able to execute traditional policy. Chambers critics pounced on the hole in his proposed fleet He did not recommend that the Navy build any cruisers in the 3000-5000 ton range such as the Atlanta, Boston, and Chicago—di^ ship type that continued to be recommended by the Naval Advisory Board year after year. Chambers argued that these cruisers were too large for effective commerce raiding, but too small and weak to engage armored warships. They were a waste of money. As he said, “no ship should be built which does not designedly occupy her place in the great scheme of preparation for war for national defense. As the fleet expanded there would be a need for balance, but at the time it

^Seager, ‘Ten Years Before Mahan,” MVHR 40 (December 1953), 499-500. "'chambers, ‘Reconstruction and Increase,” 35. 125 was in large and small ships that the Navy was deficient It still had several dozen wooden cruisers and was building steel replacements. The one piece of language his critics unanimously approved, and which became a standard piece of language in Congressional appropriations bills, was the principle that “no ship should be built that is not superior, or at least fully equal, to those of any other nation, of the same type."^ This was a lofty goal that barkened back to the famous American frigates of the War of 1812 that could outsail anything they could not outfight and outfight what they could not outsail. Three years earlier the First Naval Advisory

Board had made a similar plea for the United States to “win back from Europe our former prestige as the best ship-builders in the world.In an age of rapid technological change and competing tactical principles, though, superiority was difficult to judge. Congress eventually settled on paying bonuses for faster and faster ships, speed being the one characteristic that was easy to judge and measure. Like many naval officers, Chambers believed the fortunes of the Navy and the merchant marine were linked. The rehabilitation of one required the rehabilitation of the other. The U. S. merchant marine had begun to decline before the Civil War, and its decline was hastened by the flight from the flag during that war caused by the success of Confederate commerce raiders. As private industry alone seemed unable to reverse this trend. Chambers recommended mail and other govemment subsidies to support the merchant marine and the construction of modem, steam-powered ships. He recommended similar subsidies “to develop those industries on which we must depend for finished ships.” These needed govemment “encouragement” to expand and multiply so that they would be able to meet wartime demands. This government-stimulated expansion would be monitored by “govemment inspecting officers” who would make sure the corruption

'Chambers, 'Tteconstnictioa and Increase,” 36; , Report o f the Select Committee on Ordnance and War S/ups (Washington: GPO, 1886). "“ s o n a r , 1881.31. 126 of the 1870s would not be repeated.^ Chambers repeatedly emphasized the educational needs of officers commenting that “the life of a successful naval officer is from necessity a life more of study than of work.” He wanted govemment funding for basic science and govemment support of inventors like himself. Genius needed to be cultivated “for purposes of national defense.” He wanted an aimual budget allocation for scientific experiments, investment in research facilities, such as a model tank to test hull forms, and aimual prizes for inventors, such as himself, to encourage their efforts. The Navy needed warriors whose usefulness depended “not only on personal valor, but on high scientific attainments and constant application in the use of complicated instruments of modem warfare.”^ Several important reformers praised Chambers’ paper. Caspar Goodrich defended it as an “able and suggestive paper.His friend Foulk commended his many “ideas on how things should be” and called him “the Man for the Profession.”^ Chambers most vocal defender was Mason, who may well have read drafts of it as Chambers prepared it for submission. Mason used the presentation of Chambers’ paper to pound home several of Chambers’ points that he had been trumpeting on his own for some time. Like Chambers he argued for administrative improvements and the creation of a general staff. In supporting Chambers’ building proposal he argued that, contrary to the opinions of some in Congress, a navy could not be improvised in war. It needed to be built during peace. The discussion of Chambers’ paper shows the consensus among reformers for battleships, an enlarged role for the Navy, war planning, and the creation of a general staff.

^Chambers, 'Kecoostructioa and Inmase,” 40-41. ^Chambers. 'Tleconstruction and Increase,” 36-38,52. ^Caspar Goodrich, “Discussion of Reconstruction and Increase of the Navy,” USNIP 11 (1885), 68. ^Foulk to (Chambers, September 11,1884 and March 13,1886, Chambers Papers, Box 5. 127 The Office of Naval Intelligence at its Peak

Chambers returned to the ONI in October 1885 following the Nicaraguan survey to find it on a sound footing. While Mason, Potts, and two other ofticers had left it that year, five new officers were assigned to replace them. Slow growth had brought the ONI's total staff to ten officers and a couple of clerks. This remained the norm until it was expanded during the Spanish-American War. Another attaché was assigned to Europe, and the Bureau of Navigation finally cracked down and required all ships to have intelligence officers by the end of the year. The ONI continued to supply the intelligence needs of the Secretary of the Navy and the various bureaus of the Navy, but also increasingly reported to Congress and worked to publicize the needs of the Navy to the press. It continued to publish its reports and these now included a monthly intelligence bulletin and an annual report on naval progress. In 1888 it issued its mammoth Coaling, Docking, and Repair Facilities of the Ports o f the World, the result of almost a decade of work. Raymond Rodgers replaced Mason as the head of the ONI in April 1885. Under Rodgers it became much more aggressive in pushing for reform. He collected under him an articulate and aggressive staff, that was perhaps the “most remarkable” ever to serve the ONI. He brought in and John Charles Colwell, who had served with Chambers on the Greely Relief Expedition, and other officers who would go on to have distinguished careers. Chambers continued to compile data and the plans of foreign warships, and wrote a series of articles for the General Information Series. He assisted Lieutenant Frederick Singer in compiling data on ship construction, design, equipment and boats. He worked with Seaton Schroeder in preparing a detailed report on the isthmus of Panama. Chambers enjoyed his work at the ONI and with Rodgers help managed to

get his tour there an extended an extra year.“ *

^“Dorwart, Office o f Naval Intelligence, 21 ; Register of Personnel of the Office of Naval Intelligence, NARG 38; General Information Series Numbers V, VI, and VII (Washington: GPO, 1885-1888). 128 The new Secretary of the Navy, William C. Whitney, was a strong supporter of the ONI and naval modernization. He ordered the ONI to collect all the data it could on the latest European ship designs and further clarified its mission as the collection and classification of information on “all subjects connected with war, or which can have a bearing upon naval action, and to prepare plans of campaign covering all contingencies of active naval operations.” Beginning in 1886 the Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy contained intelligence summaries supplied by the Office of Naval Intelligence.

Whitney expected the ONI to play an important part in his effort to revitalize the Navy Department and end the corruption that continued to plague navy administration. ONI officers continued to distinguish themselves in writing and were among the earliest supporters of the Naval War College. They supplied Luce, Mahan, and their fellows with maps, charts, and other data for their strategic studies. The ONI had dead y succeeded in integrating itself into the adminisuative infrastructure of the Navy.“®

Torpedoes Following his return to the Office of Naval Intelligence, Chambers also resumed work on his inventions. He hired the law firm of Munson & Philipp, which specialized in patents, and with their help was awarded a patent on March 17, 1885, for his preliminary torpedo design. Unfortunately this was his only good news. He still had not found anyone to buy his invention, and his expenses and legal fees were mounting. His mother was in debt and needed his help to pay off her creditors. The Hotchkiss Company seemed his best prospect, and Very assured him the company was interested, but Hotchkiss had taken ill and showed no signs of recovering. The company was in disarray and was not considering any new devices. Hoping it would help sell his torpedo design. Chambers applied for patents in several foreign countries, but this failed to stimulate interest in the

“ Tackard, A Century o f Naval intelligence, 4-5,40,317; Navy Department Order, March 31,1885, quoted in Packard, 317. 129 device. As Chambers’ frustrations mounted. Very suggested he give up on seeing any money from his invention. He wished him luck with his patent, “but having had lots of experience with my original [the Very pistol] which really has paid me fairly well, I can only say that I am down on those kind of responsibilities. Naval people are not well calculated to do that kind of business as a rule. For your own interest, 1 hope that you are an exception.”®® Chambers was not Between his work at the ONI and his absence for the Greely Relief Expedition and the Nicaraguan survey, he had little time left to work on his inventions, let alone market them to an arms industry that was overwhelmed with submissions from inventors. In July 1885 Chambers heard his patent was being contested by Asa Weeks, an inventor who lived in Minneapolis. This required Chambers to make a formal defense and prove that his work predated that of Weeks. Confronted with the evidence. Weeks backed off after first trying to get Chambers to work with him and pool their efforts. Chambers was finally awarded a patent for his final rocket torpedo design on October 27,1885.®*

While Chambers’ naval career continued to go well (he passed his promotion exam in December and was promoted to Lieutenant, j. g. as of January 19, 1886), his efforts at invention proved an endless frustration. His experience with torpedoes did serve him well in the Navy. He repeatedly published reports on torpedoes in the ONI’s bulletins and became the resident expert on them. Later in his career he would twice be assigned to the Torpedo School. Nonetheless his efforts to patent and sell his devices soured him on the entire process of invention and especially patents. He never realized a profit from his work on torpedoes or any of his other inventions. Prospective buyers, as well as the Navy, were always impressed, but never enough to support his efforts with ^**Very To Chambers, February 11,1885 and June 23,1885, and William A. Redenburgh to Chambers, September 7,1886, Chambers Papers, Box 5. ^'Munson & Philipps to Chambers, April 1,1885, June 27,1885, and July 25,1885, Chambers Papers, Box 5; Weeks to Chambers, August 3,1885 and August 11,1885, Chambers Papers, Box 5; patent number 328919. 130 cash. More than a decade would pass before he again seriously pursued invention. Instead he returned to his efforts to ship design.®^

New Ships The United States Navy continued to modernize in these years, building new ships and scrapping old, but it was a slow process. Congress had authorized the famous ABCDs in 1883, the Navy’s first new ships in a decade, but failed to authorize any new construction in the hotly contested election year of 1884. In 1885 Secretary of the Navy Whitney managed to unite Democrats and Republicans on the issue of naval modernization. Congress authorized funds for two gunboats, the Yorktown and Petrel, and also two more protected cruisers, the Newark and Charleston. These were the Navy’s first cruisers to dispense entirely with sails. By 1886 Congress had committed itself to naval modernization and was ready to dig deeper into its purse. The 1886 appropriation dwarfed those of the previous few years and showed Congress’ interests in experimenting with new ship types. To clear out limited dry dock space, it authorized $3,178,046 to complete four of the five monitors {Amphitrite, Monadnock, Puritan, Terror), which had been awaiting funds for completion since 1874. It authorized the British-designed

protected cmisct Baltimore, the American designed dynamite gun cruiser Vesuvius,^ and a sorely needed torpedo boat, the Cushing, which became the second torpedo boat in the Navy. In a significant departure from previous policy. Congress also authorized the construction of the Navy’s first ocean-going armored warships. The ships were to be of different designs and just over 6000 tons, one slightly larger than the other. These would eventually become the Maine and the Texas, variously described as armored cruisers or second-rate battleships. Their designs would be chosen by a competition judged by the

^^odgers to Chambers, May 2,1888, Chambers Papers, Box I; Chambers to Hotdikiss. March 24,1888. Chambers Papers, Box 5. ^ The dynamite gun cruiser was designed to fire dynamite charges using pneumatic pressure to bombard targets on shore. 131 officers of the Naval Advisory Board. To spur interest in the contest. Congress offered a $15,000 prize to the winning designs. The cash prize certainly sparked Chambers’ interest It was several times his annual salary and would more than pay off his debts. Tapping into his network of friends and contacts, he learned everything he could about the contest His main informant was Charles Henige. Henige was a protege of Naval Constructor Francis Bowles, the first scientifically-trained constructor in the Navy. Like Bowles he was well-educated, and thought little of most of those involved in ship design and construction in the United

States. He had worked as a draftsman for the Naval Advisory Board for three years and was later briefly assigned to the ONI where he and Chambers became friends. Henige warned Chambers that the severe competition criteria for the ships would produce few entries. He expected, correctly, that almost all of the contestants would be foreign fiims.^ Chambers was not discouraged. He immediately set to work, calling on his network of friends and contacts when he needed help. With their help, he completed designs for both categories that he named the Iowa (6000) and the Ohio (6300 ton). Both would have carried an impressive armament of the day: four 10,” four 6” and a variety of smaller guns. In completing the designs. Chambers worked closely with Howden, especially for the engines about which he knew little. Howden repeatedly complimented Chambers’ work. He incorporated several of his new engine designs into both plans and designed the entire engine arrangement for the Iowa, which he expected to achieve a top speed in excess of 18 knots—quite fast for an armored ship of that day. Charles Henige helped Chambers draw up the plans for both ships. Chambers’ designs compared favorably to the entries of several prestigious British firms. This is not surprising as Chambers had not only had Howden’s help, but he also

^**Bowles to Chambers. September 13,1886, Chambers Papers, Box 5; Charles Henige to Chambers, September 15,1886, Chambers Pqiers, Box 5. 132 used his position at the ONI and his foreign contacts to gather information on his competitors. As data came in, he modified his designs accordingly.^^ Fifteen different designs were submitted to the contest Most were for the smaller of the two ships. The Naval Advisory Board chose a design by the British Barrow firm for the larger ship which eventually became the Texas, but it failed to reach a decision on the entries for the smaller ship, the future Mufne. The Board considered the entries by Chambers’ and three foreign firms to be "excellent,” each with "many good features,” but refused to decide among them or even to classify them in order of preference. It made no award. The three foreign firms, Barrow, H. A. Grandjead, and Thames, accepted this strange decision with good grace, but Chambers was furious. Once again he felt slighted by the Navy bureaucracy and this time a lot of money was at stake. He did not believe his designs were seriously considered at all and that the Navy had planned on using its own design all along.”* One of the rejected designs was by Naval Constructor Samuel H. Pook, a personal enemy of Henige whom Chambers would meet a few years later. Chambers and Henige both believed that the Bureau of Construction was intriguing through Pook, to have its own design selected even though it did not meet the competition’s strict criteria. Well aware that a protest by him alone would be ignored. Chambers decided to interest the other contestants in a combined protest He contacted William E Stillings, a New York lawyer and friend of his family, and asked him to make inquiries for him. Stillings contacted Edward Cahill, the middleman between Whitney and Tammany Hall, and began laying the groundwork to push Chambers’ case. Cahill promised to investigate the situation and plead Chambers’ case to Whitney. Stillings found two other disgruntled designers, who vowed they would never submit designs under the current system.

^Tiraft Plans of the Iowa and Ohio, Chambers Papers, Boxes 33 and 34; See the voluminous correspondence between Chambers and Howden, Chambers papers. Box 5,1886-7. ^’‘Naval Advisory Board to Chambers, August 12, 1887; Chambers to Whitney, June 18, 1887, Chambers Papers, Box 1. 133 Howden, too, was infuriated by the decision and helped Chambers intrigue with Thames and some of the other rejected British firms. While upset by the decision. Chambers’ fellow competitors were unwilling to make a fuss. The fifteen thousand dollars that seemed a princely sum to Chambers was a negligible amount to a multi-million dollar firm.”’ Meanwhile Chambers continued to do his job at the ONI. Ironically, it fell upon him to arrange for Lieutenant J. D. J. Kelly, the Navy’s press liaison, to publicize and popularize the designs recommended by the board.”* Chambers clearly plarmed to take his case to the public, but changed his mind. Perhaps one of his friends managed to dissuad him. In a letter he never sent to the Army and Navy Journal, he ruthlessly criticized the design process inside the Navy and claimed that the contest had been a mere formality. The Naval Advisory Board had no intention of paying the prize. Reporting rumors he had heard, he argued that the Bureau of Construction design, “a slight modification of that of the Brazilian ship Riachuelo," had been favored all along despite its supposed ineligibility to compete and obvious obsolescence. “So tarnished has the reputation of the [Navy] Department become that it is doubtful whether any plans would have been received had not” $15,000 been offered to the wirmer.”’ In the end Chambers simply fired off a letter to Whitney, demanding that the Naval Advisory Board do its job and choose a wirmer. He repeated his criticisms of the contest and continued to argue that the Construction Bureau design had been favored all along. He argued that he had stuck close to the 6000 tons displacement specified, but if they wanted it bigger, it was much easier to add size to a plan than take it off. Modifying his design would be easy. The Construction Bureau design was 600 tons heavier and outdated. Whitney politely commended Chambers, but supported the Board’s decision.

” ^Wiliiam E. Stillings to Chambers, February 8,1887 and March 2,1887, Chambers Papers, Box 5; Howden to Chambers, September 6,1887, Chambers Papers, Box 5. Z 5 8 J. O. J. Kelly to Chambers June 29,1887, Chambers Papers, Box 5. 3 * . Chambers to the Editor of the Armv and Navy Joumai, undated letter, 1887, Chambers Papers, Box 5. 134 They were not obligated to choose any of the submissions. The Construction Bureau design was not entered in the competition, could not be chosen, and would not be builL^ Chambers wrote one last defense of his design and then wisely backed down. He defended his actions arguing that he had “an absorbing interest in the progress of the Navy” and that his “sincere desire to see the best plans adopted, irrespective of personal considerations,” had guided him throughout this competition. He thanked Whitney for

commending him, and took the opportunity to push for reform and modernization. He recommended the Navy build a model tank to test hull forms, and asked to be sent to

Europe to study those in use there. Chambers did not get a trip to Europe (the Bureau of Construction already had the necessary data and planned on building a model tank soon), but his career survived a confrontation with the Secretary of the Navy undamaged. A design for \ht Maine eventually emerged out of a synthesis of several of the competing designs."*

Conclusion Chambers’ design efforts brought him to the attention of a number of high- ranking officers. Several of them wrote to him offering him assignments. One of these was Rear Admiral Bancroft Gherardi, the commandant of the New York Navy Yard. He wrote to Chambers asking if he was interested in working on the construction of the Maine, saying he was the best qualified person for the job.His friend Henige tipped him off that Robley Evans, who would be supervising the construction of the Maine, wanted Chambers on his team. Rancis Ramsay, the head of the board that judged the

""chambers to Whitney, June 18,1887 and Whitney to Chambers, July 12,1887, Chambers Papers, Box 1. ^ ‘chambers to Whimey, July 13,1887 and September 30, 1887, Whitney to Chambers, October 15, 1887, Chambers Papiers, Box 1; Rodney P. Carlisle, Where the Fleet Begins: A History o f the David Taylor Research Center. 7898-7998 (Washington; Naval Historical Center, 1998), 13-15. The 1884 Naval Advisory Board bad also recommended the constructioa of a model basiit Congress did not authorize ftmds for one until 1896 by which time, younger, progressive officers had risen through the ranks of the Construction Bureau to positions from winch they could vigorously press for funding. "*Gherardi to Chambers, April 26,1888, Chambers Papers, Box 1. 135 design competition, had also been impressed by his work. Chambers would normally have been sent back to sea on a cruise in the normal pattern of rotation between sea and shore, and had indeed received orders to report to the Pensacola, but with Gherardi and Evans supporting his request, he had no trouble extending his time on shore yet again. He was assigned as Assistant Superintendent of the Maine. Chambers, like his friends Foulk and Patterson, was desperate to avoid going to sea again in the dilapidated ships then in service. He intended to stay on shore until modem ships entered the Navy. Then hopefully his expertise in having built some of them might translate into an appointment to one of them on its commissioning. Henige encouraged him in this, telling him that his reputation was such that he could probably get ten years of shore duty if he wanted to. He also pointed out that Chambers’ appointment would “make our friend [Pook] feel a little sick.” Chambers, probably willingly, had been drawn into the thick of the battle between line officers and the bureaus. His appointment was a slap in the face to the Bureau of Construction, which would normally have assigned one of its Naval Constructors to supervise ship construction. Through Henige, Bowles and a few other friends. Chambers was aware of the struggle inside the Bureau of Construction between the rising, scientifically trained constructors like Bowles and Charles Gatewood and their conservative elders. Not surprisingly, he repeatedly backed these officers and helped in their intrigues against entrenched conservatism.^ During the 1880s the United States systematically developed the industrial infrastructure needed for building the New Navy. “It is clear that the physical and intellectual foundation for a vigorous policy abroad was securely laid during these years.”"* The Office of Naval Intelligence played a key role in this process, providing technical details and the latest research from Europe. It secured plans and blueprints for everything from crankshafts and turrets to complete ships. By 1887 the United States was **’Heinge to Chambers, April 26,1888, Chambers Papers. Box 1; Patteison to Chambers, June 13, 1886, Chambers Papers, Box 5. " ‘Seager, "Ten Years Before Mahan.” MVHR 40 (December 1953), 491. 136 capable of producing modem ships and by the early 1890s was no longer dependent on foreign steel or designs. New factories, new plants, and the newly created program in naval architecture at MIT, all pushed by reformers at the ONI, solved these deficiencies. Chambers was an important part of this process and expected to benefit as the process of reform and modernization continued. He had found favor among the highest ranking officers of the Navy and had a network of friends that would serve him well in the future. Rodgers deeply regretted losing Chambers and promised in the future “to be of any service to you which may be in my power.” The future looked very good to Lieutenant

Chambers.”*

P. Rodgers to Chambers, April 25. 1888. Chambers Papers. Box 1. 137 CHAPTER6

THE NEW YORK NAVY YARD

Following the Civil War, Republican party bosses used employment at the nation’s navy yards to reward their supporters. Almost all of the roughly 5,000 jobs available in the yards went to reward the party’s faithful adherents, as did most federal jobs during the heyday of the spoils system. “Workmen were chosen not only because they belonged to the party of the administration, but because they belonged to the faction of this or that boss of the local political machine.”"* The recipients of this largesse were expected to support the party by voting its ticket, contributing to its coffers, and encouraging others to do the same. Corruption in the navy yards reached its peak during the Giant administration. The Navy repaired its aging ships, some little more than rotting hulks, over and over again. Yards not needed by the Navy remained open to provide jobs for the party faithful. The Navy purchased uimecessary stores to the point that enough sail was on hand to equip the entire British Navy."’ This waste provoked a series of Congressional investigations when control of the House shifted to the Democrats, but change and reform came slowly. Naval officers accepted the spoils system as the price of doing their jobs. All naval officers had political ties and it was important for their careers to maintain them. This began with their appointment to the Naval Academy and continued through their naval careers. Well-placed friends in Congress helped officers gain choice assignments and could save an officer’s career from almost any disaster. The result was that few

" ‘Secretary of the Navy, Annual Report, 1892,49 (hereafter died as SONAR). "^Maifc D. Krsch, William C. Whitnev, Modern Warwick Dodd, Mead, 1948), 264. 138 officers were willing to challenge the spoils system. Those who were focused less on the influence of politicians and more on the role played by the Navy’s disparate bureaus within the corrupt system.

The yards reflected the Navy’s inefficient bureau system in microcosm. Each of the Navy* s eight bureaus (Provisions and Clothing, Ordnance, Construction and Repair, Yards and Docks, Steam Engineering, Navigation, Equipment and Recruiting, and Medicine and Surgery) jealously guarded its “respective prerogatives, unwilling to yield authority to secure coordination.” The bureaus pursued their own ends, “professionally arrogant, and unmindful of the needs of the Department”®” They competed with one another for money, power, and patronage. Each bureau of the Navy maintained separate facilities in each yard, including separate power plants. Each hired and paid civilian workers and purchased supplies separately with no consultation with its fellows. As an investigative commission pointed out in 1883, each navy yard was “made up of a number of separate and comparatively independent establishments, little principalities . . . each owing allegiance to its own sovereign, the chief of the bureau to which it belongs.It was through these bureaus that most patronage flowed. A later investigative commission criticized navy yard administration as “overloaded with tradition and customs.” Work at the yards was “obstructed by cumbrous organizations.” Technical responsibility was “lost in the elaborately graded multitude of semitechnical and semimilitary officials.” Instead of smoothness, there was friction; “instead of promptness, delay and procrastination; instead of thrift, extravagance; instead of unity of action, a mass of discordant interests.”^ The yard commander had direct authority over only a handful of office clerks and messengers. Most of a yard’s employees woiiced for one of the bureaus, the majority for

^**Leoiiard D. White, The Republican Era (New York; Macmillan, 1958), 162. ^SONAR, 1883.117. SONAR, 1884, cited in Lecm Burr Richardson, William E. Chandler, Republican (NY : Dodd, Mead, 1940), 309. 139 either the Bureau of Steam Engineering or the Bureau of Construction and Repair. As one yard commander later wrote in frustration, the “Captain of the Yard” had “very little charge or authority over its organization, mechanical work, the keeping of its rolls or other books connected therewith, the employment and discharge of men, or its expenditures and supplies.”^ ' He was essentially a captain with neither subordinate officers nor crew.

During the 1880s and 1890s it became increasingly important for both political parties to at least appear to be working for civil service reform. This gave reformers opportunities to slowly chip away at the spoils system. The passage of the Pendelton Act in 1883 initiated merit-based hiring for a small number of government jobs and gave reformers the opening they needed to push for more extensive reforms. Journalists increasingly focused on any hint of scandal and decried the sad state of the Navy.“ ^ Fear of scandal and a growing interest in improving the Navy continued to push reforms haltingly forward. These reforms resulted from two primary factors: 1) the need for qualified workers in an age of rapid technological change; and 2) the desire of the losing party of a presidential election to keep office holders loyal to it employed by extending civil service protection to their jobs. This prevented their termination without cause. Secretary of the Navy Chandler, partly due to Congressional obstruction and partly due to his own commitment to the spoils system, accomplished little in the way of reform during his term. His successor William C. Whitney proved more ambitious, though again members of his own party often impeded his efforts. He reorganized the bureaus, eliminating needless duplication among them, and forced the major navy yards to specialize: Washington in ordnance, Boston in equipment, and San Francisco, Norfolk, and New York in shipbuilding and repairs. Yet despite his desire for reform, Whitney

^'Captam S. Norton to the Board on Navy Yard Organization, July 2,1891, NARG 40, item 186. ^See a series of articles that ran in The Nation, April 30,1885, May 28, 1885, September 3,1885; Henry Goiinge, ‘The Navy” Yor/A American Review (1882), 474-490; Hirsch, 268-270; New York Times, June 24, 1889,4. 140 pulled out all the stops to aid his party in the 1888 Presidential election. The New York Navy Yard, the nation’s largest, hired over 1,000 men just before the election, and terminated their positions shortly thereafter. Whitney also “diverted funds on the eve of election from building ships to large contracts for clothing” to reward party supporters.^

Chambers at the Yard

Chambers arrived at the New York Navy Yard on May 15, 1888. He was well prepared for his new post with his experience as a ship designer and his work in outfitting the Portsmouth and the ships of the Greely Relief Expedition. The problems at the naval yards were no secret to him. He had addressed them briefly in his prize essay four years before.^ Several of his friends wrote to him warning of the general mismanagement of the yards and their control by political bosses. Little had changed since the passage of the Pendelton AcL His friends specifically warned Chambers about Samuel Pook, one of his fellow contestants from the design competition. Pook was in charge of the preliminary work on the Maine and was then completing the wooden shed in which the Maine would be builL His reputation for graft and corruption was legendary, a characteristic shared by several of the older naval constructors. As Charles Henige, who had worked with many of them, wrote Chambers; “all of the full constructors are more politicians than shipbuilders.” They “do not care whether the government receives any equivalent for the money expended and all they aim at is to make themselves solid with the politicians.” If an opportunity arose, none of them would hesitate to “play into their own pockets.” Pook certainly had.“® Chambers plunged into this highly political environment in the midst of the 1888 election and Whitney’s effort to win his party votes through patronage in the yards.

^Charles Oscar PauUin, History o f Naval Administration, 1775-1911 (Annapolis, MD: U. S. Naval Institute. 1968), 180; Porter to Luce, quoted in Herrick, 46. ^Chambers, 'Reconstruction and Increase,” 57. ^Charles Henige to Chambers, May 1,1888. Chambers Papers, Box 5. 141 Despite Whitney’s earlier efforts at reform, it seemed that Henige had been correct “Whatever the Secretary’s intention may have been in regard to the New York Yard,” politicians would “run things just the same as before, especially as this is an election year.”“* The spoils system was hardly the yard’s only problem. Despite the ongoing renovation of the yard and new construction, including the 1888 completion of a tramway and the ongoing construction of a new concrete drydock, the New York Yard was both inadequately and primitively equipped for its many tasks. Aging, barely serviceable ships clogged its docks and tied up work crews. Construction of new ships overwhelmed the yard’s limited resources of trained manpower, and interfered with its other tasks as the primary port of the North Atlantic Squadron. Chambers’ posting to New York brought him closer to home and allowed him to visit family and old friends on a regular basis. He got along well with most of his fellow officers and was particularly friendly with Commodore Francis Ramsay and his family with whom he dined frequently. Chambers was also a regular attendee of the informal weekly receptions for officers and their friends and families on Fridays. These were often followed by dances. Work on \hi& Maine and his efforts to improve the yard kept Chambers busy, but he maintained his interest in ship design and continued to advise Rodgers and the ONI on new ship designs. Rogers in turn, helped keep him up to date by sending him the plans of American and foreign warships. Rodgers borrowed Chambers’ Ohio design to study the gun battery lay-out, and the two frequently consulted one another on recent developments. Sicard, too, maintained a high opinion of Chambers and kept him informed of new developments.^ Chambers joined the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers shortly after its founding in 1893. ^Charles Henige to Chambers, July 4,1888, Chambers Papers, Box 1 ; Henige to Chambers, May 1 1888, and May 16, 1888, Chambers Papers, Box 5. 2 5 7 , Rodgers to Chambers, January 26,1889, Chambers Papers, Box 1. 142 Chambers remained short of cash. He supplemented his income by working as consultant for the A/iew York Herald in which he published a few articles on naval matters. He also worked as a legal consultant on maritime collisions. He worked on several cases for the Coudert Brothers law firm. They paid him $ 189.50 for his services as a nautical expert in the collision of the Garcoyrte. and he later testified for them on the collision between the Normandie and the boat Charlotte Webb. They tried to get him permission and leave to go to France to help in another case, but the Bureau of Navigation refused to approve it.“ *

Work at the Navy Yard was very different for Chambers than his previous assignments. He had to work closely not only with the naval constructors and other staff officers, but also the civilian workforce. Naval officers were long accustomed to maintaining order on board ship among unruly seamen, and Chambers had plenty of experience with this. At the yard, though, he had to enforce order on civilians without the stringent naval regulations and rules of justice to back them up. He worried that “workmen accustomed to regard their employment as a reward for political serv ices” would become “disgruntled” and cause trouble.^ Chambers was assigned as the junior member of a board with Commander F. M. Green and Lieutenant Commander A. B. H. Lillie that investigated a series of assaults and violent incidents at the yard. Their first duty was to investigate an assault by one civilian worker on another. A few weeks later two apprentices picked a fight with the leading blacksmith whose senior apprentice came to his aid. More often than not, the board was completely stymied in its efforts to discover the truth as workers would rarely testify against one another, and many of the foremen, such as the unnamed blacksmith, were quite content to enforce their authority ^Coudert Brothers to Chambers, March 9, 1889, Chambers Papers, Box 5; Coudert Brothers to Chambers, October 24,1889, Chambers Papers, Box I ; Coudert Brothers to Tracy, Septemiier 3,1889, Chambers Papers, Box 1; Chamahers to the Editor. New Ymk Herald, June 14,1891; John F. Stickly to Chambers. July 14,1890; James Gordon Bennett to Chambers, June 16,1891; JFS to Chambers, October 23, 1891, all in Chambers Papers, Box 1. ^Chambers, “Responsibilities of Commandant in Building the Maine." undated 1888, Chambers Papers, Box 30. 143 with their fists. They wanted no interference from those in uniform.""

The ABCs and \h/t Maine

The construction of the first ships of the new Navy, the cruisers Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, and the dispatch boat Dolphin, was fraught with problems. Authorized by Congress in 1883, then Secretary of the Navy Chandler awarded the contract for these ships to John Roach, an old-time Republican contributor who had been heavily implicated in the “repairs” scandals of the Grant administration. Roach submitted the lowest bid for the ships—a bid so low as to virtually guarantee that some form of collusion took place between him and Chandler.^' Not surprisingly, cost overruns became a problem toward the end of Chandler’s tenure. According to one historian “all of the so called ‘ills’ of the modem industrial-military interlock—kickbacks, cost overruns, favored contractors, political interest in defense-related industries—may be traced to the time of the ABCD cruisers, John Roach, William Chandler, and the Forty-ninth Congress.”“ ^ In a controversial decision in his first months in office, Whitney decided to complete the ABCDs in the navy yards. He seized the ships from Roach’s shipyards, forcing Roach into bankruptcy. The Atlanta and the Chicago, as well as the newer Yorktown were all nearing completion at the New York yard when Chambers arrived.

The builders and work crews of these ships experienced numerous problems adapting to new technology, equipment, and construction techniques. Much of the equipment for the ships had to sent back to manufacturers for repairs and modifications. This was especially true of the guns and gun parts which were constantly being sent back to the Washington Navy Yard for repairs and replacements. Commander French Esnor

^"’Tieport of the lovestigatiiig Board,” undated 1888, NARG 181. ^'For the conflicting versions of this story see Leonard Swann, John Roach, Maritime Entrepreneur (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1%5), 185-208; Richardson, 290-5; and Hirsch. 274-288. *“B. F. Cooling, Gray Steel Blue Water Now (Hampden, CT: Archon Books, 1979), 55. 144 Chadwick, in command of the Yorktown, reported numerous leaks on board. Other ships made similar reports. About the only equipment that woiiced correctly the first time it was tried was the electric shell hoists installed by the Sprague Electric Railway of New York, a company founded by former naval officer Frank Sprague."® Chambers helped oversee the completion of these ships. As the election neared, they received more workers, and also authorization to pay overtime. Skilled workers, who were in short supply, put in double shifts, rushing to complete the ships in time for the inauguration and a planned naval demonstration. Chambers’ penchant for new technology again proved useful. He helped install the new electric lights on the ships as well as their signaling whistles. The gun sights of theChicago proved faulty and Chambers helped Commander Charles O’Neil, the inspector of ordnance at the yard, redesign them. Chambers, though, spent most of his efforts working on the Maine and increasingly Icxiking for ways to improved the efficiency of the yard.^ Chambers arrived eager to work on the Navy’s first battleship, but he also understood the precariousness of his position. Staff officers from the Bureaus of

Construction and Steam Engineering had previously controlled ship construction. Now Chambers had been sent into their domain with an obviously subversive assigrunent—to bring the influence of line officers to bear on ship construction. He worried about friction between the line and the staff but even more about tensions between the older and younger officers regardless of their line or staff allegiances. He expected that the officers overseeing the construction of the Maine, both line and staff, would get little credit if things went well, but all the blame if there were any problems.^ The struggle between the older, traditionally trained constructors and the younger, ^Chadwick to Ramsay, April 2,1889 and June 17, 1889; see NARG 181, entry 265 for the numerous letters sent by the Bureau of Ordnance. "’'chief of the Bureau of Ordnance (Sicard) to Gherardi, December 29, 1888. The work of Chambers and O’Neill was later improved upon by Bradley Fiske who was then overseeing the installation of ordnance on iie Atlanta. Paolo E. Coletta, Admiral Bradley A. Fiske and the American Navy, 19-22. ^Chambers, TtesponsibiUties of Commandant in Building the Maine,” undated 1888, Chambers Papers, Box 30. 145 scientifically trained ones was then heating up in the Bureau of Construction and Repair. In 1879 Cadet Engineer Francis T. Bowles tried to take advantage of a recent law that provided that those who had been graduated with distinction in the mechanical department might be immediately appointed assistant naval constructors. The corps of naval constructors opposed this. The older constructors lacked scientific trairung. They had primarily worked on the “repairs” of the wooden ships, and were unfamiliar with iron and steel construction. While Bowles’ request was refused, he and Richard Gatewood were sent to the Royal Naval College at Greenwich to study. After two years of study there, they were appointed naval constructors. Over the next several years, other engineering cadets were sent to study in Britain and France. Over time, they slowly transformed the naval construction corps as the normal pattern of promotion moved them up the ranks and into positions of greater influence.^ By the late 1880s, scientifically trained constructors, like Bowles and Gatewood, felt they had proven themselves and were demanding greater influence in the ship design process, and the right to design at least some of the new ships on their own. The Chief of the Bureau of Construction and Repair, Theodore D. Wilson, opposed them at every turn. “W[ilson] made things bad for all the young, scientific constructors,” ignoring their successes and seizing on their mistakes to discredit them.^'^^ He publicly supported their calls for reform, but privately blocked their efforts. For example, Wilson publicly favored the purchase of the model tank Chambers and others had recommended, but he arranged for Hilary Herbert, the Chair of the House Naval Affairs Committee, to block its purchase.^* Henige and others were eager to see “W[ilson] in a tight place.” He hoped the problems at the New York yard would reflect badly on him, and cause him political

^"^Benjamin, The United States Naval Academy, 308-309. For more on this struggle see Monte Calvert, The Mechanical Engineer in America, 1830-1910 (Baltimore, 1967). ^ Henige to Chambers, February 2,1888, Chambers Papers, Box 5. Chambers and Henige frequently used people’s initials when discussing them in their letters. ^“Henige to Chambers, November 25, 1888, Chambers Papers, Box 5. 146 embarrassmenL^ Chambers worked well with the younger constructors, especially Assistant Naval Constructor John B. Hoover, but not their conservative seniors. This clash between the progressive, and often scientifically-trained officers and their traditional, frequently politically-oriented elders caused no end of problems and slowed work on the Maine. These included not just obsolete methods such as Book’s wooden construction shed, but barrels of pork as well. There was no need to build steel ships in construction sheds, and Pook, “a tool of the politicians,” undoubtedly knew this. The Maine would be the last

United States warship built in a shiphouse. Building a shiphouse, though, was easy work, well suited to the limited skills of politically-affiliated workers. This waste appalled

Chambers and his compatriots and they set out to put a stop to it, knowing full well that if they “interfered in any with the politicians,” that there would be trouble, especially as it was an election year.”™ The actual construction of the Maine began in 1888. While Chambers and Hoover oversaw the construction of the hull, the N. F. Palmer, Jr. Company and the Quintard Iron Works of New York began work on the ship’s engines and machinery. Chambers again gravitated toward new technology and worked closely with the Edison company on the lighting system. In a strange contrast, while Wilson kept the Bureau of Construction and Repair mired in the past, the new Chief of the Bureau of Steam Engineering, George Melville, the hero of numerous arctic expeditions, pushed his bureau into the future aggressively.

He had been appointed to the post over the heads of many of his seniors due to his reputation for decisive leadership. The engines of the Maine marked an important change in design from horizontal engines to much more powerful vertical, triple expansion engines. Horizontal engines had previously been preferred because they were small and ^^em ge to Chambers, November 16.1888, Chambers Papers, Box 5. ^™Pook to Gherardi. June 7.1888, NARG 181; Henige to Chambers, May 11,1888, Chambers Papers, Box 1. 147 all machinery would fit below the . Melville insisted on the new, more powerful engines for the Maine and arranged for them to be protected by extra armor.

The Maine, like the ABCDs, was plagued with problems. Many of these should have been anticipated by paying attention to the construction of the ABCDs which showed just how much trouble both private industry and the navy yards were having building modem, steel ships. Many of the drawings of both the Maine and the Texas were faulty and had to be redone.^ The stem post of the Maine was miscast by the Steel Casting Company, one of a series of failures by this company which soon stopped bidding on naval contracts.^ Other parts proved faulty as well and had to be sent back to their manufacturers. The traditionally trained constmctors made a series of constmction mistakes, but frequently managed to cast the blame on others. Work on the Maine was constantly slowed by obsolete equipment, archaic methods, and problems with the work force. Completing \he Maine efficiently required solving these problems first. Chambers prowled the yard, looking for ways to improve its efficiency. Encouraged by Henige who declared that “now would be your time to strike a blow,”” "* Chambers launched a campaign against corruption in the yard and managed to expose a number of shady dealings. Pook retired early in 1889, probably to avoid charges resulting from the growing stack of evidence against him, but Chambers proved unable to link Wilson with any of these activities. Henige was disappointed, but not surprised. “That you have not succeeded in comering our friend W[ilson] is not a surprise to me, he and his cooperators have been in the business so long that they know how to cover their tracks and I almost think that it is time wasted to attempt to show him up in his true lighL”” ^ Nonetheless, Chambers continued his efforts, though Wilson was by then trying to have Chambers removed from work on the Maine. ^'Bennett, The Steam Navy o f the United States (Pittsburgh: Warren & Co, 1896), 793-806. ^Henige to Chambers, November 25,1888, Chambers Papers, Box 5. ^^New York Times, December 18, 1888,2. ^Tlenige to Chambers, February 2.1888, Chambers Papers, Box 5. ^^enige to Chambers, November 25,1888, Chambers Papers, Box 5. 148 Despite Whitney’s efforts, the Democrats lost the 1888 election. The new Secretary of the Navy, Tracy, like Whitney, espoused reform but would have difficulty implementing it In February, shortly before the new administration took office. Commodore Francis M. Ramsay replaced Admiral Bancroft Gherardi in command of the yard. This proved to be a boon for Chambers. While Gherardi had clearly approved of Chambers’ reforming zeal, he did little to support his efforts. Ramsay would.

Tracv. Ramsav. and the Spoils System Yard workers shared the same desires to improve their lot as their compatriots in private industry. Like them, they chose to organize and collectively bargain. Skilled workers continued to be in short supply in the navy yards and they struck repeatedly and successfully for higher wages. In January, riveters working on the Maine stopped work refusing to resume until their demands for a raise from $2.40 to $3.00 per day were met.

Gherardi, nearing the end of his assignment, had few enough skilled workers as it was and was under constant pressure from the Navy Department to complete the new ships rapidly. He had no choice but to give in, and he gave the workers their raise.^® Perhaps inspired by the riveters, in June 1889 those clerks and draughtsmen who were paid daily petitioned to receive the paid vacation that their salaried coworkers received. Rather than striking, they hired a lawyer to press their case in court^ Over the next few years more and more workers were reclassified as salaried rather than per diem, the result of the combined pressure of workers from below, legislation like the Pendelton Act from above, and the new Navy’s need for a better-trained work-force. The increasing complexity of the new steel ships forced changes in hiring practices at the yards. While many Jobs such as clerks, watchmen, and janitors could be

^^®Ramsay to the Chief of the Bureau of Constructioa & Repair, January 21,1889, NARG 181. ^N ew York Times. June 17,1889,4. 149 filled through the spoils system, there was a rapidly increasing need for experienced mechanics, welders, and other specialized woricers. When Ramsay assumed command of the yard two different hiring policies were in force. Positions needing specialized training, such as mechanics, could be filled by the yards directly. All others were filled by the bureaucracy in Washington. Once hired, only the Secretary of the Navy could approve the dismissal of any worker. Several times Tracy overruled the dismissal of particular workers. The Secretary of the Navy could also bypass merit hiring. Tracy routinely recommended specific workers for yard commandants to hire, even in skilled trades. Yard commanders invariably complied.”*Tracy ordered that preferential treatment be given to veterans, and in the decades immediately following the Civil War veterans in New York were far more likely to be Republicans than Democrats. Ramsay hired numerous veterans, even a few too disabled to perform much useful work.” ’ Tracy tried to please both the reformers and the spoilsmen within his party who expected him to fire all of Whitney* s appointees and replace them with good Republicans. While Congress was committed to a larger, more efficient navy, it was unwilling to give up any of the benefits of the spoils system to achieve it. Tracy knew he would eventually have to commit himself more firmly to reform, but his hand was forced sooner than he expected. In his first weeks in office he announced he would be visiting the New York yard. He intended this as a routine inspection, but the press seized on a rumor that he intended to announce major reforms at what was noted as the most corrupt of the nation’s navy yards. Under pressure from the press and fearing scandal, Tracy reversed his position and set in motion a series of reforms that would slowly throttle the spoils system. He visited the yard on April 4,1889, and that night talked with many of its

^^racy to Ramsay, April 20,1889, April 22,1889, April 23,1889, and May 13,1889. National Archives, NY Branch, RG 181. Tracy’s efforts to please both reformers and the spoilsmen are described in Benjamin F ranklin Cooling, Benjamin Franklin Tracy: Father o f the Modem American Fighting Navy (Hamden, CT; Archon Books, 1973). ^"Ramsay to Head of the Department c f Steam Engineering, March 12,1889 and Tracy to Ramsay July 26, 1889, National Archives, NY Branch, RG 181. 150 officers, including Chambers and his co-agitator Lieutenant Alien Paul, in a closed meeting. They let Tracy know just how bad things had become at the yard, and how the corrupting influence of the spoils system and machine politics slowed the growth of the New Navy. Tracy had to choose between the stalwarts of his party and the efficiency of the service.” ® Over the next few months, Tracy reversed several of his policies. He increasingly delegated hiring authority to officers at the yard. By April 23, prospective apprentices had to demonstrate their abilities and pass an examination. By June, Ramsay could tell job applicants, and even influential politicians and lobbyists, that he and the Navy Department no longer directly intervened in hiring. Instead, “by order of the Secretary of the Navy,” the hiring of workmen was “solely up to the foremen.” Previously, foremen could nominate workers for positions, but had no say in the hiring process. This was an important step, but it did not immediately solve the problem. The foremen had received their jobs through the spoils system and most remained beholden to local politicians. New foremen continued to be chosen by the Navy Department in Washington.” * Also, these rules only applied to skilled workers. Clerics, watchmen, storekeepers and others not directly involved in ship construction were still hired through the Washington bureaucracy, and Tracy remained involved in selecting workers for these positions. In October, for example, he appointed a watchman to the Bureau of Ordnance at the New York Yard and canceled another appointment—both without input from local officers.” * It would be another year before Tracy took decisive action, and as with his predecessors, he accomplished the most in his last months in office after his party had lost the Presidential election. In 1890 Tracy dismissed all the yard foremen and appointed a board to design tests and create procedimes to choose their replacements. The ^N ew York Times, June 24,1889,4; Ramsay, '?4emo to All Yard Officers,” undated, NARG 181. ^'Ramsay to Jos. W. Kay, Acting Chairman of Veteran Rights Union, June 4, 1889, NARG 181; Ramsay to Jcdm Budtanan April 25,1889 and Ramsay to unknown job applicant, April 17,1889. Natiotial Archives, NY branch, RG 181. ^^racy to Sicard, October 12,1889, NARG 181. 151 examinations were “practical in character, having reference exclusively to the requirements of the position to be filled,” and aimed at ascertaining the applicant’s knowledge of his business, and his possession of the qualities that will enable him to get good work out of men.” There were no educational qualifications to hold any of the positions. Former navy yard employees and veterans of the Army and Navy who passed the test received preference in employment The tests cannot have been that difficult since the board rejected only 81 of 1,111 applicants as unqualified. The overwhelming majority of the yard foremen passed the tests and retained their jobs.^ Tracy still managed to weed out some Democrats. Of the 96 senior workers in June 1891 at the Portsmouth yard, only five had been hired during Whitney’s term of office. Other yards show a similar pattern, but this was not enough to satisfy Tracy’s detractors.^ Many complained that Democrats still held jobs in the yards. A ward captain wrote Tracy wondering if “it is possible you are so thick in the head as to suppose the 800 or 900 Democrats you retain in the yards will vote the Republican ticket? You are either approaching your dotage or you are a fraud on the Party.Y et other Republicans applauded his efforts. and the New York Civil Service Association congratulated him for having reduced the costs of the New York

Navy Yard by twenty-five percent.®^ A few weeks after T racy’s visit, on April 29 and 30, 1889, the New Y ork Navy Yard hosted a celebration for the Centennial of the inauguration of the U. S. government. It was also a celebration of the return of the Republicans to the White House and the inauguration of President Harrison. Numerous dignitaries including Harrison attended. The senior admiral of the Navy, the venerable , presided over the

^Orders to Board Rdadng to Navy Yard Organization and Examinations at Various Navy Yards, NARG 80, item 182; NARG 80, item 184; SONAR 1892,51. “ ^ARG 80. item 184. ^Charies Bandle to Tracy, Sqrtember 5,1889, quoted in Walter R. Herrick, The American Naval Revolution (Baton Rogue: Louisiana State University Press), 46-47. "“ SONAR 1892.52-3. 152 gala. Chambers helped with the preparations for the gala and during it commanded the tugCatalpa. His primary duty was to ferry important guests around. Many of them wanted to sail with the squadron. The morning of the gala he dropped various dignitaries off at their ships and then towed the Chicago into position for the naval procession. The procession provided an opportunity to show just how much the Navy had changed in the six years since 1883 and the authorization of the ABCDs. Three of these ships, the Atlanta, Boston, and Chicago along with the new gunboat Yorktown, had been rushed to completion for the gala. These new ships led a procession of aging vessels including Juanita, Jamestown, and Yantic past Hlis Island for all to see. The stark contrast between the modem steel vessels that would soon be grouped as the Squadron of Evolution, and the aging, obsolete wooden was obvious to all. Many of the older ships could barely keep up. Others, such as tHas Juanita, which was decommissioned later that year, fell behind.®’ After their brief maneuvers and a fireworks display. Chambers helped tow the aging ships back to their berths. Several had overstrained their engines. He then joined the ceremonies on shore. Chambers commanded one of the detachments of the Naval Brigade in its parade before the dignitaries, and had helped plan its route. Harrison and other dignitaries followed this with speeches calling for the continued rejuvenation of the Navy, though none addressed the sad state of the yard or the spoils system. Tracy’s slow attack on the spoils system considerably improved the efficiency of the yard, but there remained much to do. Many of the officers at the yard resented their administrative problems and searched for solutions. Rodgers at the ONI repeatedly sent reports on pay and administrative practices at British and French yards in the hopes they would prove useful.’® Shortly after his arrival, Ramsay queried all the yard’s department

^ ’Ramsay to Chambers, April 20,1889 and April 24,1889, NARG 181. ^®Rodgers to Commandant N. Y. Yard, May 15.1888, and Rodgers to Œierardi, June 2,1888, NARG 181. 153 heads, asking them if the current employment system was "‘efficient in keeping track of employees and who was at wodc on what," and solicited their suggestions for improvements.^ Ramsay focused his attention first on cleaning up the yard bureaucracy in his immediate sphere of influence. He issued a series of orders beginning March 1889 to get a handle on the situation in the yard. He ordered department heads to determine the value of property in the yard, the number of its civilian employees, and their pay. In May he ordered them to report on employee absenteeism. In Jime he issued a series of orders to reduce paperwork and implemented new requirements to standardize forms, reports and reporting periods, in addition to other efforts to streamline the bureaucracy. This not only reduced the clerical workforce, but allowed Ramsay to get a better understanding of yard operations.*" Ramsay slowly built his picture of the collection of petty dictatorships under his command and began to focus on individual problems. Perhaps the most contentious of them was the issue of pay for the yard’s many civilian employees. This centered not just on salaries, though low pay continued to provoke occasional strikes, but also on how workers were scheduled, who paid them, and the simple mechanics of getting their pay to them. Different bureaus had different payroll procedures, paid their workers at different rates, and frequently classified jobs differently. While foremen gradually received more input in hiring, their involvement in paying their employees caused nothing but trouble. When Chambers arrived at the yard, foremen paid their workers themselves. Unfortunately, some foremen occasionally disappeared with the money. Others extracted contributions for their political bosses.®* Many workers were paid on a daily basis, which complicated the administration of any pay system. At the suggestion of Chambers and Paul, Ramsay took the foremen ^’’'Ramsay to Department Heads, April 15,1889, NARG 181. *"Ramsay to DqiarUnent Heads, Mardi 2,1889 and May 6,1889, NARG 181. ^'Ramsay to Thomas Reynolds, April 20,1889, NARG 181. 154 out of the pay loop. Instead, time clerks went to the various work sites and paid the workers personally. Unfortunately, this solution caused problems of its own. Because the clerks did not know most of the workers personally, they required proof of identity which some of them lacked. When the pay clerks showed up, all work stopped until each man had received his pay. Men woddng in the inaccessible parts of ships (inside double bottoms, or inside the boilers for instance) did not get paid. They could arrange to have another worker pick up their pay for them, but this caused some of the same problems as giving the money to the foremen had. It further complicated matters that employees outside the yard were listed on its payroll. Lieutenant W. W. Kimball, the inspector of ordnance at the Hotchkiss plant in Hartford, monitored the construction of light guns for the ships outfitting at New York. His civilian employees were all paid out of the New York yard’s budget, though the yard had no authority over their supervision and hiring.

Ramsay sent them their pay, but had no control over its disbursement®^ It would eventually be not from foreign navies, but from private industry that the Navy would adopt its payroll system. Officers like Kimball learned about administration while assigned to private industry and brought this knowledge back with them to the Navy. They brought with them time clocks, improved record keeping systems, and a modem administrative vision. Personnel problems were hardly the only targets of the reformers. If anything, they were incidental. Reformers like Chambers were far more concerned with building modem warships than introducing fair labor practices. Again, Ramsay arrived interested in implementing some reforms, but it was Chambers and Pairl who pushed him along. Chambers took the initiative in investigating the state of the yard and its equipment For the most part, it was in terrible shape. Workshops, docks, and equipment were old and wom-out There was no financial plan for the yard, or in fact any plan for its operation or its future. The waste was enormous. Chambers determined to do something about it, but ^Ramsay to Commandant of Boston Navy Yard, August 5,1889, NARG 181. 155 after his experiences with \h&Maine and the Navy’s bureaucracy in general, he knew he had to proceed cautiously. Chambers proceeded slowly, suggesting an improvement here and there, saving a few dollars when opportunities presented themselves. All the while he awaited the opportunity to act decisively. That came when Chadwick returned to visit and tour the yard. Chadwick had come to the same conclusions as Chambers. During his tour he asked the yard’s senior civil engineer, H. Smith Craven, if a comprehensive plan for yard improvements had been developed. Craven’s negative reply gave Chambers his opening. Chambers had already drawn up a plan to improve the yard. He ran back to his quarters, put the finishing touches on it, and presented it to Craven later that day. Craven, probably feeling trapped, approved it Chambers then brought it to Ramsay’s attention, and suggested the creation of a board to “further progressive improvements” in the yard because “economy and efficiency seem to demand iL” He expected the board to “find a disgraceful state of affairs” that the Civil Engineers would “endeavor (unofficially and quietly) to represent” as due to the interference of line officers.^” Chambers proposed major changes in the yard. His plan touched on every facet of its operation. The yard needed a new building slip, new wharves, a modem railway landing, and a completely new coaling wharf and shed as the current one was “clumsy, slow, and inadequate in every way.” The yard needed additional drydocks to handle all the new construction, and new derricks and cranes since the current ones could not lift the guns of the new ships. The current railway pattern in the yard reinforced the isolation of the various bureaus. He offered a completely new layout His new infrastructure would better link the yard to its sources of raw materials, and also link all its workshops, docks, and storerooms. It would break down the barriers that separated all the little principalities of the yard. Removing the physical barriers would help erode the bureaucratic barriers.

^’chambers to Ramsay, May 10,1889, Chambeis Papers, Box 1; Chambers to Mason, undated 1888-89 draft of letter. Chambers Papers, Box 5. 156 and bring the “intelligent control over the whole organization” he had recommended five years before. The yard commanders would finally be in command of the yard.^ Chambers anticipated the financial objections to such a project and included a budgetary analysis. The cost of improvements could be spread over several years and much of it would be covered by savings from the elimination of waste and inefficiency. If all future money were spent according to his plan, yard improvements would “be carried out progressively, economically, and surely.”^ Ramsay concurred with Chambers’ recommendation and appointed a board composed of Commander W. H. Whiting, Chief Engineer W. J. Whitaker, and Lieutenant M. L. Tremain to oversee improvements at the yard and inventory everything in it Tracy supported this effort and sent several civil engineers to the yard to help draw up plans for its improvement”*’ The board confirmed what Chambers had already reported. Large parts of the yard were dilapidated and falling apart The old granite dry dock needed repairs. Work on the new timber one was proceeding slowly, and would require at least another year. Much of the equipment of the yard was old, worn-out or completely obsolete. Many of its buildings had seriously deteriorated, and some were in imminent danger of collapse. Even new buildings showed problems. One new building, constructed only a few years before of top grade materials, was seriously leaking due to poor workmanship. The combination of poor funding and the spoils system had left the yard in terrible shape.”’

Ramsay’s Aide It was inevitable that Chambers’ reform campaign would make enemies. As

” *Giambets, 'Progressive Improvement at the Navy Yard” Chambers Papers, Box 30; Chambers, "Reconstruction and Increase,” 57. ” ^Chambers, ‘Progressive Improvement at the Navy Yard” Chambers Papers, Box 30. ” ‘Tracy to Ramsay, May 28,1889, NARG 181 ” ^"Invcntory and Appraisement of Property,” March 1,1889, NARG 181 ; Chief Engineer H. Smith Craven to Ramsay, September 13,1889, NARG 181. 157 Henige had warned him: “Politics have always run the New York yard and I think it will continue to do so, a constructor who cannot get along with the politicians is not likely to remain there long, especially if he is one of the scientific ones for whom the great Chief has no special love.”®* Chambers did his best and accomplished the most during the lame duck months of the outgoing Cleveland administrations and during the first months of Tracy’s tenure while the new Secretary of the Navy was still accustoming himself to the job. Meanwhile Wilson continued to intrigue against Chambers and in June finally convinced Tracy to relieve him, and his fellow agitator Paul, of their posts on the M aine’s construction team. Chambers and Paul had overreached themselves in trying to eliminate corruption in supply purchasing. In a stem letter Tracy ordered Ramsay to relieve them “from any duty in cormection with the building of the Armored Cruiser Maine.” Tracy went on to quash their latest proposals, deeming “it unnecessary to have kept any accounts relative to expenditure of materials and labor in the work of building the Armored Cruiser Maine at the yard imder your command, which may be different from those which have heretofore been customary.” Ramsay, who approved of their efforts, if not their lack of political understanding, made them his aides and they continued their efforts at reform.®’ Removed from day-to-day work on the Maine, Chambers had even more time for his favorite pursuit—observing new technology at work. Chambers was fascinated by new gadgets and machines, and built on his experience from the Office of Naval Intelligence in assessing new inventions. Chambers’ weakness as an inventor was his inability to follow a project through to completion. He was much better at conceptualization and the initial woik. He was an astute observer and excellent at weeding out the handful of promising inventions and technologies from the morass of useless, and frequently crackpot, gadgets offered to the yard. He routinely made

^^enige to Qiambers, November 25,1888, Chambers Papers, Box 5. ^’^racy to Ramsay, June 20,1889 and Ramsay to Chambers, June 22,1889, Chambers Papers, Box 1. 158 recommendations to Ramsay on what to accept and what to reject of the many inventions offered them, and along with Hoover and Commander Charles O’ Neil served on a board to assess new technology. They tested everything from beveling machines to electric welding torches, and made their recommendations to Ramsay.*”

In May, Chambers observed a civilian coal in operation. He noted its efficiency and its new machinery for loading coal. He recommended that Ramsay purchase it for the Navy, but there were no funds to do so. Instead Ramsay put Chambers in charge of securing coal for the yard, getting the best prices he could and cleaning up its storage and distribution system within the yard. Chambers was soon deluged with letters from coal suppliers seeking government contracts. He examined numerous different pieces of machinery and coal delivery systems. He liked that of the United States Transportation Company best and believed their equipment better than that used by the Royal Navy, but it was not enough to meet the Navy’s daily needs. “In view of the existing crude appliance for coaling ships and for landing coal at this yard, it is comforting to feel that of this company are available where despatch is required in an emergency. It would not do, however, to rely upon this assurance, as these barges might be engaged in other contracts when most needed.’’ Unable to find what he wanted for sale. Chambers designed a coal shed and other equipment capable of discharging 100 tons of coal in an hour. He also drew up plans for an improved rail layout for coal delivery.*'^

Conclusion Chambers enjoyed his time at the yard and worked well with his commanders. Both Gherardi and Ramsay commended his work highly. Gherardi wrote that Chambers’

^Chambers to Ramsay, February 20,1889, Chambers Papers, Box 1. Chambers to Ramsay, May 31,1889 and August 7,1889 ; Ramsay to Chambers, May 31,1889, Chambers Papers, Box 1; Chambers, Report on Navy Yard Improvements,” May 10, 1889, Chambers Papers, Box 30. 159 “knowledge of naval construction and attention to his duties were of great help to me” and desired “to call the Department’s favorable attention to him.”^^ Ramsay wrote that Chambers “exhibited a high order of intelligence and was of great assistance to me in the performance of my duties especially in matters pertaining to the construction of vessels and to improvement of the Navy Yard.”” * Ramsay tried to pull strings to get Chambers posted to the newly commissioned cruiser Baltimore, but the assignment went to someone better connected. Instead, Ramsay managed to get him assigned as the senior watch officer on the new gunboat P etre l.^ Chambers left for a brief leave on October 3 1, before joining his ship. Ramsay left soon afterward to become the new chief of the Bureau of Navigation.

When Chambers and later Ramsay left the yard, it showed the signs of their work. They had streamlined its administration, improved record-keeping, and trimmed both the budget and the workforce while improving the yard’s efficiency. The plans drafted by Chambers and refined by Ramsay continued to guide the yard’s improvements. As more funds became available in 1891 and 1892, the unsafe buildings were tom down and replaced by new ones and new drydocks, cranes, and other equipment were added—all as recommended by Chambers. Spoils in hiring remained a problem, and writing years later Chambers remained dubious that it could ever be eliminated. Yet it was during his time at the yard that the basis for its eventual elimination emerged. In the following years, testing and merit-based hiring were extended to more and more positions as the Pendelton Act did its work. Following each election, more and more jobs were placed under its coverage. Eventually all jobs would be under its protection and open only to those who passed examinations to validate their qualifications. By 1890,30,626 jobs were under civil service jurisdiction.” ® ” *Gherardi to the Secretary of the Navy, June 3,1891, NARG 24. ” *Ramsay to the Secretary of the Navy, June 9,1891, NARG 24. ” *Ramsay to Chambers, December 10,1889, Chambers Papers, Box 1. “ N orton Keller, Affairs o fState: Public Life in Lale Nineteenth Century America (Cambridge: Press, 1977), 522. 160 Navy yard jobs accounted for almost ten percent of this figure—just over half the jobs in the yards.

Tracy took credit for enacting civil service reforms, but at the same time boasted to fellow Republicans that he had aided the party. He scheduled ship repairs to coincide with elections, and made sure large contracts went to yards in Republican districts. His defense failed to impress his fellow party members who condemned Tracy for costing them crucial votes in the 1892 election. The Republicans lost Brooklyn by more than 29,000 votes instead of the expected 10,000 votes, and the nation as a whole by 365,000 votes.^ Despite the problems with the ABCDs it still proved cheaper to build new ships in private yards. Only four of the 73 new ships authorized by Congress between 1883-97 were built entirely in navy yards, three of them in the New York yard. Construction on all four began during Whitney’s term, and were a result of his experience with John Roach. The Navy Yards, though, were not the answer. The A/awe would not be completed until 1895, and work on the other yard-built ships proceeded equally slowly. It proved easier to find honest private shipbuilders than to eliminate corruption from the navy yards and make them efficient and modem. As Chambers wrote years later yard commanders and department heads remained under “constant pressure . . . from local politicians. Senators, Congressmen, etc. to provide for certain of their proteges.”*” Navy yards retained their primary function of maintenance, repair, and outfitting of ships, and occasionally completed wodt on ships but this became less and less common. The nation would rely on private industry to build the new Navy.

“ te lle r . Affairs o f State, 545; Coctiag,Benjamin Franklin Tracy, 141. ^PauUin, History ofNavcd Administration, 396; Chambers, ‘tjeneral Notes on Coasolidatioa o f Navy Yards,” undated circa 1900. Chambers Papers, Box 30. 161 CHAPTER 7 THE PETREL AND ATLANTA

The Squadron of Evolution In 1889, Commodore John G. Walker’s unprecedented eight-year term as Chief of the Bureau of Navigation came to an end. During these eight years Walker had carefully cultivated reform-minded officers and arranged choice assignments for them. Now he used his influence to arrange a choice assignment for himself—a position at sea from which he could continue to influence the modernization of the Navy. He convinced newly-appointed Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Franklin Tracy to promote him to acting Admiral and group four of the Navy’s new ships (the protected cruisers Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, and the gunboat Yorktown) under his command as a “Squadron of Evolution.” These ships had only recently been completed and had spent very little time at sea. Tracy sent the squadron on an extended European cruise to train its officers and crew to handle these new ships, and to work out a doctrine tor their employment in war. The squadron’s voyage signaled the intention of the United States to reclaim its place as a naval power.“ * Both the officers and the crew of the squadron needed to accustom themselves to the new ships and their new technology, whichincluded modem weapons and fire control systems, and a variety of new electrical and mechanical devices. Walker also expected the ships’ captains to learn to maneuver as a squadron. He and other reformers wanted the

Navy to discard its doctrine of commerce raiding and single-ship actions. Instead he ^“ Daniel H. Wicks, ‘The First Cruise of the Squadron of Evolution,” Aft/z/onf Affairs 44 (1980), 64-68. For more Walker see Daniel H. Widks, ‘New Navy and New Empire” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1978). 162 advocated a doctrine that emphasized squadron and fleet engagements of an enemy’s main forces, as Chambers had recommended five years earlier and other reformers had continued to do since. This seemed especially important in 1889 as battleships would soon be joining the fleet Walker wanted a new doctrine ready and waiting for them upon their completion. The United States Navy had last attempted squadron maneuvers in 1874 during the Virginius Crisis with . They were a fiasco. Obsolete ships with worn out engines commanded by officers with no training in fleet maneuvers stumbled about the ocean barely maintaining a semblance of formation and rarely exceeding a speed of four knots.*” Walker’s captains had much to learn. “For a generation of officers accustomed to moving from port to port at their own pace, indoctrination in formation steaming was a necessary first step in modernization.” Keeping station and following signals required a

“complete reorientation of attitude” among ship captains.^'” It also required them to create a whole new signaling system as the old one proved incapable of coordinating even the four ships under Walker’s command in anything more than the simplest of maneuvers at constant speed. A constant complaint of officers in the 1870s and 1880s was the high percentage of foreign-born seamen in the Navy. Many captains reported that sigmficant portions of their crews spoke little English. Probably more than half the Navy’s enlisted men in these decades were foreigners, though no accurate statistics were compiled until 1890. Then the Bureau of Navigation reported that 58 percent of the enlisted force were citizens of the United States, though only 47 percent of the force had been bom in the United States.^" Walker, as Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, had made sure that modem ships received

*”FoxhaU A. Parker, *t)ur Fleet Maneuvers in the Bay of Florida and the Navy of the Future,” USNIF 1 (1874). 171. ’"’Wicks, 'The Hist Cruise of the Squadron of Evolution,” 65. ’"Fredericks. ^anoA, Manning rfe Afew A/lovy (Westport Greenwood Press, 1978), 16-17. By 1897 54 percent were naüve-bom while 74 percent were citizens, reflecting the Navy's increasing efforts to recruit and train Americans for the New Navy. 163 a higher than normal percentage o f native-born crewmen, including the best graduates of Stephen B. Luce’s apprentice training program. He continued this policy as the Squadron of Evolution’s commander, pulling strings to make certain he received the best sailors available. Before leaving for Europe he boasted that nearly three quarters of his squadron’s crew were native-born. He dumped the foreigners in his squadron, mostly Norwegians and Swedes, disproportionately on the Yorktown, the least impressive of his ships.^" The squadron left Boston on December 7,1889 and sailed for Portugal. The

Atlanta, Boston, and Chicago made good speed and arrived in two weeks. The small Yorktown proved unable to sustain a high speed in the rough seas of the North Atlantic. Her Captain was forced to reduce speed and arrived several days later. From Portugal, the squadron entered the Mediterranean and slowly circumnavigated the sea, stopping at virtually every major port Walker practiced a variety of maneuvers, trained his crews, drilled them at the guns and with small arms, and practiced landing operations. With the permission of the Greek government, the squadron engaged in target practice on a small island near Corfu, blasting targets to pieces at short range.^'^ Walker used the voyage not just to train the officers and crew of his squadron, but also to study and report on European developments. The ABCs were modem by American standards but were already dated by those of Europe. Many visiting European officers poked fun at them, but in doing so they frequently revealed important

characteristics of their own ships. Walker encouraged these visits, and encouraged his officers to take notes. Walker, the patron of the Office of Naval Intelligence was now in a position to collect intelligence on his own, and he did so aggressively. His officers frequently visited European warships and toured naval facilities, compiling data that

would help the United States Navy as it continued to modernize. Each ship of his

^‘^Wicks. ‘The First Cruise of the Squadron of Evolutioii,” 66; New York Times, October 6,1889,16. ^'^New York Times, May 26,1890,5. 164 squadron had specific intelligence responsibilities. The Chicago, for instance, reported on guns, while the Atlania monitored recent developments in torpedoes and tested both Whitehead and Howell models.^'"* The squadron continued its peregrinations through Europe for most of 1890, spying, touring, drilling, and training. Walker^s officers compiled a guide to squadron

maneuvers and operating manuals for their new ships. The squadron was ordered to Brazil late in 1890 for a diplomatic display, and then returned to the United States at the end of the year. Once home, it joined the North Atlantic Squadron for continued maneuvers and training and to disseminate what its officers had learned over the previous year.

The Petrel By 1889, newly-completed ships were joining the fleet on a regular basis. One of these was the Petrel, authorized by Congress in 1885, the same year as the Yorktown. Chambers joined the Petrel on December 16, 1889, just a few weeks after her commissioning. Built by Colombian Iron Works of Baltimore, the Petrel was a modem, steel gunboat with four 6” guns, and a variety of smaller guns—a rather heavy armament

for such a small ship earning her the nickname “the baby battleship” from her crew. At 892 tons, she was roughly half the size of the Yorktown, and somewhat slower. She was, in fact, the least impressive of the Navy* s new ships, and one of the few not to secure for its builders a bonus from Congress for exceeding its contract specified speed. Her

obsolete single screw, back-acting compound engines could drive her to a top speed of only eleven knots.^** Despite her size, the Petrel was the best-armed ship on which Chambers had served thus far in his career, as well as the fastest Still, she was too small and slow to keep up with the Squadron of Evolution. Instead she was assigned to the

^‘‘*Wicks, 'The Fust Cruise of the Squadron of Evolution,’' 67. ^“Bennett, The Steam Navy o f the United States, 789. 165 North Atlantic Squadron along with the new dispatch h o s i Dolphin and a variety of older ships?*®

While these new ships were better ventilated and easier to keep clean than their wooden predecessors, disease remained a serious problem for the Navy. Epidemics spread quickly in the close quarters of ships, and understanding of disease remained limited. The Squadron of Evolution’s meanderings about Europe were brought to a halt by an influenza epidemic that swept through each of his ships. Chambers, who had not suffered even a mild illness in his years ashore, came down sick within a few days of his arrival on the Petrel. It started with a series of headaches, which were followed by a serious ear infection and then other symptoms. The ship’s doctor diagnosed it as “the Grippe. ” It was probably influenza, though the illness also brought about a resurgence of

Chambers’ gonorrhoea which he had thought was cured.^'^ The Petrel was under command o f Lieutenant Commander W. H. Brownson who was eager to get an officer of Chamber* s experience. Shortly after Chambers arrived he appointed him the ship’s intelligence officer—an obvious assignment based on Chambers’ experience. Chambers worked well with his fellow officers, especially the executive officer. Lieutenant Newton E. Mason. They became friends and remained friends throughout their careers. Lieutenant Jesse M. Roper, \h& Petrel’s navigator was frequently ill, so Chambers took on many of his duties. During his prolonged absences. Chambers acted as navigator and plotted the ship’s course.^**These extra assignments in addition to his regular duties kept Chambers too busy to work on any of his extracurricular projects. The Petrel had a crew of 121 that included 20 apprentices and 10 Marines. Four

York Times, November 10,1890; John D. Alden, The American Steel Navy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1972), 39-42. ^' chambers Medical Report, NARG 24. He continued to be bothered by it for the next few years. In April 1892 he was admitted for treatment of cystitis, a cmnplicatioa of gonorrhoea. He returned to duty on May 14. "'“Logbook, USS Petrel, NARG 24. 166 ensigns, an engineer, a paymaster and a surgeon rounded out the ship’s officers. The small gunboat was quite cramped. Only the captain had a cabin. The ship’s ten other officers bunked together in the wardroom. The crew all slept in hammocks on the berth deck as they would have in older, wooden ships. Like the Squadron of Evolution, a higher than normal proportion of the crew were American citizens. This probably accounted for a marked change in discipline. Disciplinary infractions were both less common on board the Petrel and less serious than those Chambers witnessed a decade earlier. The punishments meted out by Brownson and the other officers were also much less severe. The drunken crew members who started a brawl were simply confined to quarters. Several sailors who were caught distilling were confined to the berth deck and given extra duty. Extra duty became the normal punishment on the Petrel rather than confinement in irons. Sailors still overstayed leave, but almost always returned, displaying a greater commitment to the Navy. In November, Brownson dealt with five chronic malefactors by simply dismissing them from the Navy.^” Service on the ships of the new Navy was a privilege that could easily be revoked. Old warships were being scrapped or removed from sen'ice faster than they could be replaced in these years. The decline in the total number of operating warships meant the Navy required fewer sailors and could insist on higher standards. Modernization of the fleet and the improving public image of the Navy also helped attract better-motivated men into the Navy’s enlisted ranks. Like their compatriots in the Squadron of Evolution, the officers and crew of the Petrel had to accustom themselves to their new ship. While the Navy" s old ships had rarely burned coal, the Petrel, one of the last ships built with sails in addition to its engines, did so routinely, consuming about one and half tons of coal per day. The Petrel cruised along the East Coast for several months training and drilling in a strange mixture of the new and the old. The crew practiced with modem ordnance, coaled and stoked the "'logbook. USS Petrel, NARG 24. 167 engines by electric light, raised and lowered the ship’s boats with electric hoists, but also took to the rigging, learning to trim and adjust the sails in the worst of weather and practiced with cutlasses kept racked on deck for boarding actions. Target practice, once virtually ignored by both the Navy and individual ship captains, was now encouraged, though the Navy Department strictly rationed ammunition. Ships invariably fired at short ranges. The Petrel’s six-inch guns had a maximum range of six miles, though the limited elevation of the Petrel’s guns sponsons limited this to five miles. Yet her captain did not expect to engage targets beyond 1100

yards in range. Brownson invariably ordered target practice at short range as on September 9 when the gun crews fired 100 rounds at a variety of targets at ranges less than a thousand yards.^“ Most officers remained blissfully oblivious to their poor accuracy until Lieutenant William S. Sims called attention to in his scathing reports and articles following the Spanish-American War. The North Atlantic Squadron expanded steadily in these years as the Navy assigned it most of the new ships as they were completed. Luce, who had taken command of the Squadron in 1888, had substantially changed its routine. It "ceased to spend the summers at the principal watering places and the winters in .” Instead Luce kept them constantly drilling and practicing tactical maneuvers. Luce frequently surprised officers with orders to get under way immediately, put landing parties ashore, or to prepare to repel a torpedo attack. On several occasions he ordered ships run aground in soft mud and required the youngest officers of the Squadron to get

them clear. Rear Admiral Bancroft Gherardi, who took command of the squadron the following year, continued these practices, constantly drilling the squadron. At least part of this was motivated by his rivalry with Walker. Walker might get the headlines, but Gherardi was his senior and unwilling to be shown up by an officer he thought had

““Logbook, USS Petrel, NARG 24;New York Times, November 10,1890,2. 168 unfairly used his political connections to get a choice command/^' In June 1890, the Pe/re/joined the Squadron for maneuvers guided by its flagship, the recently completed, protected cruiser Baltimore. These maneuvers differed little from those of the Squadron of Evolution the year before. Officers and captains practiced keeping station, reading and responding to signals, and learned to execute simple maneuvers. At the end of June they anchored off Portland, Maine, and practiced landing operations, sending both Marines and sailors ashore. The maneuvers continued through the summer, interspersed with individual ship target practice and further landing operations. The squadron returned to its home port of New York late in August, and the officers and crew received leave. Following their leave, the Navy sent the Petrel on a cruise to the Caribbean. There she began the traditional peregrinations from port to port that marked almost a century of

United States Naval activity in the region. Except for the newness of the ship and the greater attention to drill and training, this cruise differed little from Chambers’ cruises about Latin America a decade before. The Petrel arrived off San Juan, on December 12,1890, and spent the winter visiting a variety of Caribbean ports including SL Kitts, Martinique, and SL Lucia. Each visit brought the usual social activities and festivities by the officers with local officials and business people, and the usual bacchanals of the crew in dockside taverns. Petrel visited Kingston, Jamaica, in February followed by Santiago, Cienfeugos, and , Cuba, and then sailed for Port au Prince in March. There they learned that an American ship had wrecked on Roncador reef off Nicaragua and were ordered to search for survivors. On March 19 they located and rescued the ship’s survivors, including a former United States Senator. The Petrel stopped briefly at Greytown, Nicaragua, to dispatch some of the survivors, and then slowly worked her way back toward the United States. On May 7 she anchored off Key

^ John M Eliicott, ‘Three Navy Cranks and What They Turned,’USNIP 51 (October 1924), 1617-1618; New York Times. June 13,1890,8. 169 West, and was home in New York before the month’s end/“ Chambers left the ship in June to take his promotion exam. His old captain from the Marion, Commander Silas Terry, presided over his promotion board. Chambers easily passed promotion exam and was promoted to full Lieutenant on June 29,1891. With his new rank. Chambers also wanted a posting to a larger ship. Mason and Brownson both thought well of him and supported his efforts. Mason rated him excellent as a watch and division officer. Brownson, who also rated him excellent in every category, considered him “thoroughly competent,” and wrote that he would be “glad to have him under his command in all circumstances.” Both had recommended him highly for promotion and both supported his effort to get a transfer.

The Ailanta

With the help of Brownson and Mason, and no doubt some of his well-placed friends. Chambers attained his wish and on September 21, 1891, was detached from Petrel and ordered to the protected cxuis&v Atlanta, then under Captain John W. Philip. The Atlanta was still part of the Squadron of Evolution, which was now composed of the Chicago, Boston, Atlanta, and the Bennington, a Yorktown class gunboat Chambers took leave and then caught up with the Atlanta at Hampton Road in October, and helped with her fitting out. The long voyage to Europe had revealed many faults in the Atlanta’s design and workmanship and there was much work to do. The Atlanta carried a crew of 297 and grossed 3200 tons. She was the same size as her sistershipBoston, though much smaller than the squadron’s flagship, the 4500 ton Chicago. She was armed with two 8” and two 6” guns, all in exposed, unarmored emplacements. In fact, her only armor was a curved deck over the engine compartment - the feature from which derived the term protected cruiser. Like the Petrel, the Atlanta,

^Logbook, USS Petrel, NARG 24,New York Times, May 25,1891,2. ^^row nson to Bureau of Navigatiou, June 4, 1891, Chambers Papers, Bos 1. 170 Boston, and Chicago all carried a full allotment of sails in addition to their engines. On Saturday, October 12,1891, a major storm blew up off the coast of New York. The aging shipDespatch was caught in the storm and desperately signaled for help. The Atlanta was the only ship in port powerful enough to reach her, but was hardly ready for sea. The Navy Department ordered her to get to leave port as soon as possible to save the Despatch. Philip consulted with the yard foreman who told him it would take at least 36 hours to get theAtlanta ready for sea—possibly longer, as the yard’s many civilian employees were home for the weekend. Philip rushed back to the ship and set the crew to work. True to their motto of “always ready” they had her ready to sail in fifteen hours. They left port and sailed into the worst storm Philip had seen in his four decades of naval service. Shortly after her departure, word arrived that the Despatch had “gone to pieces” in the storm. A rescue was pointless. The tug Catalpa was dispatched to recall the Atlanta, but could not catch up to her. Despite her hasty repairs and worn machinery (the engine air pumps could only operate at half power), \he Atlanta maintained a speed of 12 knots while she sped to rescue a ship no longer afloat Like the Despatch, she was trapped by the storm and unable to return to shore. Winds reached near hurricane force and waves in excess of sixty feet high crashed over the ship leaving her smokestacks encrusted with salt that reporters would later marvel at Philip spent much of the next sixty hours on the . Locating the Despatch was quickly abandoned to simply keeping his ship afloat^” As hours passed, the storm wore down the Atlanta’s crew and began exposing her weaknesses. Water began seeping in around her anchor chains. A hawse pipe tore loose and water poured in to her forward compartments. The seaman normally stationed there had succumbed to seasickness and abandoned his post, leaving a hatch open through which the sea continued to pour. It was not until many of the forward compartments were ‘^New York Times. October 14, 1891 ,2 and October 16,1. 171 flooded that the problem was noted. While the Atlanta had excellent electric pumps in the engine room, there were none in the forward part of the ship. The crew brought in hand pumps and slowly moved their way forward. Without electricity in the forward part of the ship, they worked by lantern light Tiring, but winning their battle against the sea, they pumped the first two compartments dry. A crewman then opened the next compartment and stuck his lantern in to ascertain its condition. It was the forward paint room. The lantern detonated the paint fumes and the explosion tore through the exhausted work crew leaving six of them injured, two of them near death. This was Atlanta’s worst moment Fortunately, damage from the explosion was minimal. A fresh crew completed pumping out the forward part of the ship. The storm slowly abated, and the Atlanta returned to port Thursday evening. The injured, all still alive, were transferred ashore for treatment^

Chambers relished the adventure, but soon discovered a disadvantage to his transfer—he was the least senior of the Atlanta’s five lieutenants. This meant that Chambers could not be appointed a watch officer. The ship’s navigator. Lieutenant Hugo Osterhaus, was sympathetic but could not approve another watch officer, nor could the

Captain or the first officer. Chambers’ former commander at the ONI, Lieutenant Commander T. B. M. Mason. Chambers appealed to Ramsay at the Bureau of Navigation, but he would not alter policy to suit Chambers. Neither would Ramsay approve Chambers’ request for a transfer to the recently commissioned, and much more modem and desirable Philadelphia.^ Despite this rejection. Chambers settled in well on the Atlanta and soon made friends with two of his fellow lieutenants: Howard S. Waring and William L. Rodgers. He was appointed a watch officer following the transfer of one of his seniors a few months later. On December 9, Captain Francis J. Higginson took command of the Atlanta, and

'^New York Times. October 16,1 and October 17.8. ^^‘l^amsay to Chambers, October 24,1891, Chambers Papers, Box 1. 172 Mason departed her for a new assignment He probably put in a good word for his protege Chambers before he left The Squadron of Evolution sailed for S t Thomas the next day. The four ships frequently cruised separately, using mixture of sail and steam depending on the winds and the whims of their captains. They regrouped in S t Thomas, and departed together, but they slowly dispersed on the voyage to their next stop, Barbados. There again, they regrouped and departed together, but dispersed during the

long voyage to Brazil. Higginson was not as gentle with the crew as Brownson had been, but was still markedly more lenient than his predecessors of a decade before. On rare occasions he sentenced malefactors, especially deserters, to the old punishment of 30 days in double

irons on bread and water, but he invariably ordered them released long before their sentence had expired. Like Brownson, he made extra duty the normal punishment. On the cruise Higginson maintained a rigorous schedule of drills and exercises. On one of Chambers’ watches, lookouts spotted an old wreck. Chambers summoned Higginson who

decided to use the opportunity for target practice. He ordered the Atlanta to close on the wreck and all guns to open fire. Firing at ranges between 200 and 900 yards, they put a dozen 8” rounds, 70 6” rounds, and more than 50 rounds from the secondary batteries into the wreck, leaving the old wooden sloop riddled with holes but still afloat Chambers led a crew over in the ships’ boats and sank it with explosives to remove it as a hazzard to

navigation.^^ Chambers read avidly during the long cruise, having stocked up on books before leaving New Yoric. He maintained his interests in innovation and new technology and continued to design ships and to tinker inventions in his spare time. With Higginson’s permission, he completely redesigned the system for hoisting boats on the Atlanta. His improvements allowed them to hoist several boats at one time and made the job of hoisting them faster and easier. This brought Chambers to the attention of the Bureau of '^Logbook, USS Atlanta, 1891-92, NARG 24. 173 Equipment, which solicited his input in a study of ship’s boats.^The United States Transportation Company continued to correspond with Chambers about coal handling equipment and he gave them his advice freely. He also continued to write occasionally for the New York Herald. He represented that newspaper on the Atlanta’s cruise, keeping it informed of events in foreign ports. He maintained his contacts with the Nicaragua Canal Company and wrote to several newspapers, including the Herald, to refute their attacks on the company. Charles Scribner’s Sons approached Chambers to write a book for them on the Nicaraguan Canal, but he apparently declined.”’

The squadron anchored off Bahia Brazil on January 5, took on supplies, and left the next day for Monte Video. At Montevideo they were joined by the newly-completed

Philadelphia, which arrived on February 5. Walker transferred his flag to the Philadelphia dSid led his now enlarged squadron in a series of maneuvers that lasted through February. They returned to Montevideo at the end of the month for supplies and a brief shore leave and then sailed for Ensanada, Argentina, arriving on March 11. After a brief stop, they continued to Maldonado, Uruguay. There on the night of April 21 Chambers led a small crew that helped free the stranded Italian barque Giuseppe that had grounded. The ship was stuck fast in shallow water. Chambers directed his men in attaching lines to the stranded vessel. They then carefully hauled her free without damage. Admiral Walker commended him for a difficult job well done.” ” A few days later, the squadron sailed, and slowly retraced its steps back to the United States. They were back at Montevideo by the end of the month, and in Brazil by mid-May. In June, tiiey stopped at several Caribbean ports and again conducted squadron maneuvers. They arrived at New York in July where the ships of the squadron remained ^Chambeis. 1892 memorandum. Chambers Papers, Box 1; Chambers Fimess reports. National Archives RG 24; J. D. J. Kelly to Chambers, October 31,1892, Chambers Papers, Box 1; Chambers Hmess Report, 1892, NARG 24. ’^James Gordon Bermett to Chambers, June 16,1891 and October 23,1891, Chambers Papers, Box 5; Chambers to the Editor of the New York Herald, June 14, 1891 ; Robert Bridges to Chambera, November 14,1891. ^^"Walker to Chambers, April 26,1892, Chambers Papers, Box 1; Logbook, USS Atlanta, 1892. 174 through October. In September, the Squadron of Evolution was officially merged into the North Atlantic Squadron. The crews were slowly rotated off on leave, and many of the squadron’s officers departed for new assignments. During these months. Chambers helped make numerous modifications and changes to the Atlanta’s equipment The gunsights were again adjusted and improved as were a series of electrical systems. He spent a week in September and another week in October on board the Chicago helping her officers with similar improvements. Chambers was on board in early September when Walker sailed her to Newport to attend the opening session of the Naval War College. He

and several other officers from the Squadron of Evolution attended and listened to Mahan’s opening address in which he defended the college and explained its purpose.^'

As Chambers’ normal time to be rotated back to shore approached, he again received several offers from officers who wanted him. Chambers’ most surprising offer came from Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan who was finally assembling a permanent faculty for the Naval War College.®* Chambers was uncertain at first, for he thought

Mahan’s work was too theoretical and ignored the importance of technological change. In a series of letters, Mahan slowly convinced Chambers of the importance of the College. Chambers was apparently still considering his options when he attended Mahan’s address with the officers of the Chicago. He met with Mahan afterward and agreed to accept a position on the faculty provided his transfer could be arranged. Higginson, who turned out to be a strong supporter of the College, may have been instrumental in getting Chambers to accept Mahan’s offer. As he later wrote Chambers: “There are plenty of officers who can drill a division but very few who can write a good lecture.’’ Higginson would miss Chambers, but was willing to “give him up for the good of the service.” He had consistently rated him excellent in all categories of his evaluation, and considered him his most valuable officer. Chambers, who was then back on the Chicago was ®'fCgginsoQ to Chambers, September 11,1892; Logbook, USS Atlanta; Logbook, USS Chicago. "^Mahan to Chambers, M y 27,1892, Robert Seager II and Doris D. Maguire (eds.). Letters and Papers o f Alfred Thayer Mahan (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1975). 175 instructed to remain there lutil his orders could be cut He was finally detached to the Naval War College on October 31, 1892.^ Unlike many of his fellow officers. Chambers had managed to return to sea in modern warships. While new technology fascinated him. Chambers also relished the challenges of seamanship and command at sea. His proven abilities as line officer would later shield him from criticism from conservative officers who were often suspicious of technically-competent officers. His time at sea also gave him the real world experience that was essential for successful innovation. Despite his fascination for new technology. Chambers insisted on its practicality and applicability to real and immediate problems. While clearly ahead of the majority of his fellow officers in embracing new technology, he would always seem a little conservative compared to the more outspoken advocates of innovation who often promised more than they could deliver.

^^^ggioson to Chamben, October 4,1893 Chambers Papers, Box 1; Chambers Hmess Report, 1892, NARG 24. 176 CHAPTERS THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

Captain Stephen B. Luce first suggested the creation of a naval war college in

1877, but his proposal elicited little response. As interest in rebuilding the Navy gained support in the early 1880s he stepped up his lobbying efforts. Like many of his fellow officers he was frustrated by what he saw as the poor performance of the Navy in the Civil War. He blamed their failures on their poor understanding of the strategic principles that governed war—a deficiency not shared by some of their counterparts in the Army. Luce pounded this point home in his oft-repeated story of his meeting with General William T. Sherman. Luce and Sherman met in January 1865 to discuss the ongoing siege of Charleston. Despite repeated assaults and blockade the Navy had failed to capture the birthplace of sedition. Sherman explained that the city would soon fall without the necessity of a battle. His approaching army would “cut her communications” and Charleston would fall into the Nav>'’s hands “like a ripe pear.” And so it did, much to the embarrassment of the Navy.^ Luce found few allies for his campaign. Of the Bureau Chiefs, only Walker at Navigation supported him. Schley, the Chief of the Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting and hero of the Greely Expedition, saw no need for such an institution. Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance Sicard treated the entire idea in “a manner bordering on derision.”^*

So too did many other naval officers. Most could not have cared less. The only exceptions were a handful of reformers including the officers of the newly-created Office

^**Lucc, “Naval Administration,” USNIP 29 (1903), 1-13. ^^uce to Chandler, February 21,1905, quoted in Richardson, William E. Chandler, 307. 177 of Naval Intelligence. Like Luce and Walker, they expected the War College and the Office of Naval Intelligence to become the pillars that would eventually support a naval general staff. Walker’s support proved sufficient to move the project forward. He appointed Luce and two other reformers. Commander William T. Sampson and Lieutenant Commander Caspar Goodrich, to a board to study the creation of a naval war college. Not surprisingly, the board concluded that it “was an absolute necessity” to create “a place where our officers will not only be encouraged but required to study their proper profession; war.”^ Aimed with their report. Walker convinced Secretary of the Navy Chandler that a war college was an essential step on the Navy’s road to rearmament Chandler authorized its creation on October 6,1884 and appointed Luce, then in command of the North Atlantic Squadron, to be its first president The College was the only institution of its type in the world. The handful of officers assigned to the College over the next decade created the doctrine that guided the Navy through the 1890s and into the twentieth century. In securing its initial funding. Chandler and Luce described the College to Congress as merely a naval post-graduate school that would train officers in the new tactics and weapons required for the N a;ys new ships. They compared it to the growing number of civilian graduate programs and the Army Schools of Application established at

Leavenworth by Sherman. Luce, though, had a much more specific mission in mind for the College. It was to study “the great naval battles of history. . . which illustrate and enforce many of the most important and immutable principles of war.” Like many of his contemporaries. Luce believed that virtually all human endeavors were governed by scientific laws. He wanted naval officers to study “the great naval battles of the world” to understand “where the principles of science have been illustrated,” and especially where

“a disregard of the accepted rules of the art of war has led to defeat or disaster.” Through ’’‘SONAR, 1885,114. 178 historical analyses of past naval battles and comparisons to strategy on land officers at the College would discover the laws of naval warfare and apply them to create a science of naval strategy. Their work “would raise maritime war to the level of a science.” The study of history would form the core of the curriculum at the Naval War College.^ During the 1880s the quality and number of instructors and students at the College fluctuated wildly. The uncertainty of whether the College would even offer a session in a given year made recruiting instructors even harder, and impaired its ability to attract quality students. Which courses were taught varied based on which officers were ashore near Newport and the availability and willingness of civilian professors to lecture for free. Luce encountered great difficulty attracting a faculty to the College and regularizing its curriculum. He tried to attract officers who supported his vision for the College, but that was not always possible. Sampson and Goodrich both lectured to the first students on strategy, but were soon assigned elsewhere. The Office of Naval Intelligence sent a regular stream of officers to lecture at the College, but none stayed long due to other assignments. Army Lieutenant Tasker Bliss taught several courses in strategy, but his appointment proved particularly embarrassing to the Navy. Chandler himself had to step in and defend Luce’s choice. Naval officers may have cared little for strategy, but they cared even less to learn about it from the Army. Few officers in the Navy wanted to attend the College. Those officers sent there as students almost all resented the assignment. They attended the morning lectures reluctantly, especially those on history and other impractical matters, and probably engaged in little of the individual study for which Luce reserved afternoons. Luce was certainly correct when he argued that what “the learner derives by mental exertion is better known than what is told to him” in lectures, but that required effort on the part of the learner. It was a commodity in short supply among the College’s first students. ^Stephen B. Luce, “War Schools,” USNIP 9 (1883), 656, and “XDn the Study of Naval Warfare as a Science,” USNIP 12 (1886), 531-533; Robert Seager U,Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Man and His Letters (Naval Institute Press, 1977). 161-163. 179 though this was far from Luce’s only problem."* Contrary to Luce’s plan, the Navy expected the College to offer a variety of courses “supplementing the torpedo course” at the nearby Torpedo Station. Luce had after all justified its creation by emphasizing technological change and had never cleariy articulated its precise mission. Admiral Daniel Ammen, for example, had clearly missed Luce’s objective. He explained in his inaugural address to the first class of eight officers that the creation of College was necessary due to the “march of science,” further encouraging officers to believe that the courses taught at the College would be of a practical rather than theoretical nature.®’ These disagreements over the mission of the College grew worse over the next few years and helped fuel the bureaucratic struggle over its place in the Navy’s organizational structure. Luce’s decision to locate the College at Newport, Rhode Island, made matters worse. Luce had spent a great deal of time in the Newport area and liked the location. It was near civilian centers of learning from which he hoped to borrow instructors. It was also near the operating area of the North Atlantic Squadron which he hoped would visit the College regularly to apply its lessons. Narragansett Bay would be excellent for exercises. The Navy already had facilities at Newport and owned land on which they could be expanded, so cost would be minimal. Already in the Newport area were the Bureau of Ordnance’s Torpedo Station on Goat Island, and the Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting’s Apprentice Training School on Coaster’s Harbor Island. The arrival of the Naval War College at Coaster’s Harbor Island meant there were now three different

installations under three different commands all within a mile of one another at Newport The Chiefs of both of the Bureau of Ordnance and the Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting strongly resented the creation of another establishment at Newport under the control of the rival Bureau of Navigation. The Superintendent of the Naval Academy, "Y uce, T h e Naval War CoUege,” USNIP 36 (September 1910), 695. "*Robert Seager II, Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Man and His Letters (Naval Institute Press, 1977), 143; 1885 Opodng Address, NWC Archives. 180 Captain Francis Ramsay, was also angered by its placement He had expected that any post-graduate facility would be located at Annapolis on the Academy’s grounds and placed under his command. The result was a series of bureaucratic squabbles that lasted more than a decade. Each of these men repeatedly maneuvered to have the College placed under his jurisdiction. Temporary victories in these battles repeatedly changed the location of the College within the Navy’s convoluted organizational structure, deprived it of adequate funding, and severely curtailed its growth. Luce was quickly overwhelmed by his duties as president of the College. He spent most of his time lobbying for the College, trying to get it funding and prevent its hijack by rival bureaus. He needed to find someone to do the actual work of the school, someone to teach its students and formulate strategy—someone who would establish a “science of naval warfare under steam,” and lay a foimdation for naval strategy as

“Jomini had for strategy on land. ’^T h e officer he chose was Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan. Luce’s term as president of the College ended quickly. His ardent lobbying and routine use of political contacts to further his agenda had annoyed Secretary of the Navy Whitney. Whitney had no problem with the College, but he expected his officers to follow the chain of command through him, not make direct contacts with Congressmen to help secure funding for their pet projects. He refused to see the College as anything special, and in 1886 ordered Luce back to sea. Mahan became the College’s second president

Alfred Thaver Mahan Mahan had spent the previous year in historical research. He presented the result in a series of lectures on strategy at the College in 1887. Mahan offered his students a grand mercantile vision that linked naval strategy to national policy. He explained how Stq)ben B. Luce, “On the Study of Naval Warfare as a Science,” USNIP 12 (1886), 546. 181 nations created sea power and how that power was best employed to control the seas. Mahan argued that control of the sea should be the primary mission of a navy, not the United States’ traditional strategy of denying the sea to enemies through commerce raiding. He buttressed his argument with an examination of European naval wars. Sea

power, especially that of Great Britain, had often been the decisive factor in victory. He compiled his lectures into what would become one of the influential books of the time: The Influence o f Sea Power Upon History, published in 1890.” ‘ Mahan’s genius lay not in the originality of his ideas, for a number of reformers including Chambers had made similar arguments, but rather in his ability to synthesize the disparate ideas of many reformers into a coherent strategic vision. In formulating his theories, Mahan drew heavily on Jomini, especially his oft-repeated maxim that victory required one to concentrate one’s forces against a decisive point where the enemy was weak. From this came Mahan’s emphasis on building a fleet of battleships—the ships that best concentrated firepower—and keeping that fleet together at all times lest its scattered elements fall prey to a surprise attack by massed enemy forces. He united the Navy’s reformers behind a clear agenda and captured the attention of a number of important policy makers. His book became the bible for battleship advocates in the United States and several foreign nations.^" Mahan, like most American naval officers, believed that maritime commerce was the backbone of sea power. Control of the sea meant control of this commerce, which in turn allowed empires to thrive. Without it, they withered and shrank. Growing seaborne commerce would lead to competition. Nations would require strong navies when this competition inevitably turned violent and led to war. The only certain way to win such a war was to destroy the enemy’s fleet and blockade its coast, strangling it into submission.

*“Spector, Professors o f War, 43; Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence o f Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1890). *^Karstcn, Naval Aristocracy, 326; Seager,Alfred Thayer Mahan, 160-190; George W. Baer,One Hundred Years o f Sea Power, 14-18. 182 Mahan’s linkage of naval rearmament to commercial expansion proved timely. In the 1890s the United States increasingly exported more and more of its products, its merchants competed with those of Britain and other European nations for the markets of the world, and especially the Latin American market Here too, Mahan focused attention on an issue that naval officers had been screaming about for years without affecting policy. In ‘The United States Looking Outward,” published the same year as The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, Mahan enlarged upon his warning that the construction of a canal through the Isthmus of Panama was inevitable. Once built it would focus European attention on the Caribbean and Central America. Economic and military penetration would follow quickly. Given its present military inadequacy, “the piercing of the Isthmus” would be “nothing but a disaster to the United States.” Rearmament was an urgent necessity.^ Like Luce, Mahan actually spent much of his time as president of the College lobbying and scrounging to solve its serious funding problems. He often lacked the coal to heat the dilapidated former poor house in which classes were held. Few members of Congress actively supported the College. Even ardent supporters of the Navy like Senator

Eugene Hale questioned the Navy’s need for such an institution. Virtually all of them questioned its location near the summer homes of some of the nation’s wealthiest individuals including Cornelius Vanderbilt Newport had a reputation as a resort where the nation’s elite “played tennis in bathing suits” and indulged in “other enjoyments not usually associated with surf bathing.” Were naval officers at Newport to further their educations or their social contacts?^ Mahan’s ardent lobbying for the College ran afoul of Whitney Just as Luce’s had. Mahan’s good intentions and belief in his cause were irrelevant To put a stop to it.

Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence o f Sea Power Upon History (repnnt, NY : Dover, 1987), 33-34; ‘The United States Looking Outward,” The Atlantic Monthly 56 (1890); The Interest o f America in Sea Power, Present and Future (Boston: Little Brown, 1890), 13. ***Spector, Professors o f War, 21. 183 Whitney sent Mahan to the west coast to find a site for a naval base on Puget Sound and subordinated the College to the Torpedo Station. Fortunately for Mahan, Goodrich was then in command of the Torpedo Station. He kept the College focused on the study of

strategy and even ordered officers assigned to the Torpedo Station to attend the College’s lectures. But the College could not rely indefinitely on having a supporter at the Torpedo Station—its adherents were too few and its enemies too well-connected. By 1889, the future of the College seemed in doubt as it continued to suffer from bureaucratic neglect Consolidation of the Navy’s three installations in Newport seemed certain. The only question was under which bureau the consolidated bases would be placed. The only good news was a $100,000 appropriation for a new building near the College’s original site. There was still no permanent faculty and Mahan’s position remained unfilled. His lectures on strategy were read to the 1888 and 1889 classes by whoever was available—a practice that continued in the future, provoking Ramsay to ask why it was necessary to send officers to Newport to have Mahan’s books read to them?

Could they not read them for themselves while at sea?”® At possibly its darkest moment, a presidential election again reversed the fortunes of the Naval War College. Whitney’s successor, Benjamin Franklin Tracy fell under the

spell of the reformers and accepted the Mahanian vision for the fleet His first Annual Report was a major victory for the Navy and the Mahanian conception of sea power. Tracy called for a significant modernization of the fleet and the construction of twenty battleships. He argued that the United States “must have a fleet of battle-ships that will

beat off the enemy"s fleet on its approach.” That fleet “must be able to divert an enemy’s force from our coast by threatening its own.” Its operations, “though defensive in principle,” would be most effective by taking the offensive.”* Congress appropriated funds for three 10,000 ton “sea-going coastline battleships” the following year.

'^Ramsay to Taylor, September 13,1893, quoted in Spector, 66. ^SONAR, 1889,4. 184 It took time, though, for Mahan’s victory in shaping policy to trickle down to help the College. Tracy actually paid it little attention during most of his term. The bureaus continued to intrigue against one another, and the facilities in Newport continued their efforts to absorb one another. Ramsay still had no love for the College, and used his new position as Chief of the Bureau of Navigation to exact revenge by refusing to assign any officers to study there in 1890. The war scare with Chile the following year gave him another excuse to send no students. Without students, no classes were held in 1890 or 1891. The new commander of the Apprentice Training School, Captain Francis M.

Ounce, began actively lobbying to have the College absorbed into his command. Ramsay, in turn, tried to use the College to absorb the Torpedo Station. While clearly preferable to the former. Luce and Mahan wanted the president of the College to focus on teaching, not to become the senior administrator of the Navy’s diverse infrastructure in the Newport area.^

The situation seemed grim for the College. Urged by Luce, Tracy reassigned Mahan to be President of the College in 1892, placed the Torpedo School under his command, and forced Ramsay to release funds for the College. Mahan arrived in Newport in July and knew he had to quickly establish the College as a permanent fixture within the Navy. He needed to regularize the curriculum, recruit a permanent faculty, and attract a better class of students. Failure would doom the College. Mahan quickly recruited noted reformer Commander Charles H. Stockton, who had served with him on the Puget Soimd site selection committee, and Lieutenant James Sears, Chambers’ Academy cohort, who had reported for the Office of Naval Intelligence on the Chilean Civil War. Both eagerly accepted positions on the faculty. For his last slot Mahan wanted an officer with solid technical qualifications, but who also shared his strategic vision—an officer who would embody his dual command of the Naval War College and the Torpedo Station. Preserving the College meant accommodating those demanding courses in ^Seager,Alfred Thayer Mahan, 221-2. 185 practical subjects. Chambers was the perfect candidate. Mahan was well aware of him from his Prize Essay and writings on the Nicaraguan canal. Their views, especially on the canal, were virtually identical.^ Mahan wrote to him offering him a post, but it took some convincing before Chambers would agree. Chambers raised a number objections in his response to Mahan and questioned the role of the College in rebuilding the fleet His main critique of Mahan’s work was that the world had entered “a mechanical age.” It was “useless,” he argued, “to kick against the bricks.” Mahan, try as he might, could not turn back the

clock. Chambers worried that in his zeal to create a science of strategy, Mahan was ignoring the means to carry it out He agreed that the study of naval strategy was important, but it should focus on modem ships and weaponry. “One of the chief points in the study of Naval Strategy should be to shape a course of Naval Construction Policy.” Mahan wanted to rise above these petty details to get at great principles. Chambers argued that ignoring the technical details that would underlay the construction of a modem navy would make it impossible to create a strategy for that fleet. In the modem

world, strategy and technology were necessarily linked.^ Mahan, impressed with Chambers’ critique, redoubled his efforts to recruit him for the faculty. He wrote back that he agreed that technology was important, but argued that “trust in machinery” had been “pushed beyond reason.” The “human factor” was everyday “more and more relegated to a position hopelessly inferior.” While it was clearly impossible to halt this trend, Mahan hoped “to deflect it somewhat” Otherwise he feared the art of war would disappear under a “deluge of machinery.” He had no problem with Chambers inserting technical details in his lectures as long as he stayed focused on strategic principles. Otherwise, he feared the College would lose its focus on Its specialty

of strategy and become just another technical school. He assured Chambers the College Alfred Thayer Mahan, 193. ^**Mahan to Chambers, July 27,1892, Robert Seager II and Doris D. Maguire (eds.). Letters and Papers o f Alfred Thaver Mahan (Anmqxilis, Naval Institute Press, 1975). 186 would continue to grow, fueled by “the success of my own work, abroad and at home.” This success was proof the College was on the right track. In the long run, though, its success would “result not from the predominance of my views or your views, but from the fair collision of opinion among men connected with i t ” He repeated his invitation, and urged Chambers to make up his mind quickly. There was no “divergence of thought” between them that necessitated them “remaining apart”“° After some thought. Chambers agreed to join the faculty.

The 1892 Session While Chambers arranged for his transfer, Mahan prepared for the 1892 session scheduled to begin on September 7. Along with funds, Tracy had forced Ramsay to finally send some students. In all he sent 24 students to the College that year, though this number included Chambers who found himself listed as both a student and a faculty member. The other 23 students included some of the least promising officers in the Navy.

Mahan believed, probably correctly, that Ramsay had deliberately sent the worst officers he could find, hoping to sabotage the program. One of the few exceptions in this unpromising lot, was another of Chambers’ friends from the Academy, Lieutenant Henry T. Mayo.“ ‘ It is imcertain when Chambers joined the faculty at Newport His orders to report there were dated October 31, after the session had ended. Chambers was on board the Chicago, which arrived at Newport for Mahan’s opening address and stayed for a few days. It seems likely that Chambers, with the support of his commanding officer and Commodore Walker, simply remained in Newport after the Chicago left Everyone

^*Mahan to Chambers, July 27.1892, Letters and Papers o fAlfred Thayer Mahan. Aside from Chambers and Mayo, the students that year were Commanders M. L. Johnson, and C. H. Davis; Lieutenant Commanders R. E. Impey, and L. C. Logan; Lieutenants J. A. Rodgers, J. C. Irvine, W. P. Day, J. C. Wilson, L. C Heilner, G. A. Calhoun, J. H. Bull. F. H Tyler, B. T. Walling, W. P. White, J. L. Purcell, and E. H. Tillman; and Ensigns W. H. G. Bullard, Philip Andrews, H. K. Hines, N. A. McCuUy, and C. B. Brittain. 187 involved knew Ramsay was deliberately delaying the paperwork of both faculty and students, so they simply worked around him. The session followed the pattern established in the 1880s with lectures on naval strategy and history as well as on a number of practical and technical subjects. Stockton and Mahan lectured on the principles of strategy and naval history. Both repeatedly emphasized that preparation for war needed to be mental as well as physical. Naval officers need to “imbibe the experience of the past” to craft a strategy for the future. The students were probably more interested in what Sears had to say. He discussed the lessons of the Chilean Civil War, the only recent naval conflict, and described the effect of new weapons on naval warfare. These included the sinking of the armored cruiser

Blanco Encalada by torpedo boats. Chambers lectured on developments in Central America and the importance of an Isthmian canal, preferably through Nicaragua of course.^® Mahan brought in sixteen visiting lecturers to supplement the faculty. Among them was his brother Fred (his Army career was floundering), who lectured on coast defense. The Navy desperately wanted to hand this task off to the Army so it could build its grand, and concentrate on blue water operations. At the Navy’s urging, several coastal states had created naval militias. Retired Lieutenant and Naval Academy Professor John C. Soley explained in his lectures that these too would help lift the onerous burden of coast defense from the Navy.^ Roughly one quarter of the lectures dealt with tactical issues and modem weaponry. Commander P. F. Harrington discussed ram tactics. Lieutenant J. F. Meigs covered gun tactics. Both expected ramming attacks to be a normal feattne of naval combat Ensign Albert P. Niblack described recent developments in naval signaling, and described their use in recent maneuvers by the Squadron of Evolution and the North

^Opening Address, 1892, Naval War College Archives. ‘’Seager,Mahan, 243 188 Atlantic Squadron. Lieutenant T. C. McLean and several other oflicers from the Torpedo Station stopped by to explain the mechanics of the various torpedoes then being tested. Commander Theodore E. Jewell suggested how they might be used in combat, but little work had actually been done on developing tactics for torpedo attacks or torpedo boats.^ Despite Mahan’s strong defense of the importance of strategy as the ’’queen of military science,” most of the lectures that year focused on practical and technical subjects such as the mechanical and logistical problems of the New Navy. Surgeon C. A. Siegfried discussed the treatment and prevention of various diseases afflicting seamen.

Lieutenant Samuel Diehl discussed compass error. Two of the rising stars in the Construction Bureau, Naval Constructors J. J. Woodward and David W. Taylor, lectured on ship construction and explained how to conduct speed trials. Passed Assistant Engineer I. N. Hollis supplemented their lectures with a detailed treatment on recent developments in steam engineering. Lieutenant J. B. Murdock did the same for electricity, emphasizing the growing number of electrical devices being deployed on American waiships. Lieutenant Commander Conden explained modem developments in armor including the new Harvey, steel-hardening process.^^ Students spent the afternoons in individual study and reading the few assigned textbooks. They read Mahan, of course, and also Jomini on whom so much of Mahan’s work drew and whom he routinely praised to his students. They also read the works of British Admirals John and Philip Colomb. These two made many of the same points as Mahan. Like him, they emphasized that the primary mission of a navy was to engage the enemy fleet on the high seas. They, too, emphasized enduring principles over technological change. A few works on recent conflicts, such as those of Edward Bruce Hamley on the Crimean War, rounded out the reading list“ * ^**Vtatian to Solcy, October 29.1892, Robert Seager Q and Doris D. Maguire (eds.). Letters and Papers o f Alfred Thayer Mahan (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1975). ^“Austin M. Knight and W illiam D. Fuleston, History of the Naval War College (Newport, 1916); Seager, Mahan, 244; New York Times, December 17,1892,4. ^^Chambers, Naval War College Notes, Chambers Papers, Box 29; Spector, 42; Edward Bruce Hamley. 189 The course ended with a wargame of a prospective British invasion of the United States. It pitted a British force of 20 battleships, 40 cruisers, and 40 torpedo boats against an optimistically large American force of 10 battleships, 6 monitors, 25 cruisers, 30 converted merchant cruisers, 25 torpedo boats, and 30 converted yachts.^ It was a situation remarkably similar to that Chambers outlined in his Prize essay, and probably owed much to his input Retired Lieutenant McCarty Little refereed the game using his newly revised rules. Little’s system of wargaming would become a regular part of the curriculum in 1894.^ At the conclusion of the session. Chambers took the opportunity to propose to Isabella Reynolds. They had met as children when Isabella’s family moved to Kingston from New Brunswick, New York. They were married in a small ceremony on December 2, 1892. After a brief honeymoon, they returned to Newport. Their only child, lin ing

Reynolds Chambers, was bom there the following year.^

Torpedoes Encouraged by Mahan, Chambers renewed his interest in torpedoes. Once again he began avidly following technological developments in a variety of areas. Mahan expected him to become the College’s primary’ lecturer on torpedoes and routinely referred to him as “our torpedo man.” He resumed his correspondence with Very and consulted regularly with the officers of the torpedo station. He helped test the new Hotchkiss torpedoes and suggested a number of improvements to them.^ He also worked with the Torpedo Station to develop tactics to employ torpedo boats and he helped

War in the Crimea (New Yoric Scribner and Welford, 1890) and the Story of the Campaign of Sebastopol (Lxmdon: W. Blackwood and Stms, 1855). ^^Unknown newspaper clipping. 1892, Naval War College Archives. ’“William McCarty Little, The Strategic Naval War Game or Chart Maneuver,” USNIP 38 (1912), 1212-33. ”Tfigginson to Chambers, November 28,1892; Rands Isabella Chambers to W. I. Chambers, May 19, 1893, Chambers Papers, Box 5. ’“ Chambers to Very, November 18,1893, Chambers Papers, Box 1. 190 improve their signaling system so these attacks could be coordinated. Chambers also worked with Mahan to integrate torpedo boats into his battleship- dominated conception of strategy. Mahan’s own musings on the subject were among his least impressive work. He simply suggested that torpedo boats would be employed much as flreships had been in the era of sail. “Like fire-ships, small torpedo-cruisers will delay the speed and complicate the evolutions of the fleet with which they are associated.” They would be a threat primarily to anchored warships and might force them to scatter to safety as had the Spanish Armada when attacked by British flreships.^*

Mahan readily admitted his limited imderstanding of these new weapons systems, but did little to improve upon it Mahan suggested that increasing artillery range would doom the torpedo as it had the fireship, making it impossible for it to close into range of its target. It was a strangely static picture of technology in which he assumed that one weapons system would advance while the other held still. This was a natural result of his suspicion of technology combined with his excessive focus on battleships. In Mahan’s world, good men on poor ships usually beat poor men sailing better ships. This had often proved true in the age of sail, as Mahan’s examination of the British Navy showed, but in the industrial age the pace of technological advance was such that the gap between good ships and poor ships often could not be bridged by courage, experience, and training.^^ Chambers had much higher expectations of what torpedo boats could accomplish as well as a much better grasp of technological innovation. In his never-delivered lectures, he sharply criticized the United States for not embracing them sooner. In the War of 1812, the Navy should have adopted Fulton’s harbor defense plans and used mines and torpedoes extensively. Chambers believed Mahan’s comparison with flreships dramatically understated the case. Torpedo boats were much more powerful as well as being faster and more maneuverable than flreships. Like flreships, torpedo boats could

’“ Mahan, Influence o f Sea Power Upon History. 111. ’“ Mahan, influence o f Sea Power Upon History, 113-114. 191 attack battleships in port before they could mass on the high seas for a modem Trafalgar. Unlike flreships, though. Chambers argued that torpedo boats could also operate effectively on the high seas. He was among a handful of officers that pushed for the development of smaller torpedo boats that could be carried by battleships and launched and rearmed in the course of battle. Regardless of their size, torpedo boats would be a necessary part of any fleet Any fleet intent on massing for battle would have to defend against torpedo attack. Even if Mahan were right and Chambers doubted this, torpedo boats would continue to be used in confined and shallow waters. They would not disappear. Chambers rarely fell prey to pushing one weapons system over another. Instead he argued for the employment of an integrated fleet possessing a variety of arms and ship types. The only weapon he consistently criticized was the ram which still had numerous adherents in the United States during the 1890s. As Chambers repeatedly argued, torpedoes, as well as modem, rapid firing guns, made ramming attacks little more than suicide. A torpedo was essentially a ram able to operate free from its ship.^ Chambers was particularly worried about the vulnerability of large armored ships to torpedoes. As far back as 1882 and his first ship design, he had puzzled over how to defend against them and protect warships from waterline damage. He closely watched tests on torpedo nets at Naval Torpedo Station, but these were only useful in protecting ships in port Even then their effectiveness seemed doubtful against volleys of torpedoes.^Used aggressively torpedo boats had the potential to upset Mahan’s battleship-laden apple cart Even more threatening were submarines. Chambers observed several of the early tests of Holland’s vessels. In his notes he wondered if someday command of the sea might pass to submarines. Unless battleships’ vulnerability to

^Chambers, ‘Notebook on Tactics, Strategy, and Torpedo Warfare,” Chambers Papers, Box 32; Chambers, 'Tntroductor) Lecture on Torpedoes,” Chambers Papers, Box 33. ^‘^Mahan to Sampson, February 13,1893, Chambers Papers, Box 1. 192 torpedoes was corrected, it certainly seemed possible.^ The many unarmored ships in the United States Navy were even more vulnerable. This was a subject upon which his old friend Charles Henige was hard at work. Henige bad continued his efforts to to modernize ship design and construction and undermine Wilson and the old guard in the Bureau of Construction and after Chambers' departure from the New York Navy Yard four years before. Henige's efforts continued to meet with little success. As he wrote Chambers, his numerous enemies, who included those who had "killed your scheme six years ago," had intensified their intrigues against him. Undeterred, Henige continued to rub the Construction Bureau's nose in its many design errors. These had forced the complete redesign of several new ships in the midst of their construction. Other ships had needed several hundred tons of extra ballast to stabilize them. Henige had anticipated these problems and warned higher ups in the

Bureau, but was ignored. Instead, Wilson repeatedly suppressed his work and tried to get the Secretary of the Navy to fire him. Sampson, then Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, protected Henige from these attacks and helped him get an article exposing many of the ship design problems published in the Naval Institute's Proceedings despite Wilson's efforts to suppress iL It w as yet another scathing indictment of ship design and construction in the United States. Henige argued that the protected cruisers built and being built by the Navy were unstable and vulnerable to attack below the waterline. While the armored deck above the engine compartment from which they derived their name might help protect against plunging artillery, it made them more vulnerable to torpedo attack by shifting their centers of gravity upward. They needed waterline armored belts for protection, which would have the added advantage of improving their stability.

His suggestions were ignored. Neither Henige nor Chambers understood the lack of interest in their efforts to improve ship design and construction and embrace new

^^S^ecUx,ProJessorsofWar, 148 . 193 technology and methods. As Henige commented, it was “astonishing to see how little interest Naval Officers take in a matter which concerns them more than anybody else.” He might have been talking about Mahan.“* Pediaps sparked by his renewed correspondence with Henige, Chambers returned to his own efforts at ship design. His notes from these years are filled with designs for a variety of different battleships. His work was guided by two concerns: first, improving the armor distribution to protect against modern ordnance and waterline penetration; and second, maximizing its firepower. Chambers had accepted Mahan’s argument that concentration was key to victory, and so sought to achieve it on an individual ship basis. It was a quest that he pursued only half-heartedly in later years, but would eventually lead him to produce the first plan for an all-big-gun battleship in the United States.

Chambers on Strategy Chambers’ understanding of strategy was clarified and focused by his association with Mahan and his reading of Colomb. Like them, he came to believe “that naval strategy had its broad and indefeasible principles.” He even accepted that the study of the

past was “an essential foundation to an intelligent preparation for the present and future.”^’ Yet Mahan’s strategic principles did not cover everything. In his lectures. Chambers emphasized the importance of public opinion on the conduct of wars and campaigns. Mahan’s goal of engaging the enemy’s fleet was “but a means to an end,” and a potentially costly one.“® The gap in Mahan and Colomb’s work that most drew his attention was technology. Colomb argued that “very little technological knowledge is needed to understand that the methods of strategy may change but that its principles remain immutable. With tactics the case is very different the history of military tactics is

^‘Tlemge to Chambers, November 9, 1893 and November II, 1893, Chambers Papers, Box 5. Chambers. "Scheme for Departments at the War College,” undated 1893 paper. Chambers Papers, Box 29. ““Spector, Professors o f War, 49,86; Chambers, War College Notebook, Chambers Papers, Box 29. 194 the history of weapons successively employed and a similar evolution may be traced in naval tactics.’^

The question for Chambers was when did technology change so much that it forced strategy to change as well. Certainly the transition from oared galleys to full- rigged sailing ships had opened new strategic opportunities. The steamship, torpedo, submarine, and modem ordnance would do the same. Chamber’s major goal at the Naval War College became integrating an appreciation of technology into Mahanian strategy. He argued that the study of strategy and the development of technology were interdependent There ’‘is no royal road to the study of either independently.” By studying them together he hoped to 1) sift out general principles, 2) use these principles “to seize first advantage of new improvements and new additions to force;” and 3) to “wisely direct the line of improvements in the Navy””°

The Bureaucrats Strike Back The 1892 session ended on October 29 and Mahan’s faculty began preparing for what they hoped would be an even better session the following year. They set about devising a curriculum, preparing lesson plans and lectures. Chambers made a number of maps and diagrams for classroom use. Working closely together, they planned a course of study based on the needs of the Navy rather than the vicissitudes of teacher availability. They planned for an expanded College composed of four departments: 1) the Art of War Upon the Sea; 2) the Art Of War Applied to Coast Defense and Attack; 3) Naval History and Maritime Interests; and 4) the Torpedo Course.” ' In the midst of their work, a presidential election once again reversed control of the government and seemed to bode ill for the College. returned to the White House and Democrats regained control of both houses of Congress. They retained '"cham bers. War College Notebook, Chambers Ptgiers, Box 29. ^Chambers, Notebook on Tactics, Strategy, and Torpedo Warfare. Chambers Papers. Box 43. '^'“Scheme for Departments at the Naval War College.” Chambers Papers. Box 29. 195 Ramsay as Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, and even worse appointed Hilary Herbert to be the new Secretary of the Navy. Long the senior Democrat on the House Naval Affairs Committee, Herbert was one of the most outspoken proponents of the New Navy, but he was also a champion of economy and efficiency. He had repeatedly voted against funding the Naval War College and had supported several efforts to consolidate it with the other Newport installations. It seemed likely he would renew these efforts as Secretary of the Navy. The time was clearly ripe for the College’s enemies to attack once more.

While the new administration sorted itself out, Bunce and Ramsay united their efforts at consolidation. They had a great deal of support within the Navy. The Phythian Board in 1891, for example, had suggested merging the three Newport installations into an enlarged Naval War College composed of four divisions: Art of War, Torpedoes, Gunnery, and Apprentice Training. Bunce and Ramsay had a different scheme in mind, but they capitalized on the support for consolidation in general. They carefully built support for their case in the press, arguing that it was a matter of administrative and economic efficiency that would save the government thousands of dollars. To make sure they had the ear of the press, they also spread a variety of rumors about the goings on at Newport These included the old stories of College officers socializing with debutantes and bathing beauties, but several new ones as well. The most salacious was that sodomy had become rampant among the apprentice seamen on the training ships. Bunce argued, with questionable logic, that moving them ashore would somehow solve the problem. ^ The New York Times ran a series of articles critical of the College that summer. It favored relocating the College to Annapolis and giving its new building to Bunce’s apprentices. The College, it complained, met “for only a few months of the year” and was merely a graduate school for those few Annapolis graduates “who indicate a wish to take a post-gmduate course.” The mission of the Training School was much more important ^^Spector, Professors o f War. 68-70; Seager, Mahan. 274-5. 196 Repoiters described the crowded conditions of the apprentices in exaggerated detail. The state of the Marines, who slept in tents year-round, was even worse. The officers of the Training School were quartered together in the training sYàçRidunond’s wardroom. Only Bunce slept in comfort ashore. The Times condemned these conditions as “a disgrace of government” and demanded something be done.^ Assistant Secretary of the Navy William McAdoo visited Newport in the last days of May and came to similar conclusions. Like Herbert, he had opposed funding the College as a member of Congress, decrying the “great misfortune that our military schools should be established in connection with watering places characterized in certain seasons of the year as scenes of social display and dissipation.”^** Bunce, pleased with the news coverage he was getting, expected to win. He vowed to friends that “in six months my boys [the apprentices] will be eating their grub in the lecture room of the War College.” As momentum built, Ramsay and Bunce took their case for “financial efficiency” to Congress.^” Ramsay, as Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, used his powers to directly attack the College. In his most famous action he ordered Mahan back to sea, insisting that even Mahan must abide by the normal requirement of rotation between shore and sea. Mahan and the College’s supporters pleaded with Ramsay to make an exception, but Ramsay refused, replying that it was “not the job of naval officers to write books.” Luce, now- retired, lobbied his friends furiously to stop Mahan’s second expulsion, but they could do nothing. Mahan returned to sea in command of the Chicago and left for Europe on a cruise that better resembled a book tour than a naval exercise. Herbert honored his choice of successor, and , an expert tactician, became the College’s next president Ramsay did not stop with Mahan. Whenever possible, he found extra work for

York Times. May 29.1993,9 and July 9.1893,2. ^Congressional Record, 49th Congress, 2nd Session, February 25,1887, quoted in Spector, Professors of War, 53-4. Professors o f War, 64; Seager,Mahan, 274. 197 members of the College faculty. He valued Chambers’ opinion on ship design from their time together at the New York Navy Yard, and so sent him to observe the sea trials of a number of new ships in Narragansett Bay. On several occasions he sent him much farther afield. In January, he appointed Chambers to the preliminary trial board of the Bancroft, a new steel gunboat modified to serve as at the Naval Academy. In June he ordered Chambers to take charge of the old sloop Fortune, sail her to New London, and there help with the speed trials of the new armored cruiser iVew York. In July, and then again in August, he sent him to sit on naval examining boards.^^^

Throughout the summer, the College’s faculty continued its preparatory work, but they could almost see the vultures circling their building. All four of them were very concerned about the growing hostility of the press toward their institution. In August, rumor reached them that Ramsay would again refuse to send them any students. Frustrated, Chambers wrote Mahan asking for advice. He believed emphatically in the College’s mission and was eager to champion its cause in the press. How, he asked, should he proceed to defend the College? Mahan had kept in touch with events at Newport while in command of the Chicago. From there he orchestrated the defense of the College and maneuvered to have Robely Evans replace Ramsay as Chief of the Bureau of Navigation. The great strategist’s reply was short on details, but he encouraged Chambers to fight on for the cause, “to go down with his colors flying.” If, after “every proper effort, you are beaten by the folly and indifference of second-rate superiors you have no more cause for mortification than a man who is cut down at his post because the rest have run away from his support”^ Chambers would soon get his chance to prove his worth to the prophet of the New Navy.

Under pressure from multiple directions. Secretary of the Navy Herbert decided to

^‘Ramsay to Chambers, January 17,1893, June 1 1893, and July 7,1893, Chambers Papers, Box 1. ^M ahan to Chambers, June 1 , 1993,Papers and Letters o fAlfred Thaver Mahan. 198 visit Newport late that summer and investigate the situation himself. He traveled there on board the dispatch bodXDolphin, the first of the Navy’s new ships to be completed. Her captain, former naval intelligence attache Lieutenant Benjamin H. Buckingham was a strong supporter of the College and an admirer of Mahan. He presented a copy of

MaOxàn's Influence o f Sea Power Upon History to Herbert who read it during the voyage. Impressed, Herbert wrote to Mahan that if the College had “produced nothing more than this book it is worth all the expense incurred for iL””* This did not mean, though, that the College had to remain at its present location. Herbert remained interested in consolidation, especially as the assault in the press continued. On October 17, the New York Times once again attacked the College, claiming it fulfilled “no useful purpose,” and suggested it be closed. Taylor traveled to Washington to lobby for the College and speak with Herbert again, but met with little success. The momentum in favor of consolidation seemed unstoppable.” ’

In November Ramsay, with Herbert’s permission, ordered Chambers and Sears to report to the Apprentice Training School. In addition to their present duties at the Naval War College, which were minimal since Ramsay had sent no students, they were each to take command of a division of apprentices. Bunce had won his case for increasing the efficiency of the Newport establishment, but he had not reckoned with the personalities of the officers he sought to borrow. Chambers, who had previously accepted special assignments from Ramsay without complaint, decided to act This was not temporary duty at a speed trial or the inspection of a new ship. It was a permanent assignment under a different commanding officer—an officer who threatened the College as an educational institution. Chambers may not have been thinking clearly when he sent a letter to Ramsay the next day and enclosed a copy to the Secretary of the Navy. Certainly he recalled Mahan’s

’^*Herbeit to Mahan, October 4,1893, Papers and Letters o fAlfred Thayer Mahan. ^N ew York Times.OcXohex 17,1893,2. 199 encouragement “to go down with his colors flying.” In his letter Chambers argued that he could not work at the Training School in addition to his duties at the College. Further, he quite properly pointed out that he could not report to two different commanding officers. One was quite sufficient He asked the Navy Department to relieve him of the “arduous” position at the Training School. Apparently worried that they might simply transfer him to the Training Station, he concluded by stating that if he was not allowed to continue teaching at the College, he would accept “any duty other than training apprentices.” Sears wrote a similar letter.^ The two friends who had cooperated in a series of practical Jokes as Academy cadets were now playing a much more dangerous game. When confronted with Chambers, William C. Whitney handled the matter calmly, commending Chambers and mollifying him. Hilary Herbert was not William C. Whitney. He hit the ceiling. A former Confederate colonel, he was accustomed to having his orders obeyed. Herbert wrote Taylor demanding Sears and Chambers be court martialed for insubordination. Already facing the budget ax and possible amalgamation with its neighbors, the last thing the College needed was to have half its faculty court martialed. Taylor replied that while Chambers and Sears may have acted rashly, their objection was legitimate—two commanding officers was one too many. He tried to calm Herbert dow n, but Herbert remained unconvinced. Once he heard about the letter, Bunce Joined in and accused Chamber and Sears of conspiring in an “unlawful combination” to undermine his authority. He too pressed for their courts martial.^ Instead of fearing for their careers. Chambers and Sears actually welcomed the possibility of a court martial. It would give them an opportunity to fight back against the College’s enemies and expose their underhanded maneuvering. Both expected to win if

^"’Bureau of Navigation to Chambers, November 3,1893, and Chambers to the Chid' of the Bureau of Navigation and the Secretary of the Navy, November 6,1893, Chambers Papers, Bo.\ 1. "'Handwritten note on bottom of Chambers to the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation and the Secretary of the Navy, November 6,1893, Chambers Papers, Box 1. 200 things went that far. Sears in particular was eager to take Bunce down a notch. How, he wondered, “could a man of his age and experience can be so imbecile.” Chambers, too, must have wondered how a man he had served under and respected could have turned into such a fierce enemy. While Chambers and Sears were eager to escalate the war of words with Bunce, Taylor prudently ordered them to keep their mouths shut.^ Taylor embarked on his own campaign to save the College. After his failed trip to Washington in October, he turned to the public. Speaking to virtually any business, political, or civic group that would listen, he defended the role of the College as necessary for naval modernization. He sent regular press releases to all the major newspapers defending the College. Luce called on all of his political contacts to rally to the College, and Mahan continued his machinations, capitalizing on his now international fame to save his beloved school. Slowly the tide turned in favor of the College, but too slowly for Chambers and Sears.^ In December, Ramsay appeared before the House Naval Affairs Committee. In a private meeting he urged its members to discontinue the appropriation for the College. Bunce renewed his demands for the College’s building. Despite the arrival of the Richmond and Lancaster as training ships, he claimed he needed still more space for the apprentices.^ With Ramsay’s help, he received iL On December 8 Ramsay ordered Chambers and Sears to turn over their quarters at the College to officers from the Training School. If Bunce could not have them, he would have their quarters. The order arrived without warning and demanded instant compliance. Stockton told Chambers and Sears they could “box things neatly” once they were moved out of their quarters and into tents. He apologized for the windy weather, but assured them he and Taylor would “do what we can to help you with our limited means.” Chambers and Sears passed the next

^^ears to Chambers, December 15,1893 , Chambers Papers, Box S. ^"Taylor to Luce, December 28, 1893 and January 22, 1894, Luce Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division; Spector, 70. ^Spector, Professors o f War, 66. 201 few days shivering outside in tents, waiting to hear if they would be coiut martialed.^ Mahan, who had encouraged his subordinates in their actions, now had to save their hides from the incensed Secretary of the Navy. He complained to his sister that Chambers and Sears had “erred by being too precipitate.” They should have waited “until every argument had been exhausted with the Secretary [of the Navy]. Had he [Chambers] then persisted, an application for detachment was perfectly correct” Perhaps, but Mahan certainly knew he was at least partly to blame for the rash action of his former subordinates. He too wrote Herbert in their defense. Between them, Mahan and Taylor managed to save the careers of Chambers and Sears. Their days at the Naval War College, however, were numbered. Herbert insisted they be removed from the faculty.^

Conclusion The past year proved a watershed in the history of the Naval War College. Aside from establishing the curriculum on a sound footing. Chambers, Mahan, Sears, Taylor and their supporters defeated the last serious attempt to destroy the College. On March 14, 1894, the Navy merged the Naval Training School, Naval War College, and the Torpedo Station into one command under Bunce. While on the surface a defeat, Mahan’s fame shielded the College from direct attacks and it was able to develop unmolested. In 1895, Robley D. Evans replaced Ramsay as Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, permanently ending the threat from that direction ^ Twenty-five students attended the

1894 session, which began on June 12 and lasted for four months. It was both the most successful and also the longest of the College’s sessions in its ten year history.

Unfortunately Chambers was not there to see iL Exiled from the College, Chambers had to scramble for an assignment to his

^ C . H. Stockton to Chambers, December 5,1893, Chambers Papers, Box 1. ^"""Mahan to Ellen Evans Mahan, December 18,1893, January 5,1894, and February 9,1894, 'mPapers and Letters o fAlfred Thayer Mahan. ^Seager,Mahan. 276. 202 liking before Ramsay sent him to a far distant station. Henige tried to convince him to join the faculty of the Naval Academy. The new superintendent. Captain Robert L. Pythian, wanted him. This, though, was the same Phythian who had headed the board that recommended consolidation of the Newport installations, Chambers wanted nothing to do with him. Henige was unable to convince Chambers that Phythian was a reformer and that they would get along.^ Instead Chambers accepted a post at the Bureau of

Ordnance, which had been trying to recruit him for a decade. Chambers held its new Chief, William T. Sampson, in high regard. His credentials as a reformer and friend of the Naval War College were impeccable. From the Bureau of Ordnance Chambers continued to follow events at the Naval War College. He consulted with Taylor regularly and helped plan the 1894 and 1895 wargames.^ In 1894, Taylor implemented the curriculum and lectures that Mahan, Stockton, Chambers, and Sears had planned for 1893. The lectures were basically the same as before and covered the usual topics of history, naval strategy and tactics, coast defense, and weapons systems. Stockton lectured on the importance of the Nicaraguan canal using Chambers’ notes. Many of the lectures straddled their topic with one foot in the present and the other rooted firmly in the past Taylor and Stockton compiled synopses of these lectures into a handbook for students that included their criticisms of each, cited as college opinion. These were often quite conservative. They argued, for instance, that boarding actions were still possible, as were ramming attacks. In fact, they presented the ram as more important than the torpedo and denigrated torpedoes in general.^ Had Chambers and Sears been able to make their points in person, tliey might have helped their elders produce a more forw ard-looking document. The course of lectures that year was again followed by a wargame. Britain was again the enemy, and this time her fleet was bent on capturing or destroying New York. It ^"’Henige to Chambers, November II, 1893, Chambers Papers, Box5. ^“Taylor to Chambers, May 24.1895, Chambers Papers, Box 5. "“Naval War College, ^j/rocto/CoMrre. 1894,12,14,20,24. 203 again owed much to Chamber’s studies and prize essay and study and also the 1892 wargame. New York may well have been chosen as the target due to the bad press for the College emanating from that city. That too came to end in 1894, and even the New York Times began supporting the College.^' The College’s future was certain. Chambers seemed to have again deliberately chosen the role of martyr and provoked a serious dispute with the Secretary of the Navy and senior officers. The seriousness of this dispute finally sank in to him during his last days at the College. It would be many years before Chambers would again directly criticize his superiors, though that confrontation would have much more dire consequences for his career. Until then. Chambers would prove a model officer and loyal subordinate.

”'New York Times, June 10,1894,2. 204 CHAPTER 9 THE 1890S

By the mid-1890s, the Navy’s reannament program had made great strides. New ships joined the fleet every year. The Navy’s first battleships, the small and already dated

Maine and Texas were completed in 1895, and were soon followed by the more modem Oregon, Indiana, and Massachusetts, which Congress had authorized in 1890. Thereafter Congress authorized new battleships roughly every other year.^” The Navy concentrated most of its new armored warships in the North Atlantic Squadron. By 1897, that squadron counted among its members all five of the Navy’s battleships as well as two armored cruisers. This squadron was the Navy’s showcase. It held maneuvers regularly while cruising between the major ports of the eastern seaboard. Its activities received lavish attention in the press. The Navy scattered its new unarmored warships (protected cruisers and gunboats) throughout its various squadrons. Unlike the North Atlantic Squadron, the squadrons on foreign station continued the old practice of individual ship cruising, but each squadron assembled together at least once each year for a period of intensive drill, target practice, and maneuvers. In terms of both technology and training, the United States Navy was a capable force for the first time in thirty years.

While the fleet grew, the United States government, perhaps emboldened, embraced a more confrontational foreign policy. In 1889, a showdown with Germany over was averted only when a ^ h o o n swept the gunboats of both nations onto a reef. An 1891 assault on the crew of the cruiser Baltimore in Chile left several of them

"^The Iowa was authorized in 1893; the Kearsarge and Kenntcky in 1895; the Alabama. Illinois, and Wisconsin in 1897. 205 dead. The Navy mobilized for war, and President Harrison dispatched more ships to the region. After this show of force, the government of Chile backed down and agreed to pay an indemnity. Two years later, sailors and Marines from the cruiser flojto/i helped American settlers seize control of the government of Hawaii. The Cleveland administration changed foreign policy only slightly. Despite his refusal to annex Hawaii, Cleveland was interested in expanding American influence overseas. In 1894, he ordered the Navy to break the blockade imposed by rebels in the Brazilian Civil War. In 1895, he went after bigger game, intervening in a boundary dispute between Venezuela and Great

Britain over Guiana. Despite its size, the Royal Navy was stretched quite thin due to its worldwide commitments. The British government, interested in improving relations with the United States, backed down. These successes vindicated naval expansion and proved the Navy’s utility in foreign policy. Naval rearmament supported an increasingly aggressive foreign policy that would lead to war with Spain before the close of the decade.^

The greatest obstacle to the Navy’s modernization in the 1880s and 1890s was the lack of domestic industry specializing in steel ship construction. Steel-makers had great difficulty meeting the Navy’s stringent quality requirements and keeping pace with advances introduced in Europe. Many manufacturers were reluctant even to bid on the growing number of naval contracts due to the high start up costs. This was especially true for armor and heavy ordnance, items for which there would never be a market outside the military. Armor manufacturers were at the mercy of a government that would one year appropriate funds for several armored warships and the next year for none at all. It required more than a decade for American factories to gear up to produce modem ordnance and armor. In the 1890s this burgeoning industry was racked by a series of scandals involving overpricing and poor workmanship. Washington I. Chambers had ^^Emest Andrade, ‘The Great Samoan Hurricane of 1889,” Navcd War College Review (1981): 73-81; Walter LaFeber, The New Empire (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963), 130-136,210-218,243-282; Kermeth J. Hagan, This People’s N ow (New York: Free Press, 1991), 198-205. 206 already encountered some of these problems while working on \h& Maine. The 1890s found him in the middle of these disputes as they reached their climax. The Navy negotiated its first armor contract with Bethlehem Steel in 1886. When Bethlehem ran into production problems, the Navy negotiated a second contract with Carnegie Steel as security. Both firms proved slow to deliver their goods and quick to levy additional charges. Both charged considerably more than their European counterparts. The Navy knew it was being overcharged, but could do nothing about it It needed armor, and Congress required that it be manufactured at home. Both companies claimed that the high quality demanded by the Navy and the high rejection rate of its inspectors forced up the price. Government officials. Congress, and the Navy accepted this explanation until 1895 when the press discovered that Bethlehem, which was then selling armor to the Navy for $625 per ton, had contracted with Russia at the absurdly low price of $250 per ton. In December the Senate launched a full investigation of armor prices.^**

Bureau of Ordnance Inspector After returning from three months leave. Chambers reported to the Bureau of Ordnance on March 16, 1894. He finished his remaining fourteen months of shore duty as an ordnance inspector. Captain Sampson sent him back to Newport for his first assignment, this time to the Torpedo Station. Chambers was an obvious choice for the assignment given his long familiarity with torpedoes and his recent work with the officers there. Many of them were his friends. At the Station, Chambers supervised the test-firing of several different types of torpedoes from the Cushing, the Navy’s first modem torpedo boat He became close friends with the Cnj/ung'5 commander. Lieutenant Frank P. Fletcher. Together they developed several minor improvements to the reliability and ’b en jam in Franklin CooUng, Gray am/IVa/erMzvy (Hamden, CT; 1979), 121. This price was actually below Bethlehem’s cost of production. A later contract raised the price to $524, but the damage to Bethlehem’s reputation had been done. 207 accuracy of the Navy’s torpedoes and launching mechanisms. They might have accomplished more, but Chambers soon had to leave.^’® In May, Secretary of the Navy Herbert became convinced of problems at the

Pennsylvania Steel Casting and Machine Company, which was making parts for several of the Navy’s ships. He arranged with Sampson to have Chambers sent to its plant in Chester as an inspector. Chambers’ assignment was part of a general increase in the number of inspectors as the Navy tried to cope with the growing number of problems with manufacturers. In part this was due to the increasing number of orders as rearmament accelerated, but Herbert and many others suspected some companies of deliberately shipping substandard goods to inflate their profits. Chambers noticed problems his first day at Steel Casting. He took notes and began discreetly gathering evidence that would be “convincing and irrefutable.” Inspectors at other companies had blown the whistle at the first sign of trouble. Without sufficient evidence to proceed to court, these companies escaped with warnings. Chambers worked to get a conviction.^ The company’s fraudulent practices actually increased while Chambers was there. At first the company simply mixed in a few substandard castings into large lots of good castings in the hopes of slipping them through. Those Chambers caught were often sent through again in a second try to slip them past him. When these efforts failed, the company erased the serial numbers on the rejected castings, stamped new numbers on them, and then tried to pass them through yet again. Unable to sneak items past Chambers (or at least as many as they would have liked), company officials counterfeited his official stamp. They stamped several rejects as passed, and sent them on to the gun factory at the Washington Naval Yard. Chambers caught a company foreman red-handed with the counterfeited stamp. The company’s president, Mortimer H. Bickly, claimed he

’^Chambers, ‘Telition to Congress,” 5. ^N ew York Times, July 1, 1894,9. 208 had known nothing about any of these shenanigans and blamed his foremen for the repeated efforts at fraud. As a result of Chambers’ investigation, gun castings and forgings were thereafter tested twice by independent inspectors after they had already passed government inspectors. Along with other inspectors Chambers continued to push for higher standards and tougher inspections of the steel industry.^

In November, Sampson assigned Chambers to be the Ordnance Inspector at the Midvale Steel Company, headquartered in Philadelphia. Midvale had specialized in gun forgings, and was the only company in the United States other than Bethlehem able to manufacture high caliber naval artillery. From Philadelphia Chambers also oversaw the work at a number of smaller plants in the region. This kept him constantly traveling between different factories, often at his own expense. The Navy was always slow in reimbursing him for his travel expenses. In between inspections. Chambers also testified in a number of lawsuits the government had filed against manufacturers. The most important of these came in December when he testified fora week as the star witness in the case against Pennsylvania Steel Casting.” ®

Chambers’ time on shore was due to expire in the spring. The Bureau of Navigation warned him to prepare himself for sea duty. Sampson, though, objected to losing Chambers and called on Secretary Herbert in person to get Chambers' orders changed. The Navy continued to experience problems finding the necessary parts for its new ships and was forced to order parts and fittings wherever it could. New cases continued to go to trial and Congress demanded increased scrutiny of industry. The

Bureau of Ordnance found itself stretched beyond its limits. Sampson needed officers of Chambers’ ability more than ever. Sampson initially thought he had succeeded in retaining Chambers, but he had only managed a short delay. The policy of three year rotations between shore and sea had not been violated for Mahan. An exception would ^N ew York Times, July 4,1894,9 and December 26,1894,9. ^’'’’Ellery Ingham (U. S. District Attorney for eastern Pennsylvania) to Chambers, December 24, 1894, Chambers Papers, Box 5; Chambers, travel receipts. Chambers Papers, Box 2. 209 certainly not be made for Chambers no matter how valuable Sampson considered him. On June 13 Chambers was ordered to the Minneapolis.^

It is uncertain how Chambers felt about this assignment Unlike the past he did not make a tuss or express his feelings in any way. No doubt having repaired his image with Herbert he had no wish to antagonize him again. Regardless, the Minneapolis was a choice assignment She was one of the most modem cruisers in the fleet

The Minneapolis

Authorized in 1891 and commissioned in December 1894, the 7375 ton Minneapolis and her sister ship Columbia were the ultimate development of the protected cruiser by the United States. In response to Congressional pressure for faster and faster ships, her designers sacrificed everything for speed and endurance. They envisioned the two ships as modem Alabamas, commerce raiders that could stay at sea virtually forever, relying on their sails for cmising and refueling from prizes as needed. Chief Engineer of the Navy George Melville himself designed the innovative, triple-screw, three-engine plant Under normal cmising, the cmisers used only two engines to save fuel. The third was brought online only when great speed was needed. These cmisers could easily overtake almost any merchant ship afloat and outmn any warship that posed them serious danger. In the summer of 1895 the Columbia proved the design in a race, crossing the in just imder seven days at an average speed of 18 knots. Despite their great speed, their design met with harsh criticism from many of the Navy* s line officers. Lieutenant Albert P. Niblack, for example, complained repeatedly about the “craze for speed” that had produced such a poorly armed warship. Other officers agreed. With a main armament of just one 8” and two 6” guns, the Columbia and

Minneapolis were indeed pooiiy armed for ships of their size. Their eight 4” and dozen

^Commander C. J. Speny to Chambers, May 17,1895, Chambers Correspondence, NARG 24; Sperry to Chambers, May 20,1895, Chambers Papers, Box 2. 210 smaller guns would be of little help against a normally armed cruiser. Both also had four tubes for Whitehead torpedoes, but few officers had any faith in these weapons and even less training.^

Chambers joined ihc Minneapolis, commanded by Captain George H. Wadleigh, at New York on July 1,1895. Wadleigh had been the executive officer on the Pensacola on Chamber’s first cruise. The Minneapolis was part of the North Atlantic Squadron, which also included the new armored cruiser Aiew York and the protected cruisers Columbia, Montgomery, and Raleigh. The squadron was commanded by the War

College’s old nemesis. Admiral Bunce, on board the New York. The squadron had just returned from a prolonged cruise and spent the next month outfitting. It sailed early in August

The squadron sailed north along the coast to Boston. After a few days in port, the squadron turned south, stopping at a variety of ports and reaching Norfolk a few weeks later. It returned briefly to New York at the end of the month. There, on September 1, a delegation from the city of Minneapolis visited the Minneapolis and in a ceremony attended by Admiral Bunce presented the ship with a silver service.^' Beginning September 7, Bunce led the squadron through a series of exercises off Fishers Island near Long Island, New York. The first day the ships of the squadron followed the flagship through a series of simple maneuvers. The next day they engaged in target practice and the following day they landed a combined brigade of Marines and sailors. The brigade landed in waves led by the Marines and supported by gunfire from the ships of the squadron. Chambers considered these drills successful, but noted serious problems in keeping the landing force supplied with ammunition. On September 20, as a result of these exercises, Bunce ordered Captain Wadleigh to organize a board of two watch officers and a signal officer to consider changes and additions to the Fleet Drill

“Alden, The American Steel Navy, 56. "New York Times, September 2,1895,8. 211 Manual and their system of signalling. It was time to try more elaborate evolutions. Wadleigh placed Chambers in charge of the board and assigned two of the Minneapolis'oth&T OÏÜC&T&, lieutenants J. H. Oliver and J. B. Murdock, to help him. Together they designed a much more complex set of maneuvers that would involve changing from line to column and back again several times, each time echeloned in a different order. While not particularly useful in combat, they would give the officers much needed practice. While working on these plans. Chambers also designed a new sighting device. He pressed Wadleigh for target practice at longer ranges in the upcoming maneuvers to test it**”

The squadron practiced these new maneuvers on the 24th, and several ships had problems executing them. Even the Minneapolis made several minor mistakes each day in maintaining a correct interval. The maneuvers were followed by another round of target practice at which Chambers new sight proved a slight improvement to the old one. Following these maneuvers the squadron resumed its peregrinations along the coast In October it stopped at Newport News for the launching of the new gunboat Nashville, a ship that Chambers would later command. Following the ceremony the squadron returned to sea for yet another round of target practice, and another series of landing operations."^ The North Atlantic Squadron was a well-honed tool that regularly received favorable mention in the press. The same could not be said of the small European Squadron. In October its commander. Rear Admiral William A. Kirkland, was recalled following a succession of impolitic actions that annoyed the administration. In particular he appeared slow to respond to the needs of American missionaries in the Ottoman Empire. President Cleveland sent Commodore Thomas O. Selfridge, Jr., to Europe to replace Kirkland with orders to personally oversee the safety of the American missionaries. A week of anti-Christian rioting had just left several thousand Armenians "“^Chambers, ‘\JSS Mumeapoiis Notebook on Seamanship and Fleet Drill,’' 1895-6, Chambers Papers, Box 43. ""“Logbook, USS Minneapolis, 1895, NARG 24. 212 dead. The situation continued to escalate while Selfridge traveled to Europe on a commercial steamer to join his squadron. The rioting resumed in the first week of November, and this time missionaries were attacked in several cities. Their churches, schools, and homes were looted and burned. The missionaries’ supporters in the United States demanded that Cleveland take strong action.'*” Selfridge joined his small squadron of only two cruisers, the San Francisco and Marblehead, in Le Harve and then sailed east. They arrived in Ale.xandretta, Syria, at the end of November. Finding the situation calm. Selfridge ordered his squadron north along the coast and investigated the situation in several other coastal cities. None showed any indication of trouble. Selfridge sailed on to Smyrna where he could stay in contact with Washington by telegraph. There he and his officers quickly made friends with the local British and Greek merchants who entertained the naval officers in their lavish homes on a regular basis. Despite Selfridge’s optimistic reports, Cleveland decided another cruiser was needed at Smyrna as a show of force. He ordered the Minneapolis to join the European

Squadron. The Minneapolis left Hampton Roads on November 27, crossed the Atlantic, and arrived at Gibraltar on December 13. The Minneapolis had been quite sluggish on the voyage, so Wadleigh ordered Chambers to lead a crew of divers to inspect her bottom. They found the ship seriously incrusted and foul. The hull also showed signs of corrosion. The ship needed to be dry docked and scraped and cleaned, but they had neither the time or the facilities. Chambers and his crew cleaned the propellers, and the Minneapolis continued on her way to Smyma.^^ There she joined the varied collection of foreign warships that had assembled there following the riots. It included ships from every major European power that ranged in size from several French torpedo boats to the

Austrian battleship Tegetthoff. ***New York Times, October, 22,1895, I; William N. American Sea Power in the Old World (Westport; Greenwood Press, 1980), 113-114. ■"“Logbook, USS Minneapolis, 1896, NARG 24; New York Times, November 21. 1895.5. 213 On December 19, shortly after the Minneapolis arrived. Selfridge was again ordered to concentrate his squadron at Alexandretta following further reports of trouble there. He was to evacuate the missionaries if they were again attacked. The expected renewal of violence never came, but tensions simmered throughout the spring. In January the squadron returned to Smyrna, and the Cincinnatisanved, bringing Selfridge’s squadron up to four cruisers. Selfridge was now able to rotate his ships to Italy for maintenance while maintaining a strong presence in Ottoman waters. In February, 1896 he sent the Marblehead to Naples for a much needed overhaul.

Meanwhile the Minneapolis continued to have problems getting up to speed. Wadleigh, worried about the condition of the hull, put Chambers in charge of a board of officers to monitor the situation. Chambers and his team constantly checked for leaks in the ship’s double hull. At each of her stops. Chamber led a crew in diving suits to inspect the exterior of the hull. Covered with a thick mat of growth, it was difficult to monitor its condition, but it was clearly getting worse. In April, Chambers reported that the corrosion of the ship’s hull had become critical. The ship needed to be dry docked as soon as practical so the hull could be scraped, patched, and completely repainted. On the Marblehead’s return. Selfridge sent the Minneapolis to Genoa for repairs. Wadleigh had Chambers supervise of all work on the ship’s hull. Chambers determined the problems had been caused by careless work in the United States. Large surfaces had been left unpainted, and numerous joins in the hull had been poorly sealed. Wadleigh was so impressed with Chambers’ work that he placed him in charge of all work on the Minneapolis whenever she docked in the futime."”* After her overhaul. Self ridge transferred his flag to the Minneapolis and sailed for Kronstadt to represent the United States at the coronation of Czar Nicholas II. The Minneapolis stopped briefly in London for Selfridge to pick up his credentials and

'"’’chambers to Commanding OfTicer, Minneapolis, April 18,1896, Chambers Papers, Box 2; Chambers, ‘Notebook: USS \'finneapoIis Seamanship and Fleet Drill,” 1895-6, Chambers Papers, Box 43. 214 arrived at Kronstadt on May 13. Three days later. Selfridge and his staff along with Wadleigh departed for Moscow by train, leaving the rest of the officers and crew to sample the dubious delights of Kronstadt Selfridge and his party remained in Moscow for the next month, attending an unending succession of ceremonies. On May 30, they witnessed the riot that broke out when tens of thousands of peasants in from the countryside trampled one another trying to reach the free gifts being distributed by the future Czar. Fifteen hundred peasants died.^ Selfridge rejoined the Minneapolis in mid-June and they began the long voyage home. On the way. Selfridge made up for being cooped up in the eastern Mediterranean away from the regular social circuit of the European Squadron by making numerous stops. A five day-stop at Helsingfors, Finland, was followed by visits to both Sweden and Denmark where Selfridge dined with the royal families. By July, they had only made it to Norway, and on the 16th the Minneapolis docked at Christiana. Selfridge and his staff once again left to call on royalty. Over the course of the entire voyage to and from Russia, the Minneapolis only engaged in target practice once. On July 10, shortly after leaving Denmark, Selfridge assigned Chambers along with Lieutenants J. H. Oliver and J. B. Murdock to examine how target practice had been conducted in the past and to make recommendations for the future. Their report questioned the accuraey of scoring hits and recommended practice at longer ranges. Selfridge adopted some of their suggestions in the target practice held just prior to docking at Christiana and forwarded their report to the Bureau of Ordnance. The Navy* s efforts at target practice remained inadequate for several more years until better- connected officers took up the cause."**

The Minneapolis left Norway on July 25 and crossed the North Sea to Edinburgh,

^Selfridge, What Finer Tradition, 252-267. ‘"“Selfridge to Chambers, July 10, 1896, Chambers Papers, Box 2; Chambers, Kotcs on Target Practice,” Chambers Papers, Box 43; Chambers, Notebook; USS Minneapolis Seamanship and Fleet Drill 1895-6, Chambers Ptq)ers, Box 43. 215 Scotland where the officers and crew received a brief leave. From there they sailed to London and then Southampton and Queenstown. Selfridge was in no rush to return to the eastern Mediterranean, but following a renewed outbreak of violence and the arresi of several naturalized American citizens in Aleppo, Cleveland ordered him back to the Ottoman Empire. Selfridge delayed his departure for two weeks. The Minneapolis did not sail until August 28. Once underway. Selfridge did not rush to his destination. After an extended stopover in Tangier, he ordered \he Minneapolis to Genoa to be scraped and cleaned again. They arrived on September 18. Several members of the crew, apparently as uninterested in another extended stay in the as their admiral, deserted. Wadleigh and his senior officers, accompanied by local police, had to hunt them down in dockside taverns and paid the police a bounty of $10 for each deserter caught Selfridge spent his time visiting the Pope and touring northern Italy."*” The Minneapolis did not reach Smyrna until October 7. By then the situation had calmed on its own. A few weeks later. Selfridge transferred his flag back to the San Francisco, which had larger accommodations for him, and sailed backed to Italy. The rest of the squadron remained in Smyrna until December. Then, renewed violence against Christians forced them to scatter to different ports to protect the missionaries there. The Minneapolis spent the next month cruising among the Ottoman ports on the Syrian coast without incident^*” Throughout 1896, relations between Spain and the United States continued to worsen as Spain struggled to put down a renewed Cuban rebellion. Selfridge returned from Italy worried that if war broke out, his squadron would be trapped and destroyed by the larger Spanish fleet He and his small staff began work on war plans. They decided on a desperate gamble. They would counter Spanish superiority in firepower with a massed torpedo attack by all the ships of the squadron. On January 1, Selfridge ordered each of ^h few York Times, July 13,1897,10. ■““Selfridge, What Finer Tradition, 273-277, Still, American Sea Power in the Old World, 124-125; Logbook, USS Nûnneapolis. 216 his ships to train oOicers to fire torpedoes and to fire at least two per month at targets. Cleariy this was an opportunity for Chambers to show liis expertise with these weapons, but the necessity of Selfridge’s order shows just how unready his squadron was for combat While many American cruisers were armed with torpedoes, they were rarely fired. Only two years before the Defroif had become the first American cruiser to fire this weapon. Few officers had ever fired torpedoes and virtually none had ever maneuvered a ship to make a torpedo attack.^" Chambers trained the officers and crew of the

Minneapolis to fire torpedoes, but fortunately Selfridge’s plan never had to be executed. In May, following several calm months in the Ottoman Empire, the Navy ordered the Cincinnati and Minneapolis back to the United States. The San Francisco accompanied them as far as Athens, where it remained so Selfridge could attend the first modem Olympic games. The Cincinnati and Minneapolis sailed on to the United States. There, the two cruisers rejoined the North Atlantic Squadron. They arrived just in time to participate in the Navy’s largest maneuvers in twenty-five years. Bunce deployed his eight ships in two separate divisions. Seven of the eight were modem cruisers, the other was the monitor Ainphitrite. She participated only in the opening stages and was replaced by the Texas a few days later, having served only to slow the squadron’s maneuvers. In addition to the normal squadron evolutions, they practiced forming line of battle from separate columns and defending against torpedo attack.'*'^ On July 8,1897, following the maneuvers. Secretary of the Navy Long ordered the Minneapolis and Columbia placed out of commission at Philadelphia. They would be maintained in reserve along with several other cruisers as an economy measure. The same engines that made them among the fastest ships of their size afloat also made them expensive to operate. Decommissioning them would not only save money, but also free

■"‘Selfridge to C. O. Minneapolis. January 1,1897; Selfridge, What Finer Tradition, 278-280; New York r/mey. October 23,1894, I. ^‘'Chambers, Notebook: Fleet Maneuvers 1897, (Chambers Papers, Box 43. The other ships in the maneuvers were the New York, Columbia, Atlanta, Montgomery, w A Raleigh. 217 up crews for the new battleships joining the fleet The Navy found it easier to build new ships than to attract crews for them. Both cruisers would be hastily recommissioned for the Spanish-American War the following year.^" There were far better candidates in the fleet for mothballing. On July 1, while undergoing a routine engine trial at the New York Navy Yard in preparation for going to sea, one of the Puritan’s four boilers exploded, scalding several members of the engineering crew and leaving the ship crippled. The Puritan was one of the five double- turret monitors that had languished uncompleted through the 1870s and 1880s. She and her sister ships were finally completed as much to clear up space in the crowded navy yards as to have the ships available for service. Following the explosion, the press denounced them as obsolete menaces.

Two weeks later, Bunce appointed a board, composed of Chief Engineer Edward Farmer, the head of steam engineering at the yard, George Cowin, the Puritan’s Chief Engineer, and Chambers, who was then awaiting his next assignment, to investigate the explosion. The three investigators were appalled by what they found. One set of rubber rings at the seals connecting the boilers had ruptured, causing the explosion. But the rings on all the boilers showed severe deterioration—any of them might have ruptured. The rings were just part of the problem. An e.xamination of the fragments from the destroyed boiler revealed serious metal fatigue and corrosion. Many parts simply crumbled in the investigators’ hands. Had the rings not failed, the boiler itself might have ruptured causing even more damage. The explosion was the result of poor maintenance on a ship that despite its recent commissioning, was actually quite old.^'^The investigators tendered their report to Bunce and Chambers then departed for a brief leave.

■“Wew York Times, March 16,1897,4; Logbook, USS Miimeapolis, 1897, NARG 24; Alden. The American Steel Navy, 240. *'*New York Times, July 3. 1897,4.1897,4. 218 The Armor Factory Board The Navy continued to experience problems with private industry. In December 1896 Navy inspectors declared several of Carnegie’s armor plates for the battleships Kearsarge and Kentucky defective. Over the next few months they unearthed defects in the work of other companies as well. The steel industry’s representatives continued to complain that the standards were too high. While a few inspectors did admit that the Navy demanded a higher quality than “that used in any foreign navy,” the perception remained that the steel industry as a whole was out to defraud the govemmenf**® The primary issue, though, became price rather than quality. In April 1897, Congress declared that it would pay a maximum of only $300 per ton of armor instead of the current price in the United States of $575 per ton. Secretary of the Navy John D. Long asked Congress to compromise at $400, but was rebuffed.

Congress had Bethlehem’s contract with Russia as proof of the steel industry’s perfidy. At that time, only the Italian Navy which was paying $600 per ton for armor, paid more for its armor than the United States. Krupp charged the German Navy only $530 per ton. Le Creuset in France was the cheapest at $475 per ton."”* Clearly American firms were overcharging, but the price Congress offered was simply ridiculous. That summer the armor pricing scandal reached the peak of its fur}-. The Navy’s 1897 advertisements for bids for armor for the battleships Alabama, Illinois, and Wisconsin received no response from the industry. Despite Sampson’s efforts to encourage new companies to produce armor, not a single company tendered a bid. The steel industry refused to produce armor at a price Congress was willing to pay. What it did produce too often proved defective. Both Congress and the Navy gave up on purchasing armor from domestic industry and began discussing alternatives to private industry. Carnegie offered to sell the government his plant, a plant built with government

■“ Wew York Times, December 5, 1896,1 and January 3,1897,17. *'“New York Times. Aprü 8,1897,3. April 9,1897,3, April 11,1897,4, and July 30.1897.5. 219 subsidies, but this only infuriated Congress further. In August, Congress authorized the Navy to create a board to investigate the possibility of building a government owned and operated armor factory. They wanted its report by the end of the year, so they could act on it at the start of the next session."*’’ On August 6, Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt formally established the Armor Factory Board and appointed some of the Navy’s best technical officers as its members. He chose Commodore J. A. Howell, the inventor of the Howell torpedo to be its president Along with him served Captain A. H. McCormick, Civil

Engineer Mordecai T. Endicott Chief Engineer James H. Perry, and Lieutenant Frank F. Fletcher. He assigned Chambers to be the board’s recorder. Roosevelt was very interested in the board’s work. He sat in on many of its meetings, and pressured its officers to reach a conclusion quickly.

The board had to determine the practicality of building and then operating a government armor factory “of sufficient capacity to meet the probable requirements” of future naval appropriations. When the members of the board asked Roosevelt what Congress meant by this vague guideline, he told them to design a plant able to produce enough armor for two battleships per year. At the time, this meant about 6000 tons of armor per year. The board members needed to determine what machiner) and specialized equipment the plant would needed, how the plant should be laid out, how much land and how many buildings it would need, and finally what raw materials were required for armor production and from what companies they should be purchased. Of particular concern was whether the government should buy the steel ingots it would need from private industry or build a steel plant to make its own. The latter would considerably increase the cost of the armor plant

The officers of the board first met on August 9, 1897. They spent the next week planning their approach and then set out to examine steel plants to determine what their Cooling, Gray Steel Blue Water Navy, 141. 220 plant would need. Their first stop was Carnegie’s armor plant in Munhall, Pennsylvania, which they examined on the 24th. Afterward they examined several of Bethlehem’s plants, and then the Illinois Steel Company in Chicago. They returned to Washington and met on September 7 to draft an outline of their findings and discuss their next step. Making armor was a complicated process involving many reheatings and temperings, and the technology was changing rapidly. The board members decided they needed an expert to advise them.

Famed steelmaker John Fritz was about to retire from Bethlehem Steel. Following several discussions, the members of the board decided he was the best person available to help them, but Secretary of the Navy Long opposed his appointment because of his close cormections to the industry. Several board members suspected that Long simply wanted to appoint a political crony to the position. At its next meeting Roosevelt confronted

Howell about the board’s choice, Howell answered evasively, trying to give Roosevelt the option of inserting his own choice. The rest of the board followed Howell’s lead and were equally evasive. Frustrated, Roosevelt turned to Chambers, who was seated apart from the rest of the board taking notes, and asked his opinion. After recovering from his shock. Chambers stammered out that John Fritz was the best person then available. Roosevelt, snapped his teeth together with an audible click and then declared “we will take John Fritz.” He wished the committee a good morning and then left the room to confront Long. A few days later he ordered them to hire Frntz.""* The board, accompanied by its new advisor, then left to inspect a number of smaller plants in , Alabama, Tennessee, and . They also took a second look at Carnegie’s and Bethlehem’s operations. At the plants, they interviewed a wide selection of people from the lowest paid steelworkers to upper management When they finished, they had visited every major steel plant in the country and many of the

''"‘chambers, “A Characteristic Action of Mr Roosevelt while Secretary of the Mavy,” undated. Chambers Papers, Box 24; Coding, Gray Steel Blue Water Now, 142. 221 smaller ones as well. Chambers was kept busy recording their findings and also fending off the swarms of local politicians who descended on the board at its various stops. While the board had not been asked to make any recommendations as to the future factory’s location, local politicians assumed it had and refused to believe otherwise. All were eager to have the factory built in their districts. The board delivered its report in the first week of December. It concluded that a plant capable of producing 6000 tons per year would cost $3.75 million to build and it would have to include a separate steel factory. The best armor was produced from new steel before it had cooled. The government plant would face many of the same problems as privately-owned plants. Like them it required special equipment and tools not needed for any other type of work and would need a steady stream of orders to keep costs down. The failure of Congress to appropriate funds for armor in any given year would force the plant to shut down with the consequent loss of trained workers. Many of these would be highly skilled and hard to replace. Even with a steady stream of orders, the board still expected it to cost more than $300 per ton to produce armor, plus the cost of the plant itself. Despite the cost, the press expected Long to ask for bids to build plant within the next few months."**’ As the Armor Factory Board did its work, tensions continued to increase between the United States and Spain. Anti-Spanish rioting broke out in Havana shortly after the board delivered its report The United States sent the battleship Maine there to observe the situation. A daily barrage in the Yellow Press convinced many Americans that the Spanish were guilty of a succession of unspeakable atrocities. The cry for war grew louder and more urgent every day, and the question soon became when, not if, the United States would go to war over the last jewel in Spain’s colonial crown. As tensions increased. Congress reconsidered its intransigence on armor pricing and authorized the Navy to pay up to $400 a ton for armor. Long quickly negotiated new armor contracts *^'*New York Times, December 2,1897,3; House Document 95,55th Congress, 2nd Session, 20-21. 222 with both Carnegie and Bethlehem at that price. The Armor Factory Board's report was forgotten.'**®

The Torpedo Station

Chambers was desperate to see action in the upcoming war. So too were many of his fellow officers who scrambled for shipboard assignments. As usual, the best assignments went to those best connected. Chambers faced a double obstacle. Not only did he lack high political connections, but his technical skills made him Just the type of officer needed at home to help the Navy gear up for war and sustain it through the conflict On the advice of his friend Lieutenant Commander T. C. McLean, who had taken command of the Torpedo Station in June 1897, Chambers decided his best bet was to parlay his expertise in torpedoes to get command of one of the new torpedo boats being rushed to completion. He would help oversee their construction, and then hopefully be appointed to command one in war. Chambers wrote to the Bureau of Navigation asking to be assigned to the Torpedo Station and McLean wrote in support of his application. The Chief of the Bureau, Rear Admiral A rent S. Crowninshield, responded favorably, saying he would “see what he could do.” On the 29th Crowninshield transferred Chambers to the Torpedo Station. The first part of Chambers’ plan was complete, but getting a command proved more difficulL*** Tensions between Spain and the United States continued to escalate. On February 9, a New York newspaper published Spanish envoy Enrique Dupuy De Lome's private letter to his superiors. DeLome made numerous disparaging remarks about President McKinley in the letter and questioned his willingness to go to war. Six days later, the battleship Marne exploded in Havana harbor. On February 25, according to plan.

■‘“ LaFeber, New Empire, 348-9; Cooling, Gray Steel Blue Water Navy, 145. C. McLean to Chambers, January 1 ,1898, Chambers papers. Box 2; Crowninshield to Chambers, January 11,1898 and Jamiary 29,1898, Chambers Papers, Box 2; Chambers to Bureau of Navigation, January 10,1898, NARG 24. 223 Roosevelt sent out orders repositioning the fleet and ordering it to prepare for war. Every day more and more politicians called on President McKinley to act decisively. When tlie Navy* s investigators concluded that the Maine had met with foul play, popular sentiment for war became overwhelming. On April 21, McKinley order the Na’. y to blockade Cuba. Four days later, he asked Congress for a declaration of war against Spain. On the 30th, Commodore George Dewey’s entered Bay and quickly reduced the obsolete ships of the defending Spanish squadron to smoking hulks. Chambers was still at the Torpedo Station helping the Navy recover from years of neglect of torpedoes and torpedo boats. He was well on his way to missing the war. Despite its pioneering use of spar torpedoes in the Civil War, the United States was slow to embrace this weapon, due to post-war technological conservatism and low budgets. It was in Europe that almost all of the pioneering work took place and where the major technical problems were solved. Englishman Robert Whitehead, who managed an engineering firm in Hume, developed the first automobile torpedo in partnership with Austrian Johann Luppis. They demonstrated their first prototype in 1868. It had a range of only 200 yards and was not particularly accurate. Still, it was a great advance over the spar torpedoes it would quickly eclipse. The Russo-Turkish War of 1876 saw the first widespread use of torpedoes, and in Russian hands Whitehead torpedoes proved particularly effective against Turkish ironclads. Every European power began building torpedo boats, setting off a mini-arms race in small craft By 1880, Whitehead had sold

1500 torpedoes to a variety of different nations and was recognized as the worid’s premiere manufacturer of torpedoes.^“ Such a promising invention sparked numerous competitors. The most successful of them was Louis Schwartzkopf, the owner of a machinery business in .

Whitehead believed that Schwartzkopf had arranged the mysterious theft of a set of his

^Charles M. Arnhault The Employment of Torpedoes in Steam Launches Against Men of War,” USNIP 6 (1880); Edwyn Gray, The Devil's Device (London: Seely, Service and Co., 1975). 224 pians, but could never prove it Regardless, Schwartzkopf was soon manufacturing a torpedo remarkably similar to the Whitehead under his own name. Within a few years, most of the torpedoes sold around the world were either Whiteheads or Schwartzkopfs.^

In the United States, Captain J. A. Howell began experimenting with automobile torpedoes in 1870. His final design, patented in 1884, was ingenious. Powered by a heavy flywheel wound by a steam turbine before launch, it outperformed the contemporary models of both Whitehead and Schwartzkopf and offered the added advantage of leaving no wake of escaping air bubbles. Howell sold his rights to the Hotchkiss Company in 1884 and this firm continued to improve upon his design, increasing its range to more than 500 yards. In its 1895 tests it scored a perfect 60 hits out of 60 torpedoes fired at a range of 400 yards. Unfortunately, the Howell torpedo faced a serious problem. The same flywheel that made the Howell accurate and wakeless also severely constrained its speed and range. New Schwartzkopf and Whitehead torpedoes were much faster, and they continued to get faster every year. By the mid-1890s, Whitehead’s newest designs completely outclassed all others in both speed and range. In 1892, the United States Navy accepted the superiority of his design and contracted with the E. W. Bliss Company to manufacture Whitehead torpedoes under license. Production was shifted to the Newport

Torpedo Station a few years later.'”"’ Whitehead, though, had still not solved the problem of keeping his torpedoes on course. He tried a variety of complicated gadgets, but was never satisfied with the results. In the mid-1880s Chambers had tried to leapfrog the problem, quite literally, with his rocket torpedo. Minimizing the torpedo’s time in the water minimized its deviation from course, but this still did not solve the basic problem of getting a torpedo to return to its original course after it had been forced from it by wind or wave. This was solved by Austrian Ludwig Obry, who produced a gyroscope in 1895 and linked it to a torpedo to ■“’Edwyn Gray, The Devil's Device (London; Seely, Service and Co.. 1975), 93. ■“’Bruce McCandless, ‘The Howell Automobile Torpedo,” USNIP 92 (October 1966) 174-176; Gray. 122-131. 225 keep it on course. It increased torpedo accuracy by an order of magnitude, from hundreds to thousands of yards. Obry patented his invention the following year and then sold all his rights to Whitehead. Whitehead linked the gyroscope to an air pressure valve connected to his torpedo’s rudder. This system would theoretically reduce torpedo deviation to only half a degree over a 7000 yard run, but the Whitehead torpedo’s maximum range of just over a 1000 yards made this impossible to test at the time. In 1897, the Newport Torpedo Station began installing Obry gyroscopes on all of the Navy’s torpedoes.’*^ The United States was also well behind other nations in developing torpedo boats. The Alarm and Lightening, commissioned in the mid-1870s, were both built to carry spar torpedoes and hopelessly obsolete. The Navy did not acquire a modem torpedo boat until 1887 when the Station purchased the Stiletto from the Herreshoff Manufacturing Company for $25,000. It had previously been the Herreshoff family yacht This was the first torpedo boat the Navy fitted for automobile torpedoes. The Herreshoff Company would go on to build most of the Navy’s early torpedo boats. The first of these, and the Navy’s first steel torpedo boat was the Cushing, which was commissioned in April, 1890. By the end of that year, the world’s seven largest navies together possessed more than 800 torpedo boats. The United States Navy had only two."®* On the eve of war with

Spain, the Navy had only a half dozen torpedo boats in commission with thirteen more under construction. In March, the Navy’s attaché in France, Lieutenant John C. Colwell, purchased a Schischau class torpedo boat and a dozen Schwartzkopf torpedoes and dispatched them to the United States to bolster its inadequate force. Congress belatedly authorized thirteen more torpedo boats in May after declaring war."*” The United States entered the war seriously short of the shallow draft vessels needed to support ground

Devil’s Device, 1975), 155-158. The use of gyroscopes to guide toq)ecioes had been suggested by J. A. Howell a decade before, but he had been unable to make them work. See Seaton Schroeder, 'The Development of Modem Torpedoes,” Ge/iero/ Information Series No. VI (ONI: Washington, 1887), 1-44, 333-6. ‘'“Tarry R. Smart, ‘Evolution of the Torpedo Boat,”Military Affairs 23 (Summer 1958), 99-101. *^New York Times, March 26.1898, 1. 226 operations in Cuba and the Philippines. Chambers arrived at the Torpedo Station to find a frenzy of activity as its officers and a growing number of civilian employees rushed to ready ships and weapons for war. New wharves were being completed along with new buildings. New parts, materials, and machinery arrived almost every day. The Station was desperately short of the materials it needed, especially gun cotton and other explosives. The Station’s smokeless powder factory had just been brought back online after being leveled in an explosion the previous July.

Chambers’ first task was to prepare countermines which the Navy expected to use to seal Spanish harbors in Cuba. The needed explosive material did not arrive until just before war broke out Chambers drew up the plans for them himself and built forty countermines in ten days. Each contained 500 pounds of gun cotton. He then supervised the manufacture of a special order for projectiles for the Veswv/i«’ dynamitc-guns. Like virtually everyone else at the Station, he worked day and night preparing munitions, trying to make up for years of neglect in a few months. Chambers did manage to fit out the torpedo boat he expected to command, but at the last minute the command went to someone else. Chambers was too important to let go."*“ Had the war lasted longer. Chambers might have been granted his wish, but the war was clearly winding down by summer. Spain requested an armistice in July, following the destruction of its squadron in Cuba and defeats on land. After the war, the Station retiuned to research and development For the first time in his career. Chambers was in a position to guide the development of new weapons. He threw himself into his work with a passion. While on the Minneapolis he had designed several torpedo boats, but at the Station he spent most of his time improving torpedoes. He devised a new launching mechanism for them and considerably improved their

''^’^fcLean to Chambers, January 22, 1898, Chambers Papers, Bo.\ 2; Chambers, "Petition to Congress,’' 4-6, Chambers Papers, Box 47. 227 accuracy. He redesigned the warhead, which too often failed to explode. His greatest achievement was a complete redesign of the Obry gyroscope and the addition of a new mechanism that allowed a torpedo to run a predetermined course within a 260 degree arc of fire. The mechanism was actuated by a heavy clock spring and worked successfully in 150 consecutive tests. Later models zdlowed torpedoes to correct their course after firing so that torpedoes fired from different tubes would assume the same, course. Charles O’Neil, the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, complimented Chambers for his work and supported his efforts in getting his device constructed and tested. At the end of

1898 he was placed in charge of all experimental work on torpedoes and mines."®’ The following March, the Stiletto ran aground while carrying smokeless powder and primers for the Naval Proving Ground. The ship was severely damaged. Only able to make four knots, she was in danger of sinking or being driven aground. McLean placed Chambers in command of the rescue operation, assigned him the tug Leyden, and gave him complete discretion to proceed as he wished. Despite the risk of explosion, the operation was old hat for Chambers and he soon returned with the damaged ship in tow."®®

Chambers spent the remainder of the year perfecting his various inventions, and helping overhaul and repair captured Spanish torpedoes and torpedo boats. He was promoted to lieutenant commander on July 31 and briefly commanded the torpedo boat Dupont in a series of tests and exercises in September.

Conclusion As the time neared for Chambers to return to sea, he made an active effort to get the best assignment he could, preferably to a battleship. He supported his effort with excellent recommendations from his commanders of the past decade. All had consistently C. PoundstcMie to Chambers, November 29,1898, Chambers Papers, Box 2; Chambers, 'Tetition to Congress,” 4-6, Chambers Papers, Box 47; SONAR, 1899,486 and 504. """McLean to Chambers, March 20,1899. Chambers Papas, Box 2. 228 rated his performance in all categories as “excellent” Wadleigh was particularly effusive in his praise, saying that Chambers’ knowledge of navai construction” made him “invaluable in a ship of modem construction.” Like McLean, he would “specifically select him” for hazardous or independent duty. Chambers’ well rounded experience was marred only by his lack of combat experience. Many of his friends had been advanced several positions in seniority due to their wartime service. His old friend from the Office of Naval Intelligence, Bemadou, had been advanced ten names up the promotion list Rodgers and Chadwick both moved up five, and many others managed to move up a lesser but still significant amounf°‘ In a system where seniority and connections meant everything. Chambers was falling behind. This time, though, he had one advantage. While at the Torpedo Station, he had become friends with Lieutenant Lloyd Chandler, the son of the former Secretary of the Navy and now a Senator. With their help. Chambers managed to get assigned to the Texas. Despite being the Navy’s oldest battleship, she was a more prestigious posting than an assignment to a cruiser. Clearly, Chambers had hoped for a better ship, but service on board a battleship, any battleship, was important for his career. By the end of the decade of the 1890s the United States Navy was a substantially more modem force. The few old, wooden still in the fleet had been rushed back into service because of the war with Spain. The backbone of the fleet was its four modem battleships, and these were supported by numerous new, steel cruisers. The Navy’s new professional institutions such as the Office of Naval Intelligence and Naval War College proved their utility in the war with Spain by compiling data on the Spanish fleet and preparing war plans. In terms of both strategy and technology, the Navy had entered a new era. Yet the Navy still lagged behind other nations in adopting some new technologies, particularly, as Chambers’ experience shows, torpedoes.

■“'Donvart, Office o f Naval Intelligence, 68. ^L loyd Chandler to Chambers, October 25,1899, Chambers Papers, Box 6. 229 Fleet modernization proceeded fastest in the areas where new technology supported existing doctrine. The Navy’s old, wooden cruisers were the first to be replaced with modem designs. The new steel cruisers were followed by modem battleships when Mahanian concepts of sea-control and fleet engagements were embraced by high-ranking civil and naval officials. Torpedoes, and particularly specialized torpedo-armed vessels such as torpedo boats and submarines, possessed few high-ranking advocates, and were assumed by most officers to have little importance in the Navy’s new, Mahanian strategy. While most new warships mounted torpedo tubes, few officers actually trained with them and they were rarely fired in practice exercises. Torpedo tactics and practice failed to receive the attention that gun target practice did. Instead, torpedo-enthusiast remained isolated, and largely ignored, at the Newport Torpedo Station while torpedoes themselves rested unfired on most of the Navy’s warships.

230 CHAPTER 10 POUCING AN EMPIRE

Victory in the Spanish-American War forced the Navy to restructure its squadrons to patrolling the United States’ new empire. The Navy had always cruised the Caribbean extensively, but it now increased the number of ships dispatched there and expanded their patrol routes to include Puerto Rico. Theodore Roosevelt as President brought a global vision of the nation's foreign interests, and with it an increased emphasis on naval expansion, especially battleship construction. This created more opportunities for ambitious officers such as Chambers, who soon found himself patrolling parts of this new empire.

The Texas

In 1899 the Texas was the Navy’s oldest battleship. Designed by British naval architect William John of the Barrow Company, she had won the design contest Chambers had entered more than a decade before. As with her sistership the Maine, work on the Texas had been delayed by a series of technical problems as well as the shortage of armor and other specialty fittings. She was not completed at the Norfolk Navy Yard until 1895 and was by then clearly obsolete. She underwent a major refit in 1896 in the hopes of bringing her up to modem standards. Her engines were completely rebuilt. New watertight doors were added and many fittings were replaced. The hydraulic systems on her two 12” guns were upgraded and the magazines moved away from the engines. The torpedo tubes were removed since they could not be fired without endangering the ship.

231 Despite all this work, she was soon surpassed by the larger and more modem Oregon class battleships."*”

Chambers reported to the Texas as her navigation officer on September 25, 1899. He had long wanted to be posted to a battleship, but those assignments had gone to better connected officers. With new battleships joining the fleet regularly, this aging veteran of the Battle of Santiago was not a popular assignement, especially for her crew. In fact, the

Texas had the highest desertion rate of any battleship in the Navy. The crowded, uncomfortable living quarters of crew were unheated and too close to the engines to be effectively cooled. This kept them uncomfortably hot in the summer, but often freezing in the winter. The Texas' keel had been damaged in a recent dry docking and remained weak

after repairs. Many on board expected her to be decommissioned soon.*” When Chambers arrived, the Texas was under the command of Captain Uriah Sigsbee. TheTexas, along with the nation’s other battleships, was part of the North Atlantic Squadron under the command of Rear Admiral Norman H. Farquhar. The squadron spent the next week outfitting. It sailed on Octobers, conducted routine maneuvers, and concluded with target practice off Hampton Roads on the 5th. A few days later the squadron turned its guns on a wreck off Cape Hatteras.

During these maneuvers. Chambers noticed that Admiral Farquhar had problems coordinating the movements of the squadron. The Navy had made great efforts to ensure that each of its battleships and armored cruisers was the most technologically advanced ship it could build at the time. The result was that by 1899 the Navy was composed of ships of markedly different size and design, many powered by different engines. Their different turning radii and speeds hindered coordination in complicated maneuvers, especially in close formations. Upon discovering after the first day of maneuvers that no one had bothered to

*^^New York Times, January 1,1896,4 and January 4,1896,9; Bennett, Steam Navy. 794. ***New York Times, September 30,1897,12. 232 calculate the different turning radii of the ships. Chambers set to work on the problem. That night he cobbled together a crude gadget that would give him the data to calculate the Texas' turning radius and other maneuvering characteristics. It worked successfully the following day and was soon adopted by other ships of the squadron and eventually the Navy as a whole."®^ Following the maneuvers, the squadron embarked on its routine cruise along the Atlantic coast Only the usual stops at major cities for participation in local celebrations to gamer publicity for the Navy broke its routine of training and drill. Chief of the Bureau of Navigation A rent S. Crowninshield complained, without effect, that these frequent stops disrupted training and maneuvers. Politicians insisted on these naval displays, especially during the campaign season. Aside from disrupting training, the frequent stops also made desertion easy and the Texas lost crew members at virtually every stop. In November, the Texas sailed alone to Boston to serve as the pace ship in the speed trials of the new battleship Kentucky at Boston. Afterward, she returned to the squadron Just in time for renewed maneuvers that culminated on December 7 with another round of target practice off Hampton Roads. ^ On December 13 the Navy ordered the Texas to Cuba along with the Dolphin, Machias, and New York. Rear Admiral Norman H. Farquhar commanded this small squadron from the^ew York. Farquhar continued to drill this squadron during the brief, four-day voyage to Havana. He even arranged for target practice. In Havana the Texas took on board the remains of the crew of the Maine who had died in her explosion the previous year. Sigsbee had been in command of the Maine when she exploded in Havana harbor, and had requested this assignment The Squadron then delivered the bodies to Newport News for burial and arrived back in New York in time to celebrate the new year.

Three weeks later. Captain Sigsbee departed to become the Chief Intelligence Officer of

''^Charles O’Neil to Chambers, October 9,1900, Chambers Papers, Box 2. ■ ^ g b o o k , USS Texas. NARG 24; SONAR. 1900,448. 233 the Navy. His replacement was Commander William C. Gibson, who was promoted to captain the following month.

After leave for the officers and crew, the squadron sailed back to the Caribbean on January 28, this time bound for Puerto Rico. They arrived at San Juan on February 3 and spent the rest of the month cruising in the Caribbean and the . They stopped briefly at New Orleans and then sailed to for target practice on March 7. This was followed by another visit to Havana, then Galveston, and then a one week stop at the tiny Pensacola Naval Yard in early April to take on supplies. The squadron then returned to the Caribbean, stopping at Bermuda, San Domingo and San Juan. On April 26 theWevv York left the squadron for maintenance and Admiral Farquhar transferred his flag to the Texas. After another round of target practice off Hampton Roads, the squadron sailed once again for the Caribbean on May 6."*”

A few of the Te.raj'sailors, all recent recruits from New York's Bowry District, had been smuggling liquor aboard at her various stops. While the Texas was docked at Galveston, they pulled off their greatest coup, smuggling on board several barrels of whiskey. On May 10, two of the smugglers were caught guarding their trove of whiskey. Both were court martialed and locked in the hold. The whiskey was confiscated. Nothing else was heard of the incident, and a few days later the Texas arrived in Bermuda. On May 15, Captain Gibson ordered the ship's woodwork to be refinished with a fresh coat of shellac. In the course of this work, roughly a dozen members of the whiskey ring made off with several buckets of shellac. They mixed it with hot water and strained it through rags to separate out the pigments and isolate the alcohol. They mixed this alcohol with sugar and lime and then drank large quantities of their dubious concoction. That night ten of these sailors, by then thoroughly intoxicated, assaulted the ship’s Master at Arms in an effort to free their two incarcerated comrades. Several Petty Officers and sober sailors helped subdue the drunken ten in the ensuing brawl and tossed them into the hold with ^Logbook, USS Texas. NARG 24. 234 their friends. This was the first group assault on authority on any United States battleship, though as Captain Gibson acknowledged to the press, such incidents had been common place in the days of wooden ships. While the Navy had been making great efforts to improve the quality of its enlisted force, there was apparently still much wonc to be done."®*

In addition to his other duties. Chambers continued to work on a number of his inventions. He maintained an active correspondence with his friends at the Torpedo Station, keeping apprised of their work and experiments. He continued to make suggestions to improve torpedoes and made several improvements to his gyroscope design. The Bureau of Ordnance built two of these and both performed well in tests.^’

Chambers also designed a binnacle hood and lamp, which Lieutenant Commander Diehl at the Bureau of Equipment liked and recommended for adoption on the Navy’s new ships."*” Commander Moris R. S. MacKenzie took command of the Texas on June 3. He brought news with him that the Texas would be decommissioned before the end of the year. All her officers began scrambling to secure new postings. Chambers tried to arrange a transfer within the North Atlantic Squadron. Aside from his long list of accomplishments and inventions. Chambers had also served as the Texas' Executive Officer for a few months. With his impressive record, it was not surprising that several of the squadron's captains wanted him. The captain of the Massachusetts, Captain Charles J. Train, requested him as his Navigator and Chambers wrote to the Bureau of Navigation to arrange the transfer, but Crowninshield refused his request, transferring the navigator from the Wew York instead. Chambers also asked for a brief assignment to the Compass Office at the Equipment Bureau to study up on compasses and complete his binnacle design. He expected it to take him less than a week and would then return to sea. *^New York Times, May 24,1900,14; Chambers to W. J. Bums, June 10,1924, Chambers papers, box 4. "'^Charles O’Neil to Chambers, October9 and O ctober31,1900, Chambers Papers, Box 2. *t)iehl to Chambers, October 11,1900, Chambers Papers, Box 2. 235 Crowninshield refused this request as well. Instead, on November 6 he ordered Chambers to report to the gunboat Annapolis as her executive officer. The Annapolis was then at Norfolk outfitting for a voyage to the Philippines as the flagship of a squadron of gunboats."”*

To the Philippines The 1000 ton Annapolis was a relatively new ship, commissioned in 1897 just a few months prior to the outbreak of war with Spain. She had been designed to replace the Navy’s old wooden gunboats, few cf which remained in commission. Indeed, the Annapolis better resembled them than any of the Navy’s new steel warships. Her single screw engine was capable of only 13 knots and like her wooden predecessors she carried a full three-masted barkentine rig of 11,000 feet of sail. Of shallow draft, she was easily able to navigate coastal waters and rivers. She was armed with six 4” guns and a variety of smaller guns, including Gatling guns that proved useful supporting operations on shore. Chambers reported on board the Annapolis on November 14 along with the ship’s chief engineer. Lieutenant John F. Luby, and her new commander. Lieutenant Commander Karl Rohrer. The ship was in the midst of an extensive refiL Construction crews were still on board, and Chambers supervised the last stages of their work, which was not completed until the end of December. On Sunday, December 30, Rohrer ordered his squadron of four ships to sea. The Annapolis was the only modem ship of the lot. The Frolic was an old, converted yacht. The Wompatuck and Piscataqua were both decades- old wooden ships that would never have left port had the Navy not been so desperate for ships to cope with the Philippine War. All four were short of the full complement The Annapolis, for example, had only 100 of her rated crew of 116. After brief maneuvers to Chambers to Bureau of Navigation, October 17, 1900, Chambers Papers, Box 2; Train to Bureau of Navigation, October, 29,1900, Chambers Correspondence, NARG 24; Crowninshield to Chambers, October 22 and October 31,1900, Chambers Papers, Box 2. 236 accustom the captains to formation sailing and signaling, the squadron sailed for Bermuda and from there to the Mediterranean. It was a slow voyage as the Annapolis shepherded her outdated consorts along.

The squadron arrived at Algiers on February 6 and remained there for almost two weeks while the Piscataqua's crew repaired a leaky boiler. On the 16th a heavy storm blew into the crowded harbor, buffeting the ships and driving the Wompatuck in\o the Annapolis. In the collision, the Annapolis’ jib-boom carried away the Wompatuck’s flagstaff. Chambers, who then held the bridge on the Annapolis, signaled the Wompatuck to move, but the Wompatuck signaled back that the harbor master would not allow it Her captain added that the ship was “in chain” and would not be any more trouble. Rohrer, who had arrived on the bridge, signaled back that “if there is any more trouble it will be for you and not for us.” Shortly afterward, the Wompatuck shifted anchorage.^

The squadron left Algiers bound for Port Said on February 18, but the Frolic’s engines failed after only a few days at sea. The Piscataqua took her in tow and the squadron changed course to Malta and docked there for repairs. This delayed them yet another week, and they did not pass through the Suez Canal until March. Rohrer kept the crew busy with drills throughout the voyage, giving particular emphasis to small arms. On March 24, the squadron arrived at Colombo, Ceylon, and the crews received a week's liberty ashore while the ships resupplied. A third of them returned late and were disciplined. Commander Rohrer enlisted a local man to serve as the cabin steward. The squadron resumed its voyage in April. After a brief stop at Singapore, the squadron sailed for Manila on the 18th. Two days later the Wompatuck's engines failed. Rohrer decided to press on rather than turn back for repairs and had the Piscataqua take the Wompatuck tow. The squadron finally arrived at in on the 24th, after a voyage of almost four months.

'*°Logbook, USS Annapolis, NARG 24; Chambers USS Annapolis Journal, Chambers Papers, Box 43. **T.ogbook, USS Annapolis, NARG 24. 237 The Philippines The Asiatic Squadron, long an afterthought in the Navy, was considerably expanded following the Spanish-Atnerican war and split into two commands. One continued to patrol the Chinese coast, while the other, commanded by Admiral , supported Army and Marine operations in the Philippines. Fighting between American and Filipino soldiers had broken out the night of February 4,1899. Over the next year American forces smashed the Filipino army in a series of conventional battles. Rather than bringing victory, this simply forced the Filipinos to resort to guerilla warfare, at which they proved more adept General Arthur MacArthur launched an aggressive campaign against them, hounding their forces in the field while scattering garrisons throughout the islands' cities and towns to break the guerillas’ network of sympathizers and informants within the civilian population. In March 1901 General Frederick Funston led a company of Macabebe scouts on a daring raid that captured Filipino leader . Resistance on many islands collapsed over the next few months. The

Annapolis arrived in time to participate in the last stages of the war against the most committed of the Filipino guerillas. The Na\'y’s ships were stretched quite thin in the Philippines with thousands of islands to patrol as well as numerous navigable rivers. Following the Spanish-American

War, the United States had purchased Spain’s remaining thirteen gunboats'*** to supplement its own forces in dealing with Aguinaldo’s army. All were quite small, averaging 200 tons displacement, and could enter water as shallow as twelve feet They were frequently used to support ground operations. These gunboats, along with the Navy's larger, pre-war gunboats, played a vital role in the Philippine War. They patrolled Miilippine waters to isolate the rebels on individual islands and prevent the flow of arms

■“These were the Albay, Basco, Callao, Calamianes. Guardoqui, Leyte, Sdanelemo, Mindoro, Mariveles, Pampanga, Panov, Paragua, Quires, Samar, Villalobos, and Urdaneta. 238 and supplies to them. They also maintained communication with the scattered Army and Marine garrisons. The gunboats delivered their supplies including their pay and mail. Virtually all of the garrisons were in coastal towns and villages so they could be supplied, reinforced, and if necessary, evacuated easily.^ The gunboats were divided between four cruising stations: I) Island of Luzon; 2) Island of , Mindoro, , and Occidental Negros; 3) the Moro country of Sulu group and southern Mindanao; 4) the Visayas group composed of , Samar, Leyte, Bohol, Oriental Negros, and northern Mindanao from the straits of Surigao to the Peninsula of Dapitan. This group included hundreds of smaller islands and was considered the most desirable of the four stations.*^

The Annapolis was first dispatched to patrol in the second of these sectors and there served as the flagship of a varying number of old gunboats dubbed the “Mosquito FleeL" Her crew quickly fell into a routine, stopping and boarding passing ships to check their papers and cargo. They searched for arms smugglers while transporting messages and supplies to Army and Marine garrisons. Rohrer worked to establish good relations with the villages in their area, and his crew was trading rice captured from guerillas for all the fresh produce and meat they could eat, leaving the Annapolis' stores of salt pork, beans, and flour virtually untouched. The patrols throughout May and June remained routine as American forces consolidated their gains before concentrating on the remaining centers of resistance. The closest ihe Annapolis came to combat was on June 24 when a shark attacked several of the crew who were out for a swim, biting off the leg of one of them. Despite being in a less than healthy part of the world, the Annapolis suffered little from contagious disease. Chambers, who had seen an epidemic sweep through his ship once, made certain the Annapolis was kept spotless.^ By , the United States' pacification program had proven largely ■“^Frederick L. Sawyer, Sons o f Gunboats (Annapolis: U. S. Naval Institute, 1946), v-vi. *^Sawyei,Sons of Gunboats. 16 ''^Logbook, USS Annzgx)lis, NARG 24; Chambers, USS Annapolis Journal, Chambers Papers, Box 43. 239 successful. Only the province of Batangas and adjacent areas in southern Luzon and the « islands of the Visayan group, especially Cebu, Bohol, and Samar, continued armed resistance against American rule. On July 4, 1901, General MacArthur turned over control of the civil government of the islands to Howard Taft and left Major General with the task of crushing all remaining resistance to American ruie.*“ The Annapolis spent most of July anchored off Iloilo, Panay Island. Rohrer took

her out for target practice on the 18th and 19th along with several smaller gunboats. A few days later they went to the rescue of five Filipino sailors who had been in the water for fourteen hours after their boat had capsized. On the 26th, following an inspection by General Chaffee, the Annapolis and her squadron of gunboats sailed for Calahan, Mindoro, to support a renewed Army offensive. The gunboats escorted the Army transports Viscaya and Liscum to Polak, Mindoro, and then helped ferry Major Evans' soldiers up river, towing the small. Army boats with their steam launches. The mobility and firepower of the gunboats allowed Evans to outmaneuver and overwhelm the guerillas at every turn. Resistance collapsed and the campaign was over in two weeks. The Annapolis sailed for Cavite to put in for maintenance on August 11.^’ The Annapolis remained in Cavite for the next month while workmen scraped her clean and repaired minor damage. She sailed on September 14 for Mindanao to support army operations there. On the 23rd she was ordered to assist the Army transport Bn/brd, which was stranded off Cottabato. Tht Buford's inexperienced crew had allowed towing hawsers to wind around her propeller. Chambers organized a party of divers from the crews of the Annapolis, Panay, and Piscataqua and personally supervised their work underwater. It took a day to free the Buford. The Annapolis then towed her to Pblloc for repairs, and returned with supplies for the last stages of another brief operation.^ ■““John Morgan Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags: The United Slates Army in the Philippines. 1898-1902 (Westport: Greenwood Press. 1973), 241. ■“’'chambers, USS Ann^x)Us Journal.. ^Quartermaster General M. I. Ludington to the Secietary of War, December 12,1901, and Secretary of War to Rohrer and Chambers, December 18,1901, Chambers Correspondence, NARG 24; Chambers, USS 240 In October, Admiral Rodgers ordered \he Annapolis to Borneo to investigate the trade in arms between people there and the Philippine guerillas. The Annapolis arrived in Sandakan on the 9th and remained there for a week observing the comings and goings of other ships in the harbor. She spent the next month sailing from port to port in search of arms smugglers without success. On November 2 she received orders to return to Polloc in the Philippines to investigate the rumored outbreak of plague there. Fortunately this rumor proved false and after recoaling she resumed her normal patrol route. On the 15th she helped free another grounded army transport, this time the Viscaya.'*^^ On December 11, Rodgers ordered the Annapolis Vo investigate the slave trade among the Moros. The Moros, who occupied the Sulu Archipelago, southern Mindanao, and southern Palawan, had kept slaves for centuries despite Spanish and now American prohibitions against it. The Annapolis spent the rest of December patrolling their territory without capturing, or even sighting, a slave trader, though they did overtake and capture a small boat operated by pirates.'*”

Earlier in December, Brigadier General James Franklin Bell, in command of the newly created Third Separate Brigade, launched a major campaign against the Filipino resistance in southern Luzon. On December 7,1901, he invoked General Order No. 100, calling for reprisals against civilians aiding the resistance movement He closed all three of the region's ports and prohibited all trade by roads. Bell ordered most of the rural population into concentration camps to separate them from the guerillas. Numerous gunboats helped enforce Bell's blockade including the Annapolis, which was there in January and February. Bell's campaign proved effective and General Miguel Malvar surrendered to Bell on April 16.^ Annapolis Journal. ^'cham bers, USS Annapolis Journal. '‘^Secretary of War, Annual Report, 1901,233; A. P. NiUack, 'Operations of the Navy and the Marine Corps in the Philippine Archipelago, 1898-1902." USNIP 30 (December 1904), 751. '**^rian McAllister 1 inn, The U. S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War (Chapel M il. University of North Carolina Press, 1989),152-9; Gleim Anthony May, Battle fo r Batangas : a Philippine Province at War (New Haven : Yale University Press, 1991). 241 The Annapolis, however, had already been ordered back to Mindanao. There, Chambers was placed in charge of surveying Polloc harbor. He also drew up the plans for the base's machine shop and supervised the overhaul of several ships in dry dock.^ On March 9, Admiral Rodgers transferred him to command the gunboat Frolic and placed the six smaller gunboats of the Samar Patrol Squadron under his command. After brief farewells. Chambers caught a ride to his new command on the transport Zaphiro. Chambers would be the naval commander in the last major campaign against the Filipino resistance.

The Samar Campaign Samar, the largest island of the Visaya group, was the base of the largest remaining group of Filipino guerillas led by Vicente Lukban. Most of its 5000 square miles were mountainous and covered by dense jungle, giving Lukban's soldiers excellent cover and numerous hiding places. Samar is separated from Leyte by a narrow, easily- crossed strait through which supplies flowed at night to Lukban's army. Samar’s principle crop was hemp, and its inhabitants needed to import food through its principle ports of Calbayog and Catbalogan, making the island vulnerable to blockade. The United States Army's initial operations on Samar had gone well. Resistance seemed to collapse, and many garrisons became complacent over time. Filipino soldiers shattered this perception on September 27,1901, when, helped by the local populace, they infiltrated the town of Balingiga and surprised its eighty-eight-man garrison of Company C, 9th Infantry. In all, they killed fifty-nine of these soldiers. Of the twenty- nine who escaped the massacre, twenty-three were wounded. Americans throughout the Philippines screamed for revenge. The task of repacifying island was given to Brigadier General Jacob H Smith's 6th Separate Brigade. Admiral Rodgers sent a battalion of 300 Marines under Major L W. ■‘^Qiambcrs, Fitness Reports, 1902, NARG 24. 242 to assist Smith. It was Smith who issued the infamous order to “kill and bum,” taking no prisoners and killing “anyone capable of bearing arms.” He ordered his subordinates to turn the island into a "howling wilderness." When asked by Waller for clarification. Smith replied that any male “over ten years of age” was to be killed.^* Smith's campaign met with some initial success, but failed to cleanse the island of guerillas. Waller and his men ignored Smith’s harsher orders, and Smith slowly returned to a more benevolent vision of pacification in January and February. On February 26, 1902, Army units relieved Walleri s Marines, but the war was far from over. Despite Lukban's captures, the guerillas persevered under their new leader. General Guivaras.^ In April, General Frederick D. Grant, supported by Chambers' gunboats, launched a new campaign to crush remaining resistance on the island. The campaign unfolded rapidly. Grant pressed deep into the island's interior using shallow draft boats, while Chambers tightened the blockade around the guerilla stronghold. It ended only three weeks later when Giant's men overran the main guerilla camp on the Gandara River. On April 26, General Guivaras and his staff boarded the Frolic as prisoners. Guivaras' captured soldiers were scattered among the various Army transports, and the motley fleet returned to Catbalogan for an official surrender ceremony. On the 29th, Chambers hosted a reception on board the Frolic for the senior Army and Navy officers, while the enlisted ranks celebrated on shore. The last center of resistance had been crushed, and Chambers and Grant gleefully reported that they had captured every gun on the island but two. The following day Grant and Chambers began the work of turning over control of Samar to civilian authorities and Governor-General Luke WrighC^ Admiral Rodgers along with Admiral Crowninshield credited the Navy* s close blockade of Samar with the defeat of Lukban. Both singled out and praised the work of ■*“Stuart Creighton ^filler. Benevolent Assimilation: The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899-1903 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 219-220. ■“‘’John Morgan Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1898-1902 (Westport Greenwood Press, 1973), 254-263. ■“ Secretary of War, Annual Import, 1902,256-7; Logbook, USS Frolic, NARG 24; Chambers, Petition. 243 the small gunboats of Chambers' squadron.*'* Celebrations continued for the next week,and several times Chambers had to dispatch armed guards to arrest soldiers or sailors whose festivities had gotten out of hand. The worst outbreak of this occurred the night of May 3 when soldiers on the transport Naushhan rioted over being denied leave on shore. The Naushhan signaled for help, and Chambers sent over an armed party which brought back the worst of the offenders in chains. The squadron returned to its normal patrol stations the following week, and passed the summer in routine operations in the waters around Samar. On

August 2, the Frolic docked at Cavite for normal maintenance, and on August 6, Chambers timied over command to Lieutenant Commander William R. A. Rooney and boarded a transport for home. The Frolic had traveled more than 5600 miles since her last docking. Her hull was badly fouled with more than a foot of green moss covering a mass of barnacles almost three feet thick."*®’

Conclusion Chambers returned to the United States with his career well in hand. Despite his lack of prestigious assignments, his work and abilities were well-respected and he had once again received excellent ratings from all his superiors. He also possessed a wide range of experience having served on some of the largest and smallest ships of the Navy, and commanded his own ship as well as a small squadron. Yet despite his apparent success as a combat leader. Chambers future lay in staff appointments on shore. The Philippine Insurrection would be the only significant combat experience of his career.

^“SONAR, 1902,396 and 441. ■*“Togbook, USS Frolic, NARG 24. 244 CHAPTER 11 TORPEDOES, DREADNOUGHTS, AND THE GENERAL BOARD

After his leave. Chambers reported to the Torpedo Station on October 11, 1902. Despite his long familiarity with torpedoes. Chambers' destiny lay elsewhere. His comfort with technological change and his wide areas of technical expertise made him a valuable officer as the Navy continued to modernize and expand. After the turn of the century, the continuing retirement of the old, pre-Civil War generation of officers finally allowed the older generation of reformers such as Henry C. Taylor, who became Chief of the Bureau of Navigation at the end of 1902, to assume positions of influence. They, in turn, assigned many of the Young Turks like Chambers to the General Board, the Naval War College, and other reform-minded institutions within the Navy. Taylor in particular brought the best officers of the Navy together on the General Board and its associated staff, ensuring that reform-minded officers such as Chambers would be in positions of influence—espiecially if, as Taylor hoped, the General Board evoh ed into a full-fledged naval general staff.

Back to the Torpedo Station The Torpedo Station had grown considerably in the few years of Chambers' absence. The production facilities had been modernized and considerably expanded to supply the growing number of torpedo-armed warships in the fleet Virtually all of the

Navy's new ships, even the battleships, were equipped with torpedo tubes. The docks were also expanded to make room not just for the new torpedo boats, but also the Navy's

245 first submarines, which were then under construction. A wireless mast was installed shortly after Chambers arrived. Even the grounds were beautified and dozens of trees planted.

The Station was under the command of Chambers' friend. Commander Frank F.

Fletcher, and Chambers was assigned as his assistant with the title of Senior Assistant Inspector of Ordnance. Despite its expansion, the Station's staff remained small. Lieutenants A. H. Davis and L. R. Sargent were the only other line officers stationed there. A surgeon, a paymaster, and six gunners completed the station’s naval staff, though there were several dozen civilian employees as well.'“®

Chambers' main duty as Fletcher's assistant was supervising the construction of torpedoes and mines. Once again he made several design improvements to both weapons. Work had continued on Chambers' torpedo design after he left the Torpedo Station in 1899. His friend. Lieutenant Lloyd Chandler, had made several minor improvements to the guidance system, which Commander Newton E. Mason at the Bureau of Ordnance strongly endorsed. Chambers picked up where Chandler left off, further refining and improving the guidance system.'*’* Increasingly though, innovation came from the private sector. Private industry in the United States finally became interested in torpedoes following the Spanish-American War because the Navy continued to order more and more torpedoes for its growing fleet In 1900, Frank McDowell Leavitt began experimenting with torpedoes and tested several designs. The following year his company, E. W. Bliss, purchased a license to manufacture Whitehead torpedoes in the United States. Leavitt continued his own experiments, and in 1902 offered the Navy an improved version of the Whitehead torpedo powered by a turbine engine. In September 1903 Chambers supervised the tests of this torpedo at Brooklyn. On his recommendation. J. Coggeshall and J. E McCarthy, The Naval Torpedo Station (Newport: Training Station Press, 1920), 2-15. '"''Mason to Chambers, October 2, 1902, Chambers Papers. Box 2. 246 the Navy ordered 300 of them that November. The following April, Chambers supervised several more tests of an improved Bliss-Leavitt design and made several recommendations to improve it In September he, along with Lieutenant Commander Walter J. Sears and Lieutenant Mark Bristol judged a competition between the standard Navy gyro (the modified Chambers design) and a Leavitt gyro. Both performed well. The final design the Navy settled on incorporated features of both, but remained true to Chambers' original design.'^* The trend over the previous few years had been toward larger and larger torpedo boats. Chambers hoped to reverse this. Along with his other duties. Chambers presented an annual series of lectures on torpedoes and torpedo boats to visiting officers. He used these to put forward his own ideas on torpedo boats, arguing for smaller, faster, and cheaper torpedo boats. It was a point he would return to repeatedly over the next few years as many officers argued tfiat bigger was necessarily better when it came to warships. In 1905, for example. Commander Bradley Fiske called for the construction of large, armored torpedo cruisers. Chambers' published response to Fiske's article, while polite, highlighted Fiske's general ignorance of both torpedoes and torpedo boat tactics. Chambers argued that for the foreseeable future, guns would considerably outrange torpedoes, making torpedoes “a sccondaiy’ weapon” and one probably rarely used by large warships."*® Torpedoes needed to be fired by fast, small torpedo boats, and Chambers pushed for the replacement of steam engines in torpedo boats by oil and later gasoline engines. Along with officers from the Bureau of Steam Engineering, he supervised a series of tests on oil engines for torpedo boats. All the officers involved recommended switching to oil burning engines in torpedo boats."*®

■“®Gray, The Devil’s Device, 159; Bureau of Navigation to Chambers, September 20,1904, Chambers Correspondence, NARG 24. ^Chambers, Torpedo Lecture Notes," Chambers Papers, Box 35; Bradley Hske, "American Naval Policy," USNIP 31 (1905), 1-80; Chambers, "Discussion of American Naval Policy," USNIP 31 (1905), 183-184. •*®SONAR, 1902,27-9. 247 Submarines At the close of Chambers' previous tour at the Torpedo Station, an experimental submarine was undergoing trials, but submarines remained an unproven technology. John Phillip Holland had begun experimenting with submarines in the late 1870s, but the U. S. Navy did not place an order with Holland until 1895. That submarine, the Plunger, was launched in 1897 and completed trials after the Spanish-American War. Few officers showed interest in the Plunger, but Admiral Dewey did. After the war he emerged as a champion of this new technology and repeatedly argued that he would have been unable to hold Manila Bay if Spain had possessed a single submarine.^ The Plunger trial board rejected Holland's initial design and recommended numerous changes. The most important was switching from a steam engine to a gasoline powered internal combustion engine. The Plunger's two triple expansion steam engines had quickly brought temperatures within the cramped hull to unendurable levels.^ With the Board's advice, Holland returned to the drawing board and designed a more modest submarine. The Navy ordered four of these in April 1900, and then three more the following year. Constant changes and redesign delayed their construction, but all were nearing completion when Chambers arrived at the Torpedo Station.'*^ Chambers was only intermittently involved in the construction of these submarines but along with Sears and Bristol he supervised the trials of several of them. All seven were completed and commissioned between January and September of 1903.'** On June 1,1904, Chambers attended a much publicized submarine sail-off competition, but only Holland showed up to compete. His rivals were far behind him in most areas of ^^^onnan Friedman. Submarine Design and Development (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 19&4). 27-28. *^New York Times, July 26,1899,4; Dan van der Vat, Stealth at Sea: The History o f the Submarine (Boston: Houghton \GfHin, 1995). 31. ^ Rank T. Cable, The Birth and Development o f the American Submarine (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1924), 160-165. ■*“ln order of commissioning they woe: Adder (A-2), Moccasin (A-4), Grampus (A-3), Pike (A-5), Plunger (A-1). Porpoise (A-6), Shark (A-7). 248 technology although one of them, Simon Lake, impressed Chambers and a number of naval officers with his design. While Lake's submarine, the Protector, was slower than Holland's, it had greater endurance. It also surfaced and rose level rather than at an angle and was considerably quieter. As Chambers pointed out, stealth was more important in submarines than speed. He encouraged the Navy to purchase submarines from both builders. This would keep the technological options open and allow the Navy to benefit from the innovations of both designers. The Navy bureaucracy was not persuaded by his arguments and settled on Holland's designs, following another series of competitions and tests a few years later."*” Unlike Dewey, Chambers, and a handful of officers that had been assigned to the Torpedo Station, most naval officers had little faith in submarines. Bureau Chiefs O’Neill and Melville were both dubious of submarines and believed they had yet to prove themselves."”® Even as they joined the fleet, the General Board and Secretary of the Navy

Paul Morton denigrated the effectiveness of submarines and of torpedoes in general."” ’ At best, critics admitted that submarines might be useful for coast defense, but coast defense had long ago ceased to be the Navy's focus. Guided by a Mahanian vision of high seas confrontation, virtually all of the Navy's officers focused on the battleship as the primary instrument of sea power. Chambers was more optimistic. He believed the deployment of effective submarines would force the complete redesign of battleships to increase amnor below waterline. Assuming this was possible, and Chambers believed it was with the sacrifice of some of a battleship's speed, submarines would still be essential for scouting, mine-laying, and other missions requiring stealth."*”

""^Chambers, "Memorandum on Submarine Boats and the Principal Military Advantages of the Lake Type," February 1905, Chambers Papers, Box 35; Cable, Birth and Development o f the American Submarine, 260-265. "*™Cable, Birth and Development o f the American Submarine, 170-71. SONAR. 1904,4-7. *^Chambers, "Memorandum on Submarine Boats and the Principal Military Advantages of the Lake Type," February 1905, Chambers Papers, Box 35. 249 The All-Big-Gun Battleship Chambers' most important work in these years involved neither torpedoes nor submarines. As had often been the case during his career. Chambers found time at the Torpedo Station to pursue projects of his own, and he returned to designing warships. He had followed battleship development closely, and like a growing number of naval officers around the world, believed that current designs had reached a dead-end. Increasing armor made battleships impervious to all but the largest of guns, but they mounted relatively few of these. Chambers believed that since only guns of at least 11” caliber could penetrate current armor at reasonable combat ranges, designers needed to eliminate the battleship's intermediate battery to make room for more heavy guns. He designed an improved battleship that mounted twelve large caliber guns in dual turrets along the centerline rather than the usual four. In June 1903 he sent sketches of his design to the Naval War College, and its president. Captain French Esnor Chadwick, arranged for them to be tested in that siunmeris wargames.^ Historian Robert O'Connell argues that Chambers' design originated with Commander Homer G. Poundstone. Poundstone was also working on an all-big-gun design and sent sketches of a prototype design to several fellow officers including, possibly. Chambers. O'Connell believes that the design Chambers sent to the Naval War College was actually Poundstone's work, and that Chambers took false credit for it.^"* It is certainly possible that Poundstone sent Chambers a copy of what he was working on, though there is no indication of such a document in Chambers' papers. There are, however, numerous drafts and memoranda that support Chambers' contention that he had begun work on the all-big-gun battleship during the winter of 1902 shortly after his appointment to the Torpedo Station. Poundstone's own thoughts on battleship design.

^^Chambers, "Memorandum on the Evolution of the All Big Gun Ship;" Chadwick to Chambers, July 17, 1903, in Doris D. Maguiie, French Esnor Chadwick: Selected Papers and Writings (Washington; University Press of America, 1981), 301-2. *’*0'Cxmssidll, Sacred Vessels, 107. 250 which emphasized increasing the size of battleships over redesigning their armament, were published in the Naval Institute's Proceedings later that year.^^

Poundstone and Chambers were not the only naval officers considering this problem. As Chambers later wrote: the idea was “permeating the ether in various parts of the world at about the same time.”*^* In 1902, Chief of the Bureau of Construction and Repair Admiral Francis T. Bowles had his staff sketch a plan for a battleship with no intermediate battery, but the project was dropped by his successor. Admiral Washington L. Capps. The 1903 edition of Jane's Fighting Ships contained an article by Vittorio Cuniberti, an engineer in the Italian Navy’s Engineer Corps, titled, “An Ideal Battleship for the British Fleet” Cuniberti argued that the 12" gun was now the absolute minimum needed to penetrate the thick armor of modem battleships. In order to maximize the number of these large caliber guns, the intermediate batteries should be eliminated. His proposed all-big-gun battleship influenced navies around the world. Japan and Great Britain, in particular, embraced his proposal. The Japanese modified the battleships Akii and Satsnma then under construction, increasing the caliber of their intermediate batteries from eight to ten inches, giving these battleships four 12" and twelve 10" guns. While not quite what Cuniberti had in mind, this was definitely a step in the direction he indicated.

The British would soon embark on a much more ambitious effort^ Chambers' design was well-received at the Naval War College and performed well in wargames that summer. He was commended for his work by Commander Nathaniel Usher and Captain French Esnor Chadwick, the College's out-going president The new President, Captain Charles S. Sperry, was particularly impressed with his desigrt He and Chadwick presented it to the General Board at its meeting the following

^^Speny to Chambers, Undated, Chambers Papers, Box 34; Homer Poimdstone, "The Size of Battleships for the U. S. Navy." USNIP 29 (1903), 161-174. ^^Chambers, "Nlemorandum on the Evolution of the All Big Gun Ship." ^V ittorio Cuniberti, "An Ideal Warship for the British Navy,” in Fred T. Jane, ed . A// the World’s Fighting Ships (London: Sampson, Low, 1903), 803-807; Daniel Costello.'TIarming for Wan A History of the General Board of the Navy, 1900-1914” (Ph. D. dissertation. Tufts University, 1968), 252-253. 251 January/'" The design met with considerable interest from its members including Dewey. On January 24, 1904, the General Board asked the Construction Board to design a battleship mounting twelve heavy guns of at least 10" caliber (at least four of them of 12"

caliber) with no intermediate battery and only 3" guns for defense against torpedo attack."*” On May 14, 1904, Admiral Taylor, the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, assigned Chambers to the General Board's small staff. Exactly what Taylor had in mind

for his old protege from his days as president of the Naval War College is uncertain. Taylor died two months later on July 26, depriving the Navy of one its greatest

visionaries and reformers. It is quite likely, though, that Chambers' pioneering work on designing an all-big-gun battleship played a role in Taylor's decision, since Taylor had

been very impressed with Chambers' design."®” Chambers' record at the Torpedo Station was superb. When he left, the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance Admiral O’ Neill argued that the United States Navy had the best torpedo guidance systems in the world. By 1904, thirteen battleships, four cruisers, sixteen and thirty-four torpedo boats had been equipped with torpedoes. Torpedo installation was planned for all future armored warships as well as torpedo boats

and destroyers."®'

Speny to Chambers, February 2,1904, Chambers Papers, Box 2. "*”Spector, Dewey, 174; G.B. No. 420-2, January 26,1904, Chambers Papers, Box 35. """Costeilo, "Planning for War,” 254. "“‘SONAR, 1904,571-573. 252 The General Board Responds In March 1900, Secretary of the Navy John D. Long, pushed by Admirals Dewey and Taylor, reluctantly established the General Board, the Navy's first centralized planning institution. Reformers like Taylor hoped it would overshadow the powerful bureaus, allowing the creation of a rational, coherent naval policy and that it would eventually evolve into a navy general staff. Its powers, though, were quite limited, serving primarily to advise the Secretary of the Navy on strategic matters. Its stated purpose was to “ensure the efficient preparation of the fleet in case of war and for the naval defense of the coast’*®* It was to prepare war plans, recommend the types and armament of ships, and generally “act as clearing-house for all questions of naval policy.’*®’ Assigned to the General Board were Dewey (who remained its president for the next decade), the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, the Chief Intelligence officer and his assistant the president of the Naval War College and his assistant and three other officers with a rank of Lieutenant Commander or higher. It met at least once a month. Once a year it met for an extended session of a week or more. The average tour for an officer on the General Board or its small staff was just over two years, and these two years made a remarkable difference in that officer's later career. While the average Naval Academy graduate from the years 1865 to 1892 had a 13% chance of becoming an admiral, 79% of those attached to the General Board between 1900 and 1914 achieved flag rank. It was the place to be for an upwardly mobile line officer like Chambers and assignment to it was eagerly sought®* The General Board's request for an all-big-gun design from the Construction Board inflamed an already tense situation. While many line officers perceived the ■"“Quoted in Costello, Tlanning for War.” 24-25. ■"“GeorgeDewey, Autobiography o f George Dewey, Admiral o f the Navy (NY : Scribner’s, 1913), 291-2. ■"“Costello, ‘TIanmng for War,” 30-31. 253 General Board as the pre-eminent policy-making institution in the Navy, it actually had no authority. Day-to-day control over affairs, and especially ship design, remained in the hands of the bureaus. Secretary of the Navy Tracy had created the Construction Board in 1889 to facilitate ship design and encourage bureau coordination. It was composed of the Chief of Naval Intelligence and the heads of those bureaus invol ved in ship construction: Construction and Repair, Equipment, Ordnance, and Steam Engineering. The Chief of the Bureau of Construction and Repair, the Chief Constructor of the Navy, was its presiding officer and controlled its agenda.

Line officers had long resented the control of ship design by staff offlceis with little tactical or strategic knowledge. After the formation of the General Board line officers increased their e.fo. ,s to wrest control of the ship design process from the staff bureaus. While they were frequently correct in arguing that staff officers lacked tactical knowledge and strategic vision, the engineers were equally correct in responding that line officers overwhelmingly lacked the technical and engineering knowledge on which any ship design needed to be based. Chambers' design became the focus of the worst power struggle to wrack the Navy's bureaucracy in more than a decade. In 1903, Secretary of the Navy William H. Moody had launched a campaign to get the General Board real authority and subordinate the Construction Board to it He planned to create a general staff for the Navy modeled on that recently created for the Army. He had legislation for it introduced into the Senate in April 1904. The General Board helped him build his case and supplied him with evidence of numerous Construction Board failings and problems coordinating the bureaus. Moody's effort was derailed by Admiral Capps' careful lobbying and Assistant Secretary of the Navy Charles H. Darling's refusal to support the bill.'®* Events on the other side of the world, though, kept attention focused on the future of battleships and the utility of an all-big-gim design.

■"“Paul T. HefTron, "Secretary Moody and Naval Administrative Reform: 1902-1904," Amenco/i Neptune 29 (January 1969): 30-48. 254 Naval officers had been waiting for years to see how well the new weapons and warships performed in combat They finally did during the Russo-Japanese War (February 1904—August 1905), the first large scale conflict to employ them. Analysts around the world followed it closely and its battles, especially the destruction of the Russian fleet at Tsushima, were studied for years afterward. The Japanese opened the war with a successful torpedo attack on the anchored Russian fleet at Port Arthur that left several Russian warships crippled. But this was virtually the only successful torpedo attack of the war. Analysts dismissed torpedoes and focused instead on the battleships. For a generation of officers schooled on Mahan and Corbet, the Battle of Tsushima was exactly what they expected. The war. Chief of the Bureau of Navigation Admiral G.A. Converse wrote “proved the pre-eminence of the battleship.”*® For many, it also proved the superiority of the all-big-gun design. Admiral Togo's heavy guns had decided the Battle of Tsushima. The intermediate batteries were not brought into play until he had closed range to finish off the already crippled Russian fleet The General Board repeated its request to the Construction Board to produce an all-big-gun battleship design following news of the battle. Relations between line and staff officers continued to worsen over the course of the year, especially between their respective leaders on the Construction Board and General Board. Following the failure of Moody's campaign, several younger line officers decided to launch their own assault on the bureaus and publicized a series of problems with American warships that they blamed on the inefficiency and general ignorance of the Construction Board. The most outspoken of these officers was Commander William S. Sims, a protege of Teddy Roosevelt, then serving as the Inspector of Target Practice. Sims focused press attention on the inefficiency of the Construction Board and the poor quality of many of its designs.*’ Sims clearly overstated his case, but there were plenty of ““ SONAR 1905,391-2 '"^O’Connell, 5ocre

Sims' articles were soon followed by those of other reformers, most notably Bradley Fiske who complained that the current system “ignored individuality and discouraged initiative.”^ In a broad ranging essay, he argued that American warships were poorly designed from a military standpoint, the art and science of naval tactics were underdeveloped, and the administration of the navy had not given sufficient weight to military considerations. While he seconded Sims' and Chambers' call for all-big-gun battleships, he seemed more concerned with their size than their armament. In particular, Fiske's emphasis on torpedo tubes for battleships indicate an assumption of short range combat rather than the long range gun duel at which Dreadnought style battleships would excel. Historian William McBride argues that Sims and Fiske were technologically ignorant. Rske's proposed battleship was simply an enlarged version of the old design, not a new departure. Both Sims and Rske were out of their depth in challenging the Bureau of Construction on technical points. American designs were “the product of a conservative, well-founded appreciation of a complex technical problem.’**” Many line officers supported Sims, including most of the young reformers. The Bmeau of Construction and Repair defended its designs to the press, but line officers maintained their attack. The General Board made two suggestions to flx the situation that would have stripped the bureaus of much of their power. One was to strip the Board on culminated in 1908 with the publication of Ffeniy Reuterdahl’s scathing critique of the Navy, 'The Needs of Our Navy,” McC/iire’s (Janaury 1908). Sims actually wrote most of the article. ■““Bradley Hske, "American Naval Policy," USNIP 31 (1905), 1-80, (quote on page 72); and ^om promiseless Ships," USNIP 31 (1905), 549-553. ■"*lïske, "American Naval Policy," 25; McBride, T h e Rise and Fall of a Strategic Technology," 130-135. 256 Construction of its duties and transfer them to a ‘‘Board on Designs" composed of two civilian naval architects and five naval officers who would not be bureau chiefs. The duty of the board would be to examine all new designs and make recommendations directly to Secretary of the Navy. The second was to open up iiie design process and bring in private shipbuilders whose designs would compete with those of the NavyThe attack on the bureaus received considerable attention in the press and Sims later presented his case to the Senate. The origination of the all-big-gun battleship by line officers gave Sims and his supporters more ammunition as they continued their battle. Meanwhile, the Bureau of Construction and Repair dragged its feet in responding to the request for an all-big-gun design. The Chief of the Bureau, Admiral Capps, bounced the request around his department and later claimed his staff had lost the plans they were working on."”' The Construction Board issued its plans for the next class of battleships on October 1, 1904. They were very conserv ative and not substantially different from the previous class. The proposed ship had none of the features the General Board had asked for. When asked about the all-big-gun design, the Chief Constructor claimed that “the development of such a design would involve the uniterrupted attention of several officers and twenty or more skilled draughtsmen and computers for at least six months.” The bureau did not have the staff to work on the project This, as everyone on the General Board knew, was simply an excuse for the Construction Board to do nothing. The General Board issued a scathing critique of the bureau design and again asked for a design that eliminated the intermediate battery and increased the main armament. Meanwhile Sims and his supporters renewed their attack on the Construction Board, the Russo-Japanese War having given them plenty of ammunition to critique the Construction Board and demand an all-big-gun design.^^

■““William M. McBiide, The Rise and Fall of a Strategic Technology,” 90-94. ■“'Spector, Dew^, 175. ^Chambers, The Study of Ship Designs, Memorandum in re. Lieutenant Commander Sims’ Comments on our Methods of Determining the Designs of Men-of-War," October 18,1904, Chambers Papers, Box 35. 257 While the United States dawdled. Great Britain pushed ahead. Sir Percy Scott, who had improved target practice and introduced continuous-aim firing to the Royal Navy, became an advocate of the all-big-gun battleship and attracted some of the Royal Navy's most influential officers to the cause.'”’ Influenced by Cuniberti's article, the

Russo-Japanese War, and Scott, Admiral John Fisher presented an all-big-gun design to the Admiralty in October 1904. They rejected it due to cost, but began work on alternate designs. The ship they settled on, which would become \h& Dreadnought, would displace 18,000 tons and mount eight (later increased to ten) 12” guns in dual turrets. Three of these would be on the centerline and two on the wings. In addition they would replace the reciprocating engines of previous battleships with turbines, making the Dreadnought two knots faster than any other battleship afloat This would allow her to keep any engagement well outside the range of an enemy ship's intermediate batteries, giving her better than a two to one superiority in firepower. Under the dynamic Fisher, the Royal Navy rushed this design to completion well ahead of its more leisurely competitors.

In the United States, Chambers urged compromise between the General Board and Construction Board and repeatedly put forward his own suggestion to harmonize the friction between line and staff. The question, as he saw it, was “to what extent the studies of the General Board and Naval War College” would “influence the chief characteristics and military details of our ships in the future?” He agreed that line officers needed a voice in ship design, but a voice and control were two completely different issues. In a memorandum to the General Board, Chambers argued that the bureaus should be open to criticism from the General Board, and that the Construction Board should be willing to seriously consider all suggestions to improve the Navy's ships, even those originating outside the Navy. While Chambers admitted that many of these suggestions would be the useless schemes of crackpots, he believed that enough valuable ideas would

” Tbilip Towle, ‘The Evaluation of the Experience of the Russo-Japanese War,” in Bryan Ranft (ed.). Technical Change and British Naval Policy, 1860-1939 (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1977), 71. 258 be discovered to make sifting through the likely mass of suggestions worthwhile. Unlike Sims and the vocal line advocates. Chambers argued for harmony and cooperation and envisioned a system in which the General Board and the Construction Board would be equal partners in ship design. He believed that dialogue rather than hierarchy produced the best designs as it allowed the flow of ideas. No organization should be dominant in ship design. He proposed that the Construction Board would submit designs to the General Board, the General Board and Naval War College would critique them, and the final design would be the result of consensus between these two bodies. As Chambers repeatedly argued: "just criticism strengthens and cannot weaken good work.” This arrangement would clarify but preserve the balance in power between the line and staff."*” Slowly a compromise evolved for the 1905 battleships. The Construction Board first proposed that the two new battleships authorized for 1905 would carry a mixed battery of big guns: four 10” and four 12” like Japan's Aki. The General Board rejected this and repeated its demand for an all-big-gun design, sending them another copy of

Chamber’s design. On July 8, 1905, the Construction Board replied with a new set of plans, which again failed to meet the General Board's requirements, but were at least getting closer. After several meetings, the General Board responded to this proposal on September 30, recommending that the displacement of the two battleships be increased from 16,000 tons to 18,000 tons and that the main battery have at least ten 12” guns. The exchange of memos and debate continued, as the two bodies slow ly settled on a compromise design that would mount eight 12” guns in dual turrets on the centerline—which eventually became the standard model {or posi-Dreadnought battleships. At 16,000 tons, it was still smaller than the General Board wanted, but the General Board had won its main point in changing the gim layout Congress approved the final plans for two battleships on this design later that year. On December 5, Great

Chambers, T he Study of Ship Designs, Memorandum in re. Lieutenant Commander Sims’ Comments on our Methods of Determining the Designs of Men-of-War," October 18,1904, Chambers Papers, Box 35. 259 Britain laid down the Dreadnought—a. ship much closer to what the General Board wanted.'**

Chambers' Work for the General Board The main work of the General Board was war planning. While the United States

Navy competed to match the Royal Navy in technology, few officers saw Britain as a likely enemy. Increasingly, led by Dewey, they focused on Germany as their most likely foe. Sparked by German Admiral Otto von Diederichs' behavior in Manila Bay during the Spanish-American War, Admirals Dewey, Taylor, and many other officers became convinced of German hostility and territorial ambitions in the American sphere of influence. Increasing German operations in the Caribbean and Pacific over the next few years offered confirmation of German hostility to many American naval officers. In 1904 Dewey wrote to Secretary of the Navy Moody indicating that the United States should base its naval building and war planning on a war with Germany.'** Germany was in the process of building a fleet that would be second only to Great Britain's in size and would include more than thirty battleships. The officers of the General Board were determined not to fall behind Germany and were soon plarming for an even larger fleet Chambers too saw Germany as the United States' most likely enemy, and in response to a General Board inquiry, submitted a detailed plan for an enlarged American fleet and its strategy in war with Germany. Chambers' recommended fleet matched the final recommendation of the General Board quite closely. Chambers recommended a fleet composed 46 battleships, 24 armored cruisers, 48 scout cruisers, 75 torpedo destroyers, 30 colliers, assorted small cruisers and gunboats, and various supply and depot ships. The battleships would all be built following his all-big-gun design with

'^Chambers, "Memorandum on the Evolution of the All-Big-Gun Battleship in the U. S. Navy," January 23,1911, Chambers Papers, Box 35. ■“'^Thomas A. Bailey, “Dewey and the Germans at Manila Bay” AHR 45 (Oct 1939): 59-81; Baer, One Hundred Years o f Sea Power, 39. 260 twelve 12” guns. In the event of war, he wanted the United States to take the initiative, crossing the Atlantic and seizing the Heligoland as an advanced base from which to blockade Germany.'*®^ The final building proposal of the General Board, issued a few weeks later, called for a fleet slightly larger than what Chambers had recommended, but almost identical in the numbers of armored warships. The General Board recommended 48 battleships, two more than Chambers had suggested, which as the press suggested in later years would allow each state of the union to have a battleship with its name.**” For each two battleships, the Board wanted one armored cruiser, several smaller cruisers, three destroyers and two colliers. Again, the figures matched Chambers' recommendation almost exactly. In addition to several smaller vessels and other auxiliaries it totaled 370 ships which it hoped to have built by 1920. This became basis of General Board’s recommendations for the next decade as it sought to keep up with European naval building.'*’” While the all-big-gun battleship debate occupied much of Chambers' time on the General Board's staff, he still served on a variety of planning committees. In November 1904 he served on a board under Captain James H. Dayton to codify rules for the construction and classification of steel and iron vessels. A few months later he served on a board for physical training of the navy's sailors under Commander Charles Vreeland. On several occasions, he returned to the Torpedo Station to oversee various torpedo tests. On February 4, 1905, Dewey placed Chambers in charge of a board to compile data on the endurance and tactical qualities of the ships of the fleet The problems that had plagued the North Atlantic Squadron in coordinating maneuvers while Chambers was on the Texas had only become worse as more battleships had joined the fleet and

^Chambers to General Board, October 17,1903, "Memorandum Refening to General Board no. 420," Chambers Papers, Box 3. *"This lecommendation predates the admissicm of Oklahoma into the union in 1907 as the 48th state. ■“’'Baer, One Hundred Years o f Sea Power, 39. 261 admirals attempted larger maneuvers. The Navy needed a system to classify its ships based on their maneuvering characteristics to determine their division into squadrons. The Naval War College had attempted to gather and compile this data the previous year without success. Both the Bureau of Navigation and the Bureau of Construction and Repair had given its officers the runaround, demonstrating that the problem of bureau of coordination was more than merely a line versus staff issue.*” For Chambers, this was a resumption of the work he had begun on the Texas. Aided by Lieutenant Commanders Phillip Andrews, Benjamin Bryan , and William

White, he produced a standardized methodology and sequence of maneuvers to calculate the speed, coal usage, steaming endurance, and turning radius of a warship. They perfected the system following trials onboard the cxmsex Chattanooga several months later. By the end of the year, their system was in use throughout the fleet.*" On April 22, 1905, Chambers received a promotion to the rank of commander, but he was already looking forward to even higher rank. A few months before, he had studied the promotion procedures of the larger, foreign navies, which he outlined for the General Board. His work showed that the United States Navy had a serious shortage of personnel compared to other navies, especially the German Navy. Foreign battleships were assigned both more officers and more enlisted personal than American battleships. American naval officers also tended to be much older than their foreign counterparts. The average age for a captain in the Royal Navy was 48. In the German Navy it was only 46, and in the

Japanese only 44. The average captain in the United States Navy was 58, which was above the compulsory retirement age of both the British and Japanese navies.*® Amidst his other work. Chambers again foimd time to dabble at invention as well as design several smaller warships. He made minor improvements in two navigational

*“Dewey to Chambers, February 4,1905, NARG 24, Chambers Correspondence. Chambers, ‘Directions for Making Turning Trials and Obtaining Tactical Maneuvering Data,” Chambers Papers, Box 35; Chambers, "Notes <» Tactical Diameters, ” Chambers Pzpers, Box 29. ^Chambers, "Memorandum cm Increase of Personnel," October 25,1904, Chambers Papers, Box 36. 262 aids, Martin’s Mooring Board and Battenberg’s Course Indicator, and sent them off to the Bureau of Equipment, and continued to work on torpedoes.*® It is important to note that while Chambers had worked on numerous inventions from minor mechanical devices to his torpedo guidance system over that past decade, he made no effort to patent any of them. His failure to profit from his twenty year-old rocket-tropedo patents as well as the legal fees and the bureacracy involved in the process had kept him from seeking more patents. In addition to his battleship design. Chambers also designed a scout cruiser which Dewey liked and recommended to the General Board. The Chief of the Bureau of Equipment, Admiral Maury, also liked the design. He supported it in discussions before both the General Board and the Construction Board and it influenced the final Construction Board design. Chambers also drew up the plans for the new floating dock for the Philippines and laid out the procedure for towing it there.*”

Conclusion Over the course of the previous two decades. Chambers’ technical skills brought him to the attention of several of his immediate superiors, such as Ramsay, Bunce, and Wadi cigh, all of whom relied on his technical and engineering expertise. His pioneering work with torpedoes earned him the respect of a small number of technically sophisticated line officers including Montgomery Sicard and his successors at the Bureau of Ordnance. His detailed intelligence brought him to the attention of the small staff at the Office of Naval Intelligence and Secretary of the Navy Chandler. Y et with the exception of Chandler, Chambers received little recognition for his abilities and accomplishments apart from his immediate superiors and a small group of ^Chambers to Swift, "In te—Martin’s Mooting Board and Battenberg’s Course Indicator,” undated. Chambers Papers, Box 2. *"Dewey to Secretary of the Navy, Mardi 31,1905, Chambers Papers, Box 2; Mauiy to Chambers, May 24,1905, Chambers Papers, Box 2; Chambers. "Memorandum on the New Floating Dock for the Philippine Naval Station," March 1905, Chambers Papers, Box 30. 263 technologically sophisticated line officers. His all-big-gun battleship proposal changed that It did more for his career than any of his previous successes and brought him to the attention of the General Board and some of the highest ranking and most respected officers in the Navy including Admiral Dewey. It brought him into the inner, policy­ making circle of the Navy and set him on course to influential positions in the future. Chambers ended his tour on the General Board on July 3, 1905, and left well- regarded by several senior officers including Dewey. As always, his fitness ratings were excellent, and he had added an impressive series of accomplishments to his name apart from his ground-breaking work on the all-big-gun battleship. Clearly he was marked for greater things. His next assignment, as captain of the gnnboaX. Nashville, would be on a diplomatically sensitive mission in the Caribbean. As a voice of moderation on several issues, though. Chambers had angered many of the extremists among the reformers. At least one of them would eventually get his chance for revenge. The United States did not lay down its first fully Dreadnought-siy\e battleship, the , until 1907, the same year that Germany laid down her first Dreadnought- style battleships, the four battleships of the Nassau class. Both nations by then were desperate to close the technological gap between them and Great Britain created by the Dreadnought.^^ The Dela^vare, which w as not completed until 1910, was the first American battleship to feature both the new, centerline all-big-gun layout and turbine engines. Even this ship did not satisfy Sims and his co-agitators, and they attacked its design as well. Dewey, who had often supported them in the past, ordered them to keep quiet He would not tolerate a wholesale attack on the Navy. The future of the Navy, though, lay with these agitators, rather than Dewey The all-big-gun battleship marked an important point in both the technological progress of the Navy and the professionalization of its officer corps. The consensus that “ *Holger Hciwig,'Luxury Fleet: ’ The . 1888-1918 (London: AQen & Unwin, 1980), 54^ . **Spector,Dewev, 175-6. 264 had already formed around battleship construction in the 1890s broadened to include virtually every officer in the fleet The pre-eminence of the battleship in naval strategy and as the backbone of the fleet was unquestioned. Among both civilians and naval officers, battleships became synonymous with naval power. The United States’ new battleships also dramatized the emergence of a technologically sophisticated, professional naval officer corps—an officer corps that increasingly spoke with one voice through new, professional institutions such as the General Board and the Naval Institute. These new institutions gave naval officers greater political influence than they had enjoyed in the past, and allowed them to exercise greater control over the direction of naval policy. It also allowed them to slowly displace civilian influence from several areas of policy­ making, particularly in the construction and design of warships. While fierce, and at times divisive, the debate over battleship designs took place within the ranks of the naval officer corps. Politicians still controlled the purse strings, but they no longer intervened in the design of warships as they had in the 1880s and 1890s. Naval officers had taken control of a process critical to the development of their service as well as their professional autonomy. It simply remained to be determined where, within the Navy, new warship designs would originate, and who would oversee their development and eventual construction.

265 CHAPTER 12 THE CARIBBEAN AND THE BUREAU OF ORDNANCE

While Chambers served on the General Board, President Roosevelt inaugurated a more aggressive foreign policy in the American hemisphere. The Navy established a permanent Caribbean squadron in the autumn of 1902 ,and Secretary of the Navy Moody ordered it to: “exert our influence towards maintaining order in those regions where disorder would imperil the lives and property of our citizens.”*^ Later that year Roosevelt dispatched a strong squadron of battleships to deter a combined British, German, and Italian fleet that had blockaded Venezuela to force the payment of debts owed to European banks. In 1903 Roosevelt rushed warships and Marines to support Panama's breakaway from Columbia and to secure a canal concession. The next year, he announced his famous corollary to the Monroe Doctrine and informed the world that the United States would serve as the policeman of the Caribbean. Chambers would soon be policing this region of the world in his new command.

The Dominican Republic Venezuela was hardly the only Latin American country deeply in debt to European banks. The Dominican Republic faced a similar debt crisis. To compound the nation's problems, Ulises Heureaax’s long dictatorship ended with his assassination in 1899 and competing rebel factions soon plunged the nation into chaos. Leaders in both the Dominican Republic and the United States feared the Europeans would soon be sending warships to collect what they were owed. ^Moody to Commander-in-Chief, North Atlantic Squadron, Oct 4,1902, Area Hie 8, NARG 45. 266 Horacio Vasquez and Ramon Cdceres had launched the revolution against Heureaux. Câceres himself had assassinated the dictator. Vasquez then seized power and called for elections, throwing his support to Juan Isidro Jimenez, a merchant who had spent his fortune working to topple Heureaux. In November 1899, Jimenez became President with Vasquez as his Vice President The two did not get along for long, and Vasquez and Câceres ousted Jimenez. Vasquez became President with Cdceres as his principle advisor. Their coup split the country into two factions: the “Jimenistas” who supported ousted President Jimenez and the “Horacistas” who supported Vasquez. A constant stream of breakaway factions and as well as defections from one faction to another added to the nation's instability.*”

Meanwhile the debt situation, despite repeated refinancings, worsened. A New York syndicate of banks formed the San Domingo Improvement Company and bought up some of this debt Vasquez gave the company control of several customs houses whose revenues were to be used to make payments on the debt Collecting import duties in such an unstable situation, though, proved all but impossible. Vasquez terminated his arrangement with the company and began looking for a more reliable source of funds. A series of local rebellions that broke out at the end of 1902 made his situation even more desperate. In February 1903, the General Board sent Lieutenants Walter S. Crosely and W. S. Smith, disguised as journalists, to gather data on the Dominican Republic and to meet secretly with embattled President Vasquez. The General Board believed that Germany was Involved in secret negotiations to secure a base on the island, though Crosely and Smith found no evidence of this. Vasquez, though, promised the United States the use of the excellent anchorage at Samana Bay as a base and coaling station in exchange for

American support of his cause. The two spies returned with an enthusiastic report on the ^""David Heaiy, Drive to : The United States in the Caribbean 1898-1917 (Madison: Unviersity of Wisconsin Press, 1988), 100-115; Dana G. Mimro, Intervention and E)ollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900-1921 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), 88-100. 267 potential for naval base development at several sites, but President Roosevelt was not ready to act.®’ Frustrated at every turn and losing support, Vasquez called for new elections and retired from politics. Before these could take place, Heureaux’s old generals seized control of the capital after several weeks of bloody fighting in the spring of 1903. The new regime of General Alejandro Woss y Gil was in turn toppled by the Jimenistas that autumn. Their leader, Carlos Morales, decided he would rather keep power for himself, and quickly cemented an alliance with the Horacistas. They arranged his election to the presidency in 1904 with Cdceres as his running mate. The fighting in 1903 was particularly fierce and caused considerable damage to foreign holdings. Jimenista soldiers had burned sugar cane fields, harassed foreigners, and interfered with passenger and cargo vessels landing in the North. Captain Richard Wainwright, in temporary command of the South Atlantic Squadron, brought most of his squadron to the capital, and after being fired on from the shore, bombarded the rebel positions, and then landed Marines who drove the rebels off.^'° Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands also sent warships to protect their citizens and watch over their interests. Foreign nations had dispatched warships to Santo Domingo several times since the civil wars began in 1899, but this time word leaked to the U. S. chargé d’affaires, William F. Powell, that Germany had opened negotiations with several rebel factions, confirming the reports of the previous year. Both the State and Navy Departments saw this as further evidence of German ambition that had all the potential to lead to another showdown with a German fleeL^" Once firmly in power. President Morales declared a blockade of arms shipments to his nation, but he lacked the means to enforce it The United States Navy added this “ 'Crosely to Taylor, May 6,1903, Area File 8, NARG 45. ’‘"Damon E. Cummings, Admiral Richard Wainwright and the (Washington; GPO, 1962). 146. ’“Healy.Dnve to Hegemony, 115; Lester Langley. The Banana Wars (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1985), 26-30; Cbàüeaer, Admirals, Generals, And American Foreign Policy, 120. 268 mission to its duties in the region, and became increasingly involved in the conflict In January 1904, Commander Andrew C. Dillingham of the landed Marines at Fhierto Plata and Sosua to protect foreigners. He ordered both government and rebel troops out of the vicinity and brokered a brief truce. This truce collapsed on February 1 when rebel troops opened fire on a launch from the auxiliary cruiser , killing an American seaman. Her commander landed 300 sailors and Marines who drove off the Jimenistas rebels. Several minor interventions by American forces followed in which the Navy separated government and rebel forces, usually to the advantage of the govermnenL^" Later that month, following a series of military successes and perhaps emboldened by his recent assistance from the United States Navy, Morales publicly asked for American assistance in ending his nation's debt crisis. He offered the United States a fifty-year lease on the excellent anchorages at Samana Bay and Manzanillo in exchange for guaranteeing the Republic's foreign debt, reducing import duties, and managing his government's finances. Predictably, domestic opposition against Morales increased. Roosevelt remained reluctant to intervene, but that spring he sent a commission composed of Admirals Dewey and Taylor, Secretar)' of State Francis B. Loomis, and Commander Nathan Sargent to investigate the situation. While these men supported Morales' deal, Roosevelt was more cautious and worried about domestic support for another foreign adventure. The Department of State sent Professor Jacob H. Hollander to serve as Morales' economic advisor and suggested that Morales renew his request for aid following the 1904 U. S. Presidential election.^*^ While Roosevelt campaigned for his second term. Morales’ support ebbed away and pressure from European bankers increased. He once again tried transferring control ^‘"Powell to Hay, February 24,1904, NARG 45, AF 8; Langley, Ranana Wars, 29-33. ’‘■’Donald Y ena. Admirals and Empire: The United States Navy and the Caribbean. 1898-1945 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991), 23; Heally. Drive to Hegemony, 117. 269 of some customs houses to the San Domingo Improvement Company, but fierce domestic opposition put a stop to this. The United States, fearing European intervention, pressured Morales to pay off the debts and sent a new minister, Thomas Dawson, to negotiate a peace with the rebels who controlled several of the northern provinces. Commander Dillingham joined Dawson in the negotiations. In June 1904 they secured a tentative peace agreement between the rebels and government In exchange for peace. Morales agreed to pay the debts of the revolution and to leave the northern province of Monte Cristi under the control of the local Jimenista governor, Desiderio Arias.®*'*

This agreement was quickly followed by a treaty between the United States and the Dominican Republic for the United States to take control of all the Republic's customs houses, which provided 90% of the government's revenue. The agreement was signed January 21, 1905, but the United States Senate, wary of another foreign adventure, adjourned without ratifying it Still, the Department of State arranged to put the treaty's provisions into force anyway. This so-called modus vivendi went into effect on April 1. The United States would collect all customs duties, turning 45% of the money over to the government and using the rest to pay off the nation's $32 million debt.®*® The Jimenistas fiercely resented the imposition of the customs receivership. Like the government they relied on customs house revenue to support their operations. Governor Arias vowed to resist any takeover of the Monte Cristi customs house by the United States. Commander Dillingham and Admiral Sigsbee, who had just arrived on the island, met with Arias' and intimidated him into allowing an American naval officer to be installed as collector in Monte Cristi.®*® Chambers would soon be patrolling this unenviable station.

^'^tunro. Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 100. ®*®J. Fred Rjppy, ‘The Institution of the Customs Receivership in the Dominican Republic,” Hispanic American Historical Review 17 (Nov 1937), 419-57. ' “Munro. Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 101-2. 270 Chambers in the Dominican Republic On July 2,1905, the Bureau of Navigation ordered Chambers to take command of the gunboat A(Z5/tv{//e, tlien fitting out in Boston, and sail for the Dominican Republic when the ship was ready. Chambers arrived in Boston and took command the following day. The Nashville was much larger than his last command, the Frolic. She carried a crew of 170 as well as fifteen Marines and was armed with eight 4” guns and a variety of smaller weapons. A radio had just been installed in the ship, but it would prove of little value. Construction crews were still on board when Chambers arrived and he closely supervised their work and the work of his crew in outfitting the ship. He also ordered regular small arms practice to prepare his crew for possible combat ashore. It took until the end of August to complete their work, and the Nashville sailed on the 30th. They arrived at Santo Domingo two weeks later. Chambers himself conned the ship into port, something he did routinely. Once docked he immediately ordered gun drills while he departed to meet with Admiral Royal B. Bradford who commanded the patrol squadron.*’’ At the time, Bradford’s command included seven gunboats, a , and his own flagship, the cruiser Olympia. He had just received unequivocal orders from President

Roosevelt to prevent the importation of any arms, and “to stop any revolution.” Roosevelt intended to maintain the status quo in the Dominican Republic until the Senate had approved the customs house treaty. Neither revolutionaries in the Republic nor “red tape” at home were to be allowed to upset the smooth functioning of the modus vivendi.^^* In his reply, Bradford indicated he expected trouble, “probably in the Monte Cristi area,” and he assigned Chambers and the Nashville to patrol along the northern coast between

Monte Cristi and Puerto Plata.*” "‘’Logbook, USS Nashville, NARG 24. "‘“Hting Monison (ed.). The Letters o f Theodore /(ooseve//(Cambridge, 1951-54), vol. 5,10. "‘^Chambers to Bradford, October 5,1905, Chambers Papers, Box 2; and Bradford to the Secretar}' of the 271 The Nashville sailed a few days later and joined the other gunboat assigned to the North, the Yankee, under Commander William H. Southerland, who was senior to Chambers. The gunboats patrolled the coast to prevent arms smuggling. They were under strict orders not to land troops unless absolutely necessary. While the situation was calm, the Jimenistas were clearly mobilizing and resented the appearance of yet another American gunboat After two months on patrol. Chambers gave his crew shore leave in

November with strict warnings to be careful and avoid antagonizing the local population.®® Chambers' reports on the situation in Monte Cristi confirmed Bradford’s fears. In response, Bradford requested the Navy reinforce his command by three gunboats and three hundred Marines.®* These were slow in coming, but the Nashville and Yankee were eventually joined by the %unboaX Scorpion. Despite American help, and partly because of it. President Morales was rapidly losing public support A rumored landing of American troops in November led to a riot in Santo Domingo during which Vice President Câceres narrowly dissuaded a mob from killing Morales. After the riots, new Secretary of State Hihu Root moved the United States to a less confrontational policy. Several American warships were withdrawn and he ordered the Navy only to land troops if absolutely necessary to protect American lives and property . This was the last straw for Morales. Fearing a coup from his former Horacista supporters, he fled the capital in December, joined the Jimenistas, and launched a new revolt against his own government®^ Ramdn Câceres assumed the Presidency. Following Morales' arrival in the North, the Jimenistas resumed offensive operations. Chambers and Southerland sailed for Puerto Plata to protect the town from the depredations of both government and rebel forces. In an effort to keep the conflict

Navy, October 11,1905, Area Rle 8, NARG 45. '^’’Logbook, USS Nashville, NARG 24; Chambers to the crew of the Nashville, November?, 1905, Chambers Papers, Box 3 ^'Bonaparte to Roosevelt, September 4,1905, and Bradford to the Secretary of the Navy, October 11, 1^5 , Area Hie 8, NARG 45. ^R oot to DawsaiL, Foreign Relations, 1905,408. 272 away from the city and to ensure that it was not bombarded. Chambers arranged a meeting between government and rebel forces. He conveyed government envoys including the local commander. General Demetrio Rodriguez, to meet with Arias. At the meeting. Arias demanded the restoration of President Morales and the equal division of all government offices between the two parties. The govermnent envoys refused and the meeting broke up without agreement after several hours of argumenL^ Skirmishing began almost immediately thereafter as government soldiers moved against the city. The telegraph wires were cut forcing Chambers and Southerland to rely on courier boats to communicate with Bradford. On December 26 the Jimenistas repulsed the first vigorous government attack, but more government forces were on their way.®" The Dominican gwnboailndependencia arrived on the 30th and made to enter the port Southerland in the Yankee intercepted her, and in a meeting with her Captain warned him not to bombard the city. The Independencia left shortly thereafter. Puerto Plata was far from the only hot spot, and Southerland left the next day to confer with Bradford on the developing crisis. Before leaving he transferred the Yankee’s Marines to the Nashville and ordered Chambers into the city’s inner harbor. He ordered Chambers not to land troops unless the fighting entered the city. If it did, he was to use his limited forces to protect foreign propertj' and the civilian population as best he could. If the Inependencia returned, he was to prevent her from bombarding anywhere within three miles of the city.®“ A fierce battle followed as government soldiers forced the Jimenistas from their positions around the city. Several times the fighting entered the outskirts of the city, but the American gimboat visibly anchored in the harbor apparently dissuaded both sides from entering the city in force. As night fell, the remaining Jimenista soldiers withdrew ^Southeriand to the Secretary of the Navy, December 25,1905, Area 8 File, NARG 45. ^^Chambers to the Secretary of the Navy, December 26,1905, Chambers Papers, Box 2; Chambers to the Secretary of the Navy, December 27, 1905, Area File 8, NARG 45. ^Southerland to the Secretary of the Navy, December 30,1905, Area File 8, NARG 45. ^^Southerland to Chambers, January 1,1906, Area File 8, NARG 45. 273 and Chambers organized a medical unit and sent it ashore to render assistance to the wounded. Tnt Nashville's Surgeon, J. H. Payne led the group and established a Red Cross hospital, which treated the wounded of both sides as well as several civilians. As Chambers later reported, this was especially valuable in creating a good impression among the Dominicans.®’ Southerland commended Chambers for his actions during the battle, and wrote to the Secretary of the Navy that Chambers’ “cool headedness and judgement during a time of panic. . . resulted in quieting the panic-stricken population and preventing a call for a landing force.” His actions marked him as “an officer of tact and judgement... worthy of the confidence of the Department” Privately, Southerland, who was due for promotion to Captain soon, promised Chambers that “when he became an admiral” he would request Chambers “as his chief of staff.”®* A week later, the Nashville sailed for Monte Cristi where the defeated Jimenistas were regrouping under Desidario Arias’ banner. They remained in strong control of the countryside and controlled the city’s government Despite this, the port’s customs agents remained loyal to the government in Santo Domingo and continued to collect duties for the government When Chambers arrived, the Jimenistas were apparently planning to seize the customs house. Chambers forestalled their action by issuing a memorandum to both sides stating that he would not permit interference with or the search of any American ships by the Jimenistas as they were not a recognized belligerent and had no belligerent rights. He assured U. S. Consul I. T. Petit that he would land troops to support

customs officials if it became necessary.®’ Government forces were not far behind the retreating Jimenistas. On January 12, apparently sensing defeat. Arias asked for shelter on board the Nashville, which ^Chambers to the Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, January 4.1906, Area File 8, NARG 45. ^Chambers Htness Report, June 1906, NARG 24; Southerland to Chambers, June 30,1916, Chambers Papers, Box 13. ^Chambers, JanJanuary 9,1906, Memorandum, Area File 8, NARG 45; Chambers to U. S. Consul 1. T. Petit January 12,1906, Chambers Papers, Box 3. 274 Chambers granted. Jimenista forces remained in the field and the town's civilian population began to flee in expectation of battle. It looked to Chambers like a much bigger battle than Puerta Plata was in the offing, and he once again began negotiating with local military leaders to keep the fighting out of the city. Arias, though, made him an even better offer.^ In exchange for sanctuary in Puerto Rico, Arias and several members of his staff agreed to sign articles of capitulation, ending their resistance to the Horacista government in Santo Domingo. Arias also offered his services to help negotiate a peaceful settlement with the remaining rebel leaders. Chambers quickly agreed to this and arranged for a dozen of the rebel generals to meet with Arias on board the Nashville .They arrived on the 18th, ragged from their recent defeats and “resembling Moros in general appearance.” Instead of arranging a truce, though. Chambers caught them plotting to renew the rebellion. Apparently infuriated by this betrayal, he stormed into their conference room and delivered a stem lecture “on the evil effects of constant revolution.” As he later reported, he reviewed “the turbulent history of Santo Domingo . . . particularly with reference to the honest collection of customs by the United States,” complemented the island for its beauty and vast resources, and concluded by condemning “the evil effects of constant revolution.” If only, he argued, the Dominicans would adopt “American methods of settling their disputes,” they would enjoy peace and progress.®^ Chambers convinced only a few of the generals. The majority of them returned to the shore to renew their struggle. The rest joined Arias in Puerto Rican exile. The Nashville sailed for that island the next day and arrived on the 20th. Chambers gave his crew a few days leave, and was delayed sailing when many returned late. The Nashville sailed for Puerto Plata on 24th after the last of the crew were rounded up from dockside bars. ^Chambers to Southerland, January 13,1906, Chambers Papers, Box 3. “ ‘chambers to Enrique Leroux (U. S. consular agent), January 17,1906, Chambers Papers, Box 3. “^Chambers to Southerland, January 18,1906, Area 8 File, NARG 45. 275 Despite the generals’ vows to continue the struggle, the revolution was all but over. Câceres proved far more able than his predecessors, especially as a military commander. He kept the Jimenistas confused and scattered, allowing him to crush their generals one at a time. The Nashville spent the rest of February back on patrol off Monte Christi and Chambers sent the Secretary of the Navy a thirteen-page report on the collapse of the revolution. At the end of the month they sailed to Cuba for much needed repairs. The Nashville's boilers were seriously worn. Unfortunately, Guantanamo lacked many of the needed parts for repairs. Her boilers crudely patched, the Nashville sailed back to Monte Cristi on March 4 .^ The Nashville continued her patrols in March and April, but the ebbing of hostilities gave Chambers the opportunity to explore further afield and engage in reconnaissance for the General Board. He completed a new survey of Puerto Plata in March and explored several of the smaller, nearby islands including Turks Island. In April, he sent Admiral Dewey and the General Board detailed charts of the area as well as details of German operations and landholdings in the area, especially around San Pedro de Macoris. Much of his work was incorporated into Plan Black, the plan for a war with Germany.®^ The Nashville was ordered home to Boston on June 12. Chambers gave his crew leave, and on the 19th he and his senior officers called on President Câceres and his Minister of Foreign Affairs. They sailed for home on June 22, stopping briefly at Puerto Rico. It was a slow voyage as Nashville's worn out boilers limited her to a speed of only

5 knots. They did not arrive in Boston imtil July 23. The customs receivership ran under \he modus vivendi for the next two years until the Senate ratified a new treaty on February 8, 1907. By the end of 1906 the Dominican

“ Txjgbook, USS Nashville, NARG 24; Chambers to Secretary of the Navy, February 13, 1906, Chambers Papers, Box 3; Southerland to Chambers, February 26,1906, Chambers Papers, Box 3. ^*%vans to Chambers, March 18, 1906, Chambers Papers, Box 2; Dewey to Chambers, November 10, 1905, Chambers Papers, Box 3; Costello, "Plaonmg for War,”143. 276 Republic’s debt had been reduced from $30 million to just over $17 million. Câceres was reelected to the presidency in 1908, leaving the situation at least temporarily calm.

Intervention in Cuba

In August Chambers was placed in command of the v r o t ô X o x Florida, which had just been placed on reserve at the Naval Academy. The ship would be used as a test bed for modem, heavy ordnance with the side benefit of giving the midshipmen some experience with new ordnance. Chambers was just settling into his new command when he was ordered to take command of the cruiser Newark. Another emergency in the Caribbean required experienced captains with cool heads. In Cuba, negotiations between rival factions had all but broken down and a major revolt was expected any day. While Secretary of State Taft tried to arrange an amicable settlement in Havana, President Roosevelt ordered the Navy and Marine Corps to assemble a landing force and prepare to intervene forcefully. The battleships Louisiana, , and Virginia along with the cruisers Denver and Des Moines sailed first, and arrived in Havana with the first troops the night of September 21. Meanwhile, Marines were gathered from ever) ship in the North Atlantic Reet and assembled into the 1st Provisional Brigade under Colonel L. W. T. Waller. The cruisers Tacoma, Newark, and Minneapolis each embaiked 250 Marines and sailed as they completed loading on the 16th, 17th, and 18th respectively and arrived in Cuba a week later. On October 1, the last two battalions of Marines completed boarding the Prairie, Texas, and Brooklyn and

sailed for Havana.®* The landings in Cuba went well, and the Marines quickly secured the area around Havana. The Ne^vporî left Havana on September 30 to land fifty Marines at Nuevitas and a further one hundred at Puerto Principe. Afterward the Newport, along with the other ^’^Hairy A. H is worth. One Hundred Eighty Landings o f the United States Marines: 1800-1934 (Washington: GPO, 1974), 62-3; Allan R. \fillett. The Politics of Intervention: The of Cuba. /906-7909(Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1968), 91. 277 cruisers, spent the next several weeks transporting small detachments of Marines to secure further secondary targets. The Newport was forced out to sea on October 14 by the worst storm to hit Cuba in fifty years. In Havana harbor, several ships were wrecked and many others were run aground including several American warships. The crew of the Nashville helped clean up the harbor when they arrived. By the end of October, the Marines had the situation well in hand, and the Navy withdrew several of its warships, including the Newport, which arrived back in New York on November 9 .^

The Florida and the Ordnance Tests

After he returned from Cuba, Chambers was transferred back to command the Florida on November 12,1906. For the next month he helped train the Academy’s cadets in modem ordnance. The main reason for his assignment to the Florida, though, was to supervise a series of ordnance tests. On December 24 the Florida was ordered to the Norfolk Navy Vard to be outfitted for the tests. The main part of these was to test the effects of blast from heavy guns firing over adjoining turrets. This was a test of the centerline gun layout that Chambers had fought for and which was planned for the and South Carolina then under construction. No one was certain what the effects would be on the lower turrets when the upper turrets fired directly over them. The

Florida was fitted with 12” guns and a temporary gun platform. Chambers directed the series of test firings between March 6 and 15 and proved before observers from the Bureau of Ordnance and the skeptical Bureau of Construction and Repair that the turret arrangement was safe. Working quickly, the yard crew managed to restore the Florida to normal operating condition just in time for the midshipmen’s summer training cruise.^ That summer, the Florida along with the Olympia, Arkansas, and Nevada were organized into a practice squadron for the summer cruise of the academy midshipmen. ^Schroeder to Chambers, September 30,1906, Chambers Papers, Box 2; Logbook, USS Newport, N.ARG 24; Chambers to Senior O filca Present (Cuba). October 16.1906, Chambers Papers, Box 3. ^M etcalf to Chambers, February 27,1907, Chambers PiqieTS, Box 3. Chambers, Petitioa, 8-9. 278 Like many of the older officers. Chambers believed standards had become lax since his days at the Academy and was particularly critical of the lack of sail training, which was essential knowledge for understanding the sea. Plus, many sailing ships still plied the seas and the midshipmen would encounter them during their careers. Further, he believed that sail training was essential in building the confidence and skill in command and leadership that the midshipmen would need later in their careers.^ Chambers also took the time to write to the Secretary of the Navy about his dislike of the growing use of foreign (especially Japanese) mess attendants. He wanted Americans for these positions and argued for the return of African-Americans to the Navy and specifically as mess attendants, and suggested the Navy establish a school

under a good chef to train African-American recruits. The Navy would get good mess attendants who would easily be able to move on to civilian careers when they completed

thier service.®’ This letter may have been provoked by an incident involving Chambers’ Japanese steward, Hadewara. Hadewara had served Chambers on the Nashville and followed him to the Florida. When Chambers was temporarily transferred to the Newark, Hadewara remained on the Florida. He was apparently not treated well by the crew during

Chambers' absence and became involved in a fight with several sailors. He cracked one over the head with a fishing pole and stabbed another with a knife before being overpowered.^

The Bureau of Ordnance The success of the ordnance tests led to Chambers’ assigrunent to the Bureau of Ordnance as the Assistant Chief of the Bureau on November 11 ,1907. The Chief of the Bureau was his long time friend, Newton E. Mason. Chambers spent his first months on ^Chambers to the Secretary of the Navy, August 24,1907, Chambers Papers, Box 3. “’Chambers to the Secretary of the Navy, August 24,1907, Chambers Papers, Box 3. ’"Stephen Vaughan to Chambers, September 29,1906, Chambers Papers, Box 3. 279 an inspection tour of the Bureau’s numerous facilities at each of the navy yards to improve coordination and standardization among them. Following this he supervised another series of ordnance tests that summer in Chesapeake Bay with a small squadron under his command that included the Arkansas, Florida, Montgomery, Morris and two tugs. This time, the Florida was the target TheArkansas fired several 12” rounds into her turret face to assess its resistance to damage and test several new shells. Following this, a torpedo was detonated under the Florida to test a new layout for internal compartmentalization. After the detonation, a crew reboarded the Florida and they rushed her into dry dock in under three hours.*** Chambers’ squadron also tested the resistance to battle damage of the cage masts plaimed for battleships and a variety of other exposed ships systems. The success of these tests and those of the previous year allowed Chambers to conclude that battleship design had reached a point of finality and agreement While improvements would continue, the single caliber main gun with reserved for smaller weapons designed to deter torpedo attack would mark all future warships. The tests also showed what Chambers had long argued: while torpedoes were certainly dangerous weapons, it would take quite a few of them to sink a well-designed battleship. A few months later, on December 17,1908, Chambers was promoted to Captain.**^ Most of Chambers’ work at the Ordnance Bureau was bureaucratic and routine. Over the next two years the Navy upgraded many of its weapon systems. It replaced many of its small arms with new models and adopted the same ammunition as the Army. Torpedoes throughout the fleet were replaced with the new Bliss-Leavitt model. The capacity of the Indian Head Ordnance Factory was increased and stockpiles of ammunition were increased. The continued construction of new, larger battleships kept

“ 'Oiambers, "Petition," 8-9; SONAR, 1908,417. ^'Chambers, '^lilitary Characteristics of Battleships,” undated circa 1908, Chambers Papers, Box 35 280 the bureau constantly upgrading its facilities to produce larger and larger guns as well as their associated systems such as ammunition hoists.^ The attention of virtually everyone in the Navy during these years was focused on the around the world voyage of President Roosevelt’s “” The fleet sailed from Hampton Roads on December 16, 1907, and returned to the United States on February 22, 1909 after sailing 46,000 miles without a serious breakdown. It was a grand display that showcased the emergence of the United States as a world power. Roosevelt also hoped it would stir up support for the new battleship construction made necessary by the launching of the Dreadnought and the naval building race in Europe. As had been the case in the Spanish-American War, Chambers proved more valuable to the Navy at home helping coordinate the logistics for this massive undertaking than as part of the fleet Despite his position within one of the technical bureaus, albeit the one with strong line affiliations. Chambers continued to argue against their domination of ship design. Shortly after his arrival at the bureau, he suggested the creation of a Board of Critics that would solicit suggestions from all officers and watch over the ship design process. “Those charged with the expensive matters of design should be able to stand the test of intelligence criticism.” When the Bureau of Construction and Repair launched a campaign to absorb several of the smaller bureaus. Chambers spoke out forcefully against their plan. While it was true that fewer bureaus would probably improve coordination and planning, the gain would be marginal. It was cleariy an effort by a handful of “power mongering, empire building officers who want to enlarge their own bureaus and authority at the expense of others.” A better solution would be to divide the work between the various bureaus on a rational and equal basis and appoint a line officer over them to coordinate their efforts.^

'’"SONAR, 1907,27; SONAR. 1908,420-421; SONAR, 1909.395-401. 344Chambers. to the Secretary of the Navy, September 4,1907, Chambers Correspondence, NARG 24; Chambers, "Consolidation of Bureau Duties," undated circa 1909, Chambers Papers, Box 32. 281 Conclusion Chambers used his time in Washington to cement his contacts throughout the Navy’s bureaucracy. His performance ratings remained excellent, and in May he was

given command of the battleship Louisiana. A two-year command of a battleship was normally soon followed with promotion to admiral. At fifty-three, he was still in excellent health and easily passed his physical exam. His brown hair was just beginning to thin and he needed glasses to read. He was looking forward to a long service as an admiral, preferably on the General Board.^

’“ chambers Physical Exam Report, May 1909, NARG 24; Van Deurs. 13. 282 CHAPTER 13 THE BEGINNINGS OF NAVAL AVIATION

Chambers eagerly took command of the battleship Lowf on June 1, 1909, but his command of her would be both brief and routine. Due to his technical skills, he was soon ordered back to Washington and eventually placed in charge of the Navy’s embryonic aviation program. Chambers’ years in charge of naval aviation would be both

his most productive and most frustrating. The Louisiana was typical of the last battleships built before the Dreadnought.

Launched in August 1904, she displaced 16,000 tons, was armed with four 12", eight 8", twelve 7", twenty 3" guns, and four torpedo tubes. She carried a crew of 42 officers and

785 sailors. Chambers and his crew spent June fitting out in the New York navy yard and sailed at the end of the month to joined the North Atlantic Fleet under rear Admiral Seaton Schroeder. Throughout August and September the fleet engaged in extensive maneuvers and battle practice that ranged from the Virginia Capes to Cape Cod. The Louisiana scored well enough on target practice to earn a commendation from Secretary of the Navy Meyer. Following the maneuvers, the fleet attended the Hudson Fulton celebration in New York that October during which time Chambers became seriously ill. He was hospitalized for two weeks with acute bronchitis.^ Admiral Schroeder rated Chambers excellent or very good in all categories other than “marmer of performing duties” for which he rated him only good. While clearly a good evaluation, it was the first time Chambers had received anything other than straight

^'‘Logbook USS Louisiana, NARG 24; Meyer to Chambers, October 21.1909, Chambers Papers, Box 3; Chambers to Bureau of Navigation, October 20,1909, Chambers P^)ers, Box 3. 283 excellents on his evaluations, and it must have been disappointing for him. His drop in ratings, though, is not surprising considering his illness, brief time in command, and the difference in size between the Louisiana and his last command, the gunboat Nashville.^ No doubt he would have improved had he remained with the fleet, but the Navy had other plans for him. Secretary of the Navy Meyer introduced sweeping administrative reforms to the Navy in 1909. The most important of these was the creation of his Aide system, which was the first major step toward creating a naval general staff since the establishment of the General Board. Meyer appointed four aides who would advise him on naval matters, each overseeing a different section of the Navy. The senior of them, the Aide for Operations, would oversee war planning and coordinate the activities of the General Board, Office of Naval Intelligence, and the Naval War College. The Aide for Persormel would oversee the Bureau of Navigation and the Navy’s educational institutions other than the Naval War College. The Aide for Inspection would oversee ship trials, and inspect the fleet and navy yards. The Aide for Material would replace the Construction Board and oversee the Navy s four technical bureaus: Construction and Repair, Ordnance, Engineering, and Equipment Meyer appointed Admiral Richard Wainwright to Operations, Admiral William Potter to Personnel, Admiral to Inspections, and Admiral William H. Swift to Material.^ This plan was actually the result of the recommendations by a committee chaired by Admiral Swift, and it was Swift himself who requested Chambers to be his assistant He knew Chambers would be reluctant to leave his new command but wrote him that his services were of the “greatest importance” to the Navy. “For the first time since I can remember there is an opportunity for the military side of the naval service to make itself felt definitely and powerfully in settling the tactical features of design and construction in ^Chambers fitness report, July 1,1909 to December 6,1909, NARG 24. ^“Henry P. Beers. “The Development of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,” Military Affairs 10 (Spring 1946), 59-64; SONAR. 1909,8-11. 284 our ships.” Swift knew no one who was “better equipped for analyzing and judging these matters” than Chambers.^’

Chambers replied that he needed more time in command at the grade of captain and besides, he rather enjoyed being in command of a battleship. Couldn’t the Navy wait? Swift sympathized with Chambers’ desire to retain his command, but insisted that he was urgently needed and repeated that “no officer” was as “well equipped for that duty as you are.”*“

Chambers finally agreed and on December 7, 1909, he accepted assignment as the Assistant to the Aide for Material. He worked under Swift in laying the foundation for the new organization and coordinating the construction of new warships. Swift was soon succeeded by Captain Frank F. Fletcher, Chambers’ commander from his second tour at the Torpedo Station, and the two worked well together. Chambers had been at this post for nine months when he was suddenly asked to look into aviation in addition to his other duties.

The State of Naval Aviation Aviation was hardly new, or even new to the Navy, when Chambers had it dropped in his lap. Samuel P. Langley had successfully flown a small, stcam-powcrcd model of his ill-named aerodrome in 1896. Director of the Geological Surr ey Charles D. Walcott approached Theodore Roosevelt, then Assistant Secretary of the Navy to fund a full-sized version. Roosevelt pressured Secretary of the Navy Long into creating a four member board under Commander C. H. Davis of the naval observatory to investigate aviation. The board issued a favorable report indicating the utility of flying machines for reconnaissance and possibly combat, but the Navy* s technical bureaus were dubious. The Navy never funded Langley* s research. The Army, though, did for a total of $50,000.

“ *Swift to Chambers, November 11,1909, Chambers Papers, Box 3. ^Sw ift to Chambers, December 1, 1909, Chambers Papers, Box 3. 285 Langley twice failed to launch his full-scale, piloted aerodrome, both times nearly killing the pilot. On December 17, 1903, nine days after Langley’s second attempt, Orville and Wilbur Wright successfully flew their Flyer. Unfortunately, the ridicule of Langley’s disasters in the press had been such that few believed the Wrights had actually flown. It took them several years to interest the Army in their invention.^' From September 3-17,1908, the Wrights demonstrated their airplane to a number of Army Signal Corps officers at Fort Meyer, Virginia. The flights were observed by two naval officers: Lieutenant George C. Sweet and Naval Constructor William McEntee. Despite the crash on the 17th that injured Orville and killed his passenger. Army Lieutenant Thomas Selfridge (the world’s first airplane fatality), many officers left this exhibition with an optimistic view toward aviation. Both Sweet and McEntee reported enthusiastically on what they had seen and recommended the Navy purchase planes immediately. The Army purchased its first airplane in 1910, but it would take much more than one exhibition to interest the Navy in this new technology In 1910, flamboyant inventor and aviator Glenn Curtiss flew one of his planes nearly 150 miles down the Hudson River from Albany to to win the $10,000 prize offered by the New York World. Afterward, he told reporters that airplanes would soon take-off from ships and that warships were already v ulnerable to air attack. ‘The battles of the future,” he proclaimed, would “be fought in the air.” In July, Curtiss flew over a battleship-sized target on Lake Keuka and dropped lead weights on it, striking it repeatedly.^ Meanwhile, more and more mail describing the marvels of aviation poured into the Secretary of the Navy’s office. Meyer demanded that some officer be assigned to deal with all of it In September, Chambers was instructed to handle the aviation mail in ” ‘R. D. Layman, To Ascendfrom a Floating Base (London: Associated University Presses, 1979), 92-3. ^Archibald Turnbull and CliiTord Lord, History o f United States Naval Aviation (Yale Univeristy Press, 1949), 2-6. ’“ Glenn H. Curtiss and Augustus Post, The Curtiss Aviation Book (New Yoric Frederick A. Strokes Co, 1912), 105-6. 286 addition to his regular duties. It did not take long for aviation to become his primary concern.

The Officer in Charge of Naval Aviation Chambers witnessed the flights of several lighter-than-air craft at the 1904 SL Louis World’s Fair and watched Wilbur Wright’s flights for the Hudson-Fulton Celebration from the bridge of the Louisiana. He was aware of the recent strides in aviation and had discussed them in general with Lieutenant Sweet, but he had not followed its development closely. After being assigned the aviation mail, he read everything he could find on it He arranged for his friend. Captain Templin Potts, the Navy’s Chief Intelligence Officer, to send him copies of everything that came in on aviation and he convinced the Navy’s librarian to purchase everything then available on the science of flight and aviation. Chambers was soon receiving regular reports from the ONI’s attachés on European military aviation as well as the latest books and articles from Europe, some of which he translated himself. The more he studied aviation, the more fascinated he became with iL^ There were few aviation advocates within the Navy, despite the fact that the development of the all-big-gun battleship underlined the need for aerial spotting. New battleships such as the Michigan could fire shells out to 21,000 yards, yet observers on board could only see targets out to 16,000 yards and under the best conditions could only acciuately direct fire out to 10,000 yards. Once again it was Admiral Dewey who supported the new technology, advocating aviation as he had submarines. He repeatedly used his influence on the General Board to support Chambers’ proposals and urged Meyer to investigate aviation “without delay.While Meyer ignored Dewey, Assistant Secretary of the Navy Beekman Winthrop did not Virtually all of the important decisions

“*rumbull and Lord, 4-8; Layman, To Ascend from a Floating Base, 110. ’“Dewey to Secretary of the Navy, October 14,1910, General Board Rle 449. 287 concerning naval aviation during its first years were approved by Winthrop while Meyer was out of the office. Chambers’ anomalous position in charge of aviation with neither staff nor title coupled with the lack of authority of his two key supporters did not bode well for the future of naval aviation. Over the next two years, the General Board became more vocal in support of aviation, but its ability to influence policy waned as it was increasingly bypassed by the various Aides and ignored by the Secretary fo the Navy.“* In October 1910, Dewey convinced the General Board to recommend deploying aircraft on the new scout cruiser Chester. This sensible proposal gave the bureaus a new plum to fight over. Chief of the Bureau of Construction and Repair R. M. Watt wrote the Secretary of the Navy asking for an officer from his bureau to be placed in charge of aviation. His counterpart at the Bureau of Engineering, H. I. Cone, sent a similar note. Fortunately, Winthrop was in the office when these missives arrived and he ordered both bureaus to appoint officers to coordinate with Chambers. Lieutenant Nathaniel Wright and Naval Constructor William McEntee received the assignment.^ This demarcation of responsibility, while not codified until two years later, remained in force throughout the early years of naval aviation. Chambers remained tenuously in charge of personnel, policy-making and the general direction of the program. The Bureau of Construction and Repair had charge of the planes themselves, while the Bureau of Engineering looked after their engines. Each would soon have a separate aviation budget Both bureau chiefs, who only outranked Chambers due to the temporary rank of Admiral that all bureau chiefs received, avoided Chambers routinely, preferring to deal directly with the Secretary of the Navy.

Later that month. Chambers arranged to have Winthrop send him along with **Costello, ‘Planmng for War," 271-273., Van Deurs, Wings fo r the Fleet (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1966),14; Layman, To Ascendfrom a Floating Base, 110. NL Watt to the Secretary of the Navy, October 11,1910 and Winthrop to Watt, October 12, 1910, both in "Letters Sent Concerning the Navy’s Early Use of Aircraft” NARG 24. ““Van Dears, Wings. 35-37. 288 Wright and McEntee as observers to the International Air Meet at Belmont Park, New York. Aviators from around the world attended as did the leading airplane manufacturers in the United States; the Wright Brothers and Glenn Curtiss. For the first time Chambers could examine planes up close and question the men who designed, built, and flew them. He spoke at length with the Wrights at Belmont and then with Curtiss and his star pilot, Eugene Ely, at a meet in Halethorpe, Maryland. Chambers was especially interested in their opinions on a recent report that French aviator Henri Fabre had taken off from the water using a pontoon-equipped plane. The implications for the Navy were obvious.

While the Wrights dismissed the idea, Curtiss embraced the concept Chambers and Curtiss became close friends and formed an excellent working relationship.*®’ While Chambers left these meets convinced of the importance of aviation, he was horrified by the instability of the frail craft and the lack of scientific understanding of flight by both pilots and inventors. Even the Wrights and Curtiss operated primarily by trial and error. Chambers had participated in the introduction of scientific principles to ship design three decades before and he became determined to introduce them into aviation as well. In his report on the aviation meets, he requested the establishment of a national aeronautic lab to conduct research in all aspects of flight This centralized research facility would support the efforts of both civilian and military inventors and aviators in advancing aviation and improving its safety. Safety and scientific research became Chamber’s guiding principles while in charge of naval aviation and he remained committed to them regardless of bureaucratic opposition to centralized research or the entreaties of his pilots to set records and participate in aviation competitions.**" Chambers also recommended that the Navy establish a separate office of aeronautics to direct the aviation program, construct an airfield, begin training pilots, purchase planes for the Chester, and fund a research budget to adapt aviation to the needs

““Chambers, “Aviation and Aeroplanes,” USNIP 37 (Mar 19Il),162-208; Turnbull and Lord, 9. “%Iary C. Welbom, ‘Naval Contributions to Aeronautical Science,” USNIP 74 (August 1948), 965-974. 289 of the Navy. Despite the simulated bombing runs at Belmont using sacks of flour. Chambers believed it would be some years before planes would be able to attack targets with any degree of success. For the time being they would be used for scouting and artillery spotting.**’ To laimch naval aviation. Chambers needed a demonstration that planes could work with ships, landing on and taking off from them without difficulty. Curtiss was eager to help and Ely was willing to make the attempt All they needed was a ship and funds to construct the landing and take-off platform. Chambers proposed the idea to

Admiral Wainwright, the Aide for Operations, but he turned him down. Wainwright had also opposed the General Board’s request for a plane for the Chester, suggesting that kites were preferable for spotting “considering the present state of aeroplanes.” Captain Fletcher was sympathetic to Chambers’ request, but could do nothing without authorization or funds. Determined to make the attempt, Curtiss and Ely cornered Secretary of the Navy Meyer in his office and presented their case. Meyer refused and dismissed the airplane as a “carnival toy.”*“ Chambers, Curtiss, and Ely would not take no for an answer, and decided to look elsewhere for a ship and funds. Millionaire publisher and aviation enthusiast John Barry Ryan had just offered a $1000 reward for the first shipboard launch. Curtiss convinced him to use the money to fund the flight instead. Ryan helped arrange for a flight off the Pennsylvania, a liner of the Hamburg-America Steamship Company. Everything was ready to go when an accident damaged Qy’s plane, preventing the flight as the liner had to sail before repairs could be made. The liner’s German registry gave Chambers the leverage he needed with the Navy. Waiting until Meyer was out of the office, he approached Winthrop, mentioned Germany’s apparent interest in naval aviation, and convinced him to assign the cruiser “ ‘chambers, “Aviation and Aéroplanes;” Van Deurs, Wings, 15-17; Theodore Roscoe, On the Seas and in the Skies: A History o f the US. Navy’s Air / ’ower (New York: Hawthorne Books, 1970), 25. “Wainwright to Chambers, October 12,1910, Chambers Papers, Box 4; Van Deurs, Wings, 17. 290 Birmingham. On November 14, 1910, Eugene Ely flew his Curtiss plane off an eighty- two foot platform hastily constructed on the Birmingham's deck. There was a brief moment of panic when the wheels of the plane and then the propeller touched the water, but Ely managed to gain altitude despite liie damaged propeller. He landed five minutes later two and half miles away on Willoughby SpiL Chambers immediately wrote to Meyer announcing the success and repeated his recommendation that the Navy begin purchasing planes.** The next day, news of the flight made the front pages of papers around the country, but Meyer remained unconvinced. In his congratulatory letter to Curtiss he spelled out his requirements: “When you show me that it is feasible for an aeroplane to alight on the water alongside a battleship and be hoisted aboard without any false deck to receive it, 1 shall believe the airship of practical benefit to the Navy.”** Essentially, he challenged Curtiss to build a seaplane, a project Chambers already had him working on. Curtiss’ seaplane was almost ready, but first Chambers had another demonstration in mind for the Navy and Meyer. Two months later Chambers, Curtiss, and Ely were ready to try the second half of their test—landing a plane on board a ship. Chambers arranged to use the armored cruiser Pennsylvania, part of the Pacific Heet under Rear Admiral Edward Barry who actively supported their preparations. Chambers had a 119 foot wooden platform built over the aft deck for Ely to land on, but they needed some way to stop the plane. They settled on a series of twenty-two ropes stretched across the deck, each attached to two fifty pound sandbags. Three metal hooks were attached to the bottom of Ely’s plane to catch the ropes as he landed. On January 18, 1911, Eugene Ely took of from shore and successfully landed on the Pennsylvania anchored in San Francisco harbor. Eight of the ropes caught, slowing the plane to a stop before it crashed into the canvass screen at the end of the ^Curtiss Aviation Book, 116-9; Van Deurs, Wings, 18; Chambers to the Secretary of the Navy, November 23,1910, Chambers Papers, Box 4. ’“ Meyer to Hy, November 17,1910, Chambers Papers. Box 15. 291 platform. An hour later, Ely took off from the ship and returned to shore. The Pennsylvania's captain. Chambers’ old Academy friend Charles Ffend, hailed the landing as a major triumph and placed himself "on record as positively assured of the importance of the aeroplane in future naval warfare.” As Ely wrote to Chambers, “the value of the aeroplane for the Navy is unquestioned.”^

Following the success of the Birmingham flights, Curtiss offered to train both Army and Navy officers for free. The Wrights made a similar offer, contingent on the purchase of planes, but few naval officers expressed an interest in becoming pilots. Those who did request aviation duty often found thier orders delayed or even lost Lieutenant Theodore G. Ellyson was the first of the handful of naval officers who had applied for aviation duty that Chambers selected for pilot training. He reported to Curtiss’ winter camp in in December 1910, where he learned both to fly and repair planes. Lieutenant John Rodgers, who had repeatedly gone up in kite balloons, became the

Navy’s second aviator in March, and Chambers sent him to train with the Wrights. It took a major effort on the part of both Chambers and Ellyson to get more officers transferred to aviation. In July, after considerable delay, they managed to get Lieutenant John H. Towers sent to Curtiss, and Ensign Victor Herbster sent to the Wrights to train as pilots.^ Chambers repeatedly flew in planes as a passenger and handled the controls in a few flights with Curtiss, but he never found the time to qualify as an aviator. He later reasoned that his time was better spent as an administrator, but he clearly regretted not having mastered flying.*^

Chambers followed Ely’s latest success by arranging for a naval escort for another Curtiss aviator, J. A. W. McCurdy, who would attempt to fly from Key West to Cuba to

^ o n d to Secretary of the Navy. January 18,1911, Chambers Papers, Box 21; Ely to Chambers, January 30,1911. Chambers Papers, Box 15; Van Deurs, Wings, 29. ^C lark G. Reynolds, Aimira/ John H. Towers: The Struggle for Naval Air Supremacy (Annapolis; Naval Institute Press, 1991), 32-33. Curtiss Aviation Book, 119, 148-150; House Committee on Naval Affairs. Hearings on H. R. 10106,70th Congress, (1930), 2220. 292 claim the prize offered by the Havana Post for the first successful crossing of the Florida Strait On January 30, 1911, McCurdy made it to within 12 miles of the Cuban coast when his oil pump failed and he had to land in the water. He was recovered by Commander ’s squadron. Stirling, too, was convinced of the importance of aviation and wrote to Meyer in its support**

With Ellyson’s help, Curtiss completed his seaplane at his base near San Diego. Curtiss successfully flew their design on January 26. On February 17, after he and

Ellyson redesigned the plane’s pontoons, Curtiss took off from the water and landed near the Pennsylvania. His plane was hoisted aboard, refueled, and placed back in the water from which Curtiss again took off. The aviators had satisfied Meyer’s terms.*®

The First Appropriation of Funds

Chambers’ carefully guided progress in aviation slowly paid off, though as he wrote to one aviation enthusiast, aviation was still a “side show” in the Navy. His summary of the state of aviation and the Navy’s aviation program was published in the Naval Institute’sFroceedr/igs, and helped generate publicity for aviation. Citing his successes, he convinced Meyer to support a $25,000 appropriation to purchase planes for the Navy. Congress passed it on March 4, 1911, but Chambers could not spend any of it until the beginning of the fiscal year in July.^° Meyer ignored most of Chambers’ other recommendations, including the creation of an office of aeronautics, which would have given Chambers a staff to help his work as well as the authority to properly oversee the bickering bureaus involved in aviation. He

^Chambers, *^rief Summary of the Hrst Steps in the Development of Naval Aeronautics,” Chambers Papers, Box 10; Stirling to Secretary of the Navy, January 31,1911, Chambers Papers, Box 4; Harold B. Miller, Navy Wings (New York; Dodd, Mead & Company, 1937), 77. ^Chambers, ‘Srief Summary of the History of Naval Aviation,” Chambers Papers, Box 47,5; Turnbull and Lord, History o f United States Naval Aviation, 13. ""Chambers to A. E. Tangren, January 21,1911, Chambers Papers, Box 20; Chambers, "Aviation and Aeroplanes,” USNIP 37 (March 1911): 162-208; Chambers to the Secretary of the Navy, April 3,1911, Chambers Papers, Box 4; SONAR, 1910.23. 293 was consistently opposed in his efforts at coordination by the Chiefs of the Bureaus of Construction and Repair and Engineering, each of whom wanted aviation development placed under his control. In frustration. Chambers wrote F. H. Russell, the manager at the Wright Company, that his major effort for the next year would be getting the bureaucracy straightened out Otherwise the constant delays of the past year would only grow worse.^^ Chambers’ $25,000 budget was paltry considering that the Royal Navy had spent $175,000 on aviation the previous year, but Chambers continued to hope that new ships would be equipped with planes as standard equipment This would eliminate the need for large, separate aviation appropriations and their associated political battles. He believed it would also prevent “corrupt congressmen” from forcing inferior planes on the Navy. Chambers had not forgotten the scandal-ridden navy yards of the previous century. He encouraged, without success, both the Bureau of Construction and Repair and the Bureau of Engineering to buy planes from their own budgets for the ships of the fleet®” Later that month. Chambers also convinced Meyer to finally clarify his duties and authority. Meyer ordered Chambers to “keep informed” of the progress of aeronautics “with a view to advising the Department concerning the adaptability of such material for naval warfare, especially for the purposes of naval scouting.” He was to guide the training of the Navy’s aviators and to consult with the Navy’s librarian in gathering aviation literature. He was also to consult with the bureaus that had “cognizance of the various branches” of his work, but the enforcement of any of Chambers’ recommendations would “rest entirely with the bureaus having cognizance of the details.”®” It was an administrative arrangement guaranteed to magnify all the problems of bureau coordination that Meyer had sought to limit with the creation of the Aide

^'chambers to Russell, March 11.1911. NARG 24; Letters sent concerning the navy's early use of aircraft ’^Chambers to Ely, February 9,1911, Chambers Papers, Box 15; “Washington News,” Aero and Hydro 2 (March 11,1911), 192. 294 system. Chambers continued to operate without a title, signing his correspondence as “the Officer in Charge of Aviation.” Chambers had worked alone on aviation all these months, without even clerical support. On March 30, Dewey had him transferred to the General Board where he could get staff support as well as have a stronger voice in influencing policy. Unfortunately, Congress placed the $25,000 aviation appropriation in the Bureau of Navigation’s budget Since only that bureau could spend the money. Chambers arranged with Fletcher to be transfered to the Bureau of Navigation on April 1.^* One week later. Chambers left for his new home in the Bureau of Navigation; he had sat on the General Board for only two weeks.

Chambers proved an oddity in the Bureau of Navigation. Next to its chief, Admiral Reginald P. Nicholson, he was its most senior officer, but he was virtually ignored by everyone there. Despite numerous requests, he would never receive even a single clerk to help with his work. Nicholson actually suggested that Chambers “work at home,” but Chambers managed to find a desk and filing cabinets in the comer of Room 67 in the dank basement of the War, State, Navy building. It was “a good place to catch a cold.”^^ Repeatedly during his career. Chambers had corresponded with civilian in\ cntors, but he had never received the volume of mail he did as head of naval aviation. By February he was already receiving a letter a day. Once newspapers announced his $25,000 appropriation, the floodgates opened and mail poured in from inventors around the country. Most of them had “not taken the trouble to inform themselves” on the progress of aviation. Many had probably never even seen a plane up close. Nonetheless,

^^feyer to Chambers, March 13,1911, Chambers Papers, Box 4. ^'^etcher to Nicholson, April 7,1911, Chambers Papers, Box 4; Chambers, Typescript of Testimony to the House C om m ittee on Naval Affairs, Vlay 10,1930, Chambers Papers, Box 24. ^Chambers, Typescript of Testimony to the House Committee on Naval Affairs, May 10, 1930; Chambers, “Brief Summary ;” Turnbull and Lord, History o f United States Naval Aviation, 15; Van Deurs. Wings, 38. 295 Chambers answered all of them, and during his first year he was invariably polite, making an effort "to handle [them] with tact and with a humane effort to point out the errors.” He encouraged those he thought had promise and tried to politely discourage the resL^® The cranks were easy to spot because they were “loath to imp>art their secrets,” but always promised to revolutionize aviation if only Chambers would send them money. Chambers often gave detailed critiques of the better ideas. He suggested potential buyers, cited technical literature they should read, and even put people working on similar ideas in touch with one another so they could pool their efforts. Over time, though, the strain began to show, and by 1913 he was far from tactful, telling several inventors that their ideas were simply “absurd.” He tried to hand off the job to several of the aeronautical societies, but no one wanted such a thankless task.^ Most inventors wrote asking for money for their research, but Chambers always refused. He would only purchase complete, well tested products and challenged companies and inventors to back up their claims with proof. Blueprints were not enough. In his replies. Chambers always emphasized his limited funds and frequently included a plug for whatever project he was then lobbying Congress, most often a national aeronautic lab to which he hoped to direct would-be inventors in the future.®™

The First Planes Aviation work almost ground to a halt in May when Chambers was assigned to sit on a naval retiring board in addition to his other duties.®™ These boards sorted through the lists of senior officers due for promotion and determined which would be “plucked,” from the service (placed on the retired list) to make room for the promotion of others. ®^®Chambers to C. A. Doniss, Febniaiy 7,1912; Chambers to HndDey, undated. Chambers Papers, Box 15; Chambers to W. J. Darby. March 2,1911 and March 25.1912, Chambers Papers, Box 14. Chambers to B. C. Ribiet, January 10,1913, Chambers Papers, Box 9; Lee S. Biuiidge to M. B. Sellers, undated. Chambers Papers, Box 13. ^Chambers to William R. Rose (U. S. Aerial Navigation Company). June 26, 1912, Chambers Papers, Box 21; Turnbull and Lord, History o f United States Naval Aviation^ 15. ®^ureau of Navigaticm to Chambers, AprQ 29,1911. Chambers Papers, Box 4. 296 Progressive officers had been demanding a system of promotion by merit for more than a decade without effect In theory, the plucking boards were supposed to weed out the inept and incompetent, but this had largely been accomplished in the previous decade. Increasingly, the officers plucked had good records and promising careers. On his return. Chambers decided to buy three planes with his money: two from Curtiss and one from the Wrights. He hoped to establish a good relationship with both manufacturers and incorporate the best ideas of each into the Navy’s future planes. Chambers specified a speed of at least 45 miles per hour for the planes and room for a passenger. Later he would insist on dual controls to make training easier. Each manufacturer agreed to train a pilot and mechanic for each plane bought The first of the Curtiss planes was to be a normal land plane, the other was the famous ‘Triad’ that Chambers had discussed with Curtiss—a seaplane with landing gear so it could operate from land as well as water. The Wright plane was to have been a seaplane, but the Wrights ignored this and supplied it with the normal wheels instead. Curtiss delivered the land plane, designated the A-I, on July I and then the A-2 Triad on the 13th. The Wright plane, the B-1, was completed a few days later, and Orville took Chambers for a ride in iL ^

With a handful of pilots and planes in hand. Chambers’ priority became establishing a base at which they could train, fly, and determine the potential of airplanes for the Navy. He learned the Navy had sixty acres of land across the Severn River from the Naval Academy, secured it for aviation, and set up camp there that summer. The location was near College Park where the Army aviators trained, and the two groups of pilots shared information and socialized together frequently. It was also near the Bureau of Engineering’s Experiment Station, which Chambers hoped would cooperate in research on aircraft engines. Unfortunately, the lack of “money and interest on the part of

^Chambers to Curtiss, June 2,1911; Chambers, “Brief Summary," 6. 297 the Bureau of Engineering conspired to render this adjunct far from satisfactory.”^' The aviation unit was constantly short of supplies, spare parts, fuel, and other essential materials. The pilots often had to dig into their own pockets to buy what they needed and the Navy was slow to reimburse them for their travel and other expenses.

Along with their mechanics, the pilots often broke into the experiment station at night to borrow the parts and tools they needed. They managed to get free gas and oil by writing to companies asking for sample barrels to tesL^ While the pilots were perfecting their skills and learning the intricacies of their new planes, McEntee began experimenting with designs for seaplane pontoons using the model tank at the Washington Navy Yard. In October he was Joined by Naval Constructor Holden C. Richardson, reluctantly transferred to aviation work by the Bureau of Construction and Repair following repeated entreaties by Chambers for more technical assistance. Together, McEntee and Richardson designed the pontoons for the Wright plane, and continued to improve their designs over the next few years. Richardson would learn to fly later that year.®”

Aviation Safetv A constant problem for Chambers was the desire of many of his pilots to set records and compete in civilian aviation meets. He worried about their safety and clearly had paternal feelings toward many of them. They were just a few years older than his own son who entered the Naval Academy that year. Shortly after Hlyson completed his training. Chambers warned him against stunt flying and reminded him that he had chosen him because he was a “well balanced man

^'chambers, *Srief Summary,” 10; Chambers to the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation. May 1, 1911; Secretary of the Navy to the Superintendent of the Naval Academy, Jime 27, 1911 ; Bureau of Navigation to Chambers, July 6,1911, Chambers Papers, Box 4. “ 'Reynolds, Towers, 53; Van Deurs, Wings, 51. ““Chambers, ‘Brief Summary”, 10. 298 who would be able to assist in building up a system of aviation training.”"* The death of Eugene Ely while stunt flying in September reinforced Chambers’ concerns over safety. He had repeatedly warned Hy to stop engaging in dangerous stunts. Over the next few years Chambers repeatedly condemned the “spirit of sensationalism” that was “the cause of much imprudence, carelessness and consequent death to many of our best American aviators.” His pilots were “fine officers,” but “so zealous and eager to show what they can do that they are prone to make light of the deficiencies of their craft and to take risks that should be avoided.” Ellyson and Rodgers in particular worried him. He complained to Curtiss that Hlyson had “a bit of competition fever” and wanted to break records. Rodgers was even worse as his zeal “to do something more startling than his rivals” was very likely to get him killed. By October he was worried that Hlyson looked ill and was clearly overworking.®*® Chambers, too, was overworking, but it would take some time for the toll to catch up with him. By 1912, four Army aviators had died in crashes, but not a single Navy aviator had been killed. Hlyson, though, was severely injured in a crash on March 14, 1912. It took more than a month for him to return to flying, and he never fully recovered from a neck injury that caused him pain for the rest of his life. According to Towers, Ellyson was plagued by pain and seemed nervous and irritable. Towers took charge of the camp at Annapolis and supervised most of the flight instruction while Ellyson recovered. He blossomed as an administrator, slowly displacing Hlyson as Chambers’ right hand man.*® Following Ellyson’s crash. Chambers launched a major safety campaign. He addressed the issue in a series of speeches before aeronautical clubs, published several

^Chambers to Ellyson, January 11,1911, Chambers Papers, Box 14. Chambers to Ely February 9,1911, Chambers Papers, Box 15; Chambers to the Navy Department, June 29,1912, 'Memorandum on the Employment of Aeroplanes," Chambers Papers. Box 18; Chambers, "Brief Summary,” 7; Chambers to Curtiss, October 17, 1911, Chambers Papers, Box 13; Chambers to Russell, November 27,1911. Deurs. Ellyson, 118-124; Towers to Chambers, April 5. 1912, Chambers Ptq)ers, Box 22. 299 articles on safety, and emphasized it in his interviews with the press. Privately, he pressed both Curtiss and the Wrights to devote more efforts to making their planes safer. He wrote Russell that “the burning issue in aviation” was safety. “There are devices which can produce it and they doubtless can be improved. Why is it that manufacturers dou i want to touch the question without being forced?” All his reports to Meyer and the General Board emphasized the need for improving safety. Aviation’s death toll was far higher than it needed to be. Chambers argued that until safety issues were addressed, aviation would “not merit a role of the first order.”®*’

The lack of a standardized control system for planes exacerbated Chambers’ safety concerns. The Wright and Curtiss control systems were so completely different that pilots had to specialize in one or the other. Chambers insisted that his pilots learn both systems of controls so that a standard could be settled on, but they did so reluctantly. He pressed Curtiss and the Wrights to work on the problem, but their ongoing court battles made any standardization impossible. Besides, there was little agreement as to

what the best system would be. Each pilot remained partial to the system he first learned. Towers was one of the few with an open mind. He observed the European, Deperdusson control system at an aviation show in 1912 and recommended it to Chambers, but it took another year for Chambers to agree that European-style foot controls were the best

system. Chambers continued to hope that American manufacturers would settle on a standard of their own.®*® Chambers hoped his pilots would form a bond like “Nelson’s band of brothers,” but there was considerable tension among them. He discussed the situation with Curtiss,

worrying that they were becoming jealous of one another over their accomplishments and ^Chambers to Russell, undated. Chambers Papers, Box 21; Chambers, “Safety in Aviation as Viewed by french Officers,” Aero and Hydro 4 (June 22,1912), 275; Chambers, “Revival of Aviation in the United States,” Aero Club Bulletin^, (May 1912), 1-4; Chambers, “Aviation at Home and Abroad Reviewed,” Aero and Hydro5 (1913), 266-276. ^Chambers to Curtiss, January 3,1912; Chambers to F. H. Russell, November 27,1911, Chambers Papers, Box 21; Towers to Chambers, September 16,1912, Chambers Papers, Box 22; (Chambers to Means, December 30,1913, Box 18. 300 competing for his attention."^ It was no secret to many of the pilots that Chambers was grooming Ellyson to succeed him, and Rodgers in particular, was bothered by this. The ongoing legal battle between Curtiss and the Wrights made matters worse. The Wrights refused to have anything to do with any Curtiss-trained pilots, encouraging the division of pilots throughout the coimtry into two rival camps.

Progress at the End of 1911 Toward the end of 19II, the Navy planned to use the obsolete battleship Texas (renamed the San Marcos) as a target in ordnance tests. The Bureau of Construction and Repair suggested Chambers send one of his planes to participate in the tests and drop bombs on the ship. It was a seriously premature suggestion. None of the Navy’s three planes had been designed to drop bombs and a properly fused aerial bomb had yet to be designed. Chambers was uncertain what had motivated the suggestion, but participation in the tests would only make the Navy’s infant aviation program look bad. Besides, Chambers reasoned, just what would be proved by dropping bombs on a defenseless target? Real ships would be firing in their defense and maneuvering fast enough to make them difficult targets for his slow planes. At best. Chambers figured he could get one of his planes in the air with 200 pounds of ordnance by leaving the second seat empty, and having the pilot drop the bombs—a rather difficult task considering the state of control systems. A 200 pound bomb, though, was unlikely to do much damage to the San Marcos. Chambers estimated that at least a 500 pound bomb would be needed to make an impression on a battleship. Of course, the pilot could not even drop a 200 pound bomb.

He would have to use bombs small enough to be tossed over the side of the plane. Chambers argued that if the issue was really accuracy testing, they should just sketch out

^Chambers to Curtiss, December 31,1911. Chambers Papers, Box 13. ^Tum bull and Lord, History o f United States Naval Aviation, 20. 301 a ship on land and bomb it. That way bomb accuracy could be easily and precisely measured. If the issue was the damage resistance of battleships, he suggested they try- dropping the bombs from kites. Dropping bombs from planes would have to wait for larger and more powerful aircraft and engines.®* Despite being repeatedly called away during the year to the Naval Examining Board and other temporary assignments. Chambers managed to make real progress in building the aviation program. The training of new pilots continued without him, and Ellyson handled a growing amount of the administrative burden. The year ended with significant experimental progress, achieved against consistent bureaucratic opposition. Chambers had pilots, planes, and a base. He hoped the next year would be even more productive.®”

^'chambers to the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, October 7, 1911, Chambers Papers, Box 10; Turnbull and Lord, History o f United States Naval Aviation, 20. ^Chambers, "Brief Summary,” 9; Chambers to the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, "Memorandum on Aeronautic Progress,” December 18, 1911, Chambers Papers, Box 4. 302 CHAPTER 14 BUILDING NAVAL AVIATION

During 1912 Chambers built on his successes of the previous year, emphasizing the integration of planes with the fleet. He needed to find a way to launch planes directly from the Navy’s existing ships without extensive modifications to them. The only option at the time was lowering the planes into the water by crane—a slow process that required the ship to stop. Ellyson and Curtiss had experimented with launching a plane by sliding it down greased guide wires in September. While successful, the method was awkward and would work only in calm seas. Chambers set to woric on a solution.*® Building on his work with torpedoes. Chambers decided to use compressed air to launch planes. He knew that any ship equipped with torpedoes (and most cruisers and battleships were) would have the equipment to supply compressed air. Making use of his contacts at the Bureau of Ordnance, especially Lieutenant Commander G. L Smith, who was in charge of drafting room at the Naval Gun Factory, he designed a compressed air catapult using the parts from an old ammunition hoist. It was a simple design. An air- driven piston propelled the plane on a launching shuttle down a track and into the air. Chambers’ team installed the catapult on the Santee dock at the Naval Academy for tests that summer. On July 31, the first trial attempt to launch Ellyson in the Triad failed when the airplane prematurely lifted off the shuttle and was thrown into the water by a cross wind. Chambers rebuilt the shuttle mountings with Richardson’ help and they tried again on October 12. This time it worked perfectly. Chambers turned the catapult over to

^'^Eliysoa to Chambers, September 7.1911. Chambers Papers, Box 15. 303 Richardson who continued to refine iL“** Despite Chambers’ professed motto of “work quietly until you get result and then let these speak for themselves,” he announced in a newspaper interview that summer that airplanes had proven themselves. He confidently predicted that each of the fleet’s battleships would carry a seaplane by the end of 19I3.It seems likely that Chambers intended to use the press to goad the Navy’s bureaucracy into active support of aviation. Virtually everyone involved in the project expected catapults and seaplanes to begin being deployed on naval vessels within the next year or two.** While several of Chambers’ friends suggested he get a patent on the catapult, he told them he no longer cared “to have anything to do with patents.” Inventor James Means did patent several catapults, but none as sophisticated as what Chambers had designed. He contacted Chambers and suggested they work together, but Chambers was through with catapults and had far too much to occupy his time as was. Had only Means contacted him sooner, he would have helped him with his design and it would have saved them both a lot of work.** Chambers turned to other inventive work shortly afterward, working on wing designs and aircraft engines. Safety and navigation equipment soon became his focus, especially an aerial compass and a drift indicator, though he would not get much done on these until his retirement One of aviation’s most pressing safety needs was a stabilizer that would help pilots keep their planes level and make flying less physically exhausting. Inventor Elmer Sperry had begun work on a gyroscopic stabilizer, and Chambers actively encouraged his research. He assigned pilots to work with him and shared his own knowledge of gyroscopes. Along with Curtiss, Chambers helped Sperry test his prototypes, but he never had the money to buy one for the Navy. Sperry would eventually ^“Chambers, ‘Brief Summary,” 12-13; Turnbull and Lord, 19; Van Deurs, Wings, 69-70. ^N ew York Herald, June 9,1912, Chambers Papers, Box 21. *^enry Wisewood to Chambers, December 6,1912, Chambers Papers, Box 23; Chambers to James Means December 9 and 30,1912 Chambers Papers, Box 18; Chambers to the Secretary of the Navy, December 16,1912 Box 4. 304 sell his invention overseas after winning a $50,000 prize in France.*" The funding battle resumed anew in 1912. Chambers asked for $50,000 for each of the three bureaus involved in aviation, but when the bill was introduced it provided only $10,000 for the Bureau of Construction and Repair to buy planes and $20,000 for the Bureau of Engineering for engines and research. The $10,000 would barely be enough to purchase two planes, leaving no money to maintain those they already had. Chambers still hoped that planes would be bought as part of ship equipment, but he needed money for training, experiments, and replacement parts as well as more planes for pilot training. He launched a new lobbying effort and asked all his friends and aviation contacts to write their members of Congress and tell them just how underfunded American aviation was compared to Europe. He managed to get the appropriation increased slightly, but not back to the original sums. Several months later, he discovered that the bureaus had actually been the ones who asked for the appropriation to be lowered, believing the smaller amounts adequate. The final appropriation included $10,000 for the Bureau of Navigation, $20,000 for the Engineering Bureau, and $35,000 for the Bureau of Construction and Repair. Chambers condemned the decision in his report later that year and once again argued that planes should be paid for out of the large appropriations for shipbuilding Just as ship's boats were. The General Board repeatedly supported Chambers’ proposal, but it was also ignored.*” Despite the disappointing funding. Chambers managed to add three planes to his small force that year. The Navy bought another Curtiss seaplane (the A-3), and Chambers’ team assembled another Wright (the B-2) from spare parts. The third plane

^Chambers to R. E. Gillmore , June 29,1912, Speiry to Chambers, December 31,1912, Chambers to Sperry, October 20, 1913, and Chambers to Sperry. December 16.1913. Chambers Papers. Box 22; Chambers. “Brief Summary,” 7-8; Charles Keller. “Automatic Pilot, 1913 Version.” American Aviation Historical Society Journal 20 (1975), 130-132. ^"chambers to the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation. May 22.1912; Chambers to Senator Benjamin Tillman, April 23.1913; Chambers to George Perkins (Chair House Naval .Affairs Committee), May 24. 1912; House of Representatives. Hearings. Committee on Naval Affairs. January 9. 1913.543. “"Chambers. ‘Tiqxwt on Aviation,” in SONAR, 1912.155-170. 305 was a new Curtiss design, the flying boat (the C-1). It again owed much to his collaboration with Chambers. Instead of simply attaching pontoons to a land plane, the flying boat was designed from the beginning to be a seaplane with a carefully designed boat-like fuselage which made it much more seaworthy. Ellyson tested the new plane on November 30,1912, and was greatly impressed with it Along with new planes. Chambers also added new pilots that year including Marine Lieutenant Alfred

Cunningham, who arrived that summer, and Lieutenants Patrick Bellenger, William Billingsley and Geodfrey Chevalier who came on board a few months later. Cunningham was unique in that he had learned to fly on his own from the local Aero Club while stationed at the Philadelphia Marine barracks. Chambers was particularly impressed with him and was soon working hard to interest the Marine Corps in aviation. The Marine Corps, then seeking to clarify its mission and develop its capabilities for amphibious operations, became interested in aviation. It was then in the process of drawing up plans for an Advance Base Force whose mission would be to establish and defend naval bases in support of the plaimed naval drive across the Pacific Ocean in the event of war with Japan. The Commandant of the Marine Corps requested planes for the Advance Base Force early in 1912. Chambers supported his request and offered to train Marine pilots, though he could only handle two at a time. Meyer responded that there were no funds for the Marines to have their own plane, but he did approve the training of Marine pilots. This, as Chambers emphasized, was more important. Planes could be bought faster than pilots could be trained.®” Two more Marines, B. L. Smith and W. M. Mcllvan, reported to the Annapolis camp at the end of 1912.

Chambers became interested in the problems of the Advance Base Force and believed aircraft would play a critical role in its operations. This was the main reason he

Secretary of the Navy to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, March 4,1912, Chambers Papers, Box 18; Chambers to the Aide for Personnel, February 29, 1912, Chambers Papers, Box 18. 306 returned to work on the Triad design. He wanted to develop a plane that could operate from both water and land, a plane that would travel with the fleet but then be able to operate from the land base established by the Marines. This eventually developed into the E-I OWL (over water and land). Slow and unstable, it never performed up to Chambers’ expectations. It was hated by most of those who flew it, though Smith continued to work with Chambers to improve it“ *

Chambers had proved that planes could operate off the Navy’s ships. He now needed to prove their utility to the fleet at sea. In June, the General Board asked

Chambers to assign several planes to accompany the fleet in maneuvers that winter. Chambers eagerly agreed and confidently announced to the press that he expected these maneuvers would finally prove the value of aviation to the Navy.*“ The officers of the General Board, led by Dewey, became even more aggressive in pushing for aviation that summer. They solicited the advice of Chambers and his aviators on the future of aviation, asking detailed questions about the capabilities of airplanes. In August the General Board declared that a “complete and trained air fleet is a necessary adjunct to the Navy” and called “for the immediate organization of an efficient naval air service.” In December, it issued a full report on aviation that echoed the points

Chambers had been making for more than a year. Planes were essential for naval reconnaissance. While they had “no great offensive power” at the time, this would soon change. Planes would be used to bomb critical shore targets such as fuel depots, powder plants, the naval gun factory, and possibly even the locks of the Panama Canal. They suggested using planes to defend against aerial attack, arming them with machine guns and small bombs, which they would drop on enemy aircraft®®

“"See Chambers’ penciled notes on his copy of Major . The Naval Advance Base, GPO, 1912, Chambers Papers, Box 47; Chambers, ‘B rief .Summary,” 17-18. “^N ew York Herald, June 9,1912, Chambers Papers, Box 21. ““General Board 449, August 30,1913; General Board to Chambers, June 26,1912; General Board memorandum on aeroplanes, December 20,1912 , Box 18; Chambers to the Bureau of Navigation, January 29,1913, Chambers Papers. Box 6. 307 The aviators spent the summer and fall testing and experimenting with their planes to be certain they would be ready to sail wiiii the fleet Their most pressing need was a way to communicate with ships from the air. The Bureau of Engineering again proved unhelpful, but Towers knew Ensign Charles Maddox who was rapidly becoming the Navy’s premier expert on radio. They had met when they served together on the battleship Af/c/t/ga/i. Towers convinced Maddox to work on a transmitter small enough to fit in an airplane. Maddox spent the summer at Annapolis and designed a set that weighed only forty pounds. They mounted it in a plane and on July 27 sent a simple morse code

message to a receiver on the ground. The transmitter had only a twelve mile range and the long, trailing antenna kept snapping off, but they had proved it could be done. Manes would be able to communicate directly with ships, making it possible for them to direct their fire.“ *

Earlier that year, the French had successfully used planes to spot submarines in tests off Cherbourg. Chambers had long predicted this would be possible, but his efforts to arrange a test had been repeatedly postponed. In October he arranged a series of tests with Lieutenant Chester Nimitz who commanded the Atlantic submarine flotilla. The submarines submerged in Chesapeake Bay while Towers and Herbster flew overhead trying to spot them. Several submarine officers rode as passengers and trained the pilots to spot periscopes, air bubbles, and other signs of submarines. They successfully spotted submarines close to the surface, but the muddy waters of the Chesapeake made seeing anything at any depth difficult®”* Just before these tests, on October 6, 1912, Towers set an endurance record. He remained aloft in the A-2 for six hours and ten minutes, proving that planes could stay in the air long enough for a prolonged search. ®°® The aviation unit was ready to prove itself

““Van Deurs, Wings, 64-5; Reynolds, Towers, 45-47; Chambers, “Brief Summary,” 11. ®"®The Office of Naval Intelligence to Chambers, August 15,1911, Chambers Papers, Box 22; Reynolds, Towers, 56-, Chambers “Brief Summary”, 11. ““Reynolds, Towers, 55. 308 to the fleet

Chambers’ Thoughts on Aviation As airplanes developed, questions arose as to their rule in combat Early on Ellyson and Chambers had suggested the use of planes to attack targets on land, and they became more optimistic over time. In his 1912 report on aviation. Chambers still emphasized scouting as the primary role of aircraft They would be the “eyes of the fleet,” locating enemy forces, scouting for expeditionary forces, supporting blockade operations, and allowing rapid communication with detached squadrons or forces on shore. They would also locate and destroy submarines, mines, and dirigibles, and attack land bases including docks, ships under repair, magazines, and fuel depots.*” Chambers was always cautious in making predictions. He saw progress as “a step by step process,” that would not be ’found in radical changes all at once.” While many civilian writers argued that airplanes made battleships obsolete. Chambers knew that time had not come. More importantly, as he warned the editor of the Aero Club Bulletin: “there will be an angry reaction in the Navy if the ‘aeroplane phobia’ gets far enough along in its efforts to discredit the battleship.” Chambers needed to support aviation without threatening the status of the battleship and repeatedly emphasized in his correspondence and reports that command of the air would never have the “vital significance” of control of the sea.** Whether he actually believed this is uncertain. Chambers repeatedly insisted that “no airship or collection of airships” would “ever take the place of a battleship in the maintenance of sea power,” and argued that a battleship would “ be able to destroy a fleet of airships.” In defending the battleship. Chambers was defending not its present design, but the conception of the capital ship in general. He well understood that ships evolved and changed over time, having '"^Chambers, “Tlcport on Aviation,” 1912. ^Chambers to Wanneck, March 12,1913; Chambers to Woodhouse, October 29,1912, Chambers Papers, Bos 17; Chambers, “Airships and Naval Policy,” uiq)nblished manuscript. Chambers Papers, Box 12. 309 participated in the process throughout his career. While technology would certainly change, there would always be a role for large warships as the backbone of a fleet that sought a Mahanian control of the seas. Planes would add to the capabilities to surface ships, but would hardly supplant them."® Chambers’ conception of what a battleship would become in the future was far from the norm. He argued that battleships of the future would carry airplanes for their own defense. “Aeroplanes will fight aeroplanes and those that are not overburdened with missiles intended for dropping will have the advantage.” Dirigibles would be particularly vulnerable to airplanes, and Chambers argued they would never “be a serious menace to any American city,” or ships at sea.*‘° Chambers repeatedly emphasized to his civilian correspondents that offense and defense in war had always acted to balance one another. “For every new method of attack there is always some very effective means of defense.” Advances in bomb size and accuracy would be countered by advances in defensive firepower and early warning. Planes would not scour the seas of naval vessels. Besides, “such bombs as an aeroplane might drop would be mere flea bites to a battleship.” It was a position shared by all the world’s navies at the time. The German Navy, for instance, believed that a hit achieved from a plane flying above the range of a ships’ guns would “be a complete accident”*" Torpedoes were a more serious threat to battleships, but Chambers argued that air- launched torpedoes would no more displace the battleship than those laimched by torpedo boats or submarines. Smaller warships, submarines, and troopships, though, would be particularly vulnerable to airplanes. Throughout Chambers’ time in command, bombing was a minor issue. As he wrote to one aspiring inventor, “we are not so much interested ^Chambers, “Airships and Naval Policy;” Chambers to Ernest L. Jones, December 5,1911, Chambers Papers, Box 17; Chambers to Thomas A. Walton, July 10,1911. Chambers Papers, Box 23. ^"’chambers to Ernest L. Jones (editor of Aeronautics), December 5,1911, Chambers Papers, Box 17; Chambers to H. Henry Klinker. December 10,1912, Chambers Papers, Box 11. ‘"chambers to Thomas A. Walton, July 10,1911, Chambers Papers, Box 23; ONI translation of German Document, “Protective Measures Against Bombs Dropped from Aircraft,” October 2,1912, Chambers Papers, Box 12. 310 in bomb dropping devices now as we are in getting satisfactory aeroplanes from which to drop them.”**^

The Royal Navy had considered building an aircraft carrier in 1913 but decided it needed more experience operating aircraft first Chambers also considered specialized aircraft-carrying warships to be premature. Rumors in the press circulated repeatedly that the United States was going to construct some type of “hanger ship,” but none of them were true, and Chambers always acted quickly to denoimce them. He knew Congress would never fund such a vessel even if he managed to convince the Navy to ask for one. The Navy had experienced great difficulty in getting Congress to fund auxiliary vessels and remained short of colliers and other important auxiliaries. More importantly, a hanger ship would concentrate aviation officers at one spot, limiting their influence on the Navy as a whole. This was one of Chambers’ great fears, that aviation would find itself isolated and ignored like the Torpedo Station had for most of its history. He wanted aviation spread thorough the fleet, so that it would become part of every officer’s normal experience—even those who would never fly. Specialized aircraft carriers, he argued, would come later.**^

A National Aeronautic Lab: The Woodward Commission Aviation enthusiasts and manufacturers had sought government support for several years. F. H. Russell, for instance, wrote Chambers that “the success of aviation in this country for the next two or three years depends vitally upon the support which the government gives to the few concerned who are organized on a solid basis for experimental and manufacturing work.A 1911 effort by the Aeronautic Society to get ‘'^Chambers to Woodhouse, October 29,1912, Chambers Papers, Box 23; Chambers to L. P. Cole, May 5, 1913 , Chambers Papers, Box 10. ‘’'T.ayman, 187; New York American, June 30,1912, Chambers Papers, Box 46; Chambers, “A Hanger Ship,” Aero Club o f America Bulletin 1 (Aug 1912), 25-6. Chamben’ comments on Lieutenant Lapoint, “Aviation in the Navy,” USNIP 38 ( 1912), 744-46; Chambers to Navy Department, June 29,1912. Chambers Papers, Box 18. ^"Russell to Chambers, May 30,1912, Chambers Pzqiers, Box 21. 311 President Taft to create a national aeronautic research laboratory was derailed by Admiral Watt and the squabbling among several government agencies over its control. In 1912 Chambers, assisted by Dr. Albert F. Zahm, launched a vigorous campaign to create a national lab. Zahm, a professor of mechanics at Catholic University and the governor of the Aero Club of America, had built the first wind tunnel in the United States in 1901. Like Chambers, he believed unwaveringly in the future of aviation and believed a national research lab was vital to advance aviation. Together Chambers and Zahm rallied the nation’s numerous aeronautic clubs behind the cause and built support for it within the government and academia. Zahm used the Aero Club Bulletin to spread the word, blaming the “halting, haphazard, and fortuitous” progress of aviation in the United States on its lack of a centralized, aeronautic research facility. Chambers, too, published a series of articles on the need for the lab and devoted most of his September report on aviation to explaining its need and presenting an organizational model for it He argued that it was time for the “methods of scientific engineers” to replace those of crude inventors, and recommended that the President appoint a commission to study the matter. In ’fifteen tightly-worded pages,” Chambers presented the “rationale and the blueprint for the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics,” which would be created in 1916.*'* On December 12,1912, President Taft finally formed a commission to assess the creation of an aeronautic lab. It was composed of nineteen members: seven from government agencies and twelve from the private sector. The government appointees included a representative from the Weather Bureau, the Smithsonian, and the National Bureau of Standards as well as two Army and two Navy officers. Chambers and Captain David D. Taylor from the Bureau of Construction represented the Navy. The Committee "'^Albert F. Zahm, “On the Need for an Aeronautical Laboratory in America," Afro Club o fAmerica Bulletin (February 1912), 35; Zahm to Henry A. Wisewood, December 20,1912, Chambers Papers, Box 7; SONAR, 1912,155-170; Chambers, “Aviation Today, and the Necessity for a National Aerodynamic Laboratory,” USNIP 39 (December 1912), 329-36; Alex Roland, Model Research: the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, 79/5-/958 (Washington: GPO, 1985), 5-8. 312 was chaired by Robert S. Woodward, the President of the Carnegie Institute of Washington. The commission ran into problems immediately. It had no Congressional authorization or appropriation. Chambers arranged for a friend to introduce a bill to get it fimded. It passed in the Senate, but failed in the House. Unfunded and with questionable authority, the commission met anyway.®'* All of the commission’s members agreed on the importance of a national lab, but arguments began almost immediately over where it would be located and under whose authority it would operate. Richard Maclaurin, the President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, wanted it located near his university, which had a growing aeronautics program. Samuel Straton, the director of the National Bureau of Standards, wanted it under his agency. Chambers, along with Woodward, Zahm, and Walcott (the president of the Smithsonian) argued adamantly in favor of a research lab under the Smithsonian. Chambers believed the Smithsonian was in the best position not only to do the work, but just as importantly to rasie public awareness in order to further the development of aviation. He wanted the lab not just to do independent research, but also to verify the research of others and to serve as a source of information for all inventors. A military-sponsored lab, by its very nature, could not be open about its work. Chambers also argued that a Smithsonian lab would be much better funded because it could draw on private as well as govenunent support ®*’ Chambers main opponent in these debates was Taylor. Taylor’s chief. Admiral Watt, had consistently opposed the creation of any government-sponsored aviation research facility. Taylor, who had been the driving force in establishing the model basin and putting naval research on a truly scientific basis, took the same position. The model basin had just finished installing a wind turmel and was finally pursuing aviation research

®rumbull and Lord, History of United SlcUes Naval Aviation, 27;RciaDd,Motkl Research. 10-11. Roland, ATbde/ Research. 10-12 313 with real dedication. He argued that any funding for another establishment would be a needless duplication and waste of money.®’* This was hardly a convincing argument, and in the end the commission voted thirteen to three with three abstentions in favor of establishing a lab at the Smithsonian and issued a report to Congress advocating its establishment Taylor and its other opponents, though, proved effective lobbyists, and a bill establishing the lab failed to pass the 62nd Congress before its term expired in March. Reintroduced in the 63rd Congress, the bill died in committee.®”

Problems at the End of the Year The failure to get the lab established inaugurated Chambers' most trying months in charge of aviation. While he could boast in 1911 that the United States was ahead of European nations in exploring the potentials of naval aviation, the situation changed by the end of 1912. The British matched Ely’s pioneering flights that year and were working on a torpedo plane. The French converted a collier into . Each of the European powers spent at least ten times what the United States did on military aviation, some of them considerably more. In 1912, France spent $6.4 million, Russia spent $5 million, Britain $2.1 million, Italy $2 million, and Germany $1.5 million. As Curtiss complained to Chambers, “our statesmen do not seem to be taking a serious interest in aviation.” Underfunded and haphazardly supported, U. S. naval aviation was losing its lead.®“ Chambers was also having problems with his older pilots. Their sense of optimism from the previous year was clearly waning. Isolated from the rest of the Navy,

®‘*Rodney P. Carlisle, Where the Fleet Begins. 74-75. ‘’‘'Turnbull and Lord, History o f United States Naval Aviation, 16 ; Roland, Model Research, 13-15; Chambers to Sirsch, January 21,1919, Chambers Papers, Box 21; Chambers, “Brief Summary”. 13-14. ®*Gray, The Devil’s Device, 205-6; Curtiss to Chambers, August 3,1912, Chambers Papers. Box 13; Chambers, Heport on Aviation,” September 21.1912, Chambers Papers, Box 4,3; Turnbull and Lord. History o f United States Naval Aviation, 21 ; Layman. To Ascend from a Floating Base, 151. 314 some of them feared for their careers. Tempers began to run short and they clashed with Chambers over a host of issues ranging from aircraft design to pay and expense reimbursement Few realized Chambers’ delicate political position and resented that he could not do more for them. Rodgers, following the death of his stunt pilot cousin Cal in a plane crash, announced he would be seeking a position at sea. Shortly afterward, Ellyson too announced his interest in returning to the fleet Chambers’ decision to give command of the aviation detachment for the winter maneuvers to Towers, while Ellyson remained in the United States to continue work on Curtiss’ flying boat, may have been

the last straw for him.“ ' Regardless, Chambers lost his two most senior aviators early in 1913.

Chambers had also been eying a return to the sea, but he wanted the aviation program solidly established and in competent hands before he would leave. In October

1912, he had learned that he was going to be sent to command the new battleship Florida in a few months. Chambers thought it was too soon for him to leave aviation. He wrote to his friend Phillip Andrews, the new Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, to get his orders to sea withheld until the spring, by which time he hoped “that an officer may be detailed to assist me with a view to carrying on the work without embarrassment after 1 am relieved.” In delaying his orders to go to sea. Chambers knew he was hurting his career. In his fitness report earlier that year he had felt the need to point out that he “had never sought duty in aviation, and had only become interested in it after receiving the assignment” He concluded his letter to Andrews reminding him that his request for a delay “should not be construed as a request to escape orders to sea.” Chambers was ready to go to sea “regardless of the absorbing interest that my present duties inspire in me to be in the van of progress with Naval Aviation.”^

“ ‘Reynolds, Atirnira/ John H. Towers. 52-57; Van Deurs, Ellyson. 143-149; Van Dems, Wings fo r the Fleet. 71. ‘^Chambers, fitness report January-March, 1912, NARG 24; Chambers to Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, October 5,1912, Chambers Papers, Box 28; Chambers. *3rief Summary,”,15. 315 Andrews wrote Meyer in support of Chambers, arguing that his departure “would seriously affect the progress of naval aviation.” Work on aviation would “practically stop” if Chambers went to sea. There was no who could take up his work “without extensive preparation.” Unfortunately, with misplaced honest), Andrews added that he did not believe that Chambers wanted to go to sea, “but plainly he caimot put himself in the position of asking not to go.” The latter was certainly true. A deliberate effort to avoid sea duty would doom Chambers’ career. Chambers had already damaged his reputation with his commitment to aviation. Admiral Vreeland, the Aide for Operations, had “put Chambers down for continuous shore duty, in the belief that he is not fit for divisional or fleet command.” Meyer approved the change in Chambers’ orders, and everything seemed set for him to go to sea in the spring, but a very different administration would be in place by then.*”

1913: A New Administration In January, virtually the entire aviation unit sailed with the North Atlantic Fleet to Cuba for its winter maneuvers. Almost all the aviators went including Towers, Bellinger, Billingsley, Chevalier, Cunningham, Herbs ter, and Smith. It was the first use of airplanes in conjunction with fleet operations and the aviators worked hard to demonstrate what their planes could do and to sell aviation to higher officers. After setting up camp in Guantanomo, they spent the next six weeks scouting, photographing, and even making a few bombing runs. They managed to spot submarines as deep as sixty feet below the siuface and were also able to locate mines from the air. While they continued to have problems with the radio, which failed on them repeatedly, they proved the value of aerial spotting to the fleet They also took more than 200 officers for practice flights, among them Lieutenant Commander Henry C. Mustin who soon joined the aviation program and

‘^Andrews to Meyer, October 5,1912, Chambers Papers, Box 28; Meyer to Andrews, October 7, 1912, Chambers P^)ers, Box 28. 316 learned to Back in the United States, a change in administration compounded the uncertainty of aviation’s future. The incoming Wilson administration had promised to eliminate corruption and nm the government in strict accordance to regulations and the law. One of its most detennined members was the new Secretary of the Navy, . Daniels was in unfamiliar territory' and did not trust the Navy’s bureaucracy. He was particularly suspicious of Meyer’s aide system, which he increasingly bypassed, choosing to work directly with the bureau chiefs, especially Victor Blue, an old friend and fellow

North Carolinian, whom he appointed Chief of the Bureau of Navigation."® Along with the new administration came a new Aide for Operations, Rear Admiral Bradley Fiske. Meyer appointed him on February 11, 1913, to replace Rear Admiral Charles Vreeland who had taken ill. It was one of Meyer’s last official actions, and one that would have grave consequences for the Na\ y and for Chambers. Fiske had excellent credentials as a reformer and a number of inventions to his credit He was also one of the most outspoken officers in the Navy and among the loudest proponents of a naval general staff. He repeatedly clashed with Daniels until his resignation a few years later.

With Rske’s record of invention, it would be logical to expect him to embrace aviation, but his record of support for it is questionable. While on the General Board in 1911, Rske had advocated deploying torpedo-armed airplanes to defend the Philippines. Wainwright ridiculed his idea as a “wildcat scheme,” pointing out that the General Board had to base its plans on what was possible in the present rather than the future."® Rske left for a command at sea shortly thereafter and did not return to Washington until

®^Chambers to Towers, Febniary 13,1913, and Towers to Chambers, February 1 and 8, and March 5, 1913, Chambers Papers, Box 22. " t . David Cronon (ed.). The Cabinet Diaries o f Josephus Daniels (Lincoln: U of Nebraska Press, 1963), 6 . “‘Ctmunings, 238-239; Fiske, From Midshipman to Rear Admiral, 481; W ainwii^t, ‘The General Board,” USNIP48 (Jannary 1922), 188-198. 317 January 6, 1913, when Meyer appointed him Aide for Inspections. Apart from getting a patent for his sketch of a crude apparatus for dropping a torpedo from a plane, there is no indication that he paid any attention to aviation developments in the United States while at sea.

As Aide for Operations, Fiske had a few conversations with Chambers, but paid little attention to naval aviation during his first year in office. Instead he focused on matters more important to him, especially the creation of a naval general staff, which he sought to lead. He used his position as Aide for Operations to isolate the General Board and other officers from the Secretary of the Navy, and to enlarge his own power base. Aviation, as well as everything else, took a back seat to Fiske’s personal ambitions. Had Fiske, as Chambers later wrote “subordinated his personal schemes to the best interests of the government, he could have succeeded in establishing many necessary reforms.”**” If Chambers had expected support from Fiske, he must have been sorely disappointed. One of Daniels’ first actions on taking office was to rule that no officer would be promoted unless he had the sea duty required for his rank. This immediately posed serious problems for the Navy as Meyer had violated this policy routinely to ensure that his new administrative arrangement was staffed with the best officers possible. Now these officers found their prospects for promotion in danger. The first victim of this abrupt change in policy was Templin Pbtts. Meyer had removed him from command of the battleship Georgia to become the Chief Intelligence Officer. Potts, who had since become the Aide for Persormei, was due for promotion to admiral. Daniels denied his promotion due to lack of sea service. Dewey, and to a lesser extent Fiske, intervened on Potts’ behalf, arguing his case to Daniels, but Daniels remained adamant and sent Potts back to sea unpromoted. Shortly thereafter, the plucking board, following Daniels’ policy, found Potts short of sea service and placed him on the retired list The career of an

“ ^Costello, 'Tlanmng for War,” 99-101; Chambers to Sirsch January 21. 1919, Chambers Papers, Box 21. 318 excellent officer and noted reformer was over.““ Daniels’ treatment of Pbtts launched an exodus from Washington as senior officers on shore rushed to find appointments at sea to save their careers. Over the next few months, the Navy’s Washington bureaucracy underwent one its greatest changes in personnel in its history. Chambers' network of friends and supporters on shore evaporated. Among those who left was Phillip Andrews, who gave up his position as Chief of the Bureau of Navigation and reverted to his regular rank of commander. So did Cone, who resigned as the Chief of the Bureau of Engineering and returned to sea as a lieutenant commander.*”

Chambers clearly knew his days in aviation were numbered. Daniels would certainly not approve an extension of his time on shore as Meyer had. He needed to ensure the aviation program’s position in the Navy and he needed to do it quickly. Towers, following his return from Guantanomo, became Chambers’ primary assistant. He did his best to help with Chambers’ “legislative engineering,’’ as well as supervising the pilot training program and day-to-day operations at Annapolis.®" Chambers had testified before Congress on aviation that January, but was unable to convince its members to increase aviation funding. The budget for 1913 remained the same as the previous year $10,000 for the Bureau of Navigation, $20,000 for the

Engineering Bureau, and $35,000 for the Bureau of Construction and Repair. Following this defeat. Chambers wrote to Daniels and several friendly members in Congress asking that unused funds for “transportation navigation” be switched to fund naval aviation.®' This too fell on deaf ears. Chambers also tried to get Congress and the Navy to sponsor prizes for aviation record setting and invention. He hoped this would spur aviation developments in the United States as it had in Europe, especially if the Navy guaranteed

6» ,Colleta, Ftyfe. 104-5; Fiske, From Midshipman to Rear-Admiral, 531-2. Vaa Deurs, Wings, 90-92. “ “Reynolds. Towers, 57-60. “ 'chambers to Daniels, April 23,1913. Chambers Papers. Box 4. 319 to purchase planes and instruments from the winners. Congress would not appropriate the funds.®^

Outside the Navy, though. Chambers’ work was well respected. On April 24, the National Aeronautical Society presented him with a gold medal for his efforts to advance aviation. In his address to its membership that night, he once again spoke in favor of a national aeronautic lab, support for which continued to grow. Chambers continued to lobby for its creation, writing Daniels a long letter on the “urgent necessity” of a research lab, but without results.®^

Walcott also continued to fight for the lab, and a few weeks later he convinced the Regents of the Smithsonian Institution to reopen the Langley Laboratory and resume aeronautical research. President Wilson approved this action a short time later. Walcott appointed an eleven member board to oversee its operation that included Chambers and Richardson. The Lab’s mission and organization were virtually identical to what Chambers had outlined in his 1912 report®^

Over the next two years, Walcott, Chambers, and their supporters lobbied Congress for funding for the lab. Franklin Roosevelt weighed in on their side in the final legislative battle, and funding for the lab was tacked on to the naval appropriations bill passed in March 1915. The lab’s existence was confirmed the following year in legislation that created the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics.®* Chambers would finally have his lab, but by then his career was all but over.

®^House Committee on Naval Affairs, Hearings, January 9,1913. ‘’^^wombly (President of the .‘Aeronautical Society) to Chambers, April 17,1913, Chambers P ^ r s , Box 23; Chambers to the Bureau of Navigation and the Secretary of the Navy, March 13, 1913, Chambers Papers, Box 13. “ Turnbull and Lord, History o f United States Naval Aviation, 27-28; Roland, Model Research. 17. “ ^Roland, Model Research, 22-25. 320 The Billingsley Crash On June 20, 1913, Chambers was confronted with what he had most dreaded. Towers had accompanied Ensign William D. Billingsley on a flight of the Wright B-2. While skirting a storm, a sudden updraft tossed both men into the controls. Neither had worn the plane's crude and uncomfortable safety straps. The plane plunged into an even steeper dive and Billingsley was tossed out, falling to his death. Naval aviation had its first fatality. Towers managed to cling to the rigging and fell 1600 feet with the plane into the water. He survived, severely injured, and would spend most of the next four months in the hospital.®* The crash “cast a pall over naval aviation.” The Wright planes, which had developed a particularly deadly reputation (having killed five Army aviators and now Billingsley), were grounded. Cunningham, at the behest of his fiancee, left aviation. Chambers had lost virtually his entire first generation of pilots. His remaining senior aviator, Victor Herbs ter, while a good pilot, had proven to be a terrible administrator and repeatedly clashed with most of the other pilots. Chambers had no choice but to put Lieutenant (j. g.) James Murray in charge of the Annapolis base. While the most experienced pilot available, he had flown solo for only ten hours.®^ It must have seemed to Chambers that naval aviation's situation could hardly get worse, but it did. On June 23, 1913, Daniels issued General Order 41, which codified Meyer's division of aviation responsibilities into law with the Bureau of Construction and Repair in charge of airframes, the Engineering Bureau in charge of engines, and the Bureau of Navigation in charge of instruments, clothing, and persormei. This division would remain in force until 1921, complicating the efforts of Chambers and his successors to rationalize the administration of naval aviation. An even worse blow fell on Chambers one week later. “‘Reynolds, 65-68; Aero & Hydro (June 28, 1913), 248; Chambers, ‘Brief Summary,” 18. “ ^Reynolds, 68; Van Deurs, Wings, 85-87. Murray would die in crash the following year, also tossed out of his plane after failing to use his safety harness. 321 Plucked

Chambers was going to be assigned to command the new battleship Utah in

March as he had arranged with Andrews, but the change in administration stalled the bureaucracy. No one was assigned to relieve him. Chambers tried to get Mustin as his replacement, but he could not arrange the transfer. Chambers knew he was in a tenuous position, but he decided to pass on the proffered command.®* Chambers' friend Mason had been in charge of the plucking board the previous year and had made certain to cover for Chambers. He had written to both Chambers and Meyer asking if Chambers’ failure to secure the command of a first-class ship has been due to the requirements of the public interests.” Meyer affirmed that Chambers appointment on shore was indeed required. Chambers apparently assumed that this arrangement would cover him for another year. He also incorrectly believed that he still had several years to make up his deficiency in time at sea.®^ Meyer’s support and well-placed friends were all Chambers had needed in 1912 to safeguard his career, but the situation had changed. Mayo and several other friends phoned and wrote to Chambers warning him to apply for sea duty. Chambers did not take them seriously, believing that if the Navy could drag him from sea to shore, it could send him back just as well. Oblivious to the urgency of the situation and bogged down by work. Chambers did not apply for sea duty until May 1913.®° In typical fashion. Chambers indicated his “readiness for sea duty,” summarized his accomplishments, complained about his lack of support and funding, and repeated his request for a qualified relief who would continue his work at aviation. He foolishly concluded his letter saying: '^Chambers, handwritten note on Chambers to Chief the Bureau of Navigation, October 5,1912, Chambers Papas, Box 28; Chambers, “Brief Summary”, 15; House of Representatives. 70th Congress (1930), Hearing 499 on H. R. 10106,1930,2212. ®*Mason to Secretary of the Navy, May 29, 1912; Secretary of the Navy to Mason, June 1,1912, Chambers Papers, Box 4; House of Representatives, 70th Congress (1930), Hearing 499,2216-2217. """chambers to Pond August 28,1913, Chambers Papers, Box 21; Mayo to Chambers, June 20,1916, Chambers Papers, Box 18. 322 “I am perfectly willing to risk the chances of promotion if the Department should find it expedient to delay my orders. Nevertheless, I wish to record the fact that I am not working assiduously in the development of aviation for the purpose of avoiding sea duty and that I am ready for such duty at any time."**' Victor Blue seemed to approve Chambers’ assignment to sea, writing to Daniels that while Chambers had "done valuable work in directing the progress of aviation along scientific lines,” the Bureau of Navigation would not stand in his way of going to sea. When a few days later Daniels replied that “no action will be taken towards ordering

Captain Chambers to sea at this time.” Chambers still thought everything was in order. He was only fifth on the list of captains, so five admirals would have to retire before he could be promoted. There seemed no reason for urgency.*^* The plucking board did not agree. It met later that month. Possibly under pressure from Daniels to clear out the higher ranks, it plucked five captains, among them Chambers. This was the number maximum allowed by law. The ostensible reason for almost all of these pluckings was lack of sea service in the grade of captain. The deliberations of the plucking boards were kept completely secret, so there was no way for Chambers or anyone else to find out why or how they had made their decision. Blue phoned Chambers on June 30 and notified of him of his forced retirement Chambers was stimned, but when Blue asked him to stay on active duty and continue to direct naval aviation, he agreed.*® This arrangement was confirmed the next day in writing. Chambers agreed to continue his woiic for a short time, though he pointed out that he would “not care to continue this duty, at the pay of a Lieutenant, any longer than necessary” to complete his most important work. (Federal law mandated that retired officers called back to active '“'chambers to Secretary of the Navy, May 18,1913, Chambers Papers, Box 4. ‘“^Bureau of Navigation to Secretary of the Navy, June 3,1913, Chambers Pqiers, Box 4; Secretary of the Navy to the Bureau of Navigation, June 7,1913, Chambers Parers, Box 4. *®House of Representatives, Hearing 499,70th Congress (1930), 2216-2218. The other Captains plucked were C. C. Marsh, J. C. Quinby, J. M. EUicott, C. M. Knepper. 323 duty could not be paid more than an active duty lieutenant, which was only a few dollars more than the retired pay of a captain.) Chambers was crushed by being plucked and plaintively asked “whether the Department appreciates not only the difliculties siuTounding the problems involved and the importance of aerial navigation to the future of naval warfare, but the peculiar difficulties, the discomforts of my position, the sacrifices I have made in my zeal for this work.” Daniels accepted his willingness to continue on active duty and replied that he “hoped that an officer can be assigned to duty with you with a view to becoming your relief."^ Chambers would remain in charge of aviation for the next seven months, and it would be in this awkward position that he would preside over his final achievement It would be several years until Chambers discovered what had led to his plucking, and he probably never learned all the details of what had happened. At first. Chambers thought that Daniels was trying to purge the upper ranks of the Navy to further the career of his friend Blue, a Commander whose promotion was accelerated by plucking Potts, Chambers, and the other Captains. Later, he correctly focused on Fiske, who could have prevented his “sacrifice by a wink of his eye.” Fiske had intervened with Daniels and arranged for Chambers to stay on shore.*^® Fiske, who had witnessed the destruction of Potts' career, arranged the same fate for Chambers. The question, of course, is why. In his autobiography, Rske simply stated that aviation needed “new blood” because the “captain in charge of aviation [Chambers]. . . was more occupied with making certain inventions cormected with aeroplanes than with the subject of developing an aeronautical service.”^ This idea is supported by Rske’s biographer, who argues that Rske incorrectly believed Chambers “was more interested in solving the theoretical problems of flight than

'“^Secretary of the Navy to Chambers, July 1.1913; Chambers to Bureau of Navigation, July 2,1913; Daniels to Chambers, July 11,1913; Chambers Papers, Box 4. ‘^Chambers to Sirsch January 21,1919, Chambers Papers, Box 21; Van Deurs, Wings, 92 “ ‘Hske, Midshipman to Rear Admiral, 538. 324 in quickly developing a naval air service.”*^'This complaint, coming from Fiske, is simply absurd. Fiske had spent the better part of his career tinkering with and patenting a variety of inventions and had complained repeatedly about the lack of support inventors received from the Navy. Even as Aide for Operations, he still found time to experiment and test his inventions. If it was solely an issue of needing new blood, sending Chambers to sea would have cleared the way for Fiske to appoint a new officer to command aviation. Fiske's destruction of Chambers’ career was deliberate, personal, and vindictive.

Chambers later came to believe that it was his failure to support Fiske’s torpedo plane idea that had turned Fiske against him. He had apparently dismissed Fiske’s premature advocacy of armed aircraft as he had that of so many other inventors, stating that it needed to wait until larger planes capable of lifting torpedoes (which weighed 2000 pounds) had been developed.*^ It is also quite likely that Fiske was annoyed that Chambers was not interested in creating an independent aeronautics bureau that would have equal standing with the other bureaus that Fiske desired. Much as he had in the debate over ship design. Chambers took a middle position between line officer extremists like Fiske and the staff bureaus. He sought ways to harmonize inter-bureau cooperation and tried to work with the system as it was rather than fighting to change iL Chambers was not motivated by any love for the bureau system. Rather, he preferred to focus his efforts on practical, achievable goals. Congress would never have proved the creation of a new bureau in the Navy even had Daniels been convinced to support it The battle over the creation of an independent aviation bureau would have antagonized the technical bureaus that Chambers relied upon to purchase aircraft Fiske had cleaiiy remembered which side Chambers had been on in the debates over ship design, and may also have been offended by Chambers’ criticism of his ideas on ship design at that time.®^’ '^Qole.xtaL.Bellinger, 72. ‘^Chambers to Siisch January 21.1919, Chambers Papers, Box 21. ^*^Villiam McBride makes a similar point arguing that Rske removed Chambers because Chambers was 325 Regardless, Chambers’ career was virtually over.

Conclusion In just under three years, Chambers had built up the Navy’s aviation program from nothing to a small but respectable force that included a dozen aviators and eight aircraft. Chambers’ aviators set several world records and managed to lead the world in achievement if not in numbers. Chambers managed to carve a niche for aviation within the fleet and convince numerous, doubting senior officers of its importance. Operating under serious budgetary constraints and with virtually no support within the Navy’s bureaucracy, his achievements were a testimony to his technical and organizational skills and his tenacity. Caught between his pilots and aviation enthusiasts who always wanted more than he could possibly give them and a Navy bureaucracy that was at best indifferent. Chambers persevered. Key officers in the bureaucracy, such as Fiske and many of the bureau chiefs, were often more interested in their own empire building than the future of naval aviation and supported it only when it suited their own ends. During these years, aviation became Chambers’ entire life, and despite being plucked, he would continue to work in the aviation program for six more years. Long into his retirement Chambers remained most proud of the safety record of naval av iation under his command. By the end of 1913, the slightly larger Army aviation program had lost fourteen aviators in crashes while the Navy had lost only Billingsley

Chambers’ plucking stands in stark contrast to his record for these years. Dewey, Nicholson, and Andrews had rated him excellent in every category in evaluation after evaluation. Nicholson surprisingly wrote that he “would be glad to serve under him,” and that he considered Chambers’ work on aviation “excellent” Dewey remarked that he had a “special aptitude” for the General Board. Andrews cited his remarkable “success with willing to work with the technical bineaus rather than fight for line officer supremacy. McBride, 'The Rise and Fall of a Strategic Technology," 208-9. ““chambers, “Brief Summary,” 18. 326 development of aviation,” and considered him “calm, even tempered, forceful, industrious,” and fit for promotion."* Had he not been plucked, he would have left an even more dramatic mark on the Navy. Despite his retirement. Chambers would leave the Navy one final legacy.

327 CHAPTER 15 RETIRED

Chambers’ plucking exacerbated his already weak position within the Navy’s bureaucracy as the battle for the control and funding of naval aviation continued. Chief of the Bureau of Construction and Repair Watt remained opposed to many of Chambeis’ initiations. The two men disagreed on virtually every issue of aviation policy. Watt was especially angered by Chambers support of the Langley Lab and his efforts to create a recognized office of aeronautics within the Navy.“ * Daniels seemed completely oblivious to aviation’s desperate need of funding. Chambers needed a replacement with official standing within the Navy to fight for the aviation program. Chambers tried to get Towers to fight for the position, but Towers knew the position required someone of higher rank to deal with the bureau chiefs.*®^ Chambers suggested Mustin and several other officers to replace him, but Fiske ignored him. Fiske would choose Chambers’ replacement alone, and it would take him some time. Officers were understandably reluctant to accept the position after what had happened to Chambers. While Frske looked for a replacement for Chambers, he also tried to hijack the direction of aviation policy from him. On July 16,1913, Fiske asked Daniels to obtain the General Board’s opinion on the utility of aviation for the fleet, hoping to use its recommendation to support his effort to create an Aeronautics Bureau. The General

“ ‘chambers, Htness Rqxirts, 1911-1913, NARG 24; Van Deurs, Wings. 94-95. “ ^Reynolds, Towers, 68-69; Chambers to Towers, July 4,1913, Box 22. 328 Board sent Daniels to Chambers, despite the fact that Fiske and Daniels had destroyed his career just two weeks earlier.^* Chambers would have one last chance to influence the future of naval aviation.

The Chambers Board Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Daniels had visited the Annapolis aviation camp that summer, and had been taken for plane rides by Towers and Herbs ter. Roosevelt, at least, returned to Washington convinced of the importance of aviation.*^ Like many of his predecessors, Roosevelt would wait until Daniels was out of the office and then act forcefully to support projects he believed in. Often he would phone friends to see if there was anything he could do for them.^ On October 7,1913, probably at Dewey’s suggestion, Roosevelt created a special board to make recommendations for aviation policy. He appointed Chambers to chair it. The other members of the Aeronautic Board (usually referred to as the Chambers Board) were: Towers, by then the Navy’s most experienced aviator; Cunningham who represented the Marine Corps; Richardson who represented the Bureau of Construction and Repair; Commander C. B. Brittain representing the Bureau of Navigation; Commander S. S. Robison representing the Engineering Bureau; and Lieutenant M. H. Simons from the Bureau of Ordnance. Chambers, Towers, and Richardson dominated the board’s discussions and carved out a plan for the future that closely followed Chambers’ previous recommendations. Before the board met. Chambers sent Towers on a six-week fact-finding mission to gather information on the progress of aviation in the United States. The two of them discussed aviation policy in detail before the board met and reached agreement on most issues. The one contentious issue between them was aircraft design. Chambers had a '’“Hske,538;Coleaa,fijfe. 109. '^ 'a n Deurs, Wings, 68; Aero and Hydro 6 (May 31, 1913), 167. “ ^Albion, A/aferj o f Naval Policy, 362. 329 good engineering background and had worked haid to learn everything he could about aeronautics. He had repeatedly involved himself in the aircraft design process, but he lacked experience as an aviator. Towers wanted all aircraft designs passed by a board of pilots. He had suffered too many bad experiences with the designs of non-flyers such as the early work of Richardson. He was particularly opposed to Chambers’ OWL design. Nonetheless, they worked out most of their differences ahead of time and presented a united front during the board’s deliberations.^® The Chambers Board met in mid-November. At the first meeting. Chambers gave each member the data Towers had gathered on the progress of aviation and his own proposal for the expansion of naval aviation. He then adjourned the meeting so the members could read everything. When the board reconvened, most of the discussions focused on Chambers’ proposal. The board issued its unanimous report on November 25 after deliberating for twelve days. Its recommendations differed hardly at all from Chambers’ initial proposal.®®’ The Chambers Board recommended expanding the pilot training program, establishing a larger and more permanent base on shore, and assigning a ship to aviation to serve as a mobile base. Most importnatly, they recommended the immediate purchase of fifty airplanes and three dirigibles, and the future purchase of even more aircraft. It was a modest proposal considering that by the end of the year the militaries of Germany, Fiance, and Russia each fielded about 500 aircraft Even Belgium had twenty-seven planes, more than the United States Army and Navy combined. Administratively, the Board went along with Chambers, supporting the creation of an office of naval aeronautics, but not the separate bureau Rske wanted. The office would be directed by a Captain, with an assistant and representatives from the Marine Corps and the four

bureaus involved in aviation. To side-step potential opposition, they recommended

®^eynolds. Towers, 70-71 ; Minutes of the Aeronautic Board, Chambers Papers. 6 5 7 ,N^nutes of the Aeronautical Board; Van Deurs, Wings, 97. 330 funding research at both the Model Basin and the Smithsonian. They requested $1^97,700 to fund its recommendations.*® This was a blueprint for the future of naval aviation that contained most of Chambers’ proposals of the past three years. Had Chambers not been plucked, it would have been a fitting legacy to cap his time as director of naval aviation before returning to sea. But Chambers had nowhere to go, and simply continued to work on aviation with ever-diminishing authority and influence. The Chambers Board’s report offended Rske because it accepted the current bureau division of responsibilities. Rske tried to bury it, refusing to present its recommendations to Daniels or the General Board.*” When Chambers tried to meet with Daniels, he was blocked by Rske. Chambers passed his board’s report on to the General Board and from there it reached Daniels. Unfortunately, despite his statements to the press, Daniels was not willing to fight hard for aviation, especially since the Wilson administration was worried about a budget deficit caused by lower than expected tariff revenue. The “word had been quietly passed along to squeeze expenditures.” Chambers lost the stenographer he had managed to get for the Aeronautical Board, and once again worked alone. When Daniels presented the Navy’s proposed budget to Congress, he asked for only $350,000 for aviation and he did not fight hard for it. Congress appropriated only the same low amount it had the previous two years—a total of $65,000 split between the Bureaus of Navigation, Construction, and Engineering.**® It was another setback for aviation.

**House Naval Affairs Craninittee, 53rd Congress (1914). Hearings. 1794-1803; Roscoe.On the Seas and in the Skies, 42; Turnbull and Lord, History o f United States Naval Aviation, 33-34; Chambers, “Brief Summary,” 16. ‘’“\lcB iide, “The Rise and Fall of a Strategic Technology,” 209. ***Van Deurs, Wings, 98-99; Chambers to Burridge, December 26, 1913, Chambers Papers, Box 13. 331 Mark Bristol On December 17,1913, Rske arranged the assignment of recently promoted Captain Mark Bristol to work on aviation under him in the Division of Operations. He intended Bristol to replace Chambers, but it would be several weeks before Fiske announced his plans to anyone else. Chambers learned from newspapers on January 5 that he would be subordinated to Bristol. On January 8, Fiske had Chambers detached from the Bureau of Navigation and ordered to his Operations Division. Fiske then systematically stripped Chambers of all his authority over aviation. Rske had to approve all expenditures of funds and all correspondence. He reduced Chambers’ duties to work on the OWL flying boat and liaison to the Langley Lab, though the latter could not “be openly recognized.”**' Chambers protested to Daniels that he had not consented to remain on active duty “to perform the drudgery of this work under the direction of an officer who is junior to me.” If he and Rske wanted him to stay, they would have to give him interesting work to do. Chambers also sent a long memo to Rske that pointedly demonstrated just how little Fiske knew about aviation in general or the day-to-day business of naval aviation. In apparent retaliation, Fiske took the OWL project away from Chambers as well, but he relented on several points. He acknowledged the importance of the Langley Lab and placed Chambers in charge of aeronautical research. Rske placed Bristol in charge of day-to-day operations and establishing the new Naval Air Station at the abandoned Pensacola Navy Yard. Bristol would eventually relieve Chambers, but no date was set for this. A few weeks after this bitter exchange of memos, the strain and overwork finally caught up with Chambers. His health collapsed and he was hospitalized with

pneumonia.*^

“ ‘chambers, “Brief Sununar>’.” 19; Chambers to Rske, January 10,1914, Chambers Papers, Box 4. “ "Rske to Chambers, January 5,1914; Chambers to the Secretary of the Navy, January 6, 1914, Chambers to Rske, January 10,1914; Rske to Chambers and Bristol, Januar) 14, 1914, all in Chambers Papers, Box 4; Chambers, “Brief Summary,” 19. 332 Rske's choice of Bristol was a good one. While Bristol was not particulariy interested in aviation (he had hoped to be appointed Chief Intelligence Officer), he was a good administrator. He quickly installed Mustin and Towers at Pensacola and secured the obsolete battleship A/mmippi for aviation training, and later the North Carolina when the Mississippi was sold to Greece. Bristol and Chambers worked well together as they had in the past on the Texas and at the Torpedo Station. Chambers brought Bristol up to speed on aviation over the next year. There is no indication that Chambers vented any of his frustration over his situation at Bristol. He repeatedly emphasized his great respect for Bristol and supported him in bureaucratic battles.^

Reinstatement When he recovered from his bout with pneumonia. Chambers focused on undoing his plucking and getting reinstated into the Navy. Following his plucking, mail had poured into Chambers’ office from a host of well-wishers. Gove and several other classmates wrote to express their surprise and anger about both Chambers’ and Potts’ forced retirement His sister proclaimed him a “martyr to his sense of duty.” Robert Peary wrote that “aviation is the loser by your retirement”—a sentiment shared by many in the aviation commumty. The Navy’s aviators were also quite upset by Chambers’ plucking. They did not have to like Chambers to know what his fate meant for the aviation program as a whole and those officers too closely associated with it So many letters arrived that Chambers soon had to resort to a form letter response. He vowed to fight on and continue working on aviation though he likened it to “trying to swim in a turbulent stream with a stone tied to his feet’^

‘"Van Deurs, Wings. 99-100. ‘"Sue to Chambers, July 28, 1913; July 4,1913 Irving Chambers to W. I. Chambers, Box 13; Gove to Chambers July 3,1913; Pond to Chambers, August 15,1913; Peary to Chambers, July 3,1913; Lee Burridge to Chambers, July 2,1913, Box 13; Bellinger to Chambers, July 7, 1913; Chambers, 1913 fonn letter to well-wishers. Box 21. 333 Friends in the aeronautical societies not only wrote to Chambers, but also began pressuring members of Congress to reinstate him. Their efforts worried Chambers because he thought they would offend the Navy’s bureaucracy. He asked his friends to coordinate their efforts through him and launched his own effort to be reinstated. He began building support within the Navy’s bureaucracy in September and wrote to Dewey to ask his advice. He put his campaign on hold while he chaired the Aeronautics Board, and did not resume work on saving his career until February. As it had for the past three years, aviation took precedence over everything else.“*

In February, Chambers asked Daniels for permission to petition Congress for reinstatement “in strict conformity with Navy regulations.” Potts and several other officers were also working to be reinstated, but without success. The Bureau of Navigation opposed all their petitions, fearing a flood of plucked officers demanding reinstatement into the Navy.®“ In his petition. Chambers summarized his accomplishments and explained that when plucked he had still had time to make up his deficiency in sea duty. He also pointed out that as part of the amalgamation of the line and staff, five former engineers were promoted to the rank of admiral despite serious deficiencies in their time at sea. Since Chambers duties in charge of aviation had involved engineering, he argued that an exception should be made for him as well. The Aeronautical Society unanimously backed his petition, and its president wrote that Chambers was “principally responsible for the present progressive policy of the Navy” in aviation. Other aeronautic organizations also chimed in to support Chambers. Phillip Andrews confirmed that Chambers had been pulled from \hc Louisiana because of his “well known technical knowledge,” and his importance to the “Meyer organization.’**^ On March 9,1914, Senator James A. Reed ‘‘^Chambeis to Dewey. September 24,1913, Chambers Papers, Box 4 “*Chambers to the Secretary of the Navy, February 14 and 18,1914; Secretary of the Navy to Chambers, February 16.1914; Fiske to Chambers, February 18,1914, Chambers Papers, Box 4. Chambers, Petition; Chambers to Burridge, March 29,1914, Box 13; Woodhouse to Chambers February 4,1914; Chambers to Andrews January 24, 1914; Andrews to Chambers, January 31,1914, Box 7. 334 introduced Senate Bill 4623 “to Restore to the Active Duty List of the Navy for Special Duty Captain W. I. Chambers, USN Retired.” It died in committee.

Aviation in 1914 The following month, naval aviation received its first taste of combat. The Wilson administration, concerned about the civil war in Mexico, had concentrated a growing number of warships off Mexico’s coast under the command of Chambers’ friend Rear Admiral Henry T. Mayo. In April, Mayo demanded an apology and a twenty-one gun salute from Mexico following the detention of several American sailors in . The local governor agreed to the apology but not the salute. The arrival at Veracruz of a German steamer loaded with arms and ammunition brought the crisis to head. President Wilson ordered the Navy to occupy the Veracruz customs house and seize the arms shipment The Navy ordered Towers and Bellinger, commanding the 1st and 2nd

Aeroplane Squadrons of two planes each, to support the landing. The aviators flew reconnaissance patrols over the area, observing troop movements and helped direct artillery fire in the confused street battle that followed the landing of 4000 sailors and Marines. They were commended for their work by Admiral Fletcher.®** On July 1, 1914, Rske succeeded in establishing the Office of Naval Aeronautics under his Division of Operations and placed Bristol in charge of it. Like Chambers, Bristol found himself bogged down with paperwork but he did get one clerk to assist him. Rske ignored Chambers’ recommendations for more administrative officers, especially for the Pensacola Naval Air Station. The senior aviator there continued to handle all administrative details in addition to training new pilots and other aviation work. Chambers briefly commanded naval aviation again in October while Bristol observed the Army’s aviators on the West Coast On his return in November, Bristol officially

‘^Jack Sweetman, The Landing at Veracruz: I9I4 (Annapolis; U. S. Naval Institute, 1968); Turnbull and Lord, 41-43. 335 assumed the title of Director of Naval Aviation. The success of the aviators at Veracruz along with tlie outbreak of war in Europe encouraged Bristol to push Daniels and Congress to fimd the Chambers Board’s proposals. Supported by Rske, Bristol requested two planes for each of the Navy’s sixteen battleships. After careful lobbying, he managed to get $1 million tacked on to the naval appropriation for 1915. He also secured Congressional support for the aeronautical advisory committee that would become the NACA the following year. The first shipboard catapult launch that November underlined aviation’s readiness for fleet deployment Chambers’ dreams for aviation were finally coming true. Fiske continued his campaign to create the office of Chief of Naval Operations.

He convinced Daniels of its importance and helped draft the legislation that created it, but was infuriated when Daniels chose someone else for the office. Instead of Fiske or any of the other admirals, Daniels chose relatively obscure Captain William S. Benson, then in command of the Philadelphia Navy Yard. Benson became the first Chief of Naval

Operations on May 11,1915. Daniels, who had tired of his constant quarrels with Rske, appointed Rske president of the Naval War College in July to get him out of Washington. Rske retired from the Navy the following year.*™ Bristol’s Office of Naval Aeronautics, along with Chambers, was moved from the now defunct Operations Divisions to the office of the Chief of Naval Operations. This should have strengthened the position of aviation, but Benson systematically stripped Bristol of his authority. While hostile to Chambers and bent on personal aggrandizement,

Fiske had at least believed in and fought for naval aviation. Benson virtually ignored it Bristol, who had no time at sea at the rank of captain, left aviation in March 1916 to

command \hR North Carolina and her attached aircraft He had no desire to share in

“"Chambers, “Brief Summary,” 16. David Cronon (ed.). The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels (LiiKX}ln: U of Nebraska Press, 1963), 272; Mary Klachko, Admiral William Shepherd Benson, First Chief of Naval Operations (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press. 1987), 25,30-33. 336 Chambers’ fate. Benson placed Lieutenant (j. g.) Clarence K. (Buck) Bronson in charge of aviation until Towers returned from Britain that October and took charge. Benson remained apathetic in support of aviation until the United States entered World War

Dwindling into Obscurity In 1915, Chambers, Potts and ten other plucked officers combined forces and once again petitioned Congress for reinstatement into the Navy. They asked not just to returned to the service, but to be returned with their seniority intact and the rank of

Admiral, which they would have attained had they not been plucked. They also pressed

Congress to change the Navy’s promotion system. In an article that appeared in The

Navy, Chambers condemned the plucking system and “the selfish scramble for promotion.”*’^ Congress, faced with numerous plucked officers with good records seeking reinstatement, voted to change the Navy’s promotion policy from seniority and plucking to selection based on merit and authorized President Wilson to reinstate recently plucked officers. The Navy, though, remained opposed to the reinstatement of any officers. Removing Congress from the promotion process had long been a goal of reform- minded officers. Having acheived it, they opposed any exceptions that would once again set a precedent for renewed Congressional influence in officer promotion. Wilson, unwilling to involve himself in what he considered a Navy matter, avoided the matter entirely. Chambers redoubled his efforts at the next session of Congress, getting Fletcher (who had served on the plucking board) to support him. Fletcher wrote to Congress that “some very able officers were caught short of sea service.” He argued that if “any officers are to be restored to the active list there is no one more entitled than Captain

‘^Van Deurs, Wings, 136; Turnbull and Lord, History o f United States Naval Aviation, 50-51; Albion, Makers o f Naval Policy, 362-375. ‘^Karsten, Naval Aristocracy, 360; Chambers, “Universal Peace, Naval Efilciency and the ‘Plucking’ System,” The Navy, 9 (March-April, 1915). 337 Chambers.’*'" Riends introduced another bill to reinstate Chambers in May, but Congress was determined to leave matters to the President It again authorized Wilson to reinstate Chambers and the other petitioners. Wilson again chose not to act on the luatter. Chambers petitioned again on February 12,1917, and yet again on April 7, 1917, expecting that the plucked officers would be recalled following the United States’ entry into World War 1, but Wilson never reinstated any of them.*”'* By 1916, Chambers was far removed from the day-to-day operations of naval aviation. Given broad discretion to keep track of aeronautic research, he traveled the country visiting inventors and manufacturers and working on a number of his own projects. He spent a considerable amount of time investigating the orphans of American aeronautic research: dirigibles and helicopters. Chambers never had much confidence in the combat capabilities of dirigibles, believing that the “high speed of the aeroplane would seem to aimul the useful employment of dirigibles.”*’* Their ability to hover and observe, though, would be particularly useful to the Navy. The solution seemed to be the helicopter, or omithopter as several inventors called it. Helicopters had other advantages as well. They could be easily based on board ship, requiring little in the way of specialized equipment compared to airplanes and needed no runways or catapults. Unfortunately, as Chambers repeatedly complained, no one seemed able to make them work.”* Chambers spent several months in 1916 with omithopter designer John O’Leary and his financial backers in Cohoes, New York. O’Leary’s Dragon Flyer was one of the most ambitious designs of the time—a vertical take-off airplane using tilt-roters. Chambers had corresponded with O’Leary on and off through the years, making several suggestions to improve his design, but he always remained dubious about O’Leary’s

*‘Tletcher to Chambers, September 20,1915, Chambers Papers, Box 4. ""^Chambers to Reed, May 30,1917 and May 28,1918, Chmnbers Papers, Box 21. ‘’ ‘chambers. “Aircraft in Warfare,” September 30,1914, Chambers Papers, Box 12. ‘" ‘’Chambers to Representative William E Hunqthrey, October 15,1912; Chambers Papers, Box 16. 338 chances for success. As he had written in his first letter to O’Leary, “the ill-success that has attended the many efforts in this direction hitherto, justify caution and a certain skepticism as to your immediate success.”®” The Navy had even less confidence in helicopters in these years and recalled Chambers from Cohoes to work in Washington. The Dragon Flyer project collapsed two years later following O’ Leary’s death. Chambers tried to help his daughter salvage something from the project, but it was not marketable. The Dragon Flyer had never been practical.®” Chambers continued to work on a variety of projects over the next two years, virtually ignored by the Navy. In 1917, Admiral Benson complained that while Chambers had indicated he was “engaged in research and investigation of the science of naval aeronautics,” he had “received from him no data upon which a judgement of his efforts in this line may be made.” Chambers later complained that Benson had repeatedly promised to secure for him a solid place in the Navy’s bureaucracy with a recognized job title, but never made any effort to do so.‘” Naval aviation expanded dramatically during World War I, from 54 planes to over 2000, but Chambers’ duties remained relegated to research. During the war he developed a new motor, an improved hydraulic crane, and helped make several minor improvements to the Navy’s new seaplanes. He also resumed work on the aerial compass he had first designed in 1912 as well as a drift indicator. Unfortunately, the standardization required for rapid production left little opportunity for the kinds of incremental improvements at which Chambers excelled. He bitterly complained to friends that the Navy had made a serious mistake “in abandoning research entirely for standardization.” By the end of the war. Chambers felt completely isolated. He avoided the officers club and the other haunts

^’’chambers to John O’Leary, February 10,1913 and February 18,1913, Chambers Papers, Box 20. ‘’^Turnbull and Lord. 60; Chambers to O’Leary, May 5,1916; Chambers to Molly O’Leary, March 2,1917; Chambers to O’Leary, May 30,1917; Molly O’Leary to Chambers, July 28,1918, Chambers to Molly O’Leary, July 1918, all in Chambers Parers, Box 20. ‘‘^Chambers Htness Rqrort, April 1 to September 30,1917, NARG 24; Chambers. ‘Typescript of Testimony to the House Committee on Naval Affairs,” May 10,1930, Chambers Papers, Box 24. 339 of his “so called brother officers,” and pursued alone whatever project interested him at the moment He was finally relieved of active duty on October 31, 1919.*“

Retirement

During his retirement. Chambers kept up with naval aviation. Admiral William Moffett consulted with Chambers several times during 1919 before assuming command of naval aviation. Moffett directed naval aviation until his death in 1933 and continued to correspond with Chambers periodically. Bellinger and some of the other aviators from the early years visited Chambers at home, bringing him news of their successes but also of the constant battle for funding.**’ Chambers was the guest of honor at numerous aviation meetings in the early 1920s, but the aviation community lost interest in him as he lost his influence on policy.

For a time. Chambers threw himself into writing music and poetry so as not to think about his “disgrace and avoid having it gnaw away at him.” He managed to publish a few pieces, but mostly he sent his work to friends as Christmas presents. Many of them were quite surprised by this, such as family friend F. Law Olmstead who had never realized

Chambers’ “great gift in the direction of music and song.” Chambers was also active in the Belgian relief effort and donated the proceeds of his poem “Belgium, Brave Belgium” to iL**^ Chambers tried to maiket several of his inventions to manufacturers, most notably his aerial compass, but the collapse of the aviation market after the war made that

‘"’Reynolds, Towers, 122; Chambers to William Ford, Ainil 9,1918, Chambers Papers, Box 15; Chambers to Gove, January 8,1919, Chambers Papers, Box 15. **‘Paolo E. Coletta and Bemarr B. Cdetta, Admiral William A. Mojfett and U. S. Naval Aviation (Lewiston, NY: Mellon Press, 1997), 23-24; Chambers to Moffett, September 14,1925, Moffett Papers, Naval Academy Library; Bellinger to Chambers, July 28,1919, Chambers Papers, Box 12. ‘^Chambers to Gove, January 8, 1919; Chambers to Kermeth d a rk A p d 25,1918, Chambers Papers, Box 13; New York Herald. April 3,1918; Grace Cole to Chambers, December 29,1918; Lucile Belknap to Chambers, udated. Chambers Papers, Box 13; F. Law Olmstead to Chambers, December 14,1918,; Colonel Leon Osterrieth to Chambers October 3,1918, July 15,1919, and August 30, 1921, Chambers Papers, Box, 20. 340 impossible. He never managed to sell his compass despite the help of Robert Byrd and other friends in the aviation community.®® Over time Chambers became more and more bitter about both his plucking and Fiske’s efforts to portray himself as an aeronautic visionary. When Fiske overstepped himself in enforcing his torpedo plane patent. Chambers took his opportunity for a bit of revenge. In 1912, Rske, working with Park Benjamin, filed fora patent on a simple device for dropping a torpedo from a plane. It was essentially Just a release lever with a switch to arm the torpedo. They never built or tested the device, but on July 16, 1912, the Patent Office improperly awarded them a patent based on their sketches.®** The device was ignored by the Navy, and Rske soon had bigger things on his mind. Other nations were also working on torpedo planes, and on July 28,1914, the Royal Navy tested the first air-dropped torpedo. By the end of World War I, torpedo planes were deployed by many nations. During his retirement, Fiske worked to portray himself as a visionary martyred by Daniels and the Wilson administration; a prophet who had predicted the future of aviation and aerial warfare. As proof of this, he continued to point to his 1911 proposal to the General Board to defend the Philippines with airplanes and his patent on the torpedo plane. Suddenly, on February 10,1922, Fiske decided to exercise his patent He demanded that Moffett, the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, pay him a $500 royalty for each torpedo plane the Navy deployed.®® Aside from the obvious problems with the patent itself and Fiske’s very broad claim to royalties, it was also questionable as to whether Rske had the rights to it He

‘^William S. Sims to Chambers, May 15,1912, Chambers Papers,Box 21; Chambers to Julien P. Priez and Sons November 19,1919, Chambers Papers, Box 15; Piinnir, Goldsborough & O’Neill to Chambers, April 26, 1913, June 19,1912, April 30,1912, andJuly 20,1915, Chambers Paqiers, Box 25; Chambers to Buff and Buff, July 5, 1919 and October 24, 1919, Chambers Papers, Box 12. ““piske. From Midshipman to Rear-Admiral , 481; Cdetta, Fiske. 98-99. “ ®Coletta,F£yfe, 193-197; Coletta, ‘The Perils of Invention,” The American Neptune 37 (1977), 111-127. 341 had, of course, developed it while on duty. Fiske spent the rest of the decade in and out of court fighting to collect hts royalties. Harry C. Woiionan, the patent secretary of the Justice Department, investigated Fiske’s claim and wrote to Chambers for information. Chambers responded that he did not recall Fiske “spending much time on aviation.” He was always more concerned with his “schemes for advancement” and his patents than his duties as naval officer. Chambers also pointed out, quite correctly, that dropping a torpedo from a plane was easy given an airplane powerful enough to carry it Building a torpedo that would survive impact with the water and then proceed to its target was the hard part Fiske had not solved any pressing technical problem.®* In 1931 the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia ruled against Rske. He could not patent an idea, only a real, executed invention. The Supreme Court refused to hear the case, bringing the long legal battle to a close. By 1930, Chambers’ health was failing and he decided to launch one last effort to be promoted to admiral, this time on the retired list The promotion of Richard E. Byrd to admiral on the retired list had established a precedent and Chambers hoped to be similarly rewarded. This would expunge the stain of his plucking and finally recognize him for his pioneering work in naval aviation. Chambers rallied a number of politicians and naval officers to his cause including Senator Robert Wagner who introduced a bill to have him promoted. Admiral Moffett weighed in and testified in support of Chambers’ promotion. The Navy again opposed the bill, citing both the cost (an extra $1500 a year for Chambers’ pension) and the bad precedent it would set What would prevent other officers from demanding promotions after their retirement? This bill too, died in committee.®*’ Chambers regrouped from this defeat and tried one last time in 1932. Wagner introduced a new bill, this time giving Chambers the promotion without the pay increase. ‘“ chambers to Workman, April 8.1929 , Chambers Papers, Box 4. “^House of Representatives, 70th Congress (1930), Hearing 499; Frank Slifer to Chambers, June 7,1930; January 14,1930 Clearwater (Chambers attorney) to Pratt, Box 4. 342 Moffett again supported Chambers, as did Mark Bristol and Rear Admiral T. T. Craven, who had directed naval aviation at the close of World War I. Most impotentiy. Chief of the Bureau of Navigation F. B. Upham, a former commander of the Pensacola Naval Air Station, reversed his position and supported the bill now that it would not cost the Navy any money. Unfortunately, the remainder of the Navy’s bureaucracy remained adamantly opposed to the promotion. Chief of Naval Operations W. V. Pratt believed it would set a bad precedent and testified to Congress that there was no evidence of inequity in Chambers’ plucking. It “must be presumed that their [the plucking board’s] action was just and equitable.” In the midst of the hearings. Chambers’ health failed. His wife continued the fight for him, but without success. The bill was rejected by the Committee

of Naval Affairs.*” Chambers’ health deteriorated over the next year. He died on September 23, 1934 near Chillicothe, Ohio, while en route to Washington D. C. for medial care. He was buried in Arlington National Cemetery four days later.

"""House of Representatives, 71st Congress (1932), Hearing 638; Moffett to Chambers, March 22, 1932; Bristol to Upham, January 4,1932; F. B. Upham to Judge Advocate General. February 3,1932; Pratt to Judge Advocate General, February 9,1932, all in Chambers Papers, Box 4. 343 CONCLUSION

Many officers worked to improve and modernize the United States Navy between the Civil War and World War I. Some focused on institutional reform, envisioning and creating the Navy’s new bureaucratic infrastructure and the new institutions that embodied their professional values. Other officers focused on exploring the technological composition of the new fleet; investigating, testing, and reporting on a host of new weapons systems, technological devices, and warship designs. The new, modem Navy required the work of both groups, and both groups of officers supported and benefited from the modernization and expansion of the fleet The interests of both institutional reformers and technological innovators often coincided, and their projects were frequently complementary. Technological innovators benefited from the data gathered and published by the Naval Institute, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the other new, professional institutions of the Navy. Institutional reformers capitalized on the successes of the new Navy and the rapid pace of technological change to push for more reform and for greater autonomy from civilian authority. The fastest progress came in projects that achieved broad consensus in their favor across both groups of officers. The best example of this was the new, Dreadnought- style battleship—a warship that merged the latest weapons systems, shipbuilding technologies, and tactical methodologies with Mahanian strategic concepts. The all-big- gun battleship design quickly achieved virtually unanimous support among line officers, and its opponents in the Construction Bureau soon gave way. A similar case can be made

344 for the Panama Canal. It was a project that had long fascinated engineers with its scale and complexity, but also offered great strategic possibilities. Virtually all naval officers agreed on its importance long before it was built In general, individual reformers tended to specialize in either new technology or institutional reform. Luce, Mahan, and Henry C. Taylor led the way in creating a new strategy and new strategic planning institutions for the Navy, but were often in the dark when it came to technology. Mahan, for example, was virtually the only line officer to oppose the development of all-big-gun battleships. Officers with a technological bent tended to enter the Navy’s engineering corps and focus their attentions there. The Navy produced great engineers in these years including David Taylor, Francis Bowles, and Holden C. Richardson, but these officers rarely participated in strategic discussions and often limited their pursuit of professional acceptance to participation in the new, largely civilian, professional engineering associations. Relatively few naval officers made important contributions as both technological innovators and institutional reformers. These included Fiske, Sims, and Chambers. Chambers in particular worked to ensure the compatibility of new strategic concepts with technological advances. It was a consistent pattern throughout his career that is demonstrated by his work at the Office of Naval Intelligence, his 1884 Prize Essay, his lectures and plaiming at the Naval War College, his numerous efforts to create compromise during internal Navy debates on bureaucratic organization, and finally his guidance of the Navy’s infant aviation program. His interest in new technology, though, was paiamoimt and colored his work as a reformer. Like many reformers in the Progressive Era, his guiding principle was efficiency. He hoped to rationalize technological, strategic, or administrative planning in the Navy and clarify its organizational structure. Chambers was what today would be called an early adopter—a person fascinated

345 with new technology who was eager to examine the latest products of scientists and inventors. He read widely and kept up with scientific developments. He also enjoyed the experimental process. He developed a number of inventions of his own and improved on those of others. As he argued in the Proceedings of the Naval Institute: “If you wish to get ahead or to lead the procession, make your own experiments. Satisfy yourself by original investigation.”®* Discerning and analytical. Chambers was at his best in assessing and refining the inventions of others. During his career he made a host of minor improvements to numerous devices and made important contributions to torpedoes, ship design, and aviation. Chambers’ approach to technology was pragmatic. He insisted that new technologies work. He would not support inventions he considered incomplete or premature. He would not recommend what he had not thoroughly examined and tested. Chambers had “a longer vision of the future than most people,” and it was a carefully considered vision.”® He belie ed progress was the result of carefully taken and measured steps rather than sudden, revolutionary change. While individual inventors might spur this process from time to time with remarkable new devices, it was careful, scientific research that produced results over the long haul. Technological progress was the result of slow, incremental evolution rather than radical revolution.

In his own inventive work, and especially in guiding aviation. Chambers insisted that new technologies be adapted to support existing doctrine, avoiding what Clark Reynolds has labeled “one of the great evils of modem machine warfare”—the “weapon dictating doctrine, rather than the reverse”—a common pitfall “to which advocates of new weapons have always been particularly susceptible.”” * While he worked to perfect aviation technologically and determine its utility for combat and other missions,

Chambeis kept it focused on scouting and artillery spotting where it fit with existing “ *Chambers, Discussicm of Fiske’s “Naval Profession,” USNIP 33 ( 1907), 840. ‘” Lee S. Burridge to M. B. Sellers, undated. Chambers Papers, B o\ 21. “ 'Reynrfds, Towers. 115-6. 346 doctnne. He expected doctime to ckmgc as a\tatioo «-as mtegiaied ndo the fiees and (Afioen. ieamed its capabdmcs. RWatmg bis feflcm oOkeis on the benefits and potenoa]

Chambers became an active partx^pam m the ne« educanonal msotxmcns of the ne«, prcfewoaal Nasy induding the Office of Naval Intcffigeooe ( 1883-8), the Neu pcn Torpedo Station < 1898-9 and 1902-4). and the Nasal War College ( 1892-3). He «orked to educate not only himself, but his fellcm officCTS as « ell. He studied history. strategy. and the other subjects valued by the founders of the Naval War College, but also science and engineering. He joined the Navy^s ne« professional orgamzanoa. the U. S. Naval Insuuite, and also several of the emerging professional engineering organizations. He came to see himself as both an engineer and a naval officer, and like many of the Navy s engineenng and construction officers, he «as regarded « ith suspiaon by some of his fellow line officers. Many of the Navy’s best technical minds left to pursue the greater opportunities offered by the private sector, but Chambers remained in the Navy despite frequent frustrations. Even his forced retirement in 1913 «as not enough to drive him away. He voluntarily remained at work for six mc^e years at little more than his retired pay. Chambers continued to hope for reinstatement during these years, but he was also desperate to ensure the place of aviation in the fleet He was convinced that the Navy’s future lay with the airplane and he was willing to sacrifice his career to integrate aviation into the fleet The strength of his commitment to aviation puzzled his friends, offended conservative officers, and frustrated those officers who sought to control aviation for their own ends. His enduring commitment to the Navy despite all the difficulties be encountered is perhaps the ultimate proof of his professionalism.

Chambers’ conception of naval officers hip was at times quite romantic. As a young officer he wanted a glorious career. It was in search of glory that he joined the

347 Greely Relief Expedition and later fought for a shipboard assignment in the Spanish- American War. Over time he seemed to find the glory he sought in bureaucratic battles. He challenged senior officers over ship design and navy yard administration. He fought for a number of causes including torpedoes, expanding the fleet, the Naval War College, and eventually aviation. Once committed to a cause, he fought for it without regard to the consequences to his career. At times he seemed to actively pursue martyrdom. This could be tolerated in a young officer, but he still needed the protection of senior officers such as Mahan and Taylor when he went too far. The fight over the Naval War College dulled Chambers’ taste for bureaucratic infighting, but he returned to his old habits when he took charge of naval aviation. He aggressively lobbied for change, regularly writing members of Congress and influential people to press his case and rally their support He was willing to work around Admiral

Wainwright and Secretary' of the Navy Meyer to arrange Ely’s flights and to get the support he needed expand and improve naval aviation. Eventually, he even became willing to antagonize the Bureau of Construction and Repair on which he depended for airplane purchases. This time, though, there was no one to protect him from his enemies.

The U. S. Navy went through a difficult process of technological innovation during its rush to modernize. At first, many naval officers were simply content to follow the lead of the Royal Navy rather than seeking their own path to the future—a policy encouraged by an often penurious Congress. Innovadon was both expensive and uncertain; better to let other nations pay the cost and adopt technologies proven abroad. Whitehead torpedoes and the Navy’s warship designs of the 1880s are just a few examples of this. Many naval officers regarded new weapons and ideas with suspicion, especially those that threatened to undermine the status quo. Even some reformers, especially members of the older generation of reformers such as Taylor, Mahan, and Stockton, were

348 dubious as to the advantages new weapons systems and new technology offered. As an institution the Navy often ignored new technology. A technology too pervasive to be ignored, or which had some institutional support, could still be isolated from the mainstream of the profession as torpedoes and submarines were at the Newport Torpedo

Station. Like most innovators and reformers. Chambers encountered resistance to his ideas throughout his career. When Chambers’ technological vision coincided with that of the Navy, his career went well. High-ranking officers supported his efforts and rewarded him with choice assignments. When he tried to push the Navy too fast or into places it did not want to go, such as aviation, he encountered opposition. Many of his proposals and inventions, especially early in his career, were simply filed away and ignored. Other officers denigrated what he sought to create and at times actively interfered with his work. Chambers’ perseverance and technical expertise nullified the hostility of some of these officers. Bunce and Ramsay, for example, continued to rely on his knowledge of engineering and ship design even after the fight over the Naval War College. Sheer ability, though, could not win over all his enemies. In the end, personal enemies united with those suspicious of aviation to use his lack of sea duty to bring his career to a premature end. Aside from the pervasive conservatism of the officer corps, the greatest obstacle to innovation within the Navy was often the bureaus. Without their support innovation moved forward slowly, or not at all. The Bureau of Construction and Repair* s opposition, for example, delayed the adoption of the all-big-gun battleship by several years. Even an already accepted idea or technology could still be derailed by a power struggle over its placement within the Navy’s bureaucracy. Luce and Mahan managed to establish the

Naval War College despite opposition from the Superintendent of the Naval Academy, but then found their institution threatened by an inter-bureau struggle to control it—a

349 struggle that often had more to do with the College’s buildings and land than its mission. Twenty years later naval aviation faced the same problems. Its military potential and effectiveness were derided and disputed while its proponents fought over its control and placement within the Navy’s bureaucracy. Over the course of his career. Chambers witnessed efforts at innovation both succeed and fail. He learned what worked both from his own mistakes and from those of

Mahan, Taylor, and his other mentors. Successful innovators worked slowly, carefully building support for their ideas. All-out battles over policy, such as those instigated by

Sims and Rske, tended to fail. Successful innovators and reformers popularized new technologies and methodologies while placating the defenders of the status quo. They presented new ideas or technologies in as non-threatening a manner as possible as Taylor presented first the Naval War College and then the General Board. Innovation in the Navy was the result of long preparation and carefully arrived at consensus. It was a process of incremental evolution rather than radical revolution. It was also a process that matched Chambers’ conception of the steady, incremental advance of science and technology. Successful innovators often emphasized the improvement of current capabilities rather than the development of completely new ones. Sims’ introduction of continuous- aim firing succeeded not just because of the support of Theodore Roosevelt and its adoption by the Royal Navy, but also because of the relative ease with which the fleet could adopt it and its coherence with current doctrine that emphasized batdeline gun duels. Submarines, in contrast, suffered because of their unique characteristics, which required a new style of warfare and a new doctrine for their effective employment. Aviation suffered from many of the same problems as submarines. Even more than submarines, airplanes differed markedly from surface warships and were prone to fatal accidents. Most officers had great difficulty integrating these new technological wonders

350 into their conception of naval combat The introduction of aviation to the fleet proved the greatest challenge of Chambers’ career. He may well have based his campaign to popularize aviation on Taylor’s careful, decade-long campaign to create the General Board. He started small and built on his successes, using each one to lobby for just a little more support He sought to mollify the Navy’s Luddites by repeatedly explaining that aircraft would not displace the Navy’s warships. Rather, Airplanes would enhance their capabilities, making them more effective at their current role. Chambers carefully built up a network of supporters within

Congress and courted people in positions of influence. He was particularly effective in rallying the aviation societies to support his initiatives, though the aviation community never influenced government to the extent Chambers had hoped for. Chambers also worked to build support for aviation in the press, which closely followed the adventures of the early pilots. He had seen the press mobilized to support naval expansion during his time at the Office of Naval Intelligence and also following the

Greely Relief Expedition. He had also seen it used very effectively against the Naval War College by Bunce, and then brought over to its cause by Taylor. Unlike many reformers of his generation. Chambers consistently portrayed the Navy in a positive light when speaking to the press. He assumed that good publicity would lead to increased funding.

This was the opposite of the approach used by Rske and Sims, who believed that muckraking exposure of problems would force the Navy or the government to institute refonns. Even when U. S. naval aviation had fallen well behind the European powers. Chambers continued to emphasize the achievements of his small aviation group. Certainly he asked for increased funding, but he never exposed the inner workings of the Navy’s bureaucracy to public scandal no matter how much it interfered with his efforts to expand naval aviation. Even after he was plucked. Chambers continued to report favorably on the progress of naval aviation.*” “’^Chambers, ‘The U. S. Navy’s Splendid Aeronautic Record Reviewed, Aero and Hydro 1 (1914), 351 Chambers proved less effective in gaining support for aviation within the fleet He was opposed both by those with little confidence in the technology, such as Wainwright and Meyer, and by those who sought to control it or add it to their personal empires, such as Watt and Fiske. Still, he managed to form a netwoit of aviation supporters within the Navy. Potts, Fletcher and a number of his old friends supported his work on aviation from his earliest days in command. Like Chambers, they were innovators and reformers who had finally risen to positions of influence. Chambers slowly managed to convince other officers of the importance of aviation, especially after the 1912 fleet maneuvers, but these tended to be younger officers. Among the older officers of the Navy, especially those in positions of influence, Dewey was almost unique in believing in the future of aviation. He was also confidant in Chambers’ ability to successfully guide the Navy’s aviation program. The Bureau of Construction and Repair and the Bureau of Engineering were already maneuvering for control of aviation when Meyer handed Chambers the aviation mail. Chambers had railed against the Navy’s convoluted bureau system early in his career and worked to rationalize its division of responsibilities while stationed at the New York Navy Yard. Over time, though, he found it easier to work with the bureaus rather than against them. This was particularly true after the battle over the control of ship design of 1903-5. Chambers argued for cooperation and for the creation of institutions (like the General Board) that would coordinate the bureaus and ensure line officer input. He challenged them only if he saw no other option. During Chambers’ three years in charge of naval aviation, the bureaus were a constant source of frustration. Their refusal to support him in appropriations battles kept the aviation program small, and starved of planes, personnel, and spare parts. Chambers tried to goad them into action and often worked around them to get what he needed. At fiist he avoided direct confrontations with them. If the General Board backed by the

228-239. 352 Secretary of the Navy could not defeat the technical bureaus, what chance did a lone captain in a position with virtually no authority have?

Chambers reversed this policy when he became convinced of the need for a national aeronautic research lab. He lobbied for it aggressively against the wishes of the Bureau of Construction and Repair and he refused to back down. Chambers needed to advance aviation to the point where its usefulness to the fleet was so obvious that no one could sensibly oppose it Better planes were more important for this goal than more planes. Chambers became increasingly critical of the bureaus during his last year in charge of aviation and condemned their inaction in his January 1913 testimony to Congress. Still, he kept his protests within narrow bounds, focused on appropriations and research. He was never willing to ask for the establishment of a separate aviation bureau. To do so would have launched an all-out war with the technical bureaus rather than the narrow, issue-focused battles he preferred and thought he could win. Instead, Chambers campaigned for the authority to coordinate bureau work on aviation and for the creation of a recognized and staffed office of naval aviation. Reform is an ongoing process and successful reformers generally attract younger officers to carry on their work. Chambers was clearly selected by the older generation of reformers that included Mahan and Taylor. Like them he sought out younger officers who would carry on his aviation work. The question of his successor was one of his earliest concerns at aviation and it guided his selection of the Navy’s first pilots. His initial choices proved excellent Ellyson, Rodgers, and especially Towers would all continue to make important contributions to aviation during their careers, though the careers of Ellyson and Rodgers would be cut short by fatal crashes. Despite the termination of his own career. Chambers had ensured that others would carry on his work, though it would be some years until they achieved the rank needed to influence policy. Faced with growing opposition even from officers whose support he had

353 expected. Chambers refused to back down. His successes in earlier bureaucratic battles may well have given him a false sense of confidence in fighting for aviation. He may also have expected more support from Dewey and the General Board than they could give Chambers believed unwaveringly in the importance of aviation to the Navy. He was convinced that he was the best officer to lead the program through its early years and was willing to risk his chance at promotion and possibly his career to see it through. In the end he remained true to the advice Mahan had given him twenty years before. He went down with his colors flying.

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