DOCSLIB.ORG

China As a Hybrid Influencer: Non-State Actors As State Proxies COI HYBRID INFLUENCE COI

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
China As a Hybrid Influencer: Non-State Actors As State Proxies COI HYBRID INFLUENCE COI Hybrid CoE Research Report 1 JUNE 2021 China as a hybrid influencer: Non-state actors as state proxies COI HYBRID INFLUENCE COI JUKKA AUKIA Hybrid CoE Hybrid CoE Research Report 1 China as a hybrid influencer: Non-state actors as state proxies JUKKA AUKIA 3 Hybrid CoE Research Reports are thorough, in-depth studies providing a deep understanding of hybrid threats and phenomena relating to them. Research Reports build on an original idea and follow academic research report standards, presenting new research findings. They provide either policy-relevant recommendations or practical conclusions. COI Hybrid Influence looks at how state and non-state actors conduct influence activities targeted at Participating States and institutions, as part of a hybrid campaign, and how hostile state actors use their influence tools in ways that attempt to sow instability, or curtail the sovereignty of other nations and the independence of institutions. The focus is on the behaviours, activities, and tools that a hostile actor can use. The goal is to equip practitioners with the tools they need to respond to and deter hybrid threats. COI HI is led by the UK. The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats tel. +358 400 253 800 www.hybridcoe.fi ISBN (web) 978-952-7282-78-6 ISBN (print) 978-952-7282-79-3 ISSN 2737-0860 June 2021 Hybrid CoE is an international hub for practitioners and experts, building Participating States’ and institutions’ capabilities and enhancing EU-NATO cooperation in countering hybrid threats, located in Helsinki, Finland. The responsibility for the views expressed ultimately rests with the authors. 4 Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 7 INTRODUCTION 9 CHINA’S STRATEGIC CULTURE 10 Evolution of party supremo paradigms 10 From Maoism to the ‘peaceful rise’ of Hu 10 The assertive worldview of Xi 11 CCP strategic language 12 International narrative 12 Domestic discourse 12 Chinese exceptionalism 13 Indirect warfare in strategic thinking 14 Conclusion 15 CHINA’S DOMESTIC FRAMEWORK 17 The Party and civil society 17 The united front strategy 18 State-controlled economy after 1995 19 Media “going out” policies since 2009 20 The 2016 NGO reforms 21 National Intelligence Law of 2017 22 Conclusion 22 NON-STATE ACTORS ABROAD 23 United front-related actors 23 State-controlled enterprises 24 State-organized NGOs 25 Media 25 Academia and think tanks 26 Online and digital actors 27 Chinese and non-Chinese individuals 27 Conclusion 28 CONCLUDING REMARKS 29 5 6 Executive summary This Hybrid CoE Research Report applies the “united front” (tongyi zhanxian). Equating “love for hybrid threat paradigm to study Chinese non- the Party” with “love for the country”, the united state actors (NSA). It explores underlying Chinese front builds ethnic-based nationalism that is pro- drivers, elements of strategic culture, and societal duced top-down by party elites and bottom-up by developments that support the use of proxy NSAs. active patriotic elements. It also discusses the hybrid threat activity of Chi- As a result of the united front approach, a large nese NSAs that function as state proxies, as well as repertoire of NSAs as state proxies create oppor- various circumstances in which proxies are used tunities and capabilities for the Party. While the to achieve China’s policy goals. united front structures are the framework through As a hybrid influencer, China emphasizes asym- which these activities are carried out, successful metric, indirect, and pre-emptive strategies, includ- domestic experiences provide the context for ing the use of proxy NSAs, and China’s strategic CCP overseas influence. thinking favours realist approaches in international Under Xi Jinping, the political control of the affairs. Given that regime preservation remains the Party has advanced in all non-state, non-party primary objective of the ruling Communist Party organizations. The CCP has effectively developed (CCP), the CCP perceives foreign ideological influ- capacities to direct the non-state sector to sup- ence and domestic instability as existential threats. port regime preservation. Constant interactions, China effectively challenges the current interna- and manipulative and coercive tactics, produce tional order through political warfare, deception, dynamic interrelationships between the Party and and control over information. the non-state sector. The strategic culture in China is built on a com- Given its prior domestic experience in ambig- bination of superiority, vulnerability and griev- uous coercive tactics, the CCP is able to organize ance, coalescing into a culture of rivalry. Due to and sustain proxy NSAs in the international setting. vast resources, increasing international influence, The united front enables the Party to use the same and new technological tools, China is well placed influence tools domestically and internationally. As to pose threats and insecurity to liberal democ- Chinese social and business organizations continue racies. Through co-opting NSAs, the CCP is able to internationalize, the blurring of state and non- to exploit existing power hierarchies and seams in state sectors extends beyond China’s borders. democratic societies. This gives China an asymmet- The practices created inside China effectively ric advantage over democratic states and allows have an international impact. They guide the way the Party to advance its strategic agenda below the Chinese entities behave for internal reasons and threshold of conflict escalation. dictate the kinds of interactions they engage in with foreign actors. Chinese proxy NSAs are capa- •• ble of manipulating the threshold of detectabil- ity and enhancing the problem of attribution and Rather than conscious policy choices, longstanding response activation for democratic states. developments in China’s political system and think- At the policy level, the CCP defines an extrater- ing dictate strong public-private cooperation. This ritorial ethnic-based nation-state (zhonghua minzu), whole-of-society approach is literally known as the including Taiwan and the diaspora, belonging under 7 China’s control. If successful, this grants the CCP as well as the ways in which these influence extraterritorial reach. At the operational level, the security-related behaviour and policies, both CCP co-opts members of the transnational ethnic domestically and internationally. communities to a common national cause defined by the Party and characterized by a shared sense 2) Democratic societies should continue to raise of victimhood. awareness within the larger public and among state and non-state actors. Further develop- •• ment of investment screening mechanisms and stricter scrutiny of Party-backed cultural The interdependent relations and overlapping and academic initiatives should also continue. interests of Chinese state and non-state sectors Demands for transparency (organizational/ complicate the identification of proxy NSAs. Even if financial), rule of law, and accountability should the dilemma of attribution is resolved, an effective be further strengthened. response is difficult to formulate. The use of proxy NSAs is likely a result of the development of Chi- Democratic responses should also make use of civil na’s domestic traditions as much as a current anal- society and the open civic culture as democratic ysis of democratic weaknesses. Countermeasures force multipliers. In countering hybrid threats, should thus be considered within two frameworks: the democratic non-state sector (press, academia, 1) the domestic experiences of the CCP, and 2) the NGOs, social media companies) possesses capabil- vulnerabilities of democratic societies. ities to develop effective responses. When conflict escalation is a concern for state actors, civil soci- 1) Given that the CCP utilizes its successful ety can be effectively utilized. Supporting an open domestic experiences internationally, studying and robust civil society, as well as coordination China’s internal developments allows conclu- between state and non-state actors should sions to be drawn on how it conducts itself be included in the democratic countermeasure abroad. This highlights the need for careful toolbox. academic research and analysis. The united Finally, analyses of NSAs, as well as response front strategy effectively informs China’s hybrid formulations, should take into consideration that threat activities. Consequently, gaining an not all Chinese NSAs are state proxies, or agents understanding of them is vital when consid- of the CCP. Democratic inclusion and “targeting” ering countermeasures. Studies should address of the Chinese diaspora in democracy promotion developments in Chinese strategic culture, is vital. 8 Introduction The accelerating rivalry between China and the US particularly apt to exploit weaknesses in demo- indicates an increasing polarization of international cratic societies. affairs. While regime preservation remains the In light of this, an understanding of China’s highest priority of the ruling Chinese Communist NSA-related behaviour and the identification of Party (CCP), the CCP regards domestic instabil- NSA-related activity is vital for democratic states ity and conflict with foreign ideological influence, in countering hybrid threats. The aim of this including liberal international norms, as an existen- Research Report is therefore twofold: 1) to pro- tial problem. vide an overview of the main NSAs associated Along with other authoritarian hybrid aggres- with the Chinese state, and 2) to discuss the use of
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Your ROC Directors Unanimously Recommend
    11 September 2014 Norton Rose Fulbright Australia ABN 32 720 868 049 Level 15, RACV Tower 485 Bourke Street MELBOURNE VIC 3000 AUSTRALIA Company Announcements Tel +61 3 8686 6000 Australian Securities Exchange Fax +61 3 8686 6505 Level 2 GPO Box 4592, Melbourne VIC 3001 120 King Street MELBOURNE VIC 3000 DX 445 Melbourne nortonrosefulbright.com Direct line +61 3 8686 6710 Email [email protected] Our reference: 2813782 Dear Sir/Madam Proposed takeover bid for all of the ordinary shares in Roc Oil Company Limited We act for a wholly owned subsidiary of Fosun International Limited, Transcendent Resources Limited (Fosun ) in relation to its off-market takeover bid for all of the ordinary shares in Roc Oil Company Limited (ROC ) ( Offer ). On behalf of Fosun, we enclose: (1) a copy of the bidder’s statement dated 11 September 2014 containing the Offer ( Bidder’s Statement ) in accordance with subsection 633(1), item 5 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth); and (2) a notice of the date for determining the people to whom information is to be sent in accordance with subsection 633(1), items 6 and 12 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). We note that a copy of the Bidder’s Statement was today sent to the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, and will be sent to ROC today. Yours faithfully James Stewart Partner Norton Rose Fulbright Australia Encl. For personal use only APAC-#24123292-v1 Norton Rose Fulbright Australia is a law firm as defined in the Legal Profession Acts of the Australian states and territory in which it practises.
    [Show full text]
  • Emotion in Pre-Qin Ruist Moral Theory: an Explanation of "Dao Begins in Qing"
    EMOTION IN PRE-QIN RUIST MORAL THEORY: AN EXPLANATION OF "DAO BEGINS IN QING" Tang Yijie Departmentof Philosophy,Peking University Translatedby BrianBruya and Hai-mingWen Departmentof Philosophy,University of Hawai'i There is a view that holds that Ruistsnever put much emphasis on qing '1l and that they even regardedit in a negative light. This is perhapsa misunderstanding,espe- cially in regardto pre-Qin Ruism. In the Guodian Xing zi ming chu 'tsfi, the passage "dao begins in qing" (dao shi yu qing ^4f_'1 ) plays an importantrole in our understandingof the pre-Qin notion of qing. This article will concentrate on discussingthe "theoryof qing" in pre-Qin Ruism,and also in Daoism. In addition, it will attempta philosophical interpretationof "dao begins in qing," and in the pro- cess offer philosophical interpretationsof a numberof importantnotions. On "Dao Begins in Qing" The Guodian Xing zi ming chu is a Ruisttext of the middle WarringStates period (priorto 300 B.C.),and it contains the following key lines: Dao shi yu qing, qing sheng yu xing. ft4'hS,' 'r1S. t Dao begins in qing, and qing arisesfrom xing. Xingzi ming chu. 14 zpth. Xing issues from ming. Ming zi tianjiang. A i [F. Ming descends from tian. Discovering the correlationsamong these passages is crucial to understandingthe pre-Qin notions of xing and qing. To begin with, we can explain them as follows: the human dao (the norms of personal and social conduct) exists from the starton account of sharedemotions (qinggant1,f) among people. The qing of emotions (xi, nu, ai, le - ,Sti,) emerges out of human xing, and human xing is conferredby tian (human xing are obtained from ming, which tian confers).
    [Show full text]
  • Annual Report
    2020 (Incorporated in Hong Kong with limited liability) (Stock Code : 00656) Annual Report Profit Attributable to Owners of the Parent RMB 8,017.9 million Innovation & Win The year 2020 might be the most challenging year for Fosun, yet it was also the best year. After the pandemic, we continue with the “wartime mechanism” and maintain the fighting spirit that we have developed during the global combat against COVID-19. This has resulted in our resilient business performance throughout the year. The pandemic has also allowed us to refine further our capabilities of the Company accumulated over the years for “Industry Operations + Industrial Investment”, FC2M model, globalization and technology innovation. Fosun has thus evolved and become even stronger. The theme of Fosun’s annual report this year is “Innovation & Win”. “Innovation” means Fosun always attaches great importance to innovation. We recognize that we can create world-class products only by increasing investment in innovation and R&D. It is also because of our investment in technology innovation in various industries over the years, as well as leveraging on Fosun’s diversified and globalized business portfolio, the development model of “Industry Operations + Industrial Investment”, and the “wartime” mode that it has upkept since the battle against the pandemic, that together effectively defended the impact brought by the external environment and brought the Group a resilient performance, thereby creating mutually beneficial and win-win situation to all stakeholders. The year 2021 is a new starting point for Fosun’s transformation. Facing the huge opportunities in the industrial internet era, we will continue to create good products and put the operation of customers (C-end) as our top priority to fully unlock the multiplier growth of good products and customer resources in Fosun’s ecosystem.
    [Show full text]
  • Congressional-Executive Commission on China Annual
    CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA ANNUAL REPORT 2016 ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION OCTOBER 6, 2016 Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China ( Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 21–471 PDF WASHINGTON : 2016 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001 VerDate Mar 15 2010 19:58 Oct 05, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 5011 Sfmt 5011 U:\DOCS\AR16 NEW\21471.TXT DEIDRE CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS House Senate CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, MARCO RUBIO, Florida, Cochairman Chairman JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma ROBERT PITTENGER, North Carolina TOM COTTON, Arkansas TRENT FRANKS, Arizona STEVE DAINES, Montana RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois BEN SASSE, Nebraska DIANE BLACK, Tennessee DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio GARY PETERS, Michigan MICHAEL M. HONDA, California TED LIEU, California EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS CHRISTOPHER P. LU, Department of Labor SARAH SEWALL, Department of State DANIEL R. RUSSEL, Department of State TOM MALINOWSKI, Department of State PAUL B. PROTIC, Staff Director ELYSE B. ANDERSON, Deputy Staff Director (II) VerDate Mar 15 2010 19:58 Oct 05, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 0486 Sfmt 0486 U:\DOCS\AR16 NEW\21471.TXT DEIDRE C O N T E N T S Page I. Executive Summary ............................................................................................. 1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 1 Overview ............................................................................................................ 5 Recommendations to Congress and the Administration ..............................
    [Show full text]
  • Moscow Takes Command: 1929–1937
    Section 3 Moscow takes command: 1929–1937 The documents in this section cover the period from February 1929 until early 1937, with most of them being concentrated in the earlier years of this period in line with the general distribution of documents in the CAAL. This period marks an important shift in the history of relations between the CPA and the Comintern for two main reasons. First, because the Comintern became a direct player in the leadership struggles within the Party in 1929 (the main catalyst for which, not surprisingly, was the CPA's long-troubled approach to the issue of the ALP). And second, because it sent an organizer to Australia to `Bolshevize' the Party in 1930±31. A new generation of leaders took over from the old, owing their positions to Moscow's patronage, and thusÐuntil the Party was declared an illegal organization in 1940Ðfully compliant with the policies and wishes of Moscow. The shift in relations just outlined was part of a broader pattern in the Comintern's dealings with its sections that began after the Sixth Congress in 1928. If the `Third Period' thesis was correct, and the world class struggle was about to intensify, and the Soviet Union to come under military attack (and, indeed, the thesis was partly correct, but partly self-fulfilling), then the Comintern needed sections that could reliably implement its policies. The Sixth Congress had been quite open about it: it now required from its national sections a `strict party discipline and prompt and precise execution of the decisions of the Communist International, of its agencies and of the leading Party committees' (Degras 1960, 466).
    [Show full text]
  • Labor's Divided Ranks: Privilege and the United Front Ideology
    Cornell Law Review Volume 84 Article 2 Issue 6 September 1999 Labor’s Divided Ranks: Privilege and the United Front Ideology Marion Crain Ken Matheny Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Marion Crain and Ken Matheny, Labor’s Divided Ranks: Privilege and the United Front Ideology , 84 Cornell L. Rev. 1542 (1999) Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol84/iss6/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. "LABOR'S DIVIDED RANKS": PRIVILEGE AND THE UNITED FRONT IDEOLOGY Marion Craint & Ken Mathenytt INTRODUCTION The American workforce, once a relatively homogenous group by race, ethnicity, and gender, has grown increasingly diverse.' As the workforce has diversified, workplace disputes, once framed in terms of class conflict and considered the province of labor unions, have been eclipsed by identity-based claims raising issues relating to race, ethnic- ity, gender, sexual orientation, or disability. Antidiscrimination laws reify and reinforce gender, ethnic, race, sexual orientation, and disa- bility consciousness in workers, and academics, civil rights lawyers, and progressive social change movements have enthusiastically taken up these causes. 2 Meanwhile, the labor movement has fallen into public disfavor, as indicated by the corresponding drop in union density.3 Increasingly, the lines of identity politics divide the workforce more than issues of class unite it.
    [Show full text]
  • In the Liberation Struggle
    11 Latin Rmerican Christians inthe Liberation Struggle Since the Latin American Catholic Bishops the People's United Front. When this failed, due met in Medellin, Colombia in August and September to fragmentation and mistrust on the left and the 1968 to call for basic changes in the region, the repression exercised by the government, he joined Catholic Church has been increasingly polarized the National Liberation Army in the mountains. between those who heard their words from the He soon fell in a skirmish with government troops point of view of the suffering majorities and advised by U.S. counterinsurgency experts. those who heard them from the point of view of Camilo's option for violence has clearly affected the vested interests. The former found in the the attitudes of Latin American Christians, but Medellin documents, as in certain documents of so also has his attempt to build a United Front, the Second Vatican Council and the social ency- as we shall see in the Dominican piece which fol- clicals of Popes Paul VI and John XXIII, the lows. But more importantly, Camilo lent the fire legitimation of their struggles for justice and of committed love to the Christian forces for their condemnations of exploitation and struc- change around the continent. To Camilo it had tures of domination. The Latin American Bishops become apparent that the central meaning of his had hoped that their call published in Medellin Catholic commitment would only be found in the would be enough, all too hastily retreating from love of his neighbor. And he saw still more their public declarations when their implications clearly that love which does not find effective became apparent.
    [Show full text]
  • The Later Han Empire (25-220CE) & Its Northwestern Frontier
    University of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations 2012 Dynamics of Disintegration: The Later Han Empire (25-220CE) & Its Northwestern Frontier Wai Kit Wicky Tse University of Pennsylvania, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations Part of the Asian History Commons, Asian Studies Commons, and the Military History Commons Recommended Citation Tse, Wai Kit Wicky, "Dynamics of Disintegration: The Later Han Empire (25-220CE) & Its Northwestern Frontier" (2012). Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 589. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/589 This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/589 For more information, please contact [email protected]. Dynamics of Disintegration: The Later Han Empire (25-220CE) & Its Northwestern Frontier Abstract As a frontier region of the Qin-Han (221BCE-220CE) empire, the northwest was a new territory to the Chinese realm. Until the Later Han (25-220CE) times, some portions of the northwestern region had only been part of imperial soil for one hundred years. Its coalescence into the Chinese empire was a product of long-term expansion and conquest, which arguably defined the egionr 's military nature. Furthermore, in the harsh natural environment of the region, only tough people could survive, and unsurprisingly, the region fostered vigorous warriors. Mixed culture and multi-ethnicity featured prominently in this highly militarized frontier society, which contrasted sharply with the imperial center that promoted unified cultural values and stood in the way of a greater degree of transregional integration. As this project shows, it was the northwesterners who went through a process of political peripheralization during the Later Han times played a harbinger role of the disintegration of the empire and eventually led to the breakdown of the early imperial system in Chinese history.
    [Show full text]
  • The Party-State in China's Military-Industrial Complex: Implications for US National Security
    Testimony before the U.S.- China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing on "U.S. Investment in China's Capital Markets and Military-Industrial Complex" The Party-State in China’s Military-Industrial Complex: Implications for U.S. National Security Jason Arterburn Program Director, the Center for Advanced Defense Studies Friday, March 19, 2021 [Type here] US-China Economic Security Review Testimony Introduction China’s domestic political economy exposes the United States to national security risks that our regulatory systems are not well equipped to address. China’s commercial system blurs public and private distinctions, which have become even less meaningful under General Secretary Xi Jinping as the party-state has become resurgent in the commercial sector. While the U.S. policymaking community has largely acknowledged the risks of U.S. exposure to China’s military- industrial base, our regulatory community still faces challenges in how to identify and mitigate risks. This is largely because “the analytical frameworks that many of us are using to understand China’s economy are stuck in past paradigms” that do not reflect the “entirely new political- economic order” that China’s system has produced as both an emergent and intentional phenomenon.1 Experts like James Mulvenon, Anna Puglisi, William Hannas, Didi Kirsten Tatlow, and others have previously produced extensive analyses of China’s technology acquisition ambitions and military-civil fusion system, which have provided the policymaking community with a comprehensive overview of China’s technology acquisition system and its changes over the last decade. In this testimony, I seek to complement their work by contextualizing China’s military-industrial base against the backdrop of recent changes in China’s political economy, with the goal of developing a framework that policymakers and the business community can use to mitigate national security risk as General Secretary Xi Jinping continues to pursue illiberal governance reforms.
    [Show full text]
  • Rise of China and the Cross-Strait Relations by Philip Yang National Taiwan University
    tik 5th Europe-Northeast Asia Forum i The Taiwan Strait and Northeast Asian Security Berlin, 15-17 December 2005 A conference jointly organised by Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Berlin, the Korean Institute for International Studies (KIIS), Seoul, and the Federal Ministry of Defence, Berlin Discussion Paper Do Note Cite or Quote without Author’s Permission ftung Wissenschaft und Pol Sti Rise of China and the Cross-Strait Relations by Philip Yang National Taiwan University German Institute for International and Security Affairs SWP Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4 10719 Berlin Phone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 www.swp-berlin.org In East Asia, the rise of China has dominated most regional policy discussion and deliberation. In almost every field of regional concerns, China’s rise has posed new challenges and brought profound implications. The impacts of China's rise on cross-strait relations are also heatedly discussed in Taiwan’s academia as well as media. China’s surging economy and newfound political clout expand its tool box in handling cross-strait relations and complicate U.S. role in dealing with the cross-strait political and military stalemate. With its missile deployments directed at Taiwan and the adoption of an anti-secession law threatening the use of force to deter Taiwan’s pursuance of de jure independence, China’s coercive cross-strait policy could severely challenge the island and its most important ally, the United States. However, China’s rising economic power and political status in the region have also been translated into a growing pool of “soft” power, affording Beijing increasing leverage on cross-strait issues.
    [Show full text]
  • The Taiwan Issue and the Normalization of US-China Relations Richard Bush, Brookings Institution Shelley Rigger, Davidson Colleg
    The Taiwan Issue and the Normalization of US-China Relations Richard Bush, Brookings Institution Shelley Rigger, Davidson College The Taiwan Issue in US-China Normalization After 1949, there were many obstacles to normalization of relations between the United States and the new People’s Republic of China (PRC), but Taiwan was no doubt a key obstacle. The Kuomintang-led Republic of China (ROC) government and armies had retreated there. Washington maintained diplomatic relations with the ROC government and, in 1954-55, acceded to Chiang Kai-shek’s entreaties for a mutual defense treaty. After June 1950 with the outbreak of the Korean conflict, the United States took the position that the status of the island of Taiwan— whether it was part of the sovereign territory of China—was “yet to be determined.” More broadly, PRC leaders regarded the United States as a threat to their regime, particularly because of its support for the ROC, and American leaders viewed China as a threat to peace and stability in East Asia and to Taiwan, which they saw as an ally in the containment of Asian communism in general and China in particular. It was from Taiwan’s Ching Chuan Kang (CCK) airbase, for example, that U.S. B-52s flew bombing missions over North Vietnam. By the late 1960s, PRC and U.S. leaders recognized the strategic situation in Asia had changed, and that the geopolitical interests of the two countries were not in fundamental conflict. Jimmy Carter and Deng Xiaoping not only reaffirmed that assessment but also recognized a basis for economic cooperation.
    [Show full text]
  • China's Capacity to Manage Infectious Diseases
    China’s Capacity to Manage Infectious Diseases CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & Global Implications CSIS INTERNATIONAL STUDIES A Report of the CSIS Freeman Chair in China Studies 1800 K Street | Washington, DC 20006 PROJECT DIRECTOR Tel: (202) 887-0200 | Fax: (202) 775-3199 Charles W. Freeman III E-mail: [email protected] | Web: www.csis.org PROJECT EDITOR Xiaoqing Lu March 2009 ISBN 978-0-89206-580-6 CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & Ë|xHSKITCy065806zv*:+:!:+:! CSIS INTERNATIONAL STUDIES China’s Capacity to Manage Infectious Diseases Global Implications A Report of the CSIS Freeman Chair in China Studies PROJECT DIRECTOR Charles W. Freeman III PROJECT EDITOR Xiaoqing Lu March 2009 About CSIS In an era of ever-changing global opportunities and challenges, the Center for Strategic and Inter- national Studies (CSIS) provides strategic insights and practical policy solutions to decisionmak- ers. CSIS conducts research and analysis and develops policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change. Founded by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke at the height of the Cold War, CSIS was dedicated to the simple but urgent goal of finding ways for America to survive as a nation and prosper as a people. Since 1962, CSIS has grown to become one of the world’s preeminent public policy institutions. Today, CSIS is a bipartisan, nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C. More than 220 full-time staff and a large network of affiliated scholars focus their expertise on defense and security; on the world’s regions and the unique challenges inherent to them; and on the issues that know no boundary in an increasingly connected world.
    [Show full text]