Lecture 2: What Ethics is Not Jim Pryor – “Guidelines on Reading Philosophy” Peter Singer – “What Ethics is Not”

1 Agenda

1. Review: Theoretical Ethics, Applied Ethics, Metaethics 2. What Ethics is Not 1. Sexual Morality 2. Good in Theory, but Not in Practice 3. Necessarily Religious 4. Relative or Subjective 3. Reading Philosophy Preview Annotate Evaluate Do it again

2 What is Ethics?

• Theoretical Ethics (Normative or First Order Ethics) • Provides systematic accounts of what makes an action right or wrong or what makes someone virtuous or vicious

• Applied Ethics (Practical Ethics) • Considers what should be done on specific practical issues

• Metaethics (Second Order Ethics) • Studies the nature of morality (for example, is morality objective or subjective? or what are the origins of morality?) Should We Have an Ethical Theory?

• A systematic account of right action or virtuous character may help guide our behavior or enable us to live better lives. • In particular, an ethical theory can help us to resolve moral dilemmas or to make difficult ethical decisions. • An ethical theory can unify (and revise) our particular moral judgments on various issues. • An ethical theory can help provide our (practical and moral) identity with coherence in terms of how we see ourselves and live our lives.

4 What Ethics is Not

According to Peter Singer, ethics is not: 1. Sexual morality 2. An ideal system that is only good in theory but not in practice 3. Only intelligible in a religious context 4. Relative or subjective

5 NOT: Sexual Morality

• Is it really true that “sex raises no unique moral issues at all” and that “there are more important ethical issues [than sexual morality] to be considered” (2)? • Sure, “puritanical” prohibitions about sex may not be especially important to philosophize about. However, sex work, sexual assault, embodiment, relationships, and love are important ethical issues.

6 NOT: An Ideal—Good in Theory, Not Practice

“The reverse of this is closer to the truth: an ethical judgment that is no good in practice must suffer from a theoretical defect as well, for the whole point of ethical judgments is to guide practice” (2).

7 NOT: Only Intelligible in a Religious Context

• Should ethics be a completely secular endeavor? Why or why not? • Plato famously argued that “if the gods approve of some actions it must be because those actions are good, in which case it cannot be the gods’ approval that makes them good” (3). In other words, truths about ethics (or goodness) must be independent of what God or the gods think.

8 NOT: Relative or Subjective

Ethical Relativism: Ethics is relative to particular societies. • Ethical judgments are only true or false for a given society. Ethical Subjectivism: Ethics is relative to particular persons. • Ethical judgments are only true or false for a given individual. Ethical Objectivism: Ethics is objective, and not relative to particular societies or persons. • Ethical judgments are true or false (period) for all societies and all individuals. Why might one believe ethical relativism, subjectivism, or objectivism? What are the motivations underlying these positions?

9 NOT: Relative or Subjective

Criticisms of Ethical Relativism: 1. There is no basis for choosing between conflicting moral views from different societies. 2. Relativism cannot account for the nonconformist.

10 NOT: Subjective

Criticism of ethical subjectivism: 1. Ethical subjectivism cannot account for ethical disagreement.

11 More Nuanced Theories of Subjectivism

Some more nuanced theories of subjectivism deny there are moral facts existing independently of us. • Expressivism: ethical judgments are neither true nor false. They do not describe any objective moral facts, but instead express attitudes. (C. L. Stevenson) • Ethical judgments are commands, but not statements of facts. (R. M. Hare) • Thinking that there are objective moral standards is an error (J. L. Mackie). How do these more nuanced theories of subjectivism avoid some of the problems besetting less sophisticated versions of ethical relativism or subjectivism? 12 Ethical Reasoning

• It doesn’t follow from the claim that there are no moral facts, that “ethical judgments are immune from criticism, that there is no role for reason or argument in ethics, and that, from the stand point of reason, any ethical judgment is as good as any other” (7-8). Do you agree or disagree with this claim by Peter Singer? Why? • “The non-existence of a mysterious realm of objective ethical facts does not imply the non-existence of ethical reasoning” (8). 13 Deontologists, Consequentialists, and Utilitarians • Deontologists “think that ethics is a system of rules.” • “Consequentialists start not with moral rules but with goals” • “The classical utilitarian regards an action as right if it produces as much or more of an increase in happiness of all affected by it than any alternative action, and wrong if it does not” (3).

14 Theoretical Ethics

1. Utilitarianism 2. Mohism (A Kind of Utilitarianism?) 3. Deontology 4. Virtue Ethics 5. Confucianism (A Kind of Virtue Ethics?) 6. The Social Contract Theory 7. Feminist Ethics

15 Reading Philosophy

Every time you read, make sure you get PAED. Preview the text • Skim the text to find its organizational structure. • Try to find its main conclusion. Active reading • Annotate and highlight. • Circle key terms or definitions. • Write questions and objections in the margins. • Diagram or outline the article’s main argumentative pieces. • Identify reasons and premises offered in favor of an argument. Evaluate • Do you agree or disagree with article’s main argument and why? • What flaws might there be in an author’s reasoning? • Is the author making assumptions that you think should be challenged? Do it again! • Reread, reread, reread! 16 Chapter 2: What utilitarianism is

The doctrine that the basis of morals is utility, or the greatest happiness principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong in proportion as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By ‘happiness’ is meant pleasure and the absence of pain; by ‘unhappiness’ is meant pain and the lack of pleasure.

17 Chapter 2: What utilitarianism is

The doctrine that the basis of morals is utility, or the greatest happiness principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong in proportion as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By ‘happiness’ is meant pleasure and the absence of pain; by ‘unhappiness’ is meant pain and the lack of pleasure.

18 Chapter 2: What utilitarianism is

The doctrine that the basis of morals is utility, or the Annotate/Evaluate: greatest happiness principle, holds that actions are One implication of right in proportion as they tend to promote what Mill says here is happiness, wrong in proportion as they tend to that rightness and wrongness is a sliding produce the reverse of happiness. By ‘happiness’ is scale and comes in meant pleasure and the absence of pain; by degrees. Actions are ‘unhappiness’ is meant pain and the lack of pleasure. right or wrong in proportion as to whether they tend to promote happiness or unhappiness.

19 ·Higher and Lower Pleasures·

It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognise that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. In estimating ·the value of· anything else, we take into account •quality as well as •quantity; it would be absurd if the value of pleasures were supposed to depend on •quantity alone. ‘What do you mean by “difference of quality in pleasures”? What, according to you, makes one pleasure •more valuable than another, merely as a pleasure, if not its being •greater in amount?’ There is only one possible answer to this. Pleasure P1 is more desirable than pleasure P2 if: all or almost all people who have had experience of both give a decided preference to P1, irrespective of any feeling that they ought to prefer it.

20 ·Higher and Lower Pleasures·

It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to Mill: Some pleasure are more recognise that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable valuable than other pleasures and more valuable than others. In estimating ·the value of· because of their quality, not anything else, we take into account •quality as well as just their quantity. •quantity; it would be absurd if the value of pleasures were supposed to depend on •quantity alone. ‘What do you mean by “difference of quality in pleasures”? What, according to you, makes one pleasure •more valuable than another, merely as a pleasure, if not its being •greater in amount?’ There is only one possible answer to this. Pleasure P1 is more desirable than pleasure P2 if: all or almost all people who have had experience of both give a decided preference to P1, irrespective of any feeling that they ought to prefer it.

21 ·Higher and Lower Pleasures·

It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to Mill: Some pleasure are more recognise that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable valuable than other pleasures and more valuable than others. In estimating ·the value of· because of their quality, not anything else, we take into account •quality as well as just their quantity. •quantity; it would be absurd if the value of pleasures were Objection: How do we supposed to depend on •quantity alone. determine whether a pleasure ‘What do you mean by “difference of quality in is more valuable because of its pleasures”? What, according to you, makes one pleasure quality? •more valuable than another, merely as a pleasure, if not its being •greater in amount?’ There is only one possible answer to this. Pleasure P1 is more desirable than pleasure P2 if: all or almost all people who have had experience of both give a decided preference to P1, irrespective of any feeling that they ought to prefer it.

22 ·Higher and Lower Pleasures·

It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to Mill: Some pleasure are more recognise that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable valuable than other pleasures and more valuable than others. In estimating ·the value of· because of their quality, not anything else, we take into account •quality as well as just their quantity. •quantity; it would be absurd if the value of pleasures were Objection: How do we supposed to depend on •quantity alone. determine whether a pleasure ‘What do you mean by “difference of quality in is more valuable because of its pleasures”? What, according to you, makes one pleasure quality? •more valuable than another, merely as a pleasure, if not its Mill’s Answer: If all or most being •greater in amount?’ There is only one possible answer people who have experienced to this. both pleasures prefer one over Pleasure P1 is more desirable than pleasure P2 if: all or almost all the other pleasure, then that people who have had experience of both give a decided preference pleasure is more valuable. to P1, irrespective of any feeling that they ought to prefer it.

23 ·Setting the Standard too High?·

The objectors to utilitarianism can’t be accused of always representing it in a •discreditable light. On the contrary, objectors who have anything like a correct idea of its disinterested character sometimes find fault with utilitarianism’s standard as being •too high for humanity. To require people always to act from the •motive of promoting the general interests of society—that is demanding too much, they say. But this is to mistake the very meaning of a standard of morals, and confuse the •rule of action with the •motive for acting. It is the business of ethics to tell us what are our duties, or by what test we can know them; but no system of ethics requires that our only motive in everything we do shall be a feeling of duty; on the contrary, ninety-nine hundredths of all our actions are done from other motives, and rightly so if the •rule of duty doesn’t condemn them.

24 ·Setting the Standard too High?·

The objectors to utilitarianism can’t be accused of always representing it in a •discreditable light. On the contrary, objectors who have anything like a correct idea of its disinterested character sometimes find fault with utilitarianism’s standard as being •too high for humanity. To require people always to act from the •motive of promoting the general interests of society—that is demanding too much, they say. But this is to mistake the very meaning of a standard of morals, and confuse the •rule of action with the •motive for acting. It is the business of ethics to tell us what are our duties, or by what test we can know them; but no system of ethics requires that our only motive in everything we do shall be a feeling of duty; on the contrary, ninety-nine hundredths of all our actions are done from other motives, and rightly so if the •rule of duty doesn’t condemn them.

25 ·Setting the Standard too High?·

The objectors to utilitarianism can’t be accused of always What if the objector representing it in a •discreditable light. On the contrary, objectors who have anything like a correct idea of its criticized utilitarianism disinterested character sometimes find fault with as a rule of action and utilitarianism’s standard as being •too high for humanity. To not just as a motive for require people always to act from the •motive of promoting action? the general interests of society—that is demanding too much, they say. But this is to mistake the very meaning of a standard Criticism: Utilitarianism of morals, and confuse the •rule of action with the •motive for demands too much acting. It is the business of ethics to tell us what are our duties, from people, not in or by what test we can know them; but no system of ethics requires that our only motive in everything we do shall be a terms of what their feeling of duty; on the contrary, ninety-nine hundredths of all motives should be, but our actions are done from other motives, and rightly so if the in terms of what they •rule of duty doesn’t condemn them. have to do in order to act morally. 26