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The Moral Philosophy of Francis Hutcheson This thesis has been submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for a postgraduate degree (e.g. PhD, MPhil, DClinPsychol) at the University of Edinburgh. Please note the following terms and conditions of use: • This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, which are retained by the thesis author, unless otherwise stated. • A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge. • This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the author. • The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the author. • When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given. The Moral Philosophy of Francis Hutcheson by John D. Bishop Ph.D. University of Edinburgh 1979 Contents Page 1. Introduction 1 i. Hutcheson's Philosophical Writings 4 ii. Locke's Influence 7 2. Theory of Human Nature i. Sensation 9 ii. Affections a. Internal Sensations 14 b. Passions 21 c. Desires 23 d. Desire and Motivation 32 e. Free-will 45 iii. Reason 51 3. The Moral Sense i. Introduction 53 ii. Intuitionist Aspects a. Analogy With the External Senses 54 b. Relationship Between Goodness & Benevolence 61 c. Whose Moral Sense? 67 d. Moral Error 71 iii. Justification of Approval 78 iv. Moral Sense and Pleasure and Pain 88 v. Moral Sense and Motivation 99 vi. S mnmary 102 Page 4. Benevolence i. First Version 105 ii. Second Version 116 iii. Arguments Against Hobbes and Mandeville 125 iv. Benevolence, Utilitarianism, and Rights 148 5. The Problem of Motivation i. The Problem 165 ii. Hutcheson's Theory of Moral Motivation 174 6. Hutcheson vs. the Rationalists i. The Structure of Hutcheson's Argument 191 ii. Arguments Against the Rationalists 199 iii. Reason not the Motive for Virtuous Acts 209 iv. Price's Criticisms of Hutcheson a. Introduction 220 b. Ideas of the Understanding 224 c. Moral Ideas 235 d. Subsequent Ideas 238 e. The Motive for Virtuous Actions 244 7. The Development of Hutcheson's Thought 254 8. Concluding Assessment 268 Bibliography 273 Abbreviations and Editions of Page References 1st Inquiry - An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue: in Two Treatises. I. Concerning Beauty, Order, Harmony, Design. (4th ed. 1738). Inquiry - An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue: in Two Treatises. II. Concerning Moral Good and Evil. (4th ed. 1738) Essay - An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions. (3rd ed. 1742). Illustrations - Illustrations on the Moral Sense. (Peach's ed. 1971). Correspondence - Letters between the Late Mr. Gilbert Burnet and Mr. Hutchinson, etc. (in Peach's ed. of 'Illustrations'). System - A System of Moral Philosophy. (1755). Introduction - A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy. (3rd ed. 1764). Review - Price: A Review of the Principal Questions of Morals. (Raphael's ed. 1974). Treatise - Hume: A Treatise of Human Nature. (Selbey-Bigge's ed. 1888). Notes on References All works, except the above, are referred to by the author's surn~e only; where more than one work by a particular author is listed in the bibliography, the relevant title is also given. For full information on any work quoted, see the bibliography. Notes on Quotations In quotations from eighteenth century editions (or photo-reproductions thereof), and from Raphael's edition of the 'Review', the original spelling and punctuation has been maintained, but the italics and the capital letters modernized. All emphasis of words or phrases in such quotations, therefore, should be considered as those of the writer of this thesis, and not of the original writers. Note on Inverted Corranas Single inverted commas denote words and phrases which are mentioned (as opposed to used); double inverted commas denote phrases or sentences which are quoted verbatim. ABSTRACT OF THESIS , . John Dougla3 BiDhou /\anze of Cand1c/ate ........................................................ !: .•...•..................•....•.............••..•..............•..••..••.•...•.•...••...•.•••••••••••••••.•• 7 ~ - ,.( . d ... t J? d ". t ·. ""'\ c ' Address ......?..?. ... ~ .. ~.~ ...... ~.... ! ....... !..~ ... 9.~.?:.9. ... 9.~~.... ~··:.! . .l.~.~ ...... ~:P:~.S~.~~.!.............................................................................. Degree ......................................................................................................PhD. Date .....................................................................J~nuary, 1979 . Title of T1zesis ... T-.!~~ .. J:~g.r_~~.+. .. XP.-.~.~9.~.~l~.~1Y. ... 9..:f.. .. f£.'~X!.9.;!..~.... UMt9.h.~!?.9.n. ................................................... .'.. ······································································································································································································ The main object of this thesis· is to explai11 in a systematic fashion }1 rancis ilutcheso~1' s hioral theory. Juch an attern~t \7ill necessarily involve a discussion of the v~rious philosophical problems which are inherent in his theory. For ~xample, I discuss the issue of whether Hutcheson's theory of the moral sense is to be interpreted in an intuitionist or an emotivist f~shion. It is argued that some C:"l,.spects of his moral sense theory favour the former and some the latter inte1·pretation. ~rutcheson 1 s theory of benevolence is outlined and his arGuments against the psycholo~ical ee;oists are discussed. :t'erhaps the most imr)Qrtant problei·:i vii th ~utchesoh's moral senDe theory is the problem of motivation. ~ny moral theory which locates the virtue of virtuous actions in the motive from which they are done, as llutcheson's does, nill encounter problems in explainin~ how knonledge of rieht and wrong c~n influence us to be virtuous. Hutcheson's ingenious solution to this problem and his theory of moral motivation, which I sugGest have not been adequately discussed previouly to this thesis, are explicated at length. Hutche:.:rnn 1 s criticisms of the moral rationalists ura considered, as are Pric~s 6riticisms of Hutcheson. A final chapter attempts to sho~ how the development of Hutcheson's thinking w~s the result of his realizing the implications of his oun theories, especially his theory of moral motivation. Use orhe! slclc if :wce:m1ry. PGS/ ABST /74/5000 Use this side only 1 Introduction This thesis is primarily an attempt to explicate in detail Hutcheson's moral philosophy. Hutcheson is usually remembered as being the first to develop systematically a moral philosophy based on the notion of a moral sense; but his clear presentation of a moral sense theory is not the only aspect of his thought which is worth examining. In fact, Hutcheson's writings contain interesting views on a great variety of topics, both in moral philosophy and in areas related to it. Each of the following chapters of this thesis deals with some topic central to the study of ethics. The first topic that must be examined is Hutcheson's views on human nature, for Hutcheson wishes to argue that the origins of moral evaluation, and of the motive to virtuous actions, are to be found in human nature. He analyses human nature using primarily the categories of sensation, desires, and beliefs. One should note in particular the nature of sensations, which include both percep­ tions and feelings, and one should also note the relation between desires and beliefs. These aspects of his analysis of human nature have major implications for other aspects of his thought. The third chapter examines at length the moral sense. The moral sense has a variety of important aspects to it: it perceives moral ideas, it provides the grounds for justifying moral approval, it provides us with a type of pleasure and pain, and, in a rather indirect fashion, it influences our actions. The central question raised by a discussion of these topics is whether or not all of the 2 roles played by the moral sense are mutually compatible. There can be no simple statement of the concept of the rroral sense as it is found in Hutcheson's philosophy, but its very complexity can often hide its more questionable aspects. Chapter four examines Hutcheson's concept of benevolence. Even though it is the moral sense which perceives right and wrong, it is benevolence which motivates all morally right actions. But if benevolence is to be viewed as motivating at all, Hutcheson must first refute those who maintain that all human action is actually motivated by self-love. To consider his remarks on this topic is to consider a small part of one of the main questions debated by eighteenth century philosophers. In chapter five, one of the most important aspects of Hutcheson's thought is considered, namely, the question of how the moral sense can influence an agent towards being more virtuous. If all virtuous actions are motivated by benevolence, and if the moral sense does not cause benevolent desires, then how can the knowledge of good and evil provided by the moral sense motivate virtuous action? Hutcheson has a most ingenious answer to this problem. It leads him into viewing the scope of all endeavours to be virtuous as being confined to an agent's own personality, (though Hutcheson himself did not realize the full implications of this until he was writing his later works). Chapter six deals with Hutcheson's debate with the
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