sign in sign up
<<
Home , Argument from miracles, Boyle Lectures, Samuel Clarke, William Whiston, William Wollaston

University of Pennsylvania Press

Newtonian Science, , and the Laws of Nature Author(s): Peter Harrison Source: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 56, No. 4 (Oct., 1995), pp. 531-553 Published by: University of Pennsylvania Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2709991 Accessed: 30-10-2015 01:34 UTC

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/ info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

University of Pennsylvania Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of the History of Ideas. http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 130.102.42.98 on Fri, 30 Oct 2015 01:34:15 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions NewtonianScience, Miracles, andthe Laws ofNature

PeterHarrison

Introduction

"Newton,"writes Richard Westfall, "both believed in and did not believe in miracles."It can onlybe concluded,Westfall continues, that the greatscientist, unwilling to relinquishhis beliefin a providentialand inter- posingDeity, "abandoned himself to ambiguitiesand inconsistencies,which gave theappearance of divine participation in nature,but not the substance."' Newton'sapparent ambivalence towards miracles highlights what to many commentatorsis one of the most curiousfeatures of seventeenth-century naturalphilosophy. Leading scientists of thisera, almost without exception, had a dual commitmenton the one hand to a science premisedupon a mechanicaluniverse governed by immutablelaws of natureand on theother to a omnipotentGod who intervenedin thenatural order from time to time, breachingthese "laws" of nature.2This puzzle is heightenedby thefact that (in Englandat least)those figures who wereat theforefront of an advancing mechanicalscience were also themost staunch defenders .3The Christianvirtuosi of the Royal Society-RobertBoyle, ThomasSprat, and JohnWilkins, to takethe most prominent examples-insisted not only that miraclescould takeplace butthat they played a vitalrole in establishingthe truthof Christianreligion.4

1 Richard Westfall,Science and in SeventeenthCentury England (New Haven, 1970), 204. 2 See, e.g., ibid.,5, 89; JamesForce, "The Breakdownof thethe Newtonian Synthesis of Science and Religion,"in Force and RichardPopkin (eds.), Essays on the Context, Nature,and Influenceof 'sTheology (Dordrecht, 1990). 3 R. M. Burns,The Great Debate on Miraclesfrom Joseph Glanvill to (London, 1981), 12. 4 Boyle, The ChristianVirtuoso in The Works,ed. ThomasBirch (6 vols.; Hildesheim, 1966), V, 531; Thomas Sprat,The Historyof theRoyal Society(London, 1667), 352; John Wilkins,Of thePrinciples and Duties of NaturalReligion (London, 1675), 402. 531 Copyright1995 by Journalof theHistory of Ideas, Inc.

This content downloaded from 130.102.42.98 on Fri, 30 Oct 2015 01:34:15 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 532 PeterHarrison

It is now oftenassumed that such devoutseventeenth-century scientists led strangedichotomous mental lives or, more charitably, that their felicitous reconciliationof scientificand religiouspursuits was builtupon a set of assumptionswhich only later, in lightof argumentsproposed by Hume and his successors,proved to be mutuallyconflicting. In thispaper I hopeto shed lightupon one aspectof thispuzzle by showingthat Newton, along with his most prominentdisciples, and ,came to understandmiracles in a way quitedifferent from their seventeenth-century predecessors,and thatin developingthis new conceptionof themiraculous theymanaged to avoid thoseconceptual confusions which are thoughtto afflictthe cognitiveworlds of theirearlier contemporaries. The central featureof theNewtonians' position on thisquestion concerns the definition of "."As we shall see, theNewtonians rejected that standard defini- tionof miracle, according to whicha miraclemust involve a violationof laws of nature.Their alternativeconception, significantly, could still serve the interestsof Christianapologetics but withoutundermining the foundation uponwhich the scientific enterprise was constructedand withoutcommitting itsadherents to theambiguities and inconsistencies of whichthey are so often accused.

Defining"Miracle"

Moderndiscussions of miraclesgenerally begin by defininga "miracle" as "a violationof thelaws of nature."To thisbasic definitionmay be added the conditionthat the breach of the laws of natureoccur as a resultof the activityof or someother agent; occasionally it is specified as a furtherrequirement that the breachoccur in orderto confirmsome religiousdoctrine or to establishthe authorityof some person.5It has frequentlybeen pointed out that, given such a definition,the very concept of "miracle"suffers from an inherentlogical instability.Miracles, it seems,are parasiticupon the idea thatthere are laws of nature:without laws of nature, therecan be no miracles;however, if there are miracles,this tends to destroy thevery concept of a law of nature.6For presentpurposes, the more interest- ing questionto arise fromthis definition has to do withthe conceptionof miraclewhich existed before the adventof modemscience with its clearly formulatedlaws of nature.Miracles, in otherwords, have alwayshad some apologeticfunction in Christiantheology, a functionwhich they exercised

5 The classic statementof thisdefinition appears in David Hume's "Of Miracles,"An Enquiryconcerning Human Understanding,ed. L. A. Selby Bigge (Oxford,19753), X.I.90 (1 14f.)For a morerecent discussion of thisdefinition see RichardSwinburne, The Concept of Miracle (London, 1970), ch. 3. 6 See, e.g., AntonyFlew, God and Philosophy(London, 1966), 148f.For a responseto objectionsof thiskind, see Miracles,ed. R. Swinburne(London, 1989), 9f,and Paul Dietl, "On Miracles," in ContemporaryPhilosophy of Religion,ed. Steven Cahn and David Shatz (Oxford,1982), 146-53.

This content downloaded from 130.102.42.98 on Fri, 30 Oct 2015 01:34:15 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions NewtonianScience 533 quitesatisfactorily without recourse to a sciencecommitted to explanationin termsof laws of nature.Augustine, and afterhim Aquinas, helped shape a premodernconception of miracles,a conceptionwhich did not and indeed could notinvolve reference to laws of naturebut which came to be directly relevantto theNewtonian redefinition of "miracle." Augustinewas actually the firstto attempta formaldefinition of "miracle."7A miracle,he wrotein a letterto his Manichaeanfriend Hon- oratus,is "anythingwhich appears arduous or unusual,beyond the expecta- tionor abilityof the one whomarvels at it."8Such marvellousevents, he was to say elsewhere,are not "contraryto nature"but rather"contrary to our knowledgeof nature."9Ignorance of thecauses of an event,however, was a necessarybut insufficientmark of the miraculous.For Augustineall the phenomenaof nature-"the changes of day andnight, the very constant order of heavenlybodies, the fourfoldchange of the seasons"-were in a sense miraculous.But theywere not regarded as suchbecause they are partof our constantexperience.10 In Augustine'srather subjective view of miracles, then,a miraclehad to have an unknowncause and it had to be unusual.Yet therewas no intrinsicdifference between the miraculousand the mun- dane-miracleswere distinguished only by theireffect on observers. Aquinaswas concernedto arriveat a moreprecise definition, one which locatedthe of miracle in theevent and not in theobserver. He did this by yokingthe religious sense of miracleto the Aristoteliandoctrine of the intrinsic"qualities" or "powers"of substances.While agreeingwith Au- gustinethat a miracleis notcontrary to nature,Aquinas argued that a miracle was nonetheless"apart from the order implanted in things."11It followsthat miraclesinvoke wonder (Augustine's definition) because theircause defies explanationin termsof the naturalproperties of the objects involved:an eventis a miracleif "we observethe effectbut do not know its cause."12 Aquinas furtherclarified his positionby specifyingthree classes of event whichseem to fitthis description and yetare notgenuine miracles. First are eventsthe causes of whichare knownto some butnot others. An eclipseof the sun, for example,is not miraculousbecause althoughmost men are ignorantof itscause, the astronomer is not.A miraclecan onlybe something thathas "a completelyhidden cause in an unqualifiedway ... notsimply in

7 For a briefhistory of conceptionsof the miraculoussee JohnA. Hardon,"The Conceptof Miracle fromSt. Augustineto ModernApologetics," Theological Studies, 15 (1954), 229-57. Specificallyon Augustine,see R. M. Grant,Miracle and NaturalLaw in Graeco-Romanand Early ChristianThought (Amsterdam, 1952), 215-20. 8 De utilitatecredendi, 16.34, in The Fathersof the Church,IV (New York, 1947), 437. 9 Augustine,De civitatedei, XXI.8; ContraFaustum, XXVI.3 (my emphasis). 10 De civitatedei, XVI.34; cf. Cicero,De divinatione,ii, 49. 11Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles,tr. Vernon Bourke (New York, 1955-57), III, 100.1. 12 Ibid., III, 101.1.

This content downloaded from 130.102.42.98 on Fri, 30 Oct 2015 01:34:15 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 534 PeterHarrison relationto one personor another:it musthave a cause hiddenfrom every man."-13A second class of non-miraculousevent which seems to fit the descriptionconcerns the operationof occult qualities.Aquinas gave two stockexamples here-the magnetwhich attracts iron and thesmall fish (the Echeneis)which was thoughtto be able to impedethe passage of largeships. Althoughthe causes of theseobserved phenomena are unknown,Aquinas statesthat the effect of suchobjects are "limitedto somedefinite effect."14 In otherwords the effects are repeatableand to someextent predictable. There- fore,while the cause is hidden,or occult,the effect is notmiraculous. Finally, certainremarkable events have causes unknownto us because theyare performedby superiorbeings-angels or demons. These are not true miracles because it is withinthe created power of thesefree agents to performthese acts.Just as it is withinthe power of a humanagent to throwa stoneup into the air, causingit to act "unnaturally,"so invisibleagents can bringabout unusualeffects even thoughthey do notact above theircreated natures. Of theseevents Aquinas says:

now sincethe entire power of creatednature is unknownto us, when anythingoccurs outside the usual runof thingsthrough some power unknownto us, we assumethat it is miraculous[est miraculum quod nos]. So whenthe demons do somethingby their own natural power, we say thatthis is a miraclenot in thestrict sense, but relatively to us.15

Aquinasthus provides a clearaccount of whata genuinemiracle is butat thesame time concedes that an observer,relying on unaidedreason, may not be able to distinguishthe genuinefrom the "relative"miracle. In other wordsAquinas's definitionenables us to specifythe formal conditions for a truemiracle even thoughin practicewe mightnot be in a positionto know whetherany given event meets those conditions: it is alwayspossible that an unusualevent has causes whichare natural(i.e., not beyondthe created powersof things)and yetunknown. Withthe onset of thescientific revolution, the standard Thomist account of miraclesbecame inadequatefor two reasons.First, the Aristoteliandoc- trinethat individual substances had inherentpowers was abandoned.In the new philosophy,natural objects were strippedof those naturalqualities whichhad hithertoprovided the basis of causal explanationsof theiractivi- ties. Scientificaccounts of eventswere no longercouched in termsof the formaland materialcauses or the createdpowers of the objectsinvolved. Now explanationsrelied upon externally-acting efficient causes. The regular

13 Ibid. 14 Ibid.,III.102.3. 15Summa theologiae (London, 1964-76), la.110, 4. (XV, 17) (my emphasis). Cf. Summacontra gentiles, III, 102.

This content downloaded from 130.102.42.98 on Fri, 30 Oct 2015 01:34:15 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions NewtonianScience 535 operationsof thesesecondary causes weredescribed in laws of nature.In the new mechanicalworld order miracles came to be understoodas violationsor suspensionsof theselaws. RobertBoyle, for example, wrote that while God establishedlaws of nature,"yet he has notbound up his own handsby them, butcan invigorate,suspend, overrule, and reverseany of themas he thinks fit."'-6John Wilkins, one of thefounders of theRoyal Society,agreed that a miracle was a "violation" or "disordering"of "the universalLaws of Nature.""7Thomas Sprat,first historian of the Royal Society,spoke simi- larlyof God's prerogativeto "changethe wontedLaws of the Creation."'8 Thisunderstanding of miracleenjoyed wide acceptance in bothscientific and theologicalcircles.'9 From this modem conception it followedthat, barring God's interventionor "interposition,"everything which took place in the worldcould be accountedfor in termsof regularsecondary causes. Thus, whileGod was theultimate cause of all things,he was theimmediate cause onlyof themiraculous. All his otherworks were brought about through the operationof secondarycauses.20 It was not only the scientificrevolution which highlightedthe inad- equacyof theThomist account of miracles.Changes in thevery conception of "religion"meant that now miracleswere to play a vital role in the confirmationof thosedoctrines presumed to constitutethe essence of Christi- anity.The two centuriesfollowing the Protestant Reformation witnessed a remarkableshift in emphasisfrom to knowledge.Increasingly Christi- anitywas thoughtto be about assentingto certainrevealed propositions whichtogether constituted "saving knowledge." Miracles, along withful- filledprophecies, came to be the most importantcriterion by whichthe authenticityof putativerevelations could be assessed.It is forthis reason that apologeticarguments based on miraclesbecame prominent during the early modernperiod.2' Again, is typical.The evidenceof miracles, he argued,"is littleless than absolutelynecessary to evince ... thatthe

16 Boyle Manuscripts,Royal Society,London, VII, fols. 113-14,cited by Burns,The Great Debate, 54. Cf. Boyle, A Disquisitionabout the Final Causes of Natural Things (London, 1688), 96. 17 Wilkins,Principles and Duties of NaturalReligion, 402. 18 Sprat,History of theRoyal Society,357. 19For theologicaluses of thisdefinition see, e.g., RobertJenkin, The Reasonableness and Certaintyof the ChristianReligion (London, 1698), 34; Thomas Browne,Miracles Work'sAbove and Contraryto Nature (London, 1683); ,Origines Sacrae (Cambridge,17027), 170. 20 Boyle,A Free Inquiryinto the Vulgarly received Notion of Nature, Works, V, 252f.; The ChristianVirtuoso, Works, V, 532. 21 Admittedly,miracles and prophecyhad in the past been exploitedas argumentsin favorof theChristian revelation. See Aquinas,Summa theologica, 1 a2ae. 111, 4. However, in no previousperiod of historyhad theyachieved the prominence which they were to enjoy in the late seventeenthand earlyeighteenth centuries. See Bums, The Great Debate, 12. The use of miraclesas evidences,moreover, is typicallyProtestant. Catholic discussions of miraclesare as muchabout criteriafor canonization.

This content downloaded from 130.102.42.98 on Fri, 30 Oct 2015 01:34:15 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 536 PeterHarrison

Christian[religion] does reallyproceed from God."22 But ifmiracles were to performthis apologetic function, there had to be clearcriteria which distin- guished them fromthe merelyremarkable-from Aquinas's "relative miracles"-as well as fromthe spuriousmiracles of Catholicsand enthusi- asts.23On the understandingthat miracles were violationsof the laws of nature,it followedthat those most familiar with these laws would be best placed to judge whetherany given event warrantedthe label "miracle." Aquinas,while subscribingto a differentconception of scientificexplana- tion,had alreadyargued for the special expertiseof the scientistin the discernmentof truemiracles. This view was to be vigorouslyrestated in seventeenth-centuryEngland by thevirtuosi of theRoyal Society. Robert Boyle was thusto arguethat the practitionerof thenew philosophy"will examinewith more strictness and skill,than ordinary men are able, miracles,, or otherproofs, said to be supernatural,that are allegedto evincea real religion"and so discern "thecertain and genuinecharacters of truth."24Sprat endorsed Boyle's view, arguingfor the unique competence of theexperimental philosopher:

He cannot suddenlyconclude all extraordinaryevents to be the immediatFinger of God, because he familiarlybeholds the inward workingof things, and thence perceives that many effects, which use to affrightthe Ignorant,are broughtforth by the commonInstru- mentsof Nature.25

So it was thatthe leading advocates of themechanical philosophy in England specifiedclear formal conditions for the occurrence of miraclesand, equally importantly,made theunprecedented claim thatthey could ascertainwhen theseconditions had been satisfied.Both religious and scientificthinkers in mid-seventeenth-centuryEngland seemed to be adequatelyserved by this conceptionof miracle,remaining blissfully unaware of whatto latercom- mentatorswas a glaringinconsistency in theirapproach. Boyle and thoseof his fellow scientistswho vociferouslyadvocated the apologeticuse of miraclessaw only the positivefeatures of theirapproach-that once the

22 Boyle, The ChristianVirtuoso, Works, V, 531. Cf. Sprat,History of the Royal Society,352; JohnWilkins, Principles and Duties of NaturalReligion, 402. 23 This remaineda problemfor moderate proponents of the argumentfrom miracles. Stillingfleet,for example, while favouringthe argumentfrom miracles, despaired that "therebe no certaincprlpua or notesof difference,whereby to knowDivine Miracles from Delusions .." (OriginesSacrae, 225). 4 Boyle, The ChristianVirtuoso, Works, V, 538, 531. 25 Sprat,History of theRoyal Society,358f. Cf. Anon,A ShortDiscourse concerning Miracles (London,1702), 26f; RobertFilmer, An Advertisementto theJurymen of England touchingWitches (London, 1688), 8; JohnGaule, Select Cases of Conscience touching Witches(London, 1646), 98; Francis Bacon, The Advancementof Learning and New Atlantis,ed. ArthurJohnston, (Oxford, 1974), 222.

This content downloaded from 130.102.42.98 on Fri, 30 Oct 2015 01:34:15 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions NewtonianScience 537 immutablelaws of naturehad beenuncovered there would be no doubtwhat sortsof eventswould be miraculous.Their blindness to theapparent logical instabilityof the conceptis what has led contemporarycommentators to speak of the "absolutecontradiction" in theirthought.26 The Newtonians who followedthem, particularly , Whiston, Clarke, and even Newtonhimself, were far more aware of the difficultiesin reconcilinga mechanisticworld with an interposingGod. Yet theytoo wereto finda place in theirscientific world for miracles.

The NewtonianConception of "Miracle"

In the inauguralseries of Boyle Lecturesheld in the years 1691-92 RichardBentley had proposeda new argumentfor the existence of a provi- dentialGod. Here he announcedthat "all the powers of mechanismare dependenton the ,"for "gravity, the greatbasis of all mechanism,is not itselfmechanical, but the immediatefiat and fingerof God, and the executionof divine law."27William Whistontook up Bentley'scue and arguedsimilarly that gravity depended upon "theconstant and efficacious, and, if you will, the supernaturaland miraculousInfluence of Almighty God."28Samuel Clarke likewiseinsisted that "all those thingswhich we commonlysay are theEffects of theNatural Powers of Matter, and Laws of Motion;of Gravitation,Attraction, or the like; are indeed... theEffects of God's actingupon Mattercontinually and everymoment."29 Even Newton was reportedas havingobserved "that a continualmiracle is needed to preventthe Sun and thefixed stars from rushing together through gravity."30 For the Newtonians,then, it followedthat a conceptionof miraclewhich reliedupon God's interpositionor theoperation of his immediatepower was unavailable,for the mundane operation of gravityfell under that description. If the operationof gravitywas, as Whistonindicated, a supernaturaland miraculousoccurrence in termsof the prevailingdefinition, then a new understandingof miraclewas required,for without such a definition,gravita- tion, and the whole mechanicalsystem it supported,would be deemed miraculous.To Samuel Clarke,that redoubtable apologist for Newtonian

26 Westfall,Science and Religion,89. 27 RichardBentley, ,Sermon IV, in The Worksof Richard Bentley, D.D., ed. AlexanderDyce (London, 18386),III, 74, 75. Cf. SermonVI, Works,III, 163f. God's active presencewas requiredin the mutualattraction of bodies in orderto shield Newtonfrom the charge of revivingeither occult qualities (of whichLeibniz accused him) or atheisticEpicureanism. See Newton'scorrespondence with Bentley, in Worksof Rich- ard Bentley,III, 21 if.; cf. The Leibniz-ClarkeCorrespondence, ed. H. G. Alexander, (Manchester,1976), 92. 28 WilliamWhiston, A New Theoryof theEarth (London, 1696), 218. 29 Samuel Clarke,The Evidencesof Naturaland Revealed Religion,in The Worksof Samuel Clarke,D.D. (2 vols.; London,1738), II, 697, cf. 601. 30 Memorandaby David Gregory(1694), The Correspondenceof Isaac Newton,ed. H. W. Turnbullet al. (7 vols.; Cambridge,1959-77), III, 336.

This content downloaded from 130.102.42.98 on Fri, 30 Oct 2015 01:34:15 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 538 PeterHarrison science,fell the task of redefining"miracle" in such a way as to exclude such mundaneoperations of God's immediatepower as gravity,and yetto maintainsome continuity with the traditional sense of miracleand its apolo- geticrole. To retainthe historical sense of "miracle,"Clarke revived the Augustin- ian notionthat the key featureof a miracleis its unusualness.This under- standingof miracles was developedin boththe Boyle Lectures of 1704-5and in thecelebrated correspondence with Leibniz. In theformer he arguesthat

absolutelyspeaking, in This strictand PhilosophicalSense; either nothingis miraculous,namely, if we have respectto the Power of God; or,if we regardour own Power and Understanding, then almost everything, as well whatwe call natural,as whatwe call supernatu- ral, is in thisSense reallymiraculous; and 'tis only usualnessor Unusualnessthat makes the distinction.

Thereis, Clarke asserts,"no such thing,as whatMen commonlycall the course of Nature,or the Power of Nature...."He concludes: "'Tis not thereforea right Distinction; to definea Miracleto be Thatwhich is against the Course of Nature."31 It is worthmentioning at thisstage that in additionto this"philosophi- cal" definition,Clarke also offereda "theologicaldefinition" in whichhe appearsto returnto thetraditional conception of theinterposition of God.32 Commentatorshave usuallytaken this to mean thatin the finalanalysis, Clarketakes a traditionalview of miracles.What seems morelikely is that Clarkeholds that the same event may admit both philosophical and theologi- cal explanations-theformer dealing with causes, the latterwith purposes. How thesetwo definitions of miracle might consistently be heldis an issueto whichwe shall return.For the momentlet us note thatin the protracted controversywith Leibniz, in whicha significantproportion of thediscussion was givenover to thenotion of miracle,Clarke's wholecase is based upon the philosophicalunderstanding of miracle."Natural" and "supernatural," he again insists,are "distinctionsmerely in our conceptionsof things."33A miracle,he laterpoints out, "does notconsist in anydifficulty in thenature of thething to be done,but merely in theunusualness of God's doingit."34

31 Clarke,Evidences of Naturaland Revealed Religion,Works, II, 697f. Cf. Leibniz- Clarke Correspondence,114; and SermonCLVIII, "Of the Duty of Prayer,"Works, II, 281. 21 "[T]he trueDefinition of a Miracle,in the TheologicalSense of the Word,is this; thatit is workeffected in a mannerUnusual, or differentfrom the commonand regular Methodof Providence,by the interpositioneither of God himself,or of some Intelligent Agent superiourto Man, for the Proof or Evidence of some particularDoctrine, or in attestationto theAuthority of some particularperson" (Evidences of Naturaland Revealed Religion,Works, II, 701). 33 Leibniz-ClarkeCorrespondence, 24, 29, 35, 42. 34 Ibid.,114.

This content downloaded from 130.102.42.98 on Fri, 30 Oct 2015 01:34:15 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions NewtonianScience 539

Leibnizwas to respondthat Clarke's definition of miraclediffered from the "receivednotion" and wouldprove unacceptable to bothdivines and philoso- phers.If miraculousevents were distinguished from the mundane merely by the subjectivecriteria proposed by Clarke,then, concluded Leibniz, "there willbe no internalreal difference, between a miracleand whatis natural,and at thebottom, every thing will be eitherequally natural, or equallymiracu- lous."35 As it turnedout, this implication had alreadybeen anticipated by Clarke,Whiston, and Newton as well. Whistonagreed with Clarke that what constitutes a miracle is a function of ourknowledge of causes, and the same event may thus be bothmiraculous and naturaldepending upon the stateof knowledgeof the observer."Al- mightyGod," he says,"has so constitutedthe World that no Body can tell whereinit differsfrom one, whereall were solely broughtto pass by a miraculousPower."36 This also seemsto havebeen the view of Newton.In a shortunpublished note Newton wrote,

[M]iraclesare so called notbecause theyare theworks of God but because theyhappen seldom and forthat reason create wonder. If theyshould happen constantly according to certainlaws impressed upon the natureof things,they would be no longerwonders of miraclesbut would be consideredin philosophyas partof thephe- nomena of naturenotwithstanding that the cause of theircauses mightbe unknownto US.37

Armedwith this conception of miracles, the Newtonians and a numberof theirfellow travellers went on to showthat many miracles, in particularthose recordedin the Old Testament,were merely"relative." In one way or anotherthe marvellous events set down by Moses in thePentateuch could be demonstratedto fallwithin the mechanistic order of nature., forexample, set out a naturalisticaccount of the Old TestamentDeluge in TellurisTheoria Sacra (1681).38 In thiswork he set out a "firstRule con-

35 Ibid., 91. 36 Whiston,New Theory,219. 37 Cited in Westfall,Science and Religion,203f. Similarconceptions of miraclewere espoused by NehemiahGrew and JohnLocke. Grew thoughtthat "Natureit self is a StandingMiracle, the Operations whereof, we shouldas muchwonder at, as anyMiracle, if we did notsee themevery day." CosmologiaSacra: or, a Discourse of the Universeas it is the Creatureand Kingdomof God (London,1701), 195, 316. In his Discourse of Miracles (1706), Locke describedmiracles as eventswhich were "above the comprehensionof the spectator,and in his opinioncontrary to the establishedcourse of nature"and whichare, "taken by him to be divine" (Works [London, 180110],IX, 256, my emphasis). For contemporarydiscussion of these definitionssee William Fleetwood,An Essay upon Miracles. In Two Discourses (London, 1701), 2, 139; Anon.,A ShortDiscourse, 3f. and passim; ,A Vindicationof the ChristianReligion (London, 1725), 7-10. 38 Englishtr., The Theoryof the Earth ... the First Two Books (London, 16912); cf. Correspondenceof Isaac Newton,II, 319-34.

This content downloaded from 130.102.42.98 on Fri, 30 Oct 2015 01:34:15 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 540 PeterHarrison cerningmiracles"-"That we mustnot flie to miracles,where Man and natureare sufficient."39The Mosaic account,he insisted,"bears in it the evidentmarks of an accommodationto the vulgarnotions concerning the formof theWorld." Stripped of thesemarks of accommodation,the Genesis accountof the world'sorigins meshed quite neatlywith his own scientific accountof theCreation. William Whiston adopted the same principlein his New Theoryof the Earth (1696). Numerousevents recorded in sacredhistory, while presumedto resultfrom miraculous interventions, were not in fact againstthe ordinary course of nature:

For thoseEvents or Actionsare in Holy Scriptureattributed immedi- ately to the Power of Providenceof God, whichyet were to all outwardappearance according to theconstant course of things,and would,abstracted from such Affirmationof the Holy Books, have beenesteem'd no moremiraculous than the other common Effects of Nature,or usual Accidentsof HumaneAffairs.40

This, Whiston,later observes, is "the Secretof Divine Providencein the Governmentof theWorld, whereby the Rewards and Punishmentsof God's mercyand Justiceare distributedto his RationalCreatures without any disturbanceof thesetled Course of Nature,or a miraculousinterposition on everyoccasion."41 Whiston restated his view in AstronomicalPrinciples of Religion,Natural and Reveal'd (1717), wherehe again asks whether"ex- traordinaryand miraculousCases" mightnot take place "withoutthe direct Alterationof thosefixed and ConstantLaws of Nature."Here he provides furtherexamples of apparentmiracles which admit of naturalisticexplana- tions.42 The CosmologiaSacra (1701) of NehemiahGrew (the stated purpose of whichwas, ironically,to refutethe hermeneuticalprinciples of Spinoza) proposedsimilar explanations of Old Testamentmiracles. The plagues of Egypt,to use butone of Grew'sexamples, were all broughtabout by "sundry NaturalCauses." Moses' turningof theriver to blood was effectedwhen the unfortunateaquatic inhabitants of the Nile simultaneouslycontracted a rather unpleasantgastric complaint: "all theFish, small and great,with the Hippo- potamus,Crocadile, and otherAmphibious Creatures were seiz'd witha DysenterickMurrain."43 It was the combinedeffluvia of this indisposed menageriewhich changed the waters of thegreat river to blood.

39Thomas Bumet, The Theoryof theEarth ... theLast Two Books (London,1691), III, ch. viii. 40 Whiston,New Theory,218f. 41 Ibid., 359. Cf. JohnDonne, Essayes in (Oxford, 1952), 81-84. 42 Whiston,Astronomical Principles of Religion, Natural and Reveal'd (London, 1717), 127f. 43 Grew,Cosmologia Sacra, 196f.

This content downloaded from 130.102.42.98 on Fri, 30 Oct 2015 01:34:15 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Newtonian Science 541

Not surprisingly,critics of such accountscomplained that the introduc- tionof mechanicalphilosophy into hermeneutics not only did violenceto the literalsense of Scripture,but did away withthe traditionalmeanings of "ordinary"and "extraordinaryprovidence," and "miracle."44This in turn threatenedthe whole apologeticenterprise which looked to miraclesto validatethe claims of theChristian revelation. If miracleswere not different in a philosophicalsense, from mundane events, and if the labels "natural" and "supernatural"amounted to the same thing,as Clarke adamantlyin- sisted,then "miraculous" events could not be enlistedas supportfor the Christianrevelation.45

Miraclesas Evidence

The standarduse of miraclesin theseventeenth-century apologetics was not quite as straightforwardas critics have sometimesassumed.46 Miracles were mostusually used as proofsin conjunctionwith a numberof other arguments.The basic tenetsof naturalreligion-the , the immortalityof the and so on-could be establishedby rationalargu- ments(sometimes referred to as "internalevidences"). However, doctrines specificto ,such as Incarnationand ,were "beyond"or "above" reason,and theirtruth could not be directlyproved. The truthof these doctrinesthen, became dependentupon the authorityof those who promulgatedthem. The argumentfrom miracles was essentiallythat the doctrinestaught by Christand his discipleswere truebecause theywere accompaniedby the workingof miracles.Since miracleswere superna- tural-beyondor againstnature-they could only be directactivities of God, wroughtin orderto signifythe divine origin of themessage being preached. Traditionally,miracles were yoked to prophecieswhich also functionedas "externalevidences," the two lendingmutual support to each other.47The

" See, e.g., JohnKeill, An Examinationof theReflections on The Theoryof theEarth togetherwith a Defenceof theRemarks on Mr. Whiston'sNew Theory(Oxford, 1699), 1If. and passim; JohnEdwards, Brief Remarks upon Mr. Whiston'sNew Theoryof the Earth (London, 1697), 27-30 and passim; JohnBeaumont, Considerations of a Book, Entituled The Theoryof theEarth (London, 1693), 44; WilliamNicholls, Conference with a Theist, PartII (London,1697), 193-209;Cf. Whiston,A Vindicationof theNew Theoryof theEarth (London, 1698), 30. Keill, incidentally,was himselfa Newtonian,albeit one who clearly subscribedto the traditionalunderstanding of miracles. 45 This dilemmahas been succinctlyexpressed more recently by AlastairMcKinnon, "'Miracle' and 'Paradox,'" AmericanPhilosophical Quarterly, 4 (1967), 309. Here he arguesthat when the term"miracle" is used "expressively"(to expresswonder) and not "descriptively"(to describea violation),it is difficultto see how it retainsany religious force.Cf. Flew, God and Philosophy,148. 46 For a guide to the standardarguments, see Burns,The GreatDebate, chs. 3 and 5. 47 The fulfillmentof a prophecydemonstrated the divine origin of the prophetic message,since only God has certainknowledge of futurecontingents. For typicalstate- mentsof the dual argumentsee Robert Jenkin,Reasonableness and Certaintyof the ChristianReligion, 29-42; Stillingfleet,Origines Sacrae, Bk. II, chs. viii, ix. Jenkin

This content downloaded from 130.102.42.98 on Fri, 30 Oct 2015 01:34:15 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 542 PeterHarrison contextand tendencyof miraclesprovided important indications of their authenticity.Miracles needed to be wroughtin supportof a message,and the messagehad to be consonantwith natural knowledge of divinetruths.48 For miracles to functionas proofs,the heartsof the observershad to be receptive-as ChancellorBacon had put it, "There was never a miracle wroughtby God to convertan atheist."49The performanceof miracles, moreover,had a cumulativeeffect: a numberof miraclesperformed by the same personwas a moreconvincing display of divinepower than a single miracle.50Finally, miracles, despite the immoderateclaims of theirmore vocal advocates,constituted only a "moral"proof-a proofwhich possessed less thanmathematical certainty, but to whichunprejudiced men of reason wouldassent."1 Despitethese important qualifications and safeguards,however, the basic argumentstill required miracles to be violationsof naturallaws. On theface of it, miraclesin the Newtoniansense could not be substitutedinto these traditionalarguments (as criticsof themechanistic theories of theearth had alreadypointed out). It is surprising,then, that those within the Newtonian clique and Clarkein particularstill seemed to wantto retainsome apologetic role for miracles.Clarke firmlyinsisted that the Christianrevelation is "positivelyand directlyproved to be actuallyand immediatelysent to us fromGod" on accountof miracles,fulfilled prophecies, and thetestimony of Jesus'disciples.52 Either Clarke was dissembling,or he was usingthe argu- mentfrom miracles in quitea newway. In a sensehe was actuallydoing both, as we shallsee. For themoment, let us turnour attention to theway in which bothClarke and Whistondeveloped novel strategies which enabled them to retainan apologeticuse forthose events commonly thought to be miracles. First,they were able to put forwardan indirectproof of the Christian revelationas containedin scripture,by actuallyinverting the standard argu- mentfrom miracles. Spinoza, along witha numberof theEnglish "deists," had assertedthat miracles are a prioriimpossible. It followedthat miracle narrativesin scripturewere not to be read literallyand, if takenseriously at all, were to be interpretedin a "figurative"sense."3 The upshotwas that actuallynotes thatmiracles alone are not a sufficienttestimony to a doctrine:"Though miraclesare a mostfit and properMeans to provethe Truth of Religion;yet they are not only to be consider'dalone, but in conjunctionwith other Proofs" (43). 48 Ibid., 42. Cf. Augustine,De utilitatecredendi, 16.34. "1 Francis Bacon, Advancementof Learning,II.vi.1 (86). Cf. Boyle, The Religious Virtuoso,Works, V, 514, 524. Bentley,Boyle Lectures,6th ed., SermonVI, in Works,III, 125; Aquinas,Summa theologica, 2a2ae. 6, 1 (XXXI, 167). 50See Locke, A Discourse of Miracles, Works,IX, 259 51 On "moralcertainty," see Wilkins,Principles and Duties of NaturalReligion, 7-10, 88-93, and Clarke,Works, II, 600. 52 Clarke,Evidences of Naturaland Revealed Religion,Works, II, 697. 53 Thus CharlesBlount: "For in Scripturemany things are relatedas real, and which were also believ'd to be real even by the Relatorsthemselves; that notwithstanding were onlyRepresentations form'd in theBrain, and meerlyimaginary" (Miracles no Violations

This content downloaded from 130.102.42.98 on Fri, 30 Oct 2015 01:34:15 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions NewtonianScience 543

Scripture,as a supposedrecord of divinerevelation, was unreliable.The Newtoniansresponded by arguingthat many of the remarkableevents re- cordedin the Old Testamentwere consonant with the new science, and indeed werethe most likely scientific explanations of certain features of the world. As we have alreadyseen, such events as theCreation, the Flood, and the plagues of Egyptwere used by the Newtoniansto show thatthe detailsof sacred historywere compatiblewith the new philosophy.But morethan this, the reliabilityof Scriptureas a whole was vindicatedby demonstratingthat narrativeswhich on the face of it were highlyimplausible, were actually confirmedby a mechanicalscience. As Whistonput it:

So certainlythe Establishment of theVerity of theScriptures in the mostharsh and difficultAssertions touching the Natural World (the properCase in whichthe improvement of Philosophywas likelyto affordmeans for our Determination)ought to assureus of the like verityof thesame Scripturein theother Points, more peculiarly the Subjectsof Divine Revelation,less capable of affordingany other meansof Satisfaction.54

Clarkearticulated the same argument,declaring that in the Christianscrip- turesalone is founda scientificallyreliable account of theworld's origins. "AMONG the writingsof all, even themost ancient and learnedNations," he wrote,"there are None butthe books of theJews, which [have] ... given anytolerable account in particular,of theFormation of this our earthinto its presenthabitable State."55 Thus, despite cutting the ground from beneath the traditionalargument from miracles, scientific endorsement of miracleac- countsfunctioned like the other external evidences by attestingto thegeneral authorityof thesource of a putativerevelation. A second apologeticargument proposed by the Newtonianswas that, despitethe factthat the causes of some "miracles"might be known,the timingand combinationof variousnatural causes revealedthe hand of God: some eventsare miraculousbecause theyinvolve remarkable coincidences whichcan be givenplausible religious interpretations. Thus, even granting that"miracles" are no differentfrom other events in termsof thecausation, thesynchronization of theseunusual events with the course of human history testifiedto theprescience and providentialplan of God. For example,even thoughthe natural causes ofthe Deluge, the plagues of Egypt, and the parting of theLaws of Nature[London, 1683], 23). Blount's work,as Thomas Brownetactlessly pointedout, was plagiarizedfrom Spinoza and others.Browne, Miracles Work'sAbove and Contraryto Nature, 1-3. Cf. Spinoza, Tractatustheologico-politicus, in Works(2 vols.; London, 18892), 1, 84, 92-94; JohnToland, Tetradymus(London, 1720). Also see the argumentsof "Philologus"in Nicholls,Conference with a Theist,Part II. 54 Whiston,New Theory,381f. Cf. Burnet'spreface to The Theoryof theEarth, Books I and II (London, 16973). 55 Clarke,Evidences of Naturaland RevealedReligion, Works II, 705.

This content downloaded from 130.102.42.98 on Fri, 30 Oct 2015 01:34:15 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 544 PeterHarrison of theRed Sea could be enumerated,it was thefact that they were unusual, and had occurredprecisely when they did, whichmade themmiraculous. Whydid creaturesof theNile contracttheir distemper at such an opportune time?Why did theFlood coincidewith the growthof humanwickedness? Whydid theRed Sea partfor the Israelites and theninundate their Egyptian pursuers?The answersto thesequestions could not be foundsolely in the examinationof naturebut requiredreference to God's purposes,or to the "moralorder of theworld." In Whiston'swords, "the coincidence of things fromfirst to last,through so manystages and periodsof Nature"is whatis remarkableand "miraculous."56And in thetiming of thesecoincidences is to be foundthe reason why such "miracles" might function as evidences.God, says Whiston,"so previouslyadjusted and contemper'dthe Moral and NaturalWorld to one another,that the Marks and Tokensof his Providence shouldbe inall Ages legibleand conspicuous,whatsoever the visible second- ary Causes or Occasions mightbe... ."5 Thus the events of history,whether we wishto stylecertain of them"providential" or "miraculous,"all tendto thesame end. Futuredivine "interventions"prophesied in scripturecould sustaina similaranalysis. Burnet's conjectures regarding the final conflagration of the worldare a clear example.Burnet considered a rangeof possibilitiesas to how thisconflagration might be broughtabout-the earth'sorbit approach- ing too close to the sun or theerruption of theearth's central fire-before concludingthat the conflagrationwould be caused by a combinationof volcanoes,flammable materials in theearth's core, and fierymeteors."8 Yet despitethis scientific explanation, God's handwas visiblein thetiming of the event:"and tho' the Causes may be sufficientwhen all united,yet the unionof themat sucha time,and in sucha manner,I look uponas theeffect of a particularProvidence."59 It is hardto overemphasizethe significance of this account of miraculous events.By deletingall referenceto breaches of laws ofnature and by locating theessence of themiraculous in theconcatenation of naturalcauses, miracle accountscould become immuneto the standardcriticisms which have be- come familiarto us since Hume's "Of Miracles."60Moreover, such a con- ceptionallows fora farmore durable synthesis of scienceand religionthan had been possible withthe conceptionof naturepromoted by Boyle and others."Coincidence miracles" enable both scientificand theologicalde- scriptionsto apply to the same eventwithout competing with each other. Miraclesand laws of naturecould now peacefullycoexist.

56 Whiston,New Theory,103 (my emphasis).Cf. Grew,Cosmologia Sacra, 200. 57 Whiston,New Theory,219 (my emphasis). 58 The Theoryof theEarth, bk. III, chs. vi, vii. 59Burnet, The Theoryof theEarth ... theLast Two Books,bk. III, ch. iv. 60 The notion of a "coincidence" miracle has been rehabilitatedin the twentieth centuryby R. F. Holland ("The Miraculous," American Philosophical Quarterly,2 [1965], 43-51).

This content downloaded from 130.102.42.98 on Fri, 30 Oct 2015 01:34:15 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions NewtonianScience 545

RelativeMiracles, Accommodation, and Two-Fold Philosophy

The evidencewhich we examinedto thispoint is intendedto showthat the Newtoniansrejected outright the standardseventeenth-century assump- tionthat violations of thelaws of naturecan takeplace. However,if we set aside for the momentClarke's "philosophical"definition of "miracle" (whicha prioriseems to ruleout violations of the laws ofnature), it mightbe arguedthat all we have establishedso far is thatthe Newtonianswere skepticalabout some accountsof miraclesand thatthey reinterpreted these eventsaccordingly, even goingso faras to findalternative apologetic func- tionsfor them. It remainsa possibilitythat they retained something like the standardconception of miracle,reserving it for veryspecial occurrences. Indeed,a faircase couldbe madethat while the Newtonians regarded the vast bulk of putativemiracles as havingoccurred within the normalcourse of nature,a fewdramatic events-the Creation, the miracles and resurrection of Christ,and theapproaching Eschaton-these things genuinely warranted the label "miracle"as used in thetraditional sense. The Newtonians,according to this interpretation,were concernedto reduce dramaticallythe numberof eventswhich fell under the description "miracle" but were not committed to dispensingwith the concept completely.6" This interpretationderives a mea- sureof supportfrom the fact that Newton, Clarke, and Whistondo appearat timesto concedethat, during pivotal periods of history, genuine miracles had actuallyoccurred. For example,Newton wrote to Burnetin 1680, speculatingabout the days of theCreation: "Where natural causes are at handGod uses themas instrumentsin his works,but I doe no thinkthem alone sufficientfor ye creation& thereforemay be allowed to supposethat amongst other things God gave the earthit's motionby ... degrees."62Whiston was similarly persuadedthat God acted directlyin theformation of the sublunaryworld, but thereafterrested: "The days of creationare signallydistinguish'd from thosefollowing, in whichGod is said to have rested(when yet his ordinary Concurrenceand theCourse of naturewas continuedwithout Interruption) and mustbe reckon'das such on whichhe trulyexerted a Powerdifferent fromthe other."63 A second period in which the Newtoniansseem to allow genuine miracleswas theapostolic age, whenJesus and his discipleswrought various wonders.Newton wrote to Locke in 1691-92that "Miracles of good credit continuedin theChurch for about two or threehundred years."64 The more

61 JamesForce, forexample, writes that "Like Whiston,...Clarke ultimately commits himself,however reluctantly, to thepossibility of miraclesas transgressionsof naturallaw by a speciallyprovident God" ("The Breakdownof the NewtonianSynthesis," 149). 62 Newtonto Burnet,January 1680/81, Correspondence of Isaac Newton,II, 334. 63 Whiston,New Theory,211. 64 Newtonto Locke, 16 February1691/92 (Correspondence of Isaac Newton,III, 195).

This content downloaded from 130.102.42.98 on Fri, 30 Oct 2015 01:34:15 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 546 PeterHarrison outspokenWhiston wrote a completework expressing the same pointof view-that miraclesbegan with Christand ceased "just at, or afterthe secondGeneral Council, that of Constantinople."65The waningof miracle- workinghad additionalsignificance for the Newtonians. The denialof con- temporarymiracles was an importantcomponent of anti-Catholicpolemic. Withthe cessation of wondersall Romishmiracles, and indeedall purported miraclesenlisted in supportof otherrevelations, could be discountedas impostures.66Moreover, the withdrawal of thegift of miracle-workingfrom the Churchcoincided with the ascendancyof Athanasiantheology and its triumphover -the preferred trinitarian view of Newton,Whiston, and Clarke.67For theNewtonians the cessation of miracleswas thusin parta tokenof divine disapproval of what became the orthodox theological position withrespect to theTrinity. Finally,the third"age of miracles,"in which laws of naturewould undergoan apparentchange, was theEschaton. Whiston observed that "The stateof Natureduring the Milleniumwill be verydifferent from that at present."68Newton himself had suggested,notoriously, that the present solar systemwould eventually grind to a halt,requiring the direct intervention of God to reformit-a reformationwhich, incidentally, Newton most probably regardedas thedestruction and renovationof theearth prophesied in Scrip- ture.69 All of this seems to favorthe view thatin the finalanalysis Newton, Whiston,and Clarke were still committedto the traditionalview that miracles,qua violationsof the laws of nature,could take place, albeitnot withthe frequency claimed by theirmore enthusiastic advocates. These pas- sages, however,need not supportthe "ambiguityand inconsistency"hy- pothesis.The keyto reconcilingthese admissions with what appears to be an outrightrejection of miraclesin otherplaces is providedby an understanding of Clarke'smotivation in providingtwo apparently contradictory definitions of "miracle."Clarke, we recall,stated that miracles in the "philosophical" sense,cannot be violationsof the laws of nature(because thereis no such thingas the course of nature),nor can theybe singularinterpositions of Divinepower (because God's immediatepower is constantlyoperating in the universe).Once Clarke's "philosophical"definition of miracleis accepted, no event,in principle,can be an objectivemiracle, including the signsand wondersrecorded in theNew Testament.At bestthere can be eventswhich

65 Whiston,Mr. W.'s Accountof theExact Timewhen Miraculous Gifts Ceas'd in the Church(London, 1749), 7. Cf. Whiston'sA Collectionof AuthenticRecords belonging to the Old and (London, 1727-28), 939-48, and An Account of the Daemoniacks(London, 1737), 59-73. 66 Whiston,Ibid., 9-11. 67 Whiston,Ibid. Also see Westfall,Never at Rest (Cambridge,1980), 345. 68 Whiston,New Theory,214. 69 Newton,Optics (New York, 19524), 402; David Kubrin,"Newton and the Cyclical Cosmos," JHI, 28 (1967) 325-46.

This content downloaded from 130.102.42.98 on Fri, 30 Oct 2015 01:34:15 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions NewtonianScience 547 are miraclesfor us-miraculum quod nos,to use thephrase of Aquinas-in thatwe are,at somegiven point in time,unable to offerexplanations of their causes. The reasonClarke also providesan apparentlycontradictory defini- tionof miracles which alludes to theinterposition of God is noton accountof a failureof nerveon his part,but because of a commitmentto notionsof "accommodation"and the"two-fold philosophy." Accordingto theprinciple of accommodation,God and his messengers had, throughoutthe course of history,"accommodated" divine revelations to the conceptionsand mentalcapacities of the recipientsof thoserevela- tions.Miracles, qua apparentinterpositions into the naturalorder, are evi- dence of divineaccommodation in thatthey have an immediateappeal to people of all capacities.Had Judeo-Christianreligion been exclusivelyfor thosecognoscenti capable of graspingthe truthsof naturalreligion, along witha varietyof intricatetheological dogmas, miracles would have been unnecessary.However, for those of moremodest intellect-the simple and theilliterate-miracles could providea convincingdemonstration of "super- natural"power. The appealof miracles to thoselacking intellectual gifts had alreadybeen notedby a numberof theologians.Augustine had disparaginglyremarked thatmiracles were not for the wise butfor fools who weremore inclined to rely upon theirsenses than theirintellects.70 Twelve hundredyears later RobertBoyle, while less dismissiveof themiraculous, nevertheless pointed outthat "Miracles are a properway to appeal to menof all capacities;subtle argumentsmay convincephilosophers, but Christianityis meantfor all men."71 Locke, too, had stressedthat miracles must appeal to "all sortsand degreesof people," not least "the simple and illiterate,"and thatconse- quentlyit was theirapparent contradiction of the normalcourse of nature which was crucial.72Newton, Burnet, Whiston, and Clarke all assumed similarlythat the vulgar throughout history either failed to comprehendthe standingmiracle evident in thenatural course of things,or had simplylost theirawe of thewonders of nature through familiarity. Miracles, in thesense ofunusual events, were necessary for such people and indeedwere a markof God's accommodationof his message to the capacities of its intended recipients.73

70 Augustine,De utilitatecredendi, 16.34. 71 Boyle, unpublishedMS, "Some considerationsabout Miracles as theyare Pleadable forthe ChristianReligion," quoted in R. M. Bums, The GreatDebate, 53. 72 Locke, Discourse of Miracles,Works, IX, 264. Cf. Fleetwood,Essay uponMiracles, 78f.; ConyersMiddleton, A Free Inquiryinto the Miraculous Powers whichare supposed to have subsistedin the ChristianChurch (London, 1749), xli. 73 See, e.g., Newtonto Burnet,January 1680/1 (Correspondence of Isaac Newton,II, 331); Burnetto Newton,13 January1680/1 (Correspondence of Isaac Newton,II, 323). Cf. William Nicholls,A Conferencewith a Theist,Part IV (London, 1699), 238f; Abraham Lemoine,A Treatiseon Miracles (London, 1747), 359.

This content downloaded from 130.102.42.98 on Fri, 30 Oct 2015 01:34:15 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 548 PeterHarrison

A furtherconsequence of theprinciple of accommodationwas thatif the capacitiesof thehuman race had changedover time, God's methodsof self- communicationwould alter accordingly. In an age of advancingscience the need formiracles was farless, and notonly because scientificexplanations couldbe offeredfor events previously thought to be miraculous.For Newton and his peers the orderingof natureitself was sufficienttestimony to the sovereigntyof God; for the scientificallyimmature, unusual eventsper- formedthe same function. As JohnCockburn expressed the matter:

Underthe Patriarchal and Jewish Oeconomy, God did revealhimself morefrequently than now: The Jewshad a successionof Prophets.... ThisPrivilege is withdrawnnow, not because God carethless forthe World,but because there is notsuch occasion for it now, as then:To omitother Reasons at thistime, Men werethen in a kindof Infant- state,they did not understandclearly either the Methodsof Provi- dence,or God's Will and Purposetowards Mankind....74

Improvementsin knowledge,the most important of whichwas arguablywas Newton'sdiscovery of thelaw of universalgravitation, had not onlymade manymiracles scientifically explicable, but had uncoveredthe miraculous natureof theeveryday workings of theuniverse, making "miracles" super- fluous.The marchof science had indeednullified the concept,but fortu- itouslyhad at thesame time provided a moresophisticated alternative. It is importantto notethat while Clarke, Whiston, and Newtonwere all very conscious of the scientificprogress made since the writingof the Pentateuch,they nonetheless realized thatthe seventeenth-centurynatural philosopherwas onlyrelatively better off than the rudeIsraelites to whom Moses had firstexpounded the history of the Creation. While the Newtonians insistedthat in principleno eventcould be a truemiracle, they could concede thatcertain remarkable events still evaded scientific explanation. It is forthis reasonthat they use thefamiliar language of miracles for the Creation and the Eschaton.But as Clarke was at pains to pointout to Leibniz, this usage requirescareful analysis. The latter,as is well known,took exceptionto Newton's claim thatthe irregularitiesin the solar system,owing to the mutualattractions of the variousbodies, "will be apt to increase,till this systemwants a Reformation...."7sLeibniz objectedthat this reflected rather badlyon theCreator, who musthave lackedforesight in framingthe laws of theuniverse.76 Clarke sprang to thedefense of Newtonian science, explaining to Leibnizthat "the word correction, or amendment,is to be understood,not withregard to God, butto us only."He continues:

74 JohnCockburn, Enquiry into the Nature, Necessity and Evidenceof ChristianFaith (London, 16992), 187. Cf. JohnDonne, Essayes in Divinity,84; AlexanderCalcott, A Treatiseon theDeluge (London, 17682),10; ConyersMiddleton, Free Enquiry,cxii. 7 Newton,Optics, 402. 76 Leiibniz-ClarkeCorrespondence, 1.

This content downloaded from 130.102.42.98 on Fri, 30 Oct 2015 01:34:15 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Newtonian Science 549

The presentframe of the solar system (for instance,) according to the presentlaws of motion,will in timefall into confusion; and perhaps, afterthat, will be amendedor putinto a new form.But thisamend- mentis onlyrelative, with regard to our conception.In reality,and withregard to God; thepresent frame, and theconsequent disorder, and the followingrenovation, are all equally partsof the design framedin God's originalperfect idea.77

God interferesor interposesto reformthe solar system but only with respect to our limitedscientific conceptions-our present laws of motionas Clarke tellinglydescribes them. There will be nothingof thegenuine miracle in the dissolutionof our solar system,merely the operationof "natural"forces as yetnot fullyunderstood. All events,without exception, are partof "God's originalperfect idea," and inasmuchas science,for the Newtonians at least, was directedat the discoveryof these divine ideas, all events,without exception,fall under the purview of science.Whiston gave a similaraccount of the Eschaton:"this Catastrophe may naturallyand regularlybefal our Earth... accordingto thetrue system of theWorld, and withouta miracle."78 Even the"miraculous" resurrection of humanbodies whichwas to coincide withthe end of theworld was, in Whiston'sview, "very agreeable to some knownPhenomena of Nature."79By implication,the references of Whiston and Newtonto "direct"divine activity in the originalCreation are to be similarlyunderstood as "interventions"from our limitedperspective only. Miraclesthus have epistemological,and notontological status. Clarke'sdual definitionis renderedeven moreexplicable when we take intoaccount the "two-fold philosophy," itself a fundamentalassumption of the principleof accommodation.Subscription to the two-foldphilosophy was almostuniversal amongst the learnedof the seventeenthcentury and involvedthe view thatin science and religion,indeed in all spheresof learning,there are two forms of knowledge, one forthe vulgar and one forthe learned.It was moreor less a synchronicversion of thetheory of accommo- dation,according to whichthere would be in everyage, despitethe advance of science,those who required a simpleversion of events.In thespirit of the two-foldphilosophy Newton wrote of thephilosophers of thepast that they "loved so to mitigatetheir mystical discourses that in the presenceof the vulgarthey foolishly propounded vulgar matters for the sake of ridicule,and hidthe truth behind discourses of thiskind."80 As we have seen,Moses, too, practicedthe two-foldphilosophy, writing an "unfeigned"yet "unphilo- sophical" accountof the Creation.Even the Fathersof the Churchhad succumbedto thistendency, propounding two versions of Christianity."The

77 Ibid.,22f. 78 Whiston,Astronomical Principles of Religion,153. 79 Ibid.,152. 80 Newton,Gregory MS. 247, fols. llf. Also see FrankE. Manuel, The Religionof Isaac Newton(Oxford, 1974), 39, 46.

This content downloaded from 130.102.42.98 on Fri, 30 Oct 2015 01:34:15 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 550 PeterHarrison multitude,"averred Origen, "cannot comprehend the complextheology of thewisdom of God" and mustsettle for "the ipse dixitof Jesus.""8Thus it was notwithout precedent that the learned of theseventeenth century with- held theirspeculations on sensitivedoctrinal matters from hoi polloi.82 ThomasBumet, for instance, felt at libertyto expresshis doubtsabout the eternityof in a Latinwork but cautioned his readerthat "whatever you decide in yourown Breastof theseEternal Punishments, the people, too easilyprone to Vice and easilyterrified from Evil musthave thecommonly receivedDoctrine."83 Whiston characteristically admitted to a similarlylib- eral view of thetorments of hell and even confidedto his readersthat both Clarke and Newton(neither of whom had seen fit to make public their opinionson thisissue) sharedhis views.84Newton, as is well known,also kepthis Arianviews private and even went so faras to preventthe admission of his friendWhiston into the Royal Society on account of Whiston's ingenuousadmission of a commitmentto thattrinitarian . Whiston's offencewas clearlynot his Arianismper se butthe politically-fraught public professionof a heterodoxcreed. It is hardlysurprising, given an intellectualculture of thiskind, that Clarkewould deem it necessaryto at leastgive a nod in thedirection of the "commonlyreceived doctrine" concerning miracles, secure in the knowl- edge thatit was a harmlessway of lookingat eventswhich did have, subjectivelyat anyrate, religious significance. To waveron thisissue, in any case, would have been to play intothe handsof the deisticproponents of naturalreligion, whose desireit was to do away withrevelation altogether. The religiousestablishment would certainlyhave takena dim view of any attemptto undermineits chiefbulwark against -the argumentfrom miracles.Thus, whereas in one sensethe age of miracleswas over,in another it was necessaryfor religious and politicalreasons to perpetuatethe concept. For muchthe reason as Moses had propoundeda non-philosophicalaccount of the Creation,so the Newtoniansreluctantly promoted a "theological" conceptionof the miraculous.The trueposition of Clarke,Whiston, and Newtonis mostexpressly stated in thecontroversy with Leibniz (the argu- mentsof whichNewton personally supervised).85 In themore public Boyle

81 Origen,Contra celsum, IV.9, 1.7; cf. De principiis,IV.ii.6-8; Basil, On the , XXVII.66. 82 "Even still,"wrote Whiston, "those who believe in the trueSystem of the World, are forc'd among the Vulgar, and in commonConversation to speak as they do, and accommodatetheir expressions to the Notionsand Apprehensionsof the the generalityof Mankind"(New Theory,20). 83 Burnet,Of theState of theDead and Those thatare to Rise, tr.M. Earberry(2 vols; London,17282), II, 97. Bumetalso indicatedin theLatin original that he would takea dim view of any attemptto translatehis workinto the vernacular...acaution which Earberry blithelyignored. 84 Whiston,The Eternityof Hell TormentsConsidered (London, 1740), lf. 85 See CambridgeUniversity Library, Add MS. 3965, fol.289r, draft D, forevidence of Newton'seditorial input into the publicationof the Clarke-Leibnizcorrespondence.

This content downloaded from 130.102.42.98 on Fri, 30 Oct 2015 01:34:15 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions NewtonianScience 551 lecturesClarke had to treadmore warily-hence his inclusionof a "theologi- cal" definitionof miracleswhich was somewhatat odds withthe philosophi- cal accounthe had alreadyoutlined. None of thisis to say,however, that Newton and his disciplesembarked on a campaignof deliberateduplicity. Clarke, for instance, was privately aware thatfor even the most sophisticatedphilosophical thinker it was helpfulat timesto thinkof certain events as ifthey were interpositions on the partof theDeity. To call an eventa "miracle"was to investit witha special theologicalsignificance, and this was somethingwhich, for religious rea- sons,it was at timesdesirable to do. This viewof the psychological necessity of retainingthe more traditional use of "miracle"was sharedby Whiston.In a vindicationof his accountof thecauses of theDeluge. Whistonaddressed thosenumerous critics who argued for the incompatibility ofmechanistic and miraculousexplanations: "'Tis alledg'd against me, That myMechanical Accountof theDeluge impliesit was no divineJudgement for the World's Wickedness;but from the Necessary Motion of the Cometand Earth,must have happen'dwhether men had repentedor not."86 Whistonresponded that neithera scientificnor a moralaccount of the deluge are by themselves exhaustiveexplanations of the event.God in his prescienceknew of the futuresinful actions of menand so determinedto punishthem. The instru- mentsof hisjudgment, however, were the natural causes whichbrought the deluge-inducingcomet. It was trueboth that God punisheda sinfulhuman raceby sendinga floodand thatthe flood was inexorablybrought on through the operationof secondarycauses. In otherwords it was as if God had interposed. In an illuminatingpassage, Whiston goes on to explainthat a comparable situationexists with respect to petitionaryprayer. When we prayto God to bringabout a futurestate of affairs,says Whiston, we mustact as ifGod will literallyintervene in thenatural course of events-"it is bestto suppose... in our Devotions"that our prayersdepend upon a "particularInterposition of Providence."In offeringpetitionary prayers we act as if our prayerswill functionin some way as causes of futurecontingent events. From a philo- sophical(as opposed to a devotional)perspective, however, we know that such a beliefis highlyproblematic. The philosophicalexplanation of peti- tionaryprayer is thatGod, knowingfrom the beginning of timewhat peti- tionswill be offered,so arrangesmatters that those things we prayfor occur in accordancewith nature, and thusthese events will inevitablytake place, albeitin a ratherspecial sense,"in responseto" ourprayers.87 This notwith-

86 Whiston,A Vindication,30. The criticwas William Nicholls (see his Conference witha Theist,Part II [London,1697], 207). 87 We findsimilar solutions in AugustineDe civitatedei, V.9, 10, and AquinasSumma contragentiles, III, 95. Cf. WilliamWollaston, "And thusthe prayers,which good men offerto the All-knowingGod, and the neglectsof others,may findfitting effects already forecraftedin the course of nature"(The Religionof NatureDelineated [London, 1724], 104).

This content downloaded from 130.102.42.98 on Fri, 30 Oct 2015 01:34:15 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 552 PeterHarrison standing,it is notunreasonable to maintain a distinctionbetween a philosophi- cal and a devotionalperspective on petitionaryprayer. The samemight be arguedfor miracles. Whiston concludes, although the argumentis hard to disentanglefrom the prolixprose, thatthe two key notions of "the particularinterposition of providence"and "miracle" amountto the same thing-as will become apparent,he assuresus, when "theother parts of Natureyet to be discover'd,be foundreducible to as fixt Laws as thosewe alreadyknow are."88In otherwords we only speak of miraclesand particularinterpositions because we are ignorantof the fixed laws whichaccount for such events, just as we remainignorant of thelaws governingthe natural means by whichprayer requests are granted.In short we are similarlyplaced to thosewho in previousages, througha lack of knowledgeof nature,attributed to divineinterposition what we now knowto havebeen natural. All miracles,then, are relativemiracles.

Conclusion

The heroes of seventeenth-centuryscience inhabiteda thought-world verydifferent from our own. However sophisticated their scientific visions of theuniverse, they often found themselves unable to jettison aspects of a past world,a worldpopulated by occultforces, sympathies and antipathies,and theinfluences of supernaturalbeings. Men ofthe highest scientific reputation could still cling to the vestiges of medieval beliefs: witches,alchemy, astrology,and not least, miracles. From our contemporary perspective we are inclinedto view many such beliefs,including the in miracles,as inimicalto thescientific outlook. Accordingly, we tendto regardthese men as havingbeen faced with a starkchoice: science or miraclesbut not both. It is because Newtonand a numberof his friendsfound themselves unable to makethat choice that they stand charged with having embraced ambiguities andinconsistencies. I have argued that Newton, Whiston, and Clarkerejected thisdichotomy and establisheda firmmiddle ground, allowing that those eventstraditionally labelled "miracles"had takenplace, but denyingthat anyphilosophical sense could be made of theclaim that they were breaches of naturallaw. Thisnew conceptionof the miraculous was mostsuccessfully appliedby Newton'sprotege Whiston to theDeluge and thefinal Conflagra- tion. In an unpublishedmanuscript on theapocalypse Newton, speaking of the finalrestoration of theworld, declared that nothing is "beyondthe possibil- ity of nature,nothing too hard for the omnipotentpower of God": the possibilitiesof nature, for Newton, were nothing less thanthe possibilities of

88 Whiston,A Vindication,31. CompareBumet's responseto the same criticism,An Answerto theLate Exceptionsmade byMr ErasmusWarren against the Theory of theEarth (London, 1690), 17-19.

This content downloaded from 130.102.42.98 on Fri, 30 Oct 2015 01:34:15 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions NewtonianScience 553 theomnipotent Deity.89 With such a conceptionof the ordering of the cosmos therecould be no divine"violation of laws of nature."Newton did not,and could not,believe in miraclesin thissense. Yet committedas he was to the omnipotenceof God, Newton was open to the "strangeand wonder- ful"-those prodigieswhich in past ages, and even in his own times,men had referredto as "miracles."

Bond University.

89 Yahuda MS. 9. 2, fol. 140r.Quoted in Manuel,Religion of Isaac Newton,101.

This content downloaded from 130.102.42.98 on Fri, 30 Oct 2015 01:34:15 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions