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Factors Affecting Stability government by demonstrating that they the city the “strategic center of gravity” hold a grim likelihood for success is for AQI.8 Months later, in a new in Northern less credible absent U.S. forces. For this offensive directly commanded reason, insurgents are testing the ISF on by al-Maliki called “Lion’s Roar,” the By Ramzy Mardini its capability, resolve, and credibility as lack of resistance among insurgents a fair and non-sectarian institution. disappointed some commanders who iraq entered a new security were expecting a decisive Alamo-style environment after June 30, 2009, This litmus test is most likely to battle.9 when U.S. combat forces exited Iraqi occur in Mosul, the capital of Ninawa cities in accordance with the first of Province. In its current political and Today, AQI and affiliated terrorist two withdrawal deadlines stipulated security context, the city is best situated groups, such as the Islamic State of Iraq, in the Status of Forces Agreement for insurgents to make early gains in still possess a strategic and operational (SOFA). Signed in December 2008 by propagating momentum. Geographically capacity to wage daily attacks in Mosul.10 President George W. Bush and Iraqi located 250 miles north of Baghdad Although the daily frequency of attacks Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, the along the Tigris River, Mosul is Iraq’s in Mosul dropped slightly from 2.43 SOFA concedes that December 31, 2011 second largest city with a population attacks in June 2009 to 2.35 attacks in will be the deadline for the complete of 1.8 million.2 Described as an ethnic July 2009, the corresponding monthly withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq. tinderbox, the city is approximately death tolls have increased from 58 to President Barack Obama, however, has 70% Sunni Arab and 25% Kurd. The 79.11 This can be attributed to AQI’s signaled his intention to withdraw U.S. remaining population is composed motive of executing more high-profile combat forces by August 2010. of Shi`a, Turcoman, Yezidis, and attacks since June 30.12 On August 7, for Christians.3 The city’s large Sunni Arab example, a suicide bomber in a vehicle Iraqi Security Force (ISF)-capability population makes it an attractive base killed 38 people in front of a Shi`a has improved remarkably since for recruiting Sunni insurgents. Before mosque just outside the city.13 A second the 2007 implementation of the Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, for attack near Mosul in Khazna village U.S. counterinsurgency strategy. example, Mosul was home to a sizeable brought the total number of killed and Nevertheless, successfully pacifying Ba`athist presence, with some estimates injured to 400 in the Mosul-area in a Iraq without the ground presence of suggesting that as many as 300,000 10-day period.14 Speaking to Pentagon U.S. forces is contingent on a number of inhabitants were willing to contribute reporters via satellite at the time, Army factors, not all related to ISF-readiness. to military, security, and intelligence Major General Robert Caslen suggested This article highlights an array of efforts under Saddam Hussein.4 that the increased violence in Mosul critical factors that are likely to shape was a sign that AQI had reconstituted the new security challenges facing In 2008, as much of Iraq reached an its capability in the city: Iraq: the current unstable political improved level of stability, Mosul and security environment in Mosul, continued to witness a high level of What has increased, however, is rising Arab-Kurdish tensions over violence. On January 23, 2008, for the capability (of al-Qaeda and its disputed territories and the possible example, a massive 20,000-pound allies) to conduct the high-profile politicization of the upcoming January bomb killed and wounded more than attacks…So you see an increase in 1 2010 parliamentary elections. 300 people.5 The next day, during the numbers of casualties post- inspections of the bombing site, a suicide 30 June.15 Continued Violence in Mosul bomber killed Ninawa’s police chief.6 As The withdrawal and relocation of a result, al-Maliki sent additional Iraqi U.S. combat forces outside of Iraq’s forces to the city in January 2008 to 8 William Selby, “Coalition Focuses on Clearing Mosul cities represents a major change in the engage in a “decisive” battle against the Terrorist Networks,” American Forces Press Service, country’s security environment. With 7 remnants of al-Qa`ida in Iraq (AQI). March 4, 2008. a less proficient ISF patrolling Iraq’s Al-Maliki’s “decisive” battle, however, 9 As one report indicated, “the lack of significant resis- streets, “deterrence by denial” is less achieved questionable success against tance among the hardened fighters who had been operat- of an effective strategy; dissuading AQI and other terrorist elements. ing in Mosul suggested the insurgency was offering Ma- insurgents from challenging the In March 2008, the chief of special liki and his American backers a message of their own: we operations and intelligence information fight on our terms, not yours.” See Mark Kukis, “Maliki’s 1 Iraq has other major problems, including power short- for Multi-National Force-Iraq called Mosul Offensive,” Time Magazine, May 16, 2008. ages, unemployment, corruption, crime, and the many 10 Jane Arraf, “Stabilizing Iraq: Why Mosul is a Special political disagreements, such as on a national oil law. The 2 Eric Hamilton, “The Fight For Mosul,” Institute for the Case,” Christian Science Monitor, June 24, 2009. factors stated here, however, are considered most criti- Study of War, April 2008. 11 For statistics, see “Mosul Remains As Violent As cal for affecting Iraq’s new security environment because 3 Ibid. Ever,” Ground Truth, August 11, 2009. of their influence in potentially contributing toward na- 4 Eric Hamilton, “The Fight for Mosul,” Institute for the 12 This was the reasoning offered by U.S. Major Gen- tionwide destabilization and Iraqi death rates. One major Study of War, June 2008. eral Robert Caslen. See “Al Qaeda Shows Resilience in security factor not discussed in this article is the slow 5 Ibid. N.Iraq-US Commander,” Reuters, August 11, 2009. government integration of the Sons of Iraq into the Iraqi 6 Sam Dagher, “Al Qaeda Goes North: Police Chief Killed 13 Qassim Khidhir, “Talks Between Kurds and Hadba security and civil sectors. For recent reporting on the lat- in Mosul,” Christian Science Monitor, January 25, 2008. End Unsuccessfully,” Kurdish Globe, August 14, 2009. ter issue, see “Slow Sunni Integration a Risk to Iraq Secu- 7 Joshua Partlow, “Maliki Sending Troops to Mosul,” 14 Ibid. rity – US,” Reuters, July 31, 2009. Washington Post, January 26, 2008. 15 Ibid. august 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 8

It is likely that insurgents have altered Through a legal procedure of suggested the possibility of an Arab- their methods and adapted to the U.S. normalization, census and referendum, Kurdish civil war.24 The debate over counterinsurgency posture. Open urban residents will determine whether Article 140 would not be as problematic warfare has become less of an advantage the area under dispute will be under if the disputes were over an issue other for insurgents because the switch toward the Kurdistan Regional Government than territory. According to one report, population-protection has motivated (KRG) in Arbil or remain under the the Kurds claim somewhere between local Iraqis to collaborate and share authority of the federal government in 30-40 disputed territories inside Iraq.25 information with the U.S. military. Baghdad. The oil-rich city of Kirkuk To date, not one has been resolved. In response, political assassinations is at the heart of the dispute. Yet al- might become a more attractive tool for Maliki has purposefully delayed the Growing tensions in Mosul between insurgents in undermining opponents, implementation of Article 140 while Kurds and Sunni Arabs is another major instead of battlefield engagements with maneuvering to escape his political concern.26 As Philip Zelikow, former the goal of taking and holding territory.16 dependency on the Kurds by courting counselor of the State Department, Suicide attacks have also increased Sunni Arab nationalists and southern stated in February 2009: since the United States withdrew from Shi`a tribes.21 Iraq’s cities.17 As important as Anbar is in the Today, Kurdish leverage over al-Maliki is “Sunni story,” Mosul may turn Only by demonstrating quick and waning. They fear that U.S. withdrawal out to be much more significant decisive victories and denying the enemy will permit al-Maliki to behave more for the future. The United success in Mosul can the ISF deter the assertively in marginalizing them, even States could find itself caught sprout of insurgents elsewhere. If the by violent means. As Dr. Fuad Hussein, in the middle between Kurdish ISF does not quickly establish itself as chief of staff to KRG President Massoud friends, local Sunni nationalists, a capable and non-sectarian institution, Barzani, asserted: “If the problems and a central government in perceptions about its weakness could which exist now cannot be resolved Baghdad that might be tempted solidify and gain momentum in the in one or two years, the withdrawal of to win Sunni friends by “dealing” minds of insurgents throughout Iraq. the American army will lead to unrest forcefully with the Kurds.27 in Baghdad and perhaps a return of Rising Ethnic Tensions in the North sectarian fighting.”22 After a January Violence in Mosul has increased since A second major factor affecting stability 22, 2009 military move by al-Maliki the provincial elections of January 31, in Iraq is continued ethnic tensions to send the army’s 12th division north 2009. The results of the elections in between Arabs and Kurds. In late July toward Kirkuk, many Kurds viewed it Ninawa Province shifted the balance of 2009, the commander of U.S. forces in as an operation to militarily encircle and power away from the Kurdish parties Iraq, General Ray Odierno, told reporters cut off the city from being influenced by toward the majority Sunni Arabs, the that tensions between Arabs and Kurds the surrounding Kurdish provinces.23 latter of whom had largely boycotted is the “No. 1 driver of instability” in By February 2009, fearful rhetoric the previous provincial elections in Iraq.18 The conflict is concentrated over January 2005. The winning Arab the issue of “disputed territories,” to ber of Kurdish inhabitants in areas deemed of strategic nationalist coalition, al-Hadba, has which UN Representative to Iraq Staffan and economic value. Beginning in 1963 and commencing refused to appoint Kurds to any cabinet de Mistura claimed had “infected almost again in 1974 and 1984, hundreds of thousands of Kurds positions even though the Kurdish 19 28 every aspect of the political scene.” The were systematically deported or killed and replaced with party carried one-third of the vote. In Kurds demand the political execution of outside Arab families. The Kurdish language and other response, Kurdish officials, including Article 140, a constitutional provision forms of Kurdish culture were outlawed and replaced Ninawa mayors, have withdrawn from 29 seeking the reversal of past Ba`athist with . their posts in boycott. The Kurds have “Arabization” campaigns committed in 21 In August 2007, al-Maliki’s government was saved refused to recognize the authority of the 20 northern Iraq. from political paralysis by the formation of a Quartet newly-elected Sunni governor Atheel 30 Alliance, which involved along with al-Maliki’s Dawa al-Nujaifi over all of Ninawa. They 16 See the story on the recent political assassination of Party the two main Kurdish parties and the Shi`a Is- are concerned about his connections to Harith al-Ubaydi, head of the Sunni parliamentary bloc, lamic Supreme Council of Iraq. For al-Maliki’s political the Iraqi Accord Front: Rod Nordland and Abeer Mo- maneuvering to escape his dependency on the Quartet 24 Rahmat al-Salaam, “Kurdish Officials Warn of- Po hammed, “Sunni Lawmaker Assassinated in Iraq,” New Alliance, see Anthony Shadid, “New Alliances in Iraq tential Kurd-Arab War,” Asharq Alawsat, February 19, York Times, June 12, 2009. For information on the rise Cross Sectarian Lines,” Washington Post, March 20, 2009. of assassinations in Iraq, see Arraf. Also see Fatih Ab- 2009; Scott Weiner, “Maliki Makes a Play for the South- 25 “Article 140 Must be Adhered To, Say Kurdish Of- dulsalam, “Assassinations Become Trademark of Iraq’s ern Tribes,” Institute for the Study of War, November 6, ficials,”Kurdish Globe, December 4, 2008. New Political Epoch,” Azzaman, June 14, 2009. 2008; Jeremy Domergue and Marisa Cochrane, “Balanc- 26 “Kurdish-Sunni Tensions In Nineveh,” Entrepreneur, 17 Omar al-Mansouri, “Suicide Bombers’ Comeback Un- ing Maliki: Shifting Coalitions in Iraqi Politics and the May 25, 2009. nerves Iraqi Government,” Azzaman, August 14, 2009. Rise of the Iraqi Parliament,” Institute for the Study of 27 Philip Zelikow, “The New Strategic Situation in Iraq,” 18 Anne Gearan, “Gates: Kurd-Arab Friction Top Prob- War, June 2009. Foreign Policy, February 9, 2009. lem in Iraq,” Associated Press, July 29, 2009. 22 Eli Lake, “Kurds Anxious Over U.S. Withdrawal,” 28 Quil Lawrence, “Arab-Kurd Conflict Deepens in Mo- 19 Staffan de Mistura, “Challenges on Iraq’s Election Washington Times, April 17, 2009. sul,” National Public Radio, July 2, 2009. Day,” Washington Post, January 31, 2009. 23 Ramzy Mardini, “Rising Arab-Kurdish Tensions Over 29 Ibid. 20 The Ba`athist Arabization campaigns were policies Kirkuk Will Complicate U.S. Withdrawal From Iraq,” 30 Sam Dagher, “Tensions Stoked Between Iraqi Kurds adopted by the Baghdad government to reduce the num- Terrorism Focus 6:6 (2009). and Sunnis,” New York Times, May 18, 2009. august 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 8 powerful Arab tribes, members of the Holding insurgents accountable for the Today, al-Maliki has staked his 2010 Ba`ath Party, and allegedly insurgents.31 upsurge in violence, Odierno blamed electoral prospects on two performance Some areas within the province are under AQI for exploiting the discord between goals in the eyes of the Iraqi public: 1) the control of peshmerga (Kurdish militia) Arabs and Kurds. The deployment was stabilizing and providing security to forces because Kurds have labeled them described to be short-lived and directed facilitate reconstruction and economic “disputed” territories under Article 140. toward protecting the local population growth; and 2) solidifying his status as Yet al-Nujaifi has denied them the right and serving as a trust and “confidence- the national leader by ending the U.S. to administer those areas, claiming in a building measure” between the ISF occupation. Iraq’s former precarious February 2009 interview: and peshmerga.38 The proposal, later to environment, however, had placed these be discussed in high level meetings in two goals in zero-sum terms: security The existence of disputed areas September, comes at the backdrop of a was only maintained when U.S. forces in the province does not imply January 2010 national referendum to remained engaged in Iraqi neighborhoods that the Kurdish Region can put be held on the continued U.S. presence while patrolling the streets. The current them under its control until a stipulated in the SOFA, essentially decrease in violence inside Iraq has resolution is reached. These areas making the redeployment of U.S. forces in allowed al-Maliki to rapidly consolidate should be under one authority, Ninawa a complicated balancing act.39 and centralize his power at the expense that of Ninawa Province, which of parties advocating federalism, such is controlled by the central The Unstable Shadow of Elections as the two main Kurdish parties—the authority in the capital city of Another source of instability is Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Baghdad.32 the current period leading to the Kurdistan Democratic Party—and the parliamentary elections in January Shi`a Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq In May 2009, Kurdish forces prevented 2010. The domestic challenge presented (ISCI) headed by Abdul Aziz al-Hakim.41 the governor from entering Bashiqa, by this circumstance is two-fold: 1) Al-Maliki’s first place finish in nine out a town northeast of Mosul that was the risk that securitization might be of the 14 provinces that took part in the administered by Kurds. Al-Nujaifi politicized by al-Maliki’s government; January 2009 provincial elections have claimed the Kurds had issued a “shoot to and 2) the possibility that violence is instilled deep concern among Kurds kill” order on him if he were to enter the used among political factions in hopes and some Sunni and Shi`a parties over area.33 A similar episode occurred when of undermining the other’s electoral their waning ability to check al-Maliki’s Kurdish forces stopped the Ninawa prospects. Unfortunately, both have growing strength.42 police chief from crossing a bridge occurred in the past.40 into a disputed territory.34 A statement One concern amidst increasing violence released by the KRG blamed the al- includes the volatile city of Mosul, and then extend to in Mosul and elsewhere is that al-Maliki Hadba leadership for the recent deaths Kirkuk and to Diyala province north of the capital.” See may be hesitant to call for the assistance of 2,000 Kurds in Ninawa, claiming that Kim Gamel, “U.S. Iraq Boss Wants Troops in Disputed of U.S. troops stationed outside Iraqi they were “adopting a policy of national, Land,” Associated Press, August 18, 2009. cities. Hoping to stay consistent with sectarian and religious cleansing in 38 Liz Sly, “U.S. Troops May be Sent to Iraq’s Arab- his campaign message of achieving 35 Ninawa.” According to Azzaman, an Kurdish ‘Trigger Line,’” Los Angeles Times, August 18, both security and sovereignty, such a Iraqi news source, Arab parties in 2009. situation forces the prime minister to Ninawa have decided to form a joint 39 Odierno has not stipulated the number of U.S. sol- make an unattractive trade-off: security anti-Kurdish front to “deny Iraqi Kurds diers to be deployed in the new proposal. If the Iraqi peo- versus credibility. As suggested by one a say in the forthcoming parliamentary ple do not approve the SOFA in a referendum held on the U.S. military officer, “The last thing 36 elections.” same day as the January 2010 parliamentary elections, we want is to see this area fail because U.S. soldiers will be forced to leave a year earlier than the of some question of Arab pride in not 43 In attempting to lower the heightened December 31, 2011 deadline agreed to in the SOFA. For being able to ask for our help.” tensions in northern Iraq, on August 17 recent reporting on the referendum, see Ernesto Lon- General Odierno proposed a tripartite doño, “Iraq May Hold Vote On U.S. Withdrawal,” Wash- deployment of U.S., ISF, and peshmerga ington Post, August 18, 2009. cus 5:33 (2008). 37 forces to disputed areas in Ninawa. 40 The use of the Iraqi Army has been suspected of serv- 41 Al-Hakim’s interest in federalism is based on the de- ing al-Maliki’s political goals in the past. In August 2008, sire to form a semi-autonomous Shi`a region, similar to 31 Ibid. al-Maliki gave direct orders for the Iraqi Army to enter that of the Kurdish region, consisting of nine southern 32 Adel Kamal, “New Ninawa Governor Rejects Kurd- the disputed city of Khanaqin, forcing out peshmerga forc- Shi`a provinces. ish Allaince,” Niqash, February 24, 2009. es from the area and raiding offices belonging to Kurdish 42 Iraq has a total of 18 provinces, but only 14 partici- 33 Dagher. political parties. Kurdish observers viewed the maneu- pated in the January 2009 provincial elections. The three 34 Ibid. ver as an attempt to marginalize Kurdish influence in provinces belonging to the semi-autonomous Kurdish 35 “KRG Blames Hadbaa for Murder of Kurds, Displace- Diyala Province ahead of the 2009 provincial elections. region conducted their own provincial elections on July ment of Christians in Mosul,” Aswat al-Iraq, August 14, For al-Maliki’s suspicious and political use of the army, 25, 2009. Because of the political sensitivities surround- 2009. in particular before the 2009 provincial elections, see ing the disputed city of Kirkuk, its province had not com- 36 Jareer Mohammed, “Arabs Form Anti-Kurdish Bloc “Kirkuk and Khanaqin on Alert,” Kurdish Globe, January menced provincial elections. The national parliament has in Iraq’s Mosul,” Azzaman, August 10, 2009. 22, 2009. For more information on the standoff between yet to come to agreement on an election law for Kirkuk. 37 According to an Associated Press report, Odierno the government and the Kurds in Khanaqin, see Ramzy 43 Arthur MacMillan, “US Army Commanders Say Pull- “said the deployment of the U.S.-Iraqi-Kurdish pro- Mardini, “Iraqi Military Operation in Diyala Province out From Mosul Mired in Confusion,” Agence France- tection forces would start in Ninevah province, which Risks Renewal of Kurdish-Arab Conflict,” Terrorism Fo- Presse, June 18, 2009. august 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 8

Reports already indicate that al- and domestic—toward the upcoming Maliki will leave his political bloc—the parliamentary elections risk politicizing Shi`a United Iraqi Alliance, which is ISF missions by suggesting them as dominated by the federalism-advocate a means for achieving political ends. ISCI—in hopes of establishing a national Such prospects will permeate mistrust coalition with Sunni Arab tribes and between the different ethnic segments Shi`a parties devoted to a strong of the population and the government. central government.44 A broad-based This could cause a security dilemma alliance in the new 2010 parliament leading back to sectarian violence. will decrease the chance of the Council of Representatives removing al- To alleviate the influence such factors Maliki from power if he seeks further could have, the United States must centralization. play the central mediating role. In particular, a power-sharing agreement Parties from all major ethnic groupings between Kurds and Arabs in Mosul and may come to believe that with the in the Ninawa provincial government is exiting of all U.S. combat forces in crucial to the stability of northern Iraq. August 2010, elections earlier that Even if a provincial power-sharing year may become the last credible agreement is accomplished, however, chance at balancing al-Maliki. The northern Iraq is unlikely to remain consequences that may result from the stable if the problems surrounding elections offer an enormous incentive Article 140 remain unresolved. In for challengers threatened by Baghdad’s general, bringing about reconciliation drift to a strong central government to between the contentious parties is the undermine the prime minister. Without only guarantee of long-term stability the U.S. active in patrolling Iraqi cities, absent the presence of U.S. forces. electoral politics may revert back to Iraq’s violent politics when politicians Ramzy Mardini is an analyst on engaged one another via militias on the international security affairs. He currently urban battlefield. writes on Iraq affairs at The Jamestown Foundation, a foreign policy think tank in Conclusion Washington, D.C. Mr. Mardini has served Although violence has decreased at the State Department’s Bureau of Near significantly since the 2006-2007 highs, Eastern Affairs, the Executive Office of Iraq remains a fragile state riddled with the President, and the Center for Strategic poor institutions and intense subgroup Studies in Amman, . He holds an identities. The security environment is M.A. in international relations from the no longer characterized by the constant University of Chicago. presence of the “American pacifier.” Today, the prospect for stability in Mosul and elsewhere are determined by an array of volatile factors.

The critical factor, however, toward satiating the power gap inherited in the new security environment is not only the capability and readiness of the ISF, but their integrity as a national and unitary institution dedicated toward the protection of all Iraqis. The local population’s collaboration and trust in the ISF is critical for continuing a successful counterinsurgency campaign. Yet political developments in Mosul, rising Arab-Kurdish tensions, and conflicting interests—both foreign

44 For recent reporting, see Ammar Karim, “Iraq PM Set to Break with Shiite Coalition in January Polls,” Agence France-Presse, August 13, 2009. For further reading about al-Maliki’s strategy for a national coalition, see Shadid; Weiner; Domergue and Cochrane.

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