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U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan: Beijing Tries a Soft Sell Approach

Beijing has evidently perceived a new opportunity to move the goal posts on its long- term number one priority of reduction of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. There are, at the same time, concerns in some quarters that the focus in Washington has shifted away from the "pivot" to Asia and back to the Middle East, in the form of Syria and Iran. The domestic gridlock over a budget crisis, the national debt, and difficulties encountered with the Obamacare roll-out have further fueled this perception. Secretary of State Kerry's repeated visits to the Middle East, coupled with President Obama's non-attendance at the APEC Summit in Indonesia, due to the government shutdown, are also factors cited. Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, in an October 23rd speech at the University of Buffalo, reflected some of these concerns with the following comments: “It’s important that the president of the United States shows up at these meetings,” she said. “The Chinese president, Xi Jinping, showed up. Russian President Vladimir Putin showed up, and they were able to dominate the proceedings,” Clinton said, “and they were able to cock an eyebrow and ask a question like, well, maybe we can’t count on the Americans any more. Maybe it’s time to, in the words of one Chinese official, de-Americanize the world. Maybe we should even start thinking about a different reserve currency than the American dollar.” So a number of people are asking: is the 'pivot' or ‘re-balance' real?

Some observers of cross-Strait relations have even made a prognosis of U.S.-Taiwan relations as being "fairly grim" for the long term. With the priorities of American policymakers seemingly focused elsewhere, recent Chinese visitors in Washington have attempted to push the envelope on Taiwan. Reportedly having failed at Sunnylands and in previous attempts to get the Obama Administration to acknowledge Taiwan as a so-called "core interest" of Beijing's -- attempting to ultimately make Taiwan a taboo subject for bilateral discussions as "an internal affair," Beijing’s spokesmen have now taken a soft sell approach. This is even true on the arms sales issue which has galled them for three decades -- ever since the issuance of Ronald Reagan's "Six Assurances" to Taipei in July 1982. that there would be no date certain for a termination of U.S. arms sales to the Republic of China (Taiwan).

The necessity of the "Six Assurances" came about when President Reagan became alarmed over potential misinterpretation of the content of a joint third communiqué that his pro- Beijing, Kissingerian Secretary of State Al Haig had spent months negotiating with Beijing. This communiqué was set to be officially announced on August 17, 1982.

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The wording in that communiqué read, in part: "Having in mind the foregoing statements of both sides, the United States Government states that it does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan, leading, over a period of time, to a final resolution. In so stating, the United States acknowledges China's consistent position regarding the thorough settlement of this issue."

The "Six Assurances," conveyed as pre-emptive damage control, were transmitted to Republic of China (ROC) then President Chiang Ching-kuo on July 14th via the President's Representative in Taipei, James Lilley. These Assurances reaffirmed US policy not to set a cutoff date for arms sales to Taiwan, not to consult with the PRC on the arms sales, not to pressure Taipei to begin negotiations with Beijing, not to undertake the role of mediator between Taiwan and China, not to revise the Taiwan Relation Act and to affirm that the US position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan had not changed.

To avoid any misunderstanding or miscalculation of U.S. policy on Taiwan security, President Reagan also made a clear statement on the U.S. interpretation of the August 17, 1982 communiqué. In his statement, President Reagan stressed that the U.S. understanding of the communiqué is that any reduction of arms sales to Taiwan depends upon peace in the Taiwan Strait and the continuity of China’s declared “fundamental policy” of seeking a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. Reagan noted that “it is essential that the quantity and quality of arms provided Taiwan be conditioned entirely on the threat posed by the PRC. Both in quantitative and qualitative terms, Taiwan’s defense capability relative to that of the PRC will be maintained.” In short, as long as Beijing continues to build up its military posture and missiles against Taiwan that result in instability in the region, the U.S. should and will unwaveringly implement its arms sales to Taiwan in accordance with the TRA, regardless of what the third communiqué said about the quantity and quality of future arms sales. (Beijing has denied and rejected such a linkage between the level of arms sales and its own peaceful intent.) Reagan's lack of confidence in his Secretary of State was confirmed even before the issuance of the third communiqué when Al Haig's resignation was accepted on July 5, 1982. Still, Beijing, which saw a Pyrrhic victory with the third communiqué dashed by the announcement of the Six Assurances, has subsequently sought a American commitment to a fourth communiqué addressing, even opaquely, the arms sales issue.

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However, now having repeatedly failed through a hard-line, direct diplomatic approach, Beijing turned to its soft sell attempt to gradually erode America's commitment on arms sales to Taiwan. The Chinese Defense Minister Chang Wanquan furthered the soft sell approach when he met in August in Washington with Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel to discuss security issues of mutual concern. After the Hagel-Chang meeting, the Chinese Defense Ministry Spokesperson Guan Youfei briefed only the Chinese press with a read-out of the meeting. The spokesperson rather astonishingly announced that Washington had agreed with Beijing's proposal to set up a “working group” regarding U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Guan’s remarks were quickly picked up by the Chinese media and soon drew media attention in Taiwan.

Taipei understandably immediately raised serious concerns regarding PRC Defense Ministry Spokesperson Guan’s one-sided briefing. Fortunately Washington proved very experienced in dealing with this kind of manipulation by Beijing. The Pentagon spokesperson in short order clarified that Chinese media reports were incorrect and rejected the unconfirmed report of the establishment of a U.S.-China “working group” on arms sales to Taiwan. Such a “working group” would, of course, involve a violation of both the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) another one of Ronald Reagan’s “Six Assurances"-- that the United States would not hold prior consultations with the People's Republic of China regarding arms sales to Taiwan. The next day the State Department also reiterated that the U.S. long-standing policy of arms sales to Taiwan, based on the TRA, has not changed. Washington’s swift clarification successfully evaded the potential impact caused by the Chinese maneuvering of its media. The Obama Administration had also previously re-affirmed the "Six Assurances" as a continuing fundamental tenet of U.S. Taiwan policy in testimony given by then Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell to the House of Representatives at a hearing conducted by then Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen on October 4, 2011. Mr. Campbell said: "As I stated in my opening testimony, yes, we do abide by the so-called Six Assurances and among the most important is an assurance that we do not pre-brief China about what we will do with respect to Taiwan."

The State Department was also proactive in responding to the "pretty grim" prognosis of the prevaricators on Taiwan policy. East Asian and Pacific Affairs Deputy Assistant Secretary Kin Moy, in a presentation on U.S.-Taiwan relations made at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on October 3rd, gave a comprehensive outline of a "long-standing" U.S.- Taiwan relationship. He pointed out in detail how the relationship "encompasses business, culture, education, trade, environmental protection, and security ties." He did, however, raise one concern previously heard in the corridors of Washington that “we encourage Taiwan to increase its defense budget to a level commensurate with the security challenges it confronts.” He closed by noting that "we look forward to continued substantive engagement with Taiwan to promote business opportunities and academic exchanges to strengthen the ties that bind our two peoples together. We look forward to welcoming friends from Taiwan to every corner of our United States." 4

There is, however, the old American expression that "while the cat is away, the mice will play." And with Washington distracted by urgent domestic matters, and appearing to some in the international community as being incapable of getting its own house in order, America's competitors are moving to take advantage of the situation. In what could be termed Henry Kissinger's worst nightmare, China joined with Russia to hold 20-day long joint military exercises in August following joint naval exercises in July. The misperceived Cold War threat of a Russia and China united in the Eurasian landmass appears to be taking one step closer to reality as the American political establishment seems to fiddle while Washington smolders.

A second attempt at China’s soft sell strategy on Taiwan occurred when Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with Secretary of State John Kerry in late September during his U.S. visit to attend the UNGA session in New York and to deliver formal remarks at the Brookings Institution. Press sources indicate that Wang brought up the Taiwan arms sale issue in private meetings with Kerry and Pentagon officials. At Brookings, Wang began with similar soft sell rhetoric regarding how Taiwan "bears on the national sentiments of the 1.3 billion Chinese people." He then made an allusion easily comprehended by the American public, pointing to Taiwan as "a liability in China-US relations that undermines mutual trust and disrupts cooperation."

And the solution proposed by the Foreign Minister to the American public? As if quoting from former House Speaker Sam Rayburn on "go along to get along," the Chinese Foreign Minister said "if the United States can go along with the prevailing trend of peaceful development of cross-Straits relations, and genuinely appreciate and respect China's efforts to oppose separation and achieve peaceful reunification, the issue - once a liability and negative factor in our relationship - will be turned into an asset and a positive factor, providing guarantee to the long-term, steady growth of China-US relations and opening prospect for all-round cooperation." In other words, the soft sell solution offered by Beijing is for the United States to accept China's "core interest" in Taiwan at its face value, and to cease addressing Taiwan. It is an indirect call for cessation of such "interference “as the promotion of "separation" via such policies as seeking observer status for Taiwan in ICAO and other international organizations and the continued supply of weapons for defense.

It is not unusual for the PRC to engage in such attempts to manipulate public opinion. One noted example in recent years was Beijing’s control of media coverage of President Barack Obama’s visit to China in November 2009. During that trip, President Obama’s town hall event in Shanghai was not streamed live on Beijing’s CCTV and its content was subsequently censored by the Chinese authorities. Before President Obama arrived, Chinese Communist Party representatives instructed journalists of Southern Weekly, which is considered the most outspoken news publication in China, not to ask the tough questions they had prepared. These Party representatives then censored the end product of the interview.

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The constraints imposed by the Chinese authorities over President Obama’s public events in China actually were counterproductive, frustrating the White House and damaging American public perceptions of the trip. Nevertheless, as demonstrated by the distorted messaging of the Chinese Defense Ministry spokesperson on Taiwan, Chinese officials can still manipulate and control media reports in the United States through a well-controlled, Chinese-only press event. Such unsophisticated attempts at propaganda, especially where limits are placed on freedom of the press, threaten to overshadow Beijing's messaging on "a new type of great power relationship” which it is promoting with its American interlocutors.

It stands to reason, given current policy, that Washington would not agree with Beijing to engage in prior discussions of its arms sales to Taiwan. According to the Taiwan Relations Act, the Executive branch and the Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of defense articles and services provided to Taiwan based SOLELY upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan, in accordance with the procedures established by law. It would be clearly contrary to the law of the land and its political commitment to the Congress if the Administration clandestinely forged a mechanism to hold prior consultations with Beijing regarding arms sales to Taiwan. As noted previously, this “No Consultation with Beijing” position has been rooted in U.S. overall policy towards Taiwan security since the TRA of 1979, and this pledge was forcefully restated in President Ronald Reagan’s “Six Assurances.”

Moreover, from the very beginning of the US-PRC normalization negotiations in the 1970s, the decision makers in Washington had drawn the continued provision of defensive weapons to Taiwan as the bottom line with regard to security issues in the Taiwan Strait. This also includes a deterrence policy which contains several elements including: peaceful resolution of cross-Strait differences in a manner acceptable to the Taiwan public; no use of force; and no unilateral change of the status quo. According to the annually-updated Department of Defense (DOD) report on PRC military developments, titled Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China, Beijing has not slowed down the pace of its military build-up across the Taiwan Strait. The 2013 version of the report states that “dealing with a potential contingency in the Taiwan Strait remains the PLA’s primary mission despite decreasing tensions there - a trend which continued following the re-election of Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou in January 2012.”

The notorious Anti-Secession Law enacted by the PRC's National People's Congress in 2005, an example of this unbending policy, is still in place. It authorizes Beijing to use “non- peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China's sovereignty and integrity” against Taiwan “in the event the Taiwan independence forces should act under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan's secession from China, or that major incidents entailing Taiwan's secession from China should occur, or that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted.” The U.S. House of Representatives expressed its “grave concern “over the passage of this Anti-Secession Law in a recorded vote of 424 to 4 on H.Con. Res. 98 on March 16, 2005. 6

The current trend of the military balance of power tilting toward Beijing would not be easily shifted simply by unilateral removal of some missiles targeting Taiwan. It is not in the interest of the United States to consider Beijing’s proposal to adjust its missile deployment in exchange for a reduction of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Nor should any potential hint by Beijing of flexibility on Six-Party negotiations regarding North Korea lead to any unilateral concessions by the other parties -- whether Washington, Seoul or Tokyo -- on the Taiwan issue. Washington should view the security of Taiwan in the context of overall Asia-Pacific regional security and remember well General MacArthur's statement that Taiwan represents “an unsinkable aircraft carrier.” It is especially compelling that, while the Obama administration undertakes the policy to “rebalance” to Asia, the People’s Liberation Army has adopted its Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy to dilute U.S. military influence there.

The strategic stability of the Taiwan Strait relies on a peaceful environment that enables both Taiwan and mainland China to conduct sustained engagement and enhance mutual understanding. In this regard, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have significantly strengthened Taiwan’s confidence to pursue its policy to engage with Beijing. The nineteen agreements, including an FTA-type trade pact referred to as ECFA ( The Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement), concluded in cross-Strait negotiations in recent years have demonstrated the positive results of this engagement policy. It may seem paradoxical to Beijing’s zero-sum mentality, but the reality is that a less secure Taiwan is more reluctant to tango with its giant neighbor. The continued U.S. security commitment to Taiwan, including the continued provision of arms for Taiwan's defense, serves as the bedrock of cross-Strait and regional stability.

Dennis P. Halpin is a former career Foreign Service officer and former Professional Staff member advising the House Foreign Affairs Committee on Asian issues. He is currently serving as a visiting scholar at the U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS (Johns Hopkins University)