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Home , Ethical subjectivism, Moral sense theory, Objectivism, Samuel Clarke, William Frankena

MORAL SENSE AND THE OF

Robert Samuel Henderson

A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Graduate Department of Philosophy University of Toronto

@ 1998 by Robert Samuel Henderson National library Biblioth&que nationale du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliographic Services sewices bibliographiques 395 Wellington Street 395. rue Wellington OttawaON K1AW Ottawa ON KIA ON4 Canada Canada

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The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriete du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protege cette these. thesis nor substantial extracts fiom it Ni la thkse ni des extraits substantiels may be printed or otherwise de de-ci ne doivent titre imprimes reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation. ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS Moral Sense and the Ontology of Value by Robert Samuel Henderson Ph-D., 1998

Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto The thesis examines the ontology of value in the ethical theories of Shaftesbury. Hutcheson and Hume. These three philosophers jointly constitute the 'moral sense school' in eighteenth century . Ethical and ethical subjectivismt as I use these terms, are contrasting claims about the nature of value. 'Ethical objectivism' refers roughly to any theory according to which moral values are or are logically entailed by matters of fact which are independent of the evaluative responses of persons considering the character and actions of people, and of places and times. 'Ethical ' refers to any theory which claims that moral values are at least partly constituted by the responses of persons considering character and actions, or dependent on places and times. The thesis shows an interesting movement in moral ontology away from the objectivism of Shaftesbury to the subjectivist theory of Hume which effectively highlights some of the interesting differences between the three theories. The thesis is of historical interest since the demonstration of differences in moral ontology makes it less attractive to regard the three theories as a family. ACKNOWLED~S

I wish to thank a number of people- Professor William Blissett of the university of Toronto read drafts, challenged choices of expression, made concrete suggestions and provided exactly the right sort of support when it was most needed. Professor Ron Bontekoe of the University of Hawaii, in addition to regular encouragement throughout, gave me a strong, well-timed push for which I will

always be grateful. Professor Don Wiebe of College at the University of Toronto first introduced me to philosophy. Dr. Rob Pierson read drafts, made suggestions and offered encouragement throughout. Professor Plll kdal of Queen's University in Kingston introduced me to and eighteenth century British philosophy. Pbllls influence in what follows will be evident to those familiar with his contribution to Hume scholarship. My Area Committee included Professors Robert Irnlay, Howard Sobel and Fred Wilson of the University of Toronto, I thank them for their interest. f am especially grateful to Howard Sobel for his critical reflection and willingness to supervise this project to its completion. My family have also been supportive. Specifically, my mother and father helped in every way that they could. My parents-in-law, Betty and the late Bruce Black, supported me as they would one of their own children. Patricia, my wife, has made many to help me to finish my work. I dedicate this thesis to her and to our son Bruce. PREFACS

This thesis deals extensively with philosophical works by certain eighteenth-century British writers. I have enjoyed reading the original material, not only for its philosophical interest, but also because of the aesthetic qualities of the writing, some of which will be evident in passages I quote in what follows. I have made certain choices about quotations which should be explained. Eighteenth-century printing conventions included capitalization of nouns and extensive use of italics, which are generally removed from modem editions. Modern editions of the principal philosophical works of Shaftesbury and Hume are widely and easily accessible. On the other hand, modem publication of Hutchesonfs works and writings of some of the other authors cited in what follows are often facsimile reproductions. To simplify reading and comparison of these authors, I have taken the of observing modem conventions and removed unnecessary capitals and italics from quotations. I did not feel it was necessary either to change non-standard spellings or to indicate so many instances by the customary IIS~C.~ I have retained "sicw in the many instances in which Hume uses mistaken spellings of other philosophers' names. Finally, in quotes which follow, eighteenth-century non-ultimate esses (the ones that look like effs) have been changed to modern esses. TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ii

PREFACE iii

1: THE MORAL SENSE SCHOOL AND MORAL VALUE 1

2: SHAFTESBURY: ETHICAL OBJECTIVISM AND MORAL SENSE

3: HUTCHESON'S THEORY OF MOW VALUE: THE fNQUfRY

4: HUTCHESON'S THEORY OF MORAL VALUE:

THE ESSAY AND ILLUSTRATIONS

5: HUME'S THEORY OF MORAL VALUE

6: TEE MORAL SENSE SCHOOL

Appendix - A NOTE ON TEK 'ADVERTISEMENT' OF 1777

BIBLXOGRAPEY

VITA THE MORAL SENSE SCHOOL AND MORAL VALUE

1.1 Ontolocw of Value and Moral Sense. Are moral values objective or subjective? Ethical theories are sometimes distinguished by the answer they give to this question. LL. Mackie has contributed one of the best-known recent discussions of the ontology of moral value. His own opinion is clearly indicated in the very first of his book: DThere are no objective values."' This thesis concerns answers given to the above question by one group of early- modern philosophers. In it I explore claims about the ontology of value in what has become known in the history of philosophy as the 'moral sense school' of . Anthony Ashley Cooper (the third Earl of Shaftesbury), Francis Hutcheson and David Hume jointly constitute the moral sense school. There are definite lines of influence running from Shaftesbury to Hutcheson through to Hume which have made it convenient for historians of philosophy to group them together. The main question of the thesis will be to determine whether this so-called school shares an ontology of moral value.

1.2 Objectivism and Subiectivism. This thesis concerns the nature of moral value in moral sense theory. Specifically, in senses shortly to be explained, are moral values

J.L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventins Risht and Wronq, 15. 2 objective or subjective? The thesis will determine what each philosopher means by "moral sensen, "sense of right and wrongn or "moral sentimentw. It will address whether and in what way the moral faculty is intended to be analogous to physical sense, or , or whatever. Although it will face questions of moral , language and psychology, its central concern is the ontology of moral value. For these philosophers, what is a moral fact? Here are some examples of moral sentences: "Honesty is a ," "Friendship in the midst of adversity is ," and "Lying is wrong.11 Virtue, vice, rightness, wrongness, goodness, , duty and obligation express, grammatically speaking, predicates in moral sentences and are examples of what I refer to as moral values. Whatever else they are, affirmations of moral values are action- guiding or prescriptive; they tell people what to do or be. Are moral values, such as goodness or obligation, matters of objective fact about persons or actions or are they matters of the way persons respond to people or actions? 'Ethical objectivismr and ,', in this thesis, refer to contrasting of moral value. Roughly, a theory is objectivist if it claims that moral values do not depend on people's attitudes, beliefs, conventions or places and times. Ethical subjectivism, again roughly, is partly a denial that there are moral values of the sort claimed by objectivism and partly an attempt to explain moral values some other way. As a correlate to objectivism the term is handy but not entirely satisfactory. Subjectivism refers most obviously to the of but I will take it more broadly to include theories according to which moral values depend not only on people's attitudes or beliefs but also on conventions, places or times. The issue of objectivism is important. As Mackie put it, "the main tradition of European philosophy" and ordinary moral language "includes the contrary claim, that there are objective values of just the sortw that a minority dissenting tradition represented by Mackie denies .2

Ethical objectivism, somewhat less roughly and more specifically, refers to any theory according to which moral values are or are entailed by matters of fact which are independent of the evaluative responses of persons making moral judgments about characters or actions, and of places and times. On an objectivist theory, moral values are action-guiding or prescriptive things which are or are logically entailed by properties or qualities of persons or actions which do not depend on the , attitudes, feelings or desires of the person making the moral judgment. The of what is asserted in a moral sentence is independent of the person who uses the sentence, and the time and place at which it is spoken. According to an

2 Ibid. 30 4 objectivist interpretation, the sentence "Honesty is a virtuem, if true, is true, everywhere and always. It would be true even in a world in which the ability to tell plausible lies was amusing, admired and necessary for social stability. To appreciate its truth is to be motivated, at least somewhat, in favour of honesty. One qualification is necessary to the idea that objectivist values are independent of time and place, for a moral sentence may contain an implicit or explicit reference to a particular time or place. For example, a person who promisee to be at a particular place at a particular time has a prima facie moral obligation which depends both on time and place. An objectivist theory can maintain that it is the promising itself which entails the obligation rather than the content of the promise, so that the obligation to fulfil the promise remains independent of the time and place mentioned in the promise. Ethical subjectivism refers broadly to ethical theories which claim that there are no objectivist moral values and explain moral values some other way. More specifically, it refers especially to theories according to which moral judgments about characters and actions are judgments about the way persons considering people and actions react to them, about the way persons think or feel about people or actions. Moral judgments depend on the responses, beliefs or attitudes of persons making moral judgments or on places 5

and times. Many sorts of subjectivist theory are possible.

For instance, on a subjectivist theory the sentence "Honesty is a virtuen might mean that "Honesty is a generally useful quality of which I personally approve." Another subjectivist theory might interpret moral judgments in terms

of the approvals of people generally. The action- guidingness or prescriptivity of moral values can be seen to be the natural result of the sort of thing moral values are, emotional and motivation-laden responses of people to situations. The distinction between objectivist and subjectivist theories is not always clear. Consider a theory which claims that only certain subjective states of persons, for example, or desire satisfaction, are morally valuable. This theory also claims that moral goodness, always and everywhere, is happiness or the satisfaction of desire respectively. At first glance one might categorise this as a version of objectivism because of the "always and everywherem qualification. However, the subjective states themselves raise questions because happiness and desire

satisfaction presumably depend on the evaluative responses of the persons in question, as well as on places and times.

his suggests that such a theory could also be cast as a subj ectivism. A theory similar to one of the examples of ethical subjectivism might claim that virtue is a quality of which 6 people generally approve. If the theory, explicitly or implicitly, goes on to claim that people in all conceivable circumstances will approve of the same qualities then calling this particular theory an objectivism or a subjectivism, without qualification, is problematic. On the subjectivist side, there is the dependence of moral value on the approval of people. On the objectivist side there is the independence from places and times of the qualities which are the objects of approval. Would a theory which claims that moral value depends on the laws and conventions of particular times and places be a version of objectivism or subjectivism? This would depend on a number of variables. For instance, if the theory were to claim that it is always and evewhere morally right to lfollow the laws and conventions of the time and place in which one is, then it would be objectivist, even though the content of laws and conventions varies. On the other hand, if the theory used the idea of conventions to explain the origin of moral values in a world in which there are no objectivist moral values, then it would be a form of subjectivism. Again, a theory could explain the origin of some moral practices as the result of convention without claiming at the same time that there are no objective moral values. The 'places and times8 qualification in the definitions of objectivism and subjectivism is necessary to highlight 7 the claim of objectivism that moral values are fully objective. Platofs 'form of the good1 is an illustration of what would be an objectivist value. The form of the good would be eternal and independent of human awareness of it. of the good would tell the philosopher kings what to seek and, because of their knowledge of the good, they could be trusted to act accordingly. For to know the good would be to love it. Further distinctions are sometimes necessary to define actual theories clearly. For instance, there is the distinction between internalist and externalist theories in ethics. 'Internalist' theories claim, roughly, that there is a necessary connection between moral facts and motivation. 'Externalist' theories deny such necessary connection and explain motivation by something external to moral facts themselves. To illustrate this with a twentieth-century example, H.A. Prichard seems to be an objectivist in holding that moral facts are entailed only by describing matters of fact which themselves do not entail anything about anyone's actual beliefs or attitudes, or about particular places or times. At the same time he claims that any person who frecognizes' or

'appreciates' an obligation is moved by this cognition.' This theory might be described as a 'content externalism' and a 'cognitive internalism.' It does not follow from the

"Does Moral Philosophy rest on a Mistake?* , 1912. 8 content of the judgment that "1 ought to do Xm that I actually have a certain response, but it does follow from the claim that I ap~reciatethe content that I have a certain actual response, and so it follows from the content that I would have that response were I to appreciate it.

The content of the judgment is independent of actual responses, but is not independent of actual responses conditional on coqnitions. There is a further complication in the description of objectivism and subjectivism which will be important in what follows. This has to do with the idea of independence in the definition of objectivism and so with the question what makes a quality objective. Before describing the complication I briefly review some familiar distinctions. Locke argued for a distinction of primary and secondary qualities of objects. Both are powers to produce ideas. "Primary qualities,It he writes, are "utterly inseparable from the body, in what estate soever it been4 Solidity, extension, figure, mobility and number are qualities of objects everywhere and always. llSecondary qualitiesn, he writes, "are nothing in the objects themselves, but powers to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities, i.e. by the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of their insensible parts."' Secondary qualities stand

Essav Concernins Human Understandinq. 11, viii, 10.

Ibid., 11, viii, 10- 9 somewhere between fully-objective primary qualities and of the mind. The secondary qualities of objects are the powers of objects to produce the corresponding sensible ideas (sensations) in us. It is important to distinguish the power from the idea of a secondary quality. Considered as a power, a secondary quality resides in the object by virtue of the object's primary qualities and our dispositions to be affected by it and made to have certain perceptions. Locke is careful to note that the powers of objects do not change. Even in the dark an object retains the power of producing ideas of colour in observers in the that suitable conditions arise. Although he sometimes calls ideas "secondary qualitiesm, he is committed to a distinction between the ideas and their origin in qualities of objects. The colour 'yellow' is an example of a secondary quality. Speaking unreflectively I take this to refer to a quality of the surface of certain objects, such as the colour of a favorite shirt. Philosophy leads me to adopt Lockets secondary-quality terminology and speak of yellow as a power to produce an idea which does not resemble the actual qualities of objects that are causally responsible for it. There are three possible interpretation of secondary qualities, two of which will be important in what follows. According to the first, a secondary quality theorist, might 10 identify 'yellowr with a specific or subjective experience. This is a strongly subjectivist conception of secondary qualities. Lockers claim that the secondary qualities of objects have their basis in the primary qualities of objects and our dispositions to be affected by them shows that he did not hold this inteqretation. We shall see that neither Hutcheson nor Hume believe this either. A second interpretation focusses on the causes of our ideas of secondary qualities. Now the causes of a perception of yellow may differ with circumstances in this or other worlds. If this theorist went on to claim that moral values (e.g., goodness, rightness, virtue) are secondary, then wherever these qualities are perceived they are, and the circumstances which excited their ideas could also vary in ways analogous to those in which colour perceptions actually or conceivably differ. Certain qualities of persons or actions are powers, in this world, to excite moral impressions, and identical qualities could cause contradictory impressions in conceivable circumstances. On this interpretation of moral values as secondary, they would be dependent on the responses, beliefs and attitudes of people, and/or on places and times. A third interpretation of secondary qualities would identify yellow, not with the appearance of yellow, nor even with the power but with the physical basis in objects of the power which causes them to appear yellow to ordinary observers in normal sunlight. According to a modem version of this sort of conception, yellow is a 'reflective qualityt of objects, specifically the quality of objects which reflect light predominantly in the the band 5900 +/- 50 angstroms. the quality which is the physical basis of the power of such objects to appear yellow. This physical basis of that power is independent of the responsiveness of observers and of places and times. In a world in which responses were different, different objects could have the power to excite yellow perceptions but the property of reflecting light around 5900 angstroms would be the same. According to the theory of the previous paragraph, in a world with different responses, different objects are yellow. According to the physical qualities, basis-theory of this paragraph, the same objects are yellow even though they do not appear yellow. Yellow in this theory is a quality of objects which is independent of the responsiveness of perceivers. If a physical-basis sort of theorist understands moral values as secondary qualities, then they would not depend on the responsiveness of observers. Of the moral sense philosophers, Hutcheson and Hume often compare moral qualities to standard secondary qualities. To determine whether their theories are objectivist or subjectivist it will be necessary to examine what they mean by these comparisons. 12

The above definitions and qualifications are not perfect descriptions of objectivism and subjectivism but they are sufficient to begin an examination of the moral ontology of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Hume.

1.3 The Moral Sense School. In the history of philosophy

Shaftesury is often identified as the founder of the moral

sense school. For example, one commentator writes: "Shaftesbury was the first to attribute to a moral sense our ability to distinguish between , virtue and vice? Shaftesbury is sometimes also credited with coining the term "moral sense." D.D. Raphael writes, "It is well known that the phrase 'moral senser was introduced by Shaftesb~ry.~' We shall see that both of these specific

claims about Shaftesburyfs place in moral sense theory are mistaken, but his importance in the deveiopment of moral sense ideas is not thereby diminished.

It is generally agreed that the moral sense theorists taught that human are not purely-selfish creatures but are social as well and that moral distinctions are felt

rather than deduced. The targets of the first thesis were the 8psychological egoists' (especially Hobbes) who claimed

Ebcyclopedia of Philosophv, Edited by Paul Edwards. (1967), s .v. "Moral SenseR by Elmer Sprague.

The Moral Sense (London: Oxford University Press, 1947), 16. 13 that human beings are motivated only by personal interest. Of the egoists Shaftesbury writes: [they] would so explain all the social passions and natural affections as to denominate them of the selfish kind. Thus civility, hospitality, humanity towards strangers or people in distress, is only a more deliberate .' The moral sense philosophers claimed that human beings are additionally motivated by a desire for the happiness of others. The main targets of the second thesis were 'ethical rationalists,' who claimed that reason, acting by itself, is able to discover moral distinctions. Locke, in some places, sounds like such a rationalist, as when he writes that " is capable of demonstration, as well as mat he ma tic^.^^ Other rationalist moralists of the period

include Samuel Clarke and . Shaftesbury,

Hutcheson and Hume agree in grounding ethics in an empirical study of human nature, with a due regard to feeling. Finally, these philosophers also agree in describing the faculty of moral perception as a sense. Certainly nobody would dispute that Shaftesbury is an important figure in the history of moral sense ideas. Oddly enough, however, although the phrase "moral sensen appears several times in headings, he uses it only once in the text of his writings:

' Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humourn (I: 79) .

Essay Book 4, chapter 12, section 8. For notwithstanding a man may through custom, or licentiousness of practice, favoured by , come in time to lose much of his natural moral sense, yet it does not seem that atheism should of itself be the cause of any estimation or valuing of anything as fair, noble and deserving, which was the contrary. (I: 262) lo Shaftesbury writes a great deal about the moral faculty, but almost always under the expression 'sense of right and wrong. So that if a creature be generous, kind, constant, compassionate, yet if he cannot reflect on what he himself does, or sees others do, so as to take notice of what is worthy or honest, and make that notice or conception of worth and honesty to be an object of his affection, he has not the character of virtuous: for thus, and no otherwise, he is capable of having a sense of right and wrong, a sentiment or judgment of what is done through just, equal, and good affections or the contrary. (1:253) In fact it is only with Hutcheson that the term 'moral sense' takes on prominence in a specific theory. Hutcheson writes extensively of a moral sense while indicating a very specific debt in the original title of his first book: Incruirv into the Orisinal of our Ideas of Beautv and Virtue in two Treatises, in which the of the late Earl of Shaftesbury are emlained and defended asainst the Author of the Fable of the Bees. Hutchesonfs own substantial influence on David Hurne is widely accepted.'' In his Treatise Hume himself includes both "My Lord ShaftesburyN and "Mr. Hutchinsonn (sic) in his

lo Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times (1711). The roman numeral indicates the volume and the arabic the page.

1 L Modern appreciation of this influence seems to begin with Norman Kemp Smith Philoso~hvof David Hume (1941) and A.N. Prior Locric and the Basis of Ethics (1949) . list of "late philosophers in England. who have begun to put the science of man on a new footing.Du Hume acknowledges Shaftesbury's influence elsewhere. He writes: What has been proved beyond question by several great moralists of the present age [is] that the social passions are by far the most powerful of any, and that even all the other passions receive from them their chief force and influence. Whoever desires to see this question treated at large, with the greatest force of argument and eloquence. may consult my Lord Shaftesburyts Enauirv concernincr virtue." It might appear pedantic to insist on the term 'sense of right and wrongt for Shaftesbury and reserve the term 'moral sense8 for Hutcheson and perhaps Hume. Shaftesbury certainly uses the term 'sense' to describe the moral faculty and this similarity is one of the chief distinctions between these philosophers and their contemporaries. So one might, for simplicity, choose to use 'moral sense' throughout because this is the term that Hutcheson took over from Shaftesbury and by which historians have chosen to distinguish a family of theories. On the other hand, it is possible that this terminological points to some significant differences between the theories under consideration, and so I will generally retain Shaftesbury8s preferred term, 'sense of right and wrong,' to refer to his idea.

12 Hume (1739) xvii.

13 "Of the Dignity or Meanness of Human Naturen, Comlete Philoso~hical Works, volume 111, 91. indeed many of Shaftesburyfs ideas are anticipated by writers of the previous generation. He may have picked up the phrase from Henry More (1614-1687) who used "sense of virtuen and "inward sensen to describe the moral faculty as early as 1667. More claimed that the capacity for virtue is derived from a special "boniformn faculty which both discovers which actions accord with reason and gives people a taste for those actions. He wrote: Hence it is plain, that supreme happiness is not barely to be placed in the intellect; but her proper seat must be called the boniform faculty of the : namely, a faculty of that divine composition, and texture, as enables us to distinguish not only what is simply and absolutely the best, but to relish it, and to have pleasure in that alone.

So that in short the final judgment upon this matter, is all referred to inward sense, which I confess, I should rather have called, the boniform facultv of the soul. l4 Three passages from other seventeenth-century writers also indicate significant anticipation of opinions which later came to be identified as ideas of the moral sense school. Isaac Barrow, distinguished mathematician and divine, wrote: Since nature therefore hath made our neighbour's misery our , and his content our pleasure; since with indissoluble bands of mutual sympathy she hath concatenated our fortunes and affections together;

14 Henry More, An Account of Virtue, or, Dr. HewMore's Abridgement of Morals put into Enqlish, translated from Enchiridion Ethicum (1667) by Edward Southwell (London: Benj . Took, 1690) 6, 16. since by the discipline of our sense she instructs us, and by the importunity thereof solicits us to the observance of our duty, let us follow her wise directions.

The practice of benignity, of courtesy, of clemency at first sight, without any discursive reflection, doth obtain approbation and applause from us; being no less grateful and amiable to the mind than beauty to the eyes, harmony to the ears, fragrancy to our smell, and sweetness to our palate: and to the same mental sense, malignity, cruelty, hardness, all kinds of uncharitable dealing, are very disgustful and loathsome. There wanteth not any commendation to procure a respect for charity, nor any incentive to breed abhorance of uncharitableness; nature sufficiently prompting to favour the one, and to detest the other.'' John Hartdiffers A Treatise of Moral and Intellectual

Virtues (1691) includes the following passage: [There] is a secret impression upon the minds of men, whereby they are naturally directed to approve some things as good, and avoid other things as evil; just as the creatures below men are by a natural instinct led to their own preservation, and to take care of their young ones. In like manner we find in human nature a propensity to some things that are beneficial, and a loathing of other things, that are hurtful to them; the former appear beautiful and lovely, the latter ugly and deformed. Now these inclinations do not proceed from reason, but from nature, and are antecedent to all discourse, as is manifest from hence, that they are as strong, and do put forth themselves as vigorously in young persons, as in those that are older; they do shew themselves as much in the rude and ignorant sort of people, as in those who are more refined, and better instructed ... so that the providence of appears herein to be wonderfully careful of the happiness and welfare of mankind, in that he hath wrought such inclinations into our natures, as to secure the most

15 Isaac Barrow, Works, (New York: J. C, Riker, 1845) 270, 311. There are no dates attached to the sermons from which the passages are taken. Barrow resigned his professorship in mathematics in favour of a student, , whose greater ability he recognized. Barrow died in 1677. material parts of our duty, in planting in us a natural sense of good and evil. So, it is fair to conclude that these ideas were already current when Shaftesbury began to think about the problems of ethics. Nevertheless, Shaftesbury is still generally regarded by historians of philosophy as the original representative of these lines of thought. One explanation for this is that Shaftesburyts writings were much better known in their day than any of those of his precursors. In the eighty years after its initial publication, the Characteristics went through eleven editions! Another reason for his prominence in discussion of moral sense ideas is the explicit credit which Francis Hutcheson, also widely read and admired in his own day, gives Shaftesbury for the main principles of his ethics.

1.5 Outline of Thesis. The main question of this thesis concerns the nature of moral value in moral sense theories. Most studies of the moral sense school pay little attention to moral ontology, perhaps because these philosophers are often considered as contributing mostly to the development of a psychology of morals. The exercise is worthwhile, however, because of an evident shift in these theories away from what Mackie called "the main tradition of European philosophy," that is, away from ethical objectivism. In the

16 The passages from Barrow and Hartcliffe are cited by R. S . Crane in a X (1932), 203-206. 19 next chapter I consider Shaftesburyfs moral ontology in the Incruirv Concernincr Virtue or Merit, his most systematic work on ethics. Although his theory gives vague answers to a number of important ethical questions, it is possible to attribute a particular sort of ontology to him. his will lead to the discussion in subsequent chapters of whether Hutcheson and Hume agree with Shaftesbury on this point. Hutcheson claims that his own theory is a defence of Shaftesbury's principles. However, he seems to be offering much more than mere explication of his predecessor. In fact, it is only with Hutcheson that the idea of a moral sense becomes an important feature of a full-fledged theory. The third chapter of this thesis examines his Incruirv into the Orisinal of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (1725). The fourth chapter considers An Essav on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions, with Illustrations on the Moral Sense

(1728). A chapter division seemed advisable because of the different subject matter of these his two most historically- influential books, as well as the length of my own exposition. The discussion shows that it would be a mistake to attribute to Hutcheson the same ontology of value as Shaftesbury without a great deal of qualification. The final chapter concerns Hume, easily the best-known of the moral sense philosophers. Most of the chapter deals with the moral ontology of the Treatise of Human Nature

(1739, 1740). The later Encruirv Concernincr the Princi~les 20 of Morals (1751) is considered briefly to deternine whether there is any reason to claim that his moral ontology changed in the Enauirr. The concluding chapter is a brief discussion of what I take to be significant differences and sirniliarities between the three philosophers whose theories I consider. SEAFTESBURY: ETHICAL OBJECTIVISM AND MORAL SENSE

2.1 Introduction

2.1.1 Life and Works. Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third

Earl of Shaftesbury was born in London in 1671. His grandfather, the first Earl, was an important and controversial Whig politician." He took charge of his grandson's upbringing and assigned , his personal physician and friend, the task of the boy's education. Locke employed Elizabeth Birch to be Shaftesburyls teacher and, through her instruction, he became fluent in Greek and Latin by the age of eleven. He spent three years at Winchester School. After Winchester he spent the same number of years on a 'grand tour1 of Europe with his father. He served as a member of Parliament and sat in the House of Lords when he inherited the earldom on his father's death in 1699. He married in 1709 and he and his wife had a son. Shaftesbury was never robust and the London air was especially hard on him. He retired to Naples because of declining health, where he died in 1713. Shaftesbury must have been a remarkable person. He led an extremely active life despite ill health and died young.

17 The first Earl was the "false Achitopheln, nSagacious, Bold, and Turbulent of witn, of Drydents poem which portrays some of the political turmoil in which the Earl played a prominent part. See Absalom and Achito~hel, edited by James and Helen Kinsley (London: Oxford University Press, 1961). For the original Absalom and Achitophel see 11 Samuel 15. Nevertheless, he left a extraordinary literary and philosophical legacy in Characteristics of Men. Manners.

Opinions. Times, first published in 1711. The original two-volume work contains five treatises on a variety of subjects, including An Inwin Concerninq Virtue or Merit, Shaftesburyts most systematic treatment of ethics, on which

2-1.2 Shaftesburv and Locke. Lockers influence on

Shaftesbury can hardly be overestimated since the former was largely responsible for Shaftesburyts own education. The pupil, however, was no blind devotee. He blames Locke no less than Hobbes for a crisis of English moral thinking. In a letter he writes:

'Twas Mr. Lock that struck the home blow (for Mr. Hobbfs character, and base slaveish principles in government took off the poyson of his philosophy). Twas Mr. Lock that struck at all fundamentals, threw all order and virtue out of the world, and made the very ideas of these ... unnatural and without foundation in our minds. Among the "fundamentalsn to which he refers are Lockets rejection of innate ideas, especially in morals, against which Shaftesbury writes:

18 References which follow are to the two volumes of Shaftesbury's characteristics, ed John M. Robertson, The roman numeral refers to the volume and the arabic numeral to the page,

L9 The Inauirv was first published in 1699 in a possibly unauthorized version by John Toland, The title page of the book as it appears in the Characteristics (1711) says that the Indry was "Formerly printed from an Imperfect Copy: Now Corrected and Published entire," The question is not about the time the ideas entered ... but whether the constitution of man be such that, being adult and grown up, at such or such a time, sooner or later [no matter when] the idea and sense of order, administration, and a God will not infallibly, inevitably, necessarily spring up in him.

He claims that Lockets ethical theory deprives virtue of any measure other than fashion and custom: Morality, , equity, depend only on law and will ... And thus neither right nor wrong, virtue nor vice, are anything in themselves; nor is there any trace or idea of them naturally imprinted on human minds. Experience and our catechism teaches us all! I suppose 'tis something of like kind which teaches birds their nests, and how to fly the minute they have full feathers. This passage suggests a concern with Lockets 'ethical

voluntarism,' the idea that what is good or right depends only on the will of a God powerful enough to reward and punish. Shaftesbury writes: Had Mr. Lock been a virtuoso, he would not have philosophised thus. For harmony is the beauty, the accord and proportion of sounds; and harmony is harmony by nature, let particular ears be ever so bad, or let men judge ever so ill of music. So is architecture and its beauty the same and founded in nature, let men's fancy be ever so Gothic ... This same is the case of virtue and honesty. 'O

An important eighteenth-century sense of llvirtuoso~refers to a person who has a general interest in the and sciences. Shaftesbury claims that Lockets relative

ignorance of the arts led him to make claims which a greater familiarity with the arts would discredit.

2 0 Letter to Stanhope, November 7, 1709, 24 These passages on Locke are also interesting in that they show Shaftesbury's that harmony and beauty are independent of particular sensibilities. Yet moral sense theorists are sometimes themselves accused of claiming, or at least implying, that morals are only matters of taste.

2.2 Moral Value: Goodness and Virtue

2.2.1 Shaftesburv's Incruirv. Shaftesbury does not put forward a comprehensive philosophical system. His own antagonism to systematic philosophy is illustrated well by his remark that "the most ingenious way of foolish is by a systemw 1:89 Although he himself does attempt a systematic ethical theory in An Inquiw Concerninq Virtue or Merit, commentators are hard-pressed to pin him down on many issues. One eighteenth-century critic complained that, in interpreting Shaftesbury "the formalist is under a double difficulty: not only to conquer his enemy, but to find him.n2L D-D. Raphael wrote that "no coherent view can be extracted from Shaftesbury about the moral faculty or about moral theory in generaLn2' While agreeing with these commentators on the difficulty of interpreting Shaftesbury, I find on consideration that the Inauirv shows that

21 John Brown, Essavs on the Characteristics (3rd edn.; London, 13521, 9.

22 The Moral Sense, 17, Shaftesbury does hold one of the moral ontologies I have identified. The first book of the Inquirv examines the extent to which religious opinion and a virtuous character are connected. The second book considers the relationship between virtue and happiness. The question of the first book, "how any of these [religious] opinions, or this want of any certain opinion, may possibly consist with virtue and merit, or be compatible with an honest or moral character," requires an examination of "what honesty or virtue is, considered by itselfn (I:242 , 238) .23 He takes this up in Book I, part ii, and this chapter of my thesis will consider this section of the Inquiry in some detail. The possible religious opinions he considers in the first part of book one are 'atheismr (by which he understands a denial of or order in the miverse), 'daemonism' (the belief that the governing is not absolutely and necessarily good), '' (the belief "that everything is governed, ordered, regulated for the best, by a designing principle or mind, necessarily good and permanentn) and '' (the belief that there is more than one good governing principle, I:240). I will

7 3 The OED gives an eighteenth-century sense of "honestn as "of good moral character, virtuous, upright." For Shaftesbury, "honestyn is synonymous with "virtuen and not to be confused with wt~th-tellingn,which would be a sub-category of his sense of honesty. The synonymy appears awkward because we can easily conceive situations in which honesty (truth- telling) conflicts with benevolence. Shaftesbury does not seem to be aware of this sort of conflict. 26 follow his terminology however it is worth pointing out that what Shaftesbury calls theism is what is normally understood by '.' The relationship of these possible opinions to his moral theory will become apparent. That he regards all of these as possible opinions about the origin of the universe illustrates his own stated convictions of the limitations of human knowledge of the ultimate ends of nature (1:243). In the Inwirv he nowhere suggests that any of these opinions is demonstrable, although he himself in an intelligently-ordered, harmonious universe .24 In the second part of the first book Shaftesbury asks "what that quality is to which we give the name goodness or virtuen (1:244), which brings us to the beginning of an examination of his moral ontology.

2.2.2 Harmony and Goodness. Shaftesbury's examples show that goodness or natural value is the same as or is entailed by a certain sort of 'harmonioust relationship between

2 4 In Shaftesburv' s Philoso~hyof and Ethics (Athens, Ohio : Ohio University Press, 1967) Stanley Grean claims that Shaftesbury accepted that the of God could be demonstrated by some variation of the (52 ff .) . The passages which Grean uses to support this claim are from the words of Theocles in Shaftesbury's dialogue Moralists. Although much of what Theoclee expresses about morals agrees with Shaftesburyts Inmiry it does not follow that Theocles speaks always for the author. Shaftesburyrsconsideration of a wide variety of possible religious opinions suggests that these were matters which he regarded as %ard for any one justly to determine" as he puts it in the Incmir~(Shaftesbury 1711, 1:243). Indeed, in light of his above claim, Grean himself makes the curious admission that Shaftesbury "recognized that apart from his vision of Nature could not convince the human mindn (59)- creatures. He uses linguistic or conceptual analysis to make certain points. For instance, in the following lengthy passage he shows that calling a creature good implies a relation of that creature to something else. Should a historian or traveller describe to us a certain creature of a more solitary disposition than ever was yet heard of; one who had neither mate nor fellow of any kind, nothing of his own likeness, towards which he stood well-affected or inclined, nor anything without or beyond himself for which he had the least passion or concern; we might be apt to say perhaps, without much hesitation, "that this was doubtless a very melancholy creature, and that in this unsociable and sullen state he was like to have a very disconsolate kind of life-" But if we were assured that, notwithstanding all appearances, the creature enjoyed himself extremely, had a great relish of life, and was in nothing wanting to his own good, we might acknowledge, perhaps, "That the creature was no monster, nor absurdly constituted as to himself." But we should hardly, after all, be induced to say of him "that he was a good creature." However, should it be urged against us "that such as he was, the creature was still perfect in himself, and therefore to be esteemed good; for what had he to do with others?" - in this sense, indeed, we might be forced to acknowledge "that he was a good creature; if he could be understood to be absolute and complete in himself, without any real relation to anything in the universe besides." For should there be anywhere in nature a system of which this living creature was to be considered as a part, then could he nowise be allowed good; whilst he plainly appeared to be such a part as made rather to the harm than good of that system or whole in which he was included- (I: 244) The connection between the 'real relationsf of a creature and other things is important for . Although Shaftesbury implies that a creature may exist without any real relation to anything else he also suggests that there is no such creature. One gathers that he believed that every creature, in fact, stands in some real relation to others, although he does not state this outright, and that such relations are discovered by observation and reflection. Real relations to others are functional and systematic and show that a creature is a part of a system and it is as a part of a system that a creature is evaluated. Shaftesbury expects the reader to agree that the use of certain evaluative language in relation to an isolated, solitary creature would be at least puzzling. He admits that were a creature to stand in no real relation to anything else in the universe, it might be considered to be good in relation to himself, but obviously not in any broader context. The adjective 'goodt describes some sort of relationship, specifiable in principle, having to do with the requirements of the system and the creature's place in it. A good creature contributes posititively to the system of which it is a part. The physical makeup of creatures in some instances shows that there is a functional relation. He writes: If therefore in the structure of this or any other animal there be anything which points beyond himself, and by which he is plainly discovered to have relation to some other being or nature besides his own, then will this animal undoubtedly be esteemed a part of some other system. For instance, if an animal has the proportions of a male, it shows he has a relation to a female. And the respective proportions of the male and female, will be allowed, doubtless to have a joint relation to another existence and order of things beyond themselves. So that the creatures are both of them to be considered as parts of another system, which is that of a particular race or species of living creatures, who have some one common nature, or are provided for by some one order or constitution of things subsisting together, and co-operating towards their conservation and support. (1:245) maluation of how any creature stands, even in relation to its own "private good and interestm, unless the creature is strangely solitary, requires consideration of its relation to others. A creature with no real relations to others might be esteemed good without consideration of others. To call a normal creature good is to describe in a certain way the relation in which that creature stands to others. Evaluation requires knowledge of the system to which the creature is related. In a number of places Shaftesbury denies that anything can be known to be absolutely evil. Recall that he defines theism as the belief "that everything is governed, ordered, regulated for the best, by a designing principle or mind, necessarily good and permanentn (I:240). If anything could be known to be absolutely evil then theism as he understands it would likewise be known to be false. Whatsoever is really ill ... must be caused or produced by design (that is to say, with knowledge and intelligence) or, in defect of this, by hazard and mere chancen (1:240). This is to say that the existence of real evil implies that either daemonism or atheism, respectively, would be true. Although Shaftesbury holds that no religious opinion is demonstrable, he does believe that the universe is an ordered harmonious whole. This is why he doubts that there is a single thing that is less than the whole that is without real relations to other things. He writes: If it be allowed that there is ... a system of all things and a universal nature, there can be no particular being or system which is not either good or ill in that general one of the universe; for if it be insignificant and of no use it is a fault or imperfection, and consequently ill in the general system. (I:246) What we have seen of Shaftesburyrs theory indicates a commitment to objective natural values. A creature is made good by being in a certain harmonious relationship to the universe. The fact that the creature is good is entailed by this harmonious relationship. Since the harmonious state of affairs is objective so is the evaluative fact which it entails. Value facts are entailed by natural states of affairs that are independent of observation and appreciation.

2.2.3 A Universe of Ends. Shaftesbury affirms his belief in a teleological universe at several points in the Inairy and elsewhere. The universe is a system of systems. Each sub-system has a specific function in relation to the greater whole. In The Moralists, a philosophical dialogue, the speaker Theocles expresses this idea: Whatever things have order, the same have unity of design, and concur in one, are parts constituent of one whole, or are, in themselves, entire systems ... Now in this which we call the universe, whatever the perfection may be of any particular systems, or whatever single parts may have proportion, unity, or form within themselves, yet if they are not united a11 in general, in one system, but are, in respect of one another, as the driven sands, or clouds, or breaking waves, then there being no coherence in the whole, there can be inferred no order, no proportion, no project or design. But if none of these parts are independent, but all apparently united, then is the whole a system complete, according to one simple, consistent and uniform design. (11: 63-64) Shaftesbury supports the claim that the universe is an intelligently ordered system by referring to observable relations between creatures. For instance, there is the nabsolutely necessaryn relation of the fly to the spider and to the existence of other creatures (1:245). Such observed relations lead him to conclude that "there is a system of all animals: an animal-order or economy, according to which the animal affairs are regulated and disposedn (I:245-246). However, he goes on to use this plausible conclusion as a premise to support the claim that each part of the universe stands in some evaluatively relevant relation to the whole. Now, if the whole system of animals, together with that of vegetables, and all other things in this inferior world, be properly comprehended in one system of a globe or earth, and if, again, this globe or earth itself appears to have a real dependence on something still beyond, as, for example, either on its sun, the galaxy, or its fellow-planets, then is it in a part only of some other system. (I:246) I take this to be an argument that the earth is "in reality a part only of some other system." He indicates twofold support for the idea that each part of the universe stands in some evaluatively relevant relation to the whole. First, there is an appeal to the analogy between the observed relations between animals and the observed relations between large objects in the universe. The analogy supports the conclusion that the planet earth is part of another system. Secondly, there is a questionable movement from the plausible conclusion that there is "a system of all animals* to speaking of this in terms of "one system of a globe or

earthn as a planet in a system of planets. This seems to be a sort of equivocation on ,earthf as biological system and 'earthf as a planet which makes it easy to conclude that each biological system, indeed each part of each biological system, stands in a functional-systematic and thus in an evaluatively-relevant relationship to the whole universe. Shaftesbury believes that are about relations within systems and that our knowledge of the system of the universe is limited. This leads to the claim that knowledge of good and evil is correspondingly restricted.

We cannot say of any being that it is wholly and absolutely ill, unless we positively show and ascertain that what we call ill is nowhere good besides, in any other system, or with respect to any other order or economy whatsoever. (1:246) He is saying that we cannot know that a creature is "wholly and absolutely illn unless we know how it stands in relation to other systems and, ultimately, to the universe. To call something absolutely good or ill implies that an account could be given of its relation to "that general one of the universef1. He believes that such knowledge is beyond us and that the scope of evaluative judgments should therefore be limited to the relations between creatures of which people have knowledge through observation. Shaftesbury accepts evaluations provided that the relations between the creatures and their respective systems are understood. If there were a person, for example, "of a nature perniciousn to the species humanity, "he is in this respect justly styled an ill mann (I:246). People are not evil because they are physically sick, nor are they good because they are prevented from doing evil. It is the state of passions or affections, the determining factors of action, and their tendencies in relation to the system of which a creature is a part, which make a creature either good or ill. So that in a sensible creature, that which is not done through any affection at all makes neither good nor ill in the nature of that creature, who then only is supposed good when the good or ill of the system to which he has relation is the immediate object of some passion or affection moving him. (I:247)

The good or evil here is not moral value or disvalue but his conception of moral value is built on the same foundation, as we shall see,

2.2.4 Goodness a Balance. We have seen Shaftesburyrs distinction between the 'socialf and the 'interestedf affections. There is, according to his theory, nothing intrinsically wrong with the interested affections. They are necessary for the existence of many creatures, including human beings. He reserves the term 'selfish' for interested 34 affections which demonstrate "a more than ordinary self- concernment or regard to private good* (1.248). Unfortunately, his expression is regrettably vague. What is ordinary in relation to self-interest is not selfish and is, together with an appropriate degree of social affection, virtuous. Some degree of self-interest is virtuous since it is necessary not only for the self-preservation of individuals but also for the flourishing of the systems of which they are parts. However, a reader searches in vain for some specification of what degrees and mixtures of interested and social affections he regards as harmonious. He writes of llequal*and nunequal" affections which suggests that some sort of balance of social and interested affections is best but he is never very specific about what these mean,

The closest he comes to a criterion of virtue ia the tendency of affections to produce actions which are to the good of the species or public (1:250). He believes that an excess of social affection can actually be harmful.

Benevolence, kindness, or even parental love, "if it be immoderate and beyond a certain degree it is undoubtedly viciousw (I:250). No doubt, a parent's care can be excessive and actually harm (as we might say, spoil) the child. His examples show again only roughly what he has in mind as regards balance. Shaftesbury seems to believe that there is just one balance of affections which is appropriate to human society, but he does not address the possibility that different degrees of affection may be harmonious in different circumstances. Certain (but unspecified) degrees of self- interest or parental affection are socially beneficial. Further to this, an excess of benevolence or any social affection can be unequal and pernicious to the public good. Putting aside the indeterminacies, his main point is that for a creature to be good its motivating affections, both social and interested, must have a tendency to actions which lead to the harmony of the system or society of which the creature is a part. When in general all the affections or passions are suited to the public good, or good of the species ... then is the natural temper entirely good. If, on the contrary, any requisite passion be wanting, or if there be any one super-numerary or weak, or anywise disserviceable or contrary to that main end, then is the natural temper, and consequently the creature himself, in some measure corrupt and ill. (I:250) According to Shaftesbury, the goodness of a social creature has to do with the way it functions in relation to others of its kind. The Rproportionsn of male or female are physical indications that an creature is related to the other sex and to offspring. Likewise, certain affections are emotional indications that a creature is part of a system, and these function as guides for the creature towards ends given by nature. He emphasises that social affections, such as benevolence and parental love, are as 36

necessary and natural for human existence as any affections whatever. That this needed to be pointed out at all is an indication of the enormous influence which Hobbes exerted on the moral philosophy of the eighteenth century. Shaftesbury

rejects Hobbest psychological egoism, the claim that the root motivation for any voluntary action is always self- interest. In Hobbest 'state of nature' unrestrained self- interest leads to a life which is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short." Human beings enter society only from "fear of deathn and "desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living.n25 Against Hobbes, Shaftesbury claims that the social affections are not explicable by selfish interest. Shaftesburyts first publication, an

introduction to Select Sermons of Dr. Whichcote (1698),

displays an early concern with the influence of ~obbes.~~ There he complains that Hobbes neglected any good passions which human beings experience and has left "only one master- passion, fear, which has, in effect devourfd all the rest, and left room only for that infinite passion towards power after power, natural (as he affirms) to all men, and never ceasing but in death." Many of the responses which Hobbest moral philosophy provoked indadvertently provided support

26 Benjamin Whichcote (1609-1683) was the founder and inspiration of the 'Cambridge Platoni~ts,~ for some of Hobbesl main contentions about motivation by stressing the relation of the obedience to the moral law to future punishment or reward. Shaftesbury claims that the emphasis on natural benevolence in Whichcote's sermons make this one response to Hobbes which is free of this problem. In The Moralists, this view which I attribute to Shaftesbury on the necessity of social as well as interested affections is expressed by the speaker Theocles. In short, if generation be natural, if natural affection and the care and nurture of the offspring be natural, things standing as they do with man, and the creature being of that form and constitution he now is, it follows Vhat society must also be natural to himN and "that out of society and community he never did, nor ever can, subsist." (II:83) Although Shaftesbury does not use RnaturalN in a univocal sense the term in this context seems close to a definition he gives in another essay: [that] which is preservative of the kind itself, and conducing to its welfare and support1' (Ibid. I:74). One great system to which each human individual is naturally and necessarily related is society.

2.2.5 The Distinction of Goodness and Virtue. To this point in the Inuuirv Shaftesbury has been mostly considering goodness, a sort of harmony between the motivating affections of creatures, the systems of which they are parts and, ultimately, the universe. He then turns to an examination of virtue or merit, the moral value which may be attributed to human beings. The terms 'goodness1 and 'virtue or merit' refer to the same sort of harmonious state of motivating affections but they are distinguished by qualities of their respective objects. "Mere goodnessN, he writes, "lies within the reach and capacity of all sensible creaturesv1but "virtue or merit.., is allowed to man onlyN 25- It is allowed to human beings because of the reflective capacity which distinguishes them from other creatures. He writes: In a creature capable of forming general notions of things, not only the outward beings which offer themselves to the sense are the objects of the affection, but the very actions themselves, and the affections of pity, kindness, gratitude and their contraries, being brought into the mind by reflection, become objects. So that, by means of this reflected sense, there arises another kind of affection towards those very affections themselves, which have been already felt, and are now become the subject of a new liking or dislike. (I:251) It is interesting that virtue and merit belong only to creatures which possess a reflective capacity. What is it about reflection which makes a distinction in value for Shaftesbury? Perhaps he believes that reflection allows for consideration and choice which is not possible for non- reflective creatures. Stephen Darwall finds in Shaftesbury's theory a self-determining will in which reflection and reasoning lead to action and also claims that this theory of moral sense is most usefully viewed as rationalist .27

Z 7 The British Moralists and the Internal 80usht8,16n. and chapter 7. 39

Another reason for the difference in value which reflection makes has to do with the "new liking or disliken which reflection on affections and actions delivers. The perceptions of this reflected sense of right and wrong are not sensations or perceptions of qualities of objects but emotional responses to reflection on qualities. This liking or dislike is a motive to choose or avoid certain affections or actions. The pleasures of reflection provide additional support for the social affections. These motives are

necessarily connected to moral apprehension because of the way human beings are constituted. This would make Shaftesbury an internalist about moral cognitions. Although moral facts are entailed by objective states which are independent of actual responses, ap~reciationof these states entails that the observer feel a certain way.

Appreciation of these states requires a reflective capacity which could be the reason that there is a different sort of value or disvalue ascribed to human beings. Another possible explanation for the difference in value has to do with his metaphor of a balance of affections in virtue. Reason has a role in determining the tendency of affections and their comparative degrees. This capacity allows reflective creatures to be better (or worse) than non-reflective creatures, so the sort of value ascribed to them is different. Reflection is involved in virtue in two ways for Shaftesbury. On the one hand it is constitutive of virtue and, on the other, the basis of its apprehension and consequent motivating power. Although the standard of good or virtue is the same quality, harmony within and between systems, only creatures with a reflective capacity can be either virtuous or vicious. So that if a creature be generous, kind, constant, compassionate, yet if he cannot reflect on what he himself does, or sees others do, so as to take notice of what is worthy or honest, and make that notice or conception of worth to be an object of his affection, he has not the character of being virtuous. (I:253)

In a later section (part 111.. section 3) Shaftesbury describes how these rational. affections reinforce social affections in situations in which there appear to be conflicts with personal interest. The capacity for reflection allows an agent some choice of what sort of agent she wishes to be, and to act accordingly. His conviction that the universe is an ordered system

(1:246) leads to an interesting claim about the limits of creaturely vice. If there is "the least appearance of moral good (as there be if there be any such thing as kindness, gratitude, bounty or compassion), there is still something of virtue left (I: 257) . Something perhaps, but not necessarily very much. Obviously, he is not here setting a standard for virtue but he is indicating his view that certain sorts of affection (kindness, etc.) are virtuous, even in the smallest imaginable degree. Perhaps his 41

expression of these views should be understood as a reaction against Calvinist teaching of the total depravity of human nature. He distinguishes social affections from the interested affections by their objects, other creatures to whom one is systematically related.

2.2.6 Senses of Sense. How is it that Shaftesbury adopts

the term 'sensef to describe the moral faculty? Many commentators claim that moral sense theories intend a strong analogy between physical sense and moral perception. I will cite a number of examples. Stephen Toulmin wrote, "some [philosophers] even talk about our means of perceiving

'ethical properties' as 'the moral sensef.1128 A similar interpretation of moral sense is given by Jonathan Harrison: "one perceives the difference between right and wrong much

as one perceives the difference between a red thing and a blue one.n2g In fairness to Toulmin and Harrison, neither clearly claims that the philosophers this thesis considers actually held such opinions. But since Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Hume are, by common , the moral sense theorists, it is implied that they did. It is not hard to find writers making these claims

explicitly in relation to Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Hume.

- -. - 18 Reason in Ethics, 10.

29 Rncvclo~edia of Philosophv (1967), S.V. nEthical Objectivismn by Jonathan Harrison. D.D. Raphael wrote similarly that in speaking of moral sense, npresumably we do so by analogy with those faculties which are generally admitted to be senses."'" In a nearby note Raphael quotes , an early critic of Hutchesonts theory of moral sense: "It has got this name of sense, no doubt, from some analogy which it is conceived to

Presumably those moralists who hold a moral sense theory intend at least to assert that these judgments are analogous in certain important respects to judgments of sense perception, such as "That thing is yellow. '' All of these commentators assume that moral sense is intended to be analogous to physical sense; however, the extent to which this is the case for Shaftesbury is not obvious. The OED observes many meanings of sense which support only weak analogies with physical sense. The %ensesI1 cited below were chronologically available to Shaftesbury.

1.2. An instinctive or acquired faculty of perception or accurate estimation. 1567.

1.7. Applied to faculties of the mind or soul compared or contrasted with the bodily senses. usually with some defining word such as inner or interior. 1566.

1.8. Capacity for perception and appreciation of (beauty, humour, some quality, etc.) . 1604.

3 0 The Moral Sense, 6.

3 1 Essays on che Active Powers of the Human Mind, Part iii, chapter 6.

32 nMoral-Sense Theories in Ethicsn reprinted in Broad's Critical Essavs in Moral Philosophy 195- 1.10. Natural understanding, intelligence, especially as bearing on action or behaviour; practical soundness of judgment. 1684. 11.4. Mental apprehension, appreciation, or realization of (some truth, fact, state of things). 1540. II.4.b. The recognition of (a duty, virtue, etc.) as incumbant upon one, or as a motive or standard for one's own conduct. 1604. 11.5. Emotional of something; a glad or sorrowful, grateful or resentful recognition of (another personfs conduct, an event, a fact or condition of things). 1540. 11.6. A consciousness or recognition of (some quality, condition, etc.) as attaching to oneself. 1614.

11.7. An opinion, view, or judgment held or formed a. by an individual -1761. b. by an assemblage of persons (or by a majority of their number) . Now arch. 1654. I conclude that the term 'sensef is open to a variety of interpretations and that it is a mistake to assume that a strong or even conscious analogy with physical sense is necessarily intended. Imagine the ridicule that would be directed at a philosopher who criticised the notion of a sense of humour or a sense of duty on the grounds that there are no organs which correspond to such senses. Yet Harrison says that moral sense theories are implausible. He writes: There is no such thing as a moral sense organ. There are no "moral light wavesn emanating from the actions which we morally assess, and we do not need to take up any special spatial position in relation to these actions in order to sense their moral qualities, as we do in order to perceive the properties of material objects .33

3 3 Jonathan Harrison, Hume8s Moral EDistemolcmy, 117. These sorts of criticism have often been directed at Shaftesbury and the moral sense philosophers. Shaftesburyfs choice of 'sensef to describe this reflective capacity may seem peculiar to contemporary readers, as does the following elaboration. The case is the same in the mental or moral subjects as in the ordinary bodies or common objects of sense. The shapes, motions, colours, and proportions of these latter being presented to our eye, there necessarily results a beauty or deformity, according to the different measure, arrangement, and disposition of their several parts. So in behaviour and actions, when presented to our understanding, there must be found, of necessity, an apparent difference, according to the regularity or irregularity of the subjects. (1:251) By 'senset in these contexts Shaftesbury does not mean anything much like a physical sense. We have already seen that writers of the previous generation used sense to refer to the moral faculty. However, another reason for his choice of 'reflected senser (1:251) may be found in Lockets Essav. Locke allows that reflection "might properly enough be called internal sensem but clearly distinguishes ideas of reflection from ideas of physical sensation as "such only as the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within itself. f134 It is interesting that before the eighteenth century the distinction between sensations and emotions was not clearly made. This is very apparent in ~haftesbury.'~ The

3Z Essav Concernin9 Human Understandin9 Book 11, chapter 1, section 4.

Encvclopedia of Philoso~hv (19671, s.v. wEmotionsn by William Alston. 45 response consists "in a certain just disposition ... of a rational creature towards the moral objects of right and wrongN (I:X8) . That is, it is a "just dispositionN to objectively valuable states of affairs. It is a disposition to feel pleasure or pain, "according to the regularity or irregularityo of the ideas of objects under consideration,

"even when the real objects themselves are absent" (I: 252) . He identifies the new liking with moral approval: "In all disinterested casesn, the heart Rmust approve in some measure of what is natural and honest, and disapprove of what is dishonest and corruptm (I: 252) . The goodness of a creature is its right state, the quality of its affections, in relation to others of its kind and the systems of which it is a part. Virtue is the right state of a reflective social creature, Reflection on social affections leads to new affections which can themselves motivate. Virtue consists in "a certain just disposition or proportionable affection towards the moral objects of right and wrongm (1:258). This suggests further reasons for Shaftesbury's choice of the term 'sense of right and wrong.' 'Right' and 'wrong,' in his theory, refer to states of creatures in relation to the systems of which they are parts. The sense of right and wrong is an emotional response to beliefs about the relations of creatures to their respective systems. It is a determined systematic emotional response, "a new liking or dislike," in relation to right and wrong states. These states are discovered by observation or inferred by reason. The term ,senseJ is not mis-used in relation to such a response, Recall this OED definition:

11. 5. Emotional consciousness of something; a glad or sorrowful, grateful or resentful recognition of (another person's conduct, an event, a fact or condition of things). 1540.

This appears to cover Shaftesbury's use of the term.

2.3 Theory of Right Action

2.3.1 Virtuous Motives not Sufficient for Riqht Action. Shaftesbury focuses on moral evaluation of character, but his consideration of motivating affections and responses to them is connected to an interesting theory of right action. Motivating affections, all important in the moral evaluation of agents, only partly determine the rightness of actions. This is to say, among other things, that an action from a virtuous motive is not necessarily right. If the affection be equal, sound, and good, and the subject of the affection such as may with advantage to society be ever in the same manner prosecuted or affected, this must necessarily constitute what we call equity and right in any action. For wrong is not such action as is barely the cause of harm (since at this rate a dutiful son aiming at an enemy, but by mistake or ill chance happening to kill his father, would do a wrong), but when anything is done through insufficient or unequal affection (as when a son shows no concern for the safety of a father; or, where there is need of succour, prefers an indifferent person to him) this is of the nature of wrong. (1:253) 47 Shaftesbury is distinguishing two aspects of actions for consideration in evaluation, There are the motivating affections and what he refers to as their lrsubjectn,jointly constituting an action for moral evaluation. Something has already been said of the qualities of affections. What does

Shaftesbury mean by "the subject of the affectionN? By 'subject1 he seems to mean something like an event in the world toqether with its effects on societv. The effects may be beneficial or harmful regardless of the affections which led to an action in the first place. This terminology may be confusing so I will retain single quotation marks for 'subject1 to remind the reader of his meaning. His choice of expression and example suggest that he wishes to allow for the possibility that "equal, sound, and goodn affections might lead an agent to lsubjectslwhich are not necessarily advantageous to society. The example he gives is not as illuminating as one might hope, since the accidental killing of a parent by a dutiful child is not an instance of an action, on his theory, precisely because it is accidental, that is, this event is not motivated by any affection. Earlier in the Incruirv he writes, "that which is not done through any affection at all makes neither good nor ill in the nature of that creature, who then only is supposed good when the good of the system to which he has relation is the immediate object of some passion or affection moving himt1 (1:247). He uses the example of the dutiful son to make the distinction between wrong and mere harm. A more interesting illustration of the gap between affections and the 'subjectsf to which they may lead would show the possibility of admirable affections leading to actions of a sort not always and everywhere beneficial to society. A historical event in which, for the sake of argument, the best conceivable motives are attributed to the agents does this. In 1649 Charles I of England was executed. It is conceivable that the motivating affections of the leaders of the Commonwealth were "equal, sound, and goodn, that is, worthy of admiration. However the 'subject' to which they led, the execution of a deposed sovereign, though in this instance arguably beneficial or not, is probably not of a sort which might Rwith advantage to society be ever in the same manner prosecuted or affected. 1136

Shaftesbury's phrase describing the 'subject' of a right or equitable action, "such as may with advantage to society be ever in the same manner prosecuted or affected," strikes a universalizing note that may be felt to anticipate Kantfs categorical imperative. The passage also indicates

3 6 In this connection, it is interesting that Xant himself gives credit to the moral-sense philosophers in an announcement of a series of lectures in 1765: The attempts of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume, which, although unfinished and deficient , have none the less progressed farthest in the search for the first principle of all morality, will receive that precision and supplementation which they now lack." Quoted in P.A. Schlipp, Kant8s Pre-critical Ethics (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1960), 8. 49 his opinion that the subjects which are partly constitutive of right action have some sort of independence from particular times and places.

2.3.2 Objects of Moral Evaluation, Shaftesburyts theory of action indicates the variety of possible objects of moral evaluation and simultaneously emphasises systematic connections between them. Sometimes it is actions and their consequences which are of interest and sometimes it is the motivating affections of agents. He distinguishes the qualities of 'subjectsf and the qualities of affections. An admirably motivated action can have disastrous results. Likewise, a morally deficient character does not necessarily lead to harmful 'subjectsf but the lack of harm in the world does not prevent a negative appraisal of the character. He believes it to be a matter of fact that actions from "equal, sound and good affectionsn will generally lead to socially beneficial consequences, but the example of the "dutiful son ... happening to kill his fatherm shows a recognition of the role of chance even in a harmonious universe. Shaftesburyfs distinctions lead to four possible evaluations of actions. His words do not refer explicitly to praise and blame but the distinctions he makes suggest something like the following schematic representation. 50 ' SUBJECT ' AFFECTIONS Beneficial Harmful

Equal, Natural ~ight" Not blameable3'

Insufficient, 111 Not praiseworth?' wrongg

The distinctions between the affections, the 'subjectf and the action in evaluation allows for corresponding

distinctions of evaluative judgment. An action can be extremely beneficial to society or lead to extremely beneficial consequences and yet be motivated only by selfish interest. The fact of the selfish motive does not diminish the worth of the 'subjectr. However, belief that the motive is selfish makes praise of the agent inappropriate since the affections, a necessary part of right action and to which virtue language refers, are not present.

37 "If the affection be equal, sound, and good, and the subject of the affection such as may with advantage to society be ever in the same manner prosecuted or affected, this must necessarily constitute what we call equity and right in any action," (I:253)

3 8 "Whatsoever therefore is done which happens to be advantageous to the species through an affection merely towards self-goad, does not imply any more goodness in the creature than as the affection itself is goodu (1:249).

39 "For wrong is not such action as is barely the cause of harm . . .but when anything is done through insufficient or unequal affection (as when a son shows no concern for the safety of a father; or, where there is need of succour, prefers an indifferent person to him) this is of the nature of wrong. (I:253) 51

2.4 Objectivism and Varieties of Moral Practice

2.4.1 Shaftesburvts Ethical Objectivism. Recall that ethical objectivism refers to any theory according to which moral values are or are entailed by matters of fact which are independent of the evaluative responses of persons making moral judgments about characters or actions, and of places and times. Ethical subjectivism refers to theories according to which moral judgments about characters and actions are judgments about the way persons considering people and actions react to them. According to subjectivism, moral values depend on the responses, beliefs or attitudes of persons making moral judgments or on places and times. We have seen that Shaftesbury holds what might be called an objectivist theory of natural value (2.2.2). The goodness of a non-reflective creature does not depend on the responsiveness of the person considering it. Rather, its goodness is entailed by the state of the creature's motivating affections in relation to the system of which it is a part and, ultimately, to the universe as a whole. Virtue is the main moral value for Shaftesbury.

Goodness and virtue refer to the same sort of harmony of creaturely affections in relation to systems, except that the creatures in the case of virtue are reflective (see

2.2.5). According to the theory, moral judgments are true 52 or false depending on the state of creaturely affections in relation to the system of which a reflective creature is a part. The judgment "Bill is a virtuous mann is true only if his motivating affections are of a sort which leads to harmonious functioning of human society and the universe.

The judgment "honesty is a virtueN claims that this quality leads to harmony in society and the universe. Does the dependence of moral value on the affections or subjective states of people who are the objects of moral evaluation make the theory a version of subjectivism? Since these motivating affections presumably include the evaluative responses of these people the question is a little tricky. However the theory remains a version of objectivism because the states which are constitutive of moral value are independent from the responses of people reflecting on them. Possessing 'equal' affections makes a person virtuous as she or other people can appreciate when they reflect on those affections and the actions to which they lead. Human beings are able to appreciate virtue because of their ability to make people, actions and affections the objects of reflective attention. Shaftesbury considers a social creature with no reflective capacity and claims that the addition of reflection would cause it to approve at once of certain qualities. His expression suggests that appreciation of moral value is some sort of or more immediate intuition-

'Tis certain that if you give to this creature a reflecting faculty, it will at the same instant approve of gratitude, kindness, and pity; be taken with any show or representation of the social passion, and think nothing more amiable than this, or more odious than the contrary. And this is to be capable of virtue, and to have a sense of right and wrong, (I:266) We have seen two ways in which reflection is related to virtue for Shaftesbury (2.2.5) . On the one hand, it is the basis of the apprehension and appreciation of moral value. On the other, it has a constitutive role in making the difference in the sort of value ascribed to reflective creatures as opposed to non-reflective creatures. Only reflective creatures are capable of being either virtuous or vicious.

We have seen that the virtue of a creature is entailed by matters of fact which are independent of the person making a moral judgment. What about places and times? Shaftesbury makes scattered remarks which show his opinion that moral values are also independent of places and times. He writes: If the affection be equal, sound, and good, and the subject of the affection such as may with advantage- to society be ever in the same manner prosecuted or affected, this must necessarily constitute what we call equity and right in any action- (I: 253, emphasis added) and; And thus if there be anything which teaches men either treachery, ingratitude, or cruelty, by divine warrant or under colour and pretence of any future good to mankind; if there be anything which teaches men to persecute their friends through love, or to torment captives of war in sport, or to offer human , or to torment, macerate, or mangle themselves in a religious zeal before their God, or to commit any sort of barbarity or brutality as amiable or becoming; be it custom which gives applause, or religion which gives a sanction; this is not, nor ever can be, virtue of any kind, or in any sense, but must remain still horrid depravity, notwithstanding any fashion, law, custom or religion which may be ill and vicious itself, but can never alter the eternal measures and immutable inde~endentnature of worth and virtue. (I:255, emphasis added) According to the definition then, Shaftesbury is an ethical objectivist for whom moral values are or are entailed by matters of fact which are independent of the responsiveness of observers and of times and places.

2.4.2 Internalism and Externalism. Although moral values are or are entailed by matters of fact which are independent of the responses of observers, appreciation of moral value requires a reflective capacity in the observer. Recall the distinction between internalism and externalism. Internalist theories claim, roughly, that there is a necessary co~ectionbetween moral facts and motivation. Externalist theories deny such necessary connection and explain motivation by something external to moral facts themselves. For Shaftesbury, moral facts are entailed only by propositions describing matters of fact which themselves do not entail anything about anyone's actual beliefs or attitudes, or about particular places or times. He also claims that any person who recognizes or appreciates an 55 obligation is moved by this cognition.40 In 1.2 the theory

of H.A. Prichard was described as a content externalism and a cognitive internalism and the same could be said for Shaftesbury. For both writers, it does not follow from the

content of the judgment that '1 ought to do Xn that I actually have a certain response, but it does follow from the claim that I apnreciate the content that I have a certain actual response, and so it follows from the content that I would have that response were I to appreciate it. The content of the judgment is inde~endentof actual res~onses,but is not independent of actual responses conditional on cocmitions.

2.4.3 Other Moralities and the Role of Reason. Shaftesbury is well aware that cultures can disagree on which character traits and actions are virtuous. He explains differences of moral practice as the result of mistaken belief or which leads to mistaken judgments of value. He uses the example of countries in which various animals have been worshipped to illustrate mistaken evaluations resulting from mistaken belief.

Should it appear to anyone of the religion or belief of those countries that to save such a creature as a cat, preferably to a parent, was right, and that other men who had not the same religious opinion were to be treated as enemies until converted; this would certainly be wrong and wicked in the believer; and

4 0 "Does Moral Philosophy rest on a Mistake?" Mind, 1912. every action, grounded upon this belief would be an iniquitous, wicked and vicious action. And thus whatsoever causes a misconception or misapprehension of the worth or value of any object, so as to diminish a due, or raise any undue, irregular or social affection, must necessarily be the occasion of wrong. (I:254) Saving a cat preferable to a parent is what is "certainly wrong and wickedw. The basis of the wrong is a failure to recognise or appreciate the human social order and the way it fits into the greater order of the universe. Such a mistake leads to a misconception of the value of objects which in turn leads to wrong actions. The sense of right and wrong is a determined affective response to beliefs about the tendencies of affections and actions in relation to society. The mistake in a wrong moral judgment is not a mistake in affection but the result of a mistake in fact, for instance, a mistaken belief about the results of actions caused by the qualities of affections under consideration. With this in mind, it is not surprising that reason plays a crucial role in Shaftesbury's ethics. In the following passage 'rightt and 'wrong' should be understood to describe states of creatures. He writes: And thus we find how far worth and virtue depend on knowledge of right and wrong, and on a use of reason, sufficient to secure a right application of the affections; that nothing horrid or unnatural, nothing unexemplary, nothing destructive of that natural affection by which the species or society is upheld, may on any account, or through any principle or notion of honour or religion, be at any time affected or prosecuted as a good and proper object of esteem. (I:255) There does not appear to be space here for lucky guesses in the application of the affections. It is easy to imagine situations in which a failure to reflect adequately does not lead to wrong states. Shaftesbury would probably want to say that the guessing agent is less virtuous than one who has considered options and consequences who has been led thereby to a right application of affection. Shaftesbury believes that the qualities which entail right and wrong states do so eternally and that reason can discover the "right application of the affections." He claims that any belief-system which teaches that treachery, ingratitude and cruelty are themselves commendable or virtuous is mistaken: Be it custom which gives applause, or religion which gives a sanction; this is not, nor ever can be, virtue of any kind, or in any sense, but must remain still horrid depravity, notwithstanding any fashion, law, custom or religion which may be ill and vicious itself, but can never alter the eternal measures and immutable independent nature of worth and virtue. (I:255)

2.5 Conclusion The philosophical question of this thesis concerns the ontology of moral value. Are moral values objective, or partly or purely subjective? Ethical objectivism refers to any theory according to which moral values are or are entailed by matters of fact which are independent of the evaluative responses of persons making moral judgments about characters or actions, and of places and times. On an 58 objectivist theory, moral values are or are logically entailed by properties or qualities of persons or actions which do not depend on the experiences, attitudes, feelings or desires of the person making the moral judgment. Shaftesbury holds that the virtue of a reflective creature is or is entailed by a harmony between the creature's affections and the society of which he is a part. He is impressed by the order which he believes the universe exhibits and he articulates a moral theory which fits that order. The chapters on Hutcheson and Hume will examine the extent to which Shaftesbury's successors in the moral sense school agree with his objectivist ontology of moral value. HUTCBESON' S TaEORY OF MORAL VALW: THE INQUIRY

3.1 Introduction

3.1.1 Focus. In the previous chapter I showed that Shaftesburyfs theory is a form of ethical objectivism. The question of what moral ontology to attribute to his immediate successor in moral sense theory is the focus for this chapter and the next. Francis Hutcheson wrote two historically-influeatial books in ethics. These books defend one ethical theory but do so in relation to different critical contexts, so it seems reasonable to treat the books separately in consecutive chapters.

3.1.2 Life and Works, Francis Hutcheson was the Professor of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow University for sixteen years in the second quarter of the eighteenth century. He had been a student there from 1711 until 1717. In the years between graduation and his university appointment he founded a 'dissenting academyf for the Presbyterian youth of Dublin. While he was administering the academy, he learned of the ideas of Shaftesbury through contact with a circle of the late lord's intellectual adherents. During this time he wrote the two books of moral theory for which he is best known, An Incruirv into the Orisinal of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (1725) and An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with Illustrations on the oral

Sense (1728). In 1730 he was elected Professor at Glasgow University. He wrote a number of other works in moral philosophy during his time in Glasgow. A Svstem of Moral

Philoso~hvwas written between 1734 and 1737 but published posthumously in 1755. In 1742 he published Philoso~hiae Moralis Institutio Comendiaria. He died of a fever while visiting Dublin in 1746. Something of Hutcheson's original interest in moral philosophy can be gathered from the lengthy title of the first edition of his first book: An Inmirv into the Oricrinal of our Ideas of Beautv and Virtue in two Treatises, in which the Principles of the late Earl of Shaftesburrv are emlained and defended aqainst the Author of the Fable of the Bees: and the Ideas of Good and Evil are established, accordins to the Sentiments of the Ancient Moralists, with an attemt to introduce a Mathematical Calculation on subiects of Moralitv. In the final authorial edition the title became An Inc~irvinto the Oriqinal of our Ideas of

Beautv and Virtue in Two Treatises. The debt to Shaftesbury continues to be acknowledged in the Preface but he leaves out the attempted "mathematical calculation on subjects of m~rality.~' Hutcheson explicitly credits Shaftesbury for

References are to the page numbers of this final authorial edition (1738) unless otherwise indicated- 61 the principles underlying his own theory. They agree in their beliefs that human beings are social, that moral distinctions are not reducible to self-interest, that there is a sense of right and wrong or moral sense and, more generally, in taking an empirical and psychological approach

to morals. The author of The Fable of the Bees, Bernard Mandeville

(1670-1733), defended psychological egoism, the theory that human agents are motivated only by personal interest. The

Fable was first published in 1705 as a 433 line poem but did not reach its final state which included extensive commentary until the sixth edition in 1729. This verse allegory claims that human beings are not naturally social and that they are led to society only by selfish motives. For Hutcheson, psychological egoism is a denial of both moral distinctions and moral motivation. So the title of Hutchesonrs first book indicates both weapon and target; the principles of Shaftesbury and the most notable recent defender of the egoist theory. Hutcheson has an important place not only in the statement but in the development of the idea of a moral sense. He takes Shaftesbury8s sense of right or wrong or moral sense and elaborates it more systematically than had his predecessor. Against egoist theories, he shows the reality of moral distinctions and that they are not reducible to self-interest. Furthermore, he advances a 62 causal psychological explanation for morals. On his theory, moral sense has a twofold function: as a disposition to experience moral perception and as a source of motivation to act in accordance with it. The target of the Inauirv was psychological egoism but Hutcheson soon found himself under attack from an entirely different direction, that is, from other defenders of morals. His purely psychological approach to morals appeared to some critics to leave questions of justification unanswered. In a series of letters, he defended the theory against a version of ethical advanced by Gilbert Burnet.' Through the ensuing debate, necessarily brief because of Burnetgs untimely death, Hutcheson developed his theory to meet the rationalist challenge. This led to the publication of his second book, An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with Illustrations on the Moral Sense, just three years after the first, on which I will focus in the next chapter.

3.2 Background

3-22 Ontolow and Lansuaqe. Recall that ethical objectivism refers to any theory according to which moral values are or are entailed by matters of fact which are

Gilbert Burnet (1690-1726) was the son of Bishop Gilbert Burnet of Salisbury. 63

independent of the evaluative responses of persons making moral judgments about characters or actions, and of places and times. Ethical subjectivism refers to any theory which claims that moral values depend on the way persons considering people and actions react to them, about the way persons think or feel about people or actions, or on places and times, Neither ontology of moral value by itself entails any particular theory of moral language. The philosophers with which this thesis is concerned, both moral sense theorists and their opponents, do not explicitly advance theories of moral language. Attributing some such theory to one of these philosophers is a matter of considering possibilities and judging which to accept or reject on the basis of the general thrust of a theory and specific relevent passages. In this way, commentators have attributed theories of moral language to Hutcheson. One main division of theories of moral language is into 'propositionalf and 'non-propositional.' According to the first, moral utterances are propositions, as they appear to be judging by their grammatical form. According to the second, moral utterances are not propositions but something else; for example, prescriptions or expressions of emotion. In an article on moral-sense theories, C.D. Broad claims that non-propositional theories of moral language "can be swallowed only after one has undergone a long and elaborate process of 'conditioning' which was not available in the eighteenth century.n3 However, since many commentators attribute some such theory to Hume, and since Hutcheson is widely acknowledged among Hume8s predecessors as one of the greatest influences, whatever nconditioningn is needed to swallow the theory was probably available to Hutcheson as well,

3.2.2 Frankena8s Interpretation, In a paper on nHutcheson8sMoral Sense Theoryn, argues that Hutcheson holds "some form of the emotive or non- cognitive theory of ethics.~~In view of its considerable influence on subsequent interpretations of Hutcheson it will be useful to consider Frankenals argument, Frankena claims that of the sorts of moral-sense theory Broad distinguishes, just three are possibilities for Hutcheson:

A. The Subjective form of the Moral Sense Theow. This is a form of according to which ethical

C.D.Broad, "Some Reflections on Moral-Sense Theories in Ethics," 190- ' William Frankena, nHutcheson~sMoral Sense Theoryn, J.H.I., 16 (1955) 356. The inf hence of this paper on subsequent interpretation of Hutcheson' s moral philosophy has been great: See W.T. Blackstone, Francis Hutcheson and Contenmorarv Ethical Theorv (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 19651, Bernard Peach, "Editor's Introductionn to Illustrations on the Moral Sense (Cambridge: Hanrard University Press, 1971), and Henning Jensen Motivation and the Moral Sense in Francis Hutchesonts Ethical Theorv (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971). The most important essays which disagree with Frankena's view of Hutcheson are by David Fate Norton especially nHutcheson's Moral Sense Theory Reconsideredn in Philosonhy and Public Affairs, (volume 3, number 4, Summer 1974) , "Hutcheson on Perception and Moral Perception" in Archiv kr ~eschichte der Philosonhie 59 (1977), and Norton's own consideration of the influence of Hutcheson on Hume in David Hume: Moralist, Sceptical Metanhysician (1982). terms and propositions are cognitive but capable of analysis by reference to the subjective states of the speaker, of most people, etc. I...] B. The Naivelv Realistic form of the Moral Sense Theorv. This is the view that ethical characteristics are simple empirical qualities intrinsic to actions and persons (i.e., objective), and apprehended intuitively by a special moral sense. [...I C. The Interjectional Theom. This holds against the subjective theory that ethical judgments are not cognitive (true or false), and against naively realistic theories that the moral sense is not a cognitive faculty.' Frankena's option B appears similar to 'ethical intuitionism1, with which it shares the ideas of the simplicity and of moral qualities. If Hutcheson held something like this and agreed with the claim of 'classical intuitionism8 that moral qualities sunervene with losical necessity on natural qualities, his theory could be cast as a version of intuitionism. Frankenals options combine ontological, epistemological and linguistic theses in ways which suggest that to hold a particular theory of value requires that one holds some corresponding theory of moral language or epistemology. This is misleading since these different sorts of theory do not stand in mutually implicative relationships. In what follows I aim to keep clear distinctions between moral ontology, epistemology and language.

William Frankena, op.cit. p.365-6. Frankena takes his terminology from Broad0s paper which was written before certain terminology became widely accepted. By ninterjectio~lntheory Broad and Frankena have in mind some non-propositional theory of moral language.. Prankena tries to show that passages from Hutcheson supporting a subjective interpretation are at least ambiguous between subjective and interjectionist theories. He says that naively-realist interpretations of Hutcheson depend on narrow construals of words like "sense," "perceiven and "apprehendn in the texts. He goes on to indicate passages which, in his opinion and according to his construal of naive realism, positively rule out such an interpretation of Hutcheson's theory. He admits that there are no explicit statements which rule out a subjective interpretation but believes that some passages do so by implication. Frankena writes: But if in passing moral judgment on an action I am asserting (not just expressing) the fact that I feel pleasure in contemplating it, or that most of us do, or that all of us would if ..., etc., as the subjective theories hold, then Hutchesonrs story is incomplete. For it should include a statistical investigation into the actual or possible incidence of feelings of pleasure or pain at contemplating the act in question among the preliminaries to the moral judgment (assuming it is not made unreflectively) . (371) So Frankena, having established to his own satisfaction that Hutcheson holds neither A nor B, concludes that he holds some version of C. His argument has two weaknesses, the second of which is the incompleteness argument, just quoted, to which I will return.

3.2.3 A Losical Problem with Frankena's Arqument. The first weakness in Frankena's argument has to do with the implicit claim that the disjunction of A or B or C exhaust 67 possible interpretations of Hutcheson8s theory. Obviously, this form of argument demands that all possible interpretations be ruled out, but Frankena overlooks this. I have observed that theories of moral language, epistemology and ontology do not stand in mutually implicative relations towards each other. Hutcheson might hold an interjectional or non-propositional theory of moral language combined with a cagnitivist epistemology and either a subjectivist or objectivist moral ontology. He might believe that there are objective moral qualities and at the same time claim that it is not the of moral

language to talk about or describe these qualities but to contribute to their realization. Frankena does not rule out these and so the tacit claim that the disjunction exhausts possible interpretations is incorrect.

3.2.4 A Theow Mav Just Be Incomplete. A second weakness of Frankena's argument is his reason for finally rejecting a subjective-naturalist interpretation, that Hutcheeon8s theory would be incomplete because it lacks a %tatistical investigation into the ... incidence of feelings." The absence of a statistical investigation is supposed to imply that Hutcheson could not hold this sort of theory. Frankena assumes that the only acceptable evidence for generalizations of human responses is statistical. The incidence of feelings is certainly an empirical issue, as 68 Frankena realises, but a theory which is incomplete in this way just awaits completion. And the fact that it is incomplete is a shaky foundation for the conclusion that his theory must be of another type altogether. I cannot think of a philosopher of Hutchesonfs period who attempted to support assumptions about the uniformity of physical-sense perceptions by a statistical investigation but this doesn't mean that such an investigation would be irrelevant for their theories, Frankenars paper has been influential in subsequent interpretations of Hutcheson. The weaknesses of the central argument make it necessary to reconsider Hutcheson's text in order to determine the sort of the theory which he does hold. The main question of my thesis has to do with the ontology of value. In the previous chapter I showed that Shaftesbury is an ethical objectivist. Hutcheson claims to be explaining and defending Shaftesbury's principles, so we might expect that he also holds an objectivist theory of moral value- Let us see whether this is the case.

3.3 The Inquiry: Part One - "Of Beauty, Order, Harmony, Designm

3.3.1 Introduction, Hutcheson's Inauirv is divided into two, for him related, subject areas, and morals. The book includes causal-psychological and conceptual explanations of the ideas of beauty and moral goodness. He is writing against Bernard Mandeville specifically and against psychological egoism generally. According to Hutcheson, the disinterested conceptions of value implicit in aesthetic and moral ideas show that the egoist philosophers are mistaken in their theories of value and motivation,

3.3.2 Moral Sense a Determination to be Pleased. Hutcheson takes up Shaftesbury's idea of a sense of right and wrong or moral sense and extends it systematically. In the preface to the Inauirv he claims to be seeking "our greatest and most lasting pleasuresn (x) and that God "has given us strong affections to be the springs of each virtuous actionn (xiv). There are hints here of a distinction between qualities of pleasure of which he says something later in the Incruirv (section VI) but which I will discuss in relation to his second book, In this introductory section he says that in calling the moral faculty a sense he is distinguishing moral sense from the physical senses because of distinctive pleasures of which it is the source. He writes: These determinations to be pleased with any forms, or ideas which occur to our observation, the author chooses to call senses, distinguishing them from the powers which commonly go by that name; by calling our power of perceiving the beauty of regularity, order, harmony, an internal sense; and that determination to approve affections, actions, or characters of rational agents, which we call virtuous, he marks by the name of a moral sense. (xiii) Recall that Shaftesbury wrote of a reflected sense by which "there arises another kind of affectionn towards harmony or to a certain balance of social and interested affections because of the harmony to which it contributes. Shaftesbuly

held that the perceptions of the sense of right and wrong are reflected, perceptions which the mind gets by considering ideas of objective states of affairs. In the passage above Hutcheson writes of "determinations to be

pleased" or, as he also puts it, receiving l"erceptions of pleasuren in relation to ideas of qualities of objects. His understanding of these senses as dispositions to feel some sort of pleasure or pain in relation to certain external objects is similar to Shaftesbury8s idea of new liking or dislike." The passage also indicates his opinion that rational agents are the possessors of moral value, another idea which he shares with Shaftesbury. 71

3.3.3 Moral Sense Determines Pleasures or Pains. 'Idear for Hutcheson is whatever is an object of thought. sensation,

then, is a species of idea. He writes, "those ideas which are raisrd in the mind upon the presence of external objects, and their acting upon our bodies, are call'd

sensationsn (2). This definition of sensation is broad and would include emotions. These "determinations to be pleasedn (xiii) are not sensations analogous to colours or flavours insofar as colours and flavours are distinguishable from the pleasure or pain which accompanies them. Rather he is claiming that the determination is itself some sort of pleasure or pain which human beings necessarily experience, by virtue of their constitution, in relation to certain sorts of object . He distinguishes the pleasure of perceiving some particular colour from the pleasure felt in contemplating a complex object and argues for the relative superiority of the latter. "Thus every one acknowledges he is more delighted with a fine face, a just picture, than with the

view of any one colour, were it as strong and lively as

possible" (7). Aesthetic and moral perceptions are pleasant or unpleasant affective experiences, what we would understand as emotions or emotionally-charged sensations rather than sensations like those arising from physical

sense or cognitions. Now there are passages in the first part of the Insuirv in which moral perceptions are called 72 "sensible ideasn rather than emotions but these expressions are just what one would expect if the author failed to distinguished the two sorts of perception. In relation to

Shaftesburyfs theory I drew attention to ~illiamAlstonfs claim that emotions and sensations only begin to be distinguished in the eighteenth century, and Hutcheson is also apparently unaware of what we take to be an obvious difference. The aesthetic and moral ideas are certain emotions or emotionally-coloured responses experienced in relation to specific sorts of object. Since this is the case, it is not surprising that some commentators, following Frankenafs lead, find in Hutcheson a commitment to something like a contemporary non-cognitivist moral epistemology or a contemporary non-propositional theory of moral judgment. However, and despite the fact that the perceptions of moral sense are what we would understand as emotions, it does not follow that Hutcheson is committed to anything like contemporary non-cognitivist or non-propositional theories. The fact that he fails to distinguish emotions and sensations as sources of ideas should not be overlooked, expecially when advancing an interpretation of his theory which depends on such a distinction. The ideas of beauty and moral goodness originate in senses or ndeterminations to be pleasfd with any forms, or ideas which occur to our observationn (xiii). Hutcheson 73

aims to determine the significance of certain perceptions which, he believes, human beings always or at least generally experience in relation to ideas of certain objective qualities. What he calls "perceptions of pleasuresn, as such, are not images of any qualities in

objects. They are responses to qualities or ideas of qualities of objects or characters. He believes that there is a remarkable similarity among human beings in their dispositions to receive pleasures or pains in relation to similar objects. This is an empirical claim about the human responses to certain sorts of object, but Hutcheson does not attempt to test it statistically, as Frankena says he ought. Rather, Hutcheson's appeal is to the reader's introspection. A passage from the Illustrations on the Moral Sense is relevant to this point. He asks whether there are actions, affections or qualities which always lead to approbation in observers and writes that "we know how to answer [these questions] from reflecting on our own sentiments, or by consulting othersm

(Illustrations, section iv.). This is a survey of a sort.

Clearly he assumes that if the readersf aesthetic and moral responses differ from the account he gives this will be brought to his attention.

3.3.4 Causes of Aesthetic and Moral Ideas. In the two treatises of the Inauiw Hutcheson seeks common causes of the ideas of beauty and virtue respectively. What walitv of form determines people to feel aesthetic pleasure? What crualitv of character determines people to feel moral approbation? A prior question, which he does not address, is whether there is just one quality leading to each sort of pleasure. His assumption that each sort of idea has just one sort of cause leads to some of the distinctive, and most questionable, features of his theory.

The first treatise is An Inquirv into Beauty, Order, harm on^ and Desicm. By beauty he means "the idea raisrd in usn(7). The ,sense of beauty' is "our power of receiving

this idean (7). In relation to this thesis on moral ontology, the first point of interest is Hutchesonfs claim that beauty is not a quality of objects. By ... beauty is not understood any quality supposed to be in the object, which should of itself be beautiful, without relation to any mind which perceives it: For beauty, like other names of sensible ideas, properly denotes the perception of some mind; so cold, hot, sweet, bitter, denote the sensations in our minds, to which perhaps there is no resemblance in the objects, which excite these ideas in us, however we generally imagine otherwise. (Incruirv, 14-15) Beauty is not a quality of objects but a perception of some mind. Hutcheson is denying that beauty is a primary quality of objects, a claim which is implicit in the comment "to which perhaps there is no resemblance in the object." The positive claim is that beauty is like the secondary qualities he cites. In section 1.2 I distinguished three interpretations of secondary qualities. According to one, a secondary quality is identified with a specific sort of impression or subjective experience. According to the second, a secondary quality is the power of some object to excite a specific sort of subjective experience. According to the third, a secondary quality is identified with the physical basis in objects of the power to excite such an idea in normal observers in standard conditions. Hutcheson says that beauty "properly denotes the perception of some mind." On its own, this suggests that he holds something like the first sort of interpretation. He does not believe, however, that beauty is purely subjective and the passage needn't be taken to claim that beauty is not in the object in some sense. Hutcheson is very interested in the basis in objects of the power to excite the idea of beauty. The basis of this power in objects does not depend on the responsiveness of observers. His extensive discussion of what he takes to be the sole basis in objects of the power to cause the idea of beauty makes it plausible to attribute the 'physical basis in objects' interpretation to him. Hutcheson claims that an aesthetic judge need not be any more aware of the qualities which cause the idea of beauty than of those which are powers to excite ideas of typical secondary qualities. We may have the sensation without knowing the occasion of it; as a rnan8s taete may suggest ideas of sweets, acids, bitters, thor he be ignorant of the forms of the small bodys, or their motions, which excite these perceptions in him. (29) The forms and motions of "small bodysn are the physical basis of the powers which excite ideas of secondary qualities of taste. Just as the sensations of sweet, sour and bitter originate in objective properties of objects, the idea of beauty is caused by a particular quality of objects. The idea of beauty is analogous to a taste or a colour in having an objective basis which is generally the same for people. Since beauty is not among the qualities (i-e.,not among the primarv qualities) of objects, he looks for a quality which is common to all beautiful things to explain their power of exciting this idea.=

Although LockeOs influence in evident throughout the Insuirv, it should also be painted out that Hutcheson's terminology here and elsewhere is also sometimes remininscent of Malebranche. He qualifies ideas in a way which suggests the French rationalist's influence. In seeking the basis of the ideas of beauty and harmony, Hutcheson writes, "let us examine what quality in objects excites these ideas, or is the occasion of themn 116, emphasis added) . Malebranche accepted the Cartesian dichotomy of mind and matter, drawing the conclusion that there is no true interaction between them. What appear to be causes are not because there is no interaction between mind and body. Body does not move the mind. There is a correspondance between events in bodies and events in minds but this is of the nature of a parallelism rather than interaction. Malebranche wrote, "natural causes are not at all true causes, they are only occasional causes, which act only by the power and efficacy of God's willn (De La Recherche de la %rite, 6,2,3). Hutcheson writes of objective events and motions being the noccasionn of perceptions. His choice of terminology in these instances is not sufficient to suggest that he intends to deny natural causation, but there do seem to be intimations of Hue's problem with causation. In relation to the influence of Malebranche, Norton writes: "There seems to be more than a touch of occasionalism in Hutcheson's theory, perhaps showing that he, like Berkeley, had come under the influence of Malebranche. ... We have seen that he is careful to call bodily motions the occasion of ideas in the mind, and that he tends to use "sensationu and "feelingn interchangeably as Malebranche also had done. In addition, he says in the Synopsis that it seems to be be God himself who brings to ua the first forms or first beginnings of all ideas, our minds being entirely passive so far as the reception of ideas is concerned- He also suggests that the only possible cause of the likeness or agreement between the ideas of primary qualities and the things themselves is God himself, who has established such agreement by a sure law of nature. " (nHutcheson on Perception and Moral Perceptionn, Archiv flir Geschichte der Philoso~hie 59 (1977), p. 189, note Hutcheson believes that beautiful objects must possess one common objective feature or characteristic. This appears to be an assumption although it may in fact be an unspoken (and mistaken) inference from the belief that human beings have a particular experience of beauty to the idea that this experience must have just one sort of cause. The belief that there is just one sort of cause of the idea of beauty underlies his argument, and he offers no defense for it. He claims that the common quality of all things beautiful is "uniformity amidst varietyn. Elaborating on this he writes: What we call beautiful in objects, to speak in the mathematical style, seems to be in a compound ratio of uniformity and variety: so that where the uniformity of bodys is equal, the beauty is as the variety; and where the variety is equal, the beauty is as the uniformity. (17) Exactly what this common feature is appears extremely vague despite its nmathematical-stylenformulation and remains so in spite of his attempts to explain it. A very brief discussion of his aesthetics is useful for comparison with his ethics. An obvious objection to the theory is that the quality which be claims is the basis of the power to raise the idea of beauty does not even seem able to help distinguish beauty and ugliness. The vagueness of specification of the quality which is common to beautiful things is a result of his belief that there must be a common objective feature which is the basis of the power to excite a certain experience. That is, if one aims to define a single common objective quality, common to everything that has been, is, and ever will be taken to be beautiful by human beings, it is not surprising that there is a certain vagueness in the resulting definition. In his moral theory he expresses ideas which run parallel to his claim that there is a single cause of beauty. Hutcheson distinguishes the idea of beauty from the obj ective quality uniformity amidst variety' which is the basis of the power to excite it. He admits that "regularity and uniformity are so copiously diffused thro' the universen that the quality which determines the idea of beauty may be

"discoveredn in any object that anyone calls beautiful (75). His awareness of this obvious objection to his belief about a uniform underlying cause makes it seem odd that he chooses to build an aesthetic theory on it. Hutcheson claims that people are not mistaken about whether objects are beautiful but are often mistaken about the extent of their beauty, especially when making such claims as that some object manifests "the greatest possible beauty." He attributes such mistakes to differences of culture and education. A Goth, for instance, is mistaken, when from education he imagines the architecture of his country to be the most perfect: and a conjunction of some hostile ideas, may make him have an aversion to Roman buildings, and study to demolish them, as some of our reformers did the popish buildings, not being able to separate the ideas of the superstitious from the forms of the buildings where it was practiced: and yet it is still real beauty which pleases the Goth, founded upon uniformity amidst variety. (76)

The example in the passage suggests that education not only explains different judgments of aesthetic superiority but also shows how different people's aesthetic judgments might run in opposite directions. In the example, is enough to arouse real aversion to the creations of a hated people. Hutcheson does not address the fact that the Goth's evaluation of Roman architecture runs in the wronq direction. That is, the Goth who is wrecking the temple seems to find no beauty at all, rather ugliness, in it. Now the example points to one important difference between ideas of most secondary qualities and ideas of value. Aesthetic and moral perceptions differ from ideas of secondary qualities in being for or against the object of evaluation. Hutcheson believes that, as far as the aesthetic responses of people in this world are concerned, there is an objective matter of fact at issue between the Goth and the Roman, viz. which architecture really manifests the greatest uniformity amidst variety. Either is mistaken insofar as his evaluation implies that there is insignificant or no uniformity amidst variety in the buildings of the other. Were the Goth and Roman to come to agree on the relative ratios of uniformity and variety, Hutcheson is claiming that their agreement in evaluation would follow as a matter of psychological fact. 80

Purthemore, he is claiming that it is an objective fact that the architecture which possesses the greater ratio is more beautiful because the qualities of objects which are powers to excite the aesthetic response do not depend on the responsiveness of observers. Of course, the ratio of uniformity and variety may not be easy to determine, as the example also illustrates. Although Hutcheson denies the Gothfs opinion of architectural perfection, he does not himself make a judgment of the relative superiority of the architecture of one culture over that of another. Indeed, he cannot. What appears to be a criterion of the beautiful is too vague to make room for judgments of aesthetic superiority. He fails to see that the common quality of beautiful things would make any object beautiful precisely because, as he earlier recognised, "regularity and uniformity are so copiously diffused. " Hutcheson recognises the contingency of causation in a section critical of "reasonings [which conclude] design and wisdom in the cause, from the beauty or regularity of effectst1 (Section V) . He credits God with giving humanity a sense of beauty, the pleasures of which contribute greatly to human happiness. The aesthetic sense is a response to uniformity amidst variety and this is related to the regularity of the world in which we live, a world which naturally contains many instances of this quality. It would 81

be a mistake, he claims, to infer wise design from sense of beauty, "for a sense might be so constituted as to be pleasfd with such irregularity as may be the effect of an

undirected forcen (47). That is, creatures living in very different circumstances may find irregularity beautiful. He sees nothing objectionable in the supposition that other minds =may be so fram'd as to receive no pleasure from uniformityn (46). Are personless worlds devoid of beauty? Consider yellow again. When yellow is identified with the physical basis of the power to excite a perception of yellow there could be many yellow things in a world without people or in which people were blind. Similarly a personless world could have many instances of uniformity amidst variety. Since the power to cause the idea of beauty would exist there, people with similar dispositions to ourselves would perceive beauty if they came upon it.

3.3.5 Is Uniformity Amidst Variety Objectively Beautiful? The comments Hutcheson makes about uniformity amidst variety and the idea of beauty are of interest in relation to moral ontology. He writes: There seems to be no necessary connection of our pleasing ideas of beauty with-the uniformity or regularity of the objects from the nature of things,

antecedent to some- constitution---- of the Author of our nature, which has made such forms pleasant to us. Other minds may be so framed as to receive no pleasure from uniformity; and we actually find, that the same regular forms seem not equally to please all the animals known to us. (Inauirv, 46)

The causal connection between uniformity and the idea of beauty in human beings could have been otherwise and appears to be so in some animals. Towards the end of the book he

remarks that in the sections we are presently considering he "resolv'd the constitution of our present sense of beauty

into the divine goodnessn (302). Taken by itself the remark might suggest that our sense and divine knowledge of beauty are at least running in the same direction. However he does specifically raise the question of "whether, to an Almighty,

and All-knowing Being, there be any real excellence in regular forms...?', to which he replies, "we seem scarce capable of answering such questions any wayn (96). What can we say about Hutcheson's ontology of aesthetic value? Beauty is not just 'in the eye of the beholder' for him. Everything which is beautiful is so because it possesses a quality, uniformity amidst variety, which is the

basis in objects of the power which excites the idea of beauty, in persons like us, at all times and places. He attributes mistakes in aesthetic judgments to false beliefs about the extent to which some object possesses uniformity amidst variety. For Hutcheson, the uniformity amidst variety of an object entails a certain judgment of its beauty. Thus, since aesthetic value is entailed by these matters of fact which are independent of the responses of aesthetic judges. and of places and times, Hutcheson holds an objectivist theory of aesthetic value.

3.4 The Inquiry: Part Two - Moral Good and Evil

3.4.1 The Tarset. In the second book of the Inauirv Hutcheson develops a moral theory in opposition to egoist accounts of motivation and morals. The original title mentions one specific opponent, "the author of The Fable of the Bees." The reference is to Bernard Mandeville who attacked the claims made by Shaftesbury and some earlier opponents of Hobbes that human beings are naturally social. The full title of the book is The Fable of the Bees, or Private Vices, Public Benefits. Mandeville claims that human actions and concerns are always determined by selfish passions (private vices) which lead people into cooperative society (public benefits). 'It was impossiblen, Mandeville writes, that man should long remain uncivilized: for even those who only strove to gratify their appetites being continually crossed by others of the same stamp, could not but observe, that whenever they checked their inclinations ... they avoided a world of troubles. He claims that, other than satisfaction of private vices, the rewards for moral virtue are imaqinarv, and that "the nearer we search into human nature, the more we shall be 84 convinced, that the moral are the political offspring which flattery begot upon pride."' Against Mandeville and other psychological egoists, Hutcheson argues that human actions are not determined solely by selfish passions and that virtue and vice are disinterested values.

3.4.2 Moral Goodness and Evil. Hutcheson begins the second part of the Inwirv by giving some definitions. The word MORAL GOODNESS in this treatise, denotes our idea of some quality apprehended in actions, which procures approbation, attended with desire of the agent's happiness. MORAL EVIL denotes our idea of a contrary quality which excites condemnation or dislike. (105) Here nmoral goodnessn refers to the basis of approval in a quality of actions. It is not necessary to consider possible interpretations because he acknowledges almost immediately that these are only "imperfect descriptionsn of moral goodness and evil which are merely to prepare the way for the detailed examination which follows. In the same place he writes that "approbation and condemnation are probably simple ideas, which cannot be further explained" (105). The claim for the simplicity of these ideas and their origin in moral sense is made explicit later: "We mean by [moral sense] only a determination of our minds to receive the simple ideas of approbation or

Fable of the Bees. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1924) . See D.D. Raphael, British Moralists volume I, p. 234 ff. 85 condemnat ion , from act ions observgdn ( 12 9 ) . Frankena suggests that Hutcheson may be the first mglish philosopher to claim that moral ideas are simple, although it is approbation and disapprobation which are said to be simple, rather than moral goodness or evil.' Since no analysis or

"further explanationn is possible, a simple idea "can only be explained by synonymous words, or by concomitant or consequent circumstance^,^ as Hutcheson explains in his second book (Illustrations, 206). In the same book he indicates his opinion that any simple idea "must be the perception of some sensen (Ibid., 250). The claim that a simple idea is the perception of some sense is an important feature of Lockets epistemology. Moral goodness or evil are qualities of actions which are known by what is approved or condemned. Hutcheson, no doubt, gets the idea of the moral faculty as a sense partly from Shaftesbury. Shaftesbury himself may have taken the sense terminology either from writers of the previous generation or from Locke.

Hutcheson's conviction that approbation and condemnation are simple ideas, in the context of a Lockean epistemology, probably would have led him to describe the moral faculty as a sense without the influence of Shaftesbury.

3.4.3 Distinctions of Feelinq. According to the admittedly-imperfect definitions of moral goodness and evil,

a Frankena (1955) 361. Hutcheson appears to consider actions as the primary objects of moral evaluation. However, moral goodness is a predicate not only of actions but also of persons: "All men who speak of moral good, acknowledge that it procures approbation and good-will to those we apprehend possessed of it; whereas natural good does not (106). There is a difference in

response towards people who possess moral (e-g., honesty, kindness) and those who possess natural goods (e.g., wealth, wisdom). He introduces this idea in the

opening section of this work and returns to it frequently in his attack on egoism. At this point he is responding to Mandeville8s theory of virtue which focusses on the motivating force of anticipated pleasures and pains in 'virtuousr actions which, according to egoism, can only be self-interested. Some of the flavour of Mandevillefs theory may be experienced from the following passage:

There is no merit in saving an innocent babe ready to drop into the fire; the action is neither good nor bad, and what benefit soever the infant received, we only obliged ourselves; for to have seen it fall, and not strove to hinder it, would have caused a pain, which self-preservation compelled us to preventOg Against this sort of claim, Hutcheson would point out that observers respond very differently to baby-savers depending on the type of motive they attribute to the agent.

9 The Fable of the Bees. 56. See Selby-Bigge, L.A.. British Moralists. 11, 355. 87 In developing his account of moral approval, ~utcheson assumes that human beings agree at least in the direction of evaluative response. In the previous section I indicated a parallel assumption in his aesthetics. People are constituted so as to approve a certain quality of character in others, and this approval is independent of the personal interest of the person making the judgment. In contrast, people feel no particular determinate response to possessors of natural goods such as wealth or property. Some egoists had claimed that what is called 'moral approval' is just imagination of personal benefits which a person might obtain if she were in some sort of proximity to the person of whom she approves. Against this idea, Hutcheson says that the idea of imagined benefits just doesn't explain moral approval. Approbation does not depend on the approving person receiving imaginary or real benefits from the person approved. Although it may be difficult to distinguish esteem from other pleasant feelings when one's own interests are affected, the moral feelings are relatively easy to recognise by a spectator whose interests are not affected by the actions or characters in question. The morally good person is pleasing regardless of any possible benefit an observer might receive from his or her actions. A related problem for egoist explanations is that people may well feel moral revulsion in relation to a scoundrel from whom they have received great personal 88 benefits or, alternatively, moral approval in relation to an adversary who actually causes them personal harm. If the egoists were correct in the explanation of moral approval in terms of imagined benefits, there should be no distinction between the way people feel about any powerful tyrant and any virtuous person of history, since it is easy to imagine personal benefits from association with either. In short, disinterested approval and disapproval prove false the egoist claim that human beings are only self-interested.

3.4.4 Different Motives and Pleasures. Hutcheson considers two sorts of explanation by which his contemporaries explained the distinction between natural and moral goodness. The first, favoured by "the greatest part of our latter moralist^^^, claims that so-called moral value has a necessary relation to a superior of sufficient power to reward or punish. The second theory, which we will come to, claims that in acting virtuously one aims to receive a pleasure. Advocates of the first sort of explanation were impressed by psychological egoism as an explanation of motivation. People are supposed to obey moral laws "merely by motives of self-interestn (109). This makes moral goodness dependent on natural goodness, pleasure, in either of two possible ways. According to the first, morally good actions are conducive to the personal interest of agents, even if the contribution to interest is slight. According to the second, obedience to the moral law leads to eternal rewards. According to both, the motivation for moral action is personal interest. The second sort of explanation considers the pleasure felt on consideration of virtuous actions and claims that virtuous action is pursued and approved in order "to obtain this pleasure which arises from reflection upon the action, or some other future advantagen (109). According to this, people choose virtuous actions as means to personal pleasure, "even as we pursue, or purchase pictures, statues,

landskips, from self-interestn (108). Against the first sort of explanation, Hutcheson points out that consideration of some actions leads observers to feel an immediate pleasure, as well as a desire of the happiness of the agent, without any view to the personal advantage of the observer, Further, and against the second sort of explanation, he hopes to show that the affection, desire, or intention, which gains approbation to the actions flowing from it, is not an intention to obtain even this sensible pleasure; much less the future rewards from sanctions of laws, or any other natural good, which may be the consequence of the virtuous action; but an entirely different principle of action from self-love, or desire of private good, (110)

For instance, a person who runs into a fire to save a baby at risk is not necessarily attempting to avoid personal pain, as we have seen that Mandeville claimed, but to save the child. The motivating affections for such actions can 90 be benevolent. Hutcheson claims that human beings are determined to approve certain sorts of motives. People do not feel approbation for the agent when they believe that the motive for an action is personal interest. He follows Shaftesburyfs theory in distinguishing moral goodness from mere utility. "The actions which in fact are exceedingly useful, shall appear void of moral beauty, if we know they proceeded from no kind intentions towards othersn (167). In short, he rejects this explanation of moral approval because it does not take account of the disinterested sort of motive, the attribution of which is the only cause of moral approval. Hutcheson claims that anyone can recognise the basis of the distinction between natural and moral good by considering the ways in which the actions of others affect him. If there were no such difference people would feel the same about "a fruitful field, or commodious habitationn as toward 'la generous friend, or any noble charactern, that is, toward inanimate objects and people from whom they receive comparable benefits (111). People obviously feel differently towards other people than towards inanimate objects. The bases in people or actions for this distinction in feeling-response are the different motives which people can have. That is, observers are determined to feel differently towards agents who, on the one hand, help another because they are coerced, have no choice or to advance political ambition and, on the other, those who help out of concern for another's well-being. Towards the latter sort of motive people necessarily, by virtue of their psychological constitution, feel approbation and a desire for the well-being of the agent. Hutcheson explains the difference in feeling as the result of "a distinct perception of beauty or excellence in the kind affections of rational agents; whence we are determined to admire and love such characters and persons" (112). He writes: Suppose we reap the same advantage from two men, one of whom serves us from an ultimate desire of our happiness, or good-will toward us; the other from views of self-interest or by constraint: both are in this case equally beneficial or advantageous to us, and yet we shall have quite different sentiments of them. We must then certainly have other perceptions of moral actions, than those of advantage: And that power of receiving these perceptions may be called a moral sense, since the definition agrees to it, viz. a determination of the mind, to receive any idea from the presence of an object which occurs to us, independent on our will. (113)

3.4.5 Benevolence and Virtue. People feel pleasure and admiration for agents on contemplating attributions of benevolent motives to them. As soon as any action is represented to us as flowing from love, humanity, gratitude, compassion, a study of the good of others, and an ultimate desire of their happiness, although it were in the most distant part of the world, or in some past age, we feel joy within us, admire the lovely action, and praise its author. (115) Hutcheson takes benevolence very broadly here including one affection, gratitude, which is not an expression of benevolence and which does not necessarily excite 92 admiration. An agent can show gratitude for assistance in a crime. Hutcheson would surely admit that such gratitude needn't excite admiration for the agent. ~ratitudeonly requires that the agent feel something because of a gift or service previously given or promised by the person to whom the agent feels gratitude. The benevolent agent does not need to have received anything from the person towards whom he or she expresses kindness. Since gratitude is not a form of benevolence it should not be included in his list. Although he is mistaken about gratitude, Hutcheson intends to equate virtuous qualities with qualities which express benevolence. It is interesting that he does not include certain qualities of character widely taken to be virtues such as fidelity to promises and truth-telling. Perhaps he has noticed that on his theory of virtue not every instance of fidelity or truth-telling would be virtuous. An agent can demonstrate fidelity to promises by keeping a murderous conspiracy secret. Or an agent might, by telling the truth, deliberately and knowingly cause the or death of others. Whether fidelity or truth- telling are virtuous depends on distinguishing the character traits from particular manifestations of them. For instance, in attributing a moral value to an action Hutcheson would need to know whether the act of faithfulness or honesty is an expression of a general benevolence on the part of the agent. In such a case it would still be 93 benevolence which excites admiration rather than fidelity or truth-telling. Compassion is more plausibly included in a list of benevolent character traits than gratitude, but it does not always excite joy and admiration in observers, even when it is an expression of "a study of the good of others." Consider expressions of compassion towards baby-killers, pedophiles or serial-rapists. Such expressions of compassion often, perhaps generally, arouse anger and hostility towards the person who makes them. One claim Hutcheson makes in the context of the above passage is that the actions of which people approve are also naturally good, which is to say that such actions lead to the pleasure of some part of humanity (115). Actions of which people approve do not necessarily benefit the approver although they may. "It is true, that the actions which we approve, are useful to mankind; but not always to the approverm (127). This is partly a reiteration of the argument against egoist accounts of approval in terms of benefits to the approver but the choice of expression here is not entirely consistent with the main thrust of his theory. In an argument against egoist accounts of moral approbation in the "Additions and correction^^^ section of the third edition, he claims that the egoist explanation of approval based on imagined benefit to the approver is inadequate. Such an explanation, he writes, will never account for our high approbation of brave unsuccessful attempts, which we see prove detrimental both to the agent, and to those for whose service they were intended; here there is no private advantage to be imagined, However, there is no advantage to mankind either, contrary to the passage from 127. So there are actions of which we approve which are not useful in any way to anyone. This is not a real problem since Hutcheson does not claim that it is utilitv which leads to approbation. The only feature of importance in moral approval is whether the motive of an action is benevolent. Earlier he makes the more nuanced claim that the actions we approve "are senerally imaqin'd to tend to the natural good of mankindn (115, emphasis added) and the passage from 127 itself could be amended to include reference to an agent's motivation: "The actions of which we approve, are [such as are intended to be] useful to mankind, but not always to the approver." The idea which the passage expresses also requires a distinction which Hutcheson does not make explicitly between ways in which actions may be useful. By Wseful to mankindn Hutcheson means naturally good, that is, giving rise to pleasure in humanity. But moral approval, he claims, is also naturally good for the approver, a sort of pleasure, so any action which gives rise to approval is useful, in this sense, to the approver. The pleasure of approval is indirect in that it is an effect of reflection on the action rather than a direct effect of the action itself. So there 95 would be direct and indirect (or reflective) pleasures and the actions of which we approve are useful to humanity in the direct sense and moral approval is a sort of indirect or reflective pleasure. In this way he could distinguish the good at which an action aims from the pleasure which an observer may feel. The actions of which people approve "are generally imagin'd to tend to the natural good of mankind, or of some parts of itn (115) So Hutcheson asks: "whence this secret chain between each person and mankind?" (115). The "secret chainn8 is the moral sense, which he describes as a disposition "which makes benevolent actions appear beautifuln (115). I have been distinguishing three interpretations of secondary qualities. The first identifies a quality, say yellow or beauty, with a subjective impression. The second identifies a secondary quality with a power of objects to excite a subjective impression. An impression of yellow could be caused by quite different qualities of objects in different circumstances of place or time. The third interpretation identifies a secondary quality with the physical basis of the power which excites certain impressions in normal obsenrers in normal conditions. Objects continue to possess these qualities in different imaginable circumstances. Objects with different qualities may appear yellow in other situations but the physical basis of the power to appear yellow to normal observers in normal sunlight. that is, the property of reflecting light around the 5900 angstrom range, remains the same. In the first part of the In-irv the basis in objects of the power to excite the idea of beauty is uniformity amidst variety. In the treatise on ethics. benevolence is the basis of the power to excite approval, "in the most distant times and placesn (130). He writes: The quality approved by our moral sense is conceived to reside in the person approved. and to be a perfection and dignity in him... The perception of the approver, tho8 attended with pleasure, plainly represents something quite distinct from this pleasure; even as the perception of external forms is attended with pleasure, and yet represents something distinct from this pleasure. 130-131 What would Hutcheson say about a world in which people were the same as we are except that there were no moral senses? Would he say that this would be a world without virtue? I do not think so* Such a world could have many benevolent people whose kind actions were extremely beneficial to others. This benevolence would still be the basis of a power to excite moral approval in suitably- constituted obsenrers even though the actual people of that world would not be able to feel approbation themselves. The point is that what constitutes virtue is independent of the responses of obsenrers, even though it depends on the responses of observers for its perception or a~~reciation. 3.4.6 Determinations of Moral Sense not Affected bv Interest. Huttheson distinguishes moral evaluation of actions from evaluation based on personal interest. This distinction is important for his arguments against egoist explanations of morality. He points out that the ideas of moral sense are not influenced by personal interest, however much one's own actions may be. This moral sense, either of our own actions, or of those of others, has this in common with our other senses, that however our desire of virtue may be counter-balanced by interest, our sentiment or perception of its beauty cannot; as it certainly might be, if the only ground of our approbation were views of advantage. (120) In an earlier discussion he observed that the mixture of interest and approbation in an individual's experience can make it difficult to distinguish the two sorts of pleasure. This passage suggests ways in which the contrast can be brought into focus. If moral approval were disguised self- interest, as egoists claim, then it should be possible to influence a person's response by considerations of interest. Moral and visual perception are independent of our will to the extent that if we are attending to their respective sorts of object, under normal conditions, we cannot help experiencing the corresponding sort of perception. A person can be bribed to say or do many things. For example, for a small fee I might be willing to testify that "the grass is purplen, but my actual perception of the grass as green does not vary. Likewise, a witness might be bribed or otherwise coerced to lie at a murder trial, but no coercion will make the witness approve of the murder or, for that matter, of his own lying about it. Today, we would add qualifications to the effect that the coercion in question does not involve 'brainwashingf or perception altering 'therapyf or drugs. The fact that these determinations cannot be influenced by considerations of self-interest demonstrates that moral approvals and disapprovals are not disguised self-interest. Hutcheson considers possible motives to actions and claims that the motives of which people approve are reducible to benevolence. This represents a departure from Shaftesburygs claim that it is some particular balance of social and interested affections which is virtuous. The reduction of all virtue to benevolence appears to be the result of an assumption that there is just one sort of power which excites moral ideas, similar to the assumption that there is just one sort of power which excites the idea of beautyolo The prominence of the assumption that there is

10 points out that the (in her view mistaken) reduction of virtue to benevolence lies at the basis of . See VJtilitarianism and the Virtuesn, Mind 94 (1985), 196-209. It is interesting to observe that this reduction, mistaken or not, is nowhere more evident than in Kutcheson's theory. Hutcheson actually provides the original English formulation of the 'utilitarian principle0 later in the Inauirv. "That action is best, which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers; and that worst, which, in like manner, occasions miseryn (182). Furthermore, he is willing to accept some of the more difficult implications of the principle. He writes: "If putting the aged to death, with all its consequences, really tends to the publick good, and the lesser misery of the aged, it is, no doubt, justifiable; nay perhaps the aged choose it, in hopes of a future state. If a deformed or weak race could never, by ingenuity and , make themselves useful to mankind, but should grow an absolutely unsupportable burden, so as to involve a whole state in misery, it is just to put them to death. This all allow to be just, in the case of an overloaded boat in a storm-* (208) 99 just one sort of basis in objects for the aesthetic and moral responses is one reason for attibuting to Hutcheson a basis-in-objects-of-powers theory of secondary qualities. Hutcheson follows Shaftesbury in the way in which he brings moral perception and motivation together. Instinct determines human creatures 'to the love of others', and moral sense excites a pleasure in relation to actions motivated by benevolence. Moral values are entailed by qualities of persons which are independent of the responsiveness of observers. It does not follow from the content of the judgment "Nga is a good personn that the judge has a certain response, but it does follow from the claim that the judge ap~reciatesthe content that he have a certain actual response. So it follows from the content that he would have that response were he to appreciate it.

3.4.7 Justification and Moral Evaluation, Hutcheson offers a psychological theory of morals against psychological egoism. The theory, dealing mostly with the psychology of approval, leaves questions of the justification of approval open. In relation to aesthetic evaluation he asked whether there is any necessary connection between the quality of uniformity amidst variety and the idea of beauty and pointed to the limits of human knowledge of such things. In the account of moral value he introduces a theological buttress to support the theory, and thereby presents a contrast with the explanation of the idea of beauty. Let us recall the question from the Euthwhro: "1s the pious loved by the because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?n" affirms the first part of the disjunction, the gods love the pious because it is oious. For the purpose of this discussion, substitute nmorally goodw for "pious." Some theological moralists of Hutcheson's day seem to have accepted the second part of the disjunction. The very fact of something's being willed by God had been held to make it morally good. This is voluntarism and emphasises God's authority and power. Hutcheson leaves no doubt as to where he stands on this: But to call the laws of the supreme deity good, or holy, or just, if all goodness, holiness and justice be constituted by laws, or the will of a superior any way revealfd,must be an insignificant tautology, amounting to no more that this, "That God wills what he willslt (275) ,I2

Plato,

12 In the early twentieth century G.E. Moore became famous for criticism of 'naturalistic' moral theories with a similar argument. A number of commentators have noticed that offers versions of what has become -own as the flopen-questionargumentn but Hutcheson anticipated even Price in the form of the argument. An earlier passage in the Indw also sounds verv much like Moore: "How the disinterested desire of the good of others should seem inconceivable, ' tis hard to account : pexhaps ' tis owing to the attempts of some great men to give definitions of simple ideas. -- Desire, say they, is uneasiness, or uneasy sensation upon the absence of any good. -- Whereas desire is as distinct from uneasiness, as volition is from sensation. Don't they themselves often speak of our desiring to remove uneasiness? Desire then is different from uneasiness, however a sense of uneasiness accompanies itn (148-149). The alternate to this emphasis on God's power and authority, in the socratic disjunction, is to emphasise God's knowledge of a moral order which is independent of his will. Hutcheson appears to embrace a different position from either of these. In the Inauirv, he claims that since God is himself benevolent. he is necessarily pleased by

benevolent natures. There is no appeal to a moral order which is independent of God. The approvals of human beings originate in divine benevolence. He writes: If it be here inquirtdl "Could not the Deity have given us a different or contrary determination of mind, viz. to approve actions upon another foundation than benevolence?" There seems nothing in this surpassing the natural power of the Deity. But, as in the first treatise, we resolv8d the constitution of our present sense of beauty into the divine goodness, so with much more obvious reason may we ascribe the present constitution of moral sense to his goodness. For if the deity be really benevolent, and desires the happiness of others, he could not rationally act otherwise or give us a moral sense upon another foundation, without counteracting his own benevolent intentions. (302) If Hutcheson were pressed for an answer to the question of whether there is a 'real moral excellencef in benevolence, he might well respond as he did earlier to the similar question about the real excellence of uniformity amidst variety, "we seem scarce capable of answering such questions any wayn (96). Hutcheson claims that God Would not rationally act otherwisem than give us a moral sense which is a response to benevolence. The idea that it would be contrary to for God to give people a moral sense on another 102 foundation than benevolence is not to be understood as a problem of conceivability. Aquinas held that God could not make a contradiction true. However it is easy to imagine a moral sense which excites approval of something other than benevolence. The sense he claims people actually have might be very good for human beings, as he claims the sense of beauty is, and thus logically compatible with God's wisdom, strength and benevolence. At the same time, however, it could be a response to a limited sort of value. It is plausible that the approval of an omniscient and omnipotent being would be very different from the moral sense of human beings, even on the assumption that the deity is also benevolent. A benevolent deity might have given human beings a moral sense which responds not to benevolent motives but to the right or justice. So there is no difficulty in conceiving a different sort of object to which moral sense might respond. If the problem is not the impossibility of conceiving alternatives, then what else could it be? Hutcheson may be pointing to a problem of instrumental rationality. His understanding of instrumental reason is pretty straightforward. Ends are determined by senses or instincts. Once an end is given, an agent is rational insofar as he takes means which lead to the end. An agent is irrational if, having some end, he takes means which are known to be either incompatible with or inefficient in 103 relation to that end. A benevolent deity who desires the happiness of his creatures would frustrate this end, Hutcheson claims, if he gave creatures a moral sense based on anything other than benevolence. God has given people this moral sense based on benevolence so that they may spread the happiness which he wills.

3.5 Moral Sense and the Orator

3.5.1 Remarks on Moral Persuasion. Hutcheson does not articulate a theory of moral language. In one section towards the end of the Inquizy, however, he explictly considers and endorses some non-propositional uses of moral language. He examines the relation of the orator to the moral sense. He claims that the moral sense in humankind is the basis of the power of the orator. The various figures of speech are the several manners, which a lively genious, warmld with passions suitable to the occasion, naturally runs into ... and they only move the hearers, by giving a lively representation of the passions of the speaker. (259) A speaker who fails to express his passion will not engage the passions of the people who hear him. Hutcheson appears to be claiming that the purpose of moral oratory is not so much to draw attention to objective facts as to get people to share the passions or responses of the speaker. Bare and unemotional descriptions of benevolent actions may not be sufficient to engage the passions of spectators. What is needed to excite approval is a lively representation of the speaker's sense of partnership with humankind. He writes: Now the passions which the orator attempts to raise, are all founded on moral qualitys. All the bold metaphors, or descriptions, all the artificial manners of expostulation, arguing, and addressing the audience, all the appeals to mankind, are but more lively methods of giving the audience a stronger impression of the moral qualitys of the person accus'd or defended; of the action advisfd, or dissuaded: And all the antitheses, or witticisms; all the cadences of sonorous periods, whatever inferior kind of beauty they may have separately, are of no consequence to persuade, if we neglect moving the passions by some species of morality. (260) He believes that human beings agree in the direction of their moral evaluations. Moral evaluations are determined emotional responses of human beings. And the skilful orator uses many techniques to excite these responses in his listeners,

In this connection it is interesting that two of Hutcheson's own students at Glasgow have drawn attention to the moral passion he expressed in his lectures on moral philosophy. Alexander Carlyle (1722-1805) wrote that his pleasing manner "raised the attention of his hearers at all times, and, when the subject led him to enforce his moral duties and virtues he displayed a fervent and persuasive eloquence that was irre~istable.~~~Another student, William Leechman, wrote a short biography of his teacher in

13 J.H. Burton, editor, The Autobioqra~hy of Alexander Carlyle, London, 1910, p, 78, the preface to Hutcheson8s System of Moral Philosophv (1747). He says: [Hutcheson] did not look upon it as his duty, either in his prelictions, or in his writings upon moral and religious subjects, to keep up strictly at all times to the character of the didactic teacher, by confirming himself to all the precision requisite in accurate explication and strict argument. He apprehended that he was answering the design of his office as effectually, when he dwelt in a more diffusive manner upon such moral considerations as are suited to touch the heart, and excite a relish for virtue, as when explaining or establishing any doctrine, even of real importance, with the most philosophical exactness: he regarded the culture of the heart as the main end of all moral instruction.l4 It is unfortunate that Hutcheson does not further develop his theory in relation to the uses of moral language. It would be interesting to know, for example, what role if any

there is for language which is not emotionally-charged and purely descriptive of states external to the speaker. In any case, the remarks he makes on moral oratory, and the ways in which he sought to influence his students suggest opinions which are interesting anticipations of contemporary non-propositional theories of moral language. Hutcheson8s recognition of non-propositional functions of moral language does not imply that he denies the existence of objective values. A theorist could hold a non- propositional theory of moral language and still affirm objective values. For example, he could hold that there are objective values but that the purpose of moral language is

14 William Leechman, "Prefacen in Francis Hutcheson's A S~stemof Moral PhilosoPhv, London, 1755, p, 29. 106 not primarily to describe them but to help people to achieve them and that, given the way people are, the best way to do this is through a lively representation of the passions or moral attitudes of the speaker, In the next chapter I consider Hutcheson's elaboration of his moral sense theory in in the Essav and Illustrations, after which we will be in a better position to draw conclusions concerning his ontology of moral value. HUTCHESON8S THEORY OF MORAL VALUE:

THE ESSAY AND ILLUSTRATIONS

4.1 Moral Sense Versus Ethical Rationalism

4.1.1 Dispute With Burnet. Almost as soon as the Incruirr appeared, Hutcheson became involved in a controversy by correspondence in the London Journal on the foundation of morals with the rationalist Gilbert ~urnet.'' Ethical rationalism refers to a group of objectivist theories which claim that reason, operating by logical inference from premises known intuitively, discovers the moral value of persons or actions and is the source of moral obligation. Burnet complained that Hutcheson's empirical theory of morals is insufficiently grounded, that it lacks ultimate justification which, he believes, reason alone is able to supply. He endorses specifically the theories of Cumberland, Clarke and Wollaston and claims that the principles which these philosophers maintain, and on which he himself seeks to ground morals, amount to one

55 The complete correspondence was prepared for publication by Burnet and published posthumously in 1735. It is reprinted in an appendix to Illustrations on the Moral Sense, edited by Bernard Peach (Cambridge, Massachusetts : The Belknap Press of Hanrard University, 1971). Gilbert Burnet (1690-1726) was prebendaq of Salisbury and chaplain to George I. He was the son of Bishop Gilbert Burnet of Salisbury. In addition to the Hutcheson correspondence he published a number of sermons, pamphlets and a book in support of a bishop accused of deism. : "that virtue, or moral goodness, is founded on truth. "s6 One might expect Hutcheson to show a certain sympathy with the theories of the rationalists, who at least accept the reality of moral distinctions. Although he seems to agree with their morals, he disagrees with their account of the origin of moral distinctions in reason and attacks the confusions he finds repeatedly in their theories.

The debate with Burnet led to Hutchesonrs second book, the Essav on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions, with Illustrations on the Moral Sense (1728).'' The title indicates two areas of concern. The Essav is an elaboration of the psychology of the Incruirv which provides a foundation for his arguments against rationalism. Among other things, it describes a general theory of perception in the context of which his claims about moral perception should be understood. The Illustrations examine certain rationalist moral theories and aim to show that moral judgments are not simply of reason acting from intuitively-given premises.

56 Ibid. 200. Richard Cumberland (1631-1718) was bishop of Peterborough. His only philosophical work, De Lesibus Naturae (1672) , was published in Latin. abridged in English by James -ell (1692) and fully translated by Jotm Maxwell (1727). Interestingly, Cumberland anticipates some of the central opinions of Shafteebury and Hutcheson, for example, that the parts of a whole secure their own good by working for the good of the whole, and that benevolence is natural to huxnanity. Clarke and Wollaston will be introduced in relation to Hutcheson8s discussion of their theories.

57 For brevity, I will refer to the Essay and the Illustrations respectively. References in parentheses indicate page numbers in the last authorial edition (1742) unless otherwise noted. 109

In this chapter I consider Hutcheson's second book in order to understand his claims about motivation and moral perception, and his challenge to ethical rationalism concerning the foundation and justification of morals. He develops the empirical approach to morals which he began in the Inmirv. He shows the relative superiority of the moral sense theory by developing his account of justification and pointing out that ethical rationalism must presuppose something like moral sense to explain the preference for virtue.

4.2 The Essay

4.2.1 The Essav. Most commentators pay little attention to the Essav, concentrating their attention on the illustration^.^^ However, the Essav is significant for Hutcheson's moral theory for at least two reasons. First, it is here that he explains a general theory of perception and motivation which is important for understanding the moral theory. Secondly, it is in this book that he

58 An important exception is David Fate Norton. nHutcheson on Perception and Moral Perceptionn (Archiv fiir Geechichte der Philosophic 59 (1977) 181-197) and David Hume: Common-Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metavh~sician (Princeton: University Press, 1982). I agree with Norton on the importance of the psychology of perception in the Essav, however, his claim that the ideas of virtue and vice are, for Hutcheson, %oral concomitantsn which would make these qualities ontologically equivalent to primary qualities is in serious tension with Hutcheson's comparison of ideas of moral qualities with ideas of secondary qualities. For a discussion of this and related issues see Kenneth Winkler, nHutcheson8s Alleged Realism, (Journal of the History of Philosmhy 23 (1985), 179-194). 110 discusses in some detail the relative value of the pleasures of the senses he distinguishes, an important point for understanding his claims about moral perception and motivation.

4.2.2 More Senses and Two Ultimate Desires. Early in the book Hutcheson sketches a theory of perception which he claims is close to what Locke actually intended. He complains that it has been a mistake to fix the number of senses at five. There are many perceptions which do not originate in physical sense. We have multitudes of perceptions which have no relation to any external sensation; if by it we mean perceptions, immediately occasioned by motions or impressions made on our bodies, such as the ideas of number, duration, proportion, virtue, vice, pleasures of honour, of congratulation; the pains of remorse, shame, sympathy, and many others. It were to be wished, that those who are at such pains to prove a beloved maxim, that "all ideas arise from sensation and reflection," had so explained themselves, that none should take their meaning to be, that all our ideas are either external sensations, or reflex acts upon external sensations: Or if by reflection they mean an inward power of perception, as Mr. Locke declares expressly, calling it internal sensation, that they had as carefully examined into the several kinds of internal perceptions, as they have done into the external sensations: that we might have seen whether the former be not as natural and necessary as the latter. (x) The passage shows a general agreement with Shaftesburyfs interpretation of what Locke refers to as internal sense.''

59 See 1.2.6, above. 111

Hutcheson claims that Locke and his followers did not attend sufficiently to human affections, else "they might have felt an ultimate desire of the happiness of others as easily conceivable, and as certainly implanted in the human breast, tho perhaps not so strong as self-loven (xi). He claims that there are really two sorts of ultimate desire.

There is self-love, admittedly, but there is also a "desire of the happiness of others." And this desire is closely connected to the origin of moral distinctions in human consciousness.

4.2.3 Virtue and Calm Benevolence. Hutcheson begins a discussion of virtue with a thoroughly subjective conception. Every one calls that temper, or those actions virtuous, which are approved by his own sense; and withal, that abstracting-from particular habits or prejudices, that temper which desires, and those actions which are intknded to procure the greatest moment of good toward the most extensive system to which our power can reach, is approved as the highest virtue; and that the universal calm good-will or benevolence, where it is the leading affection of the soul, so as to limit or restrain all other affections, appetites or passions, is the temper which we esteem in the highest degree. (mi)

Virtue is known by abstraction from subjective approvals and by putting aside "particular habits or prejudice^.^ He distinguishes "the calm desire of good, and aversion to evil, either selfish or publick, as they appear to our reason or reflection, and the particular passions towards objectsw (29). Particular passions may be either interested 112

(e.go. ambition, hunger, lust, anger) or public (e.g., love, compassion, natural affection). Calm desires involve reflection and they also take either interested ("the general calm desire of private good of any kindn C291) or social forms ("the general calm desire of the happiness of others, or aversion to their misery upon reflection* 1301). The general calm public desire may look to the smaller groups of people easily known or to a more abstract general community, "such as a species or systemn (31). This latter he calls the nuniversal calm benevolencen (31). which he refers to as "the leading affection of the souln here and as

Itthe perfection of virtuew in the preface to the first edition (xvii). There is an elaboration here of Shaftesbury's idea of virtue. For Shaftesbury the qoodness of a creature depends on the relation of its affections to the system of which it is a part whereas virtue depends on both the affections and the possession of a reflective capacity?' HutchesonOs elaboration helps to explain reason's role so that it makes a difference in the sort of value one might ascribe to an agent. He distinguishes calm desires from particular passions and claims that actions motivated by universal calm benevolence will be best. Calm desires require reflection for their satisfaction. Reflective agents are capable of greater public beneficence (or harm) and, when reason leads

60 See 1.2, above. them to achieve socially beneficial (or harmful) ends, it

makes sense to make a dietinction of value, calling them virtuous (or vicious) as opposed to merely good (or ill) . Reason shows which tempers and actions produce the greatest amount of natural good. However, virtue, the quality which is the basis of the power to evoke approbation, is known by

feeling rather than inference.

4.2.4 Perce~tion. Hutcheson distinguishes two sorts of pleasure or pain. The first sort arises without any previous idea or image, though they are necessarily accom~aniedby at least one other idea. The second sort of pleasure or pain arises "only upon some previous idea, or assemblage, or comparison of ideastr,and these are what he

identifies as nperceptions of an internal senseu (2).

In a lengthy note he sketches a theory of sense and perception. He says that the common division of external senses into five "seems very imperfectn and points to sensations such as hunger, thirst and weariness which that division cannot explain. He then elaborates the notion of 'concomitant' or accompanying ideas.

(1.) That certain motions raised in our bodies are by a general law constituted the occasions of perceptions in the mind. (2.) These perceptions never come entirely alone, but have some other perception joined with them. Thus every sensation is accompanied with the idea of duration, and yet duration is not a sensible idea, since it also accompanies ideas of internal consciousness or reflection: So the idea of number may accompany any sensible ideas, and yet may also accompany any other ideas, as well as external sensations. ... (3.) Some ideas are found accompanying the most different sensations, which yet are not to be perceived separately from some sensible quality; such are extension, figure, motion, and rest, which accompany the ideas of sight, or colours, and yet may be perceived without them, as in the ideas of touch, at least if we move our organs along the parts of the body touched. ... The universal concomitant ideas which may attend any idea whatsoever, are duration, and number. The ideas which may accompany the most different sensations, are extension, figure, motion, rest. (3.4) The universal concomitant ideas, duration and number, are not perceived by the physical senses, yet at least one of them attends every idea whatever. The other concomitant ideas may be called representative in that they "are reputed images of something externaln (4). In other words, the qualities of the concomitant ideas are supposed to resemble qualities of objects in the external world. Although he does not favour Locke's terminology, he does seem to equate concomitant ideas with ideas of primary qualities when he writes that "none therefore imagines that it is reason and not sense which discovers these concomitant ideas, or primary qualitiesI1 (287). I earlier indicated occasionalist nuances in the Inmirv, and he continues to write of external motions being the noccasionsn of perceptions in the mind. The concomitants are experienced in relation to other perceptions and knowledge is some sort of combination of concomitant ideas and others. He believes that the concomitant ideas are the same for all human beings. In the paragraph to which the above note is attached, Hutcheson again claims that approbation and dislike are perceptions of some sense. In like manner, affections, tempers, sentiments, or actions, reflected upon in our selves, or observed in others, are the constant occasions of agreeable or disagreeable perceptions, which we call approbation, or dislike. These moral perceptions arise in us as necessarily as any other sensation. (4) By virtue of their constitution, human beings necessarily experience moral approval and disapproval in relation to certain objects, just as they experience yellow or sweetness in perceptions of the physical senses. Hutcheson describes five classes of perception, each with a corresponding sense. First, there are the external, physical senses. Secondly, there is the sense of beauty

which delivers "the pleasant perceptions arising from

regular, harmonious, uniform obj ects ( 5 ) . Thirdly, there is the public sense or sympathy, "our determination to be pleased with the happiness of others, and to be uneasy at

their miseryn (5). Fourthly, there is the moral sense, by which "we perceive virtue, or vice in ourselves, or othersm (6). Finally, there is the sense of honour, "which makes the approbation, or gratitude of others, for any good actions we have done, the necessary occasion of pleasuren 4.2.5 Desires not Necessarilv Selfish. Hutcheson is still concerned to show that satisfaction of desire is not necessarily selfish. He writes: Desires arise in our mind, from the frame of our nature, upon apprehension of good or evil in objects, actions or events, to obtain for ourselves or others the agreeable sensation, when the object or event is good; or to prevent the uneasy sensation, when it is evil. (7) There is a class of desire corresponding to each sort of sense and pleasure. These are called primary to distinguish them from desires for things only as means for the primary desires. The distinction allows him to claim, for example, that a desire for wealth and power is not necessarily selfish since these are normally desired as means to some other end. Whether such desires are selfish depends on whether the ends for which they are desired are selfish.

4.2.6 Qualities of Pleasures Distinquished. Near the end of the Essay Hutcheson examines the relative value of different sorts of pleasure, the pleasures given by the senses previously distinguished. He claims that the value of any pleasure "is in a compounded proportion of the

intenseness and durationn (127). By "intensenessn or intensity he presumably intends the degree or force of a pleasure, the idea being that a pleasure may vary in a manner analogous to sensations such as heat or light or smell. In the discussion Hutcheson observes reasons for diverse opinions about the intensity of different pleasures (128). He moves quickly to the claim that "those alone are capable of judging, who have experienced all the several

kinds of pleasure. * (129).61 He does not really explore the quasi-mathematical claim with which the section began in the discussion of intensity and duration. In fact, he bases the distinction between different sorts of pleasure, not on claims about relative intensity and duration, but on the reflective testimony of virtuous men. He writes: Now all virtuous men have given virtue this testimony, that its pleasures are su~eriorto anv other; that other enjoyments, when compared with the delights of integrity, , kindness, generosity, and publick spirit, are but trifles scarce worth any regard. (130, emphases added) He believes that virtuous men are acquainted with all the different sorts of pleasure so that they are in a position to make a true judgment about which pleasures are best. But has the virtuous person really experienced the pleasures of vice and perversion? What could Hutcheson say to the claim that vice and perversion offer the areatest and best pleasures if this were made by one who was previously virtuous? According to his claim that only those who have experienced the different kinds of pleasure are capable of

judging, it seems that we should take their word for it. At this point there would be no guidance on which pleasures are

1 6 In this he agrees with a doctrine of Platots Republic (sections 581, 582). 118 more valuable. Hutcheson probably doubted that such a counter-example to his claims for the testimony of virtuous men has ever or will ever exist, however easily conceived the example might be. The above passage shows that Hutcheson does not really believe his claim above that value is a matter only of degree and intensity. If degree and intensity, "in a compounded pr~portion,~jointly constitute a pleasure's value, an intense sensual pleasure of lengthy duration should be of greater value than the pleasure felt from assisting a stranger with directions. Here he claims that the pleasures of virtue are more valuable than other pleasures, regardless of their intensity or duration. He distinguishes the pleasures of people from the pleasures of animals, and human pleasures are more valuable. God has given certain "tastesm to every sort of creature (131). To human beings he has assigned the external and internal senses and their corresponding desires, the satisfaction of which is necessary for full human happiness. He writes: The happiness of an insect or brute, will only make an insect-or brute happy. But a nature with further powers, must have further enjoyments. (132). To support the claim that some pleasures are just better than others Hutcheson distinguishes the different stages of human development, arguing from an appeal to the reader's introspection that the pleasures of friendship, honour, marriage and the having and raising of children are more valuable than those of the hobby-horse, top and rattle

(132). Nature determines different pursuits at different stages of development. "Two states may both be happy, and yet the one infinitelv preferable to the otherm (133, emphasis added). Later in the section, he asks rhetorically, who would not, upon reflection, prefer that state of mind, these sensations of [reflective] pleasure, to all the enjoyments of the external senses, and of the imagination without them. (138) He anticipates the objection that the pleasures of the physical senses frequently overcome those of moral sense, and responds that 'a constant pursuit of the pleasures of the external senses can never become agreeable, without an opinion of innocence, or the absence of moral evilm (133).

For example, a human being can never be fully happy in a life of physical unless she is convinced that there is no harm in it. The discussion of intensity concludes: The pleasures of the internal senses, or of the imagination, are allowed by all who have any tolerable taste of them, as a much superior happiness to those of the external senses, though they were enjoyed to the full. (155) He does argue for the difference duration makes to the value of different sorts of pleasure. He notices that the pleasures of appetite are fairly transient; When the sensation is past, we are no happier for itn (157). To the pleasures of external sense he contrasts the enjoyments of the public sense. Although these tgcannotindeed secure us 120 against bodily pains or loss ... they are often a considerable support under themn (159). The pleasure or satisfaction of moral sense is of greater duration still, for "each good action is matter of pleasant reflection as long as we liven (160). He also compares the relative duration of different sorts of pain and points out that "the pain of the moral sense and sense of honour, are almost perpetual; time. the refuge of other sorrows, gives us least relief from themn (163). So the pleasure of kindness is more extensive than what arises directly from any single act but can be felt reflectively whenever we choose. But is there a difference duration between this and reflective pleasure in relation to past sensual enjoyment or personal achievement? Duration doesn't seem able to make distinctions in value between different sorts of pleasure. In summary, Hutcheson believes that the pleasures of moral sense are better. its pains worse, than the pleasures and pains of external sense. He does not really accept that value is constituted solely by a relation between a pleasure's intensity and duration. Perhaps he meant to claim that the value of a pleasure of any particular sort is a relation between its intensity and duration. but that the value of pleasures of that sort, speaking generally, are known only by reflective judgment of people who have experienced them. God has given people the capacity to 121 appreciate the pleasures which contribute to distinctively human flourishing .62

4.3 Illustrations Upon the Moral Sense

4.3.1 Ethical Rationalism: A Theory of Motivation or Perception? The rationalists Hutcheson discusses were unclear on whether reason is supposed to be the source of motivation or of moral perception. So, observing this distinction, he considers qualities which lead to action and approval respectively in order to explore interpretations of the rationalist theories.

4.3.2 Simplicitv of Moral Ideas. Hutcheson reiterates the claim that approbation is a simple idea. In relation to the debate on the foundation of ethics, this claim of simplicity is one way of denying what the rationalists claim, that moral judgments are inferences. Reason as he understands it, "our power of finding out true propositions," only discovers relations between existing ideas. It cannot give rise to new simple ideas.

62 Hutchesonls defence of a distinction between qualities of pleasure developed into more clearly articulated claims about the "dignityn or moral value of certain pleasures in the System of Moral Philosophy (1755). The idea of the moral dignity of certain pleasuxes is discussed ia relation to J.S. Mill's well-known argument that qualities of expected pleasures should be considered in applying the utilitarian principle in Fred Wilson Richard Price (1723-1791), Hutchesonfs most notable rationalist critic, agrees that moral ideas are simple, but rejects the epistemological framework which requires that a simple idea be a perception of some sense. Price writes: All that can appear, from the objections and reasonings of the author of the Inwirv into the orisinal of our ideas of beauty and virtue, is only ... that the words right and wrong, fit and unfit, express simple and undeniable ideas. But that the power perceiving them is properly a sense and nothing in the nature of actions, this, he has left entirely without proof. 63 Hutcheson leaves this "without proof" partly because the claim that reason cannot discover any new sort of simple idea is basic to the epistemology with which he was working. He believed, further, that morality was explicable within that framework,

Price differed with Hutcheson on the nature of moral perceptions and realised that what ethical rationalism needed was a more clearly articulated epistemology. He writes : It is undeniable, that many of our ideas are derived from our INTUITION of truth, or the discernment of the natures of things by the understanding. This therefore may be the source of our moral ideas. It is at least possible, that right and wrong may denote what we understand and know concerning certain objects, in like manner with proportion and disproportion, connexion and repugnancy, contingency and necessity ... nothing has been offered which has any tendency to prove the contrary .64

63 Richard Price, Review of the Principal Questions in Morals, edited by D.D. Raphael, 42.

Ibid. 41-42 123 One of the points at issue is the nature of the moral perceptions themselves and this point remains. This cannot be decided by introspection: the rationalist claims to perceive moral intuitions where the empiricist feels sensations. Obviously it would be question-begging for

Hutcheson to appeal to his own epistemological assumptions since this is what is at issue. In fairness to Hutcheson. his critical remarks were directed against versions of ethical rationalism which pre-date Price. Nevertheless, we shall see that Burnet did say something which approximated Price's position and which Hutcheson failed to notice. The epistemological requirements for ethical rationalism had not yet been clearly specified and one of the effects of Hutcheson's criticism was to make this apparent, paving the way for the development of these theories in Price and others.

4.3.3 A Critique of Rationalism. Hutcheson sketches two theories of approbation and election (choice of action). The first explains all human desire in terms of self- interest, the theory which was the main target of his first book. According to this. people approve of their own actions and those of others when they believe them to contribute somehow (however slightly) to their own interest

(210). For the egoist, then, there is no difference between the sorts of quality which lead to election and approbation. 124

The other theory of approbation and election claims that human beings, in addition to selfish affections, possess benevolent affections "also toward others, in various degrees, making us desire their happiness as an ultimate end," and a moral sense "to approve every kind

affection either in ourselves or others" (213). People choose actions, not only from self-interest, but also from a desire for the happiness of others. Further, people approve of kind affections, wherever these are discovered. Although he believes both theories are logically coherent, Hutcheson claims that "the former seems not to represent human nature as it is; the other seems to do it" (213). Hutcheson is aware of a third alternative, an altogether different sort of theory, which will be the target of the Illustrations. This theory claims that the 'morality of actions consists in conformity to reason, or difformity from itn (213) and that "virtue is acting according to the absolute fitness and unfitness of things, or agreeably to the natures or relations of thingsn (214). He claims that rationalist theories had not explained how reason by itself is able to lead either to choice of action or to approval. In the discussion of rationalist theories he hopes "to explain more fully how the moral sense alleged to be in mankind, must be presupposed even in these schemesn

(214). Early in the Essav he defined reason and some related terms. Since reason denotes "our power of finding out true propositions, reasonableness must denote the same thing, with conformity to true propositions or to truth" (215). People commonly call certain actions reasonable but this is most likely a confused predicate whether it is taken to refer to an actionfs motive or to qualities which determine approbation. One obvious sort of conformity to reason, that between a proposition and its object, never leads either to choice or approval. We may assert as many true propositions about actions we elect or reject, or of actions we approve or abhor (215). So conformity to reason, in this sense, can never explain either election or approbation. The force of the argument obviously depends on the conception of reason he has indicated, as Hutcheson shows himself to be well aware in a challenge to the rationalists. If reasonableness, the character of virtue, denote some other sort of conformity to truth, it were to be wished that these gentlemen, who make it the original idea of moral good, antecedent to any sense or affections, would explain it, and shew how it determines us antecedently to a sense, either to election or approbation. (217) Perhaps there is another sort of reason, according to which the 'reasonableness' of moral qualities is self-evident, a sort of rationalist intuitionism. Interestingly,

Hutchesonfs earliest critic Burnet actually seems close to saying something like this when he writes: Sometimes we perceive truth or right by a kind of natural penetration and sagacity of the mind before we have stayed to weigh distinctly every one of the steps which lead to it .... Few, indeed, are capable of such quick perceptions in those kinds of sciences where the conclusions are forced to pass through many steps. But almost all mankind are capable of them in moral science where the conclusion and the premises lie within a narrower compass. 65 Unfortunately Burnet does not clearly articulate the epistemological assumptions at issue and Hutcheson does not pick up the possibility that moral judgments might originate in reason in this way. Perhaps his own epistemological assumptions made it difficult to recognise what Burnet may have been suggesting. Hutcheson considers whether it ever makes sense to say that an action conforms to reason. He notices that different sorts of reasons for action may be given depending on whether one wishes to know what motivates or what justifies an action. The major claim which he wishes to establish against ethical rationalism then follows: Wow we shall find that all exciting reasons presuppose instincts and affections; and the justifying presuppose a moral sensetf

(218). That is, if we ask why a person did something, we shall eventually face certain facts of psychology. Likewise, if we ask what makes something virtuous, we will come to recognise another fact of psychology, viz. that there is a moral sense. What he means by these claims

65 Letter of April 10, 1725 printed in Hutcheson, Illustrations, edited by B, Peach, page 206. becomes clearer in the course of his evaluation of the rationalist theories.

4.3.4 Reason in Action is Instrumental. Hutcheson intends to show that whether ethical rationalism is interpreted as a theory of perception or motive, it presupposes something other than the conformity of certain propositions to their objects. To show that motivating reasons presuppose instincts, he asks what reason there is to pursue wealth? One might answer that wealth leads to pleasure and happiness. But why pursue pleasure and happiness? "One cannot imagine what proposition [a rationalist] could assign as his exciting reason" (221). That is, there is a limit to explanation in the instinct or desire for personal happiness- Likewise, ask why a person risks his life in a just war and, Hutcheson claims, an answer relating to the happiness of other people will eventually be given. Assuming that there are benevolent affections, as he believes he has previously established, there is no further exciting reason for an action once this answer is given. "The happiness of mankind in general, or any valuable part of it, is an ultimate end to that series of desiresn (221)- fReasonsf and do have senses in relation to action, once we accept instincts, affections and desires. Reasons for action are, he claims, which shew them to be conducive toward some ultimate end, or toward the greatest end of that kind in our power. He acts reasonably, who considers the various actions in his power, and forms true opinions of their tendencies; and then chuses to do that which will obtain the highest degree of that, to which the instincts of his nature incline him. (226) The word "tendenciesw in this passage might be taken to refer either to the actual or probable consequences of actions. That he would accept that probabilities are implicit in tendencies will be shown shortly. A selfish creature aims only for his own pleasure. For such a creature, "the exciting truths about means, would be only those which pointed out some means as more certainly

effectual than any otherf1 (227) to the greatest quantity of personal pleasure. Likewise, in a creature possessing a benevolent disposition, exciting reasons are such as show effective means of promoting the happiness of others. 'That end is called most reasonable, which our reason discovers to contain a greater quantity of publick good, than any in our powerw (227). A creature which has both sorts of disposition will act according to the strongest when dispositions are opposed. There is a proviso here, for Hutcheson believes it to be a truth about human life that the "constant pursuit of publick good is the most probable way of promoting [an individual's] own happinessn (228, my emphasis). This is connected to his claim that the internal as well as the external senses determine the nature of human flourishing. Hutcheson's phrasing echoes the reference to tendencies in the passage from page 226 which suggests that he accepts that probabilities are good reasons for actions. A human being who does not discover this truth about the "most probable wayn does not act reasonably for his own happiness since what appear to him to be direct means to personal happiness are likely to work against the public good, or at least neglect it. Consequently, his own happiness is likely to be diminished.

4.3.5 Justification. The addition of a moral sense to a creature of mixed dispositions, such as a human being, will lead to a certain uneasiness, either tho' the apprehended neglect of private interest when he serves in publick; or when he pursues only private interest, he will have perpetual remorse and dissatisfaction with his own temper, through his moral sense. So that the knowledge of this connexion of private interest, with the study of publick good, seems absolutely necessary to preserve a constant satisfaction of mind, and to prevent an alternate prevalence of seemingly contrary desires. (228) In the same way that explanations of actions end in interested or benevolent affections, justification of approval also comes to an end. So Hutcheson, again responding to the rationalists, considers justifying reasons; specifically, whether actions are ever approved because of conformity to some truth. Following the pattern of the previous argument, he points out that if reasonableness in action means that action is the object of a true propositionn then all actions should be approved, "since as many truths may be made about the worst, as can be made about the bestn (230). Furthermore, to say that an action is "fit to attain an endn does not justify any action "for the worst actions may be conducive to their ends, and reasonable in that sensen (230). Justifying reasons must therefore be about the ends themselves. The question at issue is whether conformity to any truth causes approval and he answers negatively. He can find no reason for preferring one end to another. "1 fancy we can find [no reason] in these cases, more than we could give for our liking any pleasant fruitn (230). He briefly considers some of the justifying reasons which the rationalists offer and finds that their explanations are circular or else presuppose something like a moral sense. But let these words, duty, obligation, owing, and the meaning of that gerund, is to be preferred, be explained; and we shall find ourselves at a loss for exciting reasons previously to affections, or to justifying reasons without recourse to a moral sense. (232) Consider obligation. Hutcheson believes that there are just two clear senses of this term. The first presupposes interested affections, as when it is said that a person is obliged to do an action in that it is necessary for his happiness or to avoid misery. The second presupposes a moral sense, when to be obliged to do an action means that "every spectator, or he himself upon reflection, must 131 approve his action and disapprove his omitting it, if he considers fully all its circumstancesn (229). At the end of this section he writes "As to that confused word [ought] it is needless to apply to it again all that was said about obligationN (249). I take him to mean that there are just two meanings of ought corresponding to the two senses of obligation. Hutcheson assumes that fully informed spectators, with normal human dispositions, will agree in at least the direction of their approvals and disapprovals. At one point he makes the assumption of agreement explicit. "In all men there is probably a moral sense, making publickly useful actions and kind affections grateful to the agent, and to every observern (236). He summarises the discussion of justifying and exciting reasons. Human beings approve of actions which appear to be the result of benevolent motives. "The reasons determining approbation are such as shew that an action evidenced kind affectionsll (248). What is the relation of reasons and action? Reasons, by themselves, do not move an agent. Reasons are about means and not ends. The reasons which lead to action, according to Hutcheson, require pre-existing affections or desires in the agent and show themselves to be means to the satisfaction of those affections. The reasons moving to election, are such as shew the tendency of an action to gratify some affection in the agentn (250). 4.3.6 Hutcheson on Clarke and Wollaston. Hutcheson considers the theories of two of his better-known

contemporaries, Samuel Clarke (1675- 1729 ) and William Wollastan (1690-1724). Clarke was a theologian and philosopher. His philosophical importance is based on two sets of , jointly published under a title which gives some indication of his aim: A Discourse Concerninq the Beins and Attributes of God. the Oblisations

of Natural Reliqion. and the Truth and of the Christian Revelation in Answer to Mr. Hobbes. Spinoza, the Author of the Oracles of Reason, and Other Deniers of Natural and Revealed EZeliqion. He writes of the "necessary and eternaln relations of "fitnessR in which things stand to each other and which are discoverable by reason. He claims that the fittingness of certain behaviour by human beings *...is as manifest, as that the properties which flow from the essences of different mathematical figures have different congruities or incongruities between themselves.n66 Perhaps he was grasping for an intuitionist epistemology even before Burnet. Clarke's theory is clearly objectivist in that the relation of fitness is entailed by facts which do not depend on the responses of anyone, nor on different places and times. According to Clarke, The same consequent fitness or unfitness of the application of different things or different relations

66 D.D. Raphael, ed., British Moralists, volume 1, 192. L.A. Selby-Bigge, ed., British Moralists, volume 2, 4. one to another with regard to which the will of God always and necessarily does determine itself, to choose to act only to what is agreeable to justice, equity, goodness, and truth, in order to the welfare of the whole universe, ought likewise constantly to determine the wi 11s of all subordinate rational beingsm6' Hutcheson complains, in relation to this or some very similar passage, that Clarke uses premises containing no normative terms but slides normative terminology into his conclusions without explanation. Paraphrasing and criticizing Clarke, he writes: that God who knows all these relations, etc., does guide his actions by them, since he has no wrong affection (the word wrong8 should have been first explained) and that in like manner these relations, etc . , ought (another unlucky word in morals ) to determine the choice of all rationals abstractly from any views of interest. (251) At the end of the previous section Hutcheson called ought a nconfusedn word. Here he calls it nunlucky.n He criticises Clarke for introducing words like ought and wrong into the conclusions of his arguments without e~planation.~' Hutcheson actually says that he does not intend to oppose Clarkefs scheme, "but rather to suggest what seems a necessary explication of it; by shewing that it is no otherwise intelligible, but upon supposition of a moral sensen (252). He believes that Clarkefs theory is

6 7 D-D. Raphael, ed., British Moralists, volume 2, 192. L.A. Selby-Bigge, ed,, British Moralists, volume 2, 3.

68 Hume was undoubtedly influenced by this argument in writing the famous 'is/ought8 paragraph. Nicholas Capaldi discusses the relation between Hume8s paragraph and Hutcheson's comments on Clarke in HumeDs Place in Moral Philoso~hv,chapter 3. incomplete for its failure to explain the approval of or preference for virtue over vice, a preference which reason, as the discovery of true propositions, cannot show. Fitness and unfitness do not simply describe objective facts or relations, as Clarke claims. In relation to objective states the words describe the relation of means to ends. However, as Hutcheson points out, whether ends are good or ill is irrelevant to the question of whether means are fit.

As Clarke uses the terms, fitness and unfitness refer ultimately to the approval or disapproval of ends themselves. To make his case against Clarke, Hutcheson examines three sorts of relation between inanimate objects and rational agents in order to determine whether fitness or unfitness describes qualities of those relations. A person may alter the relations between inanimate objects, but this is neither virtuous nor vicious where there is no relation

"to a rational agent's happiness or miseryn (253). Virtue and vice, therefore, are not qualities of relations between inanimate objects.

He next considers the relations of inanimate objects to rational agents and concludes that knowledge of such relations is indifferent between good and ill: The knowledge of these relations neither excites to actions, nor justifies them, without presupposing either affections or a moral sense. Kind affections with such knowledge make heroes; malicious affections, villains. (254) Finally he turns to relations between rational agents. Do any fitnesses or the contrary arise from relations such as creator and creature, or parent and child? He begins by interpreting the idea of fitness, which he finds to be only vaguely specified by Clarke. One obvious sense of fitness is the relation between means and ends; however, "the most contrary actions have equal fitnesses for contrary ends; and each one is unfit for the end of the othern (254). So fitness in relation to any end whatsoever cannot be what Clarke intended. Perhaps fitness describes the end of some action itself. But the fitness of subordinate ends will not make an action good unless the ultimate end of the action is good. To keep a conspiracy a secret is fit for the success of the conspiracy but this does not make the end good. "The publick good alone is a fit end, therefore the means fit for this end alone are goodn (255). Burnet complained that Hutcheson fails to justify moral perceptions. Here Hutcheson turns the table on the rationalist. What means the fitness of an ultimate end? For what is it fit? Why, 'tis an ultimate end, not fit for anything further, but absolutely fit. What means that word fit? If it notes a simple idea it must be the perception of some sense: thus we must recur, upon this scheme too, to a moral sense. (255) According to the theory of reason which Hutcheson believes he shares with his opponents, reason can mix and combine simple ideas but cannot be a source of new simple ideas. If the rationalists hold that fitness is not a simple idea, 136 then it is up to them to analyse and explain it. If they hold that it is a simple idea, not given by sense but by reason, then they need an alternative epistemology. Hutchesonfs next rationalist target is William Wollaston. Wollaston was the author of the Relicrion of

Nature Delineated (1722) which went through eight editions by 1750. He argues that the essence of moral value is truth. No act (whether word or deed) of any being to whom moral good and evil are imputable (i-e., intelligent and free) that interferes with any true proposition, or denies anything to be what it is, can be right. 69 Wollaston claims to be explaining everyday moral distinctions. Hutchesonfs examination of the claim that virtue is equivalent to truth shows it to be very confused. One may assert as many true propositions about a murderer or his state of mind as about the most benevolent person imaginable. Hutcheson writes, "if then significancy of falshood be the very same with moral evil, all crimes must be equal1' (274). In response to objections from what appear to be conflicts of duty Wollaston writes that "the importance of truths on the one and the other side should be diligently comparedn (my emphasis).'* From this sort of admission Hutcheson concludes that Wollastan himself does not really believe what he claims and that "signification of

6 9 Reliqion of Nature Delineated (London: 1724), 16. D.D. Raphael, volume 2, 243. L.A. Selby-Bigge, volume 2, 364-

70 D.D. Raphael, volume 2, 250, L.A. Selby-Bigge, voltme 2, 370. 13 7

truth or falshood are not the same with virtue and vicem (275).

4.3.7 Reason's Riaht Role. In the Inauirv Hutcheson argued, against the egoists, that there are social affections and a moral sense. In the Illustrations he argues that rationalist theories have not shown that moral distinctions are the products of reason and that they actually presuppose something like moral sense. Reason does have a legitimate place in morals and he examines this after his anti-rationalist critical remarks. Some questions in moral theory can only be answered by reason. For instance, reason may determine whether there are any actions or affections or particular quality which, when apprehended, receive the approval of any spectator

(280). He believes this can be answered by introspection or by consulting others. Such reflection will, he claims, show that moral sense is universal all nationsn and uniform, in that apprehension of 'kind affection, or study of the good of othersn leads to approbation in any observer (281). It is true that there is no certainty that the kind affections which we approve others will approve. However, he claims that it is highly probable that the senses of all men are pretty uniform: That the Deity also approves kind affections, otherwise he would not have implanted them in us, nor determined us by a moral sense to approve them. (285) 138

Ood has made human beings so as to approve of benevolence, a

divine attribute which, by divine benevolence, we share. He considers whether moral sense might itself have a right and wrong state, "as there is in our other senses, according as they represent their objects to be as they

really are, or represent them otherwisen (286). He admits that although moral judgments can be mistaken it is difficult to determine whether or in what way such mistakes are analogous to mistakes in judgments of physical sensation. He is then able to turn the discussion to a

further response to a rationalist objection to his own theory. The rationalists claimed that we must know antecedently what is right before saying whether moral sense judges correctly and, further, that such knowledge can originate only in reason. Hutcheson reminds the reader of the theory of perception outlined in the Essav. Some sensible ideas, such as colours and sounds, are "only perceptions in our minds and not images of any like external qualityn (286).

His phrasing might be taken to suggest a purely subjective interpretation of secondary qualities but this would run against remarks he makes about the basis in objects of powers to excite these ideas in people. 1 take him to be distinguishing ideas of secondary qualities, which do not resemble the qualities which are the basis in objects of the power to receive these ideas, from ideas of primary 139

qualities which are supposed to resemble their qualities in objects. "Other ideas are images of something external, as duration. number, extension, motion, rest: These latter, for distinction, we may call concomitant ideas of sensationm

(287). Both sorts of idea may be distorted. So we talk in terms of the perceptions, sensible and concomitant. of ordinary or healthy individuals under standard or normal conditions. We do not denominate objects from our perceptions during the disorder. but according to our ordinary perceptions, or those of others in good healthm

(287). Of the possibility of correcting errors in relation to the concomitant ideas of sensation he writes that nobody "therefore imagines that it is reason and not sense which discovers these concomitant ideas, or primary qualitiesm

(287). Recognition and correction of errors of moral perception do not show that moral apprehension originates in reason.

4.3-8 Ideas of Actions. Hutcheson extends the theory of perception he previously outlined, noting that three things are distinguishable in the idea of an action. First, there is the idea of an action or event in the world and "its tendency to the happiness or misery of some sensitive nature, often inferr'd by arguments or reasonn (287). Secondly, there is the idea of the motivating affections of the agent. again "inferred by our reasonn (288). An agent's motives must be inferred since we cannot see or sense them. These first two ideas of an action represent things which are completely external to the observer. Thirdly, there is the perception of approbation or disapprobation in the observer. Approbation is a subjective response which is not representative of anything in the action. Approval is not an image but a determinate response to certain sorts of actions . This approbation cannot be supposed an image of any thing external, more than the pleasures of harmony, of taste, of smell. But let none imagine, that calling the ideas of virtue and vice perceptions of a sense, upon apprehending the actions and affections of another does diminish their reality, more that the like assertions concerning all pleasure and pain, happiness or misery. (288) Here Hutcheson again connects approbation with the idea of virtue. One wishes he had made explicit remarks on what he takes the tie between approbation and virtue to be. In the preface to the book he does use one to define the other. He says that to define virtue by what is agreeable to moral sense "may appear perhaps too uncertainn because of the possibility that the sense of individuals 5s often depraved by custom, habits, false opinions, companyu (xv) . He observes that there are actions and motives which are kind to some people at the same time as they are harmful to others. So that he is prepared only to assert generally, that 'every one calls that temper, or those actions virtuous, which are approv'd by his own sense,' and withal, that 'abstracting from particular habits or prejudices, that temper which desires, and those actions which are intended to procure the greatest moment of good toward the most extensive system to which our power can reach, is approved as the highest virtue. ' (xv) Abstraction from known approvals shows that extensive benevolence is the highest virtue. David Fate Norton closely attends to the theory of perception outlined in the preface and attributes an intriguing possibility to Hutcheson, that the ideas of virtue and vice are 'moral concomitants' to perceptions of approval and disapproval respectively." ~ccordingto the above theory of perception, at least one of the ideas of number and duration must accompany every perception. Sensible perceptions (e.g. smells, colours, tastes) are not supposed to be images of external reality but are always accompanied by tlconcomitantideas of sensationR (duration, number, extension, motion) which are "reputed images of something external." Moral sense responds to ideas of human actions with approbation, which "cannot be supposed an image of any thing externaln (288) similar to the sensible impressions. Norton writes, concomitant with these ideas [of approbation or disapprobation] , in addition to duration and number, are the moral concomitants, the ideas of virtue and vice, which are representative of external or objective moral reality. 72

71 David Fate Norton, David Hume: Common-Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician, 86.

'' Ibid., 86- 142

The problem with Nortonfs interpretation of the moral ontology is that it makes moral qualities equivalent to primary qualities of objects which runs counter to Hutcheson's comparison of moral perception with sense perception and of moral goodness as a power. If Hutcheson had believed that the ideas of virtue and vice are representative of an objective reality in the way that ideas of primary qualities are, then he would have made this exciting claim explicitly. Instead he writes of the power of virtue to excite approval and compares approval to perception of secondary qualities. Moral goodness 'denotes our idea of some quality apprehended in actions, which procures approbationn (105). He does indicate one difference between ordinary and moral perception which is that in the former we have no idea of the quality which is the basis of the power to excite, say, a perception of yellow; whereas on the latter, we know the quality in which the basis of the power to excite moral admiration lies, and this is benevolence .')

4.3.9 Reason Corrects Percentionst. Reason has a role in morals through correcting perceptions about the tendency of actions and "rash conclusionsn about an agent's motives.

73 For more detailed criticism of Norton's interpretation see Kenneth Winkler nHutchesonOsAlleged Realism," Journal of the Historv of Philosophy 23 (1985) 179-194, But whether our moral sense be subject to such a disorder, as to have different perceptions, of the same apprehended affections in an agent, at different times, as the eye may have of the colours of an unaltered object, it is not easy to determine. (288) This would be a very difficult empirical question. It appears that perceptions of virtue can differ radically between individuals and across cultures. Whether this is a problem for the claim that people agree in the direction of their evaluative responses depends on how different perceptions of virtue are understood and explained. It might not be a problem if different perceptions of virtue are explicable in terms of benevolent motives working in different contexts. Benevolence could still be the basis of the power, always and everywhere, to excite approval, even though one society admires preserving life as long as possible and another admires allowing sick people to die so as to preserve limited resources for others. In any case, Hutcheson believes that mistaken approbation happens and that when it is mistaken the perceptions or sensations as they are experienced by the observer will not be distinguishable from true approbation. Hutcheson, following Shaftesbury, explains such mistakes as the result of mistakes in belief about objective matters of fact. 144

4.4 Hutchesonfs Moral Ontology

In the chapters on Hutcheson I have described a moral theory of great complexity. It is not an easy theory to categorise. At the beginning of the previous chapter I outlined Frankenars interpretation (3.2). I complained there that the disjunction on which Frankena bases his argument is not exhaustive and that the interpretations he does consider put together epistemological, ontological and linguistic features of theories as though these stand in logical or mutually-implicative relations to each other. Criticism of Frankena prepared the way for a fresh consideration of Hutchesonrs theory. What can we now say about his moral ontology? Recall that ethical objectivism refers to any theory according to which moral values are or are entailed by matters of fact which are independent of the evaluative responses of persons making moral judgments about characters or actions, and of places and times. Ethical subjectivism refers broadly to ethical theories which claim that there are no objectivist moral values. More specifically, it refers especially to theories according to which moral judgments about characters and actions are judgments about the way persons considering people and actions react to them, about the way persons think or feel about people or actions. Moral judgments depend on the responses, beliefs 145 or attitudes of persons making moral judgments or on places and times.

In the previous chapter we examined Hutcheson8s claim that aesthetic and moral ideas are, like ideas of typical secondary qualities, caused by objective qualities of their respective objects. Rational agents are the possessors of moral value or disvalue. Benevolence is the quality of persons which is, always and everywhere, the basis of the power to excite moral approval. The universal calm benevolence is the perfection of virtue, what is approved as best. Recall hie "imperfect descriptionn of moral goodness as denoting "some quality apprehended in actions, which procures approbationn (Inquiry, 105). We have seen that benevolence is the quality which has the power of evoking approval. The classification of Hutcheson's moral ontology depends on how we understand his claim that the ideas of moral perception are like ideas of secondary qualities. According to the second interpretation of secondary qualities (see 1.2) different qualities in different circumstances are powers to excite ideas of secondary qualities. If this were Hutchesonfs understanding of moral qualities as secondary then his theory would be a form of ethical subjectivism. There is one feature of this theory, however, which supports a more objectivist interpretation. 146

The objectivist reading considers Hutchesonfs interest in determining the specific quality which is the basis of the power to excite approval, together with his belief that benevolence would be such a power in all circumstances of place and time. This emphasis suggests that he holds something like the third interpretation of secondary qualities (see 1.2) . According to this, a quality is identified with its basis. Yellow is a reflective quality of objects. Virtue is the power of benevolence. everywhere and always, to excite moral approval. Unlike the causes of ideas of typical secondary qualities, we know that the basis of our approval lies in attributions of benevolent motives. According to this interpretation, benevolence would be the basis of the power to excite moral approval even in worlds in which people had no moral sense, and felt no moral approval. Such a world could have many instances of benevolent actions and persons, just as a world without light could have many objects which have the quality of reflecting light in the 5900 angstrom range. If a person with a moral sense came on benevolent agents he would approve of them and call them virtuous, Hutcheson believes that there are no imaginable circumstances in which benevolence and its expression in action would not excite approval, and this makes the theory a version of ethical obj ect ivism . 147

In the second chapter I showed that Shaftesbury is an ethical objectivist. We see that Hutcheson agrees that the content of a moral judgment is external to the person making it and that moral value depends on attributions of benevolent motives to agents. Let us now turn to Humefs theory to see whether he follows his objectivist predecessors in moral ontology. HUME'S THEORY OF MORAL VALUE

5.1 Introduction

5.1.1 Life and Works. David Hume was born in Edinburgh in

1711. His father died while David was an infant and his mother, as he put it, "devoted herself entirely to the rearing and educating of her children.n74 Early in life he developed a love of literature which he once described as

"the ruling passion of my life." He graduated in 1723 from the University of Edinburgh but continued studies there until 1726, preparing for a career in law. On leaving the university he began a program of study of his own which led to the formulation of an original philosophical system and the anonymous publication of A Treatise of Human Nature in

1739 and 1740." The significance which philosophical history in the twentieth century awards the Treatise was not immediately apparent to his contemporaries and Hume later described it as having fallen "deadborn from the press." In relation to this thesis, the second and third books of the Treatise contain the earliest and most detailed version of his moral philosophy.

74 Quotations in this section are from "My own Life," a very brief autobiography written within a year of his death.

7s The first two volumes were published in 1739 and the final volume, separately, in 1740. 14 9

Hume continued to write in spite of the discouraging reception of the Treatise and he published another book, Essavs. Moral and Political, just a year after the third volume of the Treatise. The first edition sold out within the year and a second, corrected. edition was published in 1742.

The Enaim concerninq Human Understandinq, dealing generally with topics from the first volume of the ~reatise, was published in 1748. Again his efforts were not successful with the public. This book was followed closely by another collection of essays and the Enuuirv concerninq the Princi~alsof Morals (1751, hereafter normally referred to as the Encruirv), also dealing with matters first addressed in the Treatise. Hume later described this book as being, of all his writings, "historical, philosophical, or literary. incomparably the best," though it also "came unnoticed and unobserved into the world," There are differences between the moral theories of the Treatise and the Enquiry, and discussion of the relation between the two works has continued to the present. Hume actually appears to repudiate the Treatise towards the end of his life. He never prepared a second edition of it for publication, and publicly acknowledged its authorship only in the short autobiography and in an advertisement to the second volume of the last authorial edition of his philosophical works (published posthumously in 1777). Both of these were composed in the final year of a terminal illness. In the advertisement he renounces the ~reatiseas a "juvenile workN. He says that he "cast the whole aneww and expresses hope "that the following pieces may alone be regarded as containing his philosophical sentiments and principles." The writings which follow the advertisement include both Enauiries, A Dissertation on the Passions and The Natural History of Relision but whether the hope expressed in the advertisement refers to all of these is open to conjecture. In a letter to his publisher around that time he describes the advertisement as "a complete answer to Dr. Reid and to that bigoted silly fellow,

Beattie. n76 Commentators, reasonably enough, infer that it was the criticisms of Thomas Reid and ,77 directed as they were mostly against the Treatise, which led

76 TO William Strahan, October 1775, The Letters of David Hume, H. Greig, ed.. Letter 509, Vol. 1, p. 301.

77 Thomas Reid (1710-1796) is kuown as the founder of the of common sense. He attacked Humefs 'theory of ideasf on the grounds that it led, in his opinion, to conclusions contrary to the common consciousness of humanity which he took to be basic. He was appointed professor of moral philosophy at Marischal College, Aberdeen in 1751 and at Glasgow in 1764, the year in which he published Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense. James Beattie (1735-1803), another common-sense philosopher, became professor of moral philosophy and at Maxischal College, Aberdeen in 1760- For a time, then, he was a collegue- of Reid. His Essav on the Nature and ~mx&tabilitv of Truth, in Opposition to So~histrvand Scevticism (1770) followed Reid in attacking the theory of ideasf. Actual criticism is directed at HumeOs Treatise but Beattie does not hesitate to take jabs at Hume's character and literary expression. For instance, The style of the Treatise of Human Nature is so exceedingly obscure and uninteresting that if the author had not in his Essays republished the doctrines of that work in a style more elegant and sprightly, a confutation of them would have been altogether unnecessary: their uncouth and gloomy aspect would have deterred most people from courting their acquaintance" (Essav on Truth, fifth edition corrected 1774, p. 485). Beattie's nconfutationnof the of Berkeley and Hume led George 111 to confer on him a pension in 1773. Hume to challenge critics to address the arguments as recast in the Encruiries and perhaps in the other books in the second volume of the works. One is hard-pressed to name a contemporary authority willing to ignore the Treatise in treating of Humefs philosophy and many would agree with P611 kdal that "if Hume was basing his judgment of the Encxuirv upon its philosophical merits one can only say that he was an exceptionally inept judge of the quality of his own work. Hume s own verdict will remain an interesting puzzle. '' It is not obvious that the Enquirv represents the same moral theory as the Treatise so it will be useful to say something of the relation between the two. Many distinctive features of the Treatise are not discussed in the Inauirv, for example the mechanism of sympathy and the distinction between the natural and artificial virtues. John B. Stewart

discusses the relation between the two works and concludes that an account of Hume's moral theory would have to be

different if we were to rely on the Encruirv alone but that

"there is nothing in the Enauirv that requires that a theory attributed to Hume on the basis of what he says in the Treatise be modified."80 That is, the Treatise appears to

Pbll. S , kdal, nIntroductionn to A Treatise of Human Nature, vol. 2, page 8,

79 For a discussion of some related matters see the appendix to this thesis entitled "A Note on HumeOs Advertisement of 1777".

John B. Stewart, The Moral and of David Hume, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963) p. 337. 152 provide a more detailed version of what is essentially the same moral theory. There is reason to disagree with Stewartfs appraisal of the relationship, and attention to the theory of value he presents in each book will highlight some of the significant differences. For this thesis, I deal first with topics from the Treatise in the order in which he presents them and then consider the moral theory of the Enairv. In relation to the question of whether certain philosophers believe that values are objective or subjective, I need to determine whether he sticks to one side of this division throughout both works. To return to his life and writings, Hume's literary fortunes eventually changed to the extent that he actually prospered by his writings. As a result he became, in his words, "not only independent, but opulent." He appears to have been a cheerful person and good . His French friends called him "le Davidm and friends in Edinburgh knew him as "St. David." Indeed, when in later years he moved to an unnamed street in Edinburgh a friend, Nancy Orde, wrote "St. David Street" on the wall of his house and this eventually became the street's official nameW8' Hume died in 1776.

81 E-C-Mossner, The Life of David Hume. 566, 620. 5.2 The Influence of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson

5.2.1 Givinq Credit. In a number of places Hume indicates that both Shaftesbury and Hutcheson influenced the development of his ideas. In the introduction to the Treatise he includes them in a list of "some late philosophers in England, who have begun to put the science of man on a new footing" (xvii). We have already seen the extensive influence of Shaftesbury on Hutcheson. Contemporary commentators follow Norman Kemp Smith's recognition of the influence of Hutcheson on Hume. Kemp Smith stresses the relation between Humers ethics and epistemology, the priority of his ethics and the dependence of his ethics on Hutches~n.~~Likewise. A.N. Prior writes that "there is little or nothing in Hume's moral philosophy that cannot be traced to Hutches~n.~~~~

the first ion An Inauiq Concernina Human

Understandinq (1748 and 1751 editions only) Hume indicates something of his debt to Hutcheson.

That faculty by which we discern truth and falsehood, and that by which we perceive vice and virtue, had long been confounded with each other; and all morality was supposed to be built on eternal and immutable relations, which, to every intelligent mind, were equally invariable as any proposition concerning quantity or number. But [Mr. Hutcheson] has taught US. by the most convincing arguments, that morality is

82 The Philoso~hvof David Hume, (London: MacMillan, 1941) -

Lode and the Basis of Ethics, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949) 31, nothing in the abstract relations of things, but is entirely relative to the sentiment, or mental taste of each particular being; in the same manner as the distinctions of sweet and bitter, hot and cold, arise from the particular feeling of each sense or organ. Moral perceptions, therefore, ought not to be classed with the operations of the understanding, but with the tastes or sentiments. Again, in a letter to Hutcheson from before the publication of the third book of the Treatise, Hume also claims that there is substantial agreement between them: I wish from my heart, I could avoid concluding, that since morality, according to your opinion as well as mine, is determinfd merely by sentiment, it regards only human nature and human life."

5.2.2 Points of Aqreement and Comparison. Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Hume agree that psychological egoism is mistaken. Hume also agrees with Hutcheson in explicitly rejecting ethical rationalism. Compared with Hutcheson, Hume does not write much of a moral sense, though the term is not without prominence in his moral philosophy. For instance, in the opening section of the third book of the

Treatise Hume argues that "reason is wholly inactive, and can never be the source of so active a principle as conscience, or a sense of moralsn (458)- In title of the second section he announces the positive claim that they are nderiv'd from a moral sensen (470) , Much later in the Treatise he states that "to have the sense of virtue, is

84 Letter to Hutcheson, 16 March 1740. Reprinted in John Hill Burton, Life and Correspondance of David Hume, (Edhburgh: William Tait, 1846), 118. nothing but to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation of a character" (1740, 471). Later still he writes, "were nothing esteemrd virtue but what was beneficial to society, I am persuaded, that the foregoing explication of the moral sense ought still to be receiv'd" (588). In the second Encruirv he writes, it is probable ... that this final sentence [which pronounces characters and actions amiable or odious, praiseworthy or blameable] depends on some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species. (173) That there was a significant influence of Shaftesbury on Hutcheson and of both on Hume is fairly obvious. We have seen that Humets predecessors held different objectivist theories of value. The main question of this chapter is whether, in the senses already specified, Hue holds an objectivist or subjectivist ontology of moral value.

5.3 Evaluation and Motive in Hume's Treatise

5.3.1 Book Two of the Treatise. My consideration of Hume's moral ontology begins with the indirect passions, introduced in Book Two of the Treatise. Not long ago this book was considered to be without much philosophical interest. For example, Kemp Smith wrote that "more than a third of Book I1 is employed in the treatment of four passions which have no 156 very direct bearing upon Hume8s ethical problems, and play indeed no really distinctive part in his system.n85 The work of P611 S. kdal caused a significant re-evaluation of its significance by demonstrating that the moral theory of Book Three has its foundation in the psychology of Book Two.86 This thesis will develop this reading of the Treatise by showing that the second book is important for understanding Hume's ontology of moral value.

5.3.2 Taxonomv of the Passions. Hume begins the second book with a review of the basic psychology of his 'science of man.' The review amounts to a taxonomy of mental experience which serves to identify and locate his subject matter. All human experience is made up of perceptions. Perceptions are either impressions or ideas which are derived from impressions. Impressions of sensation are called 'original8 in that they arise without any previous perception. Examples of original impressions include impressions of the senses, together with bodily pains and pleasures. Some other perception, either an impression or idea, preceeds 'reflective' or 'secondary8 impressions

13' Philosophy of David Hume, 160.

86 Pass ion and Value in Hume s Treatise , (Edinburgh: mversity Press, 1966) . 157

(275). The passions "and other emotions resembling themn

are secondary or reflective impressions (275) . He divides reflective impressions into the 'calm' and the 'violent', based on the intensity of feeling normallv felt when the impression is experienced. The sense of

beauty and deformity in action is one example he gives of a calm impression. Kemp Smith writes that the calm passions are "modes of approval and disapproval. hdal points out that although this is true of the examples in the taxonomy, nothing Hume says implies that all calm passions are evaluations. Indeed, he later writes of a calm benevolence, love of life, kindness to children, appetite to

good and aversion to evil (417), so he does not hold the

opinion which Kemp Smith atttibutes to him." Among the violent impressions he includes love, hatred,

grief, joy, pride and humility (276). This list is not meant to be exhaustive. Hume says the division into calm and violent reflective impressions "is far from being exactn

(276) and that a passion may be calm at one time and violent at another. This will be significant when we discuss the relation between "the sense of beauty and deformity in

actionffand love and hatred. The calmness or violence of a passion does not relate to its motivational force or

Ibid., 167.

8 8 See Passion and Value in HumeOs Treatise, 95. 158 strength either: *We must... distinguish betwixt a calm and a weak passion; betwixt a violent and a strong onen (419). Hume refers to passions which arise without previous pleasure or pain, "certain instincts originally implanted in our natures, such as benevolence and resentment, the love of life, and kindness to childrenn (417). Following Kemp Smith's suggestion, I call such passions primary.'' 'Secondary passions' arise from pleasure or pain and Hurne distinguishes these into two sorts. ,Direct passions' are felt immediately as a result of pain and pleasure. He gives some examples; "desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, fear, despair and securityn (277). 'Indirect passionst come from the same principles as the direct passions "but by the conjunction of other qualitiesm (276). Among the "other qualitiesn which distinguish the indirect passions are ideas of persons, of one's own self or of another person. The significance for this in his moral theory is that the basic object of moral evaluation is a person's character. The examples he cites of indirect passions are pride, humility, love, hatred, ambition, vanity, envy, pity, malice and generosity.

5.3.3 The Indirect Passions. Following the taxonomy of the passions, Hume begins a detailed consideration of two correlated pairs of indirect passions. 'Prider and

8 9 Ibid. , 168. 159 humilityt, ' lover and hatredt are technical terms referring to specific impressions or their corresponding ideas. Although his meanings are related to some conventional uses, it is important to treat them as referring to the specific impressions he indicates. One goal of the moral theory the ~reatiseis to explain moral evaluation without reference to unusual faculties of the mind or special qualities of objects. In explaining the indirect passions he shows how natural, albeit biased, evaluation of persons occur. We will see how these naturally-occurring evaluations are related to moral evaluation in due course. Humers first claim is that these impressions are simple, that they are not composed of parts and that they are therefore not capable of analysis, "'Tis impossible we can ever, by a multitude of words, give a just definition of themm (277, cf . 329) . There are a number of ways he suggests of bringing to mind a simple impression. For instance, one might create the causal conditions under which the impression is experienced. "To give a child an idea of scarlet or orange, of sweet or bitter, I present the objects, or in other words, convey to him these impressionsn

(5). A second way of making someone aware of a simple impression is to use synonymous terms, assuming that the person has both had the particular simple impression and learned to use the terms correctly. In the case of the first pair of indirect passions, one might speak in contemporary terms of impressions of self-esteem instead of pride and of shame instead of humililty. A third way of bringing to mind the idea of a simple impression is to describe the causal conditions, the circumstances, under which a person might have had that impression. In relation to the indirect passions, he chooses this way to indicate his subject matter. He is confident that the reader will be familiar with the impressions as he describes their causal conditions. His description of the causal conditions of the indirect passions is systematic and mechanistic. The 'object* of an indirect passion is the person to whom the passion directs attention. The *subjectf of a passion is something related somehow to the object which, independently of that relation, possesses a pleasant or painful quality. Pride and humility share the same object, self, "or that succession of related ideas and impressions, of which we have an intimate memory and consciousness. It seems odd to refer to self as object. We are more used to speaking of self as subject. There are a number of reasons

This passage may be surprising to readers who believe that Hume denies in the Treatise that there is any impression or idea of self ( "Of Personal Identityn: I, iv, 6) - It is important to follow the distinction, drawn in that section of Book I, between personal identity "as it regards our thought or imaginationn and "as it regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselvesn (253), the latter of which he treats in the second book of the Treatise. See my "David Hume on Personal Identity in Book I1 of A Treatise of Human Nature," Hume Studies; Spring 1990. supporting Humets choice of terminology. First, it is natural to speak of an object of attention and pride and humility, love and hatred have objects in this sense. The object of pride and humility is one's own self, while the object of love and hatred is some other person. Further, Hume conceives of pride and humility, love and hatred as positive and negative evaluations of self or some other person, respectively. And we naturally speak of objects of evaluation. In the end, then, there is nothing very odd about his choice of the object terminology. Self or another person is the object of these indirect passions but not their cause. Hume writes: Every valuable quality of the mind, whether of the imagination, judgment, memory or disposition; wit, good-sense, learning, courage, justice, integrity; all these are the causes of pride; and their opposites of humility. Nor are these passions confinOd to the mind, but extend their view to the body likewise. ... The passions looking farther, comprehend whatever ob jects are least allyfd or related to us. Our country, family, children, relations, riches, houses, gardens, dogs, cloaths; any of these may become a cause either of pride or of humility. (279) In the treatment of the causes of an indirect passion he distinguishes the subject and the aualitv of the subject. A person is proud of a beautiful house. The person is the object of pride. The house is the subject of the passion and must be somehow related to the person in order to be a cause either of pride or humility. Its beauty is the quality which will determine the character of the passion.

An unpleasant subject leads to humility or shame, just as a pleasing one leads to pride. A beautiful house may please anyone, but can be a source of pride only for one who is closely connected to it. Hume supposes that the causes of love and pride are the same except for their difference in object. A subject which is the cause of pride in its possessor will be the cause of love for the same person by other people. His account seems simplistic at this point, since a person can feel pride in relation to qualities or possessions which lead others to despise him. Likewise, Hume himself spends some effort in trying to explain the love of friends and relatives in whom one discerns no special merit. "Whoever is united to us by any connection is always sure of a share of our love, proportioned to the connection, without inquiry into his other qualities" (352). Sometimes his description of such a neat psychological mechanism appears to get the better of him, causing him to overlook some common experiences. These instances suggest some problems with the psychology which would need to be much more complicated for the mechanistic explanation to be plausible. Interestingly, the moral theory of the Encruirv is largely free of these specific concerns, as we shall see. Hume believes that the causes of pride, humility, love and hatred are very similar in different times and places. Can we imagine it possible, that while human nature remains the same, men will ever become entirely indifferent to their power, riches, beauty or personal merit, and that their pride and vanity will not be affected by these advantages? (281) He rejects as implausible the idea that there is a separate principle which determines each subject to be a source either of pride or humility. Instead, he seeks common principles which will explain how so many things cause pride and love, hatred and humility.

5.3.4 The Association or Relation of Impressions and Ideas. Hume reviews his claims from Book I about the relations of ideas and impressions. Ideas are naturally connected to each other by three different sorts of relation. An idea may naturally pass to another which resembles it, or is contiquous to it, or to an idea which is connected to it by causation. When one idea is present to the imagination, any other, united by these relations, naturally follows itN

(283). Impressions, on the other hand, are related only by resemblance. For example, the mind moves easily from joy to love to generosity and to other resembling affections. There is an objection to the simplicity of the indirect passions which I should briefly address. This has to do with whether the simplicity of a passion is compatible with the idea of its resembling another passion. Hume's main claim about the simplicity of an impression is that one cannot distinguish constituent parts of it in experience. The fact that it resembles but is different from another impression does not count against its simplicity unless it is analysable into distinct parts. Hume seems to have become aware of objections to the simplicity of resembling impressions around the time he was preparing the final volume of the Treatise for publication. In a letter to Hutcheson from March 1740, he writes: Our conversation together has furnished me a hint, with which I shall augment the second edition. 'Tis this - the word simple idea is an abstract term comprehending different individuals that are similar. Yet the point of their similarity, from the very nature of such ideas, is not distinct nor separable from the rest. Is not this a proof, among many others that there may be similarity without any possible separation even in thought.

In the appendix to Book 111 (1740) he makes a number of additions to Book I (1739), among which is the following: Blue and green are different simple ideas, but are more alike than blue and scarlet; tho1 their perfect simplicity excludes all possibility of separation or distinction. 'Tis the same case with particular sounds, and tastes and smells. These admit of infinite resemblances upon the general appearance and comparison, without having any common circumstance the same. (637) He meets this sort of objection in relation to impressions of physical sense and one would expect a similar defence in relation to the simplicity of the indirect passions.

5.3.5 More Distinctions of Feelinq. In a discussion of limitations to his system of the indirect passions Hume

9 1 Reprinted in John Hill Burton, Life and Correspondance of David -Hume (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1846) 118. A more detailed discussion of the notion of simplicity and the coherence of Kume8s theory may be found in &&I, Passion and Value in Hume's Treatise, pp. 7-15. 165 distinguishes pride from joy. These passions resemble each other in that both are pleasant. Any person enjoying a great feast feels joy, regardless of whether the person is the host or a guest. However, the host feels not only joy but something else, and this something else depends on the close connection of this joyful occasion to himself. This feeling is what Hume calls pride or vanity. Hume further distinguishes pride from happiness by observing that the proudest people, indeed the people who have the most reason for their pride, are not always the happiest. This can be the result of unfortunate circumstances in no way connected to the character of the person. "Such ... will not fail to make us miserable, thor they have little tendency to diminish prideN (294). The qualities of the causes of the indirect passions produce a separate pain or pleasure, systematically related to the pain or pleasure of the passion but distinguishable front it. A magnificent feast delights every guest and is also a cause of pride for the host. Hume conjectures that what he discovers in specific cases will be true of all; "that every cause of pride, by its peculiar qualities, produces a separate pleasure, and of humility a separate uneasinessn (285). The other part of the cause is the subject, the thing which possesses pleasing or displeasing qualities. Though not yet dealing explicitly with morals, he cites a moral example to support the claim that the subjects of pride and humility are either parts of ourselves, or related to us. Thus the good and bad qualities of our actions and manners constitute virtue and vice, and determine our personal character, than which nothing operates more strongly on [pride and humility]. (285) Other examples support the claim about the relation of the subject to self, and he notices that the same qualities in subjects which have no relation to one's self "influence not in the smallest degree either [pride or humility] " (285). The feeling-tone of the passions are systematically related to the qualities of the subjects. The quality of love and pride is pleasant as is the quality of the subjects which cause people to feel these distinctive impressions. This reveals a pattern, "the double relation of ideas and impression^,^ which Hume uses to explain the origin of these passions. He writes: That cause, which excites the passion, is related to the object, which nature has attributed to the passion; the sensation, which the cause separately produces, is related to the sensation of the passion: From this double relation of ideas and impressions, the passion is derivrd. The one idea is easily converted into its cor-relative; and the one impression into that, which resembles and corresponds to it. (286-87) 5.3.6 A Square of Passions. Pride, humility, love and hatred are systematically related and Hume suggests a square might be drawn to illustrate the relation. He writes: 'Tis evident here are four affections, plac'd, as it were, in a square or regular connection with, and distance from each other. The passions of pride and humility, as well as those of love and hatred, are connected together by the identity of their object, which to the first set of passions is self, to the second some other person. These two lines of communication or connexion form two opposite sides of the square. Again, pride and love are agreeable passions; hatred and humility uneasy. This similitude of sensation betwixt pride and love, and that betwixt humility and hatred form a new comexion, and may be consider'd as the other two sides of the square. (333)

The square he describes might look like this:

PRIDE (agreeable) LOVE

HUMILITY (disagreeable) HATRED He adds: Upon the whole, pride is connected with humility, love with hatred, by their objects or ideas: Pride with love, humility with hatred, by their sensations or impressions. (333). That is, pride and humility share the same object (self), as do love and hatred (some other person). Pride and love are pleasant whereas humility and hatred are not. When he considers the relation of specific causes of pride and humility to the theory of double relations Hume looks first to moral causes, to virtues and vices, "the most obvious causes of these passionsn (295). He describes the essence of virtue as a pleasure felt by a person considering a character or passion. The most probable hypothesis, which has been advanc'd to explain the distinction betwixt vice and virtue, and the origin of moral and obligations, is, that from a primary constitution of nature certain characters and passions, by the very view and contemplation, produce a pain, and others in like manner produce a pleasure. The uneasiness and satisfaction are not only inseparable from vice and virtue, but constitute their very nature and essence. (296) The section from which this passage is taken is intended to demonstrate that the indirect passions arise from a double relation of impressions and ideas. The essence of virtue is a sort of pleasure which arises from consideration of certain characters. Certain qualities of characters and passions are the basis of the power to produce certain pleasures in observers. When the character or passion is one's own, one feels the pleasure of pride. When the 169 quality belongs to another, one feels love. So the indirect passions are the pleasures and pains which are the essence of virtue and vice. The conception of virtue as any mental quality whose possession causes pride in or love of the possessor leads

Hume to include among the qualities he counts as virtuous some which were not so counted by the christFan culture of his time and place. Many qualities of character other than the christian moral virtues produce pride or love. Since the essence of virtue consists in its power to produce some pleasure in observers he sees no interesting theoretical difference between virtues such as benevolence and wit. Virtues are qualities of mind or character the possession of which causes pride in or love of persons because they are either useful or simply pleasing, The indirect passions are naturally biased by the perspective of the person experiencing them. A person is proud of his prudence because he takes it to be the best way to achieve long-term happiness. Another loves his rich benefactor because she is generous to him, Moral evaluation and moral language imply some sort of independence from the personal interest of the person making a moral judgment. The close relationship between the indirect passions and moral evaluations in this theory requires an explanation of how human beings are able to abstract from personal interest in moral evaluation. Hume takes this up in his discussion of sympathy which we will consider shortly.

5.3.7 Is this just Conceptual Analvsis? A critic might say that Hume is only making conceptual points about the use of the pride, humility, love and hate. A person obviously has to be connected with something of which she is proud. Hume, however, is also trying to explain certain psychological facts, specifically, the origin of certain ideas. He believes that a term which refers to an idea can be analysed into component impressions, unless the term refers to a simple idea for which no analysis is possible and for which there must be a corresponding simple impression. He explains the origin of certain simple secondary or reflective impressions not by positing some sense, but by mechanisms of psychological association. In relation to the genesis of original impressions, impressions of sensation, he declines to press beyond the impressions themselves. It is certain, that the mind, in its perceptions, must begin somewhere; and since the impressions preceed their correspondant ideas, there must be some impressions, which without any introduction make their appearance in the soul. As these depend upon natural and physical causes, the examination of them would lead me too far from my present subject, into the sciences of anatomy and . (275) The passions are secondary or reflective impressions which require preceding impressions. He is able to describe these 171

preceding impressions so he is able to describe the causal conditions for the passions. According to Hume, certain simple impressions are a

result of a 'double association' of ideas and impressions. The origin of these impressions and their corresponding ideas is a function of the mind. The mind is active in the production of new simple ideas. But this function of the mind is not a function of reason. The impression or feeling of pride is not the conclusion of an argument. Rather it is a determination to experience a particular sentiment or emotion which is causally determined by specific sorts of circumstance,

5.3.8 Svmpathv and Com~arison. Hume introduces two psychological principles, sympathy and comparison, to explain the origin of certain passions. Sympathy, in the Treatise, must not be confused with the primary passion benevolence or with any other passion whatever. 'Sympathyf is a technical term referring to a capacity of human beings to have an experience of feelings related to the feelings they believe others are experiencing (316). It is important to distinguish his use of the term in the Treatise from the later Enaim in which 'sympathy' becomes synonymous with a particular feeling, benevolence or a sentiment of humanity. In the Treatise it nearly always refers to the psychological mechanism I describe below. Comparison, a psychological 172 mechanism whose effects are contrary to those of sympathy, is introduced to explain the origin of certain other passions. Hume writes that there is no more remarkable quality of human nature than "that propensity we have to sympathize with others, and to receive by communication their

inclinations and sentiments, however different from, or even

contrary to, our own.w (316) For reasons having to do with his theory of motivation which I will consider in due course, he needs to explain how an idea of another person's sentiments can become an actual impression and he does this by positing a principal of communication of sentiments. This principle of communication is the psychological mechanism which he calls sympathy. Sympathy begins to operate when a person forms an idea of the feeling of another by obsenration and inference. An observer infers that another person is in pain because of certain appearances and sounds, say when a finger is hit with a hammer. This idea of the other person% feeling is converted into an impression in the observer which "acquires such a degree of force and vivacity, as to become the very passion itself, and produce an equal emotion, as any original affectionn (317, my emphasis). Calling the feelings of the observer and the observed person "equaln is not well-considered, and I will say something about this shortly . Recall that an impression is more vivid or lively than the idea which corresponds to it. To account for the transition from idea to impression Hume appeals to awareness of self. OfTis evident, that the idea, or rather impression of ourselves is always intimately present with usm (317). The qualification, "or rather impression," is crucial since an idea would not be able to do what he requires. What his theory of the mind requires is something strong enough to cause an impression in the observer and this must be an impression rather than an idea. The impression of self is very strong or lively in human beings. Since it is so strong, it is able to 'communicater some degree of its own 'vivacityf or liveliness to other ideas. The psychology is very mechanistic at this point. Only another impression can contribute sufficient liveliness to convert an idea to an impression. Since he believes we do actually experience feelings corresponding to those of others he needs to identify some always-available and sufficiently-strong impression which can explain the origin of these feelings. The idea of ourselves is always intimately present to us, and conveys a sensible degree of vivacity to the idea of any other object, to which we are related. This lively idea changes by degrees into a real impression; these two kinds of impression being in a great measure the same, and differing only in their degrees of force and vivacity. (354) Hume sometimes writes as though the ideas of the passions and sentiments of others "are converted into the very impressions they represent, and that the passions arise 174 in conformity to the images we form of themw (319). I drew attention to his reference to the "equalityn of the impressions of the obsenrer and the person observed. Putting aside the obvious objection that there is no perspective from which to compare such feelings and assuming, for the sake of discussion, that other people's feelings are comparable to my own, for instance in relation to physical pain, it is surely implausible to claim that a sympathetic response would be emal in intensity to the physical pain I believe another is experiencing. To say that ideas are converted into the "very impressions they representN is hard to believe, for example in the case of the observed hammer blow. A charitable reading together with some of his more guarded claims makes the experience of sympathetic feeling, if not his mechanistic explanation, more believable. He need not claim that observers experience exactly the same inclinations and sentiments that they take other people to feel. I may feel pain at the thought of another's toothache or broken leg without feeling a toothache or even having any experience of what a broken bone feels like. Elsewhere he claims that human beings experience emotions which are similar to the sentiments or feelings which they believe other people have. I understand him to mean that we feel pleasure and pain which correspond loosely to the pleasure and pain we believe others feel. To put it slightly differently, he believes people have 175

imressiona which originate in the ideas they form of the feelings of others and which resemble those feelings in so far as they are pleasant or unpleasant.

The impression of self is able to perform this function because of the relation of resemblance which stands between human beings,

We have a lively idea of every thing related to us. All human creatures are related to us by resemblance- Their persons, therefore, their interests, their passions, their pains and pleasures must strike upon us in a lively manner, and produce an emotion similar to the original one; since a lively idea is easily converted into an impression. (369) Sympathy also functions in relation to imaginary or non-existent passions. "We often feel by communication the pains and pleasures of others, which are not in being, and which we only anticipate, by the force of imaginationn

(386). This will be of some importance in his theory of moral evaluation. He writes:

Sympathy being nothing but a lively idea converted into an impression, 'tis evident, that, in considering the future possible or probable condition of any person, we may enter into it with so vivid a conception as to make it our own concern; and by that means be sensible of pains and pleasures, which neither belong to ourselves, nor at the present instant have any real existence, (386) Sympathy explains the experience of pain or pleasure in relation to the pain or pleasure of another. The explanation is mechanistic in that the resemblance between persons, the impression of self and the idea formed of another person's feeling combine to give an impression which 176 corresponds at least in quality or feeling tone to that idea . One point of this in relation to the moral theory is that it explains how people are able to take a perspective in moral evaluation which is different from that of personal interest. Love and hatred are evaluations which are naturally biased towards the interests of the observer. But if sympathy functions as Hume describes, the sympathetic observer shares in the happiness and sorrow of others. This gives the observer a reason to promote the happiness of others and to diminish their misery. Appreciation of moral distinctions is a way of promoting these ends. Thus sympathy has an important role in the moral theory which is unfolding. Hume also introduces another principle, 'comparison,' to explain the origin of malice and envy. Obviously, these passions run contrary to what one would expect if sympathy were the only principle affecting our responses to others.

An elephant appears bigger in comparison to a mouse than to a rhinoceros. One hand is heated, the other cool, and the same water will feel both cold and warm. He claims that comparison is at work when we consider the fortunes and feelings of other people and experience feelings opposite to those we believe the others feel. The misery of another gives us a more lively idea of our happiness, and his happiness of our misery. The former, therefore, produces delight; and the latter uneasiness. (375) 177

One reason for Hume's introduction of sympathy is to explain the move towards objectivity in moral evaluation. But the effects of the principle of comparison are directly opposite to those of sympathy. Indeed, it seems that comparison gives reasons for promoting the misery of others and diminishing their happiness. This principle cannot, however, prevent the establishment of moral conventions among human beings who recognise that the peace and stability of society, on which their own happiness and prosperity depends, requires some such cooperative framework.

5.3.9 Reason and Motive. One section of Book 11, *Of the Influencing Motives of the Willn, has received considerable attention from commentators on Hume8s moral philosophy.92 Although he is not dealing specifically with moral motivation the conclusions of the section have important implications for his moral theory. He begins by noting the popular but, in his opinion, mistaken belief in a battle between passion and reason in action. The idea that there is such a conflict is mistaken because reason, acting by itself, can never direct nor oppose passion or action. As he famously puts it, "reason is, and ought only to be the

92 For example, see: Nicholas Capaldi, Hume* s Place in Moral Pbiloso~h~(New York: Lang, 1990) ; J.L. Mackie, Hume8s Moral Theory (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980; Rachael Kydd, Reason and Conduct in Hume8s Treatise (New York: Russell and Russell, 1964). 178 slave of the passionsn (415). The subordinate clause is not some weird moral judgment but a recommendation for how the relation between reason and passion is best understood and expressed. The arguments which bring him to this conclusion are quite simple.

"Reason is the discovery of truth or falsehoodn (458). Since this is the conception of reason with which Hume is working it is easy to see one sense in which reason by itself does not influence action fox it is belief and not truth which influences action- Of course, the person who bases his action on true beliefs will be more successful in achieving his ends, but people act on true and false beliefs without discrimination. Humers choice of ndiscoveryn to describe the function of reason implies that a mistaken conclusion is not the result of reason but of some failure to discover truth or falsehood. Understanding or reason, as he conceives it, operates only in relation to demonstration and probability, viz. mas it regards the abstract relations of our ideas, or those relations of objects, of which experience only gives us informationm (413). Demonstrative reasoning, for example arithmetic and geometry, has to do with ideas only. He doubts anyone would claim that demonstrative reasoning, by itself, is ever the cause of any action. Mathematical relations are useful in mechanical operations only in relation to some independently-specified end. 179 The second sort of reason is probability, causal

reasoning, which concerns matters of fact. Can this sort of reason lead to action? Hume notices that the expectation of receiving pleasure or pain from an object causes desire or aversion which leads people to embrace or avoid whatever is causally connected with the object. Desire or aversion leads to consideration of causes and effects, so that effective means to embrace or avoid an object may be chosen. Causal reasoning therefore has a role in action only when there is some desire or end. The role of causal reason in action is to determine means to fulfil desire, but this is all the argument shows. Hume needs to establish that reason can never give rise to a want or a desire in the first place. Since he believes he has shown that reason cannot set

up volition in the first place, it follows for him that it cannot set up one volition in opposition to another. Obviously this is not to say that there cannot be conflict between instincts or passions. A person's self-interest may conflict with her benevolence. Although reason shows ways of satisfying different impulses, the final and determining choice is not a conclusion of reason, Reason, the discovery of truth or falsehood, does not indicate a preference for either self-love or benevolence or any other desire. He adds some considerations to support the claim. A passion is different from an idea because it is "an original existencen which is in no way a representation of anything. A passion, therefore, cannot oppose or contradict truth or reason, "since this contradiction consists in the disagreement of ideas, considerld as copies, with those objects, which they representn (414). He indicates two ways in which a passion might be contrary to reason. A passion might, for example, 'imply' the existence of an object which does not exist. Or, a person might be mistaken about the means necessary to attain a passion's end. Strictly speaking, in these cases, it is the mistaken judgments which oppose reason and not any passion, so these are not counter- examples to the claim that passion and reason are not at war. He forcefully states some implications of this theory of motivation. Where a passion is neither founded on false suppositions, nor chuses means insufficient for the end, the understanding can neither justify nor condemn it. 'Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the world to the scratching of my finger. 'Tis not contrary to reason to chuse my total ruin, to prevent the least uneasiness of an Indian or person wholly unknown to me. 'Tis as little contrary to reason to prefer even my own acknowledgtd lesser good to my greater, and have a more ardent affection for the former than the latter. (416)

Hume would agree that some of these preferences are imorudent and that humanity generally, and he himself, would disapprove and condemn some of these choices, but these facts do not make the preferences contrary to reason. The point of the passage is to emphasise that preferences, desires and passions are impressions with no representative function. Reason judges only in relation to ideas. Since preferences are impressions, they can never be contrary to reason, nor can reason identify one end as better than another.

Hume also offers an explanation of why passion and reason are widely believed to conflict. According to his psychology, impressions which resemble each other are easily confused. He claims that the operation of reason produces little emotion. Hence it proceeds, that every action of the mind, which operates with the same calmness and tranquillity, is confounded with reason by all those, who judge of things from the first view and appearance. (417)

In the taxonomy of the passions (5.3.2) we saw that reflective passions may be distinguished as either calm or violent, according to the intensity with which they normally appear. There are two sorts of calm desires; neither certain instincts such as benevolence and resentment, the love of life, and kindness to children; or the general appetite to good, and aversion to evil, considerfd merely as such" (417). "Goodn and "eviln in the final clause of the passage are to be understood in terms of the expectation of pleasure and pain in objects. Calm desires, "what in an improper sense we call reasonw (536), are mistaken for the determinations of reason because they are not experienced with the same intensity as violent passions. Hume postulates calm desires to explain how an agent acts contrary to some strongly-experienced, present desire. Remember that the calmness of a passion does not correlate with its motivational intensity. "We must distinguish ... betwixt a calm and a weak passionn (419). On a related matter, Hume responds in a letter to something Hutcheson wrote :

These instincts you mention seem not always to be violent and impetuous, more than self love or benevolence. There is a calm ambition, a calm anger or hatred, which tho' calm may likewise be very strong and have the absolute control over the mindwg3 It is possible for a calm desire, considered as a motivating force, to be stronger that a violent desire. According to his psychology, only a desire can oppose a desire. To review, in this section of the second book Hume claims that reason operating by itself never causes any action. By reason he means not only demonstrative reasoning but also all reasoning concerning matters of fact and existence. This conclusion has important implications for discussion of his theory of moral value, to which we now turn.

5.4 The Nature of Moral Distinctions

5.4.1 Introduction. In the first part of the third book of the Treatise Hume considers the origin and nature of moral distinctions. There is a critical and a constructive part

93 John Hill Burton, Life and Correspondence of David Hume I, 19, 46. of the discussion. In the first section he argues that nmoral distinctions [are] not derivfd from reason, and in the second that they are "derivtd from a moral sense." In what follows I focus on the arguments as they bear on moral ontology. '*

5.4.2 The Main Arqument. Hume reminds the reader that experience is made up of perceptions which are either impressions or ideas. "To approve of one character, and to condemn another, are only so many different perceptionsn (456). The first question of the critical part is "whether 'tis by means of our ideas or impressions we distinguish betwixt vice and virtue, and pronounce an action blameable or praiseworthy?" (456). If virtue and vice are distinguished by ideas then moral judgments are the conclusions of reason. If they are not distinguished by ideas then they must be distinguished by some sort of impression, there being no other sort of perception. Hume writes of philosophers who claim that virtue is "nothing but a conformity to reasonn; that "there are eternal fitnesses and unfitnesses of thingsw; and that "the immutable measures of right and wrong impose an obligation

... on the Deity himselfq1 (456). Whatever else these

94 Interesting discussions of this section are found in most commentaries on Hume s moral philosophy. For example, see J.L. Mackie, Hume s Moral Theorv (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980 ; Nicholas Capaldi , Hume s Place in Moral Philoso~hv (New York: Lang, 1990) ; Rachael Kydd, Reason and Conduct in HumeOs Treatise (New York: Russell and Russell, 1964) . versions of ethical rationalism claim, they agree that

"morality, like truth, is discern'd merely by ideas, and by their juxtaposition and comparisonm (457). William Wollaston and Samuel Clarke made such claims and Hume actually confirmed that these were the specific targets of the critical section in "A Letter from a Gentleman to his Friend in Edinburgh." There he writes of the anonymous author of the Treatise, that is, himself: He hath indeed denied the eternal difference of right and wrong in the sense which Clark [sic] and Woolaston [sic] maintained them, viz. that the propositions of morality were at the same nature with the truths of mathematics and the abstract sciences, the objects merely of reason, not the feelings of our internal tastes and sentiments. In this opinion he concurs with all the ancient moralists, as well as with Mr. Hutchison [sic] Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow. The first premise in the central argument of this section is that moral distinctions influence action. If morality had no influence on action, "Itwere in vain to take such pains to inculcate itN (457). The second premise is that reason operating by itself is incapable of influencing action. Together these premises yield the conclusion that moral distinctions are not ideas, that they are not the products of reason.

5.4.3 One Wav to Avoid the Conclusion, The conclusion can be avoided by denying either premise. Hume takes the first premise, that moral distinctions influence action, to be obvious. Accepting or appreciating a moral distinction is 185 to be disposed, at least somewhat, to act in accordance with it. It would be a puzzle to hear someone say in one breath, "that action would be wrongm and in another, "of course, that is no reason not to do iton But it is open to a critic to deny the intrinsic connection between making or accepting a moral distinction and being motivated to act in accordance with it. Nevertheless, the critic's theory would be saddled with explaining why moral distinctions have been so widely believed to be connected to action. Why take "such pains to inculcate [moralityJtlin the first place? One assumes Hume is correct in believing that his rationalist opponents would not want to give up the action-guiding character of moral distinctions. A plausible explanation of moral distinctions needs to account somehow for this-

5.4.4 The Point at Issue. Hume takes the second premise, his denial of the motivating power of pure reason, as the point at issue. If reason in his argument refers only to demonstrative reason then the conclusion would be that moral distinctions are not the products of demonstrative reason. This would be an interesting conclusion in itself in relation to moralists like Locke and Clarke who write of the possibility of moral demonstrations like those of mathematics. However, Hume refers the reader to "Of the

Influencing Motives of the Willn (see 5.3.9 of this thesis) as having already established the controversial premise, and 186 we have seen that reason in that section encompasses not only demonstrative reason but also all reasoning concerning matters of fact and existence as well. Not surprisingly, then, Hume takes the implications of this argument to be quite sweeping. To strengthen the controversial premise he reiterates one of the arguments from Book 11. He begins with the claim that passions, volitions and actions are "original facts and , complete in themselves, implying no reference to other passions, volitions, and actionsn (458). Since passions, volitions and actions are not representations ('ideast in his terminology), they cannot be either

"contrary or conformable to reasonn (458) since reason has to do only with ideas. They cannot derive merit from a conformity which they cannot possess.

5.4.5 Reason's Role in Morals, According to Hume, reason can influence action in only two ways, neither one leading to the conclusion the rationalists need. Reason may tell of the existence of an object of some passion or else of means to satisfy a passion. In either case, reason may be mistaken. In the first case, the object may not exist. In the second, the means chosen may be either inefficient, insufficient or simply mistaken. Strictly speaking it would be inaccurate to attribute such judgments to reason since 187 they would represent failures of reason, the mdiscoverv of truth or falshoodn (458, my emphasis). Now it would be strange to claim that either sort of mistake could be the basis of moral distinctions. They are both mistakes of fact, "which moralists have not generally consider8d criminal, as being perfectly involuntaryn (459). Besides, if moral distinctions are implied by the truth or falsehood of these sorts of judgment then all such judgments would be subject to moral appraisal, "whether the question be concerning an apple or a kingdom, or whether the error be

avoidable or unavoidable ff (460 ) .

5.4.6 An Interestins Passinq Comment. Hume rules out an anticipated objection. A rationalist might try to distinguish mistakes of fact and mistakes of right, with only the latter being considered "criminaln (460). Humets response is that the idea of a mistake of right nsupposes a real right and wrong; that is, a real distinction in morals, independent of these judgmentsn (460). Although nobody seems yet to have made this claim, he points out that it will be unsatisfactory simply to assert such a distinction without explaining it. One might explain the claim by asserting that there is a unique non-natural quality, rightness, perceived by rational intuition. Hurnets anticipatory response would be question-begging against any theory postulating the existence and perception of moral 188 qualities by rational intuition. This passing comment supports what has previously been noted; that rationalist intuitionism, represented by Richard Price in Hume's century and by G.E. Moore in ours, had not yet been advanced.

5.4.7 Humefs Challense. So far Hume's arguments have been largely based on the claim that reason alone is never a motive to action. The challenge to the rationalists is to explain what it means to say that moral distinctions are the conclusions of reason. It appears to be an impossible demand within Humefs conception of reason. He writes: If the thought and understanding alone were capable of fixing the boundaries of right and wrong, the character of virtuous and vicious either must lie in some relations of objects, or must be a matter of fact, which is discovered by our reasoning. (463) Hume considers the possibility that virtue and vice are demonstrable relations. However there are only four relations "susceptible of certainty and demonstrationn

(463). If virtue and vice consist in demonstrable relations then they must be relations of resemblance, contrariety, degrees in quality, or proportions in quantity and number. This claim about which relations are subject to demonstration is first made in book I, iii, 1. To the claim that morality is demonstrable he objects that these same relations stand between objects which are not objects of moral evaluation. "There is no one of these relations but what is applicable, not only to an irrational, but also to an inanimate objectD (464). So the rationalist needs to explain what it is about relations between only certain sorts of object which makes them virtuous or vicious. Hume believes that any explanation of moral distinctions as relations will refer to something additional to reason as he understands it, and that this will undercut any claim of demonstrability. Samuel Clarke wrote that there are, eternal and unalterable relations in the nature of the things themselves, from which arise agreements and disagreements, congruities and incongruities, fitness and unfitness of the application of circumstances, to the qualifications of persons; that actions agreeable to these relations are morally good, and that the contrary actions are morally evil. 95 He claims that the fittingness of certain behavior between human beings "is as manifest, as that the properties which flow from the essences of different mathematical figures have different congruities or incongruities between

themselves. 96 To this sort of claim Hume responds that if there is some demonstrable relation other than those he

specifies then it needs to be shown: "'Tis impossible to

refute a system which has never yet been explain' dn (464) . Largely in response to Hutcheson and Hume, subsequent ethical rationalists suggest that these claims of demonstrability are intended to illustrate that relations of

9 5 D .D . Raphael, BritishMoralists, 192, L.A. Selby-Bigge, British Moralists, volume 2, 4.

9 6 D.D. Raphael, British Moralists, 192- L-A. Selby-Bigge, British Moralists, volume 2, 4- fittingness or moral rightness are discerned by rational intuition, that comparisons with mathematics are meant only as analogies, and that moral relations certainly are different from the demonstrable relations Hume identifies. Even if one is charitable about what constitutes a theoryfs development as opposed to its abandonment, Hutcheson and

Hume issued a challenge which forced a drastic change in the rationalist family of theories.

5.4.8 Moral Qualities are Powers. Hume argued in Book I1 that reason by itself can never provide a motive to the will. In the first part of Book I11 he claims to be unable to make sense of the rationalist claim that moral distinctions are conclusions of reason. To complete his case against the claim that moral distinctions are discovered by reason he considers whether virtue and vice are matters of fact which are discovered in objects of moral evaluation. He considers deliberate murder, an action generally agreed to be vicious. The only objective matters of fact in this action are "certain passions, motives, volitions and thoughtsn (468). Vice is not in the object in the way that these objective matters of fact are. You never can find [vice], till you turn your reflexion into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action. Here is a matter of fact; but 'tis the object of feeling, not of reason. It lies in yourself, not in the object. So that when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it. (469) He takes the qualities of persons which are relevant to moral evaluation to include passions, motives, volitions and

thoughts. These are connected to but do not logically entail specific evaluations. The connection of these sentiments of blame with qualities of actions is causal rather than logical. He continues: Vice and virtue, therefore, may be compartd to sounds, colours, heat and cold, which according to , are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind. (469) Following Hutcheson, Hume claims that virtue and vice should be compared to secondary qualities rather than primary ones, According to the "modern philo~ophy,~by which Hume means the philosophy of Locke and his empiricist successors, secondary qualities are not qualities of objects, strictly speaking, but powers which objects possess because of their qualities to affect people in certain ways, to produce perceptions in the mind. Vice on this theory is the power of an action like wilful murder to excite disapprobation. Hume claims that there is a close relationship between the indirect passions and the moral sentiments. Recall that the indirect passions are feelings which are biased, naturally-occurring evaluations of persons. Moral sentiments differ in being evaluations only of mental qualities and their effects on people in general. He writes : Pride and humility, love and hatred are excited, when there is any thing presented to us, that both bears a relation to the object of the passion, and produces a separate sensation related to the sensation of the passion. Now virtue and vice are attended with these circumstances. They must necessarily be placfd either in ourselves or others, and excite either pleasure or uneasiness; and therefore must give rise to one of these four passions; which clearly distinguishes them from the pleasure and pain arising from inanimate objects, that often bear no relation to us: And this is, perhaps, the most considerable effect that virtue and vice have upon the human mind, (473) Virtue and vice are qualities of persons which are pleasant and painful respectively. According to Hume8s psychology, this means that they will cause observers to feel the corresponding indirect passions. He says this explicitly in a passage from the final part of the book which summarises his earlier claims about the origin of moral distinctions. Moral distinctions depend entirely on certain peculiar sentiments of pain and pleasure, and ... whatever mental quality in ourselves or others gives us a satisfaction, by the survey or reflexion, is of course virtuous; as every thing of this nature, that gives uneasiness, is vicious. Now since every quality in ourselves or others, which gives pleasure, always causes pride or love; as every one, that produces uneasiness, excites humility or hatred: it follows, that these two particulars are to be consider'd as equivalent, with regard to our mental qualities, virtue and the power of producing love, vice and the power of producing hatred. In every case, therefore, we must judge of the one by the other; and may pronounce any quality of mind virtuous, which causes love or pride; and any one vicious, which causes hatred or humility. (575) Notice that the passage also contains a clear statement that virtue is a power, *the power of producing love. I have remarked that love and hatred, pride and

humility are biased forms of evaluation. A person will feel love for another for any quality of mind, body or character which is pleasing or useful to her. Likewise she will feel pride for whatever pleasant or useful qualities she possesses. Virtues and vices are the powers to excite these responses.

Recall the distinction in Book 11 between violent and calm passions, based on the intensity with which passions

are normally experienced, and Humefs opinion that a violent passion may on occasion be calm. He classifies the indirect passions as violent and "the sense of beauty and deformity

in actionv as calm (276). Much later in the Treatise he

writes : The pain or pleasure, which arises from the general survey or view of any action or quality of the mind, constitutes its vice or virtue, and gives rise to our approbation or blame, which is nothing but a fainter and more imperceptible love or hatred. (614) Virtues and vices are qualities of mind or character which are powers to excite calm passions, versions of the indirect passions which arise from a general survey.

Hurne follows Hutcheson in writing of moral qualities as powers to excite approval and disapproval. According to Hutcheson, benevolence is always and everywhere a power to excite approval which makes his theory a version of ethical objectivism. Since Hume agrees that virtues are powers to excite approval it might appear that his theory is also a 194 version of objectivism. We will see that he differs with Hutcheson on whether benevolence alone has this power, and even on whether benevolence itself will always and everywhere have this power.

5.4.9 The Is/Ousht Parasra~h. The final paragraph of the first section of Book 111 may well have received more attention than any other single paragraph of Hume's writing. I will nat add much to what has been said except to point out that a spotlight may be too narrowly focussed and take attention from other parts of the stage. It is risky to concentrate on a single concluding paragraph without close attention to what has preceded. There is a sense in which the point he is making in this paragraph is quite straightforward. that moralists often move too easily from statements of objective fact, isstatements about God or human relations, to evaluations of objective states of affairs, ,oughtt statements. as though the evaluations are deductions from the states of affairs. However,

as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, Itis necessary that it shou'd be observrd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. (469) Hume8s line of argument in this passage closely follows an argument from Hutcheson against Clarke which we considered in section 4.3.6. Earlier in the chapter Hume denied that moral distinctions are deductions from ordinary empirical facts and this paragraph is just another way of stating this denial . In this chapter of his book, Hume contends that moral distinctions do not originate in reason, either in relations of ideas or matters of fact. Since all perceptions are either impressions or ideas, and since he has shown that moral distinctions are not ideas, he concludes that they must be impressions. "Morality, therefore, is more properly felt than judg'd ofm (470). So he turns to consider the nature of moral impressions or feelings.

5.4.10 The Positive Phase. At the beginning of the second chapter, DMoral distinctions deriv8d from a moral sense," Hume obsenres that the impressions of virtue and vice are agreeable and uneasy respectively. Although he uses "moral sensen in the title and refers occasionally to a "sense of virtuen, the focus of the chapter is on moral impressions or sentiments. He wants to explain the origin of the particular pleasure of virtue and pain of vice.

An action, or sentiment, or character is virtuous or vicious; why? because its view causes a pleasure or pain of a particular kind. In giving a reason, therefore, for the pleasure or uneasiness, we sufficiently explain the vice or virtue. (471) Much of the remainder of the book is an explanation of the pleasure or uneasiness arising from the qualities Hume takes to be virtuous or vicious. In secton 5.3 I discussed Hume8s causal theory of the origin of evaluation. Evaluations are emotions which are caused by but not inferred from beliefs. He writes: We do not infer a character to be virtuous, because it pleases: But in feeling that it pleases after such a particular manner, we in effect feel that it is virtuous. The case is the same as in our judgments concerning all kinds of beauty, and tastes, and sensations. Our approbation is implyrd in the immediate pleasures they convey to us. (471)

5.4.11 Distinctions of Pleasure. Hume anticipates one criticism. The dependence of moral distinctions on pleasure and pain implies that virtue and vice should exist wherever we experience pleasure and pain, which they obviously don't,

so the theory must be mistaken. His response is to distinguish different sorts of pleasure. A good composition of music and a bottle of good wine equally produce pleasure; and what is more, their goodness is determinfd merely by the pleasure. ... In like manner an inanimate object, and the character or sentiments of any person may, both of them, give satisfaction; but as the satisfaction is different, this keeps our sentiments concerning them from being confounded, and makes us ascribe virtue to the one, and not to the other. (472) When he is guarded he qualifies the pleasure of virtue as being of "a particular kindN (472). Again, "in feeling that it pleases after such a particular manner, we in effect feel that it is virtuousm (471, my emphasis) . He further distinguishes the sorts of pleasure which are felt in relation to characters. Not every feeling of pleasure or pain felt in relation to actions or characters is "of that peculiar kind, which makes us praise or condemn"

(472). And it is possible to admire the good qualities of an enemy. Moral pleasures and pains result from taking 'a general view' of a character. 'Tis only when a character is consider'd in general, without reference to our particular interest, that it causes such a feeling or sentiment, as denominates it morally good or evil. (472) So virtues are qualities of character which are powers to evoke certain sentiments in observers who are taking a general perspective on the actual or probable effects of those qualities.

5.5 Justice and the Artificial Virtues

5.5.1 Natural and Artificial Virtues. Hume distinguishes artificial and natural virtues. He recognises that natural is a problematic term (see 473 ff . , 484) but uses it in the Treatise to mark what he takes to be an important difference between two sorts of virtue. 'Natural virtues' are pleasing or useful mental qualities, such as benevolence, intelligence and wit, which human beings naturally possess in various degrees and of which they naturally approve. 'Artificial virtues' are pleasing mental qualities for which there is no natural motive. The approbation of artificial virtues depends on some "artifice or contrivance, which arises from the circumstances and necessities of mankindn (477). Justice, the keeping of promises, allegience to 198 government, and "chastity and modesty" in women are some examples of artificial virtues. In the later Enauirv he drops the artificial/natural terminology, but not the distinction between two sorts of virtue. There he focusses on benevolence and justice and

their different Nspeciesn of utility (Inauirv, 285). The main points about the artificial and natural virtues in the Treatise can be made by considering justice and benevolence. In the following subsections I consider justice, the paradigmatic artificial virtue.

5.5.2 Justice not a Natural Virtue. According to Hume, actions are praised only according to the mental qualities of which they are taken to be signs. At one point he goes so far as to say that "actions themselves ... are never considerfd in moralityn (575). Actions are considered, of course, but only as signs of dispositions which excite certain sorts of response or action, in other words, virtues and vices. It is now possible to see why mental qualities are, for Hume, the primary objects of moral evaluation. Book I1 was largely devoted to a causal psychological explanation of the indirect passions: pride and humility, love and hatred. These emotions are natural evaluations of persons. And moral sentiments are versions of love and hatred. Hume claims "that all virtuous actions derive their merit only from virtuous motives" (478). From this it follows that the motive for a virtuous action cannot be that the action is virtuous because this would be circular. Since it is the motive which makes an action virtuous, the motive has to be different from the belief that a particular action is virtuous. For 'tis a plain fallacy to say, that a virtuous motive is requisite to render an action honest, and at the same time that a regard to the honesty is the motive of the action. We can never have a regard to the virtue of an action, unless the action be antecedently virtuous. (480) 'Justicer, by which Hume means roughly a respect for property, is a virtue. Whether it is artificial or natural depends on whether there is a natural motive for just actions which is also naturally esteemed. There is, however, a "great difficultyw in finding any motives to justice and honesty "distinct from our regard to the honestyw (480). 97 This difficulty is related to the above circularity argument. Are there any motives for just actions which do not depend on human artifice or convention? He considers three possibilities. First, self-interest or a concern for one's reputation is a natural motive. However, if it were the motive for just or honest actions "it would follow, that wherever that concern ceases, honesty can no

9 7 I note in passing that "honestyN in this section is not equivalent to Ntruth-telling.u Rather, Hume seems to be using it as synonymous with virtue more generally (cf . Chapter 1, page 18, note 20 for a related comment on Shaftesbury). 200 longer have placen (480). For actions which run contrary to personal interest the motive would fail, however honest or just they might themselves be. He observes further that when self-love "acts at its liberty [it] is the source of all injustice and violencen (480). So he rejects personal interest as the original motive to just actions. Secondly, he rejects the idea that public interest is the motive. People simply do not consider the public interest when they pay their debts and keep their promises. That is a motive "too remote and too sublime to affect the generality of mankindn (481). At this point he explicitly denies the existence of extensive benevolence in humankind: "In general, it may be af f irm8d, that there is no such passion in human minds, as the love of mankind, merely as suchn (481). Hume8s denial of extensive benevolence as a natural motive leads him to introduce some fairly complicated psychological mechanisms to explain the origin of justice and the other artificial virtues. We will see that this is an interesting point of comparison with the theory he presents in the later Enuuirv. Thirdly, he considers whether "private benevolencen or "a regard to the interests of the party concernrdn is the motive for justice. Hume also rejects this because a just person may have no such disposition towards the concerned party. For example, the person to whom somebody owes may be a personal enemy, or a miser who will make no use of 201 the money repaid, or a debauch6 who will waste the money, or the indebted person may need the money for his own family. In such cases, on the assumption that private benevolence is the motive for justice, concern for this party would fail,

"and along with it all property, right, and obligationn

(482). Self-love and private benevolence could conceivably be motives for particular just actions but they would fail as general motives. So there is no natural motive for justice, the respect of property,

5.5.3 Orisin of Justice in Artifice. Since Hume is unable to discover a natural motive to explain the virtue of just actions, he looks for the origin of justice in some human martifice or contrivancelR1He works on the stated assumption that its origin will be related to the origin of property itself because of the connection of justice with property.

Hume distinguishes the origin of the rules of justice in some artifice and the attribution of a moral beauty or deformity to their observance or neglect. He begins with an explanation of the former. Human beings are naturally social. People are determined to live in society because individual needs cannot be met independently of others. He claims that people are naturally benevolent with the proviso, however, that natural benevolence is limited to family and friends. Do you not see, that tho* the whole expence of the family be generally under the direction of the master of it, yet there are few that do not bestow the largest part of their fortunes on the pleasures of their wives, and the education of their children, reserving the smallest portion for their own proper use and entertainment . (487) Such confined generosity would, if unchecked, lead to conflict between groups competing for limited resources. The possession of external goods is naturally unstable because there is not "a sufficient quantity of them to supply every one's desires and necessitiesm (488) . So it is very much in the interest of each individual to find some way out of the conflict which this theory of human nature predicts. The solution to this problem is the development of some convention among members of a society "to bestow stability on the possession of those external goods, and leave every one in the peaceable enjoyment of what he may acquire by his fortune and industryn (489). This would reduce for naturally-limited external goods and lead to a more peaceful society. Such conventions arise from a general sense of common interest. He compares their origin to two people rowing a boat. It is useless for one to row without the other. A coordinated effort is needed and this will be obvious to both. Assuming that both want to get somewhere they will learn to cooperate with each other to coordinate their strokes. A sense of common interest will lead to this coordination, even if the rowers do not share a language. 203

The boat example emphasises the importance of personal interest in the origin of property conventions. Although Hume denies that people are motivated only by personal interest, he claims that personal interest is the strongest of motivations. The natural dispositions of selfishness and confined benevolence, combined with the scarcity of external goods, lead to conflict. It is these very facts which lead to the origin of justice: "tis only from the selfishness and confined benevolence of men. along with the scanty provision nature has made for his wants, that justice derives its originm (495). Anyone can see that a person is likely to achieve greater satisfaction of both selfish and limitedly-benevolent desires when conflict is deliberately limited by conventions which stabilise the possession of property. So these dispositions lead people to establish such conventions.

5.5.4 Hume's Puzzle about Justice. Hume draws attention to a puzzle about the nature of justice and just actions. A single act of justice may be contrary to personal interest, public interest or even both at the same time. "Taking any single act, my justice may be pernicious in everv respectn

(498, my emphasis) . The restoration of a fortune to a miser or a bigot is iust yet bad for everyone concerned. What motive is there for justice in such a situation? Humets answer is that although individual instances of justice, considered in isolation, may be harmful, the whole system of justice is nevertheless beneficial both to society and to each person- Thot in one instance the public be a sufferer, this momentary ill is amply compensated by the steady prosecution of the rule, and by the peace and order, which it establishes in society. And even every individual person must find himself a gainer, on ballancing the account; since without justice, society must immediately dissolve, and every one must fall into that savage and solitary condition which is infinitely worse than the worst situation that can possibly be suppostd in society. (497) It is the whole system of just actions which is beneficial and the danger of suspending the laws of justice in individual situations is that this would tend to weaken these practices which are necessary for peaceful life. The conflict which would result from the breakdown of justice and other artificial virtues would make everybody much worse off. Since specific instances of justice may be noxious in every way he needs to explain our willingness to be just, bearing in mind that justice originates partly in personal interest. Our willingness originates in an appreciation of the effects and a respect of the whole system of just actions. How does he explain compliance with the demands of justice when its anticipated consequences are negative? Taking any single act, my justice may be pernicious in every respect; and 'tis only upon the supposition that others are to imitate my example, that I can be inductd to embrace that virtue; since nothing but this combination can render justice advantageous, or afford me any motives to conform my self to its rules. (498)

Just actions can be partially motivated by the belief that others will be encouraged to embrace justice by example.

Humets puzzle about justice shows how some virtues may conflict with each other. A judge might be asked to decide between the interests some squatters and a rich and miserly landlord in whose empty and derilect property the squatters have set up house. Justice demands that the rights of the landlord to his property take precedence over the squatters' needs for shelter. If the judge favours the squatters he is benevolent but unjust. If he favours the landlord he just but not benevolent.

We have seen Hume's explanation of the origin of justice and property conventions. In this part of the Treatise he also wishes to explain how the idea of virtue becomes attached to this mental quality. How is it that observers feel moral approbation in relation to justice in the face of the fact that instances of justice are frequently pernicious? When he first addresses the question he gives a short answer, postponing a fuller consideration until the discussion of the natural virtues. He reviews the origin of property in personal interest and confined benevolence. In small societies the motive of interest is sufficiently strong and the benefits of property and justice sufficiently apparent for their establishment. When the number of people in a society increases, the 206 interests on which the rules are based become relatively remote, "nor do men so readily perceive, that disorder and confusion follow upon even breach of these rules. as in a more narrow and contracted societyn (499, my emphasis) . Now it does not seem to be the case that societal chaos follows from "every breach of these at least when these conventions are strongly established. It is the widespread general adherence to justice, as opposed to a universal adherence, which is socially beneficial. Nevertheless, although we may be personally tempted to follow personal interest in opposition to justice, he claims we are always offended when we discover others do so. "We never fail to observe the prejudice we receive, either mediately or immediately, from the injustice of othersn

(499) . So the injustice of others is displeasing, even when their unjust actions in no way affect my own interests and this is Rbecause we consider it as prejudicial to human society, and pernicious to every one that approaches the person guilty of itn (499). People could differ with Hume's assessment. Some people might admire the judge who permitted the squatters to shelter in the landlord's unused property. Sympathy, the principle of communication of sentiment, was introduced in the previous book. It causes people to feel the effects of injustice in those who might be affected by it. We partake of their uneasiness by sympathy; and as every thing, which gives uneasiness in human actions, upon the general survey, is call' d vice, and whatever produces satisfaction, in the same manner, is denominated virtue; this is the reason why the sense of moral good and evil follows upon justice and injustice. (499) So justice, the quality of mind, pleases because of its effects on others which we feel through sympathy. Thus, "a sympathy with the public interest is the source of the moral approbation which attends that virtuen (500). His expression here suggests a sense of sympathy according to which one is 'in agreement' with public interest and is to this extent misleading. In the Book I discussion of personal identity Hume once uses sympathy in something like this sense when he writes of a "sympathy of parts to their common endn (257). The context of the passage from 500, as well as the later discussions of how moral approbation is attached to qualities of mind shows that it is sympathy, the principle of communication of sentiment, which he intends.

5.5.5 A Counterfactual Arqument Asainst the Objectivism of

Justice. In the section under consideration Hume advances a different sort of argument against the objectivism specifically of justice. We have seen that he traces the origin of justice to qualities of the human mind, "selfishness and confined benevolencen, and to the scarcity of external goods. This makes justice relative to circumstances in which people find themselves. If human 208 beings were sufficiently benevolent, there would be no need of property, for everything would be held in common and shared as needed (494, 495) . Likewise, leave the human capacity for benevolence unchanged and sufficiently multiply external goods so that people need not compete for them. For this case, as for the former, "you render justice useless (495), and there would be no "occasion for those distinctions and limits of property and possession. which at present are in use among mankindn (494). Hume's own speculation about the conditions under which justice would be either unnecessary or useless shows that the approval of this quality depends on places and times as well as on the responses of persons. Similar comments could be made about the other artificial virtues. The dependence of these values on places. times and the responses of persons makes these subjectivist values according to the definition. The artificial virtues are not the only sort of virtue for Hume, however, and to determine whether the theory as a whole is an ethical subjectivism we must consider the natural virtues as well.

5.6 Benevolence and the Natural Virtues

5.6.1 Virtue and the Indirect Passions. In the final part of the Treatise Hume considers the natural virtues, dispositions which human beings naturally possess to greater or lesser degrees, and of which they naturally approve. He reviews the direct and indirect passions. The indirect passions are caused by objects which are sources of pleasure or pain and which are related to another or to one's own self. Whatever mental qualities produce pleasure, when placed in ourselves or others, cause pride or humility. Virtues are mental qualities which are powers to excite pride or love (575). The causes of love or pride are diverse, for example, property, physique, physical prowess or qualities of mind. Only mental qualities, through their power of exciting either love or hatred, are virtues and vices.

5.6.2 Svmpathv and the Natural Virtues. Hume returns to the mechanism of sympathy to explain how moral sentiments arise in relation to the natural virtues. He has to explain how these mental qualities please and how observers take a general view of their effects. Recall that sympathy is a principle of communication of sentiment according to which human beings experience feelings which correspond somehow to the feelings they believe others have. He uses this to explain the approval of the artificial virtues. Now as the means to an end can only be agreeable, where the end is agreeable; and as the good of society, where our own interest is not concernrd, or that of our friends, pleases only by sympathy: It follows, that sympathy is the source of the esteem, which we pay to all the artificial virtues, (577) Sympathy is also important for his explanation of the approbation of the natural virtues. The only difference between the natural virtues and justice lies in this, that the good, which results from the former, arises from every single act, and is the object of some natural passion: Whereas a single act of justice, considerfd in itself, may often be contrary to the public good; and 'tis only the concurrence of mankind, in a general scheme or system of action, which is advantageous. (579)

The sentiment of morals which justice excites is the result of a 'sympathy with the interests of societyn in the system of just actions, since "every particular act of justice is not beneficial, but the whole systemn (580). The explanation of the natural virtues appears fairly straightforward when benevolence is the focus because llevery particular act of generosity, or relief of the industrious and indigent, is beneficialR (580). However, it is not clear that gratitude, intelligence and wit, also among Humels natural virtues, are generally beneficial or pleasing to those affected by them. When these qualities are not useful or pleasing they would not excite approval in observers, which is to say that these qualities are not always virtues, Whether these non-benevolent natural qualities are virtues depends on circumstances and the responses of people. Consideration of benevolence as an archetype of natural virtues may obscure this. To return to benevolence, since each instance is beneficial, it pleases by a sympathy with the pleasant feelings of those affected. In the same way, sympathy with the feelings of people who benefit by established property conventions (in Humefs opinion, everyone) is the source of the pleasure felt in relation to justice which is the origin of the esteem of this artificial virtue. Thus sympathy, the principle of communication of sentiments, is in this sense the source of the esteem of both the artificial and natural virtues.

5-6.3 Smathv and the General View. In explaining the origin of moral value through sympathetic approval Hume begins to show how the general view implicit in moral judgment and language is possible. He states a hypothetical objection that since sympathetic feelings vary, moral sentiments should vary accordingly, and that since moral sentiments do not vary with differences of sympathy his theory must be false. In response, he claims that moral perception is similar to other sorts of perception. Our situation, with regard to both persons and things, is in continual fluctuation ... 'tis impossible we cou'd ever converse together on any reasonable terms, were each of us to consider characters and persons, only as they appear from his peculiar point of view. In order, therefore, to prevent those continual contradictions, and arrive at a more stable judgment of things, we fix on some steady and general points of view; and always, in our thoughts, place ourselves in them, whatever may be our present situation. (582) Everyday non-moral communication requires that appearances be corrected. A general view of things is taken in relation to sense impressions and communication would be impossible if the momentary appearances of things were not overlooked. Sentiments of praise and blame vary for many reasons but 212 this does not prevent taking a general view. objectivity in evaluation is the result of putting aside how things appear immediately and judging mental qualities by their effects on people generally. We feel these effects on others through sympathy. Speaking loosely, their pain causes us pain.

5.6.4 Subjectivism and the Natural Virtues. Artificial virtues are subjectivist values, dependent on times and places and the responses of people. The question of whether Hume's overall ontology of value is subjectivist depends on whether he believes that there are any virtues whose moral value does not depend on the responses of people, or on places or times. Are the natural virtues objectivist values? Recall that Hutcheson held that benevolence is the power to excite approval, and that his moral ontology is objectivist because benevolence would be such a power always and everywhere. Hume also writes of virtues as powers to excite moral sentiments. =though the artificial virtues are subjectivist values, it would be possible for him to hold that the natural virtues are powers to excite the moral sentiments in all imaginable times and places, as Hutcheson believed of benevolence. That is, the natural virtues could still be objectivist values. Some of the reasons for claiming that Hume is a subjectivist concerning even the natural virtues have 213 already been suggested. For instance, there is reason to

doubt that every expression of gratitude, wit and intelligence is useful. Again, Humefs puzzle about justice shows that justice and benevolence frequently conflict. The bank manager who "bends the rulesn to help a family through a rough time with their mortgage is benevolent to the family but not just. Which character is virtuous depends on which excites approbation in observers, and the sympathetic responses of observers may vary between persons. Responses might vary systematically in relation to different sympathetic capacities. "Men naturally, without reflexion, approve of that character, which is most like their own1' (604). For instance, a person whose experience was more similar to that of the just banker than to the unfortunate family might believe that it is in the interests of everybody that all agreements be strictly enforced. Although they neednft be unsympathetic with the feelings of the family, their sympathy with the shareholders and other customers of the bank, and with those whose interests might be affected (however remotely) , leads to disapproval of the benevolent banker. On the other hand, a person who has experienced difficult economic times might have a greater tendency to sympathetic feelings with the unfortunate family and so be led to admire the banker who is willing to go out on a limb for them. Humefs theory entails that different sorts of 214 sympathetic response may ultimately lead to differences in moral evaluation. This means that whether some mental quality is a virtue, whether it is a morally valuable quality, depends on how people respond to it. Different people may approve and disapprove of the same quality. This shows that the natural virtues are subjectivist values. Benevolence is virtue for Hutcheson. It is the basis of all moral approval. Hutcheson cannot imagine a world or situation in which benevolence would not excite approbation. For Hume there are many artificial and natural virtues. And many of the natural virtues he identifies are not expressions of benevolence, for instance, gratitude, wit and intelligence. Benevolence is, arguably, the most important natural virtue in his theory. Recall that Hume offers counterfactual considerations which show that justice is not

an objectivist value. Can benevolence be shown to be a

subjectivist value in a similar way? Imagine a world in which life is extremely difficult for everybody because of an extreme shortage of the necessities for life. The only way for people to survive and have any happiness is to share the limited resources equally between persons. In this world people have developed a system of justice and property which is as rigid as the situation is difficult. It is crucial that everybody respect the requirements of justice, for otherwise the system of justice and the society on which it is built might 215 disintegrate, which would be very bad for everyone. Expressions of benevolence in action, giving another more than justice dictates, could weaken justice. People could not afford to be benevolent. In this imaginary world benevolence would be a weakness, a power to evoke condemnation; in short, a vice. Mental qualities which are powers to cause love or hatred are virtues or vices, respectively. Whether some quality of mind is a virtue depends on the sympathetic responses of people and the likely effects of actions motivated by that quality. Humets moral ontology is subjectivist because these responses and likely effects depend on places and times, regardless of whether the mental quality is a natural or an artificial virtue.

5.6.5 Summarv of Discussion of Treatise. Hume advances a version of ethical subjectivism. According to his theory, whether a quality of mind or character is a virtue is a complex matter of fact. Virtues and vices are not full- fledged qualities or properties of character traits but powers of character traits to excite distinctive pleasures and pains, the moral sentiments. Whether a particular character trait is a virtue depends on circumstances and the evaluative responses of people considering it. The moral sentiments are forms of love and hatred, passions which are naturally-occurring evaluations. Virtue is "the power of producing love or prideN (575). Any quality of mind is virtuous which causes love or pride. The general view implicit in moral evaluation is not a result of some perception of objective moral qualitites of characters or actions. Rather, moral evaluation is the love or hatred of a person which is excited by sympathetic feeling for the people who may be affected by the person's mental qualities and resulting actions. He writes that "all lovers of virtue ... must certainly be pleas8d to see moral distinctions deriv'd from so noble a source [as sympathy]" (619). In the next section I briefly address the question of whether Hume retains a subjectivist ontology of value in the Ensuirv Concernins the Principles of Morals.

5.7 The Ontology of Value in the Enquiry

5.7.1 Introduction, Earlier in this thesis I attributed versions of ethical objectivism to both Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. So far in this chapter I have shown that Hume defends a form of ethical subjectivism in the Treatise. The thesis has thus shown an interesting development in the ontology of moral value of the moral sense theories. One might reasonably ask whether Hume remains an ethical subjectivist in An Enwirv Concernha the Principals of Morals, his other major ethical work. In this section I

218

to be at least one extremely controversial feature of his philosophy, the imression of self. The impression of self is required to give life to the idea formed of another person's feeling so that this idea becomes an actual impression of that feeling or one related to it. These complications are the result, perhaps, of trying to explain the origin of moral distinctions in creatures which naturally possess only limited benevolence.

Sympathy in the Encmirv is quite different. The elaborate explanation of the mechanism of sympathy disappears in Humels "recastsn of the ~reatise,including the Enuuirv Concernins Human Understandinq, A Dissertation on the Passions, and moral Enquirv Concernins the Princbles of Morals. The general principle of morality in the moral

Enauinr is now called the 'sentiment of humanity1- lBenevolencel and 'sympathy1 are now sometimes used as

synonyms for this specific sentiment. "The notion of morals implies some sentiment common to all mankind, and makes every man, or most men, agree in the same opinion or decision concerning itn (272). He identifies the sentiment of humanity with a general benevolence, the existence of which he previously denied! In the Treatise he wrote, "there is no such passion in human minds, as the love of mankind, merely as suchn (481). In striking contrast, he writes in the Enauirv of "these and a thousand other instances [which] are marks of a general benevolence in human nature, where no real interest binds us to the subjectm (300)." He also identifies the sentiment of humanity with the moral sentiment since "they are governed by the same laws, and are moved by the same objectsN (236). The new version of the theory, which accepts a general benevolence, is less complicated. He now accepts that utility naturally pleases, even when it has no relation to oneself. If usefulness, therefore, be a source of moral sentiment, and if this usefulness be not always considered with a reference to self; it follows, that everything, which contributes to the happiness of society, recommends itself directly to our approbation and good-will. Here is a principle, which accounts, in great part, for the origin of morality: And what need we seek for abstruse and remote systems, when there occurs one so obvious and natural. (219). He does not find it necessary to explain the origin of the sentiment of humanity or fellow-feeling. Perhaps he believes that general benevolence originates in the sympathy mechanism. Although he pursues such questions in the Treatise, "abstruse and remote systemsn (an implicit reference to his own earlier work?) are unnecessary once a principle of natural general benevolence is admitted.

5.7.3 The Ontoloqy of the Enauirv. So far I have focussed on a striking difference between the Treatise and the Enauirv. I now consider the question whether there is any

98 References in this section are to the Endries ed. L.A. Selby- Bigge (1902). change in moral ontology. In the earlier work Hume considers the origin of moral distinctions and rejects the claim that they are either relations or qualities which are independent of moral judges, and of places and times. His positive position is that virtues are powers to arouse certain sentiments, love and pride, in observers. Whether some mental quality, say justice or benevolence, is such a power depends on places and times and the sympathetic responses of persons. This made the theory of the Treatise a version of ethical subjectivism. Examination of the Enauirv shows that the subjectivist foundations of his theory remain in place. In the first section of the Enuuirv Hume raises again the question whether reason or sentiment is the foundation of moral distinctions. He introduces some arguments on both sides and concludes "that reason and sentiment concur in almost all moral determinations and conclusions~ (172).

Although they nconcur,m he gives the last word to sentiment. The final sentence, it is probable, which pronounces characters and actions amiable or odious, praise-worthy or blameable; that which stamps on them the mark of honour or infamy, approbation or censure; that which renders morality an active principle and constitutes virtue our happiness, and vice our misery: it is probable, I say, that this final sentence depends on some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species. (173) This passage shows that Hume retains the opinion expressed in the Treatise that the moral emotions of people are fairly uniform in relation to similiar sorts of object. Although the final sentence depends on sentiment he strongly emphasises the necessary and prior role of reason in preparing for the moral sentiment, "since nothing but [reason] can instruct us in the tendencies of qualities and actions, and point out their beneficial consequences to society and to their possessorN (285). Hume maintains the same conception of reason and its practical function at the time of the Enauirv as he did in the Treatise. In the Enauiw concernins Human Understandinq

(1748, three years before the moral Enuuirv) he writes: "All the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, relations of ideas, and matters of factn (25). In the first appendix to the moral Enauirv, *Concerning Moral Sentiment," he returns to the question of the relation of reason and sentiment in moral distinctions. Reason discovers matters of fact in the tendency of qualities and actions as regards their utility so "it is evident that reason must enter for a considerable share in all decisions [of moral praise] (285). However he still clearly holds that moral distinctions do not arise from reason alone, He writes: [Reason] discovers objects as they really stand in nature, without addition or diminution: [Taste] has a productive faculty, and gilding or staining all natural objects with the colours, borrowed from internal sentiment, raises in a manner a new creation. Reason being cool and disengaged, is no motive to action, and directs only the impulse received from appetite or inclination, by showing us the means of attaining happiness or avoiding misery. Taste, as it gives pleasure or pain, and thereby constitutes pleasure or misery, becomes a motive to action, and is the first spring or impulse to desire and volition. (294) The negative claim of ethical subjectivism is that there are no objective moral values. So the subjectivist philosopher should be able to explain the widely-held, erroneous belief that moral values are objective. In the above passage Hume offers a 'projection theory' to explain this mistake. People project their feelings on objects which arouse them. Taste produces new creations, "borrowed from internal ~entiment.~The connection of evaluative feelings with pleasure or pain explains the connection of moral perception and motivation. He makes similar points about the relation between reason and sentiment in moral evaluation in a number of places. But though reason, when fully assisted and improved, be sufficient to instruct us in the pernicious or useful tendency of qualities and actions; it is not alone sufficient to produce any moral blame or approbation. Utility is only a tendency to a certain end; and were the end totally indifferent to us, we should feel the same indifference to the means. It is requisite that a sentiment should here display itself, in order to give a preference to the useful above the pernicious tendencies, (286) Generally speaking, he is not as interested in psychological mechanisms in the Enquirv as in the Treatise. The moral sentiment is taken as a brute fact of consciousness in the

and his description concise : This sentiment can be no other than a feeling for the happiness of mankind, and a resentment of their misery; since these are the different ends which virtue and vice have a tendency to promote. (286) He repeats a number of the arguments against ethical rationalism which there is no need to review. Against the vagueness of the rationalist theories, Hume asserts the simplicity of his own. The hypothesis which we embrace is plain. It maintains that morality is determined by sentiment. It defines virtue to be whatever mental action or quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation; and vice the contrary. (289) In short, Hume remains an ethical subjectivist through the THE MORAL SENSE SCHOOL

6.1 Ontolow and the School. Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Hume constitute the moral sense school. This thesis has shown an interesting development in the ontology of moral value in their theories, Shaftesbury is an ethical objectivist for whom moral values are entailed by a sort of harmony existing between reflective creatures and the systems of which they are parts. This harmony would be morally valuable even if human beings were not disposed to

favour it. For Hutcheson, also an objectivist, benevolence is the basis of the power to excite moral approval everywhere and always. In contrast to both Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, Hume is an 'ethical subjectivist.' Although he, like Hutcheson, describes virtue as the power of a mental quality to excite approval he rejects the idea that any particular quality, including even benevolence, would evoke moral approbation in all circumstances. In this final section I briefly discuss some of the similarities and differences between their theories,

6.2 Terminolosical Asreement, The 'moral senset theories have been supposed to be drawn together at least by an agreement in terminology. According to this, Shaftesburyts influence extends through Hutcheson to Hume by the use of 225 the term 'moral sensef to name or describe the moral faculty. Do they agree on what they mean by this term? I noted that Shaftesbury used the term only once in the text of his Inmirv and preferred to write of 'a sense of right and wrong.' Hutcheson uses 'moral sense' and makes it central to a theory which he claims to be a defence and explanation of Shaftesburyfs principles. but which we saw to be quite original relative to the source of his inspiration. Hume uses 'moral sensef more often than Shaftesbury but much less frequently than Hutcheson and prefers to write of 'moral sentiments.' These 'moral sentimentsf are certain sorts of naturally-occurring passions or emotions which are experienced by human observers in certain circumstances. More specifically, moral sentiments are felt on a sympathetic consideration of the effects or possible effects of an action or agent on other people. The dependence of moral sentiments on sympathetic experience. which varies between individuals, and on different circumstances of place and time makes his theory an 'ethical subjectivism.' Since the term 'moral sensef has a different significance in each theory it is fair to conclude that their agreement in terminology can best be described as limited.

6.3 Emotion and Moral Approval. Another question is whether or to what extent Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Hume agree on the state of affairs to which 'moral senset is 226

supposed to refer. Each may be referring to more or less the same sorts of subjective experience when writing respectively of sense of right and wrongn, moral sensen and "moral sentimentsn. Although the three differ in moral ontology they do share an interest in the nature of moral perception and motivation. Perhaps they agree on what individuals actually experience in moral perception. Shaftesbury does not articulate a theory of moral perception. It is clear enough that the harmony of creatures and systems which is the right state of creatures is or is entailed by matters of fact which are independent of the responsiveness of observers. The 'sense of right and wrong8 is an emotional response or preference for perceived

harmony, a new liking, He equates this new liking with moral approval. This sense, however, does not seem to be the means by which the harmony is perceived, although it will be recalled that this is one of the points on which Shaftesbury's Inauirv is not clear. For Hutcheson, benevolence is a quality of character which is the basis of the power to excite moral approval and a 'calm extensive benevolence1 is virtue's perfection. He is an 'ethical objectivist1 because the power of benevolence to excite approval does not depend on its perception, nor on places or times. The perceptions of moral sense are emotional responses, specifically approvals and disapprovals. God has made human beings so as to feel pleasures in relation to such qualities as benevolence and honour. According to Hutcheson, these pleasures are constitutive of a distinctively human happiness and are known, at least by those experienced in the different sorts of pleasure, to be of greater value than the pleasures of, say, animals or children. Humefs and antology differ from Hutchesonfs in that what is valuable depends more on the responses of people and circumstances. He puts this very clearly in a short passage from 'The Sceptic,' an essay published shortly after the Treatise: If we can depend upon any principle which we learn from philosophy, this, I think, may be considered as certain and undoubted, that there is nothing, in itself, valuable or despicable, desirable or hateful, beautiful or deformed; but that these attributes arise from the particular constitution and fabric of human sentiment and affection.99 Hume does write of virtue as the power of a mental quality

to excite love or pride, and moral approval is a species of love. In contrast to Hutcheson, however, there are many qualities which sometimes have this power and no quality which always has it. Love and pride are emotions which are evaluations of persons. So Hume agrees with his 'moral sensef predecessors in claiming that the impressions of moral sense are sentiments or emotions of approval and disapproval.

99 Essays, Moral, Political and Literary. 228 For Shaftesbury, the 'sense of right and wrong' is a 'likingf of a harmony or balance of social and interested affections, and a dislike of its contrary. For Hutcheson, moral sense is "a determination to be pleased," not by harmony but by benevolence and its expression in action. This could be understood as an elaboration on or correction of Shaftesburyfs theory with Hutcheson making the claim that benevolent affections are those which will lead generally to the harmony which is the ,right stater of creatures. Hutcheson believes that benevolence is the only virtue and that the perfection of virtue is the dominance of a 'calm extensive benevolence.' Shaftesbury would probably regard Hutchesonfs emphasis on benevolence as excessive since it appears to diminish the claims of family and friends on the extensively-benevolent individual. As Shaftesbury put it, any sort of affection, Dif it be immoderate and beyond a certain degree it is undoubtedly viciousn (Inauirv 250). Common morality, for better or worse, allows and even requires special obligations in relation to family and friends, and also allows for the development of personal happiness. Since both Shaftesbury and Hutcheson are attempting to explain rather than reform morals, the former seems closer to describing people who are generally admired in his claim that it is some sort of balance between social and interested affections which leads to harmony rather than a total, be it ever so 'calmr, concern with the happiness of 229 the greatest number. Hutchesonfs , an individual dominated by a calm universal benevolence. is one which perhaps no person could ever meet and to which the vast majority of people would not even bother to aspire. Hume sides with Shaftesbury and with common morality in claiming that both interested and social affections may be virtuous. He writes: "that we owe a duty to ourselves is confessed even in the most vulgar systems of morality*

(Enauirv 322). When he considers actual virtues he discovers that they are, as a matter of fact, all useful or pleasing to their possessor or others, that is, they share general utility. Personal merit consists entirely in the usefulness or agreeableness of qualities to the person himself possessed of them, or to others, who have any intercourse with him, (Enauirv, 257) He goes farther than Shaftesbury or Hutcheson in claiming that anv pleasant or useful quality of mind which causes 'pridef in or 'lovef of the possessor is a virtue, so that such qualities as wit and 'greatness of mind' are included in his catalogue of the virtues. He believes that there is no distinction to be made between virtues and talents, since there is no distinction between the sorts of impression by which they are known. The utility and/or pleasantness of a mental quality, either to its possessor or others, are not identical with virtue but it are the basis in mental qualities of the power to excite love from a sympathetic 230 general view. And the mental qualities which possess general utility may vary with times and places.

6.4 Moral Perce~tionand Motivation. To emphasise agreement in emotional experience and especially approvals in these theories risks ignoring important differences in the origin of these approvals and the relation of the feelings to the constitution of moral value. This being said. there is a point in relation to moral feeling and psychology on which they appear to agree and the development of which is quite important in the . This agreement has to do with the relation between moral perception and motivation. The three philosophers agree that people experience particular pleasures in their perception of what is virtuous, and corresponding pains in relation to what is vicious. The relation of these motivation-laden approvals to moral value explains the connection between making making moral distinctions and being motivated to act in accordance with them. All three philosophers could be called tinternalistf in that they agree that making a sincere moral judgment entails a willingness to act in accordance with it.

6.5 Reason and Moral Sense. The rationalists claimed that reason, acting by itself, makes or discovers moral distinctions. Although Shaftesbury might have agreed with 231 this, Hutcheson and Hume develop their own theories from a rejection of this specific rationalist claim. What is the place of reason in each of the fmoral sense' theories? For

Shaftesbury, goodness is the right state of a creature in relation to the system of which it is a part. Adding a faculty of reflection to a social creature will make it capable of being virtuous or vicious and of feeling a "new likingn in relation to the right states of creatures 24.1) . The 'sense of right and wrong8 is a reflective capacity. Perhaps because his philosophical opponents are the egoists rather than the rationalists, Shaftesbury does not specify the nature, functions or limits of reason. Hutcheson and Hume agree that reason is the discovery of truth, so they would not understand Shaftesbury's reflective sense and its 'new liking or dislikef as reason. Virtue for Shaftesbury's successors is the power of certain mental qualities to excite specific feelings rather than a relation or matter of fact discoverable by reason. The three philosophers agree that reason plays an important instrumental role. Shaftesbury says that a knowledge of right and wrong determines "a right application of the affectionsn in relation to "the eternal measures and immutable independent nature of worth and virtuef1 (Incruiuv 255). Hutcheson emphasises the role of reason in showing the means to the satisfaction of ends set by instincts and affections. "All exciting reasons presuppose instincts and 232 affectionsn (Illustrations 218). Hume agrees with Hutcheson that reason does not determine the ends of action but only the means. "Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passionsn (Treatise 415). Reason's instrumental role is to determine means and relative utility but the preference for useful or pleasing qualities, for Hume as for Hutcheson, remains an instinctive emotional response. Like Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, Hume is attempting a theoretical explanation of the qualities that people actually take to be virtuous rather than attempting to reform people's moral attitudes. He is, to be sure, at odds with christian moralists on what qualities are virtuous but believes his explanation of the utility-based value of qualities shows, to give two examples, that pride is a virtue and humility or shame a vice. Unlike his moral-sense predecessors, he is a relativist in that his theory accepts that values will be different for different places and times. It is true that utility is always praised but utility is just a tendency to some end. He explores this idea in a philosophical dialogue which was intended to be a part of the Enquir~.'"~ He says that the task of inculcating morals requires a different sort of work than the theoretical one with which he was engaged (Treatise 620,

621).

loo See Appendix, "A Note on Hume8s Advertisement of 1777". 233

6.6 Condudins Remarks. On the one hand, it is perhaps harmless to call these philosophers a school. Each is a moral philosopher of the same period in Britain, responding to roughly the same intellectual context. Each argues against tpsychological egoism, by insisting that human beings are social as well. These thinkers share an interest in moral psychology and take an empirical approach to morals. There is an emphasis in their theories on giving emotions their due place in moral life. On the other hand, we have seen that there are enough differences between their theories to justify retention of each philosopherfs preferred terminology; 'sense of right and wrong', 'moral sensef, and 'moral sentimentst. To run the philosophers together under the label 'moral sense school' runs the risk of obscuring significant differences. Furthermore, their use of nsenseflhas been widely misinterpreted. Nobody who has carefully read the texts we have considered could attribute to any of these philosophers a theory according to which moral sense directly perceives objective moral qualities, a claim which is sometimes attributed to moral-sense thinkers. If Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Hume must be grouped together it would be well to find another label. Numerous commentators refer to the 'advertisement' to the last authorial edition of Hume's philosophical works (published posthumously in 1777) . These writers are generally unclear or mistaken about the writings the advertisement is meant to endorse. I will cite two instances. David Fate Norton writes of Hume8s intention that the advertisement be "included in all editions of his Essavs and Treatises," without explicitly indicating that these certainly did not include the Treatise of Human

Nature,la' David Gauthier bases an interpretation of Hume on the Essays, Moral. Political, and Literarv and on the Enauirv concernins the Principles of Morals, claiming the authority of the advertisement for neglecting what Gauthier himself considers the "more profoundn Treatise of Human Nature. Gauthier "finds himself boundn to take Hume at his word that "the following pieces may alone be regarded as containing his philosophical sentiments and principles." Gauthier takes the pieces to include all of the writings in the 1777 edition which bear on Hume's political and moral philosophy.lo2 Norton is not clear on which writings Hume endorses and Gauthier, though clear. is clearly mistaken.

10L nHume*s Scottish Criticsn, McGill Eiume Studies. (San Diego: Austin Hill Press, 1979) , page 309 ff.

102 David Gauthier, Wavid Hue, Contractariann, The Philosophical Review, 88 (1979), page 3. EX. Mossner says that the advertisement was composed in 1775 as an indirect response to some antagonistic criticism directed at Hume. At that time Hume wrote a letter to William Strahan, his friend and publisher, that he believed it to be "a compleat answer to Dr Reid and to that bigotted silly fellow, ~eattie."l*~Thomas Reid founded what has become known as 'common sense philosophy' in the

1760fs, clearly as a response to Hume. James Beattie, Professor of Moral Philosophy at Aberdeen. published a particularly hostile criticism of Hume in 1770. Hume had the unfortunate experience of seeing Beattie's book, Essav on the Nature and Imrnutabilitv of Truth; in omosition to So~histrvand Scepticism, go through five editions before his own death in 1776. Ironically, from our perspective, there is reason to believe that the only edition of Hume's

Treatise did not sell out his lifetime .Io4

The text of the advertisement is well-known to Hume students but I quote it in full. Most of the principles and reasonings, contained in this volume, were published in a work in three volumes, called A Treatise of Human Nature: A work which the author had projected before he left college, and which he wrote and published not long after. But not finding it successful, he was sensible of his error in going to the press too early, and he cast the whole anew in the following pieces. where some negligences in his former reasoning and more in the expression, are, he hopes, corrected. Yet several writers, who have honoured the author's philosophy with answers, have taken care to

103 Mossner, page 582. 104 -Ibid. page 139- direct all their batteries against that juvenile work, which the author never acknowledged, and have affected to triumph in any advantages, which, they imagined, they had obtained over it: A practice very contrary to all rules of candor and fair-dealing, and a strong instance of those polemical artifices, which a bigotted zeal thinks itself authorized to employ. Henceforth, the author desires, that the following pieces alone may be regarded as containing his philosophical sentiments and principles. Although the advertisement is often cited, especially in the debate on the relation of the Treatise to the Enmiries, the edition of 1777 to which it is affixed is not widely available. A brief examination of this edition reveals a number of interesting things. The title of this two-volume work is Essavs and Treatises on Several Subjects. It might perhaps be thought obvious from comments in the advertisement that the Treatise of Human Nature is not a part of the work, despite reference to "treatisesn in the title. However there are a number of nineteenth-century editions of Hume's Philosophical Works, most famously that of Greene and Grose, which include the Treatise.lo5 It is important that the 1777 edition not be confused with any of these.

The first volume of 1777 contains some philosophical essays, but their titles need not concern us. This appears odd if one follows Gauthier's opinion that these are among the works Hume wishes to endorse so strongly. However, the

LO5 The Philosophical Works of Hume, edited by T.H.Green and T.B.Grose (London: Longmans, 1895) . Also EIume's Philoso~hicalWorks, (Edinburgh: Black, 1854) in which the works are "here for the first time collected in a uniform editionn (v.) . 237 reader searches in vain for the famous advertisement in the first volume. In fact, it is found only at the beginning of the second volume. From this one may reasonably conclude that the essays in the first volume are not among the pieces which the advertisement endorses. The advertisement refers to the second volume. the contents of which include Enmi- concernina Human Understandinq, A Dissertation on the Passions, An Enquirv concernina the principles of Morals, and The Natural Historv of Reliqion. The contents do not include any of the other philosophical essays. So Gauthier is mistaken in claiming that the advertisement endorses the essays. Thus it is easy enough to determine which works Hume may mean to endorse. The subject matter of the 6n~uiriesis roughly that of the first and third volumes of the Treatise and Hume writes of these in a number of places as "new casts" or nrecastsw of that work. The Oxford Enqlish Dictionarv has the following sense of 'recast': "To refashion, remodel, reconstruct (a thing, esp. a literary work, a sentence, etc.) ". The Dissertation on the Passions (originally published 1757) is an abbreviation of Book I1 of the Treatise. In saying that he "cast the whole anew in the following piecesm Hume appears to be saying that the two Enauiries and the Dissertation were intended to take the place of the Treatise. Certainly the advertisement is meant 238 to endorse at least these works, whatever shortcomings subsequent commentators attribute to them. One of Hume's most important contributions to the , the Natural Histom of Relision, also appears to be covered by the endorsement. However, if Hume is taken literally to mean that only the pieces in this volume are to be taken to contain "hie philosophical sentiments and principlesn what are we to make of the conspicuous omission of the "Dialogues concerning Natural

Religion"? That the publication of the Ilialosues was extremely important to him as he came to the end of his life is known. He took elaborate steps to be sure of their publication. Both William Strahan and were unwilling to take on this responsibility because of the controversial subject matter. However Hume's nephew and namesake discharged this important final request in 1779.

Perhaps at the time of the advertisement's composition, in spite even of the steps he had taken, Hume was uncertain that the Dialosues would ever be published. Or perhaps he knew that nobody would ever be able to attribute any specific philosophical opinion or sentiment to their author. Or perhaps the advertisement is meant to endorse only the pieces which mirror the contents of the Treatise. In summary, close attention to the contents of the second volume does not answer all of the questions which the advertisement raises. However, it is clear that the 239 advertisement certainly refers only to contents of the second volume though perhaps not to all of them. Examination of the second volume raises two other matters. First, comparison of the title page of the second volume with the earlier edition of 1764 shows that the Dissertation, a work present in both editions, has been added to the later title page. Perhaps this addition to the title page of 1777 is intended to emphasise that the

Dissertation is a distinct work from the first Encrui~.

Secondly, it is interesting that "A Dialoguen is not mentioned in the title page of either edition. The format for the table of contents of 1777 normally doubles the space between separate works; for instance, between the last chapter of the first Enauirv and the Dissertation. The exception is between the conclusion of the second Ensuirv and its "Appendixn which is also double-spaced. After the fourth section of the "Appendixn follows "A Dialoguen, with a single spacing. Following "A Dialogue," a double space precedes The Natural History of Relision. From these details it appears that Hume intended the dialogue to be read as a part of the second Enwirv. A quick glance at the contents of the first edition of the second In~uinr(1751) shows that it includes "A Dialoguen, as do subsequent editions published in Hume's lifetime. Recognition of the "Dialog~e~~as a part of the Inwirv should encourage greater attention to this relatively neglected section. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Kinsley,- ed.. London: Oxford University Press, 1961. Foot, Philippa. nUtilitariaaism and the Virtues, Mind 94 (1985), 196-209. Frankena , W .K . . lWutchesonfs Moral Sense Theory, Journal of the Historv of Ideas, vol. 16, no. 3 (June 1955) : 356. Gauthier, David. nDavid Hume: Contractarian." Philosophical Review 88 (1979). Grean, Stanley. Shaf tesbuwfs Philosophv of Relision and Ethics. Athens, Ohio : Ohio University Press, 1967.

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Henderson, R.S.. "David Hume on Personal Identity and the Indirect Passions, " Hume Studies, xvi , 1, (April 1990) : 33. Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. London: 1651. Hudson, W.D.. The Is-Ouaht Ouestion. London: MacMillan, 1969. Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. PA. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981. Enauiries, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902. A Letter from a Gentleman to his Friend in Edinburqh (1745). ed. E.C. Mossner and John V. Price (Edinburgh: University Press, 1967).

. Philoso~hical Works, Edinburgh : Adam and Charles Black, 1854. Hunter, Geoffrey. nHume on is and ought , Philosophv, mii (1962). Hutcheson, Francis - Bssav on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections. With Illustrations on the Moral Sense. 1st ed. London: 1728. Essav on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections. With Illustrations on the Moral Sense. 3d ed. London: 1742. Illustrations on the Moral Sense. ed. B. Peach. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971.

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Short Introduction to Moral Philosophv. Glasgow : 1753. System of Moral Philoso~hv.Glasgow, 1755. Kydd, Rachael . Reason and Conduct in Humefs Treatise. New York: Russell and Russell, 1964.

Locke, John. An Essay Concernins Human Understandinq, Peter Nidditch, ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979. Mackie, J. L. . Humefs Moral Theorv. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980.

Ethics : Inventinq Right and Wronq. New York : Penguin, 1977, Malebranche, N. . De La Recherche de la Vgritg. 1674-1675. Mandeville, B. . The Fable of the Bees: or. Private vices, Publick Benefits. Oxford: Clarendon, 1924. Mossner , E .C . . The Life of David Hume. Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1954. Norton, David Fate. David Hume: Common-Sense Moralist. Sceptical Meta~hvsician. Princeton: University Press, 1982. RH~tcheson's Moral Sense Theory Reconsidered." Philosonhv and Public Affairs volume 3, number 4 (1974) 3- 23 Norton, David Fate. Wutcheson on Perception and Moral Perception." Archiv far Geschichte der Philosophie 59 (1977) 181-197.

Nowell-Smith, P.H.. Ethics. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959 .

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Plato's Reniblic, trans. G.M.A. Grube. Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett, 1974. Price, Richard. A Review of the Principal Ouestions in Morals. Edited by D.D. Raphael. Oxford: University Press, 1948. Prior, A.N.. Loqic and the Basis of Ethics. Oxford: University Press, 1949. Pritchard, HIAI. "Does Moral Philosophy rest on a Mistake?" Mind, 1912 : reprinted in Readinss in Ethical Theory, second edition, edited by W. Sellars and J. Hospers, New York: 1970.

Rand, B . . The Life. Unpublished Letters, and Philosophical Resimen of Anthonv, Earl of Shaftesburv. London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1900. Raphael, D .D . . British Moralists, 1650-1800. 2 vols. Oxford: University Press, 1969. The Moral Sense. London: Oxford University Press, 1947. Reid, Thomas. Essay on the Active Powers of the Human Mind. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1969. Schlipp, P .A. - Kantrs Pre-critical Ethics. Evanston: Northwestern University, 1960. Selby-Bigge, L.A. British Moralists Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1897. Shaftesbury . Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times. John M. Robertson, ed.. New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964. Select Sermons of Dr. Whichcote. London: 1698. Sidgwick, Henry. Methods of Ethics, London: Mamillan, 1893 .

Sobel, 3. Howard. Walls and Vaults: David Hume's Natural Science of Morals. TMs 1993.

Strasser, Mark- Francis Hutchesonfs Moral Theory. Wakefield, New Hampshire: Longwood, 1990. Stroud, Barry. Hume. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977.

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Winkler, Kenneth. "Hutchesonfs Alleged Realism," Journal of the History of Philoso~hv23 (1985) 179-194 VITA

Name : Robert Samuel Henderson Place and year of birth: Ottawa, 1958 Education: Carleton University B .A. (Honours in ) 1980 . Trinity College, Toronto M.Div. 1983. Queen's University, Kingston M.A. (Philosophy) 1988 University of Toronto B-Ed* 1993 University of Toronto Ph.D . (~hilosophy)1998 Publications: nDavid Hume on Personal Identity in Book I1 of A Treatise of Human NatureN (M.A. thesis) nDavid Hume on Personal Identity and the Indirect Passions," Hume Studies XVI, 1. (April 1990)

Awards : Dean1s Honour Role, Faculty of Education, Toronto 1993 Doctoral ello ow ships, University of Toronto 1988-1992 George Paxton Young Prize University of Toronto 1990 Dean1s Fellowship Queen's University 1987

Brierly Browne Scholarship Queen's university 1987 IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (QA-3)

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