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Operation Inherent Resolve Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress

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Operation Inherent Resolve Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS OCTOBER 1, 2019‒DECEMBER 31, 2019 ABOUT THIS REPORT In January 2013, legislation was enacted creating the Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) framework for oversight of overseas contingency operations. This legislation, which amended the Inspector General Act, requires the Inspectors General of the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State (DoS), and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to provide quarterly reports to Congress on active overseas contingency operations. The DoD Inspector General (IG) is designated as the Lead IG for Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR). The DoS IG is the Associate IG for OIR. The USAID IG participates in oversight for the operation. The Offices of Inspector General of the DoD, DoS, and USAID are referred to in this report as the Lead IG agencies. Other partner agencies also contribute to oversight of OIR. The Lead IG agencies collectively carry out their statutory missions to: • Develop a joint strategic plan to conduct comprehensive oversight of the contingency operation. • Ensure independent and effective oversight of programs and operations of the Federal Government in support of the contingency operation through either joint or individual audits, inspections, or evaluations. • Report quarterly to Congress and the public on the contingency operation and activities of the Lead IG agencies. METHODOLOGY To produce this quarterly report, the Lead IG agencies submit requests for information to the DoD, DoS, and USAID about OIR and related programs. The Lead IG agencies also gather data and information from open sources, including congressional testimony, policy research organizations, press conferences, think tanks, and media reports. The sources of information contained in this report are listed in endnotes or notes to tables and figures. Except in the case of formal audits, inspections, or evaluations referenced in this report, the Lead IG agencies have not verified or audited the data and information provided by the agencies. For further details on the methodology for this report, see Appendix B. CLASSIFIED APPENDIX This report also includes an appendix containing classified information about the U.S. mission to defeat ISIS in Iraq and Syria. The Lead IG provides the classified appendix separately to relevant agencies and congressional committees. On the Cover (Top row): M2A2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles provide support to CJTF-OIR in eastern Syria (U.S. Army Reserve photo); 40mm grenades are unloaded to be destroyed by Explosive Ordnance Disposal soldiers at Al Asad Air Base, Iraq (U.S. Army photo); Protesters gather outside the Baghdad Embassy Compound (U.S. Marine Corps photo); A Peshmerga solider stands guard in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (U.S. Army photo). (Bottom row): A U.S. Army Soldier mans an observation post at Forward Operating Base Union III, Baghdad, Iraq, Dec. 31, 2019 (U.S. Army photo). FOREWORD We are pleased to submit our 20th Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) quarterly report on Operation Inherent Resolve, which generally covers the period from October 1, 2019, to December 31, 2019. This report discharges our individual and collective agency oversight responsibilities pursuant to sections, 2, 4, and 8L of the Inspector General Act. The United States launched Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) in 2014 to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and to set the conditions for follow-on operations to increase regional stability. The strategy to defeat ISIS includes military operations, as well as support for local security forces, diplomacy, governance, humanitarian assistance, and stabilization programs. Due to the significant events that took place in Iraq in early January 2020, after the end of the quarter, the Lead IG agencies considered it essential to report on these developments and their potential impact on the OIR mission. This report therefore discusses the events set in motion by the December 27 killing of a U.S. contractor at an Iraqi military base near Kirkuk, and the U.S. drone strike that killed Iranian Major General Qassem Soleimani, the commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps–Qods Force. In response to our additional questions about the impact of these events, the Lead IG agencies received additional information as available from the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of State (DoS), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). That information is also presented in this report and in the classified appendix. As of the time of completion of this report at the end of January, however, these events continued to unfold, and questions remained about how the fight against ISIS in Iraq will proceed and be affected. Therefore, the next Lead IG report will follow up on those questions and continuing developments and provide more detailed information about these dynamic events and their impact on OIR. During the quarter, the Lead IG agencies and our oversight partners issued six audit, evaluation, and inspection reports related to OIR. These reports examined various activities related to OIR including security assistance and training for Iraq’s security forces, diplomatic security programs supporting the United States’ Middle East partners in the fight against ISIS, and financial accountability in humanitarian assistance programs. The Lead IG agencies also continued significant investigations relating to OIR. Working in close collaboration, we remain committed to providing comprehensive oversight and timely reporting on this contingency operation. Glenn A. Fine Steve A. Linick Ann Calvaresi Barr Principal Deputy Inspector General Inspector General Inspector General Performing the Duties U.S. Department of State U.S. Agency for International of the Inspector General Development U.S. Department of Defense MESSAGE FROM THE LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL I am pleased to present this Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) quarterly report on the status of Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR). A series of significant events took place in January 2020, after the end of the reporting quarter, which affected OIR, led to a pause in OIR activities in Iraq, and created uncertainty regarding the future of OIR operations. The Lead IG agencies therefore sought additional information on the implications of the January developments on the OIR mission. The DoD responded that in some cases it was too soon to be able to assess the effects of the developments in Iraq, and also that, due to operational priorities, it was unable to answer other questions. Therefore, while the Iraq section of this report discusses the events of the quarter and early January, it is unclear at this time how these events will affect the OIR mission and efforts by ISIS to resurge. Specifically, as discussed in this report, after Iran-aligned militia violence Glenn A. Fine in Iraq escalated this quarter, on January 2, a U.S. drone strike in Iraq killed Iranian Major General Qassem Soleimani, the commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps–Qods Force. After the strike, U.S. forces in Iraq paused counter-ISIS operations to focus on force protection. The Combined Joint Task Force–Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) also halted support to the Iraqi Security Forces, who rely on U.S. and Coalition intelligence and air support to conduct operations against ISIS. In addition, it is unclear whether U.S. forces will be able to remain in Iraq or the scope of their operations. After the strike on Soleimani, the Iraqi parliament passed a non-binding resolution calling for U.S. forces to leave Iraq. The U.S. Government stated it has no intention of pulling troops out of Iraq. The Iraqi government has yet to agree on a new prime minister, and Iranian-aligned militias and some demonstrators continued to call for the U.S. to leave. Then, just as this report was about to be published, the Iraq government announced the resumption of counter-ISIS operations with U.S. forces. However, the announcement did not address the question of the continued presence of U.S. forces in Iraq. As discussed in our report, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)’s analysis for the DoD OIG indicates that without a U.S. troop presence in Iraq, ISIS would likely resurge in Iraq. This quarter, ISIS continued to carry out attacks and operations in both Iraq and Syria, although the number of ISIS-claimed attacks in Iraq decreased this quarter. ISIS has continued to disseminate its propaganda on Twitter, Facebook, and Telegram, and U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) reported that this propaganda revolved around two main themes: ISIS’s persistence in the face of adversity, and retaliation through a global insurgency. Following a demonstration and attack on the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad on December 31, USAID and DoS staff responsible for overseeing stabilization and humanitarian assistance in Baghdad were evacuated to Erbil and other locations. As of the end of January, it also remained unclear where and how USAID would operate and provide oversight for its more than $1 billion stabilization and humanitarian assistance portfolio in Iraq. This report also discusses widespread protests in Iraq this quarter, and the Iraqi government’s response to those protests. For example, the DIA reported to the DoD OIG that since early October 2019, thousands of protesters have been injured and hundreds killed in the ongoing demonstrations in Baghdad and the predominantly Shia provinces of southern Iraq. In Syria, this quarter the DoD completed a withdrawal, redistribution, and deployment of forces in response to a Turkish incursion into northeastern Syria. The net change was that the U.S. force size dropped from roughly 1,000 to 500 personnel in northeastern Syria. Russian, Turkish, and Syrian regime forces moved into areas previously occupied by the United States and its partner force, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). This quarter, the DoD also deployed some troops to help the SDF secure oil fields and to prevent ISIS from exploiting oil resources.
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