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Navy, Modernized 1868-1894 [Encyclopedia Entry] Michael Wert Marquette University, Michael.Wert@Marquette.Edu Marquette University e-Publications@Marquette History Faculty Research and Publications History Department 1-1-2013 Navy, Modernized 1868-1894 [Encyclopedia Entry] Michael Wert Marquette University, [email protected] Published version. "Navy, Modernized 1868-1894," in Japan at War: An Encyclopedia. Publisher Link. Japan at War: An Encyclopedia by Louis G. Perez, Editor. © 2013 by ABC-Clio, LLC. All rights reserved. Reproduced with permission of ABC-CLIO, LLC, Santa Barbara, CA. Navy, Modernized I 267 . a naval squadron led by U.S. Commodore 2. Japan's emperor, not China's, invested Matthew Perry forced the bakufu to sign Tokugawa shoguns with ruling author­ a treaty that ended national isolation by ity but did so on condition that they allowing a consul-general to reside in Japan, uphold national isolation, which per­ and Townsend Harris came to take up this force meant preserving sovereignty post in 1856. He demanded and got a and territorial integrity. shogunal audience at which he extorted 3. That point required shOguns to expel a full-blown trade pact from bakufu leader unauthorized foreigners who forced Ii Naosuke-just as China was suffering their way into Japan and the ruling defeat in the second. Opium War in 1858. warrior class to live up to its Bushido Ii signed the treaty, in a decision that counter­ ideology. manded the orders of the emperor in Kyoto, 4. Failure on those counts would justify not the emperor in Beijing. This defiant act ending bakufu rule and the warrior stirred up violent nationalistic opposition, class in the name of imperialloyalism, first among samurai from Mito domain, who and creating a new polity and a com­ murdered Ii in 1860, and later throughout moner conscript army better suited to the nation as well. In 1863, two other Nativist carrying out the preceding tasks. hotbeds, the Choshii and Satsuma domains, executed the expulsion edict that bakufu lead­ Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi ers had earlier rescinded, only to suffer a See also: Ii Naosuke; Kokutai and Ultra­ sound trouncing at the hands of m.odern nationalism; Mito School; Perry, Matthew; Western armed forces. Random acts of vio­ Sakoku; Tokugawa Bakufu Political System; lence against Westerners by individual Toyotomi Hideyoshi. samurai also met a similar fate. These abject failures persuaded younger samurai leaders Further Reading to admit the impossibility of "honoring the Jansen, Marius. China in the Tokugawa World. emperor" and "expelling the barbarians," so C:ambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, they took the step of disestablishing their 1992. own class privileges and ending Tokugawa Matsumoto, Shigeru. Motoori Norinaga. bakufu rule so as to restore the imperial court Cambridge, MA: Harvard University to power. Press, 1970. To sum up, by discrediting the Chinese Nakai, Kate Wildman. "The Naturalization world order and tribute system abroad, and of Confucianism in Tokugawa Japan." Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 40, by calling into question the bases of warrior no. 1 (January 1980): 157-199. supremacy at home, Nativism provided Wakabayashi, Bob Tadashi. Anti-foreignism grounds for ethnic nationalism and imperial and Western Learning in Early-Modern sovereignty to emerge in Japan by the mid- Japan. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer­ 19th century. The key ideas in Nativism sity Press, 1986. were as follows: 1. The Japanese are.superior to all other Navy, Modernized (1868-1894) peoples for having spontaneously revered a divine imperial dynasty Much like the modern Japanese army, the throughout history. Japanese navy in 1868 was hodgepodge of 268 I Navy, Modernized men, equipment, and facilities. Although it having few armaments and little power, was initially subordinate to the army, the and, in many cases, represented nothing government gradually centralized the navy, more than glorified transport barges. One updated its fleet, expanded shipbuilding American observer noted that Japan became facilities initiated by the Tokugawa shOgun­ the market for Western countries looking to ate, sent foreign students abroad for training, sell their outdated ships. Naval considera­ and adopted and adapted the best practices tions played little role in the fighting during of Western countries to form the most effi­ the Restoration. One of the shogunate's top cient navy in East Asia, which even rivaled naval men, Katsu Kaishu, who negotiated some Western armadas. the capitulation of the Tokugawa forces, During the early 17th century, the Toku­ turned over some of the Tokugawa ships to gawa shogunate banned the construction of the Satcha-Ied forces, while the rest were ocean-going vessels and limited Japan's commandeered by the Enomoto Takeaki. interaction with Western countries. By the Enomoto took the shogunate's remaining 1850s, the growing European presence in fleet north to Hakodate, where he led a final the East Asian seas convinced the shogunate battle against SatcM troops. He eventually to lift this ban. It called upon the large surrendered, and returned the ships. domains-in particular, Satsull.1a, Choshil, During the early Meiji period (1868- Kaga, and Tosa-to develop and expand 1912), concerns about a naval conflict with their costal defenses and naval technology. Western countries gave way to a focus on This was a decentralized effort; the shogun­ bolstering the Japanese army against inva­ ate relied on the Dutch to build a naval train­ sion and possible domestic uprisings. Poli­ ing center in Nagasaki, sent students to tics also favored the army's development Holland for further training, and later turned over the navy-many early naval officials to the French for help. French represen­ were former shogunate officials, including tatives in Japan were enthusiastic partners those few who had any naval experience, of the shOgunate, despite wavering support such as Katsu Kaishu and Enomoto. Both back in France. The shogunate, under the men became navy ministers, but even they direction of Oguri Tadamasa and Kurimoto lacked significant knowledge of the sea. Joun, invited the French engineer Francois Still, the dearth of equipment and any Verny, who had been building a shipyard in significant naval tradition meant that the China, to build facilities in Japan. Verny Meiji state could draw from a broad range chose Yokosuka as the location to build an of Western naval philosophies and new iron foundry, arsenal, and dry dock; con­ technologies. In 1870, the state officially struction began in 1865. The French also adopted the British navy as its model, send­ opened a school in Yokosuka to train future ing students to Great Britain for training, Japanese navy men, which included classes funding a British mission to Japan, and in mathematics and French language. Sat­ translating British naval texts. The British suma, in contrast, purchased ships and arms also helped the Japanese create a naval war from the British. college, and acquired the first ships specifi­ By the Meiji Restoration (1868), the cally built for the Japanese market, which domains mentioned previously possessed used the most recent technology. between 5 and 12 steamships. Most of the The navy's importance grew during the ships were obsolete by Western standards, 1880s. It received a larger share of the New Guinea Campaign I 269 military budget and attracted greater atten­ navy's attention southward rivaled the tion from the Meiji oligarchs, especially army's push toward the Asian continent, a after SatcM men began to domifiate the top source of tension that would never be navy positions. Several statesman, such as resolved. Iwakura Tomomi, argued that a country's On the eve of Japan's first modern wars standing in the world was displayed by its against China and Russia, the navy shifted navy's prowess-a position that represented from a haphazard mix of obsolete Western a shift from older naval concerns over ships to one capable of defeating a navy as defense of the homeland to Japan as an large as Russia's. Japan's initial naval weak­ imperial player. New French naval develop­ nesses did not, however, put it too far behind ments continued to influence the Japanese the West; even during the 19th century, there navy, especially a controversial organiza­ was no consensus about how a navy should tional philosophy called the "Jeune Ecole." operate or how it should be equipped. Rather than the relying on bulky fleet Japan's naval modernization reflected the consisting of large warships, like the British shifting trends in the West, allowing it to model, this French school of thought emp­ catch up quickly. hasized small to medium-sized ships armed Michael Wert with light, fast-firing guns, especially tor­ See also: Imperial Rescript for Soldiers and pedo ships. This model provided a solution Sailors; Iwakura Tomomi; Katsu Kaishu; to Japan's financial weaknesses; it could Russo-Japanese War; World War L not afford a complete British-style fleet. Even so, Japan never completely abandoned Further Reading its relationship with the British navy; in Evans, David c., and Mark R. Peattie. Kaigun: 1892, it purchased the Yoshino, the fastest Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the cruiser in the world at the time. Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941. Administratively, the Japanese navy Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997. finally became independent during the Peattie, Mark R. Nan 'yo: The Rise and Fall of 1880s. Under the old British model, the top the Japanese in Micronesia, 1885-1945. navy minister was beholden to a civilian Honolulu: Center for Pacific Islands Stud­ ies, University of Hawaii, 1988. bureaucracy; in contrast, the army followed the Prussian model and staffed its bureauc­ Schencking, J. Charles. Making Waves: Poli­ tics, Propaganda, and the Emergence of racy with royalty and others with direct the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1868-1922. links to the monarch. The state changed Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005. this model, creating a nayy ministry that maintained equal footing with the army.
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