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The Profoundest Problem of Ethics: About the Possibility of a Profound Solution Louisiana State University LSU Digital Commons LSU Master's Theses Graduate School April 2019 The rP ofoundest Problem of Ethics: About the Possibility of a Profound Solution Pol Pardini Gispert [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_theses Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Pardini Gispert, Pol, "The rP ofoundest Problem of Ethics: About the Possibility of a Profound Solution" (2019). LSU Master's Theses. 4915. https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_theses/4915 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Master's Theses by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE PROFOUNDEST PROBLEM OF ETHICS: ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A PROFOUND SOLUTION A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in The Department of Philosophy & Religious Studies by Pol Pardini Gispert B.A., Universitat de Girona, 2001 May 2019 For my mother and father, For as many books as I read, your actions are still my moral compass. ii Table of Contents Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... iv Preface ............................................................................................................................................. v Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 Chapter 1. Background to Sidgwick’s Profoundest Problem of Ethics ........................................... 8 1.1. Conceptual background ........................................................................................................ 8 1.2. The Three Methods of Ethics ............................................................................................. 17 Chapter 2. The Profoundest Problem of Ethics ............................................................................. 36 2.1. Sidgwick’s Profoundest Problem of Ethics ........................................................................ 37 2.2. Preliminary Analysis of the Profoundest Problem of Ethics .............................................. 49 Chapter 3. Classical Interpretations of the Profoundest Problem of Ethics and their Solutions ... 65 3.1. Conflict-enhancing Interpretations ..................................................................................... 65 3.2. Conflict-mitigating Interpretations ..................................................................................... 90 3.3. Formal Analysis of the Classical Interpretations of the Profoundest Problem ................. 122 Conclusions ................................................................................................................................. 127 Work cited ................................................................................................................................... 137 Curriculum Vitae ......................................................................................................................... 139 iii Abstract My thesis is concerned with the prospects for finding a solution to what Henry Sidgwick called the Profoundest Problem of Ethics. I begin by analysing Sidgwick’s The Methods of Ethics to reveal the assumptions about rationality that led SidgwicK to claim that Ethics is plagued with a profoundest problem. I then evaluate the capacity of seven accounts – those of Derek Parfit, Roger Crisp, David Brink, David Phillips, William Frankena, Owen McLeod, and Katarzyna de Lazari- Radek and Peter Singer – to solve the Profoundest Problem of Ethics; arguing that not one is able to solve it. In the conclusion, I indicate that the common problem that prevents all accounts, Sidg- wick’s included, from solving the Profoundest Problem of Ethics is that they all share the assump- tions about rationality that Sidgwick himself supposed in defining the Profoundest Problem of Ethics. I conclude suggesting that these assumptions are unsubstantiated, and I indicate that, when these unquestioned assumptions about rationality are rejected, what Sidgwick called the Profound- est Problem of Ethics comes into a new light in which a solution may not even be necessary. iv Preface Ethics is, for me and for many others, one of the most important areas of philosophy. Insofar as it studies what is right or what ought to be done, so far as this depends upon the voluntary action of individuals, it is one of the few areas of philosophy that may help us determine, in our everyday lives as well as in moments when we face momentous dilemmas, what is the right way to act: Should I treat myself to steaK, if I know that a cow, a living being, will be killed for me and others to eat her? Should I save a stranger’s life, if by doing so I need to sacrifice my own legs? Ethics is supposed to illuminate these types of questions and help us determine what we ought to do in every such case. But, what if we discovered that Ethics gives us contradictory answers to each of the ques- tions that we submit for consideration? What if, by appealing to two different – but equally valid – rational procedures, we discovered that different actions that cannot be performed at the same time can both be regarded as equally right? Ethics would leave us, then, without knowing what we ought to do, and many would see this as a reason to disregard Ethics as a useless study. Henry Sidgwick claimed in The Methods of Ethics (1907) that Ethics faces precisely this problem. He labeled it as “the Profoundest Problem of Ethics”. Sidgwick tried, without success, to find a solution to that problem. And many others have attempted the same since. In this thesis, I argue that eight distinguished philosophers who have attempted to solve the Profoundest Problem of Ethics have left the problem unresolved. In particular, I argue that all these philosophers, Sidg- wick included, constrained by their unquestioned acceptance of certain assumptions that Sidgwick himself established when he discovered the Profoundest Problem of Ethics, have omitted what truly makes the Profoundest Problem of Ethics profound. This is why, I argue, they all have left the problem unresolved. v Writing this thesis would not have been possible without the guidance of my advisor, Pro- fessor Husain Sarkar. First, he gave me orientation when my thought was unbridled with many indefinite ideas. By suggesting an extensive, careful, and systematic examination of Sidgwick’s The Methods of Ethics, he compelled me to find the presuppositions underlying the Profoundest Problem of Ethics; the acceptance of which, I would discover, was the reason why Sidgwick’s problem remained unresolved. Second, Professor Sarkar provided me with insightful and rigorous comments – about my ideas, arguments, structure, and about my often broken English – every time that he revised my manuscripts, which were more than many. Finally, when a solid amount of work had been done, Professor Sarkar stimulated me to unleash, again, my thought and present well-considered objections to the various solutions I have presented; appealing to the – now defi- nite – ideas that motivated me to write this thesis in the first place. I feel privileged to have had him as my advisor, and I will be always thankful for all the time he dedicated to me. I also want to express my gratitude to the members of my committee, Professors Jeffrey Roland and Raff Donelson. Professor Roland provided me with meticulous remarks that helped me choose every word with uttermost care, making sure that they were all properly defined. He also gave me unforgettable advice about how to be clear and precise in my prose. Professor Do- nelson, on the other hand, enabled me to understand the framework to which I, unknowingly, had subscribed in my thesis. This allowed me to foresee possible objections against my arguments; accordingly, it made my thesis more defensible and robust. Without them, this master’s thesis would have been poorer. Finally, I want to thank Louisiana State University, and in particular its Department of Philosophy, for giving me the opportunity to study for the Master of Arts’ degree in Philosophy. When I was a child in Girona, I conceived the possibility of studying in the United States only in my wildest dreams. Thanks to the Department of Philosophy, now other wild dreams occupy my mind. Hopefully, these too will be replaced by even wilder dreams in the future. vi Introduction When one encounters Henry Sidgwick’s renowned declaration to have found the Profoundest Problem of Ethics, for which he himself was not able to find a solution, one finds oneself with dual sentiments: on the one hand, one is curious about how Sidgwick arrived at this deep problem, and on the other hand, one has the urge to attempt to solve the problem that Sidgwick found. Surpris- ingly, well-known authors approaching Sidgwick’s The Methods of Ethics, where Sidgwick pre- sents the Profoundest Problem of Ethics, seem to me to take only one of the two following alter- natives: they either take seriously Sidgwick’s claim that Ethics is plagued by a profoundest prob- lem, but they do not give a proper solution to the problem; or,
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