DOCSLIB.ORG

“One China” Policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
“One China” Policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei Shirley A. Kan Specialist in Asian Security Affairs June 3, 2011 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL30341 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy Summary Despite apparently consistent statements in four decades, the U.S. “one China” policy concerning Taiwan remains somewhat ambiguous and subject to different interpretations. Apart from questions about what the “one China” policy entails, issues have arisen about whether U.S. Presidents have stated clear positions and have changed or should change policy, affecting U.S. interests in security and democracy. In Part I, this CRS Report, updated as warranted, discusses the “one China” policy since the United States began in 1971 to reach presidential understandings with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) government in Beijing. Part II records the evolution of policy as affected by legislation and key statements by Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. Taiwan formally calls itself the Republic of China (ROC), celebrating in 2011 the 100th anniversary of its founding. Policy covers three major issue areas: sovereignty over Taiwan; PRC use of force or coercion against Taiwan; and cross-strait dialogue. The United States recognized the ROC until the end of 1978 and has maintained an official, non-diplomatic relationship with Taiwan after recognition of the PRC in 1979. The United States did not explicitly state the sovereign status of Taiwan in the U.S.-PRC Joint Communiques of 1972, 1979, and 1982. The United States “acknowledged” the “one China” position of both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Since 1971, U.S. Presidents—both secretly and publicly—have articulated a “one China” policy in understandings with the PRC. Congressional oversight has watched for any new agreements and any shift in the U.S. stance closer to that of Beijing’s “one China” principle—on questions of sovereignty, arms sales, or dialogue. Not recognizing the PRC’s claim over Taiwan or Taiwan as a sovereign state, U.S. policy has considered Taiwan’s status as unsettled. With added conditions, U.S. policy leaves the Taiwan question to be resolved by the people on both sides of the strait: a “peaceful resolution” with the assent of Taiwan’s people and without unilateral changes. In short, U.S. policy focuses on the process of resolution of the Taiwan question, not any set outcome. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979, P.L. 96-8, has governed U.S. policy in the absence of a diplomatic relationship or a defense treaty. The TRA stipulates the expectation that the future of Taiwan “will be determined” by peaceful means. The TRA specifies that it is U.S. policy, among the stipulations: to consider any non-peaceful means to determine Taiwan’s future “a threat” to the peace and security of the Western Pacific and of “grave concern” to the United States; “to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character;” and “to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion” jeopardizing the security, or social or economic system of Taiwan’s people. The TRA provides a congressional role in determining security assistance “necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” President Reagan also offered “Six Assurances” to Taipei in 1982, partly covering arms sales. Policymakers have continued to face unresolved issues, while the political and strategic context of the policy has changed dramatically since the 1970s. Nonetheless, there has been no comprehensive review of U.S. policy since 1994. Since the mid-1990s, U.S. interests in the military balance as well as peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait have been challenged by the PRC’s military buildup (particularly in missiles) and coercion, resistance in Taiwan by the Kuomintang (KMT) party to raising defense spending, and moves perceived by Beijing for de jure independence under Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) President Chen Shui-bian (2000- 2008). After May 2008, KMT President Ma Ying-jeou resumed the cross-strait dialogue (after a decade)—beyond seeking detente. With President Obama since 2009, a rhetorical convergence emerged among the three sides about “peaceful development” of cross-strait engagement, but disagreement has remained about the PRC’s opposition to U.S. arms sales for Taiwan’s defense. Congressional Research Service China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy Contents Part I: U.S. Policy on “One China”..............................................................................................1 Congressional Concerns........................................................................................................1 Key Statements and Ambiguity .............................................................................................4 Changed Context.............................................................................................................4 Definitions......................................................................................................................5 Unsettled Status ..............................................................................................................5 Peaceful Settlement.........................................................................................................5 Has U.S. Policy Changed?.....................................................................................................6 Issue Area 1: Sovereignty................................................................................................7 Issue Area 2: Use of Force.............................................................................................17 Issue Area 3: Dialogue ..................................................................................................24 Overview of Policy Issues...................................................................................................27 Part II: Highlights of Key Statements by Washington, Beijing, and Taipei .................................29 Statements During Nixon Administration ............................................................................30 Kissinger’s Secret Talks with PRC Premier Zhou Enlai .................................................30 Nixon’s “Five Principles” in Secret Talks with Zhou Enlai ............................................30 Nixon on Withdrawing U.S. Military Forces from Taiwan .............................................31 U.S.-PRC Joint Communique (Shanghai Communique) ................................................31 Mao Zedong on Use of Force........................................................................................32 Statements During Ford Administration...............................................................................32 President Ford’s Address to a Joint Session of Congress ................................................32 Statements During Carter Administration ............................................................................33 U.S. Statement on Diplomatic Recognition of the PRC..................................................33 PRC Statement on Establishing China-U.S. Diplomatic Relations .................................33 ROC President Chiang Ching-kuo’s Statement ..............................................................34 PRC’s New Year’s Message to Compatriots in Taiwan...................................................34 U.S.-PRC Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations (Normalization Communique)....................................................................................35 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8 .........................................................................35 Statements During Reagan Administration ..........................................................................37 PRC Leader Ye Jianying’s Nine-Point Proposal.............................................................37 Letter from President Reagan to Deng Xiaoping............................................................38 Reagan’s “Six Assurances” to Taiwan............................................................................39 Message from President Reagan to Taiwan President.....................................................39 U.S.-PRC Joint Communique on Arms Sales (1982 Communique)................................40 President Reagan’s Statement on U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan.........................................41 Reagan’s Secret Memorandum on the 1982 Communique .............................................41 PRC’s Statement on the Communique ...........................................................................42 Assistant Secretary of State Holdridge and “Six Assurances”.........................................42 PRC Leader Deng Xiaoping on “One China, Two Systems” ..........................................43 Deng Xiaoping on Use of Force and Unification in “1,000 Years” .................................43 Deng Xiaoping on “Peaceful Coexistence” and Taiwan’s Military .................................43 Statements During George H. W. Bush Administration ........................................................44 Toast at the Welcoming Banquet in Beijing ...................................................................44 Taiwan’s National Unification Guidelines; Policy on the PRC.......................................44 Taiwan
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Bill Clinton's "Three Noes" and Taiwan's Future Vincent Wei-Cheng Wang Ithaca College
    Ithaca College Digital Commons @ IC Politics Faculty Publications and Presentations Politics Department 1-1-1999 Bill Clinton's "Three Noes" and Taiwan's Future Vincent Wei-Cheng Wang Ithaca College Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ithaca.edu/politics_faculty_pubs Part of the International Relations Commons Recommended Citation Wang, Vincent Wei-Cheng, "Bill Clinton's "Three Noes" and Taiwan's Future" (1999). Politics Faculty Publications and Presentations. 37. https://digitalcommons.ithaca.edu/politics_faculty_pubs/37 This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Politics Department at Digital Commons @ IC. It has been accepted for inclusion in Politics Faculty Publications and Presentations by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ IC. 253 BILL CLINTON'S "THREE NOES" AND TAIWAN'S FUTURE Vincent Wei-cheng Wang University of Richmond Diplomatic historians and political scientists have warned that when great powers make war or love, the smaller countries nearby feel the tremors.1 As they look back, President Bill Clinton's 1998 summit visit to China marked the emergence of a new world order: With the end of the Cold War, China is poised to become a poten­ tial superpower, and its future evolution will have great implications for the U.S. "For better or worse, the U.S.­ Chinese relationship seems destined to be one of the principal pivots in international relations well into the 21st century," as Walter Russell Mead asserts.2 That much is clear, but what is not clear is how to deal with this rising power. 1. Summit in Context: Is Engagement Actually a Realist Strategy? Historically, coping with a rising great power has sel­ dom been easy, and conflicts have often occurred during 1 An Indian .saying has a slightly different twist: "When two elephants make wars or love, the grass gets hurt.
    [Show full text]
  • China As a Hybrid Influencer: Non-State Actors As State Proxies COI HYBRID INFLUENCE COI
    Hybrid CoE Research Report 1 JUNE 2021 China as a hybrid influencer: Non-state actors as state proxies COI HYBRID INFLUENCE COI JUKKA AUKIA Hybrid CoE Hybrid CoE Research Report 1 China as a hybrid influencer: Non-state actors as state proxies JUKKA AUKIA 3 Hybrid CoE Research Reports are thorough, in-depth studies providing a deep understanding of hybrid threats and phenomena relating to them. Research Reports build on an original idea and follow academic research report standards, presenting new research findings. They provide either policy-relevant recommendations or practical conclusions. COI Hybrid Influence looks at how state and non-state actors conduct influence activities targeted at Participating States and institutions, as part of a hybrid campaign, and how hostile state actors use their influence tools in ways that attempt to sow instability, or curtail the sovereignty of other nations and the independence of institutions. The focus is on the behaviours, activities, and tools that a hostile actor can use. The goal is to equip practitioners with the tools they need to respond to and deter hybrid threats. COI HI is led by the UK. The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats tel. +358 400 253 800 www.hybridcoe.fi ISBN (web) 978-952-7282-78-6 ISBN (print) 978-952-7282-79-3 ISSN 2737-0860 June 2021 Hybrid CoE is an international hub for practitioners and experts, building Participating States’ and institutions’ capabilities and enhancing EU-NATO cooperation in countering hybrid threats, located in Helsinki, Finland. The responsibility for the views expressed ultimately rests with the authors.
    [Show full text]
  • Imaginary War with China: Is the 1992 Consensus an Essential Element In
    Imaginary War With China: Is The 1992 Consensus an Essential Element in Promoting Peace Across Taiwan Strait? Ching-Hsin Yu,* Ching-Hsing Wang,† and Dennis Lu-Chung Weng‡ Abstract This study aims to examine the relationship between individuals’ attitudes toward the 1992 consensus and their support for Taiwan in the name of the Republic of China (R.O.C) without declaring independence. Given President Tsai Ing-wen’s refusal to recognize the existence of the 1992 consensus that provides the basis for dialogue between Taiwan and China, there is a pressing need to understand the role of the 1992 consensus in Taiwanese people’s support for Taiwan under the R.O.C constitutional framework. By using data from the 2017 Taiwan National Security Survey, this study finds that people with higher levels of support for the 1992 consensus are more likely to support Taiwan in the name of the R.O.C without declaring independence. This implies that from the public’s perspective, the acknowledgement of the 1992 consensus is a required condition to maintain the status quo for Taiwan. Consequently, President Tsai and her administration might need to rethink about their policy of denying the existence of the 1992 consensus. Keywords: 1992 consensus, Taiwan, R.O.C., Taiwan independence, presidential approval. * Distinguished Research Fellow, Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, email: [email protected]. † Postdoctoral Fellow, Hobby School of Public Affairs, University of Houston, email: [email protected]. ‡ Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Sam Houston State University, email: [email protected]. 1 Introduction The independence-unification issue has been the most salient political issue in Taiwan that has played an important role in domestic political competition as well as the development of cross-strait relations.
    [Show full text]
  • The Rise and Fall of the Taiwan Independence Policy: Power Shift, Domestic Constraints, and Sovereignty Assertiveness (1988-2010)
    University of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations 2012 The Rise and Fall of the Taiwan independence Policy: Power Shift, Domestic Constraints, and Sovereignty Assertiveness (1988-2010) Dalei Jie University of Pennsylvania, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations Part of the Asian Studies Commons, and the Political Science Commons Recommended Citation Jie, Dalei, "The Rise and Fall of the Taiwan independence Policy: Power Shift, Domestic Constraints, and Sovereignty Assertiveness (1988-2010)" (2012). Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 524. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/524 This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/524 For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Rise and Fall of the Taiwan independence Policy: Power Shift, Domestic Constraints, and Sovereignty Assertiveness (1988-2010) Abstract How to explain the rise and fall of the Taiwan independence policy? As the Taiwan Strait is still the only conceivable scenario where a major power war can break out and Taiwan's words and deeds can significantly affect the prospect of a cross-strait military conflict, ot answer this question is not just a scholarly inquiry. I define the aiwanT independence policy as internal political moves by the Taiwanese government to establish Taiwan as a separate and sovereign political entity on the world stage. Although two existing prevailing explanations--electoral politics and shifting identity--have some merits, they are inadequate to explain policy change over the past twenty years. Instead, I argue that there is strategic rationale for Taiwan to assert a separate sovereignty. Sovereignty assertions are attempts to substitute normative power--the international consensus on the sanctity of sovereignty--for a shortfall in military- economic-diplomatic assets.
    [Show full text]
  • Cancer Incidence of Taiwanese Shipbreaking Workers Who Have Been Potentially Exposed to Asbestos
    Environmental Research 132 (2014) 370–378 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Environmental Research journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/envres Cancer incidence of Taiwanese shipbreaking workers who have been potentially exposed to asbestos Wei-Te Wu a, Yu-Jen Lin a, Huei-Sheng Shiue b, Chung-Yi Li c, Perng-Jy Tsai d,e, Chun-Yuh Yang a,f, Saou-Hsing Liou a,b, Trong-Neng Wu a,g,n a Division of Environmental Health and Occupational Medicine, National Health Research Institutes, Miaoli, Taiwan b Department of Public Health, China Medical University, Taichung, Taiwan c Department of Public Health, College of Medicine, National Cheng Kung University, Tainan, Taiwan d Department of Environmental and Occupational Health, College of Medicine, National Cheng Kung University, Tainan, Taiwan e Department of Occupational Safety and Health, College of Public Health, China Medical University, Taichung, Taiwan f Institute of Public Health, Kaohsiung Medical University, Kaohsiung, Taiwan g Graduate Institute of Biostatistics, China Medical University, Taichung, Taiwan article info abstract Article history: Background: Shipbreaking remains one of the most dangerous jobs worldwide. Shipbreaking workers are Received 2 August 2013 exposed to many hazardous chemicals, especially asbestos. Unfortunately, long-term follow-up studies of Received in revised form cancer incidence patterns in shipbreaking workers are lacking. This study examines whether there is an 17 April 2014 increased risk of cancer among male shipbreaking workers over a 24-year follow-up period. Accepted 22 April 2014 Methods: 4155 male shipbreaking worker's information was retrospectively collected from Kaohsiung's Shipbreaking Workers Union database from 1985. The study cohort was linked to the Taiwan Cancer Keywords: Registry from 1985 to 2008 for new cancer cases.
    [Show full text]
  • 2019 China Military Power Report
    OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019 Office of the Secretary of Defense Preparation of this report cost the Department of Defense a total of approximately $181,000 in Fiscal Years 2018-2019. This includes $12,000 in expenses and $169,000 in DoD labor. Generated on 2019May02 RefID: E-1F4B924 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019 A Report to Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, as Amended Section 1260, “Annual Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Public Law 115-232, which amends the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Section 1202, Public Law 106-65, provides that the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report “in both classified and unclassified form, on military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China. The report shall address the current and probable future course of military-technological development of the People’s Liberation Army and the tenets and probable development of Chinese security strategy and military strategy, and of the military organizations and operational concepts supporting such development over the next 20 years.
    [Show full text]
  • The Danger of Deconsolidation Roberto Stefan Foa and Yascha Mounk Ronald F
    July 2016, Volume 27, Number 3 $14.00 The Danger of Deconsolidation Roberto Stefan Foa and Yascha Mounk Ronald F. Inglehart The Struggle Over Term Limits in Africa Brett L. Carter Janette Yarwood Filip Reyntjens 25 Years After the USSR: What’s Gone Wrong? Henry E. Hale Suisheng Zhao on Xi Jinping’s Maoist Revival Bojan Bugari¡c & Tom Ginsburg on Postcommunist Courts Clive H. Church & Adrian Vatter on Switzerland Daniel O’Maley on the Internet of Things Delegative Democracy Revisited Santiago Anria Catherine Conaghan Frances Hagopian Lindsay Mayka Juan Pablo Luna Alberto Vergara and Aaron Watanabe Zhao.NEW saved by BK on 1/5/16; 6,145 words, including notes; TXT created from NEW by PJC, 3/18/16; MP edits to TXT by PJC, 4/5/16 (6,615 words). AAS saved by BK on 4/7/16; FIN created from AAS by PJC, 4/25/16 (6,608 words). PGS created by BK on 5/10/16. XI JINPING’S MAOIST REVIVAL Suisheng Zhao Suisheng Zhao is professor at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver. He is executive director of the univer- sity’s Center for China-U.S. Cooperation and editor of the Journal of Contemporary China. When Xi Jinping became paramount leader of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 2012, some Chinese intellectuals with liberal lean- ings allowed themselves to hope that he would promote the cause of political reform. The most optimistic among them even thought that he might seek to limit the monopoly on power long claimed by the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
    [Show full text]
  • PB2001100980.Pdf
    PB2001-100980 111111111111111111111111l1li111111 -------------------~~- The Chi-Chi, Taiwan Earthquake of September 21, 1999: Reconnaissance Report Edited by George C. Lee1 and Chin-Hsiung Loh2 Major MCEER Contributors: George C. Lee, Michel Bruneau, Ian G. Buckle, Stephanie E. Chang, Paul J. Flores, Thomas D. O'Rourke, Masanobu Shinozuka and Tsu T. Soong Major NCREE Contributors: Chin-Hsiung Loh, Kuo-Chun Chang, Zhe-Jung Chen, Jenn-Shin Hwang, Meei-Ling Lin, Gee-Yu Liu, Keh-Chyuan Tsai, George C. Yao and Chin-Lien Yen Publication Date: April 30, 2000 Technical Report MCEER-00-0003 MCEER Project Number 99-9002 NSF Master Contract Number CMS 97-01471 . 1 Director, Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake Engineering Research, University at Buffalo, State University of New York 2 Director, National Center for Research on Earthquake Engineering, National Taiwan University MULTIDISCIPLINARY CENTER FOR EARTHQUAKE ENGINEERING RESEARCH University at Buffalo, State University of New York Red Jacket Quadrangle, Buffalo, NY 14261 REPRODUCED BY: NrIS. u.s. Department of Commerce -~-­ National Technical Information Service Springfield, Virginia 22161 This report was prepared by the Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake Engineering Research (MCEER) through grants from the Earthquake Engineering Research Centers Program of the Na­ tional Science Foundation, the State of New York, and other sponsors. Neither MCEER, associates of MCEER, its sponsors, nor any person acting on their behalf: a. makes any warranty, express or implied, with respect to the use of any information, apparatus, method, or process disclosed in this report or that such use may not in­ fringe upon privately owned rights; or b. assumes any liabilities of whatsoever kind with respect to the use of, or the damage resulting from the use of, any information, apparatus, method, or process disclosed in this report.
    [Show full text]
  • The Long Shadow of Chinese Censorship: How the Communist Party’S Media Restrictions Affect News Outlets Around the World
    The Long Shadow of Chinese Censorship: How the Communist Party’s Media Restrictions Affect News Outlets Around the World A Report to the Center for International Media Assistance By Sarah Cook October 22, 2013 The Center for International Media Assistance (CIMA), at the National Endowment for Democracy, works to strengthen the support, raise the visibility, and improve the effectiveness of independent media development throughout the world. The Center provides information, builds networks, conducts research, and highlights the indispensable role independent media play in the creation and development of sustainable democracies. An important aspect of CIMA’s work is to research ways to attract additional U.S. private sector interest in and support for international media development. CIMA convenes working groups, discussions, and panels on a variety of topics in the field of media development and assistance. The center also issues reports and recommendations based on working group discussions and other investigations. These reports aim to provide policymakers, as well as donors and practitioners, with ideas for bolstering the effectiveness of media assistance. Don Podesta Interim Senior Director Center for International Media Assistance National Endowment for Democracy 1025 F Street, N.W., 8th Floor Washington, DC 20004 Phone: (202) 378-9700 Fax: (202) 378-9407 Email: [email protected] URL: http://cima.ned.org Design and Layout by Valerie Popper About the Author Sarah Cook Sarah Cook is a senior research analyst for East Asia at Freedom House. She manages the editorial team producing the China Media Bulletin, a biweekly news digest of media freedom developments related to the People’s Republic of China.
    [Show full text]
  • China | Freedom House
    China | Freedom House https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/china A. ELECTORAL PROCESS: 0 / 12 A1. Was the current head of government or other chief national authority elected through free and fair elections? 0 / 4 There are no direct or competitive elections for national executive leaders. The National People’s Congress (NPC) formally elects the state president for five-year terms and confirms the premier after he is nominated by the president, but both positions are decided in advance at the relevant CCP congress. The CCP’s seven- member Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), headed by Xi Jinping in his role as the party’s general secretary, sets government and party policy in practice. Xi also holds the position of state president and serves as chairman of the state and party military commissions. Xi was awarded a second five-year term as general secretary at the 19th Party Congress in October 2017, and at the NPC session in March 2018 he was confirmed for a second five-year term as state president. Also at that session, the NPC approved amendments to China’s constitution that abolished the two-term limit for the state presidency and vice presidency. Combined with the absence of another PSC member young enough to serve as Xi’s successor in 2022, the move reinforced predictions that he planned to break with precedent and remain China’s paramount leader for the foreseeable future. A2. Were the current national legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections? 0 / 4 The 3,000 NPC members are formally elected for five-year terms by subnational congresses, but in practice all candidates are vetted by the CCP.
    [Show full text]
  • The History and Politics of Taiwan's February 28
    The History and Politics of Taiwan’s February 28 Incident, 1947- 2008 by Yen-Kuang Kuo BA, National Taiwan Univeristy, Taiwan, 1991 BA, University of Victoria, 2007 MA, University of Victoria, 2009 A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in the Department of History © Yen-Kuang Kuo, 2020 University of Victoria All rights reserved. This dissertation may not be reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy or other means, without the permission of the author. ii Supervisory Committee The History and Politics of Taiwan’s February 28 Incident, 1947- 2008 by Yen-Kuang Kuo BA, National Taiwan Univeristy, Taiwan, 1991 BA, University of Victoria, 2007 MA, University of Victoria, 2009 Supervisory Committee Dr. Zhongping Chen, Supervisor Department of History Dr. Gregory Blue, Departmental Member Department of History Dr. John Price, Departmental Member Department of History Dr. Andrew Marton, Outside Member Department of Pacific and Asian Studies iii Abstract Taiwan’s February 28 Incident happened in 1947 as a set of popular protests against the postwar policies of the Nationalist Party, and it then sparked militant actions and political struggles of Taiwanese but ended with military suppression and political persecution by the Nanjing government. The Nationalist Party first defined the Incident as a rebellion by pro-Japanese forces and communist saboteurs. As the enemy of the Nationalist Party in China’s Civil War (1946-1949), the Chinese Communist Party initially interpreted the Incident as a Taiwanese fight for political autonomy in the party’s wartime propaganda, and then reinterpreted the event as an anti-Nationalist uprising under its own leadership.
    [Show full text]
  • Scoring One for the Other Team
    FIVE TURTLES IN A FLASK: FOR TAIWAN’S OUTER ISLANDS, AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE HOLDS A CERTAIN FATE A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HAWAI‘I AT MĀNOA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN ASIAN STUDIES MAY 2018 By Edward W. Green, Jr. Thesis Committee: Eric Harwit, Chairperson Shana J. Brown Cathryn H. Clayton Keywords: Taiwan independence, offshore islands, strait crisis, military intervention TABLE OF CONTENTS Page List of Tables ................................................................................................................ ii List of Figures ............................................................................................................... iii I. Introduction ............................................................................................................... 1 II. Scope and Organization ........................................................................................... 6 III. Dramatis Personae: The Five Islands ...................................................................... 9 III.1. Itu Aba ..................................................................................................... 11 III.2. Matsu ........................................................................................................ 14 III.3. The Pescadores ......................................................................................... 16 III.4. Pratas .......................................................................................................
    [Show full text]