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The History of Modern Moral Philosophy

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The History of Modern Moral Philosophy Philosophy 172 The History of Modern Moral Philosophy I. Instructor: Chris Korsgaard 205 Emerson Hall Office Telephone: 617-495-3916 [email protected] Office Hours: Thursdays, 2:00-4:00, or by appointment II. Teaching Fellow: Douglas Blue: [email protected] III. Description: A study of the development of modern moral philosophy from its origins in the natural law theories of Hobbes and Pufendorf to the emergence of the two most influential theories of the modern period, utilitarianism and Kantianism, in the works of Bentham and Kant. Selections from the works of Hobbes, Clarke, Butler, Hutcheson, Hume, Smith, Price, and others. *Note: This course, when taken for a letter grade, meets the General Education requirement in Ethical Reasoning. IV. Scheduling Information: We will ordinarily meet for lecture on Mondays and Wednesdays from 12:00 until approximately 1:00. We will have at least two Friday lectures, during the first two weeks on September 7th and September 14. We may use the other Fridays for overflow lectures or for a section meeting. IV. Required Books: D. D. Raphael, ed., British Moralists 1650-1800 (2 volumes). Hackett, 1991. J. B. Schneewind, ed., Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant. Cambridge, 2003. V. Recommended Books: Stephen Darwall, The British Moralists and the Internal ‘Ought’: 1640-1740. Cambridge, 1995. Christine M. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge, 1996. J. B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy. Cambridge, 1998. Henry Sidgwick, Outlines of the History of Ethics for English Readers (1902). Hackett, 1988. VI. Link to the Coop: https://tinyurl.com/300-PHIL-172-F18 Philosophy 172: The History of Modern Moral Philosophy, p. 2 VI. Assignments and Grading Policies: Assignments: In order to pass the course you must attend the discussion section, participate in discussions, and complete all of the written work. (We will not average in failing grades for uncompleted work.) Written Work: There will be three 8-10 page papers, due on October 12, November 16, and December 12 (in Reading Period). Topics for the papers will be assigned, but you will have some choice among them; students wishing to write on a topic other than those assigned may do so with permission of their section leader. No extensions will be granted on the final paper. Extensions on the midterm papers must be requested before the dates on which they are due. Work that is late without an extension or beyond an extension will be discounted at the rate of one-third of a grade per day (A to A-, A- to B+, and so forth). If you receive a grade of B- or below on one of your papers for reasons other than lateness, it may be rewritten for a higher grade under the guidance of your section leader. Grade Assessment: The three pieces of written work will each count for approximately 30% of your grade. The other 10% will be based on your participation in section. Especially good work on any of the papers or in your section performance, or marked improvement in your written work will weigh in your favor. Statement on Collaboration: Discussion and the exchange of ideas are essential to all academic work; they are the heart and soul of philosophy. In this course you are encouraged to discuss all of the questions that arise, including those questions that you are invited to write about in your papers, with your classmates, your section leader, the professor, and anyone else you can manage to buttonhole. Thinking together is an essential part of what makes us human. But letting someone else do your thinking for you is a sacrifice of your humanity. So any written work that you submit for evaluation must be the result of your own thinking, writing, and research, and must reflect your own ideas about and approach to the topic. You must also adhere to standard citation practices in this discipline and properly cite any books, articles, websites, lectures, etc. that have helped you with your work. If you receive any help with your writing (feedback on drafts, etc.), you should also acknowledge this assistance. SCHEDULE OF READINGS AND ASSIGNMENTS: Approximate Topic Required Readings Recommended Readings Dates 9/5 Introduction 9/7 9/10 The Law of Nature Hugo Grotius (1583-1645): Richard Cumberland 9/12 Schneewind, pp. 88-110 (1631-1718): 9/14 Schneewind, pp. 138-155 Samuel Pufendorf (1632- 1688): Schneewind, pp. 156-182 Philosophy 172: The History of Modern Moral Philosophy, p. 3 9/14 Some Challenges to Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679): Benedict de Spinoza 9/17 Moral Theory Raphael I, pp. 1-20, 28-54, 57- (1632-1677): 9/19 60 Schneewind, pp. 237-255 9/24 Bernard Mandeville (1670- Korsgaard: 1733): The Sources of Normativity, Schneewind, pp. 388-398 §1.1.1 pp.7-10, §1.3.1- 1.3.4, pp. 21-27 Rene Descartes (1596-1650), “Replies to Objections”: Schneewind, pp. 233-235 9/26 The Rationalist Samuel Clarke (1675-1729): Ralph Cudworth (1617- 10/1 Response Raphael I, pp. 189-225 1688): Raphael I, pp. 10/3 102-119 William Wollaston (1659- 1724): Gottfried Wilhelm Raphael I, pp. 237-258 Leibniz (1646-1716): Schneewind, pp. 313-330 Christian Wolff (1679-1754): Schneewind, pp. 331-350 Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, §§1.4.1-1.4.5 pp. 28-40 Korsgaard, “Realism and Constructivism in Twentieth-Century Moral Philosophy,” Section 1, pp. 302-306 (course website) 10/3 The Sentimentalist Lord Shaftesbury (1671-1713): 10/10 Response Raphael I, pp. 167-188 10/15 10/17 Francis Hutcheson (1694- 10/22 1746): Raphael I, pp. 259-321 10/8 Columbus Day Holiday 10/12 FIRST PAPER DUE 10/22 An Eclectic Theory Joseph Butler (1692-1752): 10/24 Raphael I, pp. 323-386 10/29 10/31 10/31 Associationism and David Hume (1711-1776): John Gay (1699-1745): 11/5 the Moral Sense Schneewind, pp. 399-413. 11/7 Philosophy 172: The History of Modern Moral Philosophy, p. 4 11/12 A Treatise of Human Nature, David Hartley (1705- 11/14 Book I, Part I, §§I-IV; Book 1757): II, Part I, §XI Raphael II, pp. 113-127 (On the course web site) Korsgaard, The Sources of Raphael II, pp. 1-24; 47-58 Normativity, §§2.1.1-2.2.7, pp. 49-66 Korsgaard, “The General Point of View: Love and Moral Approval in Hume’s Ethics” “Natural Motives and the Motive of Duty: Hume and Kant on Our Duties to Others” Korsgaard, “The Normativity of Instrumental Reason,” Section 2, pp. 32-46 Korsgaard papers are on the course website. 11/16 SECOND PAPER DUE 11/19 Sentimentalism with Adam Smith (1723-1790): Thomas Reid (1710- 11/26 Obligation and Raphael II, pp. 199-254 1796): Raphael II, pp. 11/28 Rationalism with 263-310 Feeling Richard Price (1723-1791): Raphael II, pp. 129-198 John Balguy (1686-1748): Raphael I, pp. 387-408 Korsgaard, “Reflections on the Evolution of Morality,” Section 3, pp. 7-16; 11/21-25 Thanksgiving Holiday 12/3 The Birth of William Paley (1743-1805): Utilitarianism Schneewind, pp. 446-459 Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832): Raphael II, pp. 311-346; Schneewind, pp. 475-480 Philosophy 172: The History of Modern Moral Philosophy, p. 5 12/5 The Birth of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804): Kantianism Selection from “Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality” (1764) Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Section One (1785) Korsgaard, “Kant’s Analysis of Obligation: The Argument of Groundwork I” (All on the course website) 12/17 Final Paper Due: No extensions can be granted for the final paper. .
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