In this paper, I am going to discuss the common objection to virtue ethics that William
Frankena and other moral theorists have posed: virtue ethics cannot tell us how we ought to act (i.e. that it is not a normative theory). In doing this I will discuss how Rosalind Hursthouse successfully defends virtue ethics against this charge and makes it more appealing than both deontological ethics and utilitarian ethics. I will then argue that Hursthouse’s defense shows that deontology ethics better serves as a heuristic for virtue ethics, than its own ethical theory. I will finish the paper by arguing Hursthouse’s defense of normative virtue ethics reveals a counterintuitive conclusion, but one that I am willing to accept in favor of the moral framework.
In William Frankena’s “A Critique of Virtue-Based Ethics” Frankena brings up the common criticism that a virtue ethics theory cannot tell us how to act, but instead gives us a way to cultivate and teach ourselves and others the existing moral principles we should hold.
He does believe virtues have a valuable role to play in “moral education and development,” but ultimately believes they do not serve the purpose of providing us with a direction when we are faced with a moral dilemma (Frankena p. 353). He writes, “the function of the virtues in an ethics of duty is not to tell us what to do but to ensure that we will do it willingly in whatever situations we may face” (Frankena p. 353). He argues that because we have to appeal to existing principles defined by different ethical theories such as trait egoism, trait utilitarianism, trait deontological theory, ect, virtue ethics is just an extension of these theories (Frankena p.
351). Another way this is put is that virtue ethics have been doing no more than supplementing these normative theories (Hursthouse p. 645). A virtue ethicist relies on virtues he believes are valuable in people to determine what is right and wrong, opposed to using principles of duty. The example commonly given, and that Frankena himself uses, is beneficence vs benevolence where beneficence is the principle of duty and benevolence is the virtue (Frankena p. 351). The virtue ethicist would say that we should try and be benevolent people and look to those with this virtue as an example. The objection that Frankena and others enlist is that an action emulating the virtuous person provides a direction only when we utilize the principles of duties that other ethical theories provide us with. Benevolence is the virtue of beneficence on the grounds of deontological theory of ethics; acting selfishly is a virtue of selfishness in trait egoism; and acting to maximize happiness is a virtue only on a trait utilitarianism framework.
Frankena puts it, “it is hard to see how we could know what traits to encourage or inculcate if we did not subscribe to principle, for example, to the principle of utility, or to those of benevolence and justice” (Frankena p. 352). The objection to virtue ethics relies on this truth: that virtues motivate, but need to be defined on the grounds of other theories of ethics, and therefore do not guide us how to act, but rather encourage us how to be.
Rosalind Hursthouse successfully responds to this objection in her chapter “Normative
Virtue Ethics,” and in doing so provides reason to believe virtue ethics are more appealing than deontological ethical theories. Hursthouse’s response to this objection cites the parallel structures of an “act-utilitarian” theorist’s account and a deontology theory’s account with that of a virtue ethicist’s account. In each case it appears as though a second premise is always needed in order to clarify how the theory actually instructs people to act. The utilitarian’s first premise is going to be, “an action is right [if and only if] it promotes the best consequences”
(Hursthouse p. 646). Naturally our next question is going to be what are the best consequences? To answer this the utilitarian needs a second premise that says something along the lines of “The best consequences are those in which happiness is maximized” (Hursthouse p.
646). Similarly, a version of deontological ethics will be laid out with the first premise being, “An action is right [if and only if] it is in accordance with a correct moral rule or principle,” and a second premise being needed in order to figure out what exactly a moral rule is (Hursthouse p.
646). So, if a virtue ethicist first claim is that “an action is right [if and only if] it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically (i.e. acting in character) do in the circumstances,” a person who holds one of the other two views can’t dismiss it as of being of no use at face value because their own views would be of no use if not explained further. Instead they must wait for the second defining premise, which, in my opinion, provides a more intuitive theory of ethics than both utilitarian and deontic ethicists can.
The reason Frankena’s common objection seems to work so well is because it assumes that the second premise of the virtue ethicist relies on the rules set up by other ethical theories. Hursthouse writes, “of course, if the virtuous agent can only be specified as an agent disposed to act in accordance with moral rules, as some have assumed, then virtue ethics collapses back into deontology and is no rival to it” (Hursthouse p. 647). There are a few ways to fill out the second premise that do not rely on these other theories. One is the neo-
Aristotelian completion which, “claims that a virtue is a character trait a human being needs for eudaimonia, to flourish or live well” (Hursthouse p. 647). The Hume account of a virtue is, “a character trait (of human beings) that is useful or agreeable to its possessor or to others”
(Hursthouse p. 646). Another response is similar to how a deontic ethicist may respond: that there is simply a list of these virtues. So, with the framework that a virtuous agent is someone who acts virtuously, if we say a virtue on the neo-Aristotelian account is a character required for someone to flourish or live well, then we have paralleled the structures of the other two theories. The way this theory guides us is by telling us to act how a virtuous agent acts. If we don’t know how one would act, Hursthouse contends that we should simply ask one. The result,
“not only does each virtue generate a prescription—act honestly, charitably, justly—but each vice a prohibition—do not act dishonestly, uncharitably, unjustly” (Hursthouse p. 648). The reason that Hursthouse’s response and virtue ethics are so appealing is that they correspond to how we actually come to figure out which actions are morally acceptable on a day to day basis.
While the virtue ethicist can cite examples of times where people have gone to a person they believe is more virtuous than themselves, it is harder for the deontic ethicist to cite a time when the rules of morality were defined by some act of god. Similarly, maximizing happiness of the general population isn’t what we think about when we are deciding between self-involved actions.
Based on this I have come to believe deontologist’s rules like “don’t kill” or “don’t lie” are valuable as a heuristic, but are much too simple to be applied to every situation. It is convenient they are so simple, but why should our theory of morality be so straightforward in a world that is so complex? Another variant of the original objection that Hursthouse addresses is that these v-rules, rules derived from virtue ethics, are inferior to deontological rules when guiding children in how to act (Hursthouse p. 648). First, I think it’s worth mentioning that how children conceive morality does not seem to have a lot of weight in determining its actuality.
Children’s opinions are usually subsequent to the opinions of adults because children often lack information, experience, and a fully developed brain. This aside, Hursthouse entertains this objection that we teach children these objective rules. Hursthouse responds that we do in fact teach children v-rules by saying things like, “don’t do that, it hurts, you mustn’t be cruel,” and
“don’t be so mean” (Hursthouse p. 649). Hursthouse’s response aside, I think the value ethicist could say these rules like “don’t kill” are just a simplified version of the more complicated, real v-rule; a heuristic that can help our children act morally until they are ready to better understand ethics.
The view that our morals are defined by the virtuous agents has lead me to perhaps a counterintuitive conclusion about ethics. If it is true that our guide to act morally is defined by the way virtuous agents acts, and a virtuous agent is determined by individuals, it seems as though ethics are completely constructed by society. This conclusion is furthered by
Hursthouse’s view that v-rules cannot tell us what to do in every situation, because there will be some moral dilemmas where virtuous agents come up with different answers to the same problem (Hursthouse p. 651). In other words, two virtuous agents can disagree on the same issue and guide people in different directions. This originally doesn’t seem to fit the definition of a normative theory because a normative theory consists of general principles which,
“provide a decision procedure for all questions about how to act morally” (Hursthouse p. 650).
It could be argued, however, that it does provide a decision procedure for every situation, but not an answer to every situation. Whether we define this as a normative theory or not, the view that certain moral situations are ambiguous can be troubling, but this does fit the idea that ethics are a social construct. Society doesn’t agree on everything and has good reason not to agree wholly on the more complex moral dilemmas. Being able to be answer in either way, but never easily, provides us with moral perspective. If we think about it, picking a side and being positive it is correct, is to be ignorant of the weight of the situation. Complex moral dilemmas intuitively should be hard to solve, not subject to a set rule, which a social construct of moral theory would allow. As a final thought, I don’t find it troubling that morality may be a social construct because it functions as its need to in order to provide better lives for people. In my opinion virtue ethics is the most appealing of the moral theories because of its intuitive nature.
Bibliography
Frankena, W. K. (2005). Ethics. New Delhi: Prentice-Hall of India.
Hursthouse, R. (2013). Normative Virtue Ethics. In Ethical theory: An anthology. (Ethical
theory.) Chichester, West Sussex [England: Wiley-Blackwell.