Tokugawa Bakufu Political System [Encyclopedia Entry] Michael Wert Marquette University, [email protected]

Marquette University e-Publications@Marquette History Faculty Research and Publications History, Department of 1-1-2013 Tokugawa Bakufu Political System [Encyclopedia Entry] Michael Wert Marquette University, [email protected] Published version. "Tokugawa Bakufu Political System," in Japan at War: An Encyclopedia by Louis G. Perez, Editor. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO/Greenwood, 2013: 433-434. Publisher link. © 2013 by ABC-Clio, LLC. All rights reserved. Reproduced with permission of ABC-CLIO, LLC, Santa Barbara, CA. Tokugawa Bakufu Political System I 433 States for a possible end to its trade embargo Further Reading with Japan while simultaneously preparing Browne, Courtney. Tojo: The Last Banzai. New the nation for war. "If Japan's hundred mil York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967. lions merge and go forward," he declared, Butow, Robert J. C. Tojo and the Coming of "wars can be won with ease." When it the War. Stanford, CA: Stanford University became apparent that U.S. President Franklin Press, 1969. D. Roosevelt would not rescind his demand Coox, Alvin D. Tojo. New York: Ballantine for a Japanese evacuation of China, Tojo Books, 1975. authorized the navy to ,attack U.S. military Hoyt, Edwin Palmer. Warlord: TojO against installations in Pearl Harbor, the Philippines, the World. Lanham, MD: Scarborough and elsewhere in December 1941. House, 1993. The initial phase of World War II in the Pacific was characterized by a lightning Tokugawa Bakufu Political series of Japanese victories over British and System U.S. forces. These successes boosted Tojo's prestige at home and led to greater accep The Tokugawa bakufu political system tance of his views on the legitimacy of represented a mixture of pre-Tokugawa sho force. By June 1942, however, the U.S. vic gunal institutions and innovations imple tory at the Battle of Midway had stopped mented by the early Tokugawa shogun. Japanese expansion in its tracks and com Hereditary daimyo continued to rule over menced a long string of heavy defeats. By semi-autonomous domains, relying on their 1943, Tojo had assumed the additional post own lands for resources, and supported by of Military Procurement Minister, and the samurai loyal only to them. The shogunate following year, he became Chief of the Gen established a general set of rules for main eral Staff. When the fall of Saipan in taining tenuous control over the daimyo, July 1944 placed Japan in the range of U.S. but relied upon daimyo cooperation to main bombers, however, Prince Konoe arranged tain domestic stability and even interna for Tojo's dismissal as Prime Minister. tional relations-for example, by asking When Allied authorities came to his resi daimyo to engage with the Ryukyu King dence with an arrest warrant, Tojo tried and dom, Korea, and the Ezo lands to the north. failed to kill himself. Upon recovering, he The Tokugawa shOgunate devoted its atten was put on trial by an international war tribu tion to a centered, but not centralized, rule nal for crimes against humanity and was over Japan. Much of its administration was sentenced to death. He accepted all respon focused in Edo and, to a lesser extent, the sibility for the outbreak of hostilities to surrounding Kanto region, with offices in absolve the emperor of any blame. He was key cities such as Osaka, Kyoto, and Naga subsequently hanged on December 23, 1948. saki. In many ways, however, the Tokugawa John C. Fredriksen shogunate mirrored the domains. For exam See also: February 26 Incident; International ple, it depended on its own lands-nearly Military Tribunal for the Far East; Ishiwara one-fourth of all land in Japan-for eco Kanji; Konoe Fumimaro; Kwantung Army nomic resources. Likewise, it created similar Adventurism; ShOwa Emperor (Hirohito); Tri recruitment and promotion structures for its partite Pact; World War II, Pacific Theater. own samurai. 434 I Tokugawa Bakufu Political System Of the nearly 22,500 Tokugawa samurai, Temples and Shrines. More importantly, nearly 17,000 worked within the shOgu they filled the highest positions, acting as nate's bureaucracy. Many of these samurai the junior and senior councilors who set received little compensation and were gen Tokugawa policy. Although the title "Great erally underemployed; some even struck Councilor" (tairo) existed, it was largely out on their own as ronin, finding various titular, except when it was occupied by Ii odd jobs where they could. Managing these Naosuke. None of the previously described lower-ranked samurai, often called "house positions were permanent, and mechanisms men" (gokenin), was a constant struggle for were in place to break political impasses, the shogunate. The regime wanted house such as the ability to create ad hoc commit men to use their time constructively-for tees, create new magistrate offices, or assign example, by maintaining preparation for trusted men to concurrent positions. Some possible military activity. Some acted as office-holding daimyo were essentially glori intendents who managed the Tokugawa fied bannermen: they might have small fiefs, lands located throughout the Kanto plain but lacked the castle stronghold that defined that surrounded Edo. Others worked as the classic image of a daimyo. Instead, they minor functionaries in the various magis spent most of their time in Edo focused on trate offices. The rest of the Tokugawa their shogunate duties. liege vassals, known as the "bannermen" Many of the roughly 23 Tokugawa-relative (hatamoto), ranged in rank and income daimyo (shimpan) were, like the outer from 500 to 9,500 koku, a rank just below daimyo (tozama), shut out from formal sho daimyo. Although many were indistinguish gunate positions. Nevertheless, the "Three able from housemen, bannermen could Houses" (sanke) were important because theoretically claim special privileges-for they provided a pool of heirs should the sho example, having an audience with the gun fail to produce one. Moreover, the small shogun. Bannermen staffed the mid-level est of the three, the Mito domain, maintained bureaucratic positions: the Edo city magis a hereditary role, by custom, as adviser to the trate, commissioners of finance and foreign shOgun. Although close to the Tokugawa leg relations, and inspectors. Each position acy, the proximity of these domains did not brought with it financial benefits on top of lead to simple acquiescence to the shogu their hereditary stipends. More importantly, nate. In Mito's case, the early 19th-century these roles gave ambitious vassals a chance daimyo, Tokugawa Nariaki, criticized the to affect Tokugawa policy. A small percent Tokugawa shOgunate for not "expelling the age of bannermen also managed fiefs, simi barbarians" from Japan. lar to daimyo domains, from which they Several informal channels existed within could draw material and human resources. the shOgunate that allowed outsiders to gain Above the liege vassal samurai were the at least a minority voice. Daimyo, regardless vassal daimyo (judai), whose putatively of their status, as well as noble families close connection to the Tokugawa progenitor, in Kyoto could influence the shOgun and Ieyasu, made them trustworthy for protecting shOgunal politics through their "women of the Tokugawa realm. This group also staffed the great interior" (Ooku)-hundreds of the higher posts, such as the Keeper of women who served the shogun and managed Osaka Castle, the Kyoto Deputy, Master his domestic needs. Thus they played an of Court Ceremony, and the Magistrate of important function in the political cliques .

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