What Euthyphro Couldn't Have Said
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"Why Adams Needs to Modify His Divine-Command Theory One More Time"
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Asbury Theological Seminary Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers Volume 11 Issue 1 Article 5 1-1-1994 "Why Adams Needs to Modify His Divine-Command Theory One More Time" Stephen J. Sullivan Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy Recommended Citation Sullivan, Stephen J. (1994) ""Why Adams Needs to Modify His Divine-Command Theory One More Time"," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 11 : Iss. 1 , Article 5. Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol11/iss1/5 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. "WHY ADAMS NEEDS TO MODIFY HIS DIVINE COMMAND THEORY ONE MORE TIME"* Stephen J. Sullivan Robert Merrihew Adams has twice modified the divine-command theory of morality in interesting and plausible ways. The resulting theory says that rightness and wrongness consist respectively in agreement and disagreement with the commands of a loving God, and that a causallhistorical account of the reference of moral terms is correct. I argue, first, that Adams's theory must face up to the objection that it depicts morality-implausibly-as arbi trary; second, that the account of reference he accepts does not permit him to adopt either of two natural strategies for rebutting the objection; and finally, that this account does allow him recourse to a third, somewhat less natural strategy which requires modifying the theory one more time. -
The Problem of Evil
The Problem of Evil PHIL6305 New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary Defend Conference January 2-6, 2017 Office: Dodd 112, extension #3245 [email protected] Assistant: Katy Platt [email protected] Seminary Mission Statement The mission of New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary is to equip leaders to fulfill the Great Commission and the Great Commandments through the local church and its ministries. Course Description The course introduces students to contemporary philosophical issues related to the Christian concept of God and the problem of evil. Issues addressed include the nature of evil, the cause of evil, the intelligibility and coherence of the Christian concept of God in light of evil, solutions offered by various world religions to the problem of evil, as well as representative solutions offered by a selection of contemporary philosophers addressing the topic of evil. The thrust of the course will focus upon personal reading, research, and writing. Core Value and Key Competency The primary core value of the Seminary addressed in this course is Doctrinal Integrity. The primary key competency in ministry addressed is Christian Theological Heritage. The core value for the 2016-2017 academic year is Characteristic Excellence. Core Values Addressed The course will address the core value of Doctrinal Integrity directly and Spiritual Vitality indirectly. Reflection on the problem of evil is intimately related to reflection on the nature and existence of God as well as to considering the doctrine of creation. The vitality of one’s spiritual life is directly related to the degree of trust one places in God, which derives from one’s understanding of God’s nature. -
Kierkegaard on Selfhood and Our Need for Others
Kierkegaard on Selfhood and Our Need for Others 1. Kierkegaard in a Secular Age Scholars have devoted much attention lately to Kierkegaard’s views on personal identity and, in particular, to his account of selfhood.1 Central to this account is the idea that a self is not something we automatically are. It is rather something we must become. Thus, selfhood is a goal to realize or a project to undertake.2 To put the point another way, while we may already be selves in some sense, we have to work to become real, true, or “authentic” selves.3 The idea that authentic selfhood is a project is not unique to Kierkegaard. It is common fare in modern philosophy. Yet Kierkegaard distances himself from popular ways of thinking about the matter. He denies the view inherited from Rousseau that we can discover our true selves by consulting our innermost feelings, beliefs, and desires. He also rejects the idea developed by the German Romantics that we can invent our true selves in a burst of artistic or poetic creativity. In fact, according to Kierkegaard, becom- ing an authentic self is not something we can do on our own. If we are to succeed at the project, we must look beyond ourselves for assistance. In particular, Kierkegaard thinks, we must rely on God. For God alone can provide us with the content of our real identi- ties.4 A longstanding concern about Kierkegaard arises at this point. His account of au- thentic selfhood, like his accounts of so many concepts, is religious. -
Effective Altruism's Underspecification Problem
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by PhilPapers Effective Altruism’s Underspecification Problem Travis Timmerman 1. Introduction Whether any given act is supererogatory, obligatory, merely permissible, or impermissible depends upon the alternative acts available to the agent. But what exactly are the relevant alternative acts available to an agent? It turns out that this is a surprisingly difficult question to answer, yet it’s one on which any complete normative ethical theory must take a stance. It’s also one on which any effective altruist must take a stance. This may be unwelcome news for effective altruists since, as I will demonstrate, each of the dominant views in the literature generates verdicts that are (i) implausible in their own right and (ii) seemingly at odds with typical effective altruist commitments. Considering a particular case will help make this issue less abstract: The Gig Brandi has been invited by her friend, Chad, to attend his musical gig. Brandi can easily decide to attend the gig, and then decide at the gig to be supportive of Chad, which would be the best outcome. Unfortunately, Chad is a mediocre musician. Consequently, Brandi would not in fact decide to be supportive of Chad if she decided to attend his gig due to being irritated with Chad’s performance—even though she could decide at the gig to be supportive. Since Chad would be deeply hurt, this would be the worst outcome. Brandi could alternatively decide not to attend Chad’s gig, which would be better than the worst outcome, yet worse than the best outcome.1 To be sure, Brandi can decide to attend the gig, and once, there she can decide to be supportive of Chad. -
The Profoundest Problem of Ethics: About the Possibility of a Profound Solution
Louisiana State University LSU Digital Commons LSU Master's Theses Graduate School April 2019 The rP ofoundest Problem of Ethics: About the Possibility of a Profound Solution Pol Pardini Gispert [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_theses Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Pardini Gispert, Pol, "The rP ofoundest Problem of Ethics: About the Possibility of a Profound Solution" (2019). LSU Master's Theses. 4915. https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_theses/4915 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Master's Theses by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE PROFOUNDEST PROBLEM OF ETHICS: ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A PROFOUND SOLUTION A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in The Department of Philosophy & Religious Studies by Pol Pardini Gispert B.A., Universitat de Girona, 2001 May 2019 For my mother and father, For as many books as I read, your actions are still my moral compass. ii Table of Contents Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... iv Preface ............................................................................................................................................ -
Why William Rowe's Argument from Natural Evil Fails
Scholars Crossing Other Graduate Scholarship School of Divinity 2015 Why William Rowe’s Argument from Natural Evil Fails Douglas Taylor Liberty University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/lts_grad_schol Part of the Christianity Commons, Metaphysics Commons, and the Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion Commons Recommended Citation Taylor, Douglas, "Why William Rowe’s Argument from Natural Evil Fails" (2015). Other Graduate Scholarship. 2. https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/lts_grad_schol/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Divinity at Scholars Crossing. It has been accepted for inclusion in Other Graduate Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholars Crossing. For more information, please contact [email protected]. LIBERTY UNIVERSITY BAPTIST THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY Why William Rowe’s Argument from Natural Evil Fails Submitted to the Evangelical Theological Society Southeastern Region Meeting by Doug Taylor February 14, 2015 CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................3 BUILDING THE THEODICY ............................................................................................6 Culpability ...................................................................................................................6 Growth .........................................................................................................................8 -
A Brief Inquiry Into the Meaning of Sin and Faith: with on My Religion Free
FREE A BRIEF INQUIRY INTO THE MEANING OF SIN AND FAITH: WITH ON MY RELIGION PDF John Rawls,Joshua Cohen,Thomas Nagel,Robert Merrihew Adams | 288 pages | 20 May 2010 | HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS | 9780674047532 | English | Cambridge, Mass, United States A Brief Inquiry into the Meaning of Sin & Faith with On My Religion by John Rawls Sign in Create an account. Syntax Advanced Search. JohnHG Rawls. Harvard University Press Faith in Philosophy of Religion. Edit this record. Mark as duplicate. Find it on Scholar. Request removal from index. Revision history. Download options PhilArchive copy. From the Publisher via CrossRef no proxy Setup an account with your affiliations in A Brief Inquiry into the Meaning of Sin and Faith: With On My Religion to access resources via your University's proxy server Configure custom proxy use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy. Configure custom resolver. Chapters BETA. Robert Merrihew Adams. A Note on the Text. Chapter Four. The Meaning of Sin. Chapter Five. The Meaning of Faith. Chapter One. A General Prospectus. Chapter A Brief Inquiry into the Meaning of Sin and Faith: With On My Religion. The Extended Natural Cosmos. Chapter Two. Vindication of the Natural Cosmos. General Index. Index of Biblical Passages. On My Religion. Epistemology Personalized. Matthew A. Benton - - Philosophical Quarterly 67 God and Interpersonal Knowledge. Benton - - Res Philosophica 95 3 Kristina Stoeckl - - Philosophy and Social Criticism 43 1 Mackenzie Bok - - Modern Intellectual History 14 1 Harvard University Press. John Rawls - - Harvard University Press. Added to PP index Total views 13of 2, Recent downloads 6 months 2of 2, How can I increase my downloads? Sign in to use this feature. -
The Problem of Evil and the Limits of Governmental Power
Liberty University Law Review Volume 5 Issue 3 Article 3 July 2011 Lessons from Theodicy: The Problem of Evil and the Limits of Governmental Power David E. Gilbert Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/lu_law_review Recommended Citation Gilbert, David E. (2011) "Lessons from Theodicy: The Problem of Evil and the Limits of Governmental Power," Liberty University Law Review: Vol. 5 : Iss. 3 , Article 3. Available at: https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/lu_law_review/vol5/iss3/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Liberty University School of Law at Scholars Crossing. It has been accepted for inclusion in Liberty University Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholars Crossing. For more information, please contact [email protected]. ARTICLE LESSONS FROM THEODICY: THE PROBLEM OF EVIL AND THE LIMITS OF GOVERNMENTAL POWER David E. Gilbert† Why is there any misery at all in the world? Not by chance, surely. From some cause then. Is it from the intention of the Diety? But he is perfectly benevolent. Is it contrary to his intention? But he is almighty. Nothing can shake the solidity of this reasoning, so short, so clear, so decisive, except we assert that these subjects exceed all human capacity, and that our common measures of truth and falsehood are not applicable to them. 1 David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion I. INTRODUCTION Although I teach law, I am fascinated by the philosophy of religion. And I am fascinated, in particular, by the Problem of Evil, which asserts that the 2 following propositions cannot be reconciled: † A version of this article was presented on May 31, 2010 at a symposium entitled “The Monotheistic Religions and the Human Liberties.” The symposium was held in Constantza, Romania and was sponsored by The Centre for Religious and Juridical- Canonical Study and Research of the Three Monotheistic Religions (Mosaic, Christian and Islamic) of Ovidius University of Constantza. -
1 from Viktor Frankl's Logotherapy to the Four Defining Characteristics of Self-Transcendence (ST) Paul T. P. Wong Introductio
1 From Viktor Frankl’s Logotherapy to the Four Defining Characteristics of Self-Transcendence (ST) Paul T. P. Wong Introduction The present paper continues my earlier presentation on self-transcendence (ST) as a pathway to meaning, virtue, and happiness (Wong, 2016), in which I introduced Viktor Frankl’s (1985) two-factor theory of ST. Here, the same topic of ST is expanded by first providing the basic assumptions of logotherapy, then arguing the need for objective standards for meaning, and finally elaborating the defining characteristics of ST. To begin, here is a common-sense observation—no one can remain at the same spot for life for a variety of reasons, such as developmental and environmental changes, but most importantly because people dream of a better life and want to move to a preferred destination where they can find happiness and fulfillment. As a psychologist, I am interested in finding out (a) which destination people choose and (b) how they plan to get there successfully. In a free society that offers many opportunities for individuals, there are almost endless options regarding both (a) and (b). The reality is that not all purposes in life are equal. Some life goals are misguided, such as wanting to get rich by any means, including unethical and illegal ones, because ultimately, such choices could be self-defeating—these end values might not only fail to fill their hearts with happiness, but might also ruin their relationships and careers. The question, then, is: What kind of choices will have the greatest likelihood of resulting in a good life that not only benefits the individual but also society? My research has led me to hypothesize that the path of ST is most likely to result in such a good life. -
Robert Merrihew Adams, LEIBNIZ: DETERMINIST, THEIST, IDEALIST
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers Volume 13 Issue 3 Article 11 7-1-1996 Robert Merrihew Adams, LEIBNIZ: DETERMINIST, THEIST, IDEALIST Michael J. Murray Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy Recommended Citation Murray, Michael J. (1996) "Robert Merrihew Adams, LEIBNIZ: DETERMINIST, THEIST, IDEALIST," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 13 : Iss. 3 , Article 11. DOI: 10.5840/faithphil199613338 Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol13/iss3/11 This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. BOOK REVIEWS Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist, by Robert Merrihew Adams. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. Pp. xi and 433. $55.00 (Cloth) MICHAEL J. MURRAY, Franklin and Marshall College In the Introduction to Robert Adams' Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist the reader is told that the work "is not an introduction to Leibniz's phi losophy, nor even a fully comprehensive account of his metaphysics. It is a piece of research into three areas related to the three attributes men tioned in the title" (p.4). But it doesn't take the reader long to realize that this book represents one of those few occasions where what is deliv ered is far more than what is advertised. Divided into three sections and composed of thirteen total chapters, the book covers the topics men tioned in its title, but in doing so takes the reader deep into the labyrinths of nearly every aspect of Leibnizian metaphysics currently of interest to Leibniz scholars. -
Must God Create the Best? Author(S): Robert Merrihew Adams Reviewed Work(S): Source: the Philosophical Review, Vol
Philosophical Review Must God Create the Best? Author(s): Robert Merrihew Adams Reviewed work(s): Source: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 81, No. 3 (Jul., 1972), pp. 317-332 Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2184329 . Accessed: 16/03/2012 01:59 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Duke University Press and Philosophical Review are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Philosophical Review. http://www.jstor.org MUST GOD CREATE THE BEST? I M ANY PHILOSOPHERSand theologianshave accepted the following proposition: (P) If a perfectly good moral agent created any world at all, it would have to be the very best world that he could create. The best world that an omnipotent God could create is the best of all logically possible worlds. Accordingly, it has been supposed that if the actual world was created by an omnipotent, perfectly good God, it must be the best of all logically possible worlds. In this paper I shall argue that ethical views typical of the Judeo-Christian religious tradition do not require the Judeo- Christian theist to accept (P). -
Virtue Ethics in This Paper, I Am Going to Discuss the Common Objection To
Virtue Ethics In this paper, I am going to discuss the common objection to virtue ethics that William Frankena and other moral theorists have posed: virtue ethics cannot tell us how we ought to act (i.e. that it is not a normative theory). In doing this I will discuss how Rosalind Hursthouse successfully defends virtue ethics against this charge and makes it more appealing than both deontological ethics and utilitarian ethics. I will then argue that Hursthouse’s defense shows that deontology ethics better serves as a heuristic for virtue ethics, than its own ethical theory. I will finish the paper by arguing Hursthouse’s defense of normative virtue ethics reveals a counterintuitive conclusion, but one that I am willing to accept in favor of the moral framework. In William Frankena’s “A Critique of Virtue-Based Ethics” Frankena brings up the common criticism that a virtue ethics theory cannot tell us how to act, but instead gives us a way to cultivate and teach ourselves and others the existing moral principles we should hold. He does believe virtues have a valuable role to play in “moral education and development,” but ultimately believes they do not serve the purpose of providing us with a direction when we are faced with a moral dilemma (Frankena p. 353). He writes, “the function of the virtues in an ethics of duty is not to tell us what to do but to ensure that we will do it willingly in whatever situations we may face” (Frankena p. 353). He argues that because we have to appeal to existing principles defined by different ethical theories such as trait egoism, trait utilitarianism, trait deontological theory, ect, virtue ethics is just an extension of these theories (Frankena p.