UC San Diego UC San Diego Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
UC San Diego UC San Diego Electronic Theses and Dissertations Title Perfectionism, value pluralism, and the human good Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/05w5h7mb Author Stedman, Jeffrey N. Publication Date 2006 Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO Perfectionism, Value Pluralism, and the Human Good A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy by Jeffrey N. Stedman Committee in charge: Professor Richard Arneson, Co-chair Professor David Brink, Co-Chair Professor Alan Houston Professor Richard Madsen Professor Donald Rutherford 2006 Copyright Jeffrey N. Stedman, 2006 All rights reserved. The dissertation of Jeffrey N. Stedman is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm: _________________________________ _________________________________ _________________________________ _________________________________ Co-chair _________________________________ Co-chair University of California, San Diego 2006 iii DEDICATION For Adam iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Signature Page..........................................................................................................................iii. Dedication.................................................................................................................................iv. Table of Contents.......................................................................................................................v. Vita............................................................................................................................................vi. Abstract.....................................................................................................................................ix. Chapter 1 Toward a Plausible Account of the Human Good.............................................1 Chapter 2 Subjective Theories of the Good.....................................................................15 Chapter 3 Hurka s Perfectionism.....................................................................................52 Chapter 4 Self-Realization Accounts of the Good...........................................................97 Chapter 5 Value Pluralism and Ethical Judgment..........................................................173 Bibliography............................................................................................................................264 v VITA Areas of Specialization: Ethical Theory, Social and Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Law Areas of Competence: Applied Ethics, History of Ethics, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Mind Education: University of Memphis B.A. in Philosophy August, 1993, summa cum laude Vanderbilt University Law School Attended 1995-96 academic year University of California, San Diego (Department of Philosophy) M.A. in Philosophy March, 2003 Ph.D. in Philosophy September, 2006 Dissertation: Perfectionism, Value Pluralism, and the Human Good Dissertation Committee: Richard Arneson (Co-chair), David Brink (Co-chair), Donald Rutherford, Alan Houston, Richard Madsen Presentations: Some Problems with Hurka s Perfectionism University of California, San Diego Graduate Philosophy Colloquium, May 4, 2004 Comment on Eric Moore s Objective Consequentialism, Right Action, and Good People American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division Meeting, March 23, 2005 Two Conceptions of Self-Realization Alabama Philosophical Society, University of Montevallo (AL), October 21, 2005 Value Pluralism and Moral Judgment Southern California Philosophy Conference, California State University at Northridge, October 29, 2005 vi Awards and Fellowships: University of California, San Diego Dissertation Fellowships, 2003-04 Research Fellowships, 2002, 2003 University of Memphis Carol Bowman Scholarship (for outstanding Philosophy major), 1992 Teaching Experience: As Instructor: Introduction to Philosophy: Metaphysics; University of California, San Diego; Winter 2005 Medical Ethics; Christian Brothers University, Memphis, TN; Spring 2006 Elementary Logic; University of Memphis; Spring 2006 As Graduate Teaching Assistant: Philosophy Department: Introduction to Logic (Augustin Rayo, Araceli Penafuerte twice) Logic and Decision Making (Jonathan Cohen) Introduction to Philosophy: Ethics (Richard Arneson twice) Ethics and Society (Mary Devereaux) History of Philosophy: Philosophy in the Age of Enlightenment (Jay Odenbaugh) Contemporary Moral Issues (Richard Arneson) Biomedical Ethics (Gerald Doppelt, Jay Odenbaugh) Philosophy of Law (David Brink) UCSD s Revelle College Writing Program: Humanities 1: The Foundations of Western Civilization: Israel and Greece Humanities 2: Rome, Christianity, and the Middle Ages Graduate Seminars: Philosophy of Mind (Psycho-neural Reduction, Paul Churchland) Ethics (Ethics and Personal Identity; David Brink) Early Modern Philosophy (Spinoza, Nicholas Jolley) Eighteenth Century Philosophy (Free Will in Early Modern Philosophy, Gideon Yaffe) Contemporary Topics in the Philosophy of Science (Science and Values, Philip Kitcher) Contemporary Epistemology and Metaphysics (Quine, Gila Sher) Greek Philosophy (Relativism and the Good in Ancient Philosophy; Georgios Anagnastapoulos) Ethics (Contemporary Metaethics, David Brink) vii Philosophy of Mind (Philosophy of Mind Since 1950, Paul Churchland) Social and Political Philosophy (Rawls and Nozick, Richard Arneson) Ethics (Contemporary Ethical Rationalism, Richard Arneson) Early Modern Philosophy (Hobbes, Donald Rutherford) Ethics (Analytical Jurisprudence, David Brink) Profession Memberships and Service: Member of American Philosophical Association, 2000-Present Referee for Philosophical Psychology, 2003 References: David Brink Professor of Philosophy University of California, San Diego Email: [email protected] Richard Arneson Professor of Philosophy University of California, San Diego Email: [email protected] Donald Rutherford Professor of Philosophy University of California, San Diego Email: [email protected] viii ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION Perfectionism, Value Pluralism, and the Human Good by Jeffrey N. Stedman Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy University of California, San Diego, 2006 Professor Richard Arneson, Co-chair Professor David Brink, Co-chair What makes for a good life? If you have a child, a spouse, or a very close friend you probably want what is best for her. However, in order to know what would be best for your loved one you need an account of the personal good. I argue for a version of value pluralism, according to which there is disparate list of fundamental goods which resist reduction to some single supervalue such as pleasure and lack any strong unifying principle. I argue that any adequate account of the human good must include pleasure and freedom from pain, knowledge and understanding, practical rationality, and proper emotional responsiveness as fundamental goods, and that the only thing these various goods have in common is their intrinsic goodness. Value pluralism is an alternative to various kinds of monism about the good, such as hedonism, perfectionism, and the desire-satisfaction theory. Hedonism explains the value of any putative good in terms of pleasure, while perfectionism sees the good in ix terms of the development and exercise of those capacities or characteristics essential to some aspect of our nature. Desire-satisfaction views are best considered a form of monism about the good, since their identification of one s good with the satisfaction of one s desires offers a way of unifying various goods. The battle between monistic and pluralistic accounts is usefully analyzed in terms of competing theoretical virtues such as unity, simplicity, explanatory coherence, and plausibility. Monistic accounts typically score high along the first three of these dimensions and quite low along the last. I consider what I take to be the most promising versions of value monism, and argue that each scores so low along the dimension of plausibility that it should be rejected in favor of value pluralism. I begin by considering hedonism and the desire- satisfaction view and then discuss two distinct versions of perfectionism. Hedonism and perfectionism, in particular, are implausible because they fail to recognize our complex natures as embodied rational agents, and our need for a vision of the good which is correspondingly complex. In the final chapter I offer just such an account. x Chapter 1 Toward a Plausible Account of the Human Good Theories of the good hold a central place in our systematic thinking about morality. This is obviously the case for consequentialists: if we are to maximize or otherwise promote the good, we must have some idea of what the good consists in. But even many deontologists, while they would deny that right action is simply a matter of promoting the good, would nevertheless agree that we have something like a prima facie or pro tanto duty to promote the good, though this duty may be overridden by competing considerations.1 Moreover, one of the most prominent of contemporary deontologists, John Rawls, says that all ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy. 2 Clearly, we need some kind of systematic account of the good. But to what extent can we hope to develop an account of the good which combines familiar